MAHAFFEY, M.: A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service.In: Mahaffey M., Hanks, J.W.,Sociai Work ^Political Responsibility, NASW, ' Silver Spring 7982
possible for a social worker to be effective in politics without violating professional values and without losing sight of our commitment to the interests of those we serve as social workers.
Notes and References
i
1. See Chester G. Atkins et ah. Getting Elected: A Guide to Winning State and Local ' Office (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973); and Edward Schwartzman, Campaign ' Craftsmanship (New York: Universe Books, 1973) and Campaign Workbook (Wash- ' ington, D.C.: National Women's Education Fund, 1978).
2. For a discussion of voters' viewa on the responsiveness at women candidates, see Irene Diamond, Set Holes in the State Hottse (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 86-88.
3. "Single Issue Politics," Newsweek, November 6,197B, pp. 4fl and 60.
4. JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick, Political Woman (New York; Basic Books, 1974), p. 91.
5. See ibid., pp. 3-23.
6. Alan D. Wade, "The Social Worker in the Political Process," in Sadat Welfare j Forum, 1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 5Z-67.
7. Kirkpatrick, op. rit., pp. 48-50.
8. See Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan, Social Work Practice: Model and Method (Itasca, HL: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1973), pp. 37-52; Charles S. Levy, "The Value Base of Social Work," fottrnal of Education for Social Work, 9 (Winter 1973), pp.
34-42; and Charles S. Prigmore and Charles R. Atherton, Social Welfare Policy— j Analysis and Formulation (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1979), pp. 23-36.
9. See Rino J. Patti and Ranald B. Dear, "Legislative Advocacy: One Path to Social j Change," Social Work, 20 (March 1975), pp. 10B-114; and Pincus and Minahan, op. j cit., pp. 76-78. I
i
10. S. It Khinduka and Bernard J. Coughlin, "A Conceptualization of Social ; Action," Social Service Review, 49 (March 1975), p. 9.
11. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 131. ;
12. Ibid., p. 119.
13. See Daniel Thursz, "Social Action as a Professional Responsibility and Political ', Participation," inj. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds.. Participation in I Politics (New York" Leiber-Atherton, 1975), pp. 213-232; and Charles Levy, Social \ Work Ethics (New Yorlc Human Sciences Press, 1976). j
14. George A. Brager, "Advocacy and Political Behavior," Socio/ Work, 13 (April 1968), p. 14.
A Social Worker-Politician Creates a New Service
MARYANN MAHAFFEY
A CCORDING to the 1975 Uniform Crime Report of the Federal JraLBureau df Investigation (FBI), .police across the country received more calls for f amilyconflict .than for murder, aggravated assault, and all other serious crimes. Incidents of wife bearing outnumbered those of rape by three to one. Responding to calls related to wife abuse accounted for 13 percent of all homicides of police officers and 40 percent of all injuries sustained by police officers.1
Families caught in patterns of j^urrmg.-yiQjenc to the.polgerTrTe~p6lice are~easiiy available through a phone call, and they come quickly. They handle the violence because they have the authority—the uniform and the badge. They are the twenty-four hour service of last resort. The director of the Police Foundation has publicly stated that such social problems occurjy_a major portion of police-officers.' time and .that although officers are _ not trained for such. worl^Jhey should be.2
Police officers across_the nation know families that expe-f rience"repeated^instances of domestic violence. Such families are ; familiar to the local precinct and to the officer on the beat. These j families are often not known_to thosej^o_p.rayide^3nseling-.ser:'
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.vices,, however^nor ^.^^families^amiHarwith the services that: pT<^de_th^ handicapping of a family member is the "solution" to the conflict.
A-Variety of responses to the problem of domestic violence have developed. Social workers in the army in Europe worked with__comm^ding^fficers and miSt^^yoOcenEb cjefuse^such" situations and to_begm J^Jc^ri^^
States,. spa^^qrjcecs_in_jame_cpmmumties have heen_assigned Mjdme^^psjjce stations. In other" commumties^'p^ychologists have trajaed_p^lice officers in de^sjojijechniques. In other cases, p^_clioloj£s^s3a-V£^^ vio-[enceJo,"sociaLagencie5. ~ "J
Despite the existence and success of such programs, social |agencies ;n manyqommunities hay£_insj§£ejij^
[ 455331^ and they
[ have questioned the valuejj^ on ' ."faniflxlrpu^^ of this approach is questiona-
ble. The knowledge, ethics, and sldlls„pt.sociaI .wotk.arje_needed | wjjerever^in&vidu^
',crggjte4. This implies that the problems and needsof families trapped HLiJPi?^^ YJp^^
^menj- Moreover, because any change process reqinres^jdentifying
and mo^ili^in^uppQjrt bjthjnaide^^djmtsj^ jeted for change, attempts to influence the police department or
any other department of government require attention to political
considerations—to balancing the needsjind mterests^^theelect§7
officials wjio mate pj)Uc£ wj^
and other sources of political power. "
Events throughout the country in recent years have increased social workers' awareness not only of the importance of public policy in solving such social problems as family violence, but also of the need to take an active part in the political processes that shape governmental policies, As a result, increasing numbers of social workers have become involved in politics, some as campaign workers or lobbyists, others as elected or appointed officials.
In 1973, such considerations drew me to become a candidate.., j°rj3ie_Dej^ and to make family.violence one of -
several human.,.seodcg1 jjrjfilems I chose as campaignJsluesTXt the time, there was some public recognition of family violence as a
problem, and demands were mounting that the Detroit Police Department find a solution. By focusing attention on the public gafgjx aspect qfjiomestin yjoIence,~"By proposing a "rational effort to deal with the problem, and by drawing a large vote as a candidate for the city council, I hoped to show that a solution involving the provision of additional police and counseling services to familiescin crjgis_had broaapubhcsupport.
This article describes my efforts, as a social worker, to_create
Inten^edtoprovide a model for incremental change through political action, the article highlights the importance of understanding mwetjn_ bringing, about change—expert power, referent power, charismatic power, and the power of numbers. iFldso'Hemon-sffates the need for resourcefulness" and fj^^ty^ji^efiingg objectives and revising, strategies andbac£ics,
Emergence of a Political Issue
In 1973, Detroit was caught in a political cross fire. The black mayoral candidate—with my support and that of the black community and progressive whites—had fought for and won changes in the city charter to create a civihan, police ..commission, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, charged with making policy for and controlling the police department. The other candidate for mayor was the white police chief. Hysteria was rising in the community as the media focused on crime, muggings, and property damage. One headline screamed "Detroit Is Murder City." The media portrayed the problem as one of sbrangersjolling strangers, creating fear among; dfoxesidents. In the suburbs, hos-tffity~"was' rising tow^d J^e;
crept" toward.a 51 percent majority. Some people were caUingJor more police and for ''untying their hands." Others were camgaign-ingjigams^ The blick
community viewed the police as a white occupying force, and verbal attacks by blacks had many police paranoid. In this climate, a political strategy of open confrontation would have been inflammatory and counterproductive.
As a candidate for city council, I^efined-as..pubHc_safety issues the need to free, police officersJ&rcrira morTjobj^with civilians, anpl the need .to. reduce the injures and
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MAHAFFEY
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deaths among poU^and citizens by training policeja .deal.with domestic vibleS^_ arid^ social conflicts. I knew the deaths were mostly results of arguments among acquaintances. My objective
Detroit and WavneJ^j^£^^ delu^ln^ents of_damestic_yiplenc
to ther^sp"jrEaa'S Tne project I proposed would (1) train the police 1 in crisis jnteryention to defuse domestic violence, (2) involve social ;workers in providing this training for the police, (3) juwesggal workexsjn^c^l^j^preanct stations, and (4) hayethe poHcejnalc.e /'refegals to sjjcjajj^qr^ of the project depended on
its acceptance by the decision makers injaty government who had rejmpjjslKi^^ depart-mentjmdj}yth(^^ agency and in
theprivate social service sy"sfenT,'^,", "** "~
My position was strengthened by the large vote I received in November 1973. From a field of eighteen candidates, I was elected to the nine-member city_ council with the fifth.highest vote. Soon after the new Virycouncir was sworn in, we marched^" with the new black mayor, in a funeral for a police officer killed in the line of duty during a social conflict situation. The emotional impact on the council members was forceful—the dirge, the lines of silent officers, the crowds along the parade route, the rifle salute, and the solidarity of officers and families as they rallied around the widow, who was herself in police training. In June 1974, the coun-cil adopted my resolution establishing a tasOorce "^investigate
.t^ce^J^^^|^^^^^staon cj (fomesac^vjo^^e^^^fuid
ffie'resoiution^ Conflict Task Force to
report to the city council and the mayor within three months with recommendations for referral mechanisms to handle situations involving 'social conflict and with" proSosals^for training Detroit police officers to.deal with such situations - The task force, by resolution, was to be composed of representatives from a number of organizations and agencies, including Family Service, the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), the Association of Blade Social Workers, community counseling and mental health coordinating agencies, the Detroit Police Department, and the department's corps of chaplains. The task force was also to include three people named by the mayor and the Detroit Board of
MAHAPFEY
Police Commissioners. .By asking the mayor and the board of commissioners to name three people, I hoped to avoid turf problems, lend credibility to the task force, ensure that the new mayor would feel involved, and avoid giving the community the impression that the council and the mayor were at odds.
The idea of a task Eorce was new for the Detroit City Council. Although the council met every day of the year in committee of the whole, subcommittees were prohibited by the charter from 1918 to 1974. Some_ members of_the council were reluctant to establish committeesor taskjforcjs^jpr thexfeltjt would then be impossible to loipw everythuigjfm Others thought
establishing such bodies wm^r^duce_the_power of the_rity council president, a position many, members, wan ted.. It seemed wise, therefore, to make this a task force with a time limit and, because it was a first, to have someone otherJ^^^£QiUj^jn.e,mber chair it. A priestjyho wa_s.^. trained cpjEm^ was asked
/to head the task force in the hope that this wc^uTreduce "turf-related problems. He would also do better, I believed, with the police department because his gender and priestly identification would help in dealings with the police chief.
It was also essential to involve a diverse group of human service professionals, to avoid ieaving^heoroiect to pollceae-' partment baditionaHsts or to professionals advocating one particular method, such as~peer group counseling, which is based on_ the idea that one does not neeQ^rofessionalJxaimng to deal with prabtems_irrTOlym^ needs only tojie a,
peer,.with a loving, caring heart." (In Detroit in' 1^73, untrained women were running rape counseling services without professional consultation; by 1975, such services throughout the country were applying for money to hire professionals because the problems to be dealt with called for more skills and training than the volunteers had.) /
A central objective of my resolution was to address thejack \ of jmdersjanding between the social work professional and _th.e_.-j _rjo]Ice^I was^onvinced__that. uTT^al'^^rit.prafessipna^were i involVed. in the project from the begmning^ some of the_artificial barriers between, the two professions would be eliminated, and the services developed woulef "be"~better for it. However, some social workersjhad serious doiibts about the project. They quesr! tioned whether a change from "traditional social agency practices^ would improve .the situation and whether social worker£_^nuld\.
Creating a New Service
ISBU*eiusJesti^^ They also
wapdgxed whaUhejhysical dangers would be. Many social workers s^therr^role as__gj^Q^fferin^therapy in_^ditionalnffirg .settings. Neither psychiatrists nor socTaTworkers have traditionally worked with the police, although, as will be discussed later, some psychologists have begun to develop cris^nteryentioii pro' grajn^designedj^ ——_
Police traditionally view their work as the pursuit of criminals and the performance of patrol duties. Intervening in social conflicts is often seen_as social work and as a Tess^q^irable ^I^ffientipr the roiit^.^^/^wever,'many police', like the public, are intrigued by the police activities portrayed in such television shows as "Baretta" and "Starsky and Hutch," although police admit that a show like "Barney Miller" is closer to reality. Police officej.sjijsually want to get the family trouble runs off their jjacks, bu^hgjrogramsj^acc^ and
ik4&SsJ^ lady, there s nothing we can do."
"As the task force began its work, it became known that a command' officer in the_Detroit JPojice Department _had researched domestic^J[ipJ^^in7KfiR^njg a .dqctoraT dissertation on the police emergency phone system. His findings highlighted thejack of crisis intervention^aining for "the policeoperators and the low j?.riori|x.pohcei gave to domestic _yioknce. Although this officer was regarded by police officers, both black and white, as fair, tough, and a true police professional, the chief refused to appoint him to the Social Conflict _.Tasfe_Efirce. Instead, the chief intimated that the officer was being investigated by the FBI because of criminal contacts. This new, white chief was intent on proving his ability to rule the department. Therefore, the police officers appointed to the task, force included one assigned to the Criminal Justice Institute (the local police academy) and an officer in headquarters command who was held in low esteem by the chief. The officers in charge of the institute were from outside the city and had little credibility in some levels of the police department. These appointmerits_reflected jthe_Joj^pjriority_the mayor assigned to the taslTIorce. The only k-£ELS3Jj£^ develop a"Base and a degreToT
unaeTs^idingof family vIolelicTuTtnTj^ social
^SSSli^JSSU&S^^ to develop a model for later
FrojST5mad5^o^merit. -"' '
Work of the Task Force
The task force studied crisis intervention programs conducted by police departments and other law enforcement agencies, examining them for their trmning^technigues^their referral mechanisms, and their effectiveness^,In 1974, most of the published work in this field had been done by psychologists, with the two major training packages having been developed by Bard from the Psychology Department of City College of New York and by Schwartz and Liebman, psychologists based in San Francisco. The Bard model emphasized teaching officers techniques for defusing conflict and for referring people to agencies.1' This package was designed for special units in police departments, but, unfortunately, such units tend to be elitist and to arrive at the scene after other officers have already performed the difficult and sensitive parts of the assignment. Moreover, when problems with funding arise, special units are the most likely to be eliminated.
The Schwartz-Liebman model used in San Francisco's Bay Area also emphasized defusing conflict.5 Although this approach involved the training of all police officers, the relationship between police and social service agencies was limited to the making of referrals and the developing of pocket-size referral books for officers. The police also tested whether the agency was receptive to police referrals and whether people were taken care of. Such referral mechanisms seemed to be afterthoughts. Both models had sexist overtones in how they viewed women victims of violence, and they built on the machismo emphasis of police training.
I joined a task force team that included representatives from the Detroit Police Department and the Criminal Justice Institute in conducting on-site research in California with police departments using the Schwartz model. The visit won support among some of the police officers for such a program and gave me additional information regarding links to community agencies and the experience of community agencies in social conflict interventions. For example, the experience of the program in Oakland, California, indicated that the peaks for conflict occurred on weekends and paydays and that once a situation was defused, 75 percent of the people being dealt with could wait until Monday morning for further intervention. Most families successfully referred needed from one to three interviews, and only 5 percent became long-term clients.6 The task force also consulted extensively with the Police
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MAHAFFEY
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201
Foundation in Washington, D.C., and one member of the task force attended an FBI seminar on social conflict in Virginia. Others attended a regional Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) conference in Chicago,
The task force also examined the policies and practices of the Detroit Police Department in handling family violence. In 1974 the department gave a low priority to "domestic calls" on 911, the emergency line. People soon caught on that calls describing family problems brought a slow response, and callers began claiming there was "a man with a gun," which made the call a high priority and prompted a quick police response.
The General Orders of the Detroit Police Department in 1974 described social conflict situations as civil matters and not as a police responsibility. Several reasons were given for this point of view: (1) the large volume of other service demands for emergencies involving immediate physical danger and crimes in progress, (2) the lack of specific training for police mediating social conflicts, and (3) the service award system that emphasized arrests and convictions. Police recruits in Detroit received a total of seven hours of lecture-type training in topics related to social conflicts, a three-hour lecture on domestic complaints, and four hours of lecture on handling abnormal individuals, all of which constituted a tiny portion of the recruits' six-month training. Nevertheless, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the calls to the 911 number in Detroit each week related to social conflicts.
Recommendations
In October of 1974, the_Social.Conflict Task Fj^ce!r^jted[to the Detroit City Council and the mayor, pointing auFpraolems in many areas. The task force cited the lagkof a legal way, in situations of marital conflict, to force a separation of to evict a violent person from the situation. It also criticized the failure of the police to treat "with the same seriousness .as^crjjnes. occurring between strangers_domestic conflict or social conflict situations that ii> ^feed-people whoTeMwlrach other; tffis~probtem was"particularly noteworthy in instances.of violence between.husbands.and wives. The Iackof understanding an^.cooperation^etweejLS]xiaX_ajgM^ cies.and the police department was another problem discussed in the task force's repbftTSpciaragencies offered services during cer-
MAHAFFET
tain_ey^mngJiours_a^ndL_ ran somej^ite^sj^^ers for people who needed a place to spend the night. This was not enough, however, and what was ayailable_jvaa often_nqt_made known tp_ppiice_offir cers. In Detroit, as in many communities, there are twenty-four-hour mental health clinics, but these are intended to deal with -psychiatric emergencies, not problems in relationships, such as family^ conflicts. In addition, most of Detroit's social agencies did not sgtaside blocks of time during_whicX clients_caughynVcon-flict situation could waTlcJn and receivejervices; with few exceptions, agenciesjiad waitingjjsjsjgrjrei^es. Two friends threatening to shoot each other do not need to be told to get at the end of the waiting list.
The task force also faulted the 911 priority list, which placed property crimes and crimes involving a weapon higher than family calls. An example of the 911 calls to which the operator could not send a car in 1974 was as follows: AJ5-y_e^r-old girl called, screaming that her mother was hitting her and beating fier up. She cried that she wa_s_frightened._thaL,her raol±ier_jMould-ldlL-her!._The operator said that thisjwag. not.a. police matter and hung_up. In turn, the p^Hce complained that.when th
night on Friday_o_rat 2:QQ A.M. on Sunday from ajamilv involved in phvsical_violence., no.social worker,qr.speial.work agencY_was_ available..
" The task force's report made five major irK^lffie^aHons]' (1) that all officers be exposed to_a forty-hour crisis mterygntjon trairun^prpjgratnrather'"tnan just members'of spj^alv.ujuj:s, (2) tlTatlTcorpjmfflty resource j_eferral i&sienVbe established, (3) that social agencies set aside blocks of time and have extended hours to as^TsTjhose_^Iingthg police department, (4) that changes be_ rn^dTTrTthe_police.prjQrity.syste^and uTlhe allocation oi personnel, giving ajT^gherjjng^^
tors ihTjIIic^TnTe^ and (5)
that a service award sys.te^be^establisheQ^orecoEnize officers for their abilities To^efuse volatile situations without injury to themselves of others.
When the report of the Social Conflict Task Force was completed in November 1974, Ijised my elected position toobtain media coverage for the^eport^findlngs. i 'also"presented .the. renortto the JJetrca£!Boar^QLP5i£e Commissioners at a public meeting. Several members of the board believed in what we were trying"to do; others thought it a minor matter. However, the police
Creating a New Service
cjiietsaj^that the recommendju^ns_of^^ not be:
acted JiuuntUsocial^ were avail able^Tweru^vf^
tiQiiis-a-da^,,. seyen^^_a_week. He was unwilling toconsiHpr employing, social workers Jn the police department unlessjjjjy were uniformed .officers; if jhexjy^jan^^^^^^^S^'s not wjljingto give them the assignment of worldng wjth_dpjnestlc violence.- "
Other^obstacles included the mayor's continuing to view the project as a low priority. It seemed obvious that the recommendations of the task force were not going to get far without better t cooperation from the top of the police department. Therefore, the stnrte^,becjmie one of_keeping the_Us^e^iyjeJthfr^gh^eeting i with the police cTiieFand^Tn^'mayor and through involvingolner ; cq_n__j_njijiu^ For exampleTwhen
1 representatives of the task force "met with the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, additional members of the Social Conflict Task Force and others were rounded up to be present as a show of support. The head of the task force organized an NASWcommit--tee qn^odsLconflict, and both of us continued totejk to the police,, the police uninn£.-andj:lie corps_of police chaplains. We alsa continued to work on the issue of 911 priorities, to talk with professionals and agencjgs_abgy.t-the .necessityjjf closer work between social agencies and_the: police, department, and to work with the NaHonalTfrganization for Women (NOW) and other community groups to keep the pressure on.
The Criminal Justice Institute had the officers most interested in the project. They even invited Schwartz and Liebman to conduct a week-long demonstration course on handling social conflicts. Not long afterwards, however, the institute was closed as a result of police department politics and Detroit's 1975-76 depression, during which every department of city government, including the police, took a 20-percent budget cut. The projection was that there would be no police to train for at least six months. It appeared the project was dead.
Breakthrough
Events quite apart from any efforts in behalf of the task force recommendations offered an opportunity for some progress. The police chief overreached himself in a depar^m^ntaL^py^e_arid_
■'was fired. A new police chief was appointed. Also, the officer who :Ea3*^ecome the expert within the department on the issue of social conflict calls became deputy executive chief for several months.
In November 1976, in an effort to break through the stalemate, I heldj^e.ejjxjg(in my office to djscuss social conflfct cate. I invited the deputy executive chief of the police department", a representative of United Community Services, the priest who had headed the task force, the two area directors of Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, and a representative of the Detroit ;unit of NASW's Michigan Chapter. Discussion at this meeting identified tjiejjv^naj&k
to house and protect children in dangeras a resi^.p.lf amily Jrou-ble, and tfrofessio^ responded_with_a
grogosaLi!^^ of Detroit and Wayne County, which eventually became known as the Family Trouble Clinic. The agency's willingness to engage in this project was partly a result of community pressure and NASW mvnlyement. A speech by~the deputy executive police chief at a local NASW meeting on the issue of family violence and the police had interested many social workers in the problem.
The project was conceived as ajhjree-month pilot effort. Family Service was to provide the finances fpr.a^odaTwor^^q b£^esent"m'"the precinct station and pffexJirnniediaulZaervice. to dients during the peak^oeriods for incidents of dome^c^ialence,, which Vere Ynday and^SaJturt^^ PrMijwitil midnighOn addition, one or two, visits hy a snrial wnrit^tnjfrp "pliantduring the week were planned to facilitate, coordinate, and direct referrals to Family Service. Objectives of the project were to demonstratejrlwt^^ ted By precinct:based
activities, make social services, better known, to more n9Jice._0.ffi-cers,_increase professional staff's appreciation oj the..problems police officers"ha ve~ in~d"omestic relations caiis,._and give., police officers a beheY uiiiaersta^bUng'of ffiJsemdj?s_.oJOfered. It was also hoped that the results of this police referral project would lend support to the task jojce^ recommendation of. establishingjiight serviceJqr.familvj:punseUng.
No movement tobK~place regarding the proposal for several months. Finally, Ijlisjzovere^^ had njatseen theproposal, so I forwarded another copy to him. I then called Him several times, and he finally agreed it was worth pur-
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!
suing. At a brief meeting in March 1977, the acceptance_ of Jhe Rrojecl.was confirmed .£nd_Jts location established for the Sixteenth Police Precinct, whose commander had volunteered to house the project. The precinct was the largest in the city, its population presented a racial and economic cross section, and the precinct station was close to an office of Family Service. As responsbiftty for the development arid" implementation of the project shifted from one step to the next, it was repeatedly necessary to confront obstacles, defuse emotions, and solve problems to keep the:.project moving toward the finalgoal. Social work skills and the modest power of my elected office were valuable assets during this stage.
Although an early problem arose when the precinct commander publicly supported a mayoral candidate in opposition to the incumbent mayor in the 1977 election, tjiejffker^mujung with the project were convinced of its value, and the two social workers assigned to Jhe projecjt__by FamilyJSeryjce_wer^pIeased 5^Lil?e|r„work. Everyone involved became supportive of the project, and both.the police and the human seryjce_pj^essignals_.said they had begun tolobbied the mayor and his staff in support of the project and, in my reelection campaign, described it as a success, thus building public acceptance and support. In the end, the project survived both the internal politics of the police department and electoral politics.
An ad hoc committee of Family Service studied the experiences of the police-referral project and compiled useful information:
• Social workers and the police were received differently by families in crisis.
• All direct referrals resulted in clients' receiving crisis counseling services within three hours of the complaint.
• Follow-up counseling occurred in 89 percent of all situations in which families received crisis counseling from the social worker.
o In all situations of family conflict, at least one member of the family received some form of direct service from a social worker.
e The number of referrals the project generated in the test precinct would have doubled Family Service's total annual intake if the rate of referral were projected to all the city's police precincts.
• Nm£ty_-nine percent of the people referred had_npi.vjsited_a human service agency"before,
i •  Police officers were concerned about domestic violence, but
j most felt helpless and powerless in confronting the problem.
I Perceived as the authority in the community, police can force
j cessation of a violent situation, but they cannot keep people
! apart. In some situations, for a variety of reasons, the next
j day the wife would say that she wanted her abuser home.
Social workers know and deal with the dynamics of relation-1 j ships, the police officer with cessation qf_the immediate;
; tTourjleTWith trie inception of the pilot project tHejpoli'ce
! orficerTi^d^sometliing to say, to recommend, after stopping
the hostile actions.
• Most disputants lacked communication skills and were not usedj^ojalkingabout feelings. There are also problems when
j only one of two marital partners is verbal.
i i
I
j Focus on Publicity
j Once this information had been compiled, my office announced on
i a Friday that there would be a report to the Detroit Board of Police
| Commissioners. A newspaper reporter called me on Sunday after-
! noon, desperately looking for a story, and, as a result, the police
i reierr^^^jjer^L-T^xeived ji_jront-page headline Mon^y^morn-
i ing. Fortunately, the writer of the newspaper article spoke with a
j police sergeant who had worked with Family Service on the pilot
I project. The sergeant was pleased with the project and praised it,
j and the article had the effect of broadening, public support. As
I planned, the report was presented to the boarf^wjili^taEojres^Lu-
I tions: (1) tHaTthe board approach the local United Foundation and
JtT^aiming agency for thFmb^ ; project permanent'_aimllp_ezpaiidJt to another precinct and (2)
that the police department be instructed to work with Family Service tojtf ejarefa^^ ajlthe precincts.
Time, place, and situation all influence process and strategy. As a result of Family Service's report and of the media coverage received by a national conference on domestic violence held in Detroit by NOW, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, on my recommendation, set up a task force on social conflict. A
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woman commissioner was to chair the task force, and I was to be vice-chair. We thus developed a publicly mandated support network as well as an entrée to the board of commissioners,.the policymaking body for the police department.
Part of my,function 3rajy;gjttaj^ in t^e-DolicejžferjaLQCoiect .andjoj^ethe^ pol^e Somgavin^^ge! in±p^aLorH,hattswith all kma*i!ÍfjgED^^
i^ht,^an.t tpJatch..oi^to a^hp^tp^ic^řOTexample, after the task force was formed by the board of commissioners, two local feminists wrote a proposal for crisis intervention training for the police. One of them, a person with experience in sociological research, was to spend two months supervising a police sergeant in the development of a program to train police officers in defusion techniques. T^researcher^lanned to develop, a referral manual. The.focus-was-on. the .victim without real consideration ofTEe pn^blerns.^ mention was m~aaVof 'the'traiiv;
ing th;e.rjqlice were afready receiving orj^anyj^ Q^^rainin^pTQgranis.'The sociological researcher and the other feminist, a planner in the city's planning department, did their political homework, and by maneuvering and taking advantage of internecine rivalry in the police department, they managed to obtain an LEAA grant despite the objections of several top officials in the police department and of the board of commissioner's task force. The grant was j>u{*=^ policeofficials concerns..
"= Cither groups also went to the board of commissioners to demand changes in. police procedures. Some representatives of these groups were made members of the board's task force.
In 1977,1 built my successful reelection campaign presentation on the theme "promises made and promises kept." One of the promises made in 1973 had been to do something about domestic violence. The promise had been kept: the police referral project had demonstrated that help could be given to families and to police officers and had resulted in some lessening of domestic violence. Therej^a^ejdde.ncgJJiat reciHivisrn_was lower among casesji^ verted^gj^amily Service.
The piloLBrpiect demonstrated the need to spread the_police rel?Eí^^fi^^ai^ÍLrouSh2^t-the_city. In November of 1977, the loralJJmtecLEo^^ money tocontinue
^JLPJ5&3Ji!-in-£ he_Šrxteerit h-Police JPrecmc^ the Tenth Precinct. When the Criminal Justice Institute resumed
training in 1977, it incorporated into its curriculum for all officers some Of the material that was prepared as a result of the studies by the Social Conflict Task Force. As a whole, the project documented the overwhelming need for money to involve additional social workers in social conflict work.
Principles of Political Practice 11 £j-
It would have been impossible to establish the police referral sys- \j)r ...J -tern had there not been support inside the police department, as ^ well as considerable support on the outside. Confrontation was ( q^L>K avoided. TJiejftajigj^ tp^womgn^ contributed
immensely to this. Despite the mayor's placing low priority on TimnaiTiervices', his reragjdtjpn^of the general support _the_issue attracted, of my expertise in this area," and' of "my "support for his administration kept the task force and the police referral project from being seen as too great a threat. In addition, success was ensured by using existing structures and by keeping small the amount of money initially requested, ^purees of fundin^qu^sjde. citx.ggvernmgnt were relied on heavily un^ the idea for a different kind ortraming.fe It was~aiio"important to the success of the program that the police de^ailn^ritJaej^
its eagerness to find solutions to help people. ~" Given the dynamics involved in working with the Detroit Police Department, the mayor, and various elements of city government, a strategy that included picket lines and mass demonstrations would have been counterproductive. However, the strategy used did include a great deal of individual assessment, persuasion, expert information and documentation, lobbying, and the implied pressure of budget power, particularly the power to hold up contracts. It further required the ability to create publicity. The value of coordinating various forces was also demonstrated, because the Detroit Police Department has expert politicians in its ranks. InjidditiojvpoUc^^
a member of the city council, I hag^.the^aower to calljhem tq a pnoTurdiscussiop qy- Hearing. Like most bureaucrats, they dreaded the pDSSiblUty^Tdverse publicity. Apparent throughout the long campaign for the referral system was the importance of timing and of keeping the issue alive during the many periods of waiting
208
MAHAFFEY
Creating a New Service
209
for favorable conditions and opportunities for progress.
A social worker entering politics cannot overlook the importance of conviction and assertiveness. In the Detroit City_Council, where the members are elected simultaneousF/-and atTarge, there is a natural competition for constituencies and for votes. Therejs. also, a t^t&greejrjenU^ issnej^srjgcial concern and is,.f]rmjjuid.asse^ not .seriously, interfere with, frisr prhgJeaders^jon .Uipit jssqe.
Social workers are fr^jljedjuju^ sjdes. jffi^
cpjn^le^itiesj:an lead to inderisiygnesSi whereas.PoIiceSreVa^ned
tQ^ejiei;isive^toE^
Aj:onsequence of thesej^erences isJh.a
at£o£tenjnJ£le^ is. needed.is.an. integra-
tion ofslcills.
Social workers as a whole, and human service agencies as well, need to understand that if they have an idea for a solution to a problem and the professional expertise to carry it out, they must be prepared to fight to get the problem solved in a professional way. Social workers sometimes take the position that the best program will eventually win and so do not fight for proposals that would assure social work services. Too often, non-social workers become attracted by a social work idea and are allowed to take it over for personal gain as it becomes popular. It is important that social workers commit themselves to engage in action for the client's benefit and for equitable treatment to ensure the availability of social work services.
The solution to a problem on a limited scale creates new"demands. As the police referral service demonstrated that it worked, the police in Detroit's Sixteenth Police Precinct made more referrals, and satisfied clients and others called the Family Trouble Clinic instead of the police. Those_who returned seemed to want Jonger. term, counseling. Eventually, the cliruc-need^d, incregs^s in
^y^^J^!™^!J^P—°iL.P3lis..and rejorted_^conducHng most counseling via telephone^^e^Qrudon..tQj3n.e_problem thus created new ones, which had to be addressed in new ways. Flexibility is an essential complement to stability of purpose. The scientific method of problem solving—assessing anddefining the problem, analyzing the forces involved, establishing goals and objectives, planning and implementing intervention strategies, and constantly
reevaluating process and substance to identify the need for any corrective action—provides a valid model for developing and delivering services to a needy population.
The steps outlined in this article can be translated for use by other social workers elected to office, by the many social workers who work with elected officials, and by community groups who have been successful in selling an issue to an elected official. The problem of domestic violence—its impact on the police as well as on families—was identified and then further defined through the use of a task force to gather information and bring various forces in the community together. At each step in the process, strategies were developed to continue the forward movement of the project. When some forces threatened to sidetrack the project, other routes were found and counterforces developed. Most important, throughout this long process, the goal was kept in focus and the pressure was continued. Perhaps the old maxim that change is slow should be extended to affirm that achieving the goal reached through long and persistent effort is even sweeter.
Notes and References
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
2. Interview with Patrick V. Murphy, executive director, Police Foundation, Washington, D.C.June 1974.
3. Interviews with United States Army social workers, Fifth Army, Frankfurt, Germany, June 1975.
4. See Morton Bard and Joseph Zacker, The Police and Intcrpeisonal Conflict: Third-Party Intervention Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1976).
5. See Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Donald A. Liebman, "Domestic Crisis Intervention" (Mountain View, Calif.: Law Enforcement Training anil Research Association, Inc., 1971). (Photocopied.)
6. Interview with Betty Terrell, director of professional services, Family Service of the East Bay, Oakland, Calif., September 1974.
210 MAHAFFEY Creating a New Service a11