

Weeks 3, 4

Who Are the Terrorists? And, Is  
Radicalization a “New”  
Phenomena?

Placing Recent Terrorists & Terror-  
Related Events into the Context of  
US Nat’ Security Policymaking

US National Security Policy

Fall 2009

Masaryk University

Dave McCuan

# How Do we Define Terrorism?

- Using Hoffman (1998, 2006) & the consensus of most academic researchers on Terror, we arrive at this definition:
  - “ ... anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets (Hoffman, 2006:41).
  - Victims of violence chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)... serve as message generators (Hoffman, 2006:41).
  - Communication processes between terrorist, victims, and main targets... manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid, 1988).


# Let's Continue Thinking About Placing "Terrorism" Into Further Context

Does 9/11 signal the "Dawn of a New Era" of terror?

1. Reasons For: New type of "Asymmetrical warfare;"
2. New groups, new strategies, & new tactics adopted by terror organizations;
3. Post-Cold War period characterized with the rise of statelessness, & state failure.
4. Reasons Against: Historical periodization;
5. Antiquity;
6. Roman Era;
7. French Revolution;
8. The modern era & escalations in conflict.

**\*What has happened since 9/11 that also may signal the  
"Dawn of a New Era?"**

# A Change in Our Understanding of Others?






# A Change in Our Understanding of Others?

## Detainees Moved to Guantánamo

President Bush announced that 14 prominent detainees had been moved to the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He cited several instances where information obtained by C.I.A. interrogation had led to the capture of others.

### Mentioned by name in President Bush's speech



Sources: White House; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; news reports

### Others who were moved

**Abu Faraj al-Libbi**  
 May 2005, Pakistan  
 A Libyan subordinate of Osama bin Laden and general manager of Al Qaeda. Point of contact between Mr. bin Laden and top Qaeda managers.

**Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani**  
 July 2004, Pakistan  
 A Tanzanian who helped run Al Qaeda's document forgery office in Afghanistan. Former cook for Mr. bin Laden.

**Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi**  
 March 2003, Pakistan  
 A Saudi financial and travel planner for Al Qaeda who, with Mr. bin al-Shibh, was a communications link between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and the Sept. 11 hijackers.

**Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri**  
 Nov. 2002, unknown  
 Saudi national and Qaeda operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula. Sentenced to death in absentia by a Yemeni court for planning and organizing the bombing of the destroyer Cole.

**Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali**  
 April 2003, Pakistan  
 Cousin of Ramzi Yousef, who was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and nephew of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Assisted his uncle with various plots, including the Sept. 11 attacks and Richard Reid's attempted shoe bombing.

**Lillie**  
 Aug. 2003, Thailand  
 Malaysian-born member of Jemaah Islamiya and Al Qaeda. Trained in Afghanistan and served as a lieutenant to Hambali.

**Walid Ba'Attash**  
 April 2003, Pakistan  
 Former bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. Assisted with the planning of the Cole bombing and helped Mr. bin Laden select operatives for the Sept. 11 attacks.

**Gouled Hassan Dourad**  
 Before 2004  
 Head of al-Ittihad al-Islami, a group that helped support members of Al Qaeda in Somalia.

The New York Times

# A “New Era” with “Old Rules?”





# Around an Area of Traditional Focus for Western Policymakers



# With New Challenges Into the Mix





# World Order: The Promise of Past Conflicts

- Peace of Westphalia
  - Territorial Integrity
  - Political Independence
  - Equality in Law & Recognition of the Rule of Law
  - Inherent Right of Self-defense
- World War I: “Sue for Peace”
- World War II: Stretch of war across a newly created “middle class”
- United Nations: Democratic visibility; smaller world; diversity of nations, numbering between 150 & approaching 200

# Significance of the End of Cold War

- Loosed tensions originally confined by a bi-polar world
- Weak states foster crime and conflict
  - *All conflict becomes a breeding ground for corruption, organized and transnational crime, and terrorism*
    - *Balkans, Iraq, former Soviet client states, African conflict areas*
- The Fall of the Wall added to tensions:
  - Created additional space for OC which became increasing transnational
  - Privatization permitted corruption
  - Started the trend toward open borders
  - Opened door to tensions b/t Geneva Convention (GC) and the LOAC

# Today's Threats are Transnational

- From 1648 until Post WWII, threats to security were defined by borders
- Aggressor states no longer the primary cause of transnational problems
- Threats exist in weakened states
- Gives rise to our distinction today between:
  - State-supported/sponsored terrorism; and
  - State-sanctioned terrorism

# Add'l Contemporary Threats

- International Terrorism
- “Official” Corruption
- Environment
- Natural Disaster
- WMD/Proliferation
- Genocide
- Inter-State Conflict
- Espionage
- Economic Espionage
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Supply Chain
- Front Companies
- Cyber Threats
  - Virtual Reality;
  - Uncertain Violent Impact



# Thoughts on $\Delta$ in Conflict & Terrorism to This Point for US Nat'l Security Policymaking

**“...warfare seeks to conquer territories and capture cities;**

**...terrorism seeks to hurt a few people and to scare a lot of people in order to make a point”**

*NY Times, 1/6/2000*



“Putting the horror in the minds of the audience, and not necessarily on the screen”



*Fear always springs from ignorance.*

*Emerson, 1837*

# Early History of Terrorism

Terror long has been used to achieve political ends and has a long history

As early as 66 – 72 A.D., resisting Roman occupation, terrorists killed Roman soldiers and destroyed Roman property.

Terror was used to resist occupation.

# Early History of Terrorism

Suicidal martyrdom represented being killed by invaders which resulted in rewards in heaven. It dates back thousands of years in most societies and religions.

*Terrorism* against the enemy is often viewed as a *religious act*.



# Modern History of Terrorism

*The term “terrorism” was coined in the French Revolution’s *Reign of Terror* (1793 – 1794). .*

*This was the birth of Government-Sponsored Terrorism*

*The line between terrorism and political violence is often blurred*


Goal: of State terrorism was to eliminate opposition, consolidate power, e.g., the Vanished in Argentina

# Modern History of Terrorism

**Anarchists** were seen in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century

## Individual terrorism

The use of selective terror against an individual in order to bring down a government, e.g. Lincoln assassination



**Propaganda by deeds** ...terrorists acts

Terrorism became tool of communication, propaganda

# Modern History of Terrorism:

Middle 20<sup>th</sup> century, terrorism became a tool used by both sides of colonial conflicts.

The last 20 years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century religious based terrorism became more and more frequent.

Another format is economic terrorism, which destructs industry and agriculture system.

# Modern History, cont'd

Terrorism is Asymmetric Warfare (AS):

Asymmetric Warfare (AS) is the use of apparently random/unpredictable violence by an weak military against a stronger military to gain advantage. (Allen, 1997).

The key of AW is using unexpected, unconventional tactics in combat (Craig, 1998).



# Our Terrorism Conclusions: One Month In

Terrorism is an *ancient* tactic.

Terrorism is a mode of *communication*.

Terrorism is a special type of violence and *Asymmetrical warfare*.

Terrorism is *used in times of peace, conflicts and war*.

Terrorism is designed to make a point, through socio-psychological & media covered means in order to incite *fear*.

Terrorism is a *political act*.

Terrorism is designed to be promulgated *rationally*.

# Why did Terrorism Draw Considerable Attention in 2001?

The risk of dying from terrorism was extremely low in 1990s, and was still relatively low compared with some diseases in 2001

But the death rate increased by 500 times in 2001 due to Sept. 11

Overall the death rate of terrorism has not been high

Despite the low risk, shock, surprise and fear engulfed the United States and world


# Part II

Placing Terrorism & Political  
Violence Into Context:  
How Terrorism is Rational

## Introduction, Part II

- Is there a common structure of modern warfare that remains more or less constant across diverse wars that affects national security?
- Aside from the inherent interest of this question, the answer can have important implications for the practical conduct of war, including Counter-Terror (CT) response strategies by policymakers, policy planners, and students of IR and of US politics.
- What is the relationship between terrorism and modern warfare?
- The distinction between the two is often blurred, e.g., in the concept of the “war on global terrorism”. But there does appear to be a real relationship there and knowledge of its nature will be very welcome.

# Introduction, Part II



- There are remarkable regularities and similarities in the size distribution of violent events in Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland
- Even in minor (?) or “unknown” conflicts, we have similar results, with interesting variation. Take the cases of Casamance (Southern Senegal, former Portuguese colonial area, near Gambia, subject to a separatist movement for the independence of the Casamance & the ethnic group of the Jola through the insurgency efforts of the “**Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance**”), and global terrorism in general, or the US Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War.
- We can understand the findings for modern wars in terms of a model of the coalescence and fragmentation of insurgent groups.
- One can learn about the nature of an insurgency from studying the size distribution of casualties that it throws up.

## Introduction, Part II

- Hammes (2004) argues that typical wars these days are irregular, guerrilla, or terrorist-type affairs. Pentagon planners are trapped in a time warp, preparing for increasingly irrelevant conventional wars in his view.
- Lind et. al. (1989) wrote earlier of “Fourth Generation War” (4GW) marked by greater battlefield dispersion, importance of small, manoeuvrable groups, diminished need for centralized logistics, blurred distinctions between military and civilian targets, parallels with terrorism and emphasis on breaking the will of the enemy.
- A key idea here is that there are important commonalities that apply across a range of modern wars.

## Thinking About “Generations of Warfare”

War & large-scale conflict has emerged in a systematic manner & can be placed into stages or generations.

Modern war begins with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in which European states claim a monopoly on waging war.

- A. **First Generation War (1GW)** - War of the organized line and column; in use from 1648 to 1860.
- B. **Second Generation War (2GW)** - Attrition warfare characterized by massive firepower and extensive casualties. Prototype is World War One; in use from 1860 to present. Militaries are vast, bureaucratic and slow-moving.
- C. **Third Generation War (3GW)** - Maneuver warfare, best characterized by the German World War Two *Blitzkrieg*. Used from 1940 to present. Rapid and mobile warfare that inflicts psychological as well as physical damage.
- D. **Fourth Generation War (4GW)** - Irregular warfare. Also called asymmetric war, guerilla war, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, etc. Often waged by non-state entities such as tribes, clans, families, criminal organizations, religious groups, ethnic/racial groups and related. In use currently, date of creation ?



## Putting the Puzzle Together, Part A

- How thinkers have conceptualized “war” & “conflict:”
  - A. Sun Tzu (~400 B.C.) - Know yourself and your enemy; use deception and subversion to be enigmatic to your enemy. Shape his perceptions and manipulate him. Employ the expected and unexpected. Strive to defeat your enemy *before* fighting him.
  - B. Karl von Clausewitz ("On War" ~1832) - Obstacles to employing military force: *friction, uncertainty, and inflexibility*.
    1. Friction - errors and miscues which affect all armies.
    2. Uncertainty - What are your forces doing; what are those of the enemy doing?
    3. Inflexibility - the larger the force, the more inflexible it is; large formations have fire power but are difficult to move.
  - C. Pentagon Thinkers, Cold War Era: Von Clausewitz devoted effort to reducing these effects on his forces, but not on multiplying them in the enemy as Sun Tzu recommends.

## Putting the Puzzle Together, Part B

- Revolutionary Socialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (mid-1800s):
  - A. Corrupt capitalist societies of 1800s: privileged elites exploit the masses; such societies can be toppled from within.
  - B. Misery of masses and unwillingness of elites to address it will lead to a precipitating event - or *crisis* - which enables the revolutionary *vanguard* to lead the masses to destruction of the old state and creation of the new.
  - C. Boyd: *Crises* and *Vanguards* are the 'golden keys' to unlocking the power of insurgency, guerilla war and revolution.
  - D. Mao Zedong unites revolutionary socialism, guerilla warfare methods, conventional war and Sun Tzu into a powerful new form of guerilla warfare. Wins Chinese Civil War and drives Nationalist forces out of mainland China.

## Putting the Puzzle Together, Part C

Historical practitioners of guerilla warfare: T.E. Lawrence *Lawrence of Arabia*, Allied Resistance Movements of WW2, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh & Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam. Lawrence, in *The Twelve Pillars of Wisdom*, writes of guerilla war:

- Guerillas must operate among the people and hide among them
- He is inconspicuous, and does not afford his enemy a clear target; he is "everywhere and nowhere."
- The guerilla movement should possess a sanctuary in which to train, refit and plan operations.
- The guerilla engages the enemy at the time and place of his choosing. When the enemy is strong, retreat; when he is weak, attack.
- The guerilla can win if he outlasts a foreign invader; he is in his own country and the enemy must eventually return to his homeland.
- The guerilla does not have to win militarily; he has only to convince his opponent to abandon the fight.
- Conventional forces and guerillas can be used together in the open when both are strong enough and have the advantage.

## Fourth Generation Warfare – Post-Vietnam Thinking, in Pentagonese

How could the U.S. be perceived as losing the war in Vietnam despite overwhelming military superiority?

Was it all politics back home?

We know previous contributions: T.E. Lawrence, Chairman Mao, General Giap and the others had shown him the answers. In Vietnam, America had been beaten by a sophisticated 4GW opponent, and not merely a bunch of simple peasant guerillas.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had operated inside the American psyche using this knowledge to “out-spirit,” according to these Pentagon thinkers, our war efforts at the moral-mental-physical levels, thereby defeating us. Moreover, they concluded:

- Western militaries focus on the strategic-operational-tactical levels of war.
- There is a “New Trinity:” people-ideas-technology, and he believed wars are fought, in order of importance, at the moral-mental-physical levels.
- Their conclusions: "Machines don't fight wars - people do. And they use their minds."
- Most western armies are focused on "breaking things and killing people," the physical side of war. This is exactly opposite of what should be emphasized - the moral, then the mental, and then the physical.

## Application of this Learning to The Long War, the GWOT, & Terrorism, Part D

- Why is Fourth-Generation War so difficult to understand and defeat?

“At the heart of this phenomenon, Fourth Generation war, is not a military but a political, social and moral revolution: a crisis of legitimacy of the state. All over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs, ideologies and so on. Many people who will no longer fight for their state will fight for their new primary loyalty.”


- William Lind -

- Military force alone is incapable of restoring legitimacy to a state, so there can be no purely military solution to the problem of 4GW.
- The central paradoxes of 4GW: What works at the strategic or tactical level often fails at the moral level. Moreover, weakness is actually strength much of the time in 4GW.
- Appropriate analogy of 4GW: "David vs. Goliath"

# Terrorism as a Tactic: Rationality in Action


- Previous work by Clauset and Young (2005) has used the MIPT database (now START database) and found “power laws” in terrorism.
- This research found coefficients of 1.7 for G7 targets and 2.5 for non-G7 targets.
- Recently, scholars used the ITERATE database & sifting through the records of major international terrorist attacks, 1968-2004, finding similar results.
- Thus, non-G7 terrorism looks much like a new war and G7 terrorism looks much like an old war.

## Log-Log plots of 1 – the Cumulative Distribution Function for Severity of Events for non G7 Terrorism







## Log-Log plots of 1 – the Cumulative Distribution Function for Severity of Events for G7 Terrorism



# Log-Log plots of 1 – the Theoretical Cumulative Distribution Function for Severity of Events for old wars, new wars and terrorism



# Log-Log plots of 1 – the Theoretical Cumulative Distribution Function for Severity of Events for old wars and new wars (without Iterate)



# Part III


Where does this leave us?

How are we to conceptualize this moment in history and the importance of terrorism/political violence in this era?

An Introduction To  
Asymmetric Warfare (AW), 4<sup>th</sup> Generation  
Warfare (4GW), and the 5<sup>th</sup> Wave of Violence

Credits needed here.

# Asymmetric Warfare (AW)



Sources:

<http://www.picsearch.com>

[http://www.cs.cas.cz/hakl/Art\\_Galery/Caravaggio\\_Michelangelo,\\_1573-1610](http://www.cs.cas.cz/hakl/Art_Galery/Caravaggio_Michelangelo,_1573-1610)

# Asymmetric Warfare (AW)

- What is it? Traditional examples:
  - David and Goliath warfare
    - Unsophisticated vs the sophisticated (technologically)
    - Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities
    - Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan)
  - Often state sponsored/supported
  - Attacking opponent via indirect means such as
    - Terrorism
    - Critical infrastructure attacks
    - Avoids combat w/ conventional forces
    - Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case
    - Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.
    - Examples? Vietnam, Hannibal, A-bomb, *War & Peace* tactics (Tolstoy), computer hackers, deception tactics (i.e. Serb/Iraqi decoys against coalition aircraft); use of children, non-traditional combatants as soldiers.

# Asymmetric Warfare (AW)

- Why is it used by actors against “superior” forces?
  - Exploits over-reliance on technology
  - Attacks “superiority” belief that homeland is an open society & belief that the US is impervious to a foreign attack. “Complacency kills”
  - Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything
  - Used to exploit greed or selfishness; legal & illegal businesses turning the blind eye to activities that could harm the security of the US i.e., immigrant smuggling, drug dealing, money laundering, illegal selling of technologies and equipment.
  - Uneducated advisors to senior government officials, or the officials themselves, who deploy forces w/out long-term considerations.
  - Superior Nation’s forces deployed for perceived “quick fix” ops forces become isolated from the local populace over a period of time, eventually becoming a soft target because of the force being perceived as an occupation force vice a helping hand. Examples: US forces in Vietnam; Somalia; Soviet forces in Afghanistan; potential exists for forces stretched out all over the current Balkans region i.e. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.



# 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)

- Formless and most deadly kind of war
- 4GW ops are intelligence driven (i.e. WTC attack; China's hacker attacks on US.) Countering the threat requires an intensive intelligence effort to drive counter-4GW ops.
- Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness
- Distinguishing a combatant from a non-combatant can be extremely difficult (i.e. use of mosques or churches to plan terrorist attacks - Levant/Asia; refugees/displaced persons infiltrated w/ agent provocateurs - Balkans; exploitation of fragmented cultures w/in a country for purposes of breaking down a society - al-Qa'ida vs US; exploitation of rules of engagement as in Somalia.)

# 4GW – Pentagon Thinking

“Fourth generation war will require much more intelligence gathering, analysis, and a greater dissemination capability to serve a highly flexible, interagency command system. At the same time, the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means our forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects as well ... therefore, it will be essential for leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they are about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever”.

-Col T.X. Hammes, USMC, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," (see <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm>)

# 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)

- What is it?
  - Stateless, or can be state, supported warfare w/ possible interstate spillover
  - Hides behind religion/ideologies
- Examples? WTC; anthrax attacks; EMP/FRY weaponry; US vs. Iraq
- Why dangerous?
  - Current us forces designed to fight against a nation state
  - Our over-reliance on technology
  - War and transnational crime intertwined - hard to see enemy (gangs, mercenaries, narco-traffickers, religious extremists, rogue states, and mafias)
  - Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone

# Sources Of AW & 4GW Conflict

- Lack of resources
  - Growing population (4 billion early 70s; now 6 billion)
  - Lack of water
  - Lack of arable land
  - Lack of food
  - Lack of land
  - Lack of minerals
  - Information/technology i.e. China
    - Examples of all the above Israel, Syria, Jordan, Haiti, Africa and Afghanistan. Haves and have-nots
  - Especially multi-ethnic areas i.e. Liberia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and Somalia.
  - Nepotism - clans taking care of their own

# Sources Of AW And 4GW Conflict (Cont'd)

- Major trends
  - Fragmentation - large nation breaking down into smaller states.
  - Integration - global networking in terms of international commerce, communications, and production of goods. “Blurred distinction of war and peace”
    - I.e. WTC, anthrax attack.
  - “Technology’s role - The technologies which support globalization of commerce are recognized and exploited by 4GW actors.
    - WWW and global financial networks have established “lines of communication” (LOC) for export of western culture and free markets.
    - 4GW actors with a little funding can use these LOCs as avenues of advance/attack.
    - Exploitation of websites that contain sensitive unclassified information; and
    - Exploitation of websites that contain classified information, but posted on the Internet because of a strong belief in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA.)

# Tactics Of AW / 4GW

- Ethnic cleansing
- Human shields
- Attacking C4I networks
- Exploitation of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) / Laws of War, Laws of Armed Conflict (LOW / LOAC)
- Exploitation of US laws/US Constitution and presence of vague laws to fight the GWOT, i.e. John Walker Lindh & Jose Padilla & the presses abused right to freedom of speech
- World Trade Center
- Employment of WMD
- Exploitation of humanitarian relief orgs i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc...
- Flooding refugees into neighboring countries (regional instability)

# Objectives Of AW / 4GW

- “Objectives of 4GW - varies, but includes: ideological objectives (i.e. Islam, neo-Nazis) and destabilizing states by force for gain (i.e. drug cartels)” — Major Chris Yunker, USMC, Joint Staff
  - Can be revolutionary (complete overthrow or breakdown of a government)
  - Can be sub-revolutionary (changing portions of a government to suit the groups objectives)
- Political objectives (IRA)
- Cultural/ethnic objectives (Kosovo)



# Modern Terrorism: “The Four Waves” Thesis

- Put forward by Rapoport (*Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, 2004) who argues that:
  - Key catalyzing events signal a shift, uptick in terror behavior & orientations;
  - Terror activity, thus, has had historic ebbs and flows, as part of a broader “ocean” of movements signaling a struggle among independence movements, calls for colonial ties to end, etc.;
  - The level of activity for insurgent & guerrilla efforts mark this rise and fall of activity;
  - International in scope in terms of trend activities.

# Modern Terrorism: “The Fifth Wave, New Tribalism” Thesis

- Argument here is that:
  - Many movements do not fit Rapoport’s “wave” thesis;
  - There is, recently, a “new tribalism” movement where common calls and bonds, across insurgent actors, delineates how groups have allied & partner against a common enemy.
  - Recognizes a disillusionment with prevailing int’l orgs. & support networks, including NGOs.
  - Radicalization is the norm, & this norm is local, intense, and seeks in one generation, broad change in the nature of relations among nation-states & NSAs.
  - See Jeffrey Kaplan (2007), “The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism” in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19:545-570, 2007.

# Still More Terror Research Outlets on the Web

