A Linguistic Phenomenology of Ways of Knowing and Its Implications for Psychotherapy Research and Psychotherapy Integration

Robert Elliott
University of Strathclyde

In this article, I use the linguistic methods of Lakoff and Johnson (1999) to deconstruct the underlying conceptual structure and metaphors for three key verbs of Knowing, in order to answer three central methodological questions: First, is Description possible? Yes, in the sense of writing things down carefully but fallibly, while trying to avoid the danger of confusing permanence with truth. Second, is Interpretation inevitable? Yes, in the sense of Translating between an audience and a text, but not in the sense Making Something Easier to See or Constructing a Model (these are desirable but not inevitable). Third, are Explaining and Understanding fundamentally different ways of Knowing? Yes, they differ in structure (mediated vs. direct knowledge), direction (toward general simplicity vs. unique complexity), and effect (constructing a conceptual model vs. creating a relationship). Consistent with the goals of the psychotherapy integration movement, I conclude that Describing, Explaining, and Understanding are each essential to psychotherapy and psychotherapy research.

Keywords: epistemology, linguistic phenomenology, psychotherapy, psychotherapy research, psychotherapy integration

In his near-future science fiction eco-thriller, *Antarctica*, Kim Stanley Robinson (1998) has the scientist radical Carlos summarize an influential, but fictional, Chilean book on ethics and the philosophy of science:

> Science is self-organizing and self-actualizing, and always trying to get better, to be more scientific, as one of its rules. Various features of normal scientific practice, the methodology and so on, are in fact ethical positions. Things like reproducibility, or Occam's razor, or peer review—almost everything in science that makes it specifically scientific, the authors show, is utopian. . . [But] what I have been saying to you is the utopian description of the situation. In reality, there are a great number of

Robert Elliott, Counselling Unit, University of Strathclyde.
I thank David Rennie for his contributions to the planning of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert Elliott, Counselling Unit, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G113 1PP. E-mail: fac0029@gmail.com

Journal of Psychotherapy Integration
2008, Vol. 18, No. 1, 40–65
Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
1053-0479/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1053-0479.18.1.40

> scientists who are not interested in the reasons they do what they do. This makes them bad scientists in that way. (pp. 272–273)

Psychotherapists and psychotherapy researchers today must master not only methods of working with clients and studying psychotherapy, but also the philosophical assumptions that underlie those methods (e.g., Slife & Williams, 1995). This task is made more difficult by the controversies that attend the different philosophical perspectives, by the use of mutually incomprehensible jargon, and by the slippery way in which words like "science," "objectivity," "realism," "relativism," "postmodern," and "interpretive" get used. Indeed, one is strongly tempted to try to ignore all the complexities and controversies and go about one's work.

The problem with an avoidance coping strategy, however, is that the underlying assumptions or implicit philosophies actually drive the whole therapeutic and research enterprise, with the force of unconscious moral imperatives. In other words, the assumptions are there, guiding what we do with clients in therapy and research, whether we are aware of them or not. Furthermore, as Robinson's fictional Carlos points out, it is these guiding assumptions that provide the moral grounding for our work, that justify what we do, and that supply the scientific framework within which our work is ultimately judged. We ignore them at the peril of becoming "bad scientists," unknowingly trapped in our assumptions.

In particular, much of the work we do as therapists and researchers revolves around how we come to know our clients, and even what we mean by "knowing." What is involved in truly *knowing* a client, or even just knowing something *about* a client? How do we *know* that we know something about a client? Are there different *kinds* of knowing? Getting down to even more specific vexing questions,

- Is it possible to simply *describe* the phenomena of therapy?
- Is some degree of interpretation inescapable?
- Is it possible to know a client from the *inside*, as they know themselves?
- Is it permissible in therapy research to interpret meanings of which the informants are *unconscious* and that they would deny if these were brought to their attention?
- How much *expertise* is the therapist or researcher expected to wield in coming to know a client?
- Can we ever know a client, or something about a client, for *certain*?
- Conversely, is all clinical knowledge just an arbitrary *social construction*?

DISCLAIMER: NONSTANDARD PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT

These questions obviously locate us in the realm of what philosophers refer to as epistemology, the philosophical discipline devoted to the systematic analysis of how human beings come to know things, and what the nature of knowledge is. However, few if any of us are professional philosophers, and even if we were, we would still be on shaky ground, because there is no *nonshaky* ground here. For this reason, I have approached the writing of this article with a great deal of trepidation and have ultimately decided to go a different direction, that of linguistic metaphor analysis (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and conceptual deconstruction (Sloman, 1978), which together make up what Austin (1970) referred to a "linguistic phenomenology" of common modes of knowing. In spite of taking a different direction, I fully realize that I am letting myself in for a load of trouble, because everyone has deeply held, fundamentally moral views of these issues. Within the field of qualitative and narrative-based psychotherapy research, I do not agree with my closest colleagues, or even with myself on odd-numbered days. Nevertheless, I will try my best to deconstruct the language and questions used to talk about some key issues of knowledge as they apply to psychotherapy research and psychotherapy integration.

BACKGROUND: THE QUALITATIVE REVOLUTION

Issues of knowing have been highlighted by the rise of qualitative research methods over the past 20 years (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Patton, 1990). Prior to this, it was easier to ignore these issues, since most researchers were working in the same quantitative, quasi-positivist paradigm, the "received view" that we had been socialized into in graduate school and that constituted the atmosphere we breathed as scientists. The qualitative revolution threw all that into question, highlighting previously invisible issues and assumptions, and forcing many of us to follow Polkinghorne's (1983) example and try to learn as much about the philosophy of science as we could.

Qualitative research methods used to study psychotherapy today make up a diverse set, encompassing approaches with brand names such as empirical phenomenology, grounded theory, heuristic inquiry, narrative analysis, ethnography, discourse analysis, consensual qualitative research, comprehensive process analysis, hermeneutics, ideal type analysis, conversation analysis, qualitative content analysis, and postmodern experiential inquiry (see recent surveys by Frommer, Langenbach, & Streeck, 2004; Rennie, 2004). By one common definition (Polkinghorne, 1983), these methods rely on linguistic rather than numerical data and use meaning-

based rather than statistical forms of data analysis. Distinguishing between measuring things with words and measuring them in numbers, however, may not be a particularly useful way of characterizing different approaches to research. Instead, other distinctive features of qualitative research may turn out to be of greater importance (Elliott, 1999): (a) emphasis on attempting to understand phenomena inductively in their own right (rather than from some outside perspective); (b) open, exploratory research questions (vs. closed-ended hypotheses); (c) unlimited, emergent description options (vs. predetermined choices or rating scales); (d) special strategies for enhancing the credibility of design and analyses (see Elliott, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999); and (e) definition of success conditions in terms of discovering something new (vs. confirming what was hypothesized).

The creative ferment of qualitative research has called traditional assumptions about research and knowing into question, most forcefully by postmodernists such as Lyotard (1984) and Gergen (1999); furthermore, this calling into question has also been called into question (e.g., Held, 1995). As a process for helping to deconstruct previously implicit assumptions, all this questioning has been a godsend, because it has stimulated researchers to think more clearly and deeply about the fundamental nature of the research enterprise in which they have been engaged. Sometimes, however, it has made for a rocky ride (Rennie, 2000).

VERBS OF KNOWING: GETTING UNTRAPPED FROM OUR LANGUAGE

For me, a key insight is how easy it is to become trapped in our language, like the fly in Wittgenstein's (1968) fly bottle. Is there such a thing as descriptive research? Is all research interpretive? Is some research more interpretive than others? Is explanation different from understanding? The answers to questions such as these depend inevitably on the meaning of words like "description," "interpretation," "explanation," and "understanding." Therefore, it is necessary to begin by trying to become clear on what exactly we mean by these words, which are mostly verbs of Knowing. While it is impossible to not be trapped in one's language, it seems to me that there are productive and unproductive ways of being trapped: For example, it is possible to waste time in endless arguments and needless polemics about abstract concepts that result in more polarization and less understanding. On the other hand, it is also possible to engage in an examination of the language we use to talk about Knowing, with the goal of fostering dialogue based on: (a) greater humility in the form of a deeper appreciation for the ambiguities of language and the tentativeness of understandings; (b) while at the same time developing richer, more complex understandings; and (c) creating enhanced opportunities

for useful collaboration among researchers with different points of view and language training.

In other words, it is possible to use language in such a way as to either generate greater division and acrimony, or conversely to enhance the interplay and integration of diverse viewpoints for the common good. Consistent with the goals of the Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration, my goal here is to construct a basis of further dialogue on modes of Knowing in psychotherapy and psychotherapy research.

To do this, I will use conceptual analysis methods (Sloman, 1978), including dictionary definitions, etymologies, identification of underlying metaphors (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), and comparison of semantically related terms, including synonyms and slang. Much of the analysis is based on the *American Heritage Dictionary* (Morris, 1981), which is both contemporary and also attempts to trace words back to Proto-Indo-European (PIE), the source of all current Indo-European languages. The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 1.

DESCRIBING VERSUS INTERPRETING

The Problem

Both traditional and 20th century, positivist views of science emphasized the importance of careful observation and description (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986), whether these were records of astronomical observations (Kuhn, 1957), naturalists' field notes and drawings (Darwin, 1839/2001), ethological observations (Tinbergen, 1972), Husserl's phenomenological descriptions (1913/1982), or the positivists' sense data descriptions (e.g., Ayer, 1952). Thus, the traditional, common sense, received view passed

Table 1. Outline of Metaphoric Basis of Some Key Epistemological Verbs

I. Describing
  A. Writing Down Carefully
  B. Making a Permanent Record
II. Knowing
  A. Explaining
    1. Translating between a Listener and a Text (acting as a go-between, negotiating)
    2. Making Something Hidden Easier to See (explaining, Giving News)
    3. Constructing a Building (Constructing Models)
  B. Understanding
    1. Getting Close Enough to Take Something (comprehending)
    2. Inferring:
      a. Finding What Stands Under (substance, hypostasis)
      b. Submitting to the Other's Importance (following)
    3. Joining (assimilating)

from one generation of students to another has been that interpretation and description are fundamentally different activities and that description is one of the pillars of science. This is a key assumption, however, of a position now generally dismissed as "naïve realism." Beginning with scholars such as Kuhn (1962), this view came to be increasingly challenged during the latter decades of the 20th century. Thus, positions referred to as social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1999) and hermeneutics (e.g., Packer & Addison, 1989) emerged to challenge the traditional view of pure description by arguing that interpretation is ubiquitous and inescapable; the logical extreme postmodernist extension of these positions would hold that *everything* is construction or interpretation.

Interesting to note, what is missing in the debates between these positions (at least as far as they have penetrated into psychology) is a careful delineation of what the words "description" and "interpretation" mean, including common dictionary definitions, historical data about their origins and evolving use, and the implicit metaphoric and conceptual structure of their meanings and uses. It seems to me that such an analysis is propaedeutic to any meaningful discussion of issues of knowing in therapy or therapy research.

IS DESCRIPTION OF THERAPY PHENOMENA POSSIBLE?

Analysis of "Description"

The word "description" refers to the result of the action of describing something. To "describe" is to give an account in speech or writing, and, more broadly, to convey an idea or impression of something (Morris, 1981). This in turn comes from the Latin *de-* + *scribere*, which originally meant to scratch or cut into something, but came to be used more generally to mean "write down." Thus, in its original sense, a description is literally something "written in stone," that is, intended to provide a permanent written representation of an event or situation. Part of the appeal of description therefore appears to be its implication of permanence and solidity. To describe is to convert the fleeting (words, perceptions) into permanent form. At the same time, the etymology of the word points to Description as a product of a particular social situation: A scribe or secretary attempting to represent words or events as accurately as possible. In most human cultures, a good scribe has been an accurate one, who serves their master by not writing the wrong words down or adding his or her own views.

On this basis, is Description of the fleeting events of psychotherapy possible? Actually, this turns out to be a silly question. Of course, Descrip-

tion is possible, in the sense of procedures that generate permanent records, or people attempting to write down things about therapy sessions and other therapy-related experiences (e.g., outcome) as accurately as possible without adding their own opinions. In Description, the client- or therapist-informant tries to be the faithful scribe or secretary of their therapy-related experiences; similarly, the qualitative interviewer tries to serve their informant accurately and nonjudgmentally. Furthermore, a descriptive qualitative analyst is one who tries to represent the data as faithfully as possible, for example, comparing the analysis to the data protocol, just as a skilled secretary proof-reads their work and gives it to their boss to check for accuracy.

There are, however, several caveats here: First, we are describing only a good-faith *attempt* at accuracy. A description is a news story, not an editorial. Everyone knows that choices always have to be made about which things to write down and that one's point of view always affects what one writes down and how one says it. This is common sense; what makes something a Description is the *intention* to faithfully represent. Second, *inaccuracy* is inevitable: everyone also knows that there is no such thing in human affairs as total accuracy. Beyond this, there are competent and incompetent scribes. Truly incompetent scribes not only don't try to get things right, but make mistakes even when they are trying to get it right, and don't know the difference. Competent psychotherapists and psychotherapy researchers try to represent faithfully, realize that errors are inevitable, try to detect and correct errors, but are humble enough to know that ultimately their written accounts are not fully trustworthy, like all written accounts. Third, in spite of our tendency to think otherwise, *material solidity and permanence are not truth*. It is a natural human tendency to think that if something takes solid, concrete form such as big black letters written on a page, and if we also find we can count on it being there next time, this begins to feel like truth to us (the PIE origin of the word "true" is the word *deru-*, meaning firm or solid, from which we also get "tree"). However, it is also commonsense that solidity and permanence are not the same as accuracy: If an event in therapy is written down inaccurately in the first place, it will continue to be inaccurate; in fact, we can count on it being permanently inaccurate (it is "truly wrong").

To sum up: Description *is* possible, but must be engaged in with great care and humility. This is because it is a social construction that is inevitably incomplete and contains error, in spite of our intention to make it accurately represent the experience it serves and our natural tendency to equate solidity and relative permanence with accuracy.

IS INTERPRETATION INEVITABLE?

Analysis

Interpretation is a substantially more complicated concept than description, and is a part of a larger family of words having to do with explanation. Stated most simply, "interpretation" refers to "the act, process or result of interpreting something" (Morris, 1981). However, there are also secondary meanings related to the humanities: Specifically, when a critic offers a way of understanding the main themes or ideas of a work of art or literature, this is also called an interpretation, as is an artist's "distinctive personal version" of a work. As a verb, "interpret" has many meanings, centering on providing an account of the meaning, significance or importance of something; there are additional meanings related to artistic presentation and criticism. However, its more basic meaning is providing oral translation between speakers of different languages. This in turn derives from the Latin *interpres*, meaning "negotiator," or "go-between," from *inter-* ("between") + *pret*, ("traffic in or sell"). (Compare Lyotard's, 1984, description of the commodification of knowledge.) In comparison to related words (e.g., "explain," "elucidate," "explicate"), "interpret" refers to showing "the underlying meaning of something by the application of special knowledge or insight" (Morris, 1981).

Integrating these different meanings, interpreting can be described as:

(a) acting as a *go-between* between a meaning-rich communicative event or thing ("text", broadly) and one or more other parties,

(b) for the purpose of providing a *translation*, way of thinking about, or appreciation of the underlying meaning, value or significance of the event or thing.

(c) This process requires that the go-between use *special knowledge* or insight, or render or enact a *personal version* of the event or thing.

This reading suggests a view of interpretation (whether in therapy or in research) as dialectically constructive (cf. Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1995), that is, an interactive translation process that is facilitated by special knowledge and ends up changing both the text and the interpretation.

However, this leaves open questions such as: What does the go-between add to the transaction? What kind of translation is produced? And what kind of special knowledge is used in the process? There seem to be three basic meanings of Interpreting, each corresponding to particular underlying metaphors (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), and each yielding a different answer to the question of the inevitability of interpretation:

(1) Interpreting Is Translating

This is the broadest definition and is close to the everyday concept of language translation, that is, rendering a message into different language as accurately as possible. However, translation is itself a complex concept; there are many different theories of what makes a good translation (see Schulte & Biguenet, 1991). Most commonly, good translation is seen not as literal, but instead as aimed at communicating the other's intentions and meanings. In the same way, translation is not "objective" (an even more slippery word, but for another time), but always requires special expertise (both language knowledge and specialized content knowledge), active sense-making efforts, and optimally interaction with both text and client. The translator thus acts as a process expert who serves those who need to understand a spoken or written message. Relationally, this means that the translator and their client are more or less equals.

Translating is the meaning of Interpreting that is closest to "describing"; but as a metaphor it is spared the potentially troublesome connotations of exact representation, solidity and permanence. Because all translations derive from a particular perspective, no two translations are exactly the same. At the same time, a good translation is not arbitrary either, and its quality can be checked against the original.

This meaning of Interpreting is ubiquitous and constitutive in both therapy and therapy research. In fact, Interpreting as Translating appears to be inevitable. More specifically, Translating works as a useful metaphor for many forms of qualitative data analysis, especially, those in the tradition of Grounded Theory Analysis (Rennie, Phillips & Quartaro, 1988; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and its spin-offs Consensual Qualitative Analysis (Hill, Thompson & Williams, 1997) and Interpretative Research (Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999). In the case of these forms of qualitative research, the researcher acts as a go-between, mediating between the data and the reader, generally translating a mountain of transcribed data into terms the reader can comprehend, generally a list of themes or categories, illustrated by examples. This is translation in the sense of "putting into simpler terms" (Morris, 1981).

(2) Interpreting Is Giving News

While translators generally try not to add meaning, in therapy the word "interpretation" is most commonly applied to therapist responses intended to tell the client something new about self (Elliott et al., 1987; Goodman & Dooley, 1976), by bringing out implicit or unconscious meanings. Inter-

preting in this sense sets itself the goal of going beyond what the data say (or what the informant explicitly tells us). Interpreting as Giving News requires expertise in the form of some explanatory framework, which is often emancipatory or critical in nature (e.g., psychodynamic, feminist, Marxist theories). Relationally, this model of interpretation implies that the informant is a nonexpert, questionable witness, and instead privileges the researcher as capable of deeper understanding because they possess special content knowledge. This metaphor for Interpreting is also similar to that of the artist or performer who seeks to bring a new perspective on an established role or theme (a specialized meaning of the word "interpreting" noted earlier).

Interpreting as giving news is *not* inevitable in research, because as we have seen, not all research intends to do this. However, it *is* an essential criterion for certain kinds of theory-based research (i.e., critical research, Lather, 1991). Furthermore, one of the tests of qualitative research in general is its capacity to surprise and change the reader ("emancipatory validity"; Packer & Addison, 1989). Interpretation in this sense is thus ultimately judged by its effects on the audience (e.g., client, theater-goer, reader).

(3) Interpreting Is Constructing Models

There is also a third meaning of "interpret," similar to the activity of a literary or arts critic, who seeks to provide readers with an explanatory framework or narrative of a work. For example, critics often summarize the main themes or movements of the work; they frequently put the work into cultural, biographical, political, psychological or other contexts; and they often provide an appraisal of the quality or value of the work. In short, they provide prospective consumers of the work with a general conceptual model or theory of the work, enabling them to judge whether they wish to experience it for themselves, and giving them a kind of roadmap to enable them to appreciate it more fully. Interpreting as Constructing Models is not a generally recognized research practice in psychology but is nonetheless common, as it is a fundamental process in science. That is, science requires the construction of what are variously referred to as theories, causal accounts, explanatory models, or narratives of how things come about or unfold over time. In fact, providing an explanatory model is an essential but little-understood condition for making causal inferences (Haynes & O'Brien, 2000).

Interpretation in this sense is constructive and requires coherence as much as accuracy. The result is a usable story about the phenomenon. New or implicit elements that go beyond what the informant has contributed may be

added, if they contribute to understanding and coherence. In qualitative research, the researcher is seen as having special expertise as an integrator of information, while the informant's or client's contributions are often taken at face value, so that the researcher's expertise is seen not as throwing doubt on the informant's expertise, but rather as complementing it by helping locating it within a larger context.

Interpreting as Constructing Models can apply to individual instances. For example, Ryle's Cognitive Analytic Therapy (Ryle & Kerr, 2001) centers on the construction of a mutually agreed-upon conceptual model of the client's functioning, while Elliott's (1989; e.g., Elliott & Shapiro, 1992) Comprehensive Process Analysis seeks to construct models of particular significant therapy events. On the other hand, more general classes of events may also be targeted, as in the general conceptual models of therapist misattunement events reported by Rhodes, Hill, Thompson, and Elliott (1994) using Consensual Qualitative Research, or client insight events reported by Elliott et al., (1994), also using Comprehensive Process Analysis. From a more diagnostic point of view Frommer, Reissner, Tress, and Langenbach's (1996) Ideal Type analysis aims to improve psychological assessment and treatment by using qualitative data to construct models of clients with a particular diagnosis (e.g., different personality disorders).

To return to the question of the inevitability of Interpretation, from the evidence of what is published as therapy research, it is clear that Interpreting as Model Building is not a universal feature. Furthermore, Model Building is an activity that falls under the Context of Discovery, which, since Popper (1959) has been seen as outside the reach of scientific methodology; it is not the *construction* of theory but rather its *testing* (i.e., falsifiability) that makes a theory scientific. In contrast, Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie (1999) and others (e.g., Stiles, 1993) have argued that providing the reader with a clear, coherent narrative is a characteristic of *good* qualitative research.

To sum up, based on this analysis, it appears that Interpreting as Translating is inevitable in therapy research (and practice), but that Interpreting as Giving News and Constructing Models are not. On the other hand, both Giving News and Constructing Models appear to be *desirable* qualities for qualitative and other forms of research on therapy. Furthermore, the three primary metaphors for Interpretation described parallel three of the four standard truth criteria (e.g., Elliott, 2003; Hamlyn, 1970; Packer & Addison, 1989): (a) The correspondence criterion (is it accurate?) applies most readily to Translating (does the translation check out against the original?). (b) The pragmatist criterion (does is work?) applies to Giving News (did it change the reader or otherwise shed light?). (c) The coherence criterion (does it fit together) applies to Constructing Models (do the elements of narrative or theory fit together?).

MODES OF KNOWING: EXPLAINING VERSUS UNDERSTANDING

The Problem

We are not, however, finished with the Explaining family of verbs of Knowing, because there still remains the key issue of the often-cited distinction made between *explanation* (said to be the province of the natural sciences) and *understanding* (said to be the goal of the human sciences). According to Polkinghorne (1983), the German historian Droysen was the first person (in 1858) to use the contrasting terms *erklären* (to explain) and *verstehen* (to understand) to characterize the difference between the human sciences and the natural sciences. Sometimes this distinction is made in terms of facts versus meanings (e.g., Taylor & Bogdan, 1998), or between causes and reasons (or intentions) (Peters, 1960), or between paradigmatic (or nomothetic) knowing and narrative (or idiographic) knowing (Spence, 1982). Indeed, this distinction is now commonly seen (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rennie & Toukmanian, 1992; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) as a key element in the distinction between the old positivist paradigm and "new paradigm" approaches such as hermeneutics, postmodernism, social constructionism, and narrative analysis.

But what do these distinctions mean? What does the distinction between explanation and understanding amount to? Some, such as Aristotle (350 BCE/2000), and, more recently, Cook and Campbell (1979), have stated that intentions can be causes; while Kuhn (1962) and others have argued that all facts are imbued with meanings. I myself have taken the position (Elliott, 1992) that mechanical causes and personal intentions are just two among many modes of explanation that people use to make sense of events. Is the Explanation-Understanding distinction just another false dichotomy that serves to divide more than to clarify? Or are Explaining and Understanding fundamentally different modes of Knowing, as has been claimed? Answering these questions requires analysis of the Explaining and Understanding families of Knowing words, in order to identity key metaphors and important similarities and differences.

A. What Is Explanation?

Conceptual analysis of the Explaining family. The general meaning of Explaining-type verbs is making "understandable the nature or meaning of something" (Morris, 1981). "*Explain*" is the most widely used and refers to making something "plain or comprehensible," with specific meanings of

defining, expounding, or offering reasons or causes (Morris, 1981). The word derives from the Latin *explenere*, from *ex-* (in its use as an intensifier) and *plenus* (clear), meaning "to make very clear." *Plenus*, in turn, comes from the PIE *pelo*, meaning flat, spread out. The underlying metaphor is therefore unobstructed vision, without folds or bumps that might conceal important information. Note that in this usage Explaining applies to a wide variety of modes of knowing and not specifically to physical causal processes (see Elliott, 1992). In this sense, an Explanation is anything that makes something clear to someone. The word *clarify* (whose origin traces to "make clear or easy to see or hear) has a similar origin, as does the German *erklären*, meaning "to explain, or declare" (Clark & Thyen, 1991).

Turning to the other members of the Explaining family, we have already traced the word "*interpret*" back to the metaphor of negotiation or acting as a go-between between parties. The word "*elucidate*" involves a visual metaphor, since both its definition and etymology (from the intensifier *ex-* + *lucidus*, bright) refer to throwing light on something that might be difficult to see. "*Expound*" and "*explicate*" both "imply detailed and usually learned and lengthy exploration and analysis" (Morris, 1981), but their etymologies differ: "*Expound*" derives from *ex-* (used as an intensifier) + *panere* (to place); the metaphor is thus one of putting something in place, as in building a structure. "*Explicate,*" on the other hand, comes from *ex-* (here meaning "out of") + *plicere* (to unfold); *plicere* comes from the PIE, *plek*, meaning to plait or braid; thus the metaphor is that of unbraiding something complex or entwined. Finally, the word "*construe*" refers to the activity of "putting a particular construction or interpretation on something" (Morris, 1981), and derives from the Latin, *construere*, to build, from *com-* (with) plus *struere* (to arrange); the metaphor here is therefore one of Explaining as Constructing a Building.

Primary metaphors for explaining. What then are the conceptual features implicit in Explaining verbs? Three basic metaphors appear to underlie the family of Explaining verbs: (1) *Negotiating* or *translating* between something and someone (interpret); (2) *Making it Easier to See*, by getting rid of obstructions, by shining light, or by unbraiding (explain, elucidate, explicate respectively); and (3) *Building a structure* (expound, construe).

The conceptual structure of each of these metaphors can then be further unpacked: First, the Negotiating metaphor entails *mediated* knowledge involving three parties: a Knower, or person who seeks to know or understand something; something difficult or complex to be Known; and an Expert who can facilitate the process of knowing. This three-party structure implies a permanent separation between knower and known and portrays knowledge as working from the outside. This corresponds to our

earlier analysis of Interpreting as Translating. The truth criterion most relevant to this metaphor is correspondence or accuracy.

Second, *visual metaphor* is central to many of these words, which describe methods for making something easier to see via getting rid of obstructions, untangling what is tied together, or shining a light. This corresponds to the previous analysis of Interpreting as Giving News. These words exemplify two of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) primary metaphors, Ignorance Is Darkness and Knowledge Is Light. As noted earlier, the relevant truth criterion here is a pragmatist one, that is, whether the explanation makes a difference or helps accomplish a knowledge task.

Third, Explaining also involves a *construction* process of Building a Structure in the form of a coherent understanding, model, narrative or theory. This corresponds to the metaphor of Interpreting as Constructing Models, previously discussed. This is also the metaphoric basis for the names of two key post-positivist movements: *constructivism* and social *constructionism*. These approaches to methodology each treat Knowing as similar to constructing a building. This portrays people as architects (or perhaps construction workers) and theoretical models as buildings. Thus, adding a new part to a theory is building an extension on your house; revising a theory is remodeling; attacking a theory is demolishing a building, and a badly built theory is at risk for falling down. Constructing a Building is also the controlling metaphor for narrative approaches, which emphasize the construction of stories. For all of these, the key truth criterion is coherence, or how well all the pieces of the story or building fit together.

To sum up: Following Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) format, a model of the general conceptual structure of Explaining can now be given as follows:

- Explaining is Translating Between a Listener (client, knower, reader) and a Speaker (other, message, not-understood aspects of self)
- Explaining is Making Something Hidden (not known) Easier to See (known)
- Explaining is Constructing a Building (conceptual model, theory, narrative)

B. What Is Understanding?

There is, however, another set of verbs of Knowing, which refer to the process of Understanding someone or something. These verbs have to do with taking in the meaning, nature or significance of something. Principal examples are *comprehend*, *apprehend*, *grasp*, and *understand* (Morris, 1981).

Conceptual analysis of Understanding. The word *understanding* has a very rich and somewhat mysterious history, with many alternative meanings. The central mystery is the exact nature of its metaphoric origin. It is easy to see that the verb *understand* is made up of *under-*, a common preposition, and *stand*, a common action verb. However, this leaves open the question, "What is supposed to be standing under what?" Standard etymologies do not make this clear. Quinion (2002) reports that the word has had its current meaning since it first appeared in written records in the 9th century, concluding that the original figurative meaning is now lost. In the absence of a clear etymological narrative, the alternative is to work inductively, from an analysis of alternative word meanings. For the following, I used the 12 meanings given in the *American Heritage Dictionary* (Morris, 1981), supplemented by checking with the 19 current meanings given in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1971). These meanings group together into three main sets:

(1) Understanding as Getting Close. The central meaning of Understanding can be boiled down to, "To succeed in thoroughly knowing the nature, significance, meaning, or intention of something or someone." The most common metaphor for this sense of the word is *taking* or *seizing* an idea as if it were an object (Understanding is Grasping; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This is the origin the most of the principal English-language Understanding Family verbs: *comprehend*, *apprehend*, and *grasp*. Lakoff and Johnson (1999), point out that the connection between Understanding and Grasping is so blatant, that most of these words still retain both meanings in ordinary use, and are thus a common source of many everyday expressions, including, "seizing on an idea," "wrapping your mind around a situation," "catching the drift of a conversation," and "getting a hold of a feeling."

In fact, informal and slang terms (Chapman, 1984) for Understanding include a rich vocabulary on the related themes of taking or getting ("take in," "get it?"); eating ("digest, "savvy," from the Latin *sapere*, meaning both to taste and to be wise); searching depths ("fathom," "dig?"); and entering ("empathy," "enter the informant's life world," "be in the client's frame of reference"). These metaphors all imply that in order to understand something one has to get close enough to touch, grasp, take, eat or enter it. In effect one has to "stand under it," as if one were picking fruit or changing a ceiling light bulb (cf. Wikipedia, 2004). The idea of closeness is also found in the most common words for understanding in Germanic languages, including the German *verstehen,* from *ver-*, before or in front of, and *stehen*, to stand: that is, to stand before or in the presence of (Harper, 2001).

In terms of conceptual features, these verbs imply: (a) knowledge from direct experience "close to hand"; (b) objectlike qualities of firmness or

solidity; (c) success or completion; (d) depth or thoroughness; and (e) incorporation (i.e., by the contrasting acts of eating or entering).

(2) Understanding as Inferring. The other main meaning of understanding also appears to be primary, and can be summarized as "making inferences about what cannot be known directly or for certain," as in "I've been given to understand that you've come to therapy because your boss thought you should"; or "Am I to understand that you're not entirely happy about how things are going?"

In fact, this meaning provides an alternative theory about the conceptual origin of the word: According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1971), Middle High German had a cognate word, *understan*, which meant "to take upon oneself, to venture, to presume." This usage and related modern English verbs of Knowing—that is, *assume*, *presume*, *suppose* – all appear to involve treating something uncertain for granted or as fact (Morris, 1981). Thus, they correspond to the metaphoric action of laying down assumptions as if they were foundations or supports. The etymology of *suppose* fits this idea well, as it comes from Late Latin *supponere*, from *sub-* (under), plus *ponere* (to place). *Presume* and *assume*, on the other hand, come from the Late Latin, *sumere*, meaning "to take," from *sub-*, "under," and *emere*, "to obtain"; thus, their original meaning was closer to Understanding as Getting Close. However, Understanding as Inferring contains two more basic but related metaphors:

(a) Inferring as Finding What Stands Under. At the same time, *understand* is also cognate with and may possibly have originated as a literal translation of the Latin *substantia* ("that which stands firm"), from *sub-*, meaning "under," plus *stantia*, the past participle of the verb *stare*, "to stand." The Modern English form of this word is *substance*, which today usually refers to the physical matter out of which something is made; however, it originally referred to the underlying essence or form of something. The Latin *substantia* was in turn a direct translation of the Greek *hupostasis*, written in English as *hypostasis*, meaning "substance, essence or underlying reality" (Morris, 1981). *Hupostasis* also originally meant "that which stands under," from *hupo*, "under," plus *stasis*, something that stands or "has standing" (i.e., exists). Thus, *substantia* and *hupostasis* both refer to what "stands under" objects or appearances, what they are made of or what constitutes them. In other words, the metaphor Understanding as Inferring in turn appears to be based on a more primary metaphor, Inferring as Finding What Stands Under. In psychotherapy research, this could include various implicit or even unconscious meanings, especially implicit assumptions, unconscious motives, cognitive schemas or emotion schemes.

(b) Inferring as Submitting. But inferences laid down as foundations are at the same time taken on as burdens that one acts "under." Thus, understanding can also mean putting oneself *under* an assumption or belief

that is not certain. Parallel uses include "He put himself under obligation" and "She *under*took a difficult task." The verb *infer* itself comes from the Latin *inferre*, from *in-* (in), plus *ferre* (to bear or carry): inferring is "carrying something in." Thus, being under obligation, undertaking a task for someone, and inferring and understanding things about them are all acts of submission (just as the word *submission* itself derives from the Latin for "to set under"). For the same reason, we use the word *following* to describe understanding what someone is saying. Understanding in this sense is treating the Other (the client in therapy, the informant in research) as more important, of making their needs the priority, of "standing under" them in order to serve and understand them. This is obviously not all there is to therapy or therapy research, but Inferring as Submitting to the Other's Importance appears also to be an important component of the concept of Understanding.

(3) Understanding as Joining. Finally, there is an associated secondary meaning of Understanding as "to have sympathy or tolerance"; Morris, 1981). This points to the relational aspect of understanding and the idea that understanding creates a bond or unity between the knower and the known. In addition to the common metaphor of understanding as eating (discussed earlier), examples include *assimilate* (from the Latin *assimilare*, to compare or make something similar), which ultimately traces back to the PIE *sem-*, meaning "one" or "as one" (Morris, 1981), and the colloquial, "Are you still with me?" This sense appears late historically (OED, 1971) and probably derives from older, more primary word meanings. Elliott (1985) found that clients' descriptions of feeling understood often overlapped with descriptions of feeling supported or that the therapist was "on my side." Finally, this sense of Understanding parallels the fourth truth criterion, consensus, that is, using agreement as a standard for evaluating whether something is true.

Summary. Based on this analysis of word origins, synonyms and alternative meanings, Understanding is a way of knowing that relies on active, direct, experience-near interaction with its object. This contact does not stay on the surface, but seeks to find its basic, implicit, underlying nature. The Knower tries to avoid imposing on or controlling the object of knowledge, but instead tries to follow or submit to it, and as a result joins with it, forming a new whole.

COMPARISON OF EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING AS WAYS OF KNOWING

We are now in a position to compare the two modes of knowing, Explaining and Understanding, in terms of their key metaphors and other

conceptual features. The analysis presented indicates that in spite of some overlap, explaining and understanding represent essentially different ways of Knowing. Table 2 depicts these contrasting characteristics, many of which can be organized into the three dimensions of Structure, Direction, and Effect.

Structure: Expert Translation versus Getting Close

Essentially, Explaining (in the aspect of Translating) implies the presence of an expert third party who mediates between the knower (client or audience) and what the knower seeks to know (experience or data). This is what Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) described as "distanced knowing," in that the knower is separated from the known and requires an external expert to represent the object of knowledge to them. Bertrand Russell (1912) referred to this as "knowledge by description." On the other hand, Understanding (in the aspect of Getting Close) refers to a what Belenky et al. (1986) refer to as "connected knowing," in which the knower seeks to experience what they seek to know directly, metaphorically touching, grasping, taking, entering, or ingesting it. This corresponds to Russell's (1912) "knowledge by acquaintance."

However, from the point of view of psychotherapy and psychotherapy research, it is easy to point to situations in which each way of Knowing is important. A puzzled, stuck client, an elliptical or an apparently contradictory section of transcript, and an anomalous correlation coefficient all

Table 2. Comparison of Explaining Versus Understanding

Distinction	Explaining	Understanding
	Key metaphor	
Structure • Mediated vs. unmediated • Parties involved	Translating • Mediated knowledge • 3 parties: knower, interpreter, known	Getting Close • Direct knowledge • 2 parties: knower, known
Direction • Dimension • Simplicity vs. complexity	Making Easier to See • Making flatter • Making simpler	Finding What Stands Under • Making deeper • Greater complexity
Effect What is made?	Constructing a Building (model, theory)	Joining (alliance, relation)
	Other features	
Relation to self	Outside self	Into self
Sensory modality	Visual (seeing, insight)	Bodily (grasping)
Role of professional	Expertise (leading)	Submission (following)

call for expert translation skills. However, as end users of the work of therapy or research, client and readers often benefit most from the opportunity to learn or experience things for themselves. They may even be subtly or not-to-subtly disempowered by too much expert mediation, and in the end will have to draw their own conclusions in any case. Thus, mediated Translating and direct Getting Close are complementary ways of Knowing that are each important and have their place.

Direction: Making Easier to See versus Finding What Stands Under

Knowing not only has a structure, but also a direction in which it moves (metaphorically) as a person's states of knowledge change. (This is an example of Lakoff & Johnson's, 1999, Change Is Motion metaphor.) With Explaining in the aspect of Making Easier to See, this movement is a horizontal one, toward greater simplicity (fewer elements and simpler structures) and flatness or spread-out-ness (the *-plain* in *explain* is cognate with *plane*). That is, Explaining seeks to generalize, make accessible, or popularize. In contrast, *Understanding* as Finding What Stands Under moves at a right angle, in a vertical direction, toward greater complexity (more elements and differentiation) and greater depth, going beyond the obvious to what is more subtle, underlying or fundamental. Consistent with this very different movement, Explaining favors visual metaphor (unfolding, enlightening), while Understanding favors bodily metaphor (groping in the dark, taking to heart, ruminating).

Again, both ways of knowing have their place. Elliott and Anderson (1994) described the complementary forces of simplicity and complexity in psychotherapy research; they attempted to lay out a middle ground between the twin dangers of excessive or distorting simplification and unnecessary and overwhelming complexity. However, it might be more productive to identify complementary uses for each. Clearly, there are times when it is important for therapy or therapy research to dive into the messy complexity of the client's life or into a challenging and idiosyncratic set of data. However, there are other times when it is important to step back in order to get a picture of the overall landscape and points of interest.

Effect: Constructing versus Joining

Knowing also has results or effects; when something comes to be known, some change emerges from the process. In *Explaining* as Constructing, a conceptual structure is built, analogous to a house or other

building. Buildings are constructions made of many different elements, brought together to form a whole in order for various uses: they house, protect, store, and serve as a meeting place or base. Conceptual models, theories or generalized narratives are easier for clients and readers to understand and remember. As Lewin (1935) said, "There is nothing as useful as a good theory." On the other hand, *Understanding* as Joining creates a relationship or "meaning bridge" (Stiles, 1999; cf. Rice & Saperia, 1984), between two people, two parts of the same person, or two different ideas, thus forming a new whole. This is a dialectically constructive process, in which new experiences are assimilated to existing schemes, changing both the experience and the scheme to which they are assimilated (Elliott & Greenberg, 1997).

In fact, it can be argued that all Knowing is *both* constructive and relational, although the balance between the construction and relationship may vary: Sometimes it is important to emphasize the therapist or researcher's agency in constructing meanings, laying down working assumptions, or constructing models. At other times, it is vital for the therapist or researcher to deliberately take the role of a diligent and respectful follower, treating client or data as the leader or expert from which knowledge is to be learned.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH AND INTEGRATION

Given my previous impression that explanation and understanding largely overlap, I was surprised to learn from the analyses presented here that they actually represent two very different modes of Knowing. From a linguistic point of view, Understanding can be described as more immediate and direct but at the same time involving deeper, more intricate knowledge that is lived in the body; as a result, one develops a relationship with the person or thing one has come to know. On the other hand, Explaining is more mediated and conceptual, and typically requires expert help to arrive at a more distanced survey of the "big picture" of the main features of someone or something, a picture that often takes the form of an overall schematic or working model.

Implications for Therapy

Obviously, in clinical work there is a place for both Explaining and Understanding, as well as Describing. Working with clients requires, first,

Describing, in the sense of careful, accurate listening and record keeping, even while we recognize that our listening and records will always be incomplete and contain errors in spite of being written down in solid form; this is the foundation. Second, it is vital to engage clients in an Understanding process in which we enter and submit ourselves to stand under their experiences in their richness and complexity, joining with them in seeking not only what is on the surface but also what stands underneath and requires digging for. Third, it is also important for us to be able to use our expertise to help our clients stand back from the often-chaotic detail of their experience in order to construct an overall narrative or model that outlines the main sources, themes and sequence of their life story and current problems. In fact, it may be useful to conceptualize therapy as a constant interaction or dialectic between Understanding and Explanation, that is, between trying to directly encounter the client's immediate lived experience in all its disorder, subtlety and contradiction, and trying to reflect on it in order to help them make sense of it. Theory may be useful, as Lewin said, but only when it is grounded in experience.

Of course, this formulation of the essence of the therapy process (and probably also the assessment process, e.g., Fischer, 1994) is nothing new. Versions of what I am talking about can be found in Gendlin's (1996) analysis of the relationship between experience and symbolization. More recently, Elliott, Greenberg, and Lietaer (2003), in a review of research on experiential and humanistic therapies, have argued that effective therapy involves an alternation between emotionally live experiencing and reflection and meaning construction. The same can be said for the relationship between conceptual and experiential learning in psychotherapy training (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg, 2004).

Implications for Therapy Research

Similarly, in psychotherapy research, the three kinds of knowing all have important roles to play. Careful, permanent recording and description are foundational. For example, in Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design (HSCED; Elliott, 2001, 2002), the first step is assembling a rich case record of information about the case, including client demographic and diagnostic information; pre-, post- and follow-up data, both quantitative and qualitative; client and therapist weekly ratings and qualitative descriptions of therapy sessions; qualitative interviews of the client, therapist process notes, and recordings of sessions.

Understanding is also important for therapy researchers, especially those involved in qualitative research. Understanding begins during the interview itself (Kvale's, 1996, "online" analysis during the interview), and

is also essential during the early phases of qualitative data analysis, when researchers are trying to immerse themselves in the world of the informant by dwelling on each bit of the interview protocol (Wertz, 1983) and trying to create an individualized understanding of the experience of particular informants. Similarly, in HSCED (Elliott, 2002), researchers try to enter the client's perspective on how they changed and what brought about change.

Finally, Explaining plays an essential role as well, especially as the research moves beyond particular informant's data protocols to looking for common themes of categories, making the data accessible to readers by focusing attention on a manageable number of key themes or categories, coherently tying those themes or categories together, and critically reflecting on whether analysis holds up in light of various criteria (Elliott et al., 1999). HSCED (Elliott, 2002) explicitly seeks to test causal explanations of whether, why, and how clients changed over the course of therapy, by employing a critical process of seeking alternative explanations (e.g., statistical relational artifacts, extratherapy events, self-help processes, psychobiological factors). The goal of this process is to construct two competing causal explanations or narratives of the client's change process: one summarizing positive evidence indicating that the client did change and that therapy was responsible for the changes, the other bringing together negative evidence weighing against the client having changed and the role of therapy in those changes.

Thus, therapy research, like therapy itself, requires the processes of Describing, Understanding and Explaining. This is an integrative view of therapy and therapy research, consistent with the psychotherapy integration movement and also with the move toward methodological pluralism.

Linguistic Phenomenology as a Method

The method of linguistic phenomenology used in this article attempts to deconstruct abstract concepts such as "explanation" by tracing them back to their more concrete metaphoric sources. Many of these are so-called "dead" metaphors, in that current speakers are no longer consciously aware of the metaphoric basis of the terms, for example, the *plain* in *explain*. Retrieving the metaphoric origins of words, however, gives us a window into the experiences of the past speakers who originally used the terms. In order for a new word or usage to catch on, it must resonate with and be picked up by multiple speakers. In order for a metaphor to be considered primary or key, it must be replicated in multiple word etymologies as well as contemporary usage including colloquialisms and slang.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that analyzing the underlying conceptual structure of language used to talk about important concepts such as explanation and understanding should make use of a wide range of types of information, including analysis of metaphoric inference patterns, metaphorically extended word senses, novel metaphors, psychological experiments, historical semantic change (evident in word etymologies), research on spontaneous illustrative gestures, language acquisition research, studies of non-English languages, and discourse analysis research. In this article, I have made use of only some of these methods; clearly, further research using other methods would be useful and might lead to better understandings of these important concepts.

Da capo

I began this article by arguing that many of the key epistemological controversies in psychotherapy and psychotherapy research stem from problems with language use. It is my view that in both fields we often talk past each other, because we are working from different metaphors, and because we often use the same words in different ways (and different words in the same ways) without realizing it. However, one way to address the question of psychotherapy integration is try to create a common space of shared understandings of the main alternative meanings of important, often contested terms. I have tried to accomplish this here by going back to the source of these key terms and concepts in order to develop a richer account of their implicit meanings. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) refer to the physical, lived sources of these words as primary metaphor, and argue that they are grounded in universal human sensorimotor and development experiences. By clarifying this grounding, the hope is that people will come to be more aware of the implicit meanings embedded in the words they use and will be able to think and communicate more clearly and productively with one another. Contemporary understandings of language indicate the ideal of unambiguous communication is illusory (Polkinghorne, 1983). However, more modest goals do seem attainable, including becoming clearer on the nature of the ambiguities, specifying the particular meanings one wishes to highlight, and exploiting a broader range of meanings to describe and facilitate one's practices.

REFERENCES

Aristotle. (350 BCE/2000). Physics (Book 2; R. P. Hardie & R. K. Gaye, Trans.). Retrieved August 20, 2003, from http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html

Austin, J. L. (1970). *Philosophical papers* (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Ayer, A. J. (1952). *Language, truth, and logic.* New York: Dover.

Bakeman, R., & Gottman, J. M. (1986). *Observing interaction: An introduction to sequential analysis.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). *Women's ways of knowing: The development of self, voice, and mind.* New York: Basic Books.

Chapman, R. L. (1979). *Roget's international thesaurus* (4th ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

Clark, M., & Thyen, O. (1991). *The concise Oxford Duden German dictionary.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). *Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Darwin, C. (1839/2001). *The voyage of the Beagle: Journal of researches into the natural history and geology of the countries visited during the voyage of H. M. S. Beagle round the world* (Modern Library ed.). New York: Random House.

Elliott, R. (1985). Helpful and nonhelpful events in brief counseling interviews: An empirical taxonomy. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 32,* 307–322.

Elliott, R. (1989). Comprehensive Process Analysis: Understanding the change process in significant therapy events. In M. Packer & R. B. Addison (Eds.), *Entering the circle: Hermeneutic investigation in psychology* (pp. 165–184). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Elliott, R. (1992). *Modes of explanation in psychotherapy research.* Unpublished manuscript, University of Toledo.

Elliott, R. (1999). Editor's introduction to special issue on qualitative psychotherapy research: Definitions, themes and discoveries. *Psychotherapy Research, 9,* 251–257.

Elliott, R. (2001). Hermeneutic single case efficacy design (HSCED): An overview. In K. J. Schneider, J. F. T. Bugental & J. F. Fraser (Eds.), *Handbook of humanistic psychology* (pp. 315–324), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Elliott, R. (2002). Hermeneutic single case efficacy design. *Psychotherapy Research, 12,* 1–20.

Elliott, R. (November, 2003). *Epistemology and the science of psychotherapy research: The relevance of the four theories of truth.* Paper presented at meeting of the North American Chapter of the Society for Psychotherapy Research, Newport, RI.

Elliott, R., & Anderson, C. (1994). Simplicity and complexity in psychotherapy research. In R. L. Russell (Ed.), *Reassessing psychotherapy research* (pp. 65–113). New York: Guilford Press.

Elliott, R., Fischer, C., & Rennie, D. (1999). Evolving guidelines for publication of qualitative research studies in psychology and related fields. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38,* 215–229.

Elliott, R., & Greenberg, L. S. (1997). Multiple voices in process-experiential therapy: Dialogues between aspects of the self. *Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 7,* 225–239.

Elliott, R., Greenberg, L. S., & Lietaer, G. (2003). Research on experiential psychotherapies. In M. J. Lambert (Ed.), *Bergin & Garfield's handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change* (5th ed., pp. 493–539). New York: Wiley.

Elliott, R., Hill, C. E., Stiles, W. B., Friedlander, M. L., Mahrer, A., & Margison, F. (1987). Primary therapist response modes: A comparison of six rating systems. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55,* 218–223.

Elliott, R., & Shapiro, D. A. (1992). Clients and therapists as analysts of significant events. In S. G. Toukmanian & D. L. Rennie (Eds.), *Two perspectives on psychotherapeutic change: Theory-guided and phenomenological research strategies* (pp. 163–186). Newberry Park, CA: Sage.

Elliott, R., Shapiro, D. A., Firth-Cozens, J., Stiles, W. B., Hardy, G., Llewelyn, S. P., et al. (1994). Comprehensive process analysis of insight events in cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic-interpersonal therapies. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 41,* 449–463.

Elliott, R., Watson, J. C., Goldman, R. N., & Greenberg, L. S. (2004). *Learning emotion-focused therapy: The process-experiential approach to change.* Washington, DC: APA.

Fischer, C. T. (1994). *Individualizing psychological assessment.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Frommer, J., Langenbach, M., & Streeck, U. (2004). Qualitative psychotherapy research in German-speaking countries. *Psychotherapy Research, 14,* 57–75.

Frommer, J., Reissner, V., Tress, W., & Langenbach, M. (1996). Subjective theories of illness

in patients with personality disorders. Qualitative comparison of twelve diagnostic interviews. *Psychotherapy Research, 6,* 56–69.

Gendlin, E. T. (1996). *Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: A manual of the experiential method.* New York: Guilford Press.

Gergen, K. J. (1999). *Invitation to social construction.* Newberry Park: Sage.

Goodman, G., & Dooley, D. (1976). A framework for help-intended communication. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 13,* 106–117.

Greenberg, L. S., & Pascual-Leone, J. (1995). A dialectical constructivist approach to experiential change. In R. Neimeyer & M. Mahoney (Eds.), *Constructivism in psychotherapy* (pp. 169–191). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hamlyn, D. W. (1970). *The theory of knowledge.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.

Harper, D. (2001, November). *Online etymology dictionary.* Retrieved July 30, 2004, from http://www.etymonline.com

Haynes, S. N., & O'Brien, W. O. (2000). *Principles of behavioral assessment: A functional approach to psychological assessment.* New York: Plenum Press.

Held, B. S. (1995). *Back to reality: A critique of postmodern theory in psychotherapy.* New York: Norton.

Hill, C. E., Thompson, B. J., & Williams, E. N. (1997). A guide to conducting consensual qualitative research. *The Counseling psychologist, 25,* 517–572.

Husserl, E. (1913/1982). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: General introduction to a pure phenomenology* (F. Kersten, Trans.). Boston: Kluwer.

Kuhn, T. S. (1957). *The Copernican revolution: Planetary astronomy in the development of western thought.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kvale, S. (1996). *InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought.* New York: Basic Books.

Lather, P. (1991). *Getting smart: Feminist research and pedagogy with/in the postmodern.* New York: Routledge.

Lewin, K. (1935). *A dynamic theory of personality.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lyotard, J. F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Morris, W. (Ed.) (1981). *The American Heritage dictionary of the English language.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Oxford English dictionary (Compact ed.). (1971). New York: Oxford University Press.

Packer, M. J., & Addison, R. B. (Eds.). (1989). *Entering the circle: Hermeneutic investigation in psychology.* Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Peters, R. S. (1960). *The concept of motivation.* New York: Humanities Press.

Polkinghorne, D. (1983). *Methodology for the human sciences.* Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Popper, K. (1959). *The logic of scientific discovery.* New York: Basic Books.

Quinion, M. (2002, June 1). *Understand.* Retrieved July 25, 2004, from http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-und1.htm.

Rennie, D. L. (2000). Grounded theory methodology as methodical hermeneutics: Reconciling realism and relativism. *Theory & Psychology, 10,* 481–502.

Rennie, D. L. (2004). Anglo-North American qualitative counseling and psychotherapy research. *Psychotherapy Research, 14,* 37–55.

Rennie, D. L., Phillips, J. R., & Quartaro, G. K. (1988). Grounded theory: A promising approach to conceptualization in psychology? *Canadian Psychology, 29,* 139–150.

Rennie, D. L., & Toukmanian, S. G. (1992). Explanation in psychotherapy process research.

In S. G. Toukmanian & D. L. Rennie (Eds.), *Psychotherapy process research: Paradigmatic and narrative approaches.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Rhodes, R. H., Hill, C. E., Thompson, B. J., & Elliott, R. (1994). Client retrospective recall of resolved and unresolved misunderstanding events. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 41,* 473–483.

Rice, L. N., & Saperia, E. P. (1984). Task analysis and the resolution of problematic reactions. In L. N. Rice & L. S. Greenberg (Eds.), *Patterns of change* (pp. 29–66). New York: Guilford Press.

Robinson, K. S. (1998). *Antarctica.* New York: Bantam Books.

Russell, B. (1912). *The problems of philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ryle, A., & Kerr, I. B. (2001). *Introduction to Cognitive-Analytic Therapy: Principles and practice.* New York: Wiley.

Schulte, R., & Biguenet, J. (1991). *Theories of translation: An anthology of essays from Dryden to Derrida.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Slife, B. D., & Williams, R. N. (1995). *What's behind the research: Discovering hidden assumptions in the behavioral sciences.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sloman, S. (1978). What is conceptual analysis? *The computer revolution in philosophy* (Chapter 4). Retrieved January 9, 2002, from http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/crp/chap4.html

Smith, J. A., Jarman, M., & Osborn, M. (1999). Doing interpretative phenomenological analysis. In M. Murray & K. Chamberlain (Eds.), *Qualitative health psychology* (pp. 218–240). London: Sage.

Spence, D. P. (1982). *Narrative truth and historical truth.* New York: Norton.

Stiles, W. B. (1993). Quality control in qualitative research. *Clinical Psychology Review, 13,* 593–618.

Stiles, W. B. (1999). Signs and voices in psychotherapy. *Psychotherapy Research, 9,* 1–21.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Taylor, S. J., & Bogdan, R. (1998). *Introduction to qualitative research methods: A guidebook and resource* (3rd ed.). New York: Wiley.

Tinbergen, N. (1972). *The animal in its world: Explorations of an ethologist, 1932–1972* (Vol. 1 & II). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wertz, F. J. (1983). From everyday to psychological description: Analyzing the moments of a qualitative data analysis. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 14,* 197–241.

Wikipedia. (2004, July 18). *Metaphor.* Retrieved July 25, 2004, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphor

Wittgenstein, L. (1968). *Philosophical investigations* (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan.