An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropology
Author(s): Marilyn Strathern
Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 2, Reconstructing the Academy (Winter, 1987), pp. 276-292
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173986
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AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP:
THECASEOF FEMINISM
AND ANTHROPOLOGY
MARILYN STRATHERN
Feminist scholarship offers the promise of a common ground between
disciplines. Yet this very promise also raisesquestions aboutthe impact of
feminist theory on mainstreamdisciplinarydevelopment. Indeed, the one
idea-the desirability of establishing autonomous women's studies centers-invariably
recalls the other-the desirability of revolutionizing
mainstreamestablishments-a pairofpropositionswhich encapsulatesthe
ideational divide between autonomy and integration that gives feminist
theories their politicaledge. The factthatfeminist scholarshipworksacross
disciplines means it cannot be parallelwith them, and this is awkwardin
relation to the idea that feminist insights might modifyworkin any single
This article is based on a lecture given in the series, Changing Paradigms:The Impactof
Feminist Theory upon the World of Scholarship, at the Research Center for Women's
Studies, Adelaide, Australia, July 1984. I thank Susan Margarey for her invitation and
hospitality, and for thus drawing my attention to the issues of paradigms. The lecture was
published in Australian Feminist StudiesJournal 1 (December 1985):1-25. I had spoken on
similarthemes atthe Department ofAnthropology,University ofCalifornia,Berkeley, andat
the History of Consciousness Unit, SantaCruz, and thankcolleagues at both places fortheir
comments. Inspiration also came from the Research Group on Gender Relations in the
Southwest Pacificat the AustralianNational University. The journal'sreaderswill recognize
ideas of theirs, for which I am most grateful.
[Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1987, vol. 12, no. 2]
? 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/87/1202-0007$01.00
276276276276276276276276276
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
discipline, for instance, anthropology. For its impact to be registered on
mainstreamtheorizing, feminist scholarshipwould have to be construedas
an isomorphic sister "discipline"fromwhich ideas and concepts could be
borrowed. Any conceptualization of the relationship between feminism
and anthropology must account for this awkwardness.
Much of the literature on the failureof feminist scholarshipto change
disciplines assumes the isomorphism of feminist studies and traditional
disciplines, forit is often couched in termsofthe immense taskofparadigm
shift. The idea that paradigmscan be shifted suggests two things at once.
The underlying assumptions that constitute disciplinarybias in its unreformed
state are exposed; at the same time, displacing these with a conscious
theoretical frameworkchallenges existing theoretical frameworks.
Fundamental premises are thus open to assault. Yet this idea of paradigm
shift, so dear to our representations of what we do, turns out to be an
inadequate description of our practice. I shall try to show why.
Disciplines are distinct both in their subject matters and in their
practices. Feminist studies examine new subjects which they can offer to
different disciplines: "placingwomen at the center, as subjects of inquiry
and as active agents in the gathering of knowledge."' What, then, of
differentpractices?Practicesareconstituted by theoreticalframeworks,by
conceptual givens and assumptions, and also by the kind of relationship
which an investigator establishes with the subject itself. This article explores
some ofthe problems thatdisciplinarypracticescanput in the wayof
responsiveness to feminist theorizing. It focuses on the investigator'srelationship
with his or her subject, a source of particularlyawkwarddissonance
between feminist practice and the practice of the discipline I know
best, social anthropology.
It is perhaps ironic to highlight a dissonance between feminism and
anthropology, for anthropology is sometimes singled out for the extent to
which it hasbeen affectedby feminist thinking. Certainlyanthropologyhas
interests parallel to those of feminist scholarship, but the proximation
makes anthropologists'resistance more poignant. Indeed, it maywell be,
asone ofthe Signsreadersput it, thatthe dissonanceis actuallyaproductof
feminists' andanthropologists'intellectual proximity-that they are, asthe
reader suggested, neighbors in tension, neighbors whose similaritiesprovoke
them to mutual mockery. I press home the point by considering the
dissonance between specific branches of feminist and anthropological
theorizing which on the surface appear congenial to one another. Rather
than looking at well-established areas of anthropology, I consider an innovative
approach that shares common interests with radical feminism.
1Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology,"
Social Problems32, no. 4 (April1985):301-16. I amgratefulto BarrieThorne, fromwhom this
article has profited greatly.
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Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
Practitioners of both imagine they might be overthrowing existing paradigms,
and one might, in turn, expect "radical"anthropologyto drawon its
feminist counterpart. This does not seem to have happened. Their resistance
to one anotherwill throwlight on the differencebetween "feminism"
and "anthropology"as such.
Anthropology: Successful or unsuccessful?
The affinity between feminist and anthropological thought is central in
Judith Stacey and BarrieThorne's account of the missing feminist revolution
in sociology. Anthropology, they state, joins history and literature as
the fields in which the most impressive feminist conceptual shifts have
occurred. The impressive gains of anthropologycan be attributed to the
"significant female imprint on the anthropological pavements from the
discipline's earliest days," to the centrality of kinship and gender in traditional
anthropological analysis, and to a holistic perspective that accepts
gender as a pervasive principle of social organization.2
In many ways ideas generated by feminist inquiry have received a
ready response in mainstreamsocialanthropologists'descriptions of other
societies. No one any longer can talkunselfconsciously about the position
of women. It is no longer possible to assume that women are to be
measured by the status they hold relative to another or relegated to a
chapter dealing with marriage and the family. The study of gender has
become a field in its own right. Most majorareas of anthropology were
rapidlycolonized by such ideas during the enormous growthof interest in
feminism in the 1970s, creating the subdiscipline of feminist anthropology.
The early questions asked by feminist anthropology-What is the
place of ideology in collective representations?How do systems of inequality
arise?Are analyticcategories such as "domestic"and "political"useful?
and, How are concepts of personhood constituted?-remain at the forefrontofits
concerns. Moreover, the discipline provides materialsforpartof
the feminist enterprise, namely, the scrutiny of Western constructs.
Anthropologists have investigated Western biological idioms; have
stressed thatwhat happens to women cannotbe comprehended unless we
look at what happens to men and women, and that what happens in that
realm cannot be comprehended without attention to the overall social
system; and continue to provide glimpses into other worlds, into different
2
StaceyandThorne, 303. See alsoCarolMacCormack,"Anthropology-a Discipline with
a Legacy," in Men'sStudies Modified, ed. Dale Spender (New York:PergamonPress, 1981),
99-110. Judith Shapiro, however, includes anthropology in her castigation of the social
sciences, which "haveyet to come to terms with gender as a socialfact"("Anthropologyand
the Study of Gender," in A Feminist Perspective in the Academy, ed. E. Langland and
W. Gove [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 110-29, esp. 112).
278278278278278278278278278
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
forms of oppression and freedom. Anthropologysupplies a range of crosscultural
data that, to borrow a phrase, are good to think with.
The discipline thus appearsto offeranunparalleledpositionfromwhich
to scrutinize Western assumptions, enlarging the scope of feminist enterprise
by reminding us of the conditions under which women live elsewhere.
Yet, in the early 1970s, specificfeminist interest entered anthropology
in the form of stinging attackson the discipline's male bias. This was a
clear signal that anthropologistscould not affordto be complacent. Simply
having had a "place" somewhere for women in their accounts was not
enough; they could well be replicating male evaluations of women in the
societies they studied. Thisfeminist critique ofbiasquicklyfound its mark.
Afterall, feminists were askingthe kindsof questions about ideologies and
models that anthropologists recognized. In short, they gave excellent
anthropological advice.3
Stacey and Thorne perceive such innovationsin anthropologythrough
the formula of paradigm shift. To them, feminist gains in anthropology
have shifted paradigmsin two senses: existingconceptualframeworkshave
been challenged, and the transformationhas been accepted by others in
the discipline. Thus "ofall the disciplines, feminist anthropologyhas been
the most successful in both of these dimensions."4
Anthropology is similarly, though less optimistically, singled out in
Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove's collection of essays on feminist
perspectives in the academy.5 By comparison with the state of affairsin
several disciplines, they conclude that anthropologists have long been
sensitive to differences in male and female behavior, but they leave it at
that. Whereas Stacey and Thorne see anthropology6as accomplishing a
double paradigm shift, Langlandand Gove's more pessimistic reflections
see the major shift still to come. However, these authors both take a
transformationof frameworksas the criterion for success.
Langlandand Gove speakof the resistance documented in their collections:
the scholars agree that while a "feminist perspective has begun to
affect the shape of what is known-and knowable-in their respective
3
See Jane MonnigAtkinson, "Anthropology(Review Essay),"Signs:Journal ofWomenin
Culture and Society 8, no. 2 (Winter 1982):236-58, esp. 238. Ironically, Edwin Ardener's
paper on the problem of women was written to elucidate certain features of model building
and, in retrospect, has become a contribution to feminist literature; see Edwin Ardener,
"Belief and the Problem of Women," in The Interpretation of Ritual, ed. Jean La Fontaine
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972).
4
Stacey and Thorne, 302.
5Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The
Difference It Makes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; first published by the
Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University, 1981).
61refer to social/culturalanthropology. A moderate case forphysical anthropologyis put
by Helen Longino and Ruth Doell, "Body, Bias, and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysis of
ReasoninginTwoAreasofBiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (Winter 1983):206-27, esp. 226.
279279279279279279279279279
Stathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGYStathen / ANTHROPOLOGY
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
disciplines, perhaps the more urgent note in each essay is the failure of
women's studies to altercollege anduniversitycurricula.Paperafterpaper
concludes that, while the potential power to transformthe discipline is
great, women's studies has not yet significantly unleashed that power."7
They echo an overview of women's studies that refers to the "massive
resistance against which feminist scholarsstruggle."8Langlandand Gove
ask about the cause of the failure. Their answer is in terms of a paradigm
model (though this is not a phrase they use): "Women'sstudies has had so
little impact on traditional bodies of knowledge because it challenges
deeply held, often sacred beliefs .... [It] challenges vested interests; it
uproots perspectives which are familiar, and, because familiar, comfortable
.... [For] women's studies is not an additionalknowledge merely to
be tacked on to the curriculum. It is, instead, a body of knowledge that is
perspective transforming and should therefore transformthe existing curriculum
from within and revise received notions of what constitutes an
'objective' or 'normative'perspective."9In other words, feminist analyses
have not substantiallyinfluenced traditionalcurriculabecause such analyses
challenge fundamental disciplinary frameworks.
As faras the impact of feminist thought on anthropologyis concerned,
where would one place the resistance? Can one in fact see it in terms of
challenge and counter-challenge over paradigms?
Socialanthropologyis in manyways an open discipline. Faced with an
arrayof social and culturalsystems, its practitionerstend to grabfora tool
kit, in JamesClifford'sphrase(see n. 30), which containssuchconstructsas
can be turned to analytical utility. Specializations proliferate-regional
ethnography, economics and politics, legal theory-as do frameworksMarxism,
structuralism, symbolic anthropology. This tolerance made
room for the study of gender and for feminist ideas. Yet a milieu of
tolerance has also reduced feminist scholarshipto just another approach,
one way among many into the data. Consequently, a declared interest in
putting women back on the map encourages theoretical containment. If
feminist scholarshipis seen as the study of women or of gender, its subject
can be taken as something less than "society." Feminist anthropology is
thus tolerated as a specialty that can be absorbedwithout challenge to the
whole.
Within anthropology few names are associated with an exclusively
feminist position. Rather, feminist anthropologyis tied to a general cate-
7 Langland and Gove, 2.
8 MarilynBoxer, "ForandAboutWomen:TheTheoryandPracticeofWomen's Studies in
the United States," in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane,
Michelle Rosaldo, and BarbaraGelpi (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 260.
9 Langland and Gove, 3-4.
280280280280280280280280280
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
gory, to "women"asits practitioners,aswell asits subjectmatter. 0Clearly
it is the intention ofmanyfeminist scholarsto restorewomen to view. Butit
is unfortunate that their concerns can be concretized in this way. Where
feminist anthropologists see themselves as taking on the whole of the
discipline, they are met with a tendency to section off gender analysis or
women's studies from the rest of anthropology. Perhaps, as Langlandand
Gove would argue, this is a reaction to threat. Feminist-inspired anthropologists
raising questions about male bias could be regardedas challenging
the foundation of the subject, with its theoretical emphasis on group
structures, on systems of authority, and on rules and norms, and with its
assumptions about the description of total systems. Ironically, however,
where these concepts have most powerfully come under scrutiny-and
"groups,""rules," and "norms"have hardly survived the last decade-it
has been in response to internal criticism that has had little to do with
feminist theory. Meanwhile, social anthropology still continues to know
itself as the study of social behavior or society in terms of systems and
collective representations. Ifthese constitute aparadigm,then it is largely
intact.
Is this in fact a process of challenge and counter-challenge? Does
feminist theory present a profoundthreat to core paradigms?And has the
threatbeen ingeniously deflected by the restofthe anthropologicalpopulation,
assuming it is just "aboutwomen"? Both the idea of challenge and
counter-challenge, and anthropology'sother face, its openness to feminist
ideas, invite one to think in terms of paradigms. Indeed, Stacey and
Thorne characterize the fields in which feminist thinking has had most
headway as ones with "strong traditions of interpretive understanding,"
thatis, ones thatarereflexive andself-critical." Here the conclusion would
seem to be that those disciplines most aware of the paradigmaticbases
upon which they proceed will be most open to paradigm shift. This
argument, however, contains an interesting flaw.
The flaw is made visible by the invocation of Thomas Kuhn'swork on
paradigms in scientific theory. Without such a reminder one might get
away with a commonsense understanding of paradigmsas "basicconceptual
frameworksand orienting assumptions of a body of knowledge."12 Yet
one significant feature of the Kuhnian paradigmis that the scientists he
studied become awareofparadigmshiftonly afterthe fact.The whole point
10See Judith Shapiro, "Cross-culturalPerspectives on Sexual Differentiation,"in Human
Sexuality:A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. H. Katchadourian(Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979).
"l Stacey and Thorne (n. 1 above), 309.
12Ibid., 302; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970). Langland and Gove do not cite Kuhn, though their
terminology strongly suggests that they are familiarwith his work.
281281281281281281281281281
Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
is thatthey do not aimto shiftparadigms-they aimto accountforthingsby
what they know. The twin ideas ofparadigmsandthe possibility of shifting
them remain powerful ones. These ideas belong to the way innovative
scholars represent themselves. They are part of the way they talk about
what they do. The image of perspective transformationbelongs to the
rhetoric of radicalism-and requires explanationas partof that rhetoric.13
The rhetoric of paradigm shifting
Paradigmenters the vocabularyof the social sciences (andhumanities) to
referto aconstructed model. One mayenvisage new paradigms"invented"
or an alternate paradigm"emerging."'4The idea of overturningparadigms
is apopularmetaphorforthe perceived challenge andcounter-challenge in
the relationship between feminist scholarshipand established disciplines.
It is the received radicalview that people will defend their present paradigms
because it is too uncomfortableor threatening to give up what one
has. In her survey on women's studies, MarilynBoxer observes, "Justas
manyfeminists found thatthe goalsofthe women's movement could notbe
fulfilled by the 'add-women-and-stirmethod,' so women's studies scholars
discovered that academic fields could not be cured of sexism simply by
accretion."'5Initial compensatory scholarship led to the realization that
only radical reconstruction would suffice. Many scholars have found an
explanationin Kuhn'stheory of scientific revolutions. Kuhn'sformulations
aretakenasjust asapplicableto the socialsciences asthey areto the natural
sciences for which he developed them. I suggest that they are less applicable
than appears at first sight.
I give one example. Elizabeth Janewayfollows Kuhn'sformulationsin
detail to show that they provide apowerful analogyforthe investigation of
sex stereotypes.16 He defined aparadigmasanimplicitbody ofintertwined
theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation,
and criticism. Change is first evaluated, then registered as an anomalythe
pressure of anomalies eventually forcing a new normative model.
Janeway argues that male representations of female sexuality provide
patterns that fit into the accepted structure of behavior, beliefs that provide
a source of permissible metaphorsthroughwhich people think about
themselves, standards for behavior, and exemplars learned from the
13See Longino and Doell; Donna Haraway, "In the Beginning Was the Word: The
Genesis of Biological Theory," Signs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1981):469-81.
14See Elizabeth Janeway,"WhoIs Sylvia?On the Lossof SexualParadigms,"Signs5, no.
4 (Summer 1980):573-89, esp. 588; and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexualityas the Mainstayof
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," Signs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980):605-30, esp. 613.
15
Boxer, 258.
16 Janeway.
282282282282282282282282282
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
anonymous pressure of ascriptive social mythology. Beliefs about female
sexuality also act like Kuhnianparadigmsin their response to anomalies.
Over time, anomalies force paradigmsinto a different position; instead of
being takenforgranted,they become idealspreached about. Indeed, she is
concerned to press the point that for some, male sexual stereotypes never
fitted. Women could never share fully in them, since they cannot fit
themselves into expectations of male normalcy. Paradigms in her view
establish the rules of normalcy.
Yet, what do we do with the internal contradictions that Janeway's
"paradigms"also seem to entail? The very constructionof normalcyalong
exclusive male lines, forinstance, invites questions about the place of men
and women in relation to its definition of what is normal. Janewaywrites,
"The shared beliefs and values expressed by our 'paradigms'of female
sexuality are not, in fact, sharedfully by the women who have had to take
them as models."'71would suggest that the factthey are not sharedcomes
less from a failure of a paradigm to accommodate reality than from the
structure of an ideology which, in speaking to certain social interests, also
reproduces others and thus promotes contradictory propositions. It is
important, then, to look at the manner in which so-called paradigmsare
shared.
SandraCoyner advises women's studies practitionersto "abandonthe
energy-draining and still overwhelmingly unsuccessful effortto transform
the established disciplines. Instead they should continue developing the
new community of feminist scholars who will eventually discover new
paradigms and found a new normative science."18This interesting statement
breaks with the assumption that paradigms are like some set of
cultural norms; instead, it locates paradigmsin relationto a community of
practitioners. The question is whether we are still dealing with paradigms
or not.
Kuhnhimself claims thathis investigations in naturalscience stemmed
from realizing the extent to which social science, by contrast, was characterized
by overt disagreement. He professes to be puzzled at the way his
notion of paradigm had been adopted in other fields.19Kuhn notes the
specific natureofthe communityin naturalscience: there arerelativelyfew
competing schools, so thatrevolutions affectuniversalperceptions; a community's
members are the onlyjudge of one another;and puzzle solving is
anend in itself. Kuhnemphasizes the sharedmeaningsofparadigmswhich
both define a scientific community and are defined by it. Of course,
scientific communities exist at different levels, but on the whole there will
be agreement about the status of their disagreements. Above all, there is
17
Ibid., 575.
18Cited by Boxer, 260.
'9 Kuhn (n. 12 above), on the first point, viii; on the second, 208.
283283283283283283283283283
Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
general agreement about scientists' relationship to their subject matter:
the world presents them with problems to be solved.
These are the characteristicsofaclosed system. Revolution serves only
to close the system again: successive paradigmsreplace or substitute for
one another. Overt competition between paradigmsis short-livedbecause
the proponents of the new paradigmclaim they have solved the problems
thatput the old one in crisis. Yetthis hardlyfitsthe present case offeminist
scholarship, insofaras it has an interest in sustainingantagonismbetween
"paradigms."Here it is the very championing of a new "paradigm"that
makesthe old one problematic. Indeed, it is in feminists'overt interests to
take a conflict view of their social context. If so, its explicit conceptual
frameworkscannot be regarded as paradigms.
Competitive premises
Talking about paradigms is not the same as using them. The metaphor
suggests the immovabilityof massivefoundationsandthe herculean taskit
would be to dislodge them. Yet when we are dealing with social scientists
who constantly overturntheir own theories andconstructexplicit histories
of internal revolution, I do not think the key to resistance is feminism's
challenge to intellectual frameworks, let alone "paradigms."I wish to
accountforthe awkwardnessinthe relationshipbetween anthropologyand
feminism, and the continuing resistance thatfeminist scholarshipencounters,
in different terms. Talkabout "paradigms"belongs to the conscious
effortto establish anew subject matter. Whatcannotbe so self-consciously
shifted, I shall argue, is the nature of investigators' relationship to their
subject matter that particularscholarlypractices create. We must look to
the social constitution of both feminist and anthropologicalpractice.
Neither feminist scholarship nor social anthropology is closed in the
Kuhniansense. Thus there is no one anthropology;its practitionersrange
fromdeterminists to relativists, fromthose interested in power relationsto
those who give primacyto culturalmodels, fromthe politicaleconomists to
the hermeneuticists. Manyof these positions correspond to philosophical
ones or have counterpartsin historyorliterarycriticism. When anthropologists
call themselves poststructuralists,they cannotescape contemporary
literarytraditionsany more than they ever could claim a monopoly on the
concept of structuralism.It should be no surprise, then, that smallas it is,
the field offeminist anthropologyis based on divisions. Socialanthropological
studies of women persistently divide into two camps over whether or
not sexual asymmetry is universal. One side argues that Western constructs
blind us from seeing egalitarianismin unfamiliarcontexts and that
we encounter hierarchicalrelations only in the historicalcontext of privatized
ownership. The other side argues that we should look for sexual
284284284284284284284284284
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
inequality in all its forms, for sexual difference everywhere contributes to
socially constituted differences. Diane Bell has called these "evolutionist"
and "universalist"positions;they echo established strategies in the anthropological
handling of cross-cultural data.20
Anyone overviewing feminist theory alsohasto accommodateits explicitly
self-differentiated positions. Labels have a political flavor: liberal/
radical/Marxist-socialist.The political vantage points provide a model for
the differentiationof feminist vantagepoints, which againreplicate potential
intellectual divisions within Western society at large. Indeed, it may
look as though there is an impossible arrayof theoretical positions within
feminist debate: "Here we are speaking in many voices."2 Yet it is a
phenomenon offeminism thatthe positions areheld explicitlyin relationto
one another. Through the vast amount of internal criticism and countercriticism,
the voices depend on one another'spresence. It need hardlybe
instanced that Marxist-socialistfeminism places itself in relation to both
liberaland radicalfeminism and is constantlycommenting on the fact. The
arguments are never dispatched. In other words, no one viewpoint is
self-reproductive: feminist "theory"is created dialogically, in the sense
that all the positions in the debate constitute its base. The pluralism that
characterizes both anthropology and feminist scholarshipwould seem to
have them touch mutualground at several points. Andhere is the contrast
with natural science: not simply that within such scholarly practice one
findsdiverse "schools"(alsotrue in science) but alsothattheir premises are
by their nature constructed competitively in relation to one another.
Kuhn characterized the relationship of scientific scholarsto their subject
matter as one of problem solving. The naturalworld is conceived as
made up of different things, ultimately related through sets of "laws"
which by "naturallogic"22cannot be in conflict. The problem is how to
specify these laws. Paradigmsprovide rules for registering the nature of
the problem and what its solution would look like. In the social sciences,
however, the differences between the theoretical positions I have been
talkingabout correspond to the formationof different social interests. The
social world is conceived as made up of persons who are basically similar
but divided between themselves by interests that may indeed conflict;
more than that, "social logic" allows contradictoryviewpoints. Scholarly
20Diane Bell, Daughters of the Dreaming (Melbourne:McPhee Gribble/George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 245-46.
21
Haraway (n. 13 above), 481; see also Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today:
Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980);Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (Sydney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984);Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1981),esp. xix;JanetSayers, BiologicalPolitics:FeministandAnti-Feminist
Perspectives (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982).
22Compare T. M. S. Evens, "Mind, Logic and the Efficacyof the Nuer Incest Prohibition,"
Man, n.s., 18 (1983): 111-33.
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Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
practice concerned with the constitution of this social world internally
replicates this differentiation. It would be pointless to seek a homogenization
or reconciliation of all points of view; there can be, in this sense, no
common worldview. What is seen to constitute the socialworld, rather, is
the natureofthe relationshipsbetween differentviews fromdifferentsocial
positions.
The anthropologist does not wish to assimilate the characterof other
systems to his or her own. The essence of the comparative method is to
make sense of differences, not collapse them. Feminist theory also has an
interest in difference-in constantly bringing to mind the "difference it
makes" to consider things from a perspective that includes women's interests.
Insofar as men's and women's interests are opposed, perpetual
effortmust bring this to attention. Again,homogenization makesno sense.
Feminism's and anthropology'sconcerns in promoting difference would
seem to be further grounds for mutual convergence. So why the resist-
ance?
The answer cannot lie in "paradigms,"first, because the different
theoretical positions occupied in the social sciences are not analogous to
the paradigms of Kuhnian science. They are based on overt conflict between
competitive conceptual frameworks which cannot be reduced to
single positions and, second, because theoretical positions, in anthropology
at least, are in fact overturned and displaced very easily-radicalisms
abound. It may be objected that such positions are not, then, really of
paradigmaticstatus, andwe should lookfordeeper paradigms.Yetto do so
would be easier from within anthropology:for instance, it is encounters
with alien social and cultural systems that allow one to scrutinize the
subject/object dichotomy or commodity notions that informWestern concepts
of personhood and identity. From the anthropologicalpoint of view,
much feminist thinking participates in such constructs, embodying
ethnocentric commentary upon the world. Third, the awkward relationship
between feminism and anthropologyis lived most dramaticallyin
the tension experienced by those who practice feminist anthropology.
They are caughtbetween structures:the scholaris facedwith two different
ways of relating to her or his subject matter. The tension must be kept
going; there can be no relief in substituting the one for the other.
Neighbors in tension
For the tension between feminist scholarship and anthropology, I have
used the term "awkward,"to suggest a doorstep hesitation rather than
barricades. Each in a sense mocks the other, because each so nearly
achieves what the other aims for as an ideal relation with the world.
There is, in anthropologicalinquiry, a long traditionof breakingwith
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Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
the past, so that theoretical generations tend to be short-lived. A recent
heir to this constant radicalizationare innovations interesting in the present
context for the weight placed on the interpretation of experience.
Experience is also an explicit topic of feminist inquiry. The well-argued
radicalview is that feminist theory is "experiential,"23in the sense that its
firststep is consciousness raising. In transmutedform, a number offeminist
anthropologists emphasize the significance of experience. RaynaRapp
reported in her 1979 review of anthropology the "searchfor analysis of
more finely delineated female experience";she laternotes interest in "the
lived body"-women's self-concepts as mediated through perceptions of
their bodies.24Nancy Scheper-Hughes addresses a feminist anthropology
that explores "the nature of the self" in the fieldworksituation:ethnography
as "intellectual autobiography."25Yet the focus on similar issues in
general ethnographicwritinghasproceeded asaquite independent radical
development, without regardforthe feminist contribution.The anthropologist's
aim is to grasp"livedexperience" throughperceptions ofthe body;26
"a new anthropology of ritual experience" is heralded in a collection of
essays on initiation rites.27Feminist interest in these matterswould not be
challenging "paradigms"that are not alreadyunder challenge fromwithin
the anthropology. I think this is because "experience"is not the common
meeting ground it appears to be, and my focus on it will be a focus on the
awkwardness between anthropology and feminist scholarship as such. I
briefly contrast the way the idea of experience is used in nonanthropological
feminist discourse and in nonfeminist anthropologicaldiscourse. In
each case it is developed as a weapon against orthodoxy.
Feminist scholarshipsees itself aschallenging stereotypes that misrepresent
women's experiences. Women's experience maybe set againstmale
ideology, including academic theory building, which appropriatesspeech
andimage in the interests ofpatriarchy.These arethe imagesofsexualityof
which Janeway talked-women being made to feel in certain ways about
themselves, asthough thatthinkingcould be done forthem. Closely tied to
23 Nannerl Keohane, Michelle Rosaldo,and BarbaraGelpi, eds., "Foreword"to Feminist
Theory: A Critique of Ideology (n. 8 above), vii; also Cheri Register, "LiteraryCriticism
(Review Essay)," Signs 6, no. 2 (Winter 1980):268-82, esp. 269. StaceyandThorne note that
feminist theorists "arereconsidering the relationshipbetween knowerandknownto develop
amethod ofinquirythatwill preserve the presence ofthe subjectasanactorandexperiencer,"
and stress their affinityto others who contribute to hermeneutic and neo-Marxistcritiques of
positivist social science (n. 1 above), 309.
24 Rayna Rapp, "Anthropology(Review Essay)," Signs 4, no. 3 (Spring 1979):497-513,
esp. 500 and 503.
25
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Introduction: The Problem of Bias in Androcentric and
Feminist Anthropology," Women's Studies 10 (1983): 115.
26
Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," Man, n.s., 18 (1983):327-45.
27 Gilbert Herdt, "Preface"to Rituals of Manhood:Male Initiation in Papua New Guinea
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), esp. xix.
287287287287287287287287287
Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
the personal, experience cannot but resonate with conditions as they are,
even if its meaning has to be brought up to individual consciousness.
Experience thus becomes the instrument of a knowledge which cannotbe
appropriatedby Others. It can only be shared with like persons.
Essential to this view of the feminist task is the need to expose and
thereby destroy the authority of other persons to determine feminine
experience. The constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men's
accountsremindswomen thatthey must see men asthe Otherin relationto
themselves. Creating a space forwomen becomes creating a space for the
self, and experience becomes an instrument for knowing the self. Necessaryto
the construction of the feminist self, then, is a nonfeminist Other.28
The Other is most generallyconceived as"patriarchy,"the institutionsand
persons who represent male domination, often simply concretized as
"men."Because the goalis to restoreto subjectivityaselfdominatedby the
Other, there can be no shared experience with persons who standfor the
Other.
Within anthropology, the ethnographer'sfocus on experience signals
an effort to remain open to people's emotional and personal lives. The
problem is that in writing his or her account, the ethnographer must first
translate another's experience through his or her own and then render
experience in the written word. Contemporary experimentation with
biography, narrative, and novel constitutes an explicit response to this.29
Experimentation includes recent self-consciousattempts to let the anthropologists'
subjects speak for themselves. As a historian of anthropology,
James Clifford describes a new genre of works designed to reproduce
multiple authorship. Paul Rabinowtypifies the genre as poststructuralist,
an "intercalationof mixed genres of texts and voices."30In allowing the
so-called informantto speakinhis orher ownvoice, the resultingethnography
replicates the interlocutoryprocess offieldwork,which alwaysrestson
collaborationbetween anthropologistand informant.Anthropologistsand
their reactions are thus part of the data, rather than being mysterious
hidden hands. The anthropologist'sown experiences are the lens through
which others of his or her own society may achieve a like understanding.
28See Haraway (n. 13 above); and Genevieve Lloyd, "History of Philosophy and the
Critique of Reason," Critical Philosophy 1 (1984):5-23, esp. 14. However, Keohane et al.,
eds. (n. 8 above), delimit varieties of consciousness, of which consciousness of oneself as the
object of another's attention is only one.
29Michael Jackson, Allegories of the Wilderness: Ethics and Ambiguity in Kuranko
Narratives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Michael Young, Magicians of
Manumanua:Living Myth in Kalauna (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1983).
30Paul Rabinow, "'Facts Area Wordof God':An Essay Review ofJamesClifford'sPerson
and Myth:MauriceLeenhardtin the MelanesianWorld,"in Observers Observed:History of
Anthropology, ed. G. Stocking(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress, 1983), 196-207, esp.
196; also James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," Representations 1 (1983): 118-46.
288288288288288288288288288
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
These experiences consequently become a vehicle forcross-culturalcommentary,
as when Rabinow'spersonal reactions in the field reveal a "cultural
self."31
Anthropology here constitutes itself in relation to an Other, vis-a-vis
the alien culture/society under study. Its distance and foreignness are
deliberately sustained. But the Other is not under attack.On the contrary,
the effort is to create a relation with the Other, as in the search for a
medium ofexpression thatwill offermutualinterpretation,perhapsvisualized
as a common text, or a dialogue. Clifford develops the concept of
"discourse"to evoke the structure of a dialogue that retains the distinct
multiple voices of its authors yet yields a product that they all to some
extent share. Under attack,by contrast, is thatpartof oneself embodied in
the traditionto which one is heir. It is claimed that the pretensions of the
old anthropologyobliterated the multiple authorshipoffieldworkdataand
did not acknowledge the input either of the informantor of the anthropologist's
particularexperience.
Feminist inquiry suggests that it is possible to discover the self by
becoming conscious of oppression from the Other. Thus one may seek to
regain a common past which is also one's own. Anthropological inquiry
suggests that the self can be consciously used as a vehicle forrepresenting
an Other. But this is only possible ifthe self breakswith its own past. These
thus emerge as two very different radicalisms. For all their parallel interests,
the two practices are differently structured in the way they organize
knowledge and draw boundaries, in short, in terms of the social
relations that define their scholarly communities.
Perhaps the differences could be turned into a dialogue between
feminist scholarship and anthropology. But it would be an awkwarddialogue
insofaras each has a potential for undermining the other. For both
are vulnerable on the ethical grounds they hold to be so important. I
construct a hypothetical encounter to make the point.
Mockery between neighbors
How can feminism be said to mock this style of anthropology?The anthropologist
is trying to establish him or herself as an interpreter of experiences.
Yet obviously the anthropologist would also admit to being in
control of the final text. However much multiple authorship is acknowledged,
using people's experiences to make statements about matters of
anthropological interest in the end subordinates them to the uses of the
discipline. But that does not mean it is a worthless exercise. On the
31 See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Reflectionson Fieldworkin Morocco(Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1977).
289289289289289289289289289
Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
contrary,and the reasonthe issue of ethics is raised, the plea thatmultiple
authorshipis desirable speaksto anideal relationshipwith informants.The
ethnographeris anxiousnot simplyto renderthe experience ofothers in his
or her own terms, but to preserve their separate dignity. To present a
monographas a collaborativeproduction, then, is a metaphorfor an ideal
ethical situation in which neither voice is submerged by the Other.32
From a feminist perspective, of course, there can be no collaboration
with the Other. This anthropologicalideal is a delusion, overlooking the
crucial dimension of different social interests. There can be no parity
between the authorship of the anthropologist and the informant; the
dialogue must alwaysbe asymmetrical. Whether the prime factorsare the
colonial relations between the societies from which both anthropologists
and informants come or the use to which the text will be put, the social
worlds of anthropologist and informant are different. They have no interests
in common to be served by this purportedly common product.
Although I have used the case of the innovative ethnographyof experience,
ethnography in general draws on values widespread within the
discipline. Anthropologicalpracticewould cease if it could not implement
in some way or another a working ethic of humanism.33The feminist
critique comes from different premises, but that does not prevent its
poking fun at anthropological pretensions at their most vulnerable. Indeed,
mockery always comes from a different vantage point, so the blow
strikes infuriatinglyat a tangent. But feminists come close to displayingan
alternative route to what anthropologistshope to achieve in collaborative
enterprises. Feminist scholars can claim substantialinterests in common
with the people they study. They may be speaking woman to woman, or
else have a common ground in understanding systems of domination.
How, then, could anthropology possibly mock feminism? The radical
feminist approachemphasizes the conscious creation of the self by seeing
its difference from the Other. Women have to know the extent to which
their lives are molded by patriarchal values. It is an achievement to
perceive the gulf, and in turn, an ethical position, forthis is what validates
women's commitment to one another. Now, if such feminism mocks the
anthropological pretension of creating a product in some ways jointly
authored, then anthropologymocksthe pretension thatfeminists can ever
reallyachieve thatseparationfromanantitheticalOtherwhich they desire.
From a vantage point outside their own culture, anthropologistssee that
32 Rabinowsuggests that it is not authenticity that Leenhardt'scoauthoredtexts claimbut
"anethically superiorproductofjoint work"(myitalics),204;see JamesClifford,"Fieldwork,
Reciprocity and the Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice Leenhardt,"
Man, n.s., 15 (1980):518-32; and Young (n. 29 above), 34-35.
33Robert Bellah, "Foreword"to Rabinow (n. 31 above), esp. xii.
290290290290290290290290290
Winter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNSWinter 1987 / SIGNS
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
the very basis for the separation rests on common cultural suppositions
about the nature of personhood and of relationships. If women construct
subjectivity for themselves, they do so strictly within the sociocultural
constraints of their own society. The establishment of self must endorse a
worldview shared equally by the Other.
Again, these constitute ethical issues over which feminist thinkers
concern themselves: silent speech; connivanceandparticipationin oppression;
how we set about creating a feminist discourse that rejects domination,
when language itself is conceived as an instrument of domination.34
Feminism requires adogmaof separatismasapoliticalinstrument in order
to constitute a common cause. Anthropologists mock feminists by almost
effortlessly achieving that distance fromtheir own society which feminists
create with such anguish. Yet, again, the mockeryalsoglances off, because
in fact feminists inhabit their own society, and the discovery that their
values are culture bound is irrelevant. Feminists can only operationalize
their perspectives if these are held to have some congruence with reality.
Thus they do not need to know that "really" they cannot distinguish
themselves fromthe oppressive Other;on the contrary,what they need to
know are all the ways in which "really"they can and must.
If we were to seek in the social sciences ideas comparableto the status
that paradigms hold in natural science, it might be helpful to recall that
paradigmsin Kuhn'saccount are sharedworldviews thatcome fromdoing
science rather than from acquiring rules for doing it.
In the natural sciences such worldviews necessarily take the form of
intellectual paradigms,that is, models fororganizingknowledge about the
world. I have suggested that the conscious theorizings about knowledge
that characterize both anthropologicaland feminist thought are not best
conceptualized as paradigms. Yet there is a set of views analogous to
paradigms regarded by feminists and by anthropologists alike as so fundamental
thatneither could proceed without them. Butthese views cannot
be open to conscious challenge, because they define the very practice by
which each acts. They thus do not appearas "views"at all, but as knowledge
of the world. It is a social world and involves the differing relationships
that feminists and anthropologistshave constructed toward the
Other.
Although I dwelt on particularapproaches, the construalsof the Other
briefly described here can be generalized to feminism and anthropology
overall. These constructionsarefundamental.When broughtinto the open
and compared, their proponents cannot possibly challenge each other, for
the one is no substitute forthe other. As Kuhnwrites of the proponents of
34See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents: Language, Power
and Meaning," in Keohane et al., eds. (n. 8 above), 145.
291291291291291291291291291
Strathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGYStrathern / ANTHROPOLOGY
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
competing scientific paradigms, they practice their trades in different
worlds. Indeed, the properly paradigmaticstatus of these two practices is
revealed in the extent to which they appear irrelevant to each other and
thus offer not challenge but what I have called mockery.
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Manchester
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