The Contemporary Transformation of the International System

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Lecture 2

The transformation of the states-system: the role of the United States

- Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory
- 2. Rise to hegemonic dominance of U.S.A., and its decline?
- 3. Susan Strange's counter-arguments

- 1. <u>Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems</u> <u>Theory</u>
 - a) the 'whole' world economy was a *capitalist* economy;
 - b) the capitalist economic system needs a *parallel political system* the inter-state system to maintain order;
 - c) the capitalist economic system needs a *universal capitalist social system*

3 periods of hegemonic dominance (one state "primus inter pares" ('first among equals'):

a) *middle of 17th century*United Provinces (approx. 1620 - 1672)

b) *middle of 19th century*United Kingdom (approx. 1815 - 1873)

c) *middle of 20th century*United States (approx. 1945 – 1967)



Economic position of enterprises (companies) of <u>hegemonic power</u>



Hegemony secured through a 30 year long world war:

- 1. The 'Thirty Years War' (1618–1648) Dutch triumphed over Hapsburg Empire (*Westphalia*)
- 2. Napoleonic Wars (1792 –1815) United Kingdom triumphed over France ('*Concert of Europe'*)
- 3. The 'Long Euro-asian Wars' (1914 1945) United States triumphed over Germany (*U.N. and Bretton Woods agreement*)

Wallerstein's World System:

- Modern Core states: industrialised, technologically advanced, diversified production and service sector;
- 2. Semi-Periphery states: supply Core states with raw materials and Periphery states with finished goods;
- 3. *Periphery states*: tied by dependence, monocultural economic activities, overspecialisation

Wallerstein's 'Strong State':

- 1. *Mercantilism/liberalism* state helps own companies compete
- 2. *Military capacity* covert and overt military policies
- 3. *Finance and tax capacities* state's ability to mobilise financial resources
- 4. *Bureaucratic capacity* ability to administer and carry out policies
- 5. *Class/ideological factor* dominant hegemonic block/group within the state

2. <u>Rise to hegemonic dominance of U.S.A.</u>

- a more interventionist form of U.S. state:
- a) *The State* Executive became initiator of recovery
 - By end of 1940s new institutional state structures set up to facilitate interventionism
 - Council of Economic Advisors
 - Bureau of the Budget
 - Federal Reserve
 - National Security Council
 - Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - Greater integration of State intelligence Agencies (F.B.I./O.S.S/C.I.A)

b) **Politics** - Rooseveldt 'coalition' developed

- won support of large urban 'blue collar' vote and the southern vote;
- extended rights of workers to organise industrially (more rights to join t.u.)
- extension of welfare and social security
- c) *Economy* 'pump priming' by the state
 - development of multinational companies
 - acceptance of more state intervention
 - rise in taxation levels and extension of state's fiscal base
 - changes in production processes and techniques
 - 'New Deal' institutional structures (National Recovery Agency, Agricultural Adjustment Agency)

1944 U.S. Senate document: 'War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations' - argued U.S. should pursue 'Grand Area' approach to give U.S. companies access to markets and resources in post-war world ('Open Door **Principle'**) - seeds of 'Pax Americana'

1944 Bretton Woods conference and agreement:

- initiated 4 new world institutions:

- 1. World Bank
- 2. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- 3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

4. United Nations (UN)

(1,2, and 3 = economic. 4 = political institutions)

Fred Halliday, 'The Making of the Second Cold War', London, Verso, 1983, ch.4.
wave of 3rd World revolutions and U.S. defeats in 1970s (U.S. 'bloody noses')

- Ethiopia 1974

- Cambodia 1975
- Laos and Vietnam 1975
- Iran, Grenada and Nicaragua 1979

Wallerstein's 3 elements that produce change in World system:

- the location of production processes and plants/factories/businesses shifts to cheaper labour areas;
- there is a change between a boom ('A' phase) and a slump/downturn ('B' phase) in the world economy;
- 3. decline of the hegemonic state, and rivalry develops to succeed that state

Susan Strange – arguments about hegemonic decline of U.S.A. fail to take account of *'the structural power of the modern state'*

 break away from territorially based conceptions of power

- information rich occupations confer power

- "Is it more desirable that Americans should wear blue collars and mind the machines or that they should wear white collars and design, direct and finance the whole operation?"
 - (Strange, S. 'The future of the American empire', in Little, R. and Smith, M. *Perspectives on World Politics*, 2nd edition, London, Routledge, 1991, p.435)

- 4 Interlocking Structures increasing U.S.A. power in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s:
- The Security Structure ability to offer, withhold or threaten security;
- 2. *The Financial Structure* ability to offer, withhold or demand credit;
- 3. *The Production Structure* ability to determine the location, mode and content of wealth-creating activity;
- *The Knowledge Structure* ability to influence ideas and beliefs, and control access to and communication of knowledge (links to culture)