

Seminar in US Foreign Policy (USFP)

History of War & its Effects on USFP

Dave McCuan
Masaryk University
Fall 2009

This Week We Examine the Use & Utility of Force in USFP

- How does the President & Congress deal with problems of USFP like the growth and spread of terrorism?
- What is the role of public opinion (mass publics) here?
- What are strategies of US Force Projection & how does the US deal with problems of terrorism and hostile regimes?

On Terrorism, Current USFP Policy is

1) No Concessions

2) Bring Terrorists to Justice

A) Through Intel & Law Enforcement

B) Rewards

C) Military Tribunal

3) Isolate and Pressure States

A) Sanctions

B) Military

C) Domestic Restrictions

4) Support Allies Counter-terrorism

A) Training & Advisors

B) Law Enforcement Coop.

5) Prepare & Prevent Future Growth

- A) Intelligence
- B) Financial Efforts
- C) Cooperation with allies
- D) Missile Defense
- E) Domestic Preparation

Alternative Ideas, Additions

- 1) More Domestic Preparation
- 2) Better Intelligence
- 3) Stem Proliferation

Additions to Current Policy are
always on-going & developing

Macro Changes in Approach

1) Address Root Cause of Terrorism

A) Do not Negotiate BUT re-evaluate AFP, I.e. Adams, Do Not Search for Monsters

B) Deal with Political Issues Politically

2) The “Hard-line” Approach

- A) Assassinations
- B) Attack Groups and States
- C) Stronger Coalition
- D) Domestic Scrutiny
- E) Forced “Regime Change”

What is Regime Change?

Lots of definitions

Regime is Internal Political
Institutions

-- Not Leaders

Not Regime Change:

Clinton To Bush (2000)

Kim II Sung to Kim Jong II (1994)

Regime Change: Afghanistan
(2001)

Soviet Union/Russia (1991)

Iraq (2003)

Regime vs Leaders is key difference

Foreign Imposed Regime Change

Importance

- 1) Powerful FP tool
- 2) Influences Relations with other States
- 3) Increase in Real & Perceived Power – both real, soft & real, hard powers
- 4) Domestic Politics drivers

Long-Standing US Policy of Regime Changes

Past: 1) Cuba- 1899-1901

2) Mexico- 1914

3) USSR- 1918-1922

4) WE and Japan, Post WW2

5) Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam 60s and 70s

6) Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Frmr Yugoslavia 80s and 90s

7) Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)

Regime Change for Security

- Threats to US or US interests

In the past, not always democratic,
Current US policy emphasizes
democracy

- 1) Promote Democracy
- 2) Assist New Democracies
- 3) Aid Democracy Groups
- 4) Denounce non-democratic regimes

How & When These “Interests” are Threatened is not Defined.
US uses the following policies

- Name and Shame
- Aid Dissident Groups
- Economic & Political Pressures
(Sanctions)
- Force (These Two we are interested in)
- War (US seeks support but will act Unilaterally)

Benefits of Regime Change

- 1) Policy Changes
- 2) Remake International Relations

Drawbacks

- 1) Uncertainty
- 2) Costly
- 3) Imperialism?

Alternatives

1) Only Use Force Multilaterally

Advs: 1) Intl Support

2) Burden Sharing

3) Multilateralism

Problems 1) US Interests

2) Disproportionate
burden to control ratio

2) Use Assassinations

- Advs 1) Saves Lives
- 2) Allows Internal Change
- 3) Allows Rapid Policy Change

Problems

- 1) Instability
- 2) No Change
- 3) Not Legitimate
- 4) Hard to Do

3) No Forceable Regime Change

Advs 1) Respects Sovereignty

2) No direct loss of US life

3) Reduce Anti-American
Sentiment/ Increase
Legitimacy

4) US Does not need this

Problems of No Forced Change

- 1) Universality
- 2) Constant FP problems
- 3) Future Threats
- 4) Unintended Victims

Problem here – Decline of Interstate War & Rise of NSAs & Changes w/ Trans-national conflict


How does USFP deal with this?

Belligerent Behavior, “Belligerence”

“Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is an integral part of God’s ordering of the universe. In war, man’s noblest virtues come into play: courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and a readiness for sacrifice that does not stop short of offering up life itself. Without war the world would become swamped in materialism.”

-Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke [1880]

Decline of Interstate War: 1948-2003



Obsolescence of War Arguments

- Most wars now result in the restoration of the status quo ante
- Due to nationalism democratization, new territory is difficult to control politically
- International system has delegitimated aggressive war
- Economic well-being is only loosely linked to the control of population and territory; trading is less risky than fighting
- Nuclear weapons make war between the major powers too destructive
- Globalization of military technology makes intervention by major powers anywhere in the world increasingly risky
- Violent conflict increasingly involves sub-national and unconventional forces rather than regular, national forces

Recent Wars, 1980s

| Attacker | Target | Outcome |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Libya | Chad | Status quo |
| Israel | PLO/Lebanon | PLO removed; status quo |
| Syria | Lebanon | Syria achieves control after civil war |
| Argentina | Great Britain (Falkland/Malvinas) | Status quo |
| USSR | Afghanistan | Status quo |
| Iraq | Iran | Status quo |
| USA | Libya | Status quo |
| Ethiopia | Eritrea | Eritrean forces win in 1991 |
| South Africa | Angola | Status quo |
| South Africa | Namibia | Namibia achieves independence with UN mediation |
| Vietnam | Cambodia | Vietnam withdraws; UN mediation |
| USA | Grenada | USA achieves control after coup |
| Morocco | Spanish Sahara | Morocco annexes territory |

2010 US Defense Budget (in billions, USD)

- Core functions:
 - Dept of Defense base: \$533.7
 - Supplement for Iraq, Afghanistan: \$130
 - Intelligence (estimate): \$40 [includes some DoD funds]
 - Total: \$703.7
- Also sometimes included by some analysts:
 - Veteran's Affairs: \$51.7
 - Interest on debt: 4% on \$14,078: \$563
 - 20% of this: \$112
- Approximate world military expenditures: \$1,339 (SIPRI estimate for 2008)

Patterns of US military expenditures

BUDGET ►

After years of decline following the cold war, the defense budget rose with the war on terrorism. But after a short boost for the war in Iraq, the Army is once again getting the smallest share of Pentagon funds



Percentage of defense budget going to service branches



Problems in US military recruitment

RECRUITING ►

The Army has been lowering standards to meet enlistment goals, taking on more dropouts and even convicted felons. Recruiters face a bigger challenge as they try to permanently add 65,000 troops



Waivers of enlistment standards



"Operational Bombing Doctrine" Evolution & Force – Merging USFP & Defense Policy

1. Locate everything using satellite reconnaissance and remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs).
2. Suppress air defenses using specialized weapons, including F-22
3. Destroy high-value fixed military targets such as defense ministry infrastructure, airfield control towers, fuel and ammunition depots, and communications facilities using cruise missiles and long-range bombers (B-2, B-52)
4. Destroy mobile capital intensive equipment -- tanks and aircraft -- using fighter-bombers with laser-guided munitions targeted by special forces and RPVs.
5. Allow local forces to defeat opponent on the ground.
Examples: Iraq (partially), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan

Advantages of Operational Bombing

1. Appears to be effective, “It has worked so far.”
2. Produces very, very few US casualties
3. Civilian casualties are limited compared to the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII, Vietnam
4. Only the US has this capability

Disadvantages of Operational Bombing

1. It does not result in US control on the ground -- essentially it creates a military power vacuum that brings in the second-strongest force in the area, whoever that happens to be. If you don't like that second-strongest force (e.g. in Iraq 1991 and 2003, an independent Kurdistan in the north and a Shi'a state allied with Iran in the south), the approach is not effective.
2. Only works against a conventional military force that has fixed, capital-intensive assets. For example, this would not work against drug cartels or an urban terrorist cell (e.g. al-Qaeda).
3. Near-zero US casualties makes this very attractive to civilian leadership. This may make it more likely that the US will abandon an operation if there are sudden, conspicuous casualties, as happened in Lebanon and Somalia.
4. By re-writing the rules of the game, it makes most of the US military—notably the parts designed to kill Russians in Germany—irrelevant. E.g. situation of British navy in 1890.
5. System substantially damages civilian infrastructure—electricity, roads and bridges, communication—which makes a subsequent occupation more difficult, weakens the new government, and increases the costs of repairs.

Lessons Learned From Recent US Military Engagements: pre-Iraq

1. Tanks are not necessarily a dominant weapon -- they are too slow to deploy, too easy to target, and can't operate many places we need them. This mostly applies to helicopters as well.
2. Existing equipment already gives the US air superiority -- there is no [military] need for the Joint Strike Fighter.
3. Long-range bombers are still very important. The B-52 is the equivalent of the British ship-of-the-line, which might last a century or more.
4. It is very unlikely that we will deploy large numbers of troops. Mobile, well-trained, specialized forces are more important. The size of the military could probably be reduced substantially with no loss of US effectiveness.
5. High technology weapons that are essentially robotic are very important.

Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq”

1. “Do not try to do too much with your own hands.”
2. Act quickly, because every army of liberation has a half-life before it becomes an army of occupation.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.



Source: *MILITARY REVIEW* 86,1:1-12 (January-February 2006)

Lessons learned from Iraq [so far...]


1. The US still does not face any peer competitors, consequently almost all warfare is asymmetric
2. Stability operations are equal in importance to combat operations
3. Stabilization of a potentially-hostile population takes a force to population ratio of somewhere between 1:20 and 1:50. This very substantially limits even the US, particularly once training and refitting is taken into consideration.
4. The diffusion of effective small-scale weapons that can significantly impact military operations appears to be increasing and is continuously being adapted
5. There has been a very substantial privatization of military roles in Iraq: we are nearing a situation where something approaching mercenaries are once again a factor in warfare.

Would you add others here that are “political” and merge the militaristic aspect of conflict with that of the political process?

The “Spectrum” of Political Violence



Contemporary Political Violence



Westphalian-Clausewitzian Worldview

“Realism”


Contemporary PV, cont'd

Somalia 1991-1995

Yugoslavia 1994-1999

Afghanistan 2001-2004; Current?

Liberia 1991-2004



Westphalian-Clausewitzian Worldview


Contemporary PV, cont'd

Palestine 1936-
2004; Current?

Kashmir 1948-
2004


Southern Lebanon 1985-
2001

Chechnya 1993-
2004; Current?



Westphalian-Clausewitzian
Worldview

Contemporary PV, cont'd



Westphalian-Clausewitzian
Worldview


Contemporary PV, cont'd

India 1945-2004

Rwanda 1994

Lebanon 1976-
1985


Yugoslavia 1991-
1995



Westphalian-Clausewitzian
Worldview

Contemporary PV, cont'd

Zaire/D.R. Congo 1997-
2002



Westphalian-Clausewitzian Worldview


Why the Shift to Non-State Conflict as a Challenge for USFP?

- Global market for light weapons financed by global trade in resources such as timber, diamonds, and narcotics
- Decline in major power war due to
 - Democratic peace
 - Liberal peace
 - “Hollandization”—substitution of trade and finance for military activities
- “Hourglass effect”—increase in power of international and local institutions at the expense of centralized government
- Non-state conflict existed all along but was ignored in the Westphalian-Clausewitzian worldview

Traditional Typologies of Violence: Structural

- **Low-intensity conflict**
 - Conflict involving actors with a low level of political organization such as terrorists, warlords, and peasant revolts.
- **Civil War/Revolution**
 - Conflict contesting the control (or establishment) of a state from within.
- **Interstate War**
 - WCR conflict between two or more states.
- **Systemic war**
 - Wide-spread conflict involving most of the states within an international subsystem such as the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II.

Alternative: Organizational-Behavioral Typology



Material Explanations

- “Follow the money”
 - Somali warlord: “We decided we couldn’t afford to spend \$100,000 on a six-hour firefight”
- Coercive efficiency: how many individuals can be supported by the efforts of one armed individual?
 - This must be substantially greater than 1 to support a professional military
- Too much fighting and not enough farming means everyone starves
 - Both DNA and linguistic evidence seem to support the hypothesis that until recently—perhaps the past 3000 years—population expansion primarily followed agricultural innovation rather than conquest.
- Weakness of the material approach:
Societies in similar material-economic circumstances can behave quite differently with respect to violence

Constructivist Considerations

- Ideas matter: individuals will engage in violence for non-material gains such as status, honor, religion, or revenge
 - To say nothing of gaining status by revenging the honor of religion...
- Due to the risks inherent in violence, non-material motivations may be at least as important as material for the individuals engaged in the activity
 - Never share a foxhole with a rational utility maximizer. Share a foxhole with a romantic hero.
- Weakness of the constructivist approach:
"Hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good blaster at your side, kid."
Han Solo, *Star Wars*, Episode IV.

Primitive Mode: Characteristics

- Violence is generally ritualized and seasonal
- Lethality is *usually* relatively low
 - However, in some instances it *may* be quite high and may serve to control population
- Rewards are generally status rather than economic
 - Some rewards may occur from raiding
 - Territory may be defended but generally is not acquired
- Violence is done by amateurs, usually young males
 - (who are biologically expendable)
 - Cross-cultural mortality curves from homicide are almost identical in shape but differ in scale: Japanese kill each other at 1/10th the rate of Americans, but do so with the same age profile

Primitive Mode: Examples

- Pre-urban tribal warfare
- Contemporary street gangs
 - (to the extent that they are transient rather than professional)
- Ethnic violence
 - Automatic weapons and other methods of efficient mass killing may have changed this in recent decades

Warlord Mode: Characteristics

- De facto long-term control of a defined territory, plus the possibility of acquiring further territory
- Full-time professionals in the use of violence
- Hierarchical social structure, usually with a personalist leadership
- Questionable political legitimacy—systems usually co-exist (and can economically exploit) more organized systems
- Warlord systems are *stable!*—in fact they are probably the fundamental unit of political violence
 - Most warlords don't want to become governments, though they may be willing to be designated as one if you ask politely and this doesn't involve very much additional work...

Warlord Mode: Examples

- Nomadic raiders
 - Economic base: the raided
- Western Europe, 400 - 1500 CE
 - Economic base: manorial agriculture
- Military warlords
 - Economic base: anybody in the vicinity weaker than they are
- Economic warlords
 - Economic base: narcotics, smuggling (this requires co-existence with a state structure to make these activities illegal and therefore lucrative)
- Organized crime
 - Economic base: Typically gambling, prostitution, kidnapping and protection rackets. Occurs within a sovereign state.

Sovereign Mode: Characteristics

- Territorial with an established legal-bureaucratic state structure which has some legitimated means of extracting revenue
 - Legitimacy greatly increases coercive efficiency
- Professional military focusing on
 - Internal control—monopoly on the use of violence which promotes economic stability (Tilly, McNeill, Olson)
 - External security
- Hollandization (Mueller): state does not engage in military expansion but instead concentrates on becoming fabulously wealthy
 - Military activity is limited by the Westphalian compromise with the economic elite: they support the military in the expectation that this will provide economic benefits

Sovereign Mode: Examples

- Classical city-states
 - When they weren't realist.
- 18th century: Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland
- Post-WWII: “Old Europe”, Japan
- 21st century: Russia
- 21st century: China??—let's hope...

Balance of Power: Characteristics

- Military control (or political legitimacy) is sufficiently strong to be able to extract significant economic resources
- Political elites behave according to realist/balance-of-power principles
- Note that in many—historically most—cases, these states are actually hegemonic, though they typically view themselves as struggling to survive

Balance of Power: Examples

- Classical empires—Assyria, Egypt, China, Persia, Rome, Byzantium, Ottoman, etc.
 - Imperial conquest provided an autonomous resource base for the military
 - Isolation allowed some of these to operate in a Westphalian mode at times
- Napoleon/France and Bismarck/Prussia
- Late industrial states—Britain, France, Japan, USA, Germany
 - Proximate cause: mass production, population growth and the mechanization of agriculture dramatically reduced the real cost of military power
- 21st century USA?—position as sole superpower

Transnational: Characteristics

- Military operations that are not primarily for the benefit of a territorial political entity
 - These would be distinct from conventional military alliances, which are simply realist policy tools

Transnational: Examples

- International peacekeeping operations
- Transnational terrorist groups
- Multinational corporations to the extent that these exercise autonomous military power
 - Most do not but, for example, the Dutch East Indies Company, the United Fruit Company, and most everything Cecil Rhodes was involved in did
- Transnational religious military organizations
 - Crusades (well, at least that was the theory...), Knights Templars
 - Islamic Caliphate (again, in theory)
- *Clash of Civilizations*, the Huntington thesis
 - if this actually exists or is it measurable, it probably fits here