CHAPTER 10
The Legal Regulation
ofAdolescence
JENNIFER L WOOLARD AND ELIZABETH SCOTT
The scientifie view of the boundaries between
childhood and adulthood recognizes adolescence
as a discrete developmental period
"beginning in biology and ending in society,"
(Lerner & Galambos, 1998, p. 4I4). Scientists
generally divide the span of adolescence into
early (ages II to 14), middle (ages 15-18) and
late (ages 18-21) periods (Steinberg, 2008).
Few believe that development in all domains
tracks these phases with stagelike consistency,
but instead considers adolescent development
as a series of transitions to maturity, the pace
of which varies among adolescents and across
domains within an individual (Steinberg. 2008).
Biological, cognitive, and social transitions
affect adolescents' capacities to respond to
their environment and elicit changing expectations
and reactions from the larger social world
(Lerner & Galambos, 1998: Steinberg, 2008).
To what extent does legal regulation recognize
the developmental reality of adolescence
as adiscrete stage and distinguish between adolescents
and children (and between adolescents
adults)? The answer is, not very much at
all. Generally, policymakers ignore this transitional
developmental stage, classifying adolescents
legally either as children or as adults,
'''''f'IOllUll'" on the issue at hand. Lawmakers
regulation is based on this image (Scott,
. Children are assumed to be vulnerable
dependent and to lack the capacity to
make competent decisions. Thus, not surprisingly,
they are not held legally accountable for
their choices or behavior. Children also are not
accorded most of the legal rights and privileges
that adults enjoy, such as voting. driving,
drinking, and making their own medical
decisions. Finally, children are assumed to be
vulnerable and unable to care for themselves,
and thus their parents and the government are
obligated to provide the care, support. and education
that allow them to develop into healthy
adults. Once children cross the line to legal
adulthood, they are considered autonomous
citizens responsible for their own conduct,
entitled to legal rights and privileges, and no
longer entitled to protections.
The simple binary classit1cation of legal
"childhood" and legal "adulthood" in fact
is more complex than it seems because the
boundary between childhood and adulthood
varies depending on the policy purpose. For
example, for most purposes, children become
legal adults on their 18th birthday, which is
the modern "age of majority" in most states.
However, 20-year-old college students are
legally prohibited from drinking alcohol,
while youth in elementary school can be subject
to the adult justice system when they are
charged with crimes. Thus, although legal
regulation oflers a clear account of the attributes
of children that indicate the need for
treating them ditTerently from adults under the
chapter draws OIl Elizabeth Scott, "The Legal Construction of Adolescence," Hof~tra Low Review 29:
(2000).
345
346 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
law. children's legal status is complicated by
the shifting boundary between childhood and
adulthood.
For most purposes, adolescents are
described in legal rhetoric as though they
were indistinguishable from young children,
and are subject to paternalistic policies based
on assumptions of dependence, vulnerability,
and incompetence. For other purposes. teenagers
are treated as fully mature adults, who are
competent to make decisions, accountable for
their choices and entitled to no special accommodation.
The variation is due mostly to the
fact that different policy goals are important
in different context. rather than to efforts to
attend to variations in developmental maturity
in different domains. For example, although
many of the same cognitive and psychosocial
capacities affect decision making both behind
the wheel and in a bar, allowing 16-year-olds
to drive givcs young persons independence
and mobility, while restricting the privilegc to
buy alcoholic beverages until age 21 protects
youth (and the rest of us) from the costs of
immature judgment.
Js there a cost to a legal approach that
ignores the developmental realities of adolescence?
In our view, the binary classification
of childhood and adulthood works quite
well for most purposes. It has the advantage
of simplicity and administrative efficiency,
and arguably it promotes parental responsibility
by linking parents' support obligation to
their children's general status as dependents.
Moreover, because adult rights and duties are
extended at different ages for different purposes.
the transition to adulthood takes place
gradually, even without an intermediate stage
of legal adolescence. Adolescents may benefit
if they are allowed to make some adult decisions,
but not others. To return to our example,
l6-year-olds acquire experience in the adult
domain of driving long before they are legally
authorized to make other adult choices, such
as drinking. Thus. even though the crude legal
categories distort developmental reality, for
the most part, the binary classification system
is not harmful to the welfare of adolescents or
to general social welfare. In fact, in some areas
in which legal regulation subjects adolescents
to special treatment (different from adults or
children), youth would be better served by the
standard approach. As we will discuss, regulation
of adolescent abortion is such a case.
In some contexts, however. binary categorical
assumptions that ignore the transitional
stage of adolescence can lead to harmful outcomes.
Juvenile justice policy provides a stark
example of a failure of the binary approach.
This is an arena in which the boundary of
childhood shifted dramatically over the course
of the twentieth century, and strikingly different
accounts of young offenders have been
deployed in service of the different policy
agendas. The juvenile justice system was
established at the end of the nineteenth century
with the purpose of providing rehabilitation
to young offenders instead of punishment
in the criminal justice system. The Progressive
reformers who founded the juvenile court were
very committed (in their rhetoric, at least) to
describing and dealing with young offenders
as children (Van Waters, 1926). In recent years,
a major law reform movement has transformed
this system, such that today even preadolescents
can be tried as adults for serious crimes
in many states (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).
Developmental research indicates both portraits
(i.e., adolescents as children and adolescents
as adults) are largely fictional: developmental
reality is much more complex. Moreover, in
our view. both the romanticized vision of youth
offered by the early Progressive founders and
the harsh account of modern conservatives
have been the basis of unsatisfactory policies.
In contrast to many other areas of legal regulation,
binary classification in the juvenilejustice
sphere imposes significant costs on both young
offenders and society. In this context, effective
legal regulation requires a realistic account of
adolescence based on developmental theory
and empirical research.
For over 30 years, social scientists and
legal scholars have argued for the need for
developmental research on adolescence to
inform legal policy and practice (Grisso &
Lovinguth, 1982; Melton, 1981; Reppucci,
Welthorn, Mulvey, & Monahan, 1984; Wald,
1976). In this chapter we describe and evaluate
the extent to which legal regulation recognizes
the developmental reality of adolescence
and differences between adolescents and either
children or adults. First, we present the legal
account of childhood, sketching the traits
that are assumed to distinguish children from
adults, and the absence of any clear vision of
adolescence. Next, we describe how the legal
boundary between childhood and adulthood
. is determined, and we show that the judgment
is determined by policy (and politics) as much
as science. Our analysis includes a description
ofthe forces that led to the passage of the 26th
Amendment, which extended voting rights to
18-year-olds-an enactment that led states
to lower the age of majority for many other
. purposes. We then examine medical decision
making and abortion rights; the latter is an
issue that clarifies the difficulties in creating
a special legal status for adolescence. Finally,
we examine juvenilejustice policy, and explain
why binary classification has not worked well
in this context. We describe recent research that
supports the conclusion that a justice policy
·that treats adolescence as a distinct legal category
not only will promote youth welfare, but
will also help reduce the costs of youth crime.
LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT CHILDHOOD
·Several assumptions undergird the legal regula­

tion of children. Because children are assumed 

to be incapable of looking out for them­

selves, they need adult care and protection. 

Specifically, three interrelated dimensions of 

·immaturity guide legal policy. First, children 

are dependent beings, and must rely on adults 

clothing-and for education and care
allow them to mature into healthy, producadults.
Children are also presumed to be
of making sound decisions, due
Legal Assumptions about Childhood 347
to cognitive immaturity that limits youthful
understanding and reasoning, and psychosocial
immaturity that may lead to poor judgment
and harmful or risky choices (Scott, 1992;
Zimring, 1982). Finally, children are presumed
to be malleable, making them susceptible to
int1uence and vulnerable to harm from others
(Van Waters, 1926).
These assumptions about childhood justify
the need for adult control over children's lives
and clarify why the legal rights, privileges, and
duties assigned to adults are not extended to
children. The law accords parents the primary
authority and responsibility for rearing children
and caring for their needs. Parents have
authority to make decisions about all aspects
of children's lives, from medical care and
education to the most mundane aspects of
daily living. In turn, the law charges parents
with safeguarding children's welfare and protecting
them from harm. The U.S. Supreme
Court elaborated on the basis of parents' legal
and constitutional authority in Parham v. 1.R
~ 1979), an opinion that dealt with the commitment
of children to state psychiatric hospitals:
The law's concept of a family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what children lack
in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required to make life's difficult decisions.
More importantly. historically it has recognized
that natural bonds of affection iead parents to act
in the best interests of their children. (p. 602)
Parents do not have blanket authority in
making child-rearing decisions, however.
When parents fail to fulfill their duties, the consequences
redound to the child and to a society
interested in a healthy, productive citizenry.
When parents abuse or neglect their children,
the state intervenes on children's behalf under
its parens patriae authority to protect the welfare
of minors (Rendleman, 1971). The state
also preempts parental authority categorically
on some matters. Thus, parents' decisions
about their children's behavior are subject to
child labor and compulsory school attendance
348 The Legal Regulation ofAdolescence
laws that remove discretion on these matters
(Prince I'. Massachusetts, 1944).
The unique legal status of children is
revealed in several distinct aspects of legal
regulation. First, the rights and privileges of
children are more restricted than are those
of adults. For example, concerns about juvenile
crime and victimization led to curfew laws that
restrict minors' nighttime freedom in ways
that would clearly be unconstitutional ifapplied
adults (Schle(f'er v. City a/Charlottesville, 1997).
Limitations on free speech (such as censorship
of school newspapers) are imposed on
youth because of their presumed vulnerability
(Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988;
Morse v. Frederick, 2007). Minors are not permitted
to vote, drink alcohol, drive a vehicle, or
give consent to their own medical treatment.
Second, children are not held accountable
for their choices or responsible for their
behavior to the same extent as adults because
of assumptions about their cognitive and social
immaturity and vulnerability to influence. For
example, under the infancy doctrine in contract
law, minors can avoid liability on their
contracts, presumably because they cannot be
expected to exercise adult-like judgment or to
resist a seller's influence when considering a
purchase (Scott & Kraus, 2007). Also, youth
(traditionally, at least) have not been held to
adult standards for their criminal conduct. The
juvenile court was created in part on the premise
that youthful misconduct is in part a product
of immaturity and that young offenders
are less culpable than their adult counterparts
(Arenella. 1992; Scott & Steinberg, 2003).
Third, children are accorded special legal
protections and entitlements because of their
dependency. Parents are required by law to
provide the necessities of food, shelter, clothing,
and care for their children and the government
subsidizes the provision of these services
when parents who are financially unable to
do so themselves. The public education system
guarantees a free education to children in
all states. Civil and criminal child maltreatment
laws encourage parents to care for their
children; failure to do so can result in coercive
interventions ranging from parenting assistance
to termination of parental rights and/or
criminal conviction.
In summary, assumptions about the vulnerability,
incompetence, and dependency of children
result in a complex set of regulations that
accord children a unique status in law. Minors
are provided special legal protections and
entitlements, held less accountable for their
actions, and accorded fewer rights and privileges
than adults. Policy makers have mUltiple
goals of protecting children, promoting parental
responsibility, and ensuring that children
mature into productive adults, all of which are
grounded in a set of shared assumptions about
what it means to be a child.
DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN
LEGAL CHILDHOOD AND
ADULTHOOD
Although the law sets varying age boundaries
depending on the domain of interest, the
presumptive boundary between childhood and
adulthood is the legal age of nuljority, which
currently is age 18. To some extent, this line
tracks developmental knowledge; late adolescents
are more similar to adults than children
in their physical and cognitive development
(Gardner, Scherer, & Tester, 1989; Siegler &
Alibali, 2004). However, childhood has multiple
legal boundaries that are reflected in a
complex system of age grading. Deviations
from the age of majority can be explained in
part as justified because different decisionmaking
domains require different maturity levels.
For example, greater maturity is required
to serve as president than to drive a motor
vehicle. However, although assumptions about
maturity and immaturity play a role in the
legal judgment about when children become
adults for different purposes, other considerations
factor into the age grading scheme.
Lawmakers balance the competing goals of
promoting youth welfare, protecting parental
authority, and considering societal benefit.
Administrative efficiency also plays a role, as
Drawing the Line Between Legal Childhood and Adulthood 349
does political controversy and compromise, as
is seen most clearly in the debate over minors'
. access to abortion. In this section, we examine
the categorical approach of the age of majority,
and then turn to medical decision making and
abortion access to illustrate the complexity of
domain-specific variation in the legal view
ofadolescence. Both of these latter issues have
generated interest among researchers interested
in evaluating the legal standard guiding
boundary drawing by comparing adolescent
and adult capacities.
The Age of Majority: The Legal
Invisibility of Adolescence
The age of majority functions as the threshold
to legal adulthood for many purposes. Upon
attaining the age of 18, adolescents are no longer
subject to parental authority; parents are no
longer responsible for their children, and the
state withdraws the services and protections
available under its parens patriae powers.
Eighteen-year-olds have the legal authority to
consent to medical treatment, to execute contracts.
deeds and leases, to vote, and to serve
on juries (e.g., Va. Code Ann. §1-13.42). They
are considered responsible, autonomous individuals
who bear the consequences, both good
and bad. of their actions and choices.
The legal age of majority represents a crude
judgment that late adolescents are mature
enough to function in society as adults, but it is
not tailored to recognize any specific developmental
milestone. Life-span research confirms
that development is by no means complete
at age 18; indeed, some have suggested that
young adulthood should constitute a new postadolescence
phase of development (Arnett,
2000; Arnett & Tanner, 2006). Differences
between late adolescents and adults are a
matter of degree rather than kind, yet as with
most phases of development individuals vary
widely in their capacities (Scott, Reppucci. &
Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).
The categorical age of majority ignores
variation among individuals as well as varying
maturity demands in different decision
domains, but extending legal childhood into
late adolescence has some advantages, even
though adult privileges and rights likely
are often withheld from competent youth
(Melton, 1983a). An extended dependency
period assures that youth receive protections
and support, both from their parents and from
the government, and it may reinforce parental
responsibility (Scott & Scott, 1995). A bright
line rule creates certainty regarding expectations
for the relationship between youth,
parents, and the state. Domain- or decisionspecific
assessments of adolescents' capacities
would undermine that certainty, creating a
complex, inefficient, and costly process prone
to error. Moreover, for most purposes postponement
of adult status imposes few costs
on adolescents. Thus, even though it sacrifices
developmentally accuracy, the categorical
approach embodied in the current operationaJization
of thc age of majority mects most of
the legal system's needs with minimal developmental
cost to adolescents.
The right to vote has long been a defining
marker of legal adulthood, and it has historically
been linked to the age of majority. A
cornerstone of participatory democracy, the
right to vote is withheld from minors because
they are presumed less capable of exercising
the right through educated, informed understanding
(Cultice, 1992). Thus, the question
of when individuals are capable of exercising
this right is a consideration in the judgment
of when the right should be extended.
In the 1960s, research suggested that adolescents
possess some of the capacities that
are important to political participation. For
example, abstract understanding of rights, a
sense of community, and conception of the
individual as part of the larger social contract
develop throughout adolescence into adulthood
(Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; Torney-Purta,
1992). Moreover, recent research that separates
understanding of rights, civil liberties,
and democracy from hypothetical situations
that place rights in conflict with other moral
principles, even young children evince more
350 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
sophisticated understanding that previously
thought (Helwig & Turiel, 2002; chapter 7,
voL I, this Handbook)
Most of that early work on "political socialization"
focused on attitudes and perceptions
of children and adolescents, rather than their
underlying cognitive capacities. More recent
work examines the development of politicai
socialization and cognitive representations
of the social order and political system (e.g.,
Helwig & Turiel, 2002; but empirical data on
age differences between adolescents and adults
or developmental trajectories are quite limited
(see chapter 7, vol. I of this Handbook).
Although some reviews of political socialization
research suggest that there is no particular
point when persons learn about politics
or develop civic engagement (Dudley &
Gitelson, 2002; Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998;
Sherrod. Flanagan, & Youniss, 2002), recent
theoretical and empirical research supports
the importance of civically motivated behavior
during adolescence as a predictor of civic
engagement, including voting behavior, in
adulthood (Campbell, 2(06).
Although adolescents may possess the necessary
capacities to engage in informed voting
behavior, only rarely in our history has attention
focused on the age at which the right to vote
is extended, and for the most part, few objections
have becn expressed over withholding
this right from minors-in contrast to protest
over withholding other constitutionally protected
rights, such as the right to make abortion
decisions. This probably renects recognition
that it would be costly to identify those individual
adolescents who are eapable of making
informed voting decisions. Lawmakers may
also assume that adolescents (and society)
incur little harm by postponing the exercise of
voting rights until age 18.
In the 19608, these factors were overcome
by a substantial and ultimately suceessful
effort to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.
The historical record of this important reform,
which is embodied in the 26th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, highlights the
importance of the social and political factors
in defining adult status, and underscores that
developmental maturity may not be the core
consideration (Cultice, 1992). During the
Vietnam War, legal minors, who were not permitted
to vote or exercise other adult rights,
were being drafted into military service and
sent into battle. Moreover, college students
were actively engaged in political participation,
protesting against the Vietnam War and
in support of civil rights. Noting these political
facts, the Senate committee that considered
the proposal to lower the voting age also
documented in its report that this age group
already engaged in a number of adult roles
as employees, taxpayers, and citizens subject
to criminal laws and punishments (S. Rep.
No. 92-26, 1971). The report emphasized that,
for most purposes, psychological maturity is
achieved by age 18.
The passage of the 26th Amendment offers
an interesting account of the forees that int1uence
judgments about when children become
legal adults. First, social and political forces
in large measure propelled the initiative to
shift the boundary of childhood, but legislators
also felt it was important to ground their
proposal in substantive developmental claims
about the cognitive and psychosocial maturity
of 18-year-olds. Another interesting theme is
that, in denning the boundary of adult status,
lawmakers thought that parity should
exist between rights and responsibilities. On
this view, 18-year-olds were reeast from children
into adults with the most important right
of citizenship because they were required to
bear the most onerous civic responsibilitymilitary
service.
Because the right to vote has always been the
marker of legal adulthood, the age of majority
was lowered to age 18 for most purposes after
the passage of the 26th Amendment. This took
place through sweeping legislative and judicial
action at both the state and federal level
that lowered the age of adult status in domains
as disparate as medical decision making, contracting,
and entitlement to support.
Drawing the Line Between Legal Childhood and Adulthood 351
Decision Making: Special
Status for Adolescents
foundafor
the extension of voting rights to late
a substantial body of research
focused on adolescents' capacity to conto
medical treatment. Although in genadolescents
are subject to their parents'
in this realm, the law has granted
adoles(;ents the authority to consent to certain
of treatment without involving their paradolescent
decisions to obtain aborin
this domain lawmakers have adopted
unusual approach of treating adolescents
a category distinct from childhood and
adlllthood. Although the capacities to consent
different medical procedures may develop
cornp1lfalbly. different social and political consldl~ral:t0I1S
have shaped legal policies in these
contexts. Thus, the broad domain of
decision making offers an interesting
study in how factors other than maturity
determine the boundary between childand
adulthood.
m",UIUlLl Treatment: Informed Consent
Adolescents do not have the legal authority to
consent to most medical treatments until they
reach the age of majority. Presumed to lack the
necessary capacities. they are subject to
the decision-making authority of their parents,
who are presumed to act in their children's
best interests. The basis for parental authority
in this area is relatively straightforward.
Medical treatment must be based on competent
informed consent-otherwise, the treatment
provider commits a battery on the patient
(e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hospital, 1970). For
consent to be informed, it must be knowing,
rational, and voluntary (Meisel, Roth, & Lidz,
1977). In general, these legal concepts have
been translated to mean that an individual must
have a factual understanding of the information
provided, utilize a rational process to assimilate
information, and make a decision that
is not simply the result of coercion or deference
to another. Legal regulation gives parents
authority to give informed consent to their children's
(including adolescents') medical treatment,
in part because lawmakers assume that
children and adolescents are not competent to
do so themselves.
Thus, an interesting threshold question is
whether this assumption about adolescents'
incompetence is valid. Competence is a legal
construct that may differ depending on the context;
a finding of competence to consent to one
form of medical treatment does not necessarily
indicate a general ized "competence to consent"
to all treatments. Nonetheless, basic cognitive
capacities known to develop during childhood
and adolescence underlie the abi lity to provide
informed consent, regardless of the specific
context. Grisso and Vierling (1978) map the
legal terms of knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
consent onto relevant psychological
concepts and developmental considerations.
Using their framework, we summarize what is
known about adolescents' capacities generally,
providing detail from a recent review (Miller,
Drotar, & Kodish, 2004) and empirical studies
of informed consent.
Grisso and Vierling (1978) define knowing
consent as the match between the meaning
of the information provided to the patient and
the meaning attached by the patient to that
information; this implicates understanding
of specific terms as well as ethical and legal
concepts such as rights and confidentiality.
Research on children's knowledge of rights
reports an age-based progression from concrete
thinking about what rights can do for an
individual to more abstract appraisals of rights
and moral implications, typically emerging in
adolescence (Melton, 1980, 1983b; Melton &
Limber, 1992), although concrete thinking
about rights still persists in adolescence (e.g.,
Ruck, Keating, Abramovitch & Koegl, 1998).
Intelligent consent refers to the capacity for
assimilating and processing the information
in a rational manner to reach a decision, Such
a process implicates a wide range of abilities
352 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
for abstract reasoning and logical thinking.
Recent reviews conclude that these basic cognitive
capacities have developed sufficiently
by about mid-adolescence, although variations
exist among individuals and within individuals
across decision domains (Steinberg &
Cauffman, 1996). In one study, for example,
Weithorn and Campbell (1982) presented 9-,
14-, 18-, and 21-year-olds with hypothetical
dilemmas regarding alternative treatments
for two medical conditions (diabetes and
epilepsy) and two psychological conditions
(depression and enuresis). The l4-year-olds
performed comparably to the two adult groups
on outcome scores for evidence of choice, reasonableness
of outcome (as judged by experts
in the field), rationality of reasons, and understanding
on three of four dilemmas. In the epilepsy
dilemma, however, a higher percentage of
adolescents rejected the reasonable treatment,
which occasionally had physical side effects
that might affect attractiveness. Although able
to express a reasonable treatment choice, the
9-year-olds clearly demonstrated poorer capac-.
ities than adolescents and adults to understand
and reason about the information provided.
Voluntary consent is given freely, not as
a product of coercion or deference to others.
Scherer and colleagues (Scherer, 1991;
Scherer & Reppucci, 1998) presented groups
of children, adolescents, and adults with three
hypothetical treatment dilemmas in which
the degree of parental influence varied. Most
participants in all groups deferred to parental
authority for less serious treatment decisions,
but adolescents and young adults were less
likely than children to go along with parental
wishes regarding a kidney transplant.
Developmental aspects of deference to the
authority of medlcal personnel are less well
known. In this realm, research on consent to
treatment is sparse; once treatment decisions
have been made, however, adolescents are
generally less compliant than adults but rates
vary by the type of treatment and related factors
such as complexity of regime (Cromer &
Tarnowski, 1989).
The resei3.fch literatures on consent to treatment
are limited by their reliance on samples
of white, middle class youth responding to
hypothetical vignette, but it indicates that, by
age 14, most adolescents have developed the
capacities to meet the threshold requirements
for informed consent to medical and mental
health treatment. Thus, empirical evidence
largely contradicts the legal presumption of
minors' incompetence to consent to treatment.
Even if many adolescents are competent to
make medical decisions, giving parents legal
authority may be a sensible policy for most
medical treatments. It obviates the need and
cost of individual competence assessments
and it encourages parents to provide for their
children's welfare-and to pay their medical
bills, Moreover, although adolescents may be
competent to make medical decisions within
the informed consent framework, psychosocial
influences on decision making may lead them
to make choices that reflect immature judgment.
For example, as mentioned, Weithorn
and Campbell (1982) found adolescents more
reluctant than adults to choose a beneficial
treatment with untoward effects on physical
appearance, perhaps due to greater youthful
sensitivity to peer approval, In general, it
seems likely that children and their parents
do not have a conflict of interest about most
treatment decisions, so the standard approach
of giving parents authority generally functions
satisfactorily to protect children's interests in
this realm.
Most exceptions to the general rule that
parents have authority to make medical decisions
for their ehildren arise in contexts in
which minors' welfare and the general social
welfare would be compromised if parental
consent were required. The traditional mature
minor doctrine allows older competent minors
to consent to routine beneficial treatment
or treatment in emergency situations when
parents would likely consent or are unavailable
(Wadlington, 1973). More interesting
are statutes in many states that give minors
the authority to consent to specific types of
Drawing the Line Between Legal Childhood and Adulthood 353
medical treatments. These typically include
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases,
substance abuse, mental health problems, and
contraception and pregnancy (e.g., Va. Code
Ann. §44.l-2969).
These minor consent statutes presume
that adoleseents are competent to consent to
the designated medical treatments, but not
on the basis of a judgment about adolescent
maturity. Instead, minors are allowed to seek
treatment without involving their parents
out of concern that the standard requirement
of parental consent may expose vulnerable
youth to harm. The harm may eome from
two sourees. First, lawmakers may rightly be
concerned that for the kinds of treatments targeted
by minors' eonsent statutes, parents, in
fact, may have a conflict of interest with their
children; if so. the traditional presumption
that parents will generally act to promote their
children's welfare may not hold. For example,
parents may be angry when they learn of their
children's sexual activity or drug use. Just as
important, adolescents' fears about the anticipated
parental reaction, whether accurate or
not, might deter some adolescents from seeking
needed treatment. Removing the parental
consent barrier to treatment benefits the adolescents
themselves as well by encouraging
them to seek treatment; it also may reduce the
prevalence of harmful and costly conditions
(e.g., drug addiction, unwanted pregnancy),
and thus benefit social welfare as well.
Access to Abortion: Competing
Ideologies and Developmelltal
Capacities
Of the issues in which lawmakers have
departed from the standard legal treatment of
adolescence, none has generated more controversy
than the question of when and if legal
minors should have access to abortion. This
debate has brought into stark relief conflicting
perspectives on adolescents and their capacities.
Conservatives depict pregnant teens as
children who should be subject to their parents'
authority, while advocates for youthful
self-determination describe them as adults
who should have the freedom to make their
own decisions about abortions. Moreover,
both sides are concerned not only with the
developmental capacities and rights of minors,
but also with the larger contest over abortion
rights, regardless of age (Gorney, 1998; Rubin,
1998). Developed against the background of
this intense controversy, the resulting legal
framework is a complex product of judicial
and political compromise. Thus, in many
states, lawmakers regUlating abortion have
rejected the conventional binary classification
and created a separate legal category for adolescents,
in which teens are subject to judicial
proceedings to determine whether they will be
authorized to make their own decisions about
abortion. We argue that this costly regulatory
scheme harms the interests of pregnant teens
and offers little in the way of social benefit.
Advocates of adolescent self-determination
argue that adolescents should be accorded
adult status in this context because the decision
to terminate a pregnancy differs in many
ways from other types of medical treatment.
Because this choice is grounded in constitutionally
based privacy and autonomy rights,
lawmakers cannot ignore evidence that adolescents
have the developmental maturity
to make this decision. In the last 2 decades.
researchers have struggled to investigate adolescent
decision making about abortion in
ecologically valid ways. Social scientists have
examined many dimensions of the abortion
decision, including moral and personal dimensions
of reasoning (e.g., Smetana, 1981), patterns
of consultation with others (e.g., Finken
& Jacobs, 1996; Resnick, Bearlinger, Stark,
& Blum, 1994), and the medical and mental
health sequelae (Pope, Adler, & Tschann,
200 I; Quinton, Major, & Richards, 2001).
The few studies that have focused on this
decision context have found few significant
differences between the capacities ofolder adolescents
and adults to meet the legal requirements
for informed consent to abortion. Lewis
(1980) interviewed 42 adolescents and adults
354 The Legal Regulation ofAdolescence
about their pregnancy decisions, and found
no age-based differences in decision-making
strategy or abstract reasoning. Adolescents
did view their decisions as more externally
compelled (through pressure from parents)
than adults, indirectly implicating the voluntariness
prong of competence. Ambuel and
Rappaport (1992) interviewed young adolescents
(ages 15 and under), older adolescents
(ages 16-17), and adults (ages 18-21) awaiting
pregnancy test results at a medical clinic.
Responses were scored according to four criteria
relevant to legal competence: volition
of choice, global quality of reasoning, consequences,
and richness of reasoning. Overall,
these researchers found no age differences in
any dimensions of competence. Young adolescents
who reported they would not consider
abortion as an option scored significantly
worse than adults on volition, consequences,
and global quality of reasoning. Although
limited, these studies are consistent with
more general research on decision making in
their conclusion that mid- to late adolescents
have developed the basic cognitive capacities
required to provide valid informed consent.
Those who argue that adolescents should
be classified as adults for purposes of abortion
decision making do not rely soieiy on developmental
claims or on the constitutional importance
of the decision. After all, minors may
be competent to exercise constitutional rights
in other domains (e.g., voting, jury service)
but are not granted the right to do so, in part
because no great harm results from postponement.
A distinguishing feature of the childbearing
decision is that it cannot be postponed and
that it has enormolls consequences for the individual,
often for the course of her future life.
Moreover, pregnancy and childbirth pose substantial
health risks for teens-and for their
children-as well as negative consequences for
the future welfare of both young mothers and
their children (Furstenburg, Brooks-Gunn, &
Chase-Lansdale. 1989). For these reasons,
advocates who have little interest in adolescent
self-determination per se might well support
adolescent access to abortion on paternalistic
grounds (Scott, 1992).
The rationale for allowing adolescents to
make decisions about abortion without involving
their parents is similar in many regards to
that which supports the minor consent statutes,
discussed earlier. As with treatment for substance
abuse, contraception, and sexually transmitted
diseases, the decision about abortion
is one on which parents' interests may not be
consonant with their children. Parents' moral or
religious views about abortion or teenage sexual
behavior may trump concerns for the health or
welfare of their pregnant adolescents. Although
substantial research documents parental attitudes,
behaviors, and influence on adolescent
sexual behavior (Brooks-Gunn & Furstenburg,
1989; Meschke, Bartholomae, & Zentall,
2002), only a few studies have examined parental
views or decision making in the abortion
context (Henshaw & Kost, 1992; Resnick et al..
1994; Torres, Forrest, & Eisman, 1980).
Abortion is similar to treatments targeted by
minor consent statutes in another way. Even if
parents would be supportive of the choices their
daughters make, teens might postpone dealing
with the pregnancy because they fear their
parents' reactions-a consequence with potentially
even greater consequences that postponing
other treatments. Approximately one-half
to two-thirds of all adolescents do consult their
parents about pregnancy; younger adolescents,
who may be most in need of parental support
and advice, are more likely than older girls to
talk to their parents (Adler, Ozer & Tschann,
2003). Indeed, most adolescents who obtain
an abortion consult parents or another adult
(Resnick et aI., 1994). In a nationally representative
sample of unmarried minors having an
abortion, 61 % had told their parents; the most
common reasons for nondisclosure were desires
to preserve the relationship with parents (e.g.,
they might be hurt, disappointed, or angry), to
prevent interference with relationships (e.g.,
parents might prevent the continuation ofa relationship
with the sexual partner), and to protect
parents from additional problems (e.g., parents
Drawing the Line Between Legal Childhood and Adulthood 355
already had enough stress; Henshaw & Kost,
1992). [n a study of women obtaining an elective,
first-trimester abortion. adolescents scored
significantly higher than adults on perceptions
that having an abortion conflicts with how thier
parents viewed them (Quinton et ai., 2001). At
I month postabortion, adolescents reported fewer
benefits and greater harm from the abortion than
adults, a difference that was explained in part by
the significant age difference in parental conflict.
Some observers have suggested that adolescents
have unrealistically negative views of
potential parental reaction to sex-related issues
(Newcomer & Udry, 1985), but in large measure
the accuracy of their beliefs is less relevant
than the impact of those beliefs and concerns
on adolescent behavior. In the Henshaw and
Kost (1992) study. a substantial proportion of
adolescents who did not tell their parents about
their abortions reported as the reasons that they
had experienced family violence. feared domestic
violence, or thought they might be kicked
out of the house if their parents found out about
the abortion. Five of 26 Massachusetts young
women who pursued ajudiciaJ bypass to parental
consent requirements (i.e., a provision under
the state's law that permits an adolescent to act
without her parents' involvement if a judge
agrees that the minor is mature enough to make
the decision herself or that this course of action
is in her best interests under the circumstances)
did so out of fear of parental reaction; each of
them described prior threatened or actual harm
(Ehrlich. 2006). One-fourth of minors seeking
judicial bypass under Minnesota's two-parent
notification law brought one parent with them
in the quest to legally bypass notification of the
other parent (O'Keefe & Jones, 1990). Thus,
standard legal requirements of parental consent
to minors' medical treatment may pose a threat to
the welfare of pregnant teens.
In one way, abortion is different from the
treatments targeted by minors' consent statutes,
but the difference itself arguably points in
the direction of adolescent self-determination
in this context. Unlike other procedures for
which adolescents can provide consent without
their parents' involvement, abortion involves
a highly contested moral choice. Few dispute
that the "right" choice for adolescents with a
drug problem is treatment. However, no consensus
exists about the "right" choice for a
pregnant adolescent. Thus. a core issue in classifying
pregnant teens as children or as adults
is whether parents (or courts) should have the
authority to impose their values on a pregnant
adolescent or whether her values should determine
whether she ends the pregnancy or has
a child.
The legal regulation of adolescent access to
abortion varies in different states. Some states
(e.g., Connecticut, Washington) have shifted
the boundary of childhood downward and
classified pregnant teens as adults for abortion
decisions, adopting the approach of the minor
consent statutes. Others have maximized the
reach of parental authority to the extent that
it is constitutionally permitted, within limits
set by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of
decisions have defined the parameters of state
regulation. These decisions permit restrictions
that would be unconstitutional for adults while
simultaneously preventing states from subjecting
adolescents to conventional parental
authority over their children. Parental consent
cannot be required of mature minors, but states
can require that the determination of "maturity"
be the subject of a judicial proceeding
(Bellotti v. Baird, 1979). Under Supreme Court
doctrine. if a minor is found to be immature.
the court, exercising the state's parens patriae
authority, must determine whether an abortion
without parental involvement is in her best
interest (Bellotti v. Baird, 1979; City qfAkron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
1983). Although parents are not granted veto
power over an adolescent's abortion (Bellotti
v. Baird, 1979; City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health. 1983: Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.
1976), states can require that parents must be
notified of their daughter's intent to obtain an
abortion (H.L. '" Matheson, 1981; Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 1990; Ohio v. Akron Center for
356 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
Reproductive Health, 1990; Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood ofNorthern Nelv England, 2006).
Indeed, the Court upheld a parental requirement
that both parents be notified, even if they
are divorced (Hodgson v. Minnesota, 1990).
A substantial majority of states have
responded to Supreme Court's pronouncements
by passing laws requiring parental
involvement in minors' abortion decisions,
either through consent or notificaticn, unless
the pregnant minor demonstrates that she
is "mature and well enough informed" to make
her own abortion decision in a judicial bypass
hearing (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 2008;
Bellotti v. Baird, 1979, p. 647). The Court has
provided no further guidance to judges making
these determinations, and studies and judicial
opinions confirm that the indeterminacy
of such a standard results in wide variability of
bypass hearing outcomes. In some states, virtually
all petitions are granted using justifications
that appear paternalistic rather than autonomy
focused (Mnookin, 1985). In Massachusetts,
1,000 hearings per year resulted in just 13
denials over a lO-year period (Mnookin,
!985). Similarly, only 9 minors were deemed
immature out of 477 Ohio bypass hearings
that lasted an average of 12 minutes (Yates &
Pliner, 1988). However, some states grant
few petitions, and advocates recommended
that adolescents go to nearby states to seek
an abortion (Lewin, 1992). The capacities of
those adolescents seeking abortion via judicial
bypass (as a distinct subgroup of adolescents
seeking abortion) have not been systematically
studied (but see Ehrlich, 2006, for results of
extensive interviews); nonetheless, it is highly
unlikely that the extreme variation in the outcomes
of bypass hearings (i.e., virtually all
young women in one state are competent to
consent, whereas all in another state are not)
are a function of neutral competence assessments,
particularly given the hearings' limited
duration. Much more likely is that the attitudes
of courts about abortion, teen pregnancy, and
parental authority play an important role in
judges' evaluations of "maturity."
The legal framework endorsed by the
Supreme Court can be understood as an effort
to find an acceptable resolution to a highly
contested dispute about the boundary of childhood-a
dispute that has more to do with
conflicting attitudes about abortion itself than
with views on the maturity or autonomy interests
and capacities of adolescents. In a legal
framework that predicates the minor's exercise
of her cO::1stitutional right of choice on
her ability to persuade a court of her maturity,
even mature teens are subject to greater regulation
than their adult counterparts. At the same
time, however, states are precluded from treating
pregnant adolescents as children subject to
their parents' authority, solely because they are
minors. This regulatory scheme eschews the
standard binary classification of childhood and
adulthood in favor of a special intermediate
status for adolescents, albeit through a costly,
time-consuming procedure of individualized
maturity determinations.
On its face, this exception to the bright
line rule is consistent with recognition of adolescence
as a unique developmental period.
However, it appears that this regulatory framework
that treats adolescence as an intermediate
category can be understood as the result of
political and moral compromise, rather than as
an expression of developmentally based legal
theory. Although this compromise may remove
the controversy from the politically charged
legislative arena to the more deliberative setting
of the courtroom, the regulatory scheme
has little to recommend it. Empirical research
has yet to examine the impact of participation
in bypass hearings on health and developmental
outcomes, but this procedural hurdle may
lead pregnant teens to delays that can increase
the health risks of abortion. Moreover, there is
little reason to believe that the assessment of
maturity that is the function of bypass hearings
serves any useful purpose. Few studies examine
the factors that predict judicial decision making.
In some jurisdictions minimal variability
in the outcome measure precludes meaningful
statistical analysis; in others, judicial
attitudes about abortion or teen pregnancy
may trump adolescent capacities as an outcome
predictor (Ehrlich, 2006). Some courts
even refuse to conduct bypass hearings.
(Silverstein, 2007). The upshot is that the creation
of an intermediate category of adolescence
in this context apparently does little to
promote the health of adolescents and the welfare
of society, and has no obvious advantage
over the binary classification found in minors'
consent statutes under which adolescents are
simply treated as legal adults.
The experience with abortion regulation
reinforces the theme with which we began.
Although psychologists recognize adolescence
as a distinct developmental period, for
the most part, the law's tendency to ignore this
transitional stage does not seem to have harmful
effects. The rather simplistic approach of
binary classification, under which the transition
to adulthood is effected through a series
of bright line legal rules, seems to serve the
collective purpose of facilitating young citizens'
development to healthy adulthood.
Adolescents can drive at age 16, and vote and
execute contracts at age 18, but they remain
children until age 21 for the purposes of
purchasing alcohol and (in some states) receiving
child support while they attend college. The
societal and developmental costs of delaying
these rights and responsibilities do not appear
to outweigh the benefits of such an approach.
RECOGNIZING ADOLESCENCE
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY
There is one context in which policies that
recognize the unique developmental status of
adolescence would serve to promotc both the
interests ofyouth and ofsociety. Injuvenile justice
policy, lawmakers have followed the conventional
approach, treating young offenders
either as children or as adults during different
historical periods. As the following account
will suggest, neither of these approaches has
worked satisfactorily. Scientific knowledge
about adolescence can scrve as the basis of
a legal regime that is fair to young offenders
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 357
and at the same time promotes social welfare
(Scott & Steinberg, 2008).
Contrasting Portraits 

of Adolescent Offenders 

The Era ofWayward Children­

The Traditional Juvenile Court 

The establishment of the juvenile court at the
turn of the twentieth century was part of
a broader Progressive reform agenda that
expanded the boundaries of childhood, and
dramatically reshaped the relationship between
families and the state (Kelt, 1977; Levine &
Levine, 1970; Tiffin, 1982). With the creation of
compulsory school attendance laws, the prohibition
of child labor, and the establishment of a
child welfare system, government assumed
a far more active role in the supervision and
even preemption of parental authority in the
upbringing of children. Progressive reformers
pursued a fundamental objective of improving
the experience of childhood and expanding its
boundaries, with a goal of shaping youth into
productive citizens. In the rhetoric of this era,
adolescents were described as children who
required the care and protection oftheir parents,
or of the state if parents were not up to the task.
A reformer and juvenile court judge, Miriam
Van Waters (1926) described the underlying
theory of the new juvenile court, which was a
core component of the Progressive program, in
the following terms:
[T]he child of the proper age to be under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court is encircled by
the arm of the state, which, as a sheltering. wise
parent, assumes guardianship and has power
to shield the child from the rigors of the common
law and from the neglect and depravity of
adults. (p. 9)
In an era in which teens often assumed
adult roles and responsibilities, reformers used
several strategies to create a new image of
adolescents. First, as the statement by Waters
suggests, advocates described the youth who
would benefit from Progressive policies in
358 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
terms that emphasized their vulnerability,
innocence and dependence. For example,
dramatic stories of horrendous working conditions
in factories bolstered the arguments
for the need for protection through compulsory
school attendance and child labor laws
(Bremner, 1974). The solution to exploitation
of children was a government ready to intervene
to provide what the Progressives thought
parents failed to provide-firm guidance and
benevolent protection from harm.
The paternalistic rhetoric and protectionist
agenda was readily accepted as applied to
children who were subject to parental maltreatment,
but reshaping the image of delinquent
youth was more of a challenge. An
important focus of Progressive reform was the
establishment of a separate court that would
respond to the needs of children who were
subject to abuse and neglect by their parents
and would also deal with juvenile offenders
up to 16 or 18 years of age. Young offenders
would not be subject to criminal punishment,
but instead would receive rehabilitative
treatment that would guide them on the path
to productive adulthood. A second rhetorical
"strategy" employed by the reformers was to
downplay distinctions between young offenders
and child victims of parental abuse, by
arguing that abuse. neglect, and delinquency
were all manifestations of inadequate parenting
(Fox, 1967). Thus, young offenders were
portrayed as children whose parents had failed
them, and the state's role in both delinquency
and maltreatment cases was "to intervene
in the spirit of a wise parent" (Van Waters,
1926, p. II) to provide care and rehabilitation.
Advocates and judges related stories of
young offenders-boys and girls, younger and
older teens, committing minor and more serious
offenses-who came before the juvenile
court and responded favorably to paternalistic
interventions designed only to promote their
welfare (Lindsey & O'Higgins, 1909).
Although the child labor and school attendance
reforms effectively shifted the boundary
of childhood, the Progressive efforts in the
area of juvenile ju~tice were less successfuL
The romanticized accounts of young offenders
as innocent children wronged by their parents
ignored the crucial distinction between delinquents
and maltreated children-that criminal
conduct causes harm to others. Thus, the
system's pretense that delinquency proceedings
were solely to promote the welfare of the
child before the court ignored the state's legitimate
interest in protecting society from crime.
Moreover, acceptance of the rehabilitative
model was likely always premised on the success
of rehabilitative interventions in reforming
young offenders and protecting society,
and over time, confidence in the effectiveness
of rehabilitation waned.
Criticism of the juvenile court came from
those who thought the system failed to control
juvenile crime, but it also came from liberals
who cared about the welfare of young offenders.
Advocates for youth became disenchanted,
because young offenders were not receiving
treatment and yet they were processed without
the procedural protections and guarantees
that were provided to adults in criminal court
(Allen, 1964). In 1967. the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed a landmark opinion holding that
juveniles facing the deprivation of their liberty
in delinquency proceedings were entitled to
many of the rights accorded to adult criminal
defendants under the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution-most importantly, the right
to an attorney (In re Gault, 1967).
In the view of many observers, Gault
marked the beginning of the end of the traditional
juvenile court. Although it was at least 2
more decades before the idea that juvenile
offenders should be subject to more lenient
treatment in the juvenile system was seriously
challenged, Gault dealt a severe blow
to the already faltering rehabilitative model.
More importantly, perhaps, although thoughtful
reforms were proposed in the 1970s and
1980s, no coherent contemporary rationale
for maintaining a separate juvenile justice
system took hold (American Bar Association,
1982; Zimring, 1978). Youth continued to be
processed in the juvenile system, but it was
not clear what its purposes should be or how it
should differ from the adult system.
Contemporary Reform and Young
Criminals
Conservative critics ridiculed the leniency of
the juvenile justice system and, as violent juvenile
crime rates rose in 19808 and early 19905,
they intensified their attacks. In sharp contrast
to the Progressive depiction of young offenders
as children, these punitive reformers argued
that youth who commit serious crimes should
be tried and punished as adults. This modern
reform movement has led to sweeping statutory
changes over the past decade or so (Torbet &
Szymanski, 1998). The explicit goals of this
crusade were public safety and punishment,
and little concern was expressed about the
welfare of young wrongdoers or hope for their
reform. The historical depiction of delinquents
as wayward children has been replaced by a
modern archetype of the savvy young criminal
who is a serious threat to society. Modern
advocates of tough policies have denied any
psychological distinctions between youth and
adults that are relevant to criminal responsibility;
the mantra of the movement is "adult time
for adult crime" (Ellis, 1993; Regnery, 1985).
Contemporary reformers have accomplished
the transformation of children charged
with crimes into legal adults through several
legislative strategies. First, the age at which
juveniles can be transferred to adult court
has been lowered for many crimes (Torbet,
Gable, Hurst, Montgomery, Szymanski, &
Thomas, 1997). The juvenile court has always
used transfer to adult court as a safety valve
for those juveniles ill suited to its jurisdiction.
Traditionally, transfer required a judicial
inquiry into a juvenile's appropriateness
for juvenile court that considered a broad set
of criteria, including the youth's maturity and
development. Recent reforms have not only
lowered the age of transfer and expanded the
range of crimes that can trigger a transfer hearing,
they have also narrowed the scope of the
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 359
transfer inquiry to focus only on offense seriousness
and prior record (Wagman, 2000). In
combination, these changes facilitate the transfer
of greater numbers ofjuveniles.
Moreover, reliance on judicial hearings in
which transfer decisions are made on a case-bycase
basis by judges has yielded in many states
to other avenues to criminal court adjudication
and punishment ofjuveniles. Legislative waiver
categorically excludes from j uvenile courtjurisdiction
large classes of young offenders, usually
defined by age and offense category. Thus,
a 13-year-old charged with armed robbery may
be statutorily defined as an adult and simply
not eligible for juvenile court treatment at alL
Moreover, "direct file" statutes confer discretion
on prosecutors to charge youth as juveniles
or as adults for certain crimes (Snyder &
Sickmund, 2006). In addition, youth sentenced
in juvenile court under blended sentencing
schemes serve time in adult facilities once they
exceed the age of juvenile corrections jurisdiction.
Through these mechanisms, the modern
reformers have transformed the legal landscape
by lowering the age of adult prosecution
and punishment for a broad range of juvenile
offenders. Although no national statistics exist,
researchers estimate that over 200,000 youth
are tried annually as adults (Sickmund, Snyder,
and Poe-Yamagata, 1997).
The reforms have resulted in more punitive
treatment of youth in the juvenile system
as well. Incarceration plays a much larger role
in the disposition of juveniles today as a result
of the "get-tough" reforms of the I990s. A study
in Washington State found that confinement
rates in that state's juvenile system increased
by 40% during the 1990s-period when serious
crime rates fell by 50%. In the late 19808,
out of each 1,000 Washington youth, 2.5 youth
were confined in juvenile facilities; a decade
later the confinement rate had increased to 3.5
youth per 1,000 (Aos, Phipps, Barnoski, &
Lieb, 2001 ). Two changes have led to increased
confinement of juveniles across the country.
First, juveniles who would have received community
sanctions in an earlier era are sent to
360 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
secure facilities today. Moreover, incarceration
periods are much longer than they once were.
On one level, these reforms are consistent
with some other policies that have lowered the
age boundary to define adolescents as adults.
Advocates for minors' consent statutes and
alcohol restrictions, for example, argue that
these policies respond to harmful conduct by
adolescents in ways that promote social welfare.
Unlike these other policies, however, the
modernjuveniIejustice reforms make little pretense
that punishing young offenders as adults
will benefit the juveniles themselves. Their
advocacy rests solely on a claim that punitive
policies will reduce the social costs of youth
crime and promote social welfare. In its lack of
regard for the welfare of young persons, juvenile
justice policy is unique and anomalous in
the legal regime of youth regulation. Shortly,
we will review the growing research base that
challenges this claim and argue that social
welfare and youth welfare are undermined by
modem juvenile justice reforms.
Enthusiasm for pur.ishing young criminals
seems to have abated in recent years as policy
makers and the public are having second
thoughts about a justice system in which age
and immaturity often are ignored in calculating
criminal punishment. Rates of violent juvenile
cnme decreased steadily beginning for
since the mid-1990s (Snyder, 2005; Torbet &
Szymanski, 1998), and legislatures have begun
to realize that harsh sanctions are costly to
taxpayers. In several states, punitive statutes
adopted in the 1990s are being moderated or
repealed (National Juvenile Defender Center,
2007). There is also evidence that public support
for harsh policies is weaker than conventional
wisdom presumed (Nagin et al.. 2005).
Courts and legislatures are beginning to pay
attention to arguments by critics of contemporary
policies that holding young offenders
fully responsible for their crimes violates wellaccepted
principles that define just punishment
in the criminal law (Scott & Steinberg, 2003;
Steinberg & Scott, 2003). In this calmerclimate,
many observers argue that a reexamination of
punitive justice policies is in order (Scott &
Steinberg, 2008; Zimring, 1998).
A Developmental Model of Juvenile
Justice Policy
Both the history of the traditional juvenile
court and the account of contemporary justice
policies under which youth often are classified
as adults suggest that the standard approach to
legal regulation of adolescence-binary classification
as either children or adults-has not
worked well in the context of crime policy.
Instead, a system that treats adolescence as an
intermediate legal category between childhood
and adulthood and that is based on scientific
knowledge about this developmental stage is
likely to be more satisfactory than either the
traditional or the contemporary approach.
Juvenile crime regulation based on developmental
knowledge has two important advantages
over the alternatives. First, it is more
compatible with principles of fairness that
shape the constitutional contours of criminal
punishment and procedures. Second, a system
based on scientific knowledge of adolescence
is more likely to promote social welfare
by reducing ;:he social costs of juvenile crime
(Scott & Steinberg, 2008).
Traditional juvenile justice policy, although
its tone was benign, did more harm than good.
Even assuming that the Progressive reformers
had pure intentions (an assumption that some
have challenged; Platt, 1977). the myth of
offenders as vulnerable children was implausible
when applied to older youth charged with
serious crimes. It undermined the credibility of
the system, leading many to believe that public
safety and accountability did not get adequate
attention (Feld, 1999). Moreover, as the Court
recognized in Gault, young offenders themselves
were harmed because the juvenile court
operated without the procedural constraints
that protect adult criminal defendants, whose
interest was always understood to be in conflict
with that of the state. Further, because the
ostensible purpose of intervention was to rehabilitate
rather than punish the child, the court
and correctional system had virtually unbridled
discretion in fashioning dispositions, unconstrained
by the principles limiting criminal
punishment (Allen, 1964; Scott & Steinberg,
2003). Thus, because punishment and public
protection were important but hidden forces at
work in the disposition of young offenders, the
reality of the juvenile justice system was that
many youth got little rehabilitation in prisonlike
correctional facilities. A return to traditional
juvenile justice policy is not the solution
to the excesses of the recent punitive reforms.
Modem reformers make several empirical
assumptions in justifying punitive policiesassumptions
that the scientific evidence does
not support. First, they assume that adolescents
are not different from adults in any way
that is important to criminal responsibility and
thus deserve the same punishment for their
offenses as their adult counterparts. Second,
they assume that youth who are tried in criminal
proceedings are as capable as adults of
functioning adequately as defendants and meet
the constitutional mandate that criminal defendants
must be competent to stand trial (Pate v.
Robinson, 1966). Finally, conservative reformers
also assume (and argue) that punishing
young offenders as adults is essential to protect
society from juvenile crime. The empirical
evidence from developmental psychology
challenges all of these assumptions.
First, the evidence indicates that adolescent
psychosocial immaturity distinguishes young
lawbreakers from adults in ways that are very
likely to affect their understanding and judgment
in making criminal choices. Thus, holding
them fully accountable for their crimes
violates the principle of proportionality, which
defines fair criminal punishment. Second,
research shows that younger teens are likely to
be less capable than adults of functioning competently
in the trial setting, raising questions
about whether they meet the constitutional
mandate of trial competence (Grisso, et. aI.,
2003; Scott & Grisso, 2005). Finally, the claim
that harsh punishment promotes social welfare
does not stand up to empirical scrutiny.
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 361
Research comparing youth retained in juvenile
court with those prosecuted as adults indicates
that harsh policies may aggravate recidivism
rates (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; Fagan, 1996).
Moreover, recent research on developmental
pathways indicates that the most adolescent
offenders desist from offending as part of their
life course development and are not likely to
become career criminals unless the justice
system pushes them in that direction (Moffitt,
1993; Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 20(3).
This, together with research showing the
importance of social context for the accomplishment
of critical developmental tasks. suggests
that correctional interventions can play an
important role in the whether young offenders
continue in lives of crime or become productive
(or at least noncriminal) adults (Steinberg,
Chung & Little. 2004). Thus, policies based on
utilitarian goals must consider the long-term
consequences of punishment in addition to the
direct costs ofjuvenile crime.
Crimillal Respollsibility ill Adolesce1lce
The criminal law assumes that most offenders
make rational autonomous choices to commit
crimes, and that the legitimacy ofpunishment is
undermined if the criminal decision is coerced,
irrational, or based on a lack of understanding
about the meaning of the choice (Bonnie,
Coughlin, Jeffries, & Low, 2004). Punishment
must be proportionate to blameworthiness,
which is mitigated ifthe individual's decisionmaking
capacity is seriously compromised.
Historically, developmental immaturity has
been deemed irrelevant to criminal responsibility
because juveniles were processed in
a separate court and correctional system that
ostensibly did not impose punishment at all
(Scott & Steinberg, 2003; Walkover, 1984).
Thus, the question of how the criminal law
should take immaturity into account in deciding
fair punishment got little attention. Recently,
the role of immaturity in the determination
of criminal responsibility has become important,
as younger and younger offenders are
processed in adult court. There is a pressing
362 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
need for theory and research regarding how
developmental immaturity should be considered
in determining criminal responsibility and
punishment.
Psychological research supports the hypothesis
that developmental factors inHuence
youthful judgment and (ultimately) decision
making in ways that could be relevant to criminal
choices. Several authors have reviewed how
aspects of adolescent cognitive and. particularly.
psychosocial development might implicate
youth's capacities as defendants (e.g., Scott
et ai., 1995: Scott & Steinberg, 2008; Scott &
Grisso, 1997; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000;
Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996; Woolard, 2002).
Capacities for reasoning and understanding
improve significantly from late childhood into
adolescence. and by mid-adolescence. most
teens are close to adults in their ability to reason
and to process information (what might be
called pure cognitive capacities), at least in the
abstract (Keating. 2004). lbe reality, however,
is that adolescents are likely less capable than
adults are in usilll? these cognitive capacities
in making real-world choices partly because
of lack of experience and partly because teens
do not tend to learn from experience as effectively
as adults (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Ward &
Overton, 1990),
Psychosocial maturation lags behind cognitive
development, however, and psychosocial
immaturity may contribute to decisions about
involvement in criminal activity, in several
ways. First, adolescents are more responsive to
peer inBuence than are adults. Peer conformity
and compliance are powerful influences on
adolescent behavior and likely play an important
role in delinquent conduct as well (Berndt.
1979: Costanzo & Shaw, 1966; Gardner &
Steinberg, 2005). [n contrast to adult offending,
most juvenile crime occurs in groups, and
peer influence may be an important motivating
factor (Reiss & Farrington, J991 ). Adolescents
also generally have a foreshortened temporal
perspective; they tend to identify and focus
on short-term consequences more readily than
those in the future (Nurmi, ]991; Greene, ]986;
Steinberg et at, in press). Developmental differences
in future orientation may be linked
to differences in risk preferences: it is well
documented that youth tend to engage in risky
behaviors more often than adults. They also
appear to calculate and weigh risks and benefits
somewhat differently than adults, tending
to focus more on rewards and less on risks than
do adults (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg,
2004; Byrnes, 1998; Furby & Beyth-Marom,
1992; Gardner, 1992). Adolescents' capacities
for risk perception are almost as good as adults
in laboratory studies, but teens' abilities are
diminished in social contexts where emotion,
experience, willingness, and opportunity for
risk behavior interact (Reyna & Farley, 2006;
Steinberg, 2004). Finally. the limited research
that exists suggests that adolescents are more
impulsive than adults, that they tend to be subject
to more rapid and extreme mood changes,
and that they may be more reactive to environmental
cues and temptations-although
the relationship between impulsivity and
moodiness is unclear (Reyna & Farley, 2006;
Steinberg & Cauffman. 1996).
Thesepsychosocial attributes ofadolescence
may be linked to neurological development.
Recent studies of adolescent brain development
show that important structural change
takes place during this stage in the frontal
lobes of the brain, most importantly in the prefrontal
cortex. This region is central to "executive
functions" and self-regulation-advanced
thinking processes that are employed in planning,
regulating emotions. the anticipation of
future consequences, and weighing the costs
and benefits of decisions before acting (Dahl,
2004; Giedd, 2004; Spear. 2000). Researchers
believe that the prefrontal cortex does not fully
develop until one's early 20s. Thus, the immature
judgment of teens to some extent may be a
function of hard wiring that creates a disjunction
between heightened sensitivity to reward
and regulatory capacity (Steinberg, 2004).
Adolescents, due to their psychological
immaturity, are less blameworthy than adult
offenders for another reason. The criminal law
presumes that a criminal act reflects the actor's
bad character. Thus, offenders who can show
that their criminal conduct was out of character
(by offering evidence that they generally are
persons of good character) may be able to get
a reduced sentence. This source of mitigation
applies to adolescents as well, not because they
can demonstrate good character, but because
their characters are unformed. As psychologists
since Erik Erikson have observed, an important
developmental task of adolescence is the
formation of personal identity (Erikson, 1968).
During this stage, identity is fluid; values, plans,
attitudes, and beliefs are likely to be tentative
as teens struggle to figure out who they are.
This process involves a lot of experimentation,
which for many adolescents means engaging
in risky activities, including crime. Research
supports that much juvenile crime stems from
experimentation typical of this developmental
stage rather than moral deficiencies ret1ecting
bad character. Thus, it is not surprising that
17-year-olds commit more crimes than any
other age group and that the rate declines
steeply thereafter (Piquero et aI., 2003).
Developmental research is consistent with
theories about cognitive and psychosocial differences
between adolescent offenders and
adults, but only a few empirical studies exist
that deal even indirectly with decision making
about criminal activity. (That little research
deals directly with these matters is easy to
understand.) Fried and Reppucci (2001) evaluated
the influence of several psychosocial
factors on criminal decision making using
videotaped vignettes of a series of decisions
resulting in a crime. Age-based differences in
psychosocial capacities followed a V-shaped
function with mid-adolescents (ages 15-16)
scoring lower on maturity than their younger
(ages 12-14) and older (ages 17-18) counterparts.
A possible explanation for this pattern is
that the responses of younger teens, who have
not yet undergone individuation, may ret1ect
their parents' values. Cauffman and Steinberg
(2000) examined age differences between adolescents
and adults on a series of hypothetical
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 363
vignettes describing various criminal behaviors.
They also found age differences in psychosocial
factors, which in turn predicted
decision outcomes. Higher psychosocial maturity
was associated with more socially responsible
decisions in the vignettes. Age did not
remain a significant predictor once psychosocial
maturity was taken into account.
Although limited in scope, this research
provides initial support for the hypothesis that
developmental factors contribute to immature
judgment in ways that may differentiate adolescent
criminal decision making from that of
adults. These studies provide the impetus for
continued research into developmental capacities
that are relevant to legal assessments of
culpability. The findings are consistent with
the notion that adolescent offenders should
be considered less blameworthy than adults
but not blameless, as an insane defendant or a
child might be. In short, developmental arguments
support adoption of a mitigation model in
the regulation of juvenile crime-a model that
recognizes the adolescents generally are less
culpable than adults (Scott & Steinberg, 2008;
Steinberg & Scott, 2003).
The V.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
adolescent immaturity mitigates culpability in a
landmark case holding that imposing the death
penalty for crimes committed by juveniles is
a violation of the Constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment (Roper
v. Simmons, 2005). Adopting the mitigation
framework offered by Scott and Steinberg in
an American Psychologist article (Steinberg &
Scott, 2003), the Court pointed to the diminished
decision-making capacity of adolescents,
which leads them to make "impetuous and
ill-considered decisions," and also to youthful
vulnerability to peer pressure. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, also emphasized
transient nature of the traits that contribute to
youthful criminal conduct. He opined that the
unformed nature of adolescent character make
it "less supportable to conclude that even a heinous
crime [by an adolescent] was evidence of
an irretrievably depraved character" (p. 570).
364 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
Adolescent Competence as Criminal
Defendants
The punitive juvenile justice policies of the
past generation implicate another issue of constitutional
importance. The Supreme Court has
held that under the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution, criminal
defendants cannot be subject to criminal adjudication
unless they are competent to stand
trial. The competence standard that is applied
to criminal trials focuses on the defendant's
"rational as well as factual" understanding of
the proceedings against him and his capacity
to assist his attorney in his defense (DUSkY v.
United States, 1960). This requirement was
developed to ensure that mentally disabled
(adult) defendants are dealt with fairly in the
justice system: fundamental fairness requires
that an individual facing the deprivation of
his or her liberty in a criminal proceeding must
understand the purposes and consequences
of the trial and be capable of participating
effectively. Only recently have courts and
legislatures begun to recognize that the competence
requirement also applies to defendants
whose competence may be questionable due to
developmental immaturity (National Juvenile
Defender Center, 2007; Scott & Grisso, 2005).
As increasing numbers of juveniles are transferred
to the adult system and subject to criminal
prosecution, the question arises of whether
they are competent under the standards applied
to adult criminal defendants. The concern. of
course, is particularly great for younger teens,
who today are eligible for adult treatment for
a broad range of crimes. A second concern
relates to the standard of trial competence to
be applied in delinquency proceedings.
As the boundaries between the adult and
juvenilejustice systems became more porous in
the 1990s, the need for a comprehensive study
comparing the capacities ofjuveniles and adults
to function as trial defendants became apparent.
The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence
Study was conducted in response to that
need (Grisso et. ai., 2003). Conducted in four
sites and involving almost 1,400 participants
between the ages of 11 and 24 from the community
and from the justiee system, this study
aimed to examine whether and how adolescent
immaturity affected abilities that are important
in the trial setting. The study employed several
measures, including an instrument that had
been developed and validated independently to
measure reasoning and understanding relevant
to the trial context: the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication
(MacCAT-CA) (Poythress et aI., 2002). A cutoff
score denoting significant impairment was
derived by administering the test to thousands
of defendants, including a large group that had
been found incompetent to stand trial. The
researchers also used an instrument developed
for the study to assess psychosocial capacities
as they affect judgment in decision making
in the trial context: the MacArthur Judgment
Evaluation instrument (MacJEN).
The study confirmed that competencerelated
abilities improve with age during
adolescence, On average, youth aged
11-13 performed significantly more poorly
than adults on the competence measures. The
performance of approximately one-third of
this age group evidenced significant impairment,
comparable to adult~ found ineompetent
to stand trial. Approximately 20% of youth
ages 14 and 15 showed substantial impairment.
Adolescents aged 16 and 17 performed
comparably to adults. Younger youth also performed
less well on the measures of psychosocial
maturity. For example, 11- to 13-year-olds
were much more inclined to waive their constitutional
rights and admit their crimes than
were older participants, suggesting that they
are more vulnerable to coercion by adult
authority figures (e.g., the police). They also
were less inclined to consider the future consequences
of their decisions (regarding interrogation
and accepting a plea agreement) than
older participants.
This study raises a significant constitutional ..
challenge to the adjudication of younger teens
as adults and supports the conclusion that, at
a minimum, competence should be evaluated
whenever younger teens are transferred (and
perhaps that trying young teens as adults generally
risks unfairness and inefficiency) and
implications for remediation be considered
(see Viljoen & Grisso, 2007). Just as importantly,
the study raises a question of what the
standard for competence should be in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Courts have recognized
that the requirement of trial competence
applies to these proceedings, but have been
uncertain about whether the adult (Dusky)
standard applies (People v. Carey, 2000). The
MacArthur study suggests that a more relaxed
standard should be applied-to avoid a large
number of younger youth being found incompetent
to be tried in any court. Under constitutional
Due Process principles, however, a
more relaxed competence standard is acceptable
only if the stakes that juveniles face in
delinquency proceedings are substantially
ditIerent from sentences imposed by criminal
courts. This suggests a need to rethink the
trend toward sanctions in the juvenile system
that is similar to adult punishment (Scott &
Grisso, 2005).
Adolescent Development and the Social
Costs of Crime
In reality, although the scientific evidence of
adolescent immaturity is compelling, principle
alone will not dictate juvenile crime policy,
any more than it has dictated policy governing
minors' access to abortion. Ultimately, the
most compelling argument for a separate, less
punitive, system for dealing with young criminals
rests on utilitarian grounds. In this section,
we draw on developmental and criminological
research to challenge the claim offered
by proponents of the recent reforms that punitive
policies are the best means to achieve
public protection and minimize the social cost
ofyouth crime. These ends can better be served
by policies that attend to the developmental
needs of young offenders as adolescents.
The utilitarian argument for tough sanctions
has a superficial appeal; after all, youth
who are in prison cannot be on the street
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 365
comlmttmg crimes. It seems likely, indeed,
that the expanded use of incarceration has
contributed to the decline in juvenile crime
through incapacitation, at least in the short
term. But researchers directly examining the
impact of statutory change have not found that
reform laws have a deterrent effect. For example,
a few researchers have studied the etIect
of automatic transfer statutes, either by comparing
two similar states with different laws,
or by examining crime rates in a single state
before and after a legislative reform (Singer &
McDowelL 1988; Jensen & Metsger, 1994).
These studies have found that punitive reforms
have little effect on youth crime. Only one substantial
study has found that crime rates appear
to decline under harsh statutes (and the methodology
of that study has been sharply criticized)
(Doob & Webster, 2003; Levitt, 1998).
Interview studies find that many incarcerated
youth express intentions to avoid harsh penalties
in the future, but the extent to which these
intentions result in behavior change is unclear
(Schneider & Ervin, 1990).
More importantly, supporters of tough policies
ignore what are likely to be substantial
long-tenn costs of punitive policies, in light of
existing knowledge about the developmental
patterns of antisocial behavior in adolescence.
Rather than reducing crime, prosecuting and
sentencing youth as adults and subjecting
them to long periods of incarceration may
have iatrogenic effects that increase the costs
of offending both for individual offenders and
for society. Interventions in the juvenile system,
however, both in facilities and in community
programs, potentially can facilitate the
transition of delinquent youth to conventional
adult roles.
Developmental knowledge underscores the
risks associated with the recent trend toward
widespread processing and punishing of adolescents
as adults. A major flaw of these policies
from a social welfare perspective is that
they expand the net of social control well
beyond the relatively small proportion of
juvenile offenders that research indicates are
366 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
on long-term offending trajectories. Many
youth engage in some form of delinquency
during adolescence, but desist as adulthood
approaches (Piquero et al.. 2003; Farrington,
1986; Jessor & Jessor, 1977). Indeed, most
teenage males participate in some delinquent
behavior as part of the experimentation
that contributes to identity formation, described
earlier. This reality has led Terrie Moffitt, a
developmental psychologist, to conclude that
delinquent behavior is "a normal part of teen
life" (Moffitt, 1993). These youth are not
headed toward lives of crime, unless the correctional
system pushes them in that direction.
Thus, based on her research on developmental
trajectories, Moffitt labels most youthful criminal
conduct "adolescence-limited" behavior.
Her research, which is supported by many
other studies, identifies a relatively small percentage
of youthful offenders who are at high
risk of becoming career criminals, (D'Unger,
Land, McCall, & Nagin, 1998; Moffitt, 1993).
A number of factors predict the likelihood of
belonging to the group that Moffitt has labeled
"'life-course persistent offenders," most importantly,
a pattern of antisocial conduct that often
begins in early childhood, but differentiating
them from more typical adolescent offenders
in a cross-sectional sample of same-aged
offenders is an uncertain business and prone
to error. Transfer policies driven by age and
offense type cannot distinguish serious persistent
offenders from those likely to desist with
maturity.
The likelihood that typical adolescent offenders
will accomplish the transition to adulthood
successfully may depend in part on the state's
response to their criminal conduct. A policy
of imposing adult criminal penalties on young
offenders may increase the probability that they
will become career criminals. or it may delay
desistence. At a minimum, criminal punishment
is likely to undermine their future educational
and employment prospects and general social
productivity as members of society.
Research evidence supports this concern.
Prosecution and incarceration in the adult
system appear to increase recidivism and
limit prospects for a productive future. Young
offenders in Florida described the criminal
court process in very different terms than
their youthful counterparts in juvenile court
(Bishop and Frazier, 2000; Bishop, Frazier,
Lanza-Kaduce, & White, 1998). Offenders
perceived juvenile court in relatively favorable
terms, describing the court process and resulting
punisnment as well intentioned and fair.
Transferred offenders, in contrast, felt court
officials (including some defense counsel)
were disengaged or hostile to their interests;
they found the process confusing and the outcomes
unfair. Transferred juveniles felt physically
and emotionally threatened by staff and
other inmates. They also reported learning
about crime from other inmates. Although one
might reasonably expect that inmates would
view incarceration as a negative experience,
the distinctions drawn between the inmates
in the juvenile and criminal justice systems
may be important to the extent that the effectiveness
of punishment in reducing recidivism
depends in part on perceptions of its legitimacy
(Bishop & Frazier, 2000).
Studies also indicate that adult punishment
may increase recidivism rates for most offense
categories. Studies in Florida (Bishop et al.,
1998; Johnson, Lanza-Kaduce, & Woolard,
in press; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, &
Frazier, 1997) and New York and New Jersey
(Fagan, 1996) compared youth adjudicated as
adults with those retained in juvenile court for
comparable offenses. Both sets of studies used
multiple measures of recidivism over shortterm
and long-term years) follow-up periods.
Fagan's research found that transfer was
associated with higher rearrest and reincarceration
among robbery offenders, although
not among burglary offenders. Using a matching
procedure that paired transferred youth
and juvenile system youth on demographic
and offense variables, the Florida studies
found that transferred youth were more likely
to reoffend in five of the seven offense categories
studied, and were rearrested more often
and more rapidly than their juvenile court
counterparts. Recent analyses of matched
pairs of transferred and retained youth suggest
that transfer may aggravate recidivism
because it "leapfrogs" over a system of graduated
sanctions often found in juvenile court
(Johnson et a!., in press). Repeat offenders
in the juvenile justice system who received
graduated sanctions had lower recidivism as
adults than those in the juvenile justice system
who did not receive graduated sanctions (and
proceeded directly to incarceration) and those
who were transferred to the adult criminal
justice system. Transfer status failed to predict
recidivism when measures of correctional
histories, including graduated sanctions, were
included in the analysis.
Higher recidivism rates are not the only
potential social cost of transfer; criminal conviction
also harms young offenders' future
prospects for productive lives upon release.
The research on transfer's effects is scanty at
present, but it challenges the claim that punitive
legal policies are the optimal response to
juvenile offending.
Developmental knowledge reinforces this
conclusion. Adolescence is a critical developmental
stage during which teens acquire competencies,
skills, and experiences essential to
success in adult roles (Steinberg et aI., 2004).
Acquiring necessary skills is a process of interaction
between the individual and her social
environment, which can enhance or impede
healthy development. Correctional facilities
and programs constitute this environment for
youth in the justice system. If a youth's experience
in the correctional system disrupts educational
and social development severely, it may
irreversibly undermine prospects for gainful
employment successful family formation, and
engaged citizenship, and directly or indirectly
contribute to reoffending.
The differences between the juvenile and
adult systems have blurred a bit in recent years,
but, even today,juvenile facilities and programs
are far more likely to provide an adequate context
for development than adult prison. Prisons
Recognizing Adolescence in Juvenile Justice Policy 367
are aversive developmental settings. They are
generally institutions with staff whose
function is custodial and who generally relate
to prisoners as adversaries; educational and
counseling programs are sparse, and older
prisoners are often mentors in crime or abusive
to incarcerated youth (Bishop & Frazier,
2000). The juvenile system, although far from
optimal, operates in many states on the basis of
policies that recognize that offenders are adolescents
with developmental needs. Facilities
are less institutional than prisons; staffoffender
ratio is higher; staff attitudes are more
therapeutic and more programs are available
(Forst, Fagan, & Vivona, 1989). A substantial
body of research produced over the past
15 years show that many juvenile programs,
in both community and institutional settings,
have a substantial crime-reduction effect;
for the most promising programs that effect
is in the range of 20%-30% (Aos et al.. 200 I:
Lipsey, 1995). In general, successful programs
are those that attend to the lessons of developmental
psychology.
The success of rehabilitative programs
does not mean that we should return to the
traditional rehabilitative model of juvenile
justice, however; punishment is an appropriate
purpose when society responds to juvenile
crime. Both adult prisons and juvenile
correctional programs impose punishment,
however, and the juvenile system is better
situated to invest in the human capital of
young offenders and facilitate the transition
to conventional adult roles, a realistic goal for
youth who are adolescent-limited offenders.
In reality, the future prospects of juveniles in
the justice system are not as bright as those of
other adolescents. But developmental knowledge
reinforces a growing body of empirical
research indicating that juvenile offenders
more likely to desist from criminal activity
and to become noncriminal adults if they are
not dealt with as adults, but rather are sanctioned
as juveniles in a separate system that
is attendant to the needs of adolescents as a
special class of offenders.
368 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the last century, lawmakers
have tended to ignore adolescence as a distinctive
age period, preferring instead to categorize
individuals in this developmental stage
as either children or adults depending on the
policy context and goals. Presumptions about
dependency, vulnerability, and incompetence
to make decisions are used to justify a bright
line demarcation between childhood and adulthood.
In general, this approach has functioned
well, providing adolescents with societal protections
at relatively low cost to their developmental
autonomy. However, in juvenile justice
policy, the binary approach has been a failure.
Cast alternately as innocent, wayward children
or as fully mature predators, juvenile delinquents
have been subject to policy initiatives
that fail to protect their interests or those of
society. A policy approach grounded in a realistic
account of adolescence would maximize
the likelihood that juvenile offenders could
desist from crime and reintegrate successfully
into the community.
The twenty-first century may see policy
makers paying attention to this transitional
stage in other areas. Although, as we have suggested.
this move can be costly and should be
taken only when binary categories are inadequate.
in some contexts, adolescents might
benefit from a probationary period in which
adult skills can be acquired, with protection
from the costs of inexperienced choices. Some
states have recently adopted this approach in
changing laws governing driving, authorizing
adolescents to drive motor vehicles, but
imposing restrictions (e.g.. no night driving)
that do not apply to adults (California Vehicle
Code §12814.6). On issues as varied as liability
for contracts and the weight accorded
to teens' preferences in divorce custody disputes,
lawmakers have recently taken tentative
steps toward recognizing the uniqueness of
this developmental stage (Scott, 2000). Developmental
research underscores the notion that
adolescents resemble both children and adults
in many ways, depending on the context and
circumstances. The developmental realities
of adolescence alone will never dictate legal
regulation, but developmental research and
theory can provide the empirical foundation
for policies that promote a healthy and productive
transition from childhood to adulthood.
REFERENCES
Adelson. J., & O'Neil, R (1966). The growth of political ideas in
adole:-.cence: The sense of community, Journal (~f Personali(\!
and SodaI Psychology, 4. 295-J06,
Adler, N. E.• Ozer. E. J" & Tschann. J. M. (200.1). Abortion among
adolescents. American Psychologist. 58, 214-·2.14.
Alan Guttmacher Insritute. (2008). Parcntal involvell1cnt in minors'
abortions. SWte policies in hrilja,1 orMal' I. 2008. New York:
Author.
Allen. E (1964). The horderland oj criminul justice. Chicago:
Univer;ity of Chicago Press.
Ambuel. B" & Rappaport. J. (1992), Developmental trends in adoIescents'
psychological and legal competence to consent 10
abortion, Law & HUll/un Behavior. 16, 12'1-153.
American Bar Association. (1982). Standards relating to dispositions.
Institute o..t Judicial Admini:ilrationlAmeriCfJn Bar A.ssociation
Juvenile Juslice Siundurds. Wasbington. DC: Author,
Aos, S.. Phipps. P.. Barnoski, R. & Lieb. R. am)I). The compara·
tive cost:; and benelh'i (~r programs to reduce crime. Olympia:
Washinglon Stat(' Inslitute for Public Policy.
Arenella, P. (1992), Convicting the morally blameless. UCLA ww
Review, 39, 151 1-lfi22.
Amett. J. J. (2000) Emerging adulthood: A theory of deveiopment
from the late teens through the twenties. American Ps.vc/lOlogis[,
55, 469-480,
Arnett. J. ],' & Tanner. J. L. (Eds.), (2006). Emerging adalts in
America: COlllinX nli1Re l11t1l(' 21st cemury. \Vashington. DC:
American Psychological Association,
Avotte \'. Planned Parenthood 'if Northern New Ellgland. 546 U,S.
320(2006),
Bellotti ", Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
Berndt. T.]. (1979). Developmental cilange, in conformity to peers
and parents, Del'elop"'J?f/ta/ P.I),('holoIlY, 15.608,,616.
Bishop. D. M., & Frazier. C. E, (2000). Consequences of transfer.
In 1. Fagan & F. Zimring (Eds.). The <'itaflging hordt'rs ~f]uvenile
justice: TrwL~tt:r of adolescents 10 tlie: criminal CDurt (pp.
227-276). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bishop. D. M.. Frazier. C E.. LanLa~Kaduce. L.. & White. H. G,
(1998). lut'£!nile fran~·ters [() criminal court sWdy: Phase I
tinal report, Washington, DC: Offiee of Juvenile Justice and
Dellllquency Prevention,
Bonnie. R., Coughlin, A.. Jetl'ries, 1. & Low, P. (2004). Criminal law
(2nd ed.), New York: Foundation Press,
Bremner, R. H, (Ed.). (1974). Children and vouth ill America:
A documelllary history. vol. 4. Cambridge. MA: Harvard
University Pres::..
Brooks-Gunn. J,. & Furslenburg, E. Jr. (1989), Adolescent sexual
behavior. American Psycli%gisi, 44, 249-257.
Byrnes. J.P. (19Q8). Tire nature and de~!eI(Jpf}U!f1I (~f (lecislOn making.
Mahwah, N]: Lawrer,ce Erlbaum,
Cali/c)mia Vehicle Code § 12814.6 (2000).
Campbell, D. E. (2006). Whl' we vole: How schools and communities
shape our chic NIt>. Prim.:eLOn. NJ: PrincelOn University
Press,
Cauffman, E.. & Steinberg. L. (2000). (lm)maturity of judgment in
adolescence: Why adolescents may be less culpable than adults.
Behavioral Sdences lind Ihe La\>: 18. 741-760.
Citv (!f Akron v, Akron Centerror Reproductive Health, 462 U,S,
416 (983),
Costanzo, P. R.. & Shaw, M, E, (1966), Conformitv as a function of
age level. Child Development, 37, 967-975, .
Cromer, B, A.. & Tarnowski. K, j, (1989), I\'oncompliancc in adolescents:
A revlew. J(mrnaf of DevtloprrU!ntal and BelUlvioral
Pediatrics, 10,207-215,
Cuhice, W (1992), Youlh's balllejiJr the ballot: A history ofth" VOlin/?
aRe in America. \\'estpoI1. CT: Greenwood Press,
Dahl, R, (2004). Adolescent brain development: Aperiodofmlnerahilities
and opportunities, Annals ofthe New York Academy of'
Sciences, 1021, 1-22,
Doob, A.. & Wehster. C. (2003), Sentencing severity and crime:
Accepting the null hypothesis, In M, Tonry (Ed,), Crime and
Justice, 30, 143-195, Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss,
Dudley, R, L & Gitelson, A. R, (2002), Political literacy, civic education,
and civic engagement: A return to political sociahza~
tion? Applied Deve/ol'mel1lai Science, 6,175-182,
D'Unger, A, V" Land, K, c.. McCall, p, L. & l\'a1'in, D, S, (1998),
How many latent classes ofdelinquentlcriminal careers'l Results
from mixed Poisson regression analyses. American Journalt4
SorialoK,'" 103, 1593-1630,
Du.,ky 1', United Slates, 362 U.S, 402 (1960),
Ehrlich. j, S, (2006), Wilo decides? The "borlion rilih/s of leens,
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Ellis, E. (1993, January 15), Lungren to seck lower age for trial as
adult IAIS AIlj<e/es Times, p, A),
Erikson, E, H, (1968), Idelllin': l,mlh and crisis, New York: W. W
Norton.
Fagan, 1. (1996). The comparative advantages of juvenile versus
niminal coun sanction on recidivism among adolescent felony
offenders. Law and Polie'v, 18, 77-112,
Fullington, I), (1986), Age and crime, In M. Tonry & :-/, Morris
(Eds.), Crime and justire: An annual review (?t research (pp.
189-250), Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Feld, B, (1999), Bad kids: Raci' alld transfarmalioll orthe juvenile
a!tlr!. New York: Oxford Umversiry Pfe~s.
Finken, L L., & Jacobs, J, E. (1996\. Consultant choice across
decision context:.:.: Arc ahortlon decisions different? Journal (d
Adolescent Res('llrch. 11,235-260,
Flanagan, C A" & Sherrod, L R, (1998), Youth political development:
An introduction, Journal of'Sodal issues, 54, 447A5(),
Forst, M" Fagan. J" & Vivona, T (1989), Youths in priwns and
training schools: Perceptioni' and consequences of the treatment-custody
dichotomy, Juvenile & FamUy Court Journal.
40, 1-14,
Fox, S, (1967), The juvenile coLlrr: lIs ('ontex/, problems and "pporltmirie,\',
W;::t..,hington DC: President's Commi~sion on Law
Enforcement and Adminis[ralion of Ju:.:.ticc,
Fried, c., & Reppucci, 1\',1). (2001), Criminal decision making: The
development of adolescent judgment, crimmal responsibility,
and culpability. Law and Human Behavior, 25, 45·<>1,
Furby, L" & Beyth-Marom, R. (1992), Risk taking in adolescence: A
decision-making perspective. Den:>Iopmental Review, 12. 1--44,
FUl'S,enburg, E E, Brooks-Gunn, j" & Chase-Lansdale, L. (1989),
Teenaged pregnancy and childhearing, American Ps)'('h%gisf,
44.313-320.
Gardner, M" & Steinberg, L (2005), Peer influence on risk-taking,
risk prefe,enee, and risky decision--making in adolescence and
adulthood: An experimental study. Developmenral Psvcl",h'!iY,
41, 625..,635,
Gardner, W, (1992). A life span theory of risk taking, In N, Bell & R,
W, Bell (Ed",), A,/olesccnr and adull risk laking: The 8til Texas
srmp(>siwn on inleljilCfs in psychology (pp, 66--83), Thousand
Oaks. CA: Sage,
Gardner. W, Scherer. D" & Tester, M, (1989). A>serting scientific
authority: Cognitive development and adolescen, legal right',
,4mencan P.\Ych%gi,\I, 44, 895-902,
References 369
Giedd, JS, (2(Xl4), Structural magnetic resonance 

adolescent hrain, Annals of Ihe N",,, York Academv 

1021,77.., 8 5 . ' --

Goldberg. E. (2001), The execulire brain: Fmn/a"o/>es lind Ihe
civili~ed mind, New York: Oxford University Press,
Gorney, C. (1998). Articles offaith: A frontline histor\, ofthe abortion
WafS, f'.iew York: Simon and Schuster. -,
Greene. A, L, (1986), Future-time perspecti\'e ill adobeence:
The present of things future revisited, JOllrnal of )f>lIlh lind
Adolescenc£'. 15.99-1/3, .
Griffin-Carlson, M, S" & Mackin, K. j, (1993), Parental consent:
Factors influencing adolescent di<;;c]osurc regarding ahonion.
Adolescence, 28, 1···1 I ,
Grisso, T, & Lovinguth, T (1982), Lawyers and child clients: A
call for research, In J, Henning (Ed.), Children and Ihe 1(1)1',
Springfield, IL: CharleS C Thomas,
Grisso, T, Steinherg, L, Woolard, J, L. Cauffman, E.. Scott, E"
Graham, S,' et aL (2003), Juveniles competence to stand trial:
A comparison of ado1escents' and adult..;" capacities as trial
defendant,. Law and Human Beho>,ior. 27, 333-364,
Grisso, T" & Vierling, L (1978), Minors' consent to treatment: A
developmental perspective, Profi',cv;o,"" Psrch%gv. 9, 4I2A26,
HL 1', Matheson, 450 U.S, 398 (1981),
Hazelwood School Disl, v, KuMmeier. 484 U,S, 260 (1988)
Helwig, C. C, & Turiel, E, (2002), Civil liberties, autonomy, and
democracy: Children's perspectives, Inlern{l/ional .Ioumal (~r
Law and Psychiatry, 25, 253~270,
Henggeler, S" Melton, G., & Smith, L (1992), Family preservation
using multi~ystemic therapy: An effective alternalive to incar~
ccrating serious juveniie offender.'>, Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 60, 953-961.
Henshaw, S, K" & Kost, K. (1992), Parental involvement in minors'
ahortion deei,ions, Fami/v Planmnj< Per.'fIeclives, 21, 85·· 88,
Hodgson" Minnesota, 497 U,S. 417 (1990),
InreGault, 387U,S, 1(1967),
jensen, E" & Metsger, L (1994), A test of the deterrent effect
of legislative waiver on violent juvenHe crime, Crime amI
Delinquell(~v, 40, 96-W4,
Jcssor, R" & Jessor. S, L (1977), Problem belw"ior and l'sreho,
social developmenr: A longitudinal srudy o(vowh, New York:
Academic Press.
Johnson, K" Lanza-Kaduee, L, & Woolard, j, L (in pre"s),
Disregarding graduated treatment: Why transfer aggw\'ates
recidivism. Crime and DeNnqufncy.
Keating, D, (2004). Cognitive and hrain development In R, Lerner
& L Steinberg (Eds,), Handbook of adolescenl ,,,·,'phn/r,,,,'
(2nd ed.. pp, 45-84), Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Kelt, j, (1977), Rites of passage: Adolescence ill America 1790 to
'he present, New York: Basic Books,
Lerner, R, M_, & Galarnbo!', 1\', L (1998), Adolescen, development:
Challenges and opportunities for research, programs. and poli~
cies, Anllual Review of Psycholog)" 49, 413-446,
Levine, M" & Levine, A, (1970), ,4 soci,,1 history of'ire/pinK
services: Clinic' ('{Jun, school and communify. New York:
Applelon-Century-Crofts,
Levin, S, t 1998), Juvenile crime and punishmem. Journal of
Political Economy, 106, 1158",1185,
Lewin, T (1992, May 28), Parental cOllscm to abortion: How
enforcement can vary. New }-hrk Timc/.,-, p. A I.
Lewis, C. C lI980), A comparison of minors' and adults' pregnancy
decisions, ,4merican Journal ,!rPsw:iliatry. 50, 446A53,
Lindsey, R B" & O'Higgins. H, J, (1909), The beast, Seattle:
University of Washington Press,
M, (1995), What do we learn frOI11 400 research studies on
effectiveness of treatment with juvenile delinquents? In
J, McGuire (Ed.), What works:' Reducing
from researcil and practice (pp, 63--78), New York:
& Sons,
370 The Legal Regulation of Adolescence
Meisel, A., Roth, L H" & Lidz, C W, (1977), Toward a model
of the legal doctrine of informed consent American Journal of
Psvehiatry, 134, 285,,289,
Melton, G, B, (1'180), Children's concepts of their rights, Journal of
C/iniml Child PWcholo?,)" 9, 186-190.
Melton, G. (1981). Psycholegal issues in juveniles' competency to
waive their rights, journal of Clinical Child P,,-vcholoRY, 10,
59-62,
Melton, G. B. (I 983a), Toward "personhood" for ad,)leseents:
Autonomy and privacy as values in puhlic policy. American
Plvefwlogil'!, 38, 99-103.
Mclton, G, B. (l983b), Child advocac,,: Ps\'elwleRal ismes and
in/{'!Temhms. New York: Plenum Press.
Mdton. G, B" & Limber. S, (1992), What children's rights mean!O
children: Children's own views, In M, Freeman & P. Yeerman
(Eds,), Ideologies of"IIildren's rights (pp, 167-187), Dordrecht.
Netherlands: Martinus NiJhoff.
Meschke. L L.. Bartholomae. S" & Zental!. S, R, (20(m, Adolescent
sexuality and parent-adole,cent proce,,",: Promoting health
teen choices. loam,,1 ofAdalescent Health, 31, 264-279,
:Vliller, v. A" Drotar. D., & Kodish, E. (2004), ChIldren', compe,
tem:e for a~sent and consent: A review of empirical findings.
Elhin alld Bch(/I'ioc 14, 255,,295,
Mnookin. R, (1985). Bel/olli I', Baird: A hard case, [n R, H. :V1nookin
(Ed,),ll1tl1e Adro«/cy, law /'~form and flllb,
III' flolic,\ (pr, New York: W, H, Freeman.
Mvffitt. T. E.tI99J), Life,coursc-persistent and adolescence· limited
antisocial behavior: A devclopmenUll taxonomy, Psychological
RCl'iPll: 100. 67.j.,.7()I.
Morse I', Fredcrl,k, 127 S, Cl. 2618 (2007),
Na!ional Juvenile Defender Center. (2007), 2006 Stalejuvellilejas,
lice legi5/l11ion. Washington. DC: Author.
0icwcomer. S, F.. & Udry. J, R. (1985), Parcnt--<:hild communication
and adoh:sccrlt sexual behavior. Famil.r Planning Perspectives.
17, 169-1'14,
Nurmi. 1. (1991), How do adolescents sec t~eir future: A review
of the development of future orientation and planning.
J)cl'elopnu>nral Rt'\'ie~c. II. 1-59.
Ohio 1', Akron C('''terlii/' Rel'roduclil'e Health, 497 u.s, 502 (1990),
O'Keefe. J.. & Joncs, J, M, (l9\iO), Easing restrictions nn minors'
abortion rights. Issues in Science and Technolog\', 7, 74~80.
Parlwm v. J.R.. 442 U.S, 584 (1979),
Pate 1: Ro/Jinson, 383 L.S, 375 (1966).
People 1: Carel: 615 N.w'2d 742 (Mich, Ct. Apr, 200())
Pi4uero, A" Farrington. D., & Blumsrcin, A, (2003). The criminal
career paradigm, Crime ami Justicc: An Annual Reriew of
Research, 30, 359·..506,
Plunnc,1 Parenllwod (:{ Ccntral Aliss()uri t~ Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
Plait. A, (11')77), The child .'{/J'ers: the il1l'el1tlon ofdelilli/uency (2nd
i.!d.). Chicago: Uni\'crsily of Chicago Press.
Pope. L :vt. Adler. N. E" & T;chann, J 1\1, (2(X) I), Postabortion
nsychologkal adjustment: Arc minors at increased risk? Journal
A(loles(mt Hea"". 29, 2.. 11,
Poythress, N, G" Bonnie, R, L Monahan, j,. Olto, R.. & Hoge, S. K,
(2002) ..4djudlc(flil'e competence: TIU? MarArthur studies. New
York: Springer.
Prince I; Ma.(wc/w.H'f/S, 321 U,S. 158 (1944).
Quinton. W, J.. Major. B" & Richards, C. (2001). Adolescents and
adjustment to abortion: Are minors at gr~ater risk'! PsycllOJogr,
Public Polin, alld [.fIH', 491-514.
Regnery, A. S. ( 1(85), Getting away wIlh murder: Why the juvenile
justice system needs an overhaul. Policy Re\'iew, 34, 65-72,
Reiss, A" Jr.. & FarringlOn. D, (1991), Advancing knowledge about
co-offending: Results from a prospective longitudinal survey of
London maJes. Juurnal 0/ Criminal Law wul Crimin(Jlo(~): 82,
,160--.195.
Rendleman, D,R, (1971), Parens patriae: From chancery to the
juvenile court, Soulh Carolina Lmv Rede,,~ 23, 205~259,
Reppucci, N, D" Wiethorn, L. A" l-.'lulvey, E. P" & Monahan,
rEds,) (19~4), Children, mental health, and the law,
Hills, CA: Sage,
Resnick, M. D" Bearinger. L. H" Stark. P.. & Blum. R, W. (1994),
Patterns of consultation among adolescent minors obtaining an
abortion, American Journal ofOrthopsychiall}; 64, 310--316,
Reyna. V. F.. & Farley. F. (2006), Risk and mtionality in adolescent
decision making: Implications for theory, practice. and public
policy, P,l}'ciw/ogical Science in the Publi:- lntere,l, 7, 1-44,
Roper \" Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
Rubin, E. R, (Ed,), (1998), The abortIOn conlroversv: A documen·
WI)' hisIOT\'. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Ruck. M, D" Keating. D, P.. Abramovitch, R" & Knegl, C.
(1998), Adolescents' and children's knowledge about ril
Some evidence for how young people view rights in their
lIves, Journal ofAdolescence, 21,275,,289,
S. Rep, No, 92,,26 (1971),
Scherer. D, G. (1991). The capacities of minors to exercise voluntariness
in medical trealment dCl'isions. Law and Human
Behavior, 15, 4~1 ..449,
Scherer. D, G" & Reppucci, N, D, (1988), Adolescents' capacities
to provide voluntary informed consent: The effects of parental
int1uence on medical dilemmas, WW lJnd Human Behavior, 12.
123-141.
Schleiler ,", Citr or CiwrlollesI'ilie, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W,D.
1997), alrd 159 F 3d 843 (4th Cil. 1998),
Schneider, 	A" & Ervin. L (1990), Speciijc deterrence,
choice and decision heuristics: Applicalions in juvenile justice.
Social Seimet Quarlerly, 71,585-601.
Scott. E, (1992), Judgment and reasoning in adolescent
making, Vil/allom Law Rel'ie~~ 37,1607--1669.
Scott, E, (2000), Criminal responsibility in adolescence:
lessons from developmental psychology, [n T.
B, Schwartz (Eds,). Youth on Irial (pp. 291-324).
University of Chicago Press.
Scott, E.. & Gnsso. T, (2005), Developmental
due process. and juvenIle justice policy, North Carolina
ReV/e\\', 83, 793-845,
Scott. E.. & Kraus. J, S, (2007), Contra{'1 law and
(4th cd.) Newark, NJ: Lexis Nexis.
Scott. E. S.. Reppucci, N. D. & Woolard. J. L (1995),
decision making in legal contexts. Lmr amI Human
19,221-244,
Scott, E" & Scott, R. (1995), Parent, as fiduciaries, Virginia
Rel'ie,,~ 81. 2401--2476,
Scot(, E.. & Steinberg, L (2003), Blaming youth. Texas Lnw
81, 799--40,
Scott, E" & Sieinberg, L (2008), Rethinking juvenile
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
Sherrod, L R" Flanagan. C.. & Youniss, j, A, (2002),
duction, Applied Developmental Science, 6, 173~ 174,
Sickmund. M" Snyder. H. N., & Poe,Yamagata. E. (1997).
oBi;nders and vidims: 1997 update on t'io!encc. Wru
DC: U,S, Depmtment of Justice, Office of Juvenile justice
Delinquency Prevention,
Siegler. R. S" & Alibali, 1\1, W. (2004), Children's
(4th cd,), Englewood Cliff,. NJ: Prentice HaiL
Silverstein, H, U(07). Girls on rile stand: How murts/ail
minon;. New York: New York Cnivcrsily Press.
Singer. S" & McDowell, D, (1988), Criminalizing delinquency:
deterrent effects of the New York juvenile offender 'aw,
and Sodety Review. 22, 521-535.
Smetana. J, G. (1981), Reasoning in the personal and
Adolescent and young adult women's decision,makin~
ing uhonion, lournal o/Applied Del'elol'mental
211-226,
Snyder, H, (2()05), OJJDP Bulletin: Juveniic arresb 2004, www
.m:jr~.gov.
Snyder, 11.. & Sickmund, M, 12(06), '/Ul'1'1I11" oiti'nilers (III" vic,
tims: 20V611al;·onal reporl. Wa~hington, DC: Office of Juveniie
Justice and Dclinquen-.:y Prevention. U,S, Department of
Justice,
Spear, L p, (20(0), The adolescent brain and age-related behavioral
manifcstalion~. Neurmcience lind Bioheluwiural ReFiews, 24,
417-463,
Steinberg, L (2004), Risk-taking in adolescence: What changes,
and why? Annals (~l the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021.
51-58,
Steinberg, L (2008), Ado/esel'lIcl' (8th cd,), New York: McGraw-Hili
Steinberg, L, & Cauffman, E (1996), Yiatllrity of judgment in adolescence:
Psychosodal fal.:'lors in adolescent decbion making.
lAW (/m/ Human Beh(}\'I'OI; 20, 249··-272.
Steinberg, L, & Cauffman, E. S, (1999), The elephant in the courtroom:
A developmental perspective on the of
youthful offenders, Virginia journal r~r SOfial
6,389-417,
Steinberg, L Chung, H" & Little, M, (20()4), Reentry of young
offenders from the justice sy~lCm: A uevelopmental perspecrive.
Youth Violence and Juvenile Jus/ice, 21-38.
Steinherg, L, Dahl, R" Keating, D" Kupfer, D, L Mastcn, A, S" &
Pine, D, (2006), The study of developmental psychopathology
in adolescence: Integrating affei.:tive neurosciL~nce with the study
of comexL In D, Cohen & D, Cicchetti (Eds,), j)evr/opmenlal
n,,,'choID'"V, vol. 2: Developmefl1fl1 neuroscience (2nd cd.: pp.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons,
Steinberg, L Graham, S" O'Brien, L, Woolard, J" Cauffman, E"
& Banieh, M, (in press), Age difference, in fUlUre orientation
and delay discounting. Child Development.
Steinberg, L & Scon, E, (2003), Less guilty hy reason of adolcs,
cence: Developmental immaturity. uiminbhed re",ponsibility,
and thc juvenile death penalty, American Psych%liixl, 5R,
1009-1018,
Tiffin, $, (1982), In whose hesl inlprrst: Child we/fare reJ(mn m the
progressive era, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Torbet, P" Gable, R" Hurst, H" IV, Montgomery, L Szymanski,
L, & Thomas. D. (1997)' State reponsf!.\ 10 serious and l'iofent
juvenile rrime, \Vai-\hington DC: Oftll'e of Juvenile Justice anu
Delinquency Prevention, C,S, Department of Justice,
Tarbet, p, & Szymanski, L (199g) Stale legis/ative respunses 10
violent juw'nile crime: 1996-/997 updale. Washington, DC:
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U,S,
Department of Justice.
Tomey-Purta, J, (1992), Cognitive representation, of the political
system in auolescenl:-i: The continuum from pre-novice 10
expert. In H, Haste & j, Torney,Purta IEds,), The developmenl
ojf'olilical understanding:.4 /lew l'erspecllI'e (pp, 11-25), San
Francisco: Jossey·Bass.
References 371
Torres, A.. Forrest. L D" & Eisman, S, (1980), Telling parents:
Clinic policies and adolc~.:ents' use of family planning
and abortion services. Fami!.v Plal1niHR Pcrspec!ircs. J2,
284--292,
Van Waters, M, (1926), Youth in cOll/7iel, New York: Repuhlic.
Viljoen, J, L, & Grisso, T (2007),
niles' adjudicative incompetence, P,',A,,,/',,,cund
[A,"'; /3,87-114,
Virginia Code AnnOlutet! I~ 13.42 (Michie 2000),
Virxillia Cod,' Annola/ed 44, 1~2969 (Michie 1999),
Wadlington, W. (1973), Minors and health care: The age of consent.
Osgoode Hall L,m' '/ou!'",;/, I j, 115~125,
Wagman, M, (2000), Innocence ""I in tile wake of green: The
trend is dear-If you arc old enough w do the crime you nrc
old enuugh to UD the time, Catholic Unil'crsirr utH' Rt'vit!w, 11,
643-677.
Wald, M, (1976), Legal policies affecting children: A lawyer's
request for aid, Child Develo/,menl, 46, 1-5,
Ward, S, L & Overton, W, E (1990), Semantic familiarity, relevance.
and the development of deductive reasoning. De\'(~l-
0plllenlill PIrc!wla!!)" 26, 488-493,
Walkover, A, (19~4), The infancy defense in the new ,juvenile court,
UCLA Law Review, 31. 503-562.
Weithom, L A.. & Campbell, S, /3, (I9g2), The competence of
children and adolescents to make informed treatment decisions.
Child Deve/0l'lIIellf, 53, 1589-159H,
Winner, L Lanza-Kaducc, L Bishop, D,M" & Fru/,!cr, c'E, (1997),
The transfer of juveniles to criminal court Reexamining recidivism
over the long term, Crime (lntl Delinquency. 43, 548-563.
Woolard, J, L (2002), Capacity, compelence, and the juvenile defendam:
Implications for research and In [l, L Bottoms, M,
B, Kovera" & B, D. McAuliff and Ihe /a,,-:
Social science and policy (pp, 270-298), New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Yates, S" & Pliner, A, j, (19gS), Judging maturity in the courlS:
The Massaehusens consent statute. American Journal (~rpuhlic
Heallh, 71i, 646--649,
YtJUnis l', 51, Francis Hospita/ aild School ufNursinfi, Inc.. 469 P,2J
300 (Kan, 1970),
Zabin, L S" Hir>ch, M, B" & Emer,on, M, R, (1989), When urban
adolescent!'! choose abortion: Effcds on education, psycho··
logical status, and subsequent pregnancy. Family P/(1nnillK
Per.specJiW!S, 21, 248~255.
Zimring. F E, (1978). Cm(frol1ting youth crime: Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task for(,e on senlcneing policy Imrard
young f1.ffenders. ~ew York: Holmes and Meier Puhlishers,
Zimring. F. E. (1982). Tilt' clumgirlg fe~al n'orld {~r (J(/olescence.
~cw York: Free Pres.>;,
Zimring, E E, (1998), ,1merican ymllh l';olem.e. New York: Oxford
University Press,
HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY
THIRD EDITION
Volume 2: Contextual Influences on Adolescent
Development
Edited By
RICHARD M. LERNER
LAURENCE STEINBERG
(5f)
WILEY 

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.