"WE ARE ALL DEMOCRATS NOW
W E N D Y B R O W N
"Welcome Back, Democracy'"
—Headline, article on Obama election, The Beaver
(London School of Economics newspaper),
November 6, 2008
Democracy as Empty Signifier
Democracy has historically unparalleled global popularity today yet
has never been more conceptually footloose or substantively hollow
Perhaps democracy's current popularity depends on the openness
and even vacuity of its meaning and practice—like Barack Obama,
it is an empty signifier to which any and all can attach their dreams
and hopes Or perhaps capitalism, modern democracy's nonidentical
birth twin and always the more robust and wily of the two, has
finally reduced democracy to a "brand," a late modern twist on commodity
fetishism that wholly severs a product's salable image from
its content.1
Or perhaps, in the joke on Whiggish history wherein
the twenty-first century features godheads warring with an intensity
that ought to have been vanquished by modernity, democracy
has emerged as a new world religion—not a specific form of political
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power and culture but an altar before which the West and its admirers
worship and through which divine purpose Western imperial
crusades are shaped and legitimated.
Democracy is exalted not only across the globe today but across
the political spectrum. Along with post-cold war regime changers,
former Soviet subjects still reveling in entrepreneurial bliss, avatars
of neoliberalism, and never-say-die liberals, the Euro-Atlantic Left is
also mesmerized by the brand. We hail democracy to redress Marx's
abandonment of the political after his turn from Hegelian thematics
(or we say that radical democracy was what was meant by communism
all along), we seek to capture democracy for yet-untried purposes
and ethoi, we write of "democracy to come," "democracy of the
uncounted," "democratizing sovereignty" "democracy workshops/'
"pluralizing democracy," and more. Berlusconi and Bush, Derrida
and Balibar, Italian communists and Hamas—we are all democrats
now But what is left of democracy*
Rule by the Demos
It cannot be said often enough: liberal democracy, Euro-Atlantic
modernity's dominant form, is only one variant of the sharing of political
power connoted by the venerable Greek term. Demos + cracy =
rule of the people and contrasts with aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny,
and also with a condition of being colonized or occupied. But no
compelling argument can be made that democracy inherently entails
representation, constitutions, deliberation, participation, free markets,
rights, universality, or even equality The term carries a simple
and purely political claim that the people rule themselves, that the
whole rather than a part or an Other is politically sovereign. In this
regard, democracy is an unfinished principle—it specifies neither
what powers must be shared among us for the people's rule to be
practiced, how this rule is to be organized, nor by which institutions or
"WE ARE ALL DEMOCRATS N O W . . . " 45
supplemental conditions it is enabled or secured, features of democracy
Western political thought has been haggling over since the beginning.
Put another way, even as theorists from Aristotle, Rousseau,
Tocqueville, and Marx through Rawls and Wolin argue (differently)
that democracy requires the maintenance of precise conditions, rich
supplements, and artful balances, the term itself does not stipulate
them. Perhaps this is another reason why contemporary enthusiasm
for democracy can so easily eschew the extent to which its object has
been voided of content.
De-democratization
If it is hard to know with certainty why democracy is so popular
today, it is easier to adumbrate the processes reducing even liberal
democracy (parliamentary, bourgeois, or constitutional democracy)
to a shell of its former self. How has it come to pass that the people
are not, in any sense, ruling in common for the common in parts of
the globe that have long traveled under the sign of democracy> What
constellation of late modern forces and phenomena have eviscerated
the substance of even democracy's limited modern form>
First, if corporate power has long abraded the promise and practices
of popular political rule, that process has now reached an unprecedented
pitch.2
It is not simply a matter of corporate wealth
buying (or being) politicians and overtly contouring domestic and
foreign policy, nor of a corporatized media that makes a mockery of
informed publics or accountable power. More than intersecting,
major democracies today feature a merging of corporate and state
power: extensively outsourced state functions ranging from schools
to prisons to militaries; investment bankers and corporate CEOs as
ministers and cabinet secretaries; states as nongoverning owners of
incomprehensibly large portions of finance capital; and, above all,
state power unapologetically harnessed to the project of capital ac-
46 WENDY BROWN
cumulation via tax, environmental, energy, labor, social, fiscal, and
monetary policy as well as an endless stream of direct supports and
bailouts for all sectors of capital. The populace, the demos, cannot
fathom or follow most of these developments let alone contest them
or counter them with other aims. Powerless to say no to capital's
needs, they mostly watch passively as their own are abandoned.
Second, even democracy's most important if superficial icon,
"free" elections, have become circuses of marketing and management,
from spectacles of fund-raising to spectacles of targeted voter
"mobilization/' As citizens are wooed by sophisticated campaign
marketing strategies that place voting on a par with choosing brands
of electronics, political life is increasingly reduced to media and marketing
success. It is not only candidates who are packaged by public
relations experts more familiar with brand promulgation and handling
the corporate media than democratic principles; so also are political
policies and agendas sold as consumer rather than public
goods. Little wonder that the growing ranks of CEOs in government
is paralleled by the swelling of academic political science departments
with faculty recruits from business schools and economics.
Third, neoliberalism as a political rationality has launched a frontal
assault on the fundaments of liberal democracy, displacing its basic
principles of constitutionalism, legal equality, political and civil liberty,
political autonomy, and universal inclusion with market criteria
of cost/benefit ratios, efficiency, profitability, and efficacy.3
It is
through a neoliberal rationality that rights, information access, and
other constitutional protections as well as governmental openness,
accountability, and proceduralism are easily circumvented or set
aside and, above all, that the state is forthrightly reconfigured from
an embodiment of popular rule to an operation of business manage-
ment.4
Neoliberal rationality renders every human being and institution,
including the constitutional state, on the model of the firm
and hence supplants democratic principles with entrepreneurial
ones in the political sphere. In addition to dethroning the demos in
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democracy, this transformation permits expanded executive state
powers at the very moment of declining state sovereignty about
which more in a moment. Having reduced the political substance of
democracy to rubble, neoliberalism then snatches the term for its
own purposes, with the consequence that "market democracy"—
once a term of derision for right-wing governance by unregulated
capital—is now an ordinary descriptor for a form that has precisely
nothing to do with the people ruling themselves.
But capital and neoliberal rationality are not the only forces responsible
for gutting liberal democratic institutions, principles, and
practices. Rather, fourth, along with expanded executive power, recent
decades have witnessed the expanded power and reach of
courts—domestic as well as international.5
A variety of political struggles
and issues, including those emerging from domestic social movements
and international human rights campaigns, are increasingly
conferred to courts, where legal experts juggle and finesse political
decisions in a language so complex and arcane as to be incomprehensible
to any but lawyers specializing in the field. At the same time,
courts themselves have shifted from deciding what is prohibited to
saying what must be done—in short, from a limiting function to a
legislative one that effectively usurps the classic task of democratic
politics.6
If living by the rule of law is an important pillar of most
genres of democracy, governance by courts constitutes democracy's
subversion. Such governance inverts the crucial subordination of adjudication
to legislation on which popular sovereignty depends and
overtly empowers and politicizes a nonrepresentative institution.
Fifth, along with the domination of politics by capital, the overtaking
of democratic rationality with neoliberal rationality, and the
juridification of politics, globalization s erosion of nation-state sovereignty
as well as the detachment of sovereign power from nationstates
is also crucial to the de-democratization in the West today7
If
nation-state sovereignty was always something of a fiction in its aspiration
to absolute supremacy completeness, settled jurisdiction, mo-
48 WENDY BROWN
nopolies of violence, and perpetuity over time, the fiction was a potent
one and has suffused the internal and external relations of
nation-states since its consecration by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
However, over the past half century, the monopoly of these combined
attributes by nation-states has been severely compromised by
ever-growing transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, resources,
commodities, violence, and political and religious fealty These flows
both tear at the borders they cross and crystalize as powers within,
thus compromising nation-state sovereignty from its edges and its
interior.
When states remain fiercely agentic amidst their eroding sovereignty
when they detach from the unique double meaning of sovereignty
in democracies—popular and supervenient—there are two
especially important consequences. On the one hand, democracy
loses a necessary political form and container and, on the other,
states abandon all pretense of embodying popular sovereignty and
hence carrying out the will of the people, a process already inaugurated
by the neoliberal governmentalization of the state already
mentioned. With regard to the first, democracy, rule by the people, is
only meaningful and exercisable in a discreet and bounded entity—
this is what sovereignty signals in the equation of popular sovereignty
with democracy Democracy detached from a bounded sovereign
jurisdiction (whether virtual or literal) is politically meaningless:
for the people to rule themselves, there must be an identifiable
collective entity within which their power sharing is organized and
upon which it is exercised. Of course, the vastness of the nationstate
already limits the kinds of power sharing that makes democracy
meaningful, but when even this venue gives way to postnational and
transnational fields of political, economic, and social power, democracy
becomes incoherent.
JWith regard to the second, states detached from sovereignty become
rogue states in both their internal and external dealings. The
reference point for ordinary exercises of state power is neither rep"WE
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resentation nor protection of the people (the latter being the classic
liberal justification for state prerogative power). Rather, faintly
echoing the raison d'etat of the old realists, contemporary states substitute
for pursuit of the prestige of power a complex double role as
actors within, facilitators of, and stabilizers for economic globalization.
In this context, the people are reduced to passive stockholders
in governmentalized states operating as firms within and as weak
managers of a global order of capital without, an order that has partly
taken over the mantle of sovereignty from states. Nothing made this
more glaringly apparent than state responses to the finance capital
meltdown in the fall of 2008.
Finally, securitization constitutes another important quarter of
de-democratizing state action by Western states in a late modern
and globalized world. The ensemble of state actions aimed at preventing
and deflecting terrorism in Israel and India, Britain and the
United States are often mischaracterized as resurgent state sovereignty,
but, like state bailouts of capital, are actually signs of the detachment
of state from sovereign power and have everything to do
with this loss of sovereignty Facilitated by neoliberal displacements
of liberal political principles (liberty equality, the rule of law) for an
emphasis on costs, benefits, and efficacy the security state reacts to
eroding and contested state sovereignty with a range of inadvertently
de-democratizing policies, from suspended rights of movement
and information access to racial profiling to increased zones of
state secrecy and permanent undeclared wars.
In sum, for the people to rule themselves, they must be a people
and they must have access to the powers they would democratize.
Globalization's erosion of nation-state sovereignty undermines the
former and neoliberalism's unleashing of the power of capital as an
unchecked world power eliminates the latter. But, if "actually existing
democracy" is in a woeful state, let us consider what, if anything,
remains of democracy s raison d'etre.
$0 WENDY BROWN
Democratic Paradoxes
As is well known, ancient Athenian democracy excluded 8 0 - 9 0
percent of the adult Attican population from its ranks—women,
slaves, free foreign residents, and others who did not meet the strict
lineage requirements for citizens. These exclusions of Western
democracy in its cradle were extreme, but not the exception. Democracy
as concept and practice has always been limned by a nondemocratic
periphery and unincorporated substrate that at once materially
sustains the democracy and against which it defines itself
Historically, all democracies have featured an occluded inside-—
whether slaves, natives, women, the poor, particular races, ethnicities,
or religions, or (today) illegals and foreign residents. And there
is also always a constitutive outside defining democracies—the "barbarians"
first so named by the ancients and iterated in other ways
ever after, from communism to democracies3
own colonies. In our
time, the figure of "Islamicism" comforts democrats that they are
such, even and perhaps especially in the face of de-democratization
in the West. Thus has an overt antiuniversalism always rested at
the heart of democracy, suggesting that if the imperial dream of universalizing
democracy materialized, it would not take the shape of
democracy.
If premodern, republican democracy was premised on the value
of ruling in common—rule by the common for the common—and
hence centered on a principle of equality, the promise of modern democracy
has always been freedom. Modern democracy has never
pledged equality except in the most formal sense of representation
(one person—one vote) or equal treatment before the law (not a
necessary entailment of democracy, rarely secured in practice, and
irrelevant to substantive equality). Rather, it is Rousseau's difficult
wager—that we surrender ungoverned individual liberty for collective
political power, and this in order to realize our individual free"WE
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dom—that lies at the heart of the normative supremacy claimed by
democracy Indeed, individual freedom remains democracy's strongest
metonymic associate today even while its promise of rule by the
people is often forgotten.8
Only democracy can make us free because
only in democracy do we author the powers that govern us.
In modernity, freedom understood as self-legislation is presumed
a universal human desire, if not, as Kant, Rousseau, and Mill had it,
the quintessence of being human. Indeed, it is modernity's birth of
the a priori free moral subject that establishes democracy as the only
legitimate modern Western political form. This is the figure of the
subject that made and continues to make democracy's legitimacy literally
incontestable. At the same time, the white, masculine, and colonial
face of this subject has permitted and perpetuated democracy's
hierarchies, exclusions, and subordinating violences across the entirety
of its modern existence. Thus does an overt and perhaps even
necessary unfreedom rest at the heart of democracy, suggesting that
if the imperial dream of freeing all people was to materialize it would
not take the shape of democracy.
The Impossibility of Freedom
Modern democracy's normative presumption is self-legislation attained
through shared rule of the polity; the sovereignty of the subject
is linked to the sovereignty of the polity, each securing the other.
But legislation of what, rule of what? Theorization of a range of normative
(formally nonpolitical) powers combined with devastating
critiques of the Kantian subject have together rendered freedom especially
complex and elusive in late modernity. What powers must we
govern, what must we legislate together, what forces must we bend to
our will to be able to say we are even modestly self-governing or selflegislating?
Answers to these questions have divided democrats
across the ages. At one end, liberals make elected representation for
$2 WENDY BROWN
lawmaking the core of the matter, along with sharp limits on the
transgress of individual activities and ends. At the other end, Marxists
insist that the means of existence must be collectively owned and
controlled as a first condition of human freedom. Radical democrats
emphasize direct political participation while libertarians would
minimize political power and institutions.
Once we surrender the conceit of the a priori moral subject for an
appreciation of the panoply of social powers and discourses constructing
and conducting us, it is impossible to be sanguine about the
liberal formulation. Popular assent to laws and representatives is insufficient
to fulfill democracy's promise of self-legislation. Instead,
we would have to seek knowledge and control of the multiple forces
that construct us as subjects, produce the norms through which we
conceive reality and deliberate about the good, and present the
choices we face when voting or even legislating. Power understood as
making the world and not simply dominating it—or, better, domination
understood as fabrication and not only rule or repression of the
subject—requires that democrats reach deep into polyvalent orders
as powers for the grounds of freedom. The simple idea that we and
the social world are relentlessly constructed by powers beyond our
ken and control immolates the liberal notion of self-legislation
achieved through voting and consent. And yet the notion of democratically
ruling all the powers constructing us is absurd: it approximates
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps or grasping from
without the psyches through which we experience and know the
world. So democracy, to be meaningful, must reach further into the
fabrics of power than it ever has and, to be honest, must give up freedom
as its prize. From this angle, democracy could never be achieved
but is only an (unreachable) aim, a continuous political project; democratization
commits its signatories to sharing in the powers that
make, order, and govern them, but is perpetually unfinished.9
As troubling to the liberal formulation as the Foucauldian- and
Derridean-inspired concerns with forms of power other than law
"WE ARE ALL DEMOCRATS N O W . . . " 53
and command is the force of capital in making and arranging democratic
subjects, already discussed. What can democratic rule mean if
the economy is unharnessed by the political yet dominates it> Yet
what could be more of a fantasy than the notion of subordinating a
global capitalist economy and its shaping of social, political, cultural
and ecological life to democratic political rule or, for that matter, to
any political rule?
In sum, apart from state power, both capital and a range of less
forthrightly economic normative powers must be reckoned with
when considering prospects for redemocratization today. History
features no success, or even sustained experiments, with democratizing
either. So continued belief in political democracy as the realization
of human freedom depends upon literally averting our glance
from powers immune to democratization, powers that also give the
lie to the autonomy and primacy of the political upon which so much
of the history and present of democratic theory has depended.10
Alternatively,
this belief entails thinking and practicing democracy
with a realist's acute attention to powers democracy has never before
tried to theorize, address, or subdue.11
For the second possibility, a
sharper break with liberalism's monopoly on the term democracy is
hard to imagine.
Do Humans Want Freedom* Do We Want Humans to Be Free?
There is one last contemporary challenge for those who believe in
popular rule, perhaps the most serious challenge of all. As we have
already said, the presumption of democracy as a good rests on the
presumption that human beings want to be self-legislating and that
rule by the demos checks the dangers of unaccountable and concentrated
political power . But, today, what historical evidence or philosophical
precept permits us to assert that human beings want, as
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Dostoyevsky had it, "freedom rather than breads All the indications
of the past century are that, between the seductions of the market,
the norms of disciplinary power, and the insecurities generated by an
increasingly unbounded and disorderly human geography, the majority
of Westerners have come to prefer moralizing, consuming,
conforming, luxuriating, fighting, simply being told what to be,
think, and do over the task of authoring their own lives. This was the
conundrum for the future of liberation first articulated by Herbert
Marcuse in the middle of the last century12
And if humans do not
want the responsibility of freedom, and are neither educated for nor
encouraged in the project of political freedom, what does this mean
for political arrangements that assume this desire and orientation?
What extreme vulnerability to manipulation by the powerful, along
with domination by social and economic powers, does this condition
yield? Plato worried that improperly ordered souls in charge of their
own political existence would author decadence and unchecked licentiousness,
but there is a more evident and worrisome danger
today: fascism authored by the people. When nondemocrats are
housed in shells of democracies, clutched with anxiety and fear in an
increasingly unhorizoned and overwhelming global landscape, and
ignorant of the workings of the powers that buffet them, how can
they be expected to vote for, let alone more actively pursue, their
own substantive freedom or equality, let alone that of others?
On one side, then, we face the problem of peoples who do not
aspire to democratic freedom and, on the other, of democracies we
do not want—"free" peoples who bring to power theocracies, empires,
terror or hate-filled regimes of ethnic cleansing, gated communities,
citizenship stratified by ethnicity or immigration status,
aggressively neoliberal postnational constellations, or technocracies
promising to fix social ills by circumventing democratic processes
and institutions. Contouring both possibilities is the problem of
peoples oriented toward short-run gratifications rather than an en"WE
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during planet, toward counterfeit security rather than peace, and
disinclined to sacrifice either their pleasures or their hatreds for collective
thriving.
Rousseau so deeply appreciated the difficulty of getting a corrupted
people oriented toward public life that his commitment to
democracy is often seen to have impaled itself on the project of converting
such a people into democrats. There are many ways of understanding
what he meant by "forcing someone to be free" but all
converge on suspending the commitment to freeing the subject in
order to realize that commitment. Today, however, it is hard to imagine
what could compel humans to the task of ruling themselves or
successfully contesting the powers by which they are dominated.
Possibilities
Does the poor fit of popular rule with the contemporary age add up
to a brief for abandoning left struggles for democracy and soliciting
left creativity in developing new political forms? Or does it, instead,
demand sober appreciation of democracy as an important ideal, always
unavailable to materialization? Ought we to affirm that democracy
(like freedom, equality, peace, and contentment) has never been
realizable, yet served (and could still serve?) as a crucial counter to
an otherwise wholly dark view of collective human possibility? Or
perhaps democracy, like liberation, could only ever materialize as
protest and, especially today, ought to be formally demoted from a
form of governance to a politics of resistance.
I am genuinely uncertain here. What I am sure of, however, is
that this is not a time for sloganeering that averts our glance from
the powers destroying conditions for democracy Encomiums from
left philosophers and activists to "deepen democracy," "democratize
democracy," "take back democracy" "pluralize democracy" or invest
ourselves in a "democracy to come . . . " will only be helpful to the
56 WENDY BROWN
extent that they reckon directly with these powers. We require honest
and deep deliberation about what constitutes minimal thresholds
of democratic power sharing, whether and why we still believe in democracy,
whether it is a viable form for the twenty-first century, and
whether there are any nonchilling alternatives that might be more
effective in holding back the dark. Is there some way the people
could have access to the powers that must be modestly shared for us
to be modestly self-legislating today? Is the freedom promised by
democracy something humans want or could be taught to want
again? Is this freedom likely to yield the good for the world? What
kind of containment or boundaries does democracy require, and, if
these are not available, is democracy still possible? If we were able to
arrive at answers to these questions, there still remains the most difficult
one: how the demos itself could identify and reach for the
powers to be handled in common if democracy is to become anything
more than a gloss of legitimacy for its inversion.
"WE ARE ALL DEMOCRATS N O W . . . " 57