Globalization and Inequalities Curiiplť.Oly dnd Contested Modernities Sylvia Walby Globalization and Inequalities Complexity and Contested Modernities Sylvia Walby ®SAGE C Sylvii TiDw 30» Pln publlihcd JľHH Apurl fmii: iny ľilr ik-jllnv f p4"i>r rcprodutiioii. In i'. lc-rdimí.' villh triĽ 11:1mi cl l;i\'iiLi«t imuiixI by 1hií Qi|yyr1|thi LlDtniJn^ ľLBťriL.T ErquIrtĽi Ľíini'.'mln(j. reíirínkK.1>:in (MiiklĽ íluiK' dmikí JxhJJ 1)ľ »tml id Ihe piilvjri-v.'rr; EXQfi PuNxiilimi lid ] Ohref.í Yird Vr City IKllíl Ljruijn. EC L V 1SP sisfi PuNJcailiTci im- 2V& TcIIi.t Eisíd lhcHJBnd Qifci, Gjllľnmli ÍL53J \\í JŕaN aľ.:iiTcí I■ IM In: II J.-l I :,l(il::n: '.:-::":iiT.iir'V I iJi.--r.il tSMbimu Uru d New Delil ] 10 nit hAjGlí FuNxmliirŕi JĽaa-HKlTfc.- Plo- Liii 35 PctLn stred HlI-m Pu ľjjI IŤ:|ujrť LIľlU,ipCTLL CUKTíií Jmtí' dí Ľcnflŕem Canipol Mjmhŕ*: JMHSiSflM HriUsh U b* ary Ľjulopiinfl !□ PuUlcncliGii djca A ciiifogjje rmd ŕar UhLi Trrak t; □villihlu [mm lln- Elrhhk Llhtsxy VABK íľľH-rM»3IMft]lWi fptlkj TjpeieJ by CiU rj^ifc (p) uxl. ChĽnrul. Inili:i ľrliiiĽil In- CPl Anlixry Biiwc-. Chlpfwnhini, TOŕuhirť ľrlnlĽd Dn [sipcr Trom lutfinirHi; iraijnrei. T3C hMbv-^wmťjBiri Contents Ackmnriedgemems- viu List of Tobies and f-'igttfes be 1 [riuroducttOD: progress and modcr niilts 1 Introduction I What is PnjfjjeEt? 3 Multiple Complies I mequalitbCH IH Modernity? FoHtmodterniLy? Mat yet Modern? varieties of Modernity? 2^ Globalization 35 Complexity Theory -47 Contents 5ft 2 TTteortzlncj multiple social systems SB Introduction 5K Multiple Inequalities and [nKeiscLLitjnaltty fin RegiiTHJH and Domains lkj System anJ its Fjnivirorimenl: Over-Lappins, Non-Saturatinfl, ISon-Nested Systems f>7 Socielaiization not Societies filJ EimerRencc and Projects 71 Bodies, Technologies arid Ihe Social 75 Path Dependency Coevolutian of Complex Adaptive ^SyHLems in Changing Fitness landscapes 3ft waves 95 Conclusions 99 3 Economies 101 Introduction Hodjefinina true Eeontjmy ][|] 101 From Premodern to Modern: The- Second Great Transformation Iriy Global Processes and Economic [ncquaLhics 115 Varieties of Political Economy 132 Conclusions 152 4 Polities 1$6 [ntroduction 156 BeconceptijaLipins Types oF Polities 157 Politics Overlap and do not Politically Saturate a Territory 171 Democracy 17fi Conclusions |so 5 Violence 1^1 [ntroduction 1^1 Developing the Ontology of Violence 1^3 Ht>demity and Violence l^y Path Dependency in Trajectories oF Violence- 2CK Global 212 Conclusions : I 6 CtvU societies 21B Introduction 218 Theorizing CiviL Society 2lH Modernity and Civil Society 221 Civil Society Projects 228 Global Civil Societies and Waves 233 Conclusions 1 ~ 7 Regimes of complex Inequaliry 2^0 Introduction 2^y Beyond Class Regimes 251 Gender Regimes 1~\ 1 F1 hnic Regimes 2t>4 Further Regimes oF Complex Inequalities 270 Intersecting Hcgimes oF Complex Inequality 272 Conclusions 275 8 Variedes of modernity 277 Introduction 277 XeoliljL-ni■ :mt: Social Dcmocrati* Varic-lie* Modernity 27fi Path Dependency at the Economy/Polity fucius 2HO Palh Dependency at the Violence Nexus 2^6 Gender Regime 3tH Democracy and [ncqualhy 30s Coric I Li si cms Appendix: Data Sou rets 5tö 312 9 Measuring prepress Introduction 314 Economic Development 315 Equality 31? Human llights 344 Human Development, Wcll-Being anJ Capabilities 3^t> Key Indicator Sels: What Indicators? What UnderLymg Concepts of Progress? 352 Extending the Frameworks and Indicators oF Progress: Where do Environmental Susiainahtlity and Violence Fit? 35^ The Achievement oF Visions of Progress: Comparing NcoliberaLLsm and Social Democracy .Vv-; Conclusions 3fi3 10 Comparative paihs Through modernity: neoliberaltsm and social democracy 3^7 Introduction 3£>7 Political Economy 3f>? Violence 3yc> Gender Transformations The FjTi*rp,ence of Employed Women as the New Champions oF Social Democracy' 40$ Dampeners and Catalysts of Economic Growth: War and Gender Regime Transformations 415 Conclusions 417 11 Comested Futures 12s, Iritroduetion 425 Financial and Economic Crisis 2HHI7-2lKI9 425 Contesting Hegemons and the Future of the TCfarld 433 12 Conclusions 443 Introduction 4^3 The Challenge of Complex Inequalities and GlobalijatKm (o Social Theory 444 äiblioftrapby 45t> /pwfcr 4yH G I 7 VII Polities Introduction. Policies constitute 1.1 n inmilLitionalized domain, a sedimentation of political forces in a system of centralized institutions that govern the economy, violence, and civil society. The nature of political Institutions la the outcome of past political struggles that continue to have- implications into the- future as a consequence of their embeddedness In institutions, states and polities need to be recon-ceptualized in order to fully take into account complex inequalities and global processes. Four themes are addressed Ln this chapter: the reconceptualization of types of polities; the non-saturation of a territory by any one- polity, and the implications of their overlaps: rethinking the conceptualization of democracy; the development of democracy. First, the concept of state is too narrow to capture the range of political institutions thai are made visible when complex inequalities air brought into focus. The broader concept of polity Ls needed so as to encompass not only stales but also nations, organized reUgkins, hege-rnons, and emerging global institutions. Further, the assumption that oation-states were evier common is challenged, n Nk-kl l'J9S) Much analysis of the state., democracy, and globalization has fbeused on social processes prijnarily connected with changes in capitalism and associated class relations. However, this is unduly reslrijctiver as it excludes other complex inequalities stemming from ethnicity, :race' (Wilson VJK7), nation (Smith iys6; Calhoun J 995; lirubaker l9Un), religion flieyer 1994), and gender (Kenworlhy and Malami ly^y). When these complex inequalities in addition to class are made visibler then a wider set of polities comes into focus. In particular, religions are prime carriers of ethnic, national, and gender projects into global and regional conflicts. Such conflicts (for instance, that between fundamentalism and lthe West') are hard to understand without the inclusion of interests of gender and ethnic-it)' alongside those of class and economics. It is important to consider the full range of polities and not only the sub-set constituted by states if the politics associated with complex inequalities arc to be included in the analysis. A minimal definition of a polity is an entity which has authority over a specific social group or territory or set of institutions, which in turn has some degree (}f internal coherence, some degree of centralized control, some rules, the ability to typically enforce sanctions against those members who break iLs rules, the ability to command deference from other polities in specific arenas over which it claims jurisdiction, and which in turn has authority over a broad and significant range of social institutions and domains. The forms of authority and power, and the means to enforce sanctions, Lire varied. There are different kinds of power of polities, including coercion, economic, Legal, and symbolic power. These can be coordinated in different ways and have varied spatial and temporal reach. The notion of membership is needed to ascertain who Ls within and who is without a polity, and most have complex rules regarding entry and. exit Obr example, membership if the parent was a member or if birth was within ils territory), with complex processes or rituals mediated Vsy bureaucrats or priests. This definition of polity is wider than that traditionally used, however, it is not intended to capture all forms of governance structures within this definition. There are some forms of governance that do not have the temporal and spatial scale or the institutional range necessary to constitute a polity. 5mall-scj]e specialized institutions of governance, such as business firms, labour unions, hospitals and universities, are not within the concept. Not all sets of political institutions constitute politics. There are a number of borderline cases, for instance, national projects that hive strong institutions within civil society. If a political collectivity is not able to enforce deference to its rules frum its members and from established polities then it falls outside the definition of polity. Only very well developed national projects will meet these criteria, and many embryonic projects will not. Similarly, communities leased on criteria of ethnicity or racializatinn or linguistic commonality may or may not establish sufficiently developed institutions for diem to constitute a polity. P-olltLes include. In addition to states, nations (if they have well-developed sets; of civil society institutions), regional polities {such as (he European Union), some organized religions (such as Catholicism and [slam). empires and hefiemons. 'Nation' should not be conflated with 'state' (as in 'nation-state') if the greater number of states lhan nations and conflicts between nations and states are to be explained. Empires, should not be conflated with nation-stales, because of the political significance of multiple nations subject lo a common state. Organized religions should not In.1 excluded from the category of polity, if the ethniL. national, and gender political projects that they carry onto a global stage are to be understood. The European Union is a significant polity, with con.>k:c|Lience.H for Hinder, ethnicity, and nation, as well as class, but defeats categorization as either a slate or a committee of states. Both the USA and the EU are hegemons. In addition there are emergent global political institutions. States States today are usually polities. This is □ pared-down concept of state, In m which i he in ;it-n of natkwi ha:- Invn Mj.prvd ■ :\~. v-ii-d: dtv^ not make the presumption of a conprucnt civil society and economy. Most contemporary states have sufficient power and authority to command internal Rovemance and external deference, to warrant being conceptualized as polities. However, there are occasional exceptions, such as when a state's institutions of internal governance have suffered serious collapse due to a civil or foreign war, for example, as wli^ tlit: case in Somalia at the turn of the twenty-first century. Slates are distinguished from most (tflier forms of polities by their use of force to obtain and maintain consent, amon^ oiIut forms of Rover-nance. States have relations with other states in an inter-state system. Nations Nations can be a tvpe of polity under certain circumstances. A nation is a social and political group which is perceived to have a common history and destiny (Anderson l^HJ; Hobsbawm and Ranger iyH3>, sometimes a common ethnic origin (Smith 1^H6), althoufih this may not necessarily be so (Gellner iyH3): and a set of governing institutions that root such beliefs in the social and political practices. It can be a polity when its institutions are well developed and it is able to ■lI-l'cj'unci some external deference. It can lie distinguished from a state 159 (Guibemau 2fHH) because it due?.- not have a full range of centralized political institutions, such as those that control the majority (if the use of force. One example is- the [rinn nation in tin.1 period just before the establishment of the ärish state (Miller 1*J73; Larkin 1^5) while another is contemporary Scotland (McCrone l£*J2). Nations can tie Important in carrying ethnic, religious, and gendered project;. Nation- s tates ? N-at ion-states exist more En mythh as aspirations, than as empirical entities. [E Ls Inappropriate to treat nation-states as the main type of contemporary polity for several reasons: there are many more nations lhan states; several key examples of supposed nation-stales were actually empires; and there arc diverse and significant polities in addition to stales, including the European Union and some organized religions. There are Jar more nations than states (Guibemau l^ty; Keating 2002; Minahan 2O021. It is rare for a territory to have one nation and the whole of that nation, and one state, and (he whole of that state. Most nations and national projects do not have a state of their own. instead they often share a slate with other nations and national pn> jecl.H. This pattern of cross-cutting nations and statics can be a result of migration {forced or voluntary), or of war or conquest. This is not to argue that there are not stares, but rather that there arc not often stähle HJJjbfl-Rtates. For instance, wilhin Britain or the United Kingdom in the post-empire period there are nations of English. Scottish, and TStlsh, as weEl a^ part (if the Irish nation (Nairn 1^77; MJcCrone ly^Z; IJryant ZjCHKS>. The struggle over the location of the border between the UK and Ireland is an example of the militarized conflict and terrorism that can be generated when there is a contestation rather than the neat mapping of state and nation. Within Spain and France there is the Basque nation that seeks separation and a state of its own. The tweak up of the Soviet empire has precipitated many nations and would-be nations into seeking stJtes of their own, with several cf these having not achieved their objective despite the multiplicity of new states that have been created. The stale of Canada contains not only Canadians but also the French speaking, stale-seeking nation of Quebccuis. The nation of Germany had two states for half the- twentieth century. The boundaries of states can change rapidly, as. for instance, in the case of Germany, established as a stale only in the nineteenth century, which has seen the repeated movement of pieces of territory between itself and France, enlargement and contraction during the middle of the twentieth century, partition into two quite different states in I he accord haJf estimates that there are around 20(10 'nation-peoples', that is, around ten times as many as the states recognized by the United Nations. Nation-states with the whole of one nation and no olher and one state and no other polity, which are stable in time and space, are hard to find in Europe and indeed anywhere elsewhere in ihe world. At most, ration-states exist for short moments in history before being reconstructed yet jjpain. Many key examples of nation-states were actuary empires. Nation-states are often considered to become a common political and social form after the Treaty of Westphalia in lo4K. The hey-day, the height, of this form is usually considered to be from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries until the mid-twentieth century, and its most frequently found location is usually assumed to be Europe {Tilly Mann ]°y3a}. For instance, Mann, despite his interest in early, pre-l7n0 empires (Mann iy«n>, leaves this conceptualization behind in his analysis of the post-1760 period, where he treats Britain and France as if they were nation-slates fMann iyy3aX Vet several of the key examples of nation-states (for example, Britain, France, Spain and Portugal) were actually empires during the nineteenth century and not nation-states. It docs not make sense to consider people who were subject to such empires to be either members of European nation-slates or members of their own local nation-states. At the time of Lhese empires most people were not within an entity that could reasonably be called a nation-state, since those colonized would hardly recognise themselves as part of the colonizLnji :nation\ To consider the llritish and other empires to be nation-states rather than empires Ls to erase from history the experiences of those man)' people who were subject to these states, [t is also to neglect the use of political and military domination to restructure economies in the interest of the imperial power. 11 is not appropriate to ignore these empires in accounts of the rise of r..-t.i :|1-M.:.Ll-S. lI ^ if lliCSL" lIT-lIlT lilt l-LI k" ( I lt.l| 1 i jl'^ wl'IV i.-- link1 significance, as if Europe and North America constituted the whole of the world. Empires have states, not nation-states. The nineteenth century was the hey-day of empires, not nation-states. Nation-states are Largely mythical entities, frequently aspired to, but rarely realized in practice. [ >hLi ugrcgatuur nation and state can be more helpful than conflating them in a spurious unity of nation-state. The tensions that can exist ;is a result tjf the usually incomplete and partial mapping of nation onto state are a major cause of contemporary militarized conflict* and terrorism. The conflation of important distinctions between nation, stale, and nation-stale thus Leave* out-of-focus points of disjuncture between these entities that are important in ^eneratin^ social and political struggle and change. Such disjunctures have important consequence* For social and political strife. Different polities often carry dilfercjil gender a™j ethnic projects, so L:k- (:u Lcojiie of these a>nflkls Lls iioHiaiLions for llie form and decree of complex inequalities. To argue th:H nation-states are tartly mythical does not mean that beliefs about them are unimportant (contra Druce and Vbas 2£n>0- Myths are powerful. Ideas move people to action. Invented traditions, have effects (Hobsbawn and Ranker ly^J)- A myth is a narrative story that is considered to represent a tradition and to provide information about core values and the conduct necessary to achieve them. The myth of the nation-state is that a nation will find full and true expression of its values and will secure its economic well-being only if it has a state of its own in a territory of its own: and that it is possible to achieve (his, with the evidence being that there are believed to be many examples of successful nation-states. It is predicated on the assumption that it is possible and desirable to bring into alignment in one place culture, economy, and political representation through a state. The myth of the nation-state is a very powerful force. It does not depend upon there being any actually existing nation-states, only a belief that there are. Many national movements believe that it is possible as well as desirable to achieve a nation-stare. The myth of the nation-state has launched many political movements and militarized conflicts. The nation-state is a powerful myth about purity. It is about a nation having a stale of its own so that it can self-regulate its environment in conformity with its values. The nation-state myth is about the -close fit of a nation and its own state, with its own politics, economy, and culture mapping onto one another in the same territory. The desire of a nation, or would-be nation, for a slate of its own has been a tremendous force in human history. On the one hand! it can lx.L LLndcrsKHXL in terms of a discourse of self-determination, of community, of democracy, of the realization of j society in conformity with the values of the nation, free from the impositions of invasive, colonialist, exploitative, foreign powers. On the (idher liand i1 can also be a tenible force. It can unleash militarism and armed struggle, by regular armies, guenillas. and terrorists, as nations seek to establish a slate (if their own in a territory of their own. It can be a force (hat seeks purity where there is none, driving genocide, ethnic cleansing, communal murders, and pogroms. The nation-state is a powerful and resilient myth. The aspiration of nations for states of their own is a powerful driving force in contemporary politics. However, nationalists seldom achieve a state just for themselves and usually have to settle (or same sort, of messy compromise with other nations, and polities. Organized religions Organized religions constitute politics in those instances where they have significant powers of governance over significant aspects of people',s Lives. Religions frequently have authority over the regulation of intimacy, and sometimes economic matters, such as whether h is acceptable to pay interest on loans (usury), though [here may be contestation or negotiation with a state frja- authority over these matters (Inglis Parrel! Kandiyoti iy!)l). This can include the regu- lation of marriage, divorce, non-marital sexuality, clothing, and diet. Organized religions have three main routes to authority: moral authority articulated through, religious belief; political pressure on states and other polities and the power to sanction members of the religious community if thev break (he rules of a religion. It might lie thought that, in the modem world, the powers of organized religion have been reduced to the fiist two and that only the state lias the right to sanction citizens for hreaking community rules. However, this is mistaken. This power is still potent in some locations, especially in tlte regulation of intimacy (that is, in areas of sexuality and family relations such as marriage, divorce, contraception, abortion, and homosexuality). Sanctions can include a religion's refusal to carry out rituals which are considered essential (e.g. communion for those ex-communicated; divorce; church re-marriage for those divorced by the state}; exclusion from a religious community with implications for a way of life, condemnation to some kind of hell in a believed-in afterlife, that is. the threat of eternal damnation fe.g. for abortion)- a refusal to recognize Lir.iiMi - kuiliiiLLik- nftVprinji ■■■■'.!I: ijnpJ:i"LlLc:-ns lor pn>\w.\ fiiLiile-ments as well as moial standing, and various forms of penitence (Smyth l£?2; Hardacre iy93; Moghadam 1993; Hebe-Lucas 1904). Religion is sometimes considered as no longer relevant to analyses of modernity (Thompson I9!^>), largely because of a presump-li- m :k.ir [iKick'miAiLiun pmdLueti >et ularLKatii m. While I he process of secularization is an important process (Bruce 2(Xt2) its extent can be exaggerated, while the significance of its restructuring in relation to secular polities can be under-estimated f Gorski ZllOlf). There are important variations in the secularization process in different countries, with the process much more advanced in Europe than in the USA (Inglebart 1^97; Harris and Inglchart Organized religions typically have a different range of power resources from those of states. Nevertheless, in certain contexts tkey may effectively govern important social institutions such as intimacy {.sexuality, reproduction, marriage, and divorce). Not all religions take the form of a polity. The concept is restricted to those religions Lhat liave regularised structures of governance and a hierarchy of or,gani7.ational practices. Only salvau'onal religions are likely to develop such governance structures. Organized religions, are important on the global political starve. For example, in international politics, lsla.ni constitute!; a significant polity that has various effects on the policies of other bodies. Islam can he an actor on the global staj^e. despite very important internal diller-ences and multiple centres of power, ft can constitute a frame of reference within which Islamic individuals perceive themselves to he acting. Jihadists are prepared to die in the pursuit of goals (hat they perceive as part of [slam. A further example of ihe presence of both Catholicism and Islam as polities on ihe global stage was that of the alliance between Islam and Catholicism in opposition to the ELT at the fourth UN world conference on women in 1995, on ihe nature of women's' human rights in relation to fertility and sexuality. Catholicism ■was represented by the Pope's representatives since the Vatican is treated by the UN as if it were a state. The religious coalition sought to restrict the extension of rights to individual women to make their own choices on matters of intimacy, especially abortion, contraception, and sexuality. The EU, by contrast, was a significant advocate of .:. wc-nur.'s ir.^li\.i>.\:\ a - i-:ii:i:*r ■' Mi ■i^'it.ilI.mil I(J'juJ. The argu-menl here is that the major salvutional religions of Catholicism and Islam constitute polities. They govern significant aspects of life, especially intimacy, among significant numbers of people. Empires Empires are an important form of polity in history {Mann lL,#io). with lasting effects. There have also been various attempts to hroaden the usage of the -concept to some modem polities iVan Alslyne 1974; Hardt and Negri 2HKK). 2IKJ6). An empire is a specific form of polity in which a single main state rules over many other countries using formal political hierarchies supported by military force. Military force is usually necessary to establish the political hierarchies through which routine rule is maintained. Routine rule may he further supported by religious and other ideological forms for cultural domination. The British state ruled many countries around the world, from Ireland to Africa, from Canada to Australia, as part of the British Empire. Most of Africa was subject to coJonial rule from Britain, France, and Portugal. Most of South America was subject to colonial rule from Spain and Portugal until almost the end of the nineteenth century. De-colonization of Africa from ihe British Empire was not complete until the l^TOs (.[Junks and Muller Ik'veral countries in central Europe did not achieve independence from empires, such as the Hapsburg and Ottoman, until (Tbcrborn 1995). Ehiring the nineteenth and most of the twentieth cenluries the Russian empire grew to stretch from East Asia to [he middle of Europe, including by the middle of the twentieth century countries in Eastern and Cent ml Europe. Russian de-colonization did not take place until after lyiftK A ruling group of people, while clearly distinct from the subordinated people, may deny their separateness (Kumar 2f>00>. The expansion in mililary power of the USA, for example in its invasions of Vietnam and Iraq, has led some to consider that it takes the form of an empire {Van Alstyne I LXiO; Johnson 21100; Maon 2(M33X 1 lowever, while significant military power was used, the formal political hierarchies that are a defining feature of empires were never successfully established by the USA. This was partly because public adherence to ihe notion of respect for national sovereignty meant lhat such political hierarchies had to be covert rather than overt in order for this public rhetoric to be sustainable, and partly hecause of a practical assumption that dominance could be maintained without such political mechanisms, resting on military force and economic pressure alone. As Mann (2fHE3) noted, this stance led to incoherence and a lack of sustai nubility for this US project. Hardl and Negri (ZlftUU1) have addressed the new forms of power that are consequent on globalization. They consider that there is now one empire, one sovereign power, which governs ihe whole world as a consequence of the globalization of economic and cultural exchanges, it does not have a gutjgraphical centre, nor territorialized instruments of rule: its nationalities are merged and blended. Hardt and Negri (2iHrf) assert that we arc now in a state of global war. This is not an argument thai capitalist power is absolute, bat one in which there are also a wide-ranging set of oppositions Ibe multitude is letter placed than before to eflect a transformation. Hatch and Negri are right to argue that there are new forms of political interconnect inns in this global era; power is more fluid {cf. Bauman) and interconnected; political configurations take new spatialized forms; boundaries between countries are treated more lightly in some respects. ] lowever. their picture of a globalized polity over-states the extent to which deterritorial-ization of political forms has occurred. Corporate capital still needs concentrated territorial locations for some cf its functions (Sassen 2001), while geographical distance is implicated in many forms of capitalist appropriation (Harvey 2(103). Powers are .still concentrated in specific states and other polities which are in opposition to each other rather than merged into a unity. While they are right to integrate an analysis of the importance of violence into political economy they over-generalize — the USA may be leading a war but not all countries have joined in. The concentrations of power and its alternative configurations are important for understanding the potential ibr alternative futures. I [ardt and Negri {Z(XH|i) have invented a novel use for the term empire, which traditionally has been used lo denote a geographically located dominant state that has power over many peoples outside its borne territory through the use of formal political structures supported by military power. While new concepts are needed to grasp the particularities of global organization, it is not useful to use a term that has a clearly established meaning, we need new terms to denote new concepts to capture new forms of global hierarchy. Hegemon Hegemon is a term thai more usefully captures the concept of a dominating stare lhat is able to deploy a range of forms of power over many other countries in the contemporary era (Chase-Dunn 19 bornschier and Chase-Dunn L»£ Chase-Dunn eL al. ZiXiOX Dominance is created through a range of technologies of power, including military, political, economic, and civil societal means. Each of these forms of power is a contingent rather than an essential part of the powers of the hegemon. Following Gramsci. hegemony is achieved through a mix of coercion and manufactured consent: the mix varies over time and place so that at some times coercion is dominant while al others consent is achieved without visible coercion. Ihe concept of hegemony is useful in invoking notions of asymmetry, power, and coercion simultaneously with consent (Granisei 1971; Anderson l97rV7)- Thc concept of hegemon captures the new modalities of power in a global era better than the more traditional concepts of empire and militarism. The concept (if hegemon, drawing on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, better captures the dynamic mix of coercion and consent. It allows for the various combinations of these forms of power, signalled in Gramsci's notions of wars of position as well as wars of manoeuvre. The concept avoids the notion of overt formal political hierarchy, which is a time-specific form (]f global power from a previous era. it enables a consideration of the nature of power that avoids some of the simplicities of a 'zero-sum" approach. this includes a range cf issues, including that countries may perceive benefits from acquiescence rather than contestation, that there can be mutual benefits in the avoidance of hostile contestations, and also that in some instances there can be meaningful ctJ-devclopmenL Polities are complex adaptive systems that coevolve. The concept of hege-mon signals the range of forms of power, as well as their shaping lay the economic, political, military, and civil societal environments. Hegemons have sodetalization projects, which are directed externally as well as internally. These are never complete but always in process, as rival hegemons and other entities compete to set the rules by which all must live, within tlii' territory of a hegemon there may well he competing projects, for example of organized religions. Hegemons set the global rules in order that they suit the characteristics of the dominant hegemon. so that while these rules are general to all players nonetheless the hegemon benefits most. The concept is helpful in grasping the setting and implicatitms of the regulations of man)' economic aspects of the glolial system, for example, the rules of international trade as set by the World Trade Organization. The power of the concept of hegemon is further advanced if it Ls juxtaposed to the concept oF 'fitness landscape' derived from KauFman (1993). The US hegemon, by ensuring that iLs rules are best represented by the WTO, has changed the fitness landscape to its own advantage. It is not just that the liegemon has power over other countries, but also that it has changed the landscape in which they all compete in its own favour. The environment, or fitness landscape (Kaufrnann I99?X within which these polities operate is changing as a result of increased glolnaE linkages. These increased links are partly the result of new technologies that speed, communications both physically and electronically and partly consequent on new political institutions and practices developing at regional and global levels. Changes in the fitness landscape have implications for the construction of political preferences and for an ability to carry these through. Some political actors thrive under one set of conditions but will in others. Their capacities for action are the result of their interaction with their environment and not only their intrinsic capacities. Doth the European Union and the United States of America are currently hegemons. Both have economic, cultural, and political powers, though these are differently constituted and deployed. But they do differ critically in relation to military force. The EU does not have significant armed forces cf its own (though its Member States do), while the USA hegemon depends on iLs armed forces. while the EU meets the definition of a polity, there have been extensive arHumenLs over whether or not the EU meeLs the conventional definition of a state. These focus in particular on its Jack of armed forces and the question of its degree of autonomy from Member Slates. Conventional definitions of states (following Weber) include a monopoly of legitimate force in a territory. The EU does not have its own standing army, militia, or police. Early attempts to creale a military arm -the European Defence Community in the- ly^tls - failed (Kapteyn ]L/X>1- However, since 2<)(W [here has been the capacity for the EU to engage in a temporary military deployment through the European Union Force {.EUEQR)- by drawing temporarily on the armed forces of Member States, as it did in Bosnia in 2(XH, Congo in 200fi. and Chad in (Council of the European Union 20£}7bV This Jack of a standing army either means that the EU is not a state or lhat the conventional definition of a sure- needs to be revised so as to encompass such bodies as the EU. The second reason offered as to why the European Union might not be a state is lhat it is merely an inter-govcmmentaJ body, used as a tool by Meml>er States to complete their own domestic agendas (Milward 1992- Moravcsik This position is based on giving pri- macy to the consent of Member States through their signature on treaties rather than to the actions of the EU machinery of governance, and considering the Council of Ministers as more important in the internal governance of the EU than the European Commission, the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice. However, these arguments that the EU is merely an inler-govemmentaJ body are not convincing. This is because the EU, through the European Court of Justice and European Commission, has powers not only to coerce recalcitrant Member States to obey its rulings, but also allows EU citizens direct access to EU legal rulings on those matters within its remit (Wallace Leibfried and Pierson 1^5; Kurzer 1997)- The EU has sufficient internal coherence, rules of actions, ability to enforce its rules through sanctions, and institutional depth and hreadth to constitute a polity even though it is not a conventional slate. Its prominence as an actor at a global Level means that it is a hegemon and not only a polity, in particular, the EU conducts a distinctive foreign and security policy with global implications despite differences between Member States. It also conducts trade and economic policy for all Member States, including negotiations with the WTO (Smith 2003; Smith 20(H). The U5A is a state, polity, and hegemon: it is also close to beings a nation and a nation-state. The USA is a hegemon in a different way from the EU. It dties not have a queue of countries wanting to join voluntarily. While it is joined by Mexico and Canada in a free trade area CNAPTA), these countries did not change [heir regulations in ■order to do so. The USA i.s more assertive in setting the parameters of global economic policy than Lbe ELT and enforcing its policy preferences-. The USA i.H much more assertive in foreign affairs as a result cf its use and ihreat of use of military force, l'lxe USA is currently a more powerful begemon than the EU. There are further potential or would-be hegemons. Japan has sometimes been considered a third hegemon alongside the USA and the EU, because of its influence over economic development, especially in South East Asia (Hettne el al. However, a lack of economic growth since the ly^tls as well as political and financial difficulties have reduced its capacity for action and influence, islamic radicals have their own project to counter Western military aggression and secure universal respect for their religious ideals. However, this project docs not involve the whole of IsJam even if it is done in its name. Despite Huntington's (I^JB) assertions of the clash of civilizations. Islam is not best currently understood as a singularity, but instead enjoys considerable variations (Kandiyoti and internal contestations over changes. However, some within the radical Islamic movement do conceive of their project as potentially hegemonic, indeed they proclaim a jihad or holy war in order to achieve this. China is likely to become a future hegemon. This is due to its current rapid economic growth which means that in the foreseeable future il will become the world's largest single economy, its relative internal cohesion and an increasing tendency towards involvement in global bodies such as the WTO, influencing diplomacy in international crises, and hosting global events such as the UN conference on women and the 2(Xiy Olympics. However, the speed of this trajectory is not clear and neither is the extent to which China will seek influence outside its borders (Hutton ZiiK)3>. The contemporary contestation between two he pernors, llie EU and the USA, is key to the emergence of the new economic world order. For example, their bailies within the World Trade Organization determine the Level of risk allowed in food production through the use of new technologies such as the genetic modification of organisms and the use of antibiotics on farm animals; deciding the tarifFs on goods and services thai encourage or discourage trade and particular types of economic development. The WTO'a rules establish the fitness landscape under which some economies thrive and others suffer. More frequently the USA wins these contests with the EU. as in the case of the WTO adjudication of the riskiness of genetically modified Joods fw'inJckofF el al. 24Rf?), though there are exceptions, such as in the case of data privacy standards where EU regulations do have an effect on the USA with the WFO protecttng the EU from threats of retaliation from the USA (Shaffer 20(H)). This contestation between the EL" and US hegemona and their varieties of modernity is discussed further in Chapter 11. Global political institutions A series (if political institutions have been established at a global level that assist in the governance of global finance, militarism, and human rights. These are best regarded as emergent polities rather than as fully formed. They include the global Financial institutions discussed in Chapter 3 on Economies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMP), the TTorld Bank, and the world Trade Organization (w"TO) that lend money to governments in times of financial crisis and act as regulators of the global economic environment through a series of conventions, groups, and meetings (for example the GZil). They are not entirely new - even the nineteenth century had a global financial system, while the Bretton woods monetary agreement lasted! from 1(X4 to 1^71 - but they are increasingly important (Keohane l989| Hirst and Thompson VM\ Ruggie l'M\ 1WH; Held el al. lQ&f)- There has also been the development of international ^security1 structures, such as the LTN Security Council and regional military pads such as NATO i E lefkl IWy. Ruggie W%. l^Jří>; and the emergence of global institutions with the ability to compromise the power of states especially over issues of human rights. There are near-global legal institutions, especially in relation to human rights and crimes against humanity, including the United Nations (with its power to declare wars legal and legitimate), and the Internatiortal TOar Crimes Tribunal. There have been developments in international law covering legal rights for individuals that are over and above the legitimate powers of stales, concerning the implementation of the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights (Haas l^fk; Held l£#S; Ruggie 19%, 'the state is only one of several types of polity. Rather than focusing ordy on the concept of the slate, it is important to consider a wider range of polities, including not only the state but also the nation, organized religion, empire, and hegemon. This increase in the range of polities beyond stales is needed in order to include the significance of complex inequalities in addition to class for centralized political institutions. Nations and organized religions often carry gender and ethnic prefects, as well as class ones. Including these entities within the analysis of polities is important in order to analyse and theorize the significance of complex inequalities in addition to class. The nation-state is a very powerful mylh; its institutional existence is very rare. The recognition of the normal lack of congruency of rations and states (and also ethnicity and religion) and the strenuous efforts to achieve this elusive alignment are crucial to explaining the extent and nature of group and state violence, which so often takes place along these fractures. Attempts to bring nations and slates into alignment are part of the process of soci eta l i zat i on. and their fret|uent failure to complete the process to produce a societ)' that has a full alignment of economy, polity, violence, and civil society is usual. The concept of hegemon is needed to theorize global processes, since their emergence and relative significance are central to understanding the emerging form of globalization and societal ization. lbe globalizing world is not made up of similar types of polities, of nation-states, hat rather a much richer variety of entities. Globalization has nol resulted in a single polity or empire, but rather of a contestation between hegemons and the emergence of would-be hegemons. Polities Overlap and do not Politically Saturate a Territory [n a global era, it becomes especially dear that it is rare for one polity to politically saturate any given territory. Jn any given territory it is rare that any one polity controls all possible political niches and domains. Ibe concept saturate' is introduced in order to address this issue. Polities variously cooperate, compete, fight, and accommodate each other—and they can overlap in the same territory, [different kinds of polities often govern different areas of social Life. While some polities that coexist in a given territory may reach an accommodation as to their respective remits, others may continually contest this, řif Hnetimcs polities will agree overtly, or accommodate de facto, to their division of jurisdiction over different institutions. Such a division means that two different polities can coexist in a given territory, since they will govern different institutions. The notion of a monopoly of political control must give way. The exceptions to the conventional notion of polilicai monopoly constitute the norm, not the exception. It is in the tension between different overlapping polities within the same territory that many important issues are shaped. For instance, a church and a state thai coexist in the same territory may divide between themselves those institutions over which they can claim authority and jurisdiction. The variable boundary between religion and state is an example of these processes, there are significant variations in the institutions over which church and state can -claim jurisdiction. Many institutions have liecn effectively claimed to be within the remit of the church in some times and places and in E 171 others by the state-. In most of Europe, various churches have, over recent centuries, been slowly if unevenly ceding to the state (often after a struggle) the authority to regulate many aspects of intimacy or 'personal life, such as contraception abortion, marriage, divorce, homosexuality, and sexual practices (Smyth 1992; Snyder 1992; Nelson and Chowdhury 19!J4). These have often been constructed as 'moral' issues when they have been under religious jurisdiction, hut have become more 'political' the more they crime under the jurisdiction of a stale. This change is related to processes of modernization and lo a change in the nature of the gender regime (walby 1990: 1997). This transfer of remit of this arena Ls ncrt complete in Europe, but is openly contested in Ireland (Smyth 1992} while it is more settled in the Nordic countries. The Location of the boundary between religion and the state in the regulation of intimacy is an important \>-1.1.1.- in m.Lnv I'.LidaiiiL-iil.-a^l ou^eioejirs. holh i'hrisii.ir. .:.nd M.ioi.c. from Asia lo the USA. which seek to reverse this transfer of authority (Marty- and Appleby 1993X Ivlaiu has complex relations with the states with which it coexists. In many though not all Moslem countries, Islamic religious or Sharia Law directly governs intimacy while in other matters Islamic principles merely guide the state. In practice, there is a vast variety of relations between Islam and various slates, ranging from the formal separation of religion and the stare rri Turkey and the application of 'personaT religious laws to Muslims only as in .Malaysia, lo (he integration of religion and state in a theocratic state under the Ayatollah in post-1979 Iran Qbrahim 19W0; Kandiyoti 1991; Moghadam 1993; Shamsul 1996'; Afsliar 199K). The contestation of the remit of the state and Islam has been particularly acute in the area of 'personal laws1 regulating marriage, divorce, women's clothing, and whether wife beating is within the remit of secular or religious law. There have been cjuitc different outcomes to this contestation among such Muslim countries as Malaysia, Iran, and Turkey (Sisters in ]slam 1991; Hardacre 1993: Moghadam 1993, 1994: Helie-Lacas 1994). There are significant variations in its form, at least partly due to the interactions between Islam and the slate, and with the economy of the country as well as the ethnic identity of its location (Moghadam 1993; Shamsul 199(5; Afshar 199K>. The detailed implicatitins of the Koran for conduct are interpreted by Local as well as regional and global Islamic leaders and can vary according to the social and economic environment. For instance, interpretations of the rules surrounding interest tin savings and related banking Uansacuons are more conducive ro modernization in Malaysia than in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. En Malaysia there has been a process, albeit contested and uneven, of a reformation of [slam so that it has become more conducive to economic deveLopment than is the case in contemporary Pakistan (Said 109fi; the Economic 2f00). The ethnic composition of the population is a farther source of variance, since the fnnn of [slam more typically practised by Arabs can differ from that" of other ethnic groups, such as the Malays in .Malaysia (Said 1906; Shamsui 109ft. Further, the political economy of Islamic countries varies according to whether they possess oil or not. Polities cut across each other. Nations rarely coincide with states, and still less with elhos and religion, as any analysis of Europe demonstrates (Brubaker IWf): 3Jojc ct al. 1099)- Many states contain more than one nation, while nations may straddle more than one stale. Diaspora may or may not have national aspirations, and always straddle state boundaries (Cohen 1997). Some religions have a global reach (Beyer 1994) and follow rules that are in contest with those of the host state. The EU is nor in a monopoly position in the area thai it covers, nor does il not saturate all the political arenas within its territory. Kalher there are otlicr politics with which it overlaps on the same territory. Not only are there Member States, there are also other polities including the Catholic Church and nations without states. Most of the time there is a clear division as to which institutions are H^vemcd by the EU. which are by Member Slates, and which are by other polities:, though this is occasionally contested. 3nilialJy the remit of the EL" was restricted to a specific range of economic matters that focused on the creation of a single, fair, and competitive market for products, services, and labour. However, its remit has grown in recent years especially following the Treaty of Amsterdam, although many policy matters are currently still outside its remit and belong to Member Stales. Power relations are not always zero-sum. While the relations Iviwcvn pHrk^ iii.lv K- ojk1 ■ T u r.k-^L:i:i-in -Ik1 re nuy .iNo be relations of cooperation where each helps the other to fulfil their goals. For example, while the EU is legally superior to Memljer States on those areas: within its remit, this superiority is not l>est conceptualized as always being a Jtero-sum game between these polities. Instead, sometimes, the EU enables Member States to cany out domestic agendas more successfully than if they were not part of the EU CMilward 1992; Moravcsik 1093). In particular, the development of the Single European Market has made it more pi is^ile for some Member States to have successful domestic economies in a global era. For some Member States the EU has increased their discretion in policy making, though this may not be the case for all. In another example, the Church in Ireland had complex relations with the developing national project and establishing state. Sometimes they were in conflict ever their spheres of action, lis over the development of state welfare provision (Whyte 1071). and at other times they provided mutual support (Larkin 1^75; tnglis iyK7J. Politics coexisting in the same space may sometimes he rivals and sometimes not. 3]olities do not usually exist in nested hierarchies, although these do exist within a federal polity. For example, there are nested hierarchies within federal polities of the USA and Germany, where clearly demarcated powers arc devolved to more local levels. However, most of the relations between the polities under discussion here are not nested. Political relations within the USA are not an appiopriate template for understanding the relations between polities elsewhere. Rather, there is a range of types of relations between polities, including cooperation, symbiosis, conflict, and accommodation. Instead of a nested hierarchy, the relations between polities are conceptualized, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, as the mutual adaptation of complex systems operating in a changing fitness landscape. The mutual adaptation involves changes to interacting polities rather than simple impacts. These mutual adaptations change the environment for other political systems. The changing political environment in which these interactions between politics take place affects the nature of the polities and their interactions. For example, the increase in global linkages changes the environment for polities, while the development of the European Union chanfrcs the environment for states in Europe. Polities do not have exclusive authority over a given territoryr nor are their powers limited to a specific territory. This is not a new phenomenon, as is sometimes suggested in accounts of the ostensibly restricted power of the nation-state in the era of globalization (llrenner Ityffi}. Several religions, including islam and Catholicism, have always straddled state boundaries and have ■often been accommodated by a state, dividiog authority over different areas of social life (Kandiyoti IIAUX Folities such as the EU share legitimate authority with their Member States within negotiated and agreed arenas {Leibrried and Eierson 1995; walby l*JWa. ]9Wb). Even states have rarely exercised the monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory, given the extent to which they have condoned, and thus accepted as legitimate, the use of violence by husbaods aguiost wives within the home (Ekjbash and Dobash VM'I: Walby 11J90). Further, the power of same states extends way beyond their borders as a result of their exercise of military or economic power. There are overlapping polities with differing remits over differing areas of social lire; the boundaries between these different remits themselves variously contested and accommodated. Ihe extent to which polities are constituted in and through space is variable. Mid-twentieth century states were more intensely territorialized than many other entities. Early empires did not have the technologies- of power necessary lo have such an intense hold on their territories, such as bureaucracies with sophisticated means of surveillance (Mann I9H6). Religions are less intensely territorialized, in the sense that members of religious groups often retain their affiliations whether or not they are in the heartland of their religion, although they are stronger when they have at least the amount of proximity needed for groups to meet in churches and temples. Ethnic groups likewise usually retain their sense of belonging whether they like it or nol, even when they are a minority. The retention of such ethnic and religious identities constitutes the basis of the phenomenon of diaspora (Cohen 1*J97)- religions and ethnic groups may strongly maintain sroup boundaries without a dependence on teni-torial boundaries. lly contrast, the dominant conception of the contemporary state usually includes a territorial element, locating this entity in a spatial ized location. This lies behind the conception of a ' westphal ian' stare that has sovereignty over its territory within its physical borders. This concept Ls used widely in social science and not only in international relations (Waltz 1979). Weber defined the mod- em state as that body that had a monopoly of legitimate coercion in a given territory. However, this spatialized conception of a state serves us badly when we come to try to understand globalization. This is because there are many exceptions to a state having that monopolv of leghiimtc coercion in a given territory, and indeed to many other forms of monopoly authority {Krasner 191^? >■ The temptation is then to declare these exceptions lo the idealized notion -of the Westphalian state as new and indeed as a consequence of globalization. However, deterntorialization is not entirely new. The extent to which polities and other social entities have been constituted in and through space has always hecn variable and constandy subject to change. This is despite accounts of globalization in which enhanced mobility and carnmunications are seen newly to undermine societies. There have rarc3y if ever been stales that politically or otherwise saturated their territories. There have always been overlapping powers, other entities that claimed authority over specific domains, even the authority to use coercion. The conventional notion of space and authority is one in which space has traditionally been conceptualized as a solid that could be under one authority or another. This needs to be replaced with a notion of space that is more of a porous sponge than a solid, as a location where many fluid entities can overlap and coexist as well as sometimes competing. Polities can be fluid and polities are created: over UK) new slates have emerged since the formation of the United Nations in f I ntcr-Parl iamentary Union V)95~)- Polities can also disappear, subsumed involuntarily within other .stales or empires (McNeill iyfj3ŕ Mann l^íBŕD; and polities can change, voluntarily forming alliances such as that of the European Union which entail the loss of sovereignty (Leibfried and Pierson their borders can change, los-Lng and gaining: territory, such as Russia/Soviet Union and Germany {west, East, and now united}. Stability is unusual, even though more social theory is written about polities that have a Jong history than those which do not IMoore ]9h6; Skocpol I In any one country there is likely to he more than one polity often, but not always, governing different aspects of social relations according to different practices with a different spatial and temporal reach. Each is likely to constitute a focus for a project of" socielah'zalion in which other domains are brought into alignment with its priorities and principles of social organization. As the relations between the polities change with the changing fitness landscape, then their implications for different sets of complex inequalities will also change. It is necessary here to have an understanding of the global political system. This wider framework has been variously understood to be a determining system (wallerstein iy74). an influential regime ťKrasner iyH3J\ or merely a background global arena. There are epis-temological and oncological issues here as to whether individuals, polities, or the system in which they are embedded are seen as the prime mover in the analysis (Gemy l*)9fk Ruggie l^yK). There are ontological debates as to whether the focus should lie on the polity or system, as well as substantive debates as to whether time-space compression alters the relationship lietween the polity and the global. This analysis has ranged from realist international relations theory in which states are understood to be the prime movers (waltz 1979) to Marxist accounts which see the world system as the prime mover and in which states are merely nodes (Wallerstein 197Í1- The conventional understanding of the relations between states suggests that they follow their own interests in international settings. However,, states can adjust to, shape, or otherwise co-evolve with the global fitness landscape. However, there is a question as to how these perceptions of their own interests are formed and indeed the content of these interests (Ruggie Rather than treating the interests of states as self-evident, as in the realist international relations tradition, it is important to see these as socially constructed (Ruggie ly^H). This is not a denial of the notion of state self-interest, but rather thai the pursuit of this self-interest may take -íL-vt-riU different routes, .irw: lhLir -Ik-^.' LJimot be -íiehoIv w.w: off from the balance of power í Ruggie íy^ťi). Such strategizing will involve both the particular and the contingent in the interaction of regime and polity. Kuggic {199n, I99H) develops the- notion of multi-lateralisrn, which sits in between the notion of a polity-led or a system-led analysts. Rather it is states that jointly construct new sets of expectations and understandings and build these into new institutions. Ibis implies a notion of an international regime that significantly conditions the actions of other states fKrasner iySi3). The argument here Ls that at least bttfh the levels of polities and global system are needed for the analysis and that it is inappropriate to consider only one to be inherently primary. Some levels of the system are emergent from others, and it is impirtant to develop a multi-level analysis of interacting complex systems in a changing fitness Landscape. The changing global fitness landscape facilitates the emergence of new polities as well as the restructuring of their powers and capacities. w'hile military and economic power are pre-eminent in the global fitness landscape, there is also some power in argumentation. Kisse i inspired by Habermas. Jocks onto the space between knowl- edge and power where knowledge and power do not quite equate to the other, arguing that argumentation is an important part of the political process in relation to the application of international norms, especially those concerning human rights which are diffusing, via a process of the socialization of states. 'Human rights are embedded in a whole variety of international regimes and organizations and thus form part of the normative settir^g of international society. They increasingly define what constitutes a "civilized state" as a member of the international community in "good standing"' (Kisse l*J9y: 52D-30>. Risse suggests there are three types of process: the forced imposition of norms, strategic tjargaining and instrumental adaptation; processes of institutionalization and habilualization; and processes of moral consciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion. There are coalitions of countries in global fora which can be significant for outcomes of global negotiations although they do not constitute a polity. The :Group of 77' at the United Nations, established in I9Ŕ4 and with 131H members in Ls the largest intergovernmental organization of developing states al the UN (Group of ~T~! 20H7). This group is important in global trade negotiations, and has sometimes thwarted the ambitions of countries of the North in negotiations over trade liberalization in the WTO. There is usually more tban one polity in any geographical area as any one polity does not saturate any given territory. Polities coevolve, unevenly, in a changing global fitness landscape. They overlap. They contest and cooperate in the same territory, sometimes in different spheres of governance. Some are more dominant than others: the most powerful are global hegemons, with a disproportionate influence on the rules through which the globe is governed, on matters from trade to human rights. A key difference- between polities is the extent to which they are governed democratically. Democracy Democracy Ls treated here as a key indicator of both modernity and 'progress', despite dissenting voices. Dernocralic governance is a key confinement of good governance, which also involves the rule of law, the protection of minorities, human rights, and those institutions sufficiently developed to deliver democratic intent. The conventional definition of democracy is too narrow: in order to address complex inequalities it needs to be broadened to include, in addition to suffrage and elections, the presence of women and minorities within the institutions of governance. Here a ten-point scale is proposed to capture three levels of the depth of democracy; sufrrage-democracy, presence democracy, and broad democracy. Conceptualizing democracy in a global era is also a challenge. The depth of democracy is linked to the development of neoliberalism or social democracy. The analysis of the development of democracy is challenged when complex inequalities are included since it arrives in stages and not all at once. Further global as well as ctjaLntjy-specific processes are involved. Democracy and modernity Democracy today is a major hallmark of modernity while polities that are not democratic are premodern. E>emocracy is often framed as progress, as a universal value. It is valued in North and South. USA and ETJ, and enshrined in many UN statements. However, there arc exceptions to this framing of democracy as progress and modernity, in particular from the perspective of multiple modemilies. In the discourse of Asian values' democracy is not .seen as part of modernity or progress because of the priority given to the collectivity over the individual, of a combination of consensus and hierarchy {Thompson 2000; Barr ZlQtte), but this view is widely contested as being merely self-serving for elites in some Asian countries (Sen l9yr?X Another challenge to the valuation of democracy is the communist prioritization of socialist economic development over individual rights, as in the former Soviet Union and in China today (wc>odiwiss 1C/JH). Similar issues concerning individuation are discussed in Chapter fi on civil societies. The absence- of democracy ts here understcKKi as a lack of completion of the project of modernity. The comprehensiveness of access to political power through democratic procedures and the depth of that democratic power are here taken as indicators of modernity and progress. Redefining democracy The conventional definition of democracy is too narrow. In order to include procedures that are necessary for effective access to political power for women and minoritized ethnic groups, it is necessary to reconsider this definition of democracy. Polities that allow access to political power for some groups but not others are not fully democratic. Democracy can vary in its depth (Fung and Wright 3001, Heetham et al. 2002). While the oft-stated goal of democracy is to provide equal access to political decision making for all citizens and to ensure the accountability of government, in practice the conventional definition Is primarily procedural, involving universal suffrage and free, fair, and competitive elections that elect representatives of the population to parliament in the context of freedom of speech and association (Dahl iy71: Held iy£5; Potter etal. 1&J7; Freedom E louse 21I0H). These urc- indeed important. I nil nor sufficient to capture the depth of democracy. The locus here is tm the full range of procedures that are needed to achieve democracy. The timiog of democracy is often differeot for different social groups, with implications for the depth of the democracy of the polity as a whole. E'en indicators of the depth of democracy in a country are: 1. no hereditary or unelccted positions, including a monarch and members in either chamber of parliament; 2. no colonies, (i.e. no governance of territories that do not also meet these criteria}; 3- no powers of governance held by an additional non-dcrnocratic polity (e.g. organized religion): 4. universal suffrage, de facto as well as de jure- 5. elections, especially those that are free, fair, and competitive, in a context of free speech and free association and developed civil society associations; (?. a low cost for electioneering, either by law or by custom; 7- an electoral system with proportional representation; B. an electoral system with quotas for under-represented groups £ such as women; r 175 9. j proportionate presence in parliament of women and minorities: 10- a range of institutions (e.g. welfare services) that are governed by the democratic polity. These ten points are grouped into three forms, of democracy each of a different depth. The shallowest is that of 'suffrage-democracy' (involving points 1—5) which concerns the absence of hereditary, military, and religious governance together with universal suffrage and free, fair and competitive elections in the context of a free civil society. A deeper form of democracy is that of 'presence democracy' f additionally including points n-9) and the presence of all groups in the governing institutions. The deepest form is 'bread democracy' (which includes point 10). concerning the application i 'l' "LIL1 111"! OlTilI JC p.ilH.^k^ ■ if L;i : VVITi.-O*. t.1 LklOSS .1 hp V.d I ..111 11':, 111 a narrow range of institutions. First, the absence of a hereditary principle is a basic precondition for democracy. Surprisingly it is often passed over as if it is of no account that hereditary monarchs still exist (e.g. in the UK and Sweden), and that in some t'e.ji. the UK) ihcv still have constitutional duties, even if these are severeJv drcurnscribed — indeed the UK. in 2W.t) still bud *il hereditary peers in the upper chamber of its parliament. Dernocracy entails elections to all governing institutions. Once again there are some curious except ions here, such as appointments to the upper house (the majority method of selection in 15 out of the countries with ,i second irhamberl indudinL! iIiosl.- 'v i he \i<. jvem iiK/nl in Ik>iIi Ireland {11 out of b(J members) (Russell 1999) and the UK (in the second chamber most are appointed for life; short-term appointments include top judges and religious leaders; no one is elected). Second, there is an absence of colonies. Colonies in an Empire are not democraticaLv governed. Hence any country that is an empire is directly responsible for the absence of democracy in those territories that it colonizes. Several European empires, such as the British. French, and Portuguese empires, did not break up until the last h;ilf of the twentieth century. Former colonies typically had universal suffrage on their day of independence but not before Ilk iv ,ire perlup^ a surprising numher of ■territories" that continue to be ruled Itv some countries which are not geographically contiguous and have attained only partial integration into the full set of democratic processes of the main slate. The USA has several of these. includinH Guantanamo Bay. Third, is an absence of governance by mc m-elected religious bodk\s. A key set of polities that are not democratic are organized religions. While these do not govern all aspects of social life, in some cases they are important in the governance of intimacy, including maniage. divorce, contraception, abortion, and sexual practices. Organized ivli^iun^ Livf ^.i^nifitLinrly different modes governance than states, confining access to decision making to small groups of anointed rather than democratically elected leaders which usually excludes women, line more important organized religion is in the governance of personal life, (he less democratically governed that area of life will be. Countries in which an organized religion governs intimacy compromise democracy. Fourth, is universal suffrage. Universal suffrage might seem an obvious essential for democracy but some analysts have settled for male suffrage or even majority male suffrage as the indicator of democracy, for example. Etueschemeyer el al. (1992} take suffrage for tfH per ^.viy of men. as tliL-ir indicator ol -Limit fc/nkv. Ibis i.s a mistake, as the omission of women and minority ethnic groups from the franchise precludes the designation of a country as democratic. Women and ethnic minorities have often gained the right lo vote later than men in the dominant ethnic group. When fully universal suffrage without exceptions for women and ethnic minorities, is taken as an essential benchmark for democracy, the timing of the democratic transition traditionally used by scholars is put back by several decades for most countries in the North IThcrljom Paxton 21K)0: Paxton et al. Z1K)3>, though less frequently for those in the South where universal suffrage will often have been won al independence. Suffrage requires the de facto Tight to vote, not only its de jure existence. In the USA. the disenfranchisemcnt of African-American slaves in the southern states by Jim Crow' laws una] the civil rights movement appeared, means lliar i he claim lK:lI the l'S.\ ! xv.u:*- duo ht.llU- before :Iil- ..ik- L9M) indicators of political rights and civil liberties, which rank all countries of the world on a 1—7 scale for each of these: most Western ctHjntrics were awarded full marks. Sixth, is access to the democratic process through the low cost of electioneering. Several detailed pnjcedural matters have a significant impact on the differential access of less and more advantaged citizens to political power. Levels of expenditure can have a significant effect on the outcome of an election, especially for challengers {rather than incumbents} Oacobson 1*/7H}. Some countries, such as the UK and Ireland, have implemented a cap that limits the amount of money that can be spent on elections in an attempt to ensure that those without rich supporters can still effectively stand for election {w^lecki ZlQfl?). In the 1J5A candidates can spend very large sums of money contesting elections: for example, the cost of running, for election for the President of the USA in 3CH14 ■was $3fj7m for the winner (Bush), and £32Hm for the Loser (Kerry) (Rooney 2007), whiLe ihe amount for the 20(1H election contest between Obama and McCain rose to around $ 1 billion. Seventh, there arc electoral systems with proportional representation; eighth, there are electoral systems with quotas for under-represented groups such as women; and ninth, the proportionate presence in parliament and governing in^ituior^ ul women and minorilized groups. Suffrage, free elections, and free association are not sufficient to deliver democracy if the concept is interpreted as the procedures necessary to facilitate the equal involvement of all social groups in political decision making - a presence in parliament is also required. The presence or absence of women in parliament makes a difference to political priorities and policy outcomes: there is evidence of this from a range of countries including the UK (Harris 19ytia)r the USA (Thomas iy*H), and Sweden (Wangnerud 2Q00). On average, elected women are more Likely to support policies that directly or indirectly support gender equality. In Sweden. Wangnerud (2CKM)) finds that the presence of women in the Swedish parliament (Jlifadafi) makes a difference in lhat women in the Jfr't-v; .■ are more likely than men to hold to the notion that gender equality is a good thing. In the UK, Noiris {VJtyfa} finds that the increase in women politicians in Westminster makes a difference to support for gender equality issues and other social democratic matters. Women MPs and candidates to be M\*s arc more likely ttan men to support women's rights on abortion, criminalizing rape in marriage and domestic violence, and promoting equal opportunities, as well as on some other importanl issues including, niiLioiiiil i aii ion pr.vLiti^.Loou. trade union power, equal opportunities for ethnic minorities, use of the death penalty, nuclear weapons, and defence spending. In a comparison of states within the USA, Thomas (l^JQl) finds that women do make a difference. Women in slates with the highest percentages of female representatives introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues about women, children, and families than men in the same stales and more than female representatives in legislatures where they are low in number. She also suggests that women can diffuse their policy priorities in two ways: through high percentages of women in office, or through the presence of a formal women's legislative caucus. Drawing on Kanter iVJT~?). she argues that relative numbers arc critical in shaping interaction dynamics: a critical mass of women makes ;i difference .l^ well .l-^ womtnV cukt:-^^ in i be k'^ish^irv. In a skewed' group that has 15 per cent or less of the total its members are seen as token, continuously responding to their status. In :tLLtcd." groupings minority members- form 15-^(J per cent. Where there is 'balance' - a fjQAth split - members of the minority are less often perceived as abenanl. This is hljjhly relevant in a contest where few countries can match Sweden's 41 per cent of women in parliament in 20tK7. Indeed the USA lias only In per cent of women in its Legislature and Ireland 13 per cent (Inter-ParLiamentary Union 2[)U7), the proportion where they may only be seen as not much more than token. However, even in the USA, the increase in women in parliament is associated with significant changes in gender policy since 1945, with a movement away from separate spheres Hinder policies towards equal opportunities in areas of violence, employment, maternity leave, and chiJdcarc (Uurstcin el aL. 1995}- The significance of women in parliament for policies requires a rethinking of the conventional operationalization of the notion of 'representation" and the relationship between 'descriptive representation", where representation reflects the identified groups, and substantive representation1 where the presumption is the representation of the interests of the ftTtwp {Pitkin 19(V7, 2[)tr4; Norrisand Lovenduski 1995: Phillips 1995: Squires 1999). The relative lack t)f present e of women and minority ethnic groups in parliament has been shown to reduce their prospect of influencing governmental decision making; while they are formally represented via the electoral system, the representation of their views is less established. Presence matters. A proportionate presence in parliament should be included in the operationalization of the concept of democracy. However, while the presence of women is necessary for the representation of women's interests it is still not sufficient (Jones and Jonasdottir 19HH; Jonasdottir 1991). A series of procedures exist that are more likely to lead to the Less unequal presence of women. These include: voting systems that involve proportional representation rather than "first past the post'; multi- rather than single-member constituencies (Norris 19^5; Kt^worthy and Malami 1999); and the use of quotas (t^ahlerup I99K). Proportional representation makes a difference in the representation of minoritized ethnic groups as well as of women. In the UK in H)fJ? using 'first past the post', 2 per cent of elected Mi's were from minority ethnic groups as compared with (j per cent of UK representatives to the European Parliament who were elected using proportional representation {Economic 2QU7X Tenth, there is the application of the demtxTatic principle to a broad ran^e of institutions. This is revealed in 'democratic audits' that consider a wider ran^e of institutions flleetham et al. 2(102} and a concern for the depth of democratic practice, particularly the del il^erative or empowered participatory governance involving citizens more directly in decision making (Fung and Wright 2[JfiT). Three types of institutions in particular vary in the extent to which they are governed try democratic practices: welfare institutions, employment, and the military. First, education, care, and health services, and the criminal justice system arc under democratic control and directly provided by the state in some countries, while in others fto varying degrees) they are organized through the market. This tends to align with the difference between social democratic and neoliberal forms of governance. The move towards neoliberalism is often accompanied by the privatization of previously public services (Hedlund 199$; Harvey 2/K>5>- This shift is facilitated by the (much disputed} wTO directive on the liberalization of public services. Privatization of public services is an example of the shrinking of the remit of the democratic polity. This is often represented as if it were a reduction in the state and bureaucratic control of services, but il.iiL- -:.ik- h du:,' ht.lIk I hen .1 .l/jo .l rvduclion in di-iiii >cum' control. Second, the governance of the workplace and employment may be at the discretion of employers or can be subject to regulation by the polity and sometimes by the participation of worker representatives, usually unions. Third, is the extent to which military institutions are controlled by a democratic polity or have significant autonomy (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2IKJH). This varies as a result of different forms of state reconstruction through war - the extent to which organized econcmic interests are entwined with the military in a rrulitarynndustrial complex, including the privatization of security operations (Mills V)5(\ Harris 2005). All three types of institutions (welfare, employment, and military) are subject to greater democratic control in .social democratic as compared with neoliberal forms of development. Bringing into focus gender and other complex inequalities thus requires revisions to the conventional definition of democracy. The depth of democracy does matter: it is necessary to distinguish between suffrage-democracy that is limited to suffrage and free electkjns, presence-democracy that includes the procedures to ensure the presence of women and minorities in governing institutions, and broad democracy in which clemooatic practices are extended to a wide rattier than narrow range of institutions. When these distinctions are drawn, inequalities in access to democratic power between social groups are made more visible. This increased visibility enables the differentiation of the time at which different levels of democracy are accessed by different groups, typically later for women and minority ethnic groups than for men of the dominant ethnicity. The depth of democracy is linked to the extent to which a country is neoliberal or social democratic. The development of democracy Dors economic development drive the creation of democracy, -as is conventionally argued, or are processes in civil society and violence also important? Are processes within countries the moHt important, or are global processes also significant? Democracy does not arrive all at once for all people, instead it occurs at varying levels and times for different regimes of inequality. Do the same processes in the development of democracy apply to gender and fill ilk' reunites of inequality as t:ul i-\ das^ or du they differ? To what extent do political processes create negative or positive feedback loops in the development of democracy and modernity? There is a robust conelation between democracy and economic development when it is limited to male suflrmge-democracy (Lipset l"5y: Diamond 1992; Muller 1995a). There are several ways in which economic development facilitates the development of suffrage-democracy. One is through the growth of a larger middle class and the development of education, which reduces the grounds for extremist politics and promotes tolerance and the legitimacy of democratic values (Lipset 1^59). However, higher levels of inequality lend to reduce the prospects for. and stability of. democracy such as in Latin America during the l9WHs (Muller 1995a), probably because it increases the resistance of the powerful to sharing power < Rueschemeyer et at. 1992; Muller l9$>5b}. The second way in which economic development feeds the development of democracy is by increasing the resources available for the struggles of the disadvantaged. Economic development is associated with an increased independence of free wage labour and the resources to build organizations for a robust civil society and political struggle. Ibis increases the efficacy of the struggle of the working class by facilitating growth in the economic and organizational resources that the under-represented groups need in order to struggle effectively for access to political power, thereby translating economic power into political power (Eueschemeyer et al. 1^92). Hut it is not reducible to economic development, opening up the possibility of divergent paths of development to democracy (Moore 196fi). Presence-democracy for working-class men and parties representing their interests in parliament was not simultaneous with male suffrage Hit came later. It depended on the development of civil society organizations, especially trade unions, to form the organizational strength to have both a presence in parliament and to introduce a labour agenda within parliament. This occurred most readily in those countries where there developed strong trade unions with hirdi rates of membership and a centralization of activities as welE as the development of a labourist or socialist party. This trade union and party pattern became common in Nordic ctmntries such as Sweden, moderately bo in the UK, but was much less developed En the USA and Ireland. The development of social democracy was strongest in those countries with the strongest development of trade unions {Kitschert l^iM; Callaghan 2(XKh). The development of democracy is not oory the outcome of processes at the country-level, but is also affected by global and regional processes of various forms. Military intervention in the aftermath of the Second World War led to the reconstruction of authoritarian slates as democratic ones in Germany and Japan. Ibe 1920s .:.nd .J:::- i:i j-iin \i^v iiivergem w.lvl'> (k!' fascism i:i the south and social democracy in the north, with the former attackiog embryonic forms of democracy and the latter enhancing them. During the mid- and late-twentieth century a wave of decolonization was. associated with democratization as nationalist movements world wide adopted a democratic agenda. What difference does takiog complex inequalities in addition to cbss into consideration make to this analysis? Does the correlation between economic development and democracy apply to complex inequalities other than class? And does it apply equally to suffrage, parliamentary presence, and a range of potentially democratically governed institutions? Access to democracy often occurs at different times for different social groups, women have often achieved suffrage later than men in the North, though more often at the same time during decolonization in the South. Minoritixed ethnic groups are sometimes excluded from access to suffrage and other democratic procedures. There may be de facto exclusions, such as those of the Jim Grow' practices in the southern states of the USA. which excluded African-Americans, the former slaves, from voting oilier et al. 1997}, including acts of violence {Shapiro MJftH). African-Americans in the south of the USA only obtained the vote after the efforts of a Strong civil rights movement (Tilly McAdam 1999)- There may also be formal legal barriers to political citizenship, as in the case of in-migrants who may work and live in a country without political entitlements. In some countries a second generation acquires political citizenship at birth (e.g the UK); in others citizenship can only be inherited from parents. In cases where the in-migration was not legally approved, political citizenship cannot be acquired. Increased global migration for economic reasons can thus sometimes entail ptditical disenfranchisement. Unlike the case for men, the winning of female suffrage does not correlate with either economic development (Trierborn 1977) or women's employment. In North-west Europe and North America, most countries granted women the vote around 191H-1920, with a second wave in southern and eastern Europe around V.t4-j. This challenges a simple link of economic development and democracy for women. Kather there was a global, or perhaps better, a regional wave of Jcmalc suffrage. While Ramirez et al. fTyy?) link women's suffrage to the development of world society, in which each country adopts similar practices concerning citizenship as a result of a global diffusion of cultural and political practices rather than economic development, this misses the specificity of female suffrage and the intense and highly contested feminist struggles for the vote in the period up to lyiH. which is not best captured by the rather gentle notion of a process of diffusion. In the UK the process involved women front all classes, from those organized in unions in the cotton textile mills of northern England to middle-class ladies, with their actions ranging from mass properly' damage (e.g. smashing windows in fashionable shopping streets, setting fire to post boxes, and burning 'votes for women' into golf courses) with consequent imprisonment, hunger strikes, and force feeding, to petitions, lobbying, and mass dernonstralions fEvans l977i Liddington and Norris ItyTH: Purvis and joartnou I99H). Suffrage-democracy' for women Ls not as driven by economic development as for men. but instead is more associated with global and regional civil societal waves. Presence-democracy for women, in which women are elected as representatives in parliament and arc present in executives and other governing hodies, does however correlate with economic devekjpment (Matland 199H), more especially women's free wage labour (Rule 19H1, 19^7; Matland iy9H; Eaxton and Kunovitch 2O03J. the presence of women in higher level jobs CKenworthy and Malami lyW; Etnntsen 2Q0l>, and women's education (Rule 19H1. 1MB7). Thus, while economic development is not clearly linked to sufrrage-democracy for women, it is Jinked to presence-democracy. This is in addition to its association with ih-l- u^l- of propt:ni-mil ncpr-l-^-iil:iLi-.jii r.r:u-r lkin. iii.LJurkjr..Lfi vtJting systems, multi-member rather than single-member constituencies (Rule 19K1, 1994; Norris Darcyet al. 1994 Kenworthy and Malami IV99). Thus, a combination cf economic development, which includes women's free wage Labour and education, and specific electoral Jbrms drives the development of presence-demcEracy ft.tr women. A further global aspect of presence-democracy for women has been the development of quotas to address the shortage of women in parliament (Dahlcrup 199«; Karam 1098). In 1995 only three countries {Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Tanzaniai had statutory quotas, but by there were 4(5 countries which had a constitutional or statutory quota and til had a political party quota, so that overall countries had some form of quota system (some had more than one kind) {'Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995; IDEA 3005). While in some cases the process of the introduction of quotas may have a predominantly national focus, in others development is as a result of local activists drawing on a near global feminist movement and Learning from ideas and practices in other countries to push for change in their own fllahlerup and Freidenvall 2fl05)- Presence-democracy also deepens as a result of the increasing organization of women in civil society organizations. w"hile the highly visible aspects of women's movements have declined somewhat (Taylor 19Hf>; liagguley 2002}. there has been substantial growth in the organization of women in civil society, including trade unions, professional associations, and many NCOs, Contrary to Fraser (1^7), much of this is associated noL with cultural issues ItuI rather with eco-nomic and politico] issues. In many countries the proportion of women who are members of trade unions has been growing slrongry and in several (including Sweden and the UK} it is now around SO per cent of trade union irjembership (Hicks and Palmer 201^4). Akingside this change, (he proportion of women in leadership positions in trade unions has grown (Ledwilh and Colgan 200U), there is a developing equalities agenda within trade union bargaining strategies {Ellis and Ferns 2Q0O}, and there is a new representation of women's interests in workplace bargaining as a result of these changes in trade unions together with women's increased presence in the labour market (Gagnon and Lcdwith 21X10)- Most western countries now have established national feminist organizations that coordinate activity across a variety of fronts. The European Union actively encourages this development through its funding of the European women's Lobby, with representatives coming from each Member Stale's 'peak' feminist organization {European women's Lobby). At a global level feminist coalitions seek and find international spaces, especially in the interstices of the United Nations, to develop shared platforms for action, as for example in IJeifing in (LTN These have implications for the development of positions put forward at a national level, from suggestions for the reform of democratic procedures, such as quotas i liable nip J^'/Hi. and the developjiKJil of hmIc ijisLituiii^i.il machinery to lake forward gender equality Issues at a national Level (Mazur 20!]2), to shared feminist programmes. The development of democracy, the modernization of the polity, is nol simply driven by- economic development, but a consequence of the complex interaction of economy, polity, violence, and civil society. Democracy for women and minoritiTed ethnic groups is often but not always later than for men of the dominant ethnicity. It is important to note the varying depth of democracy and to go beyond the traditionally narrow focus on suffrage-democracy, to include presence-democracy and broad democracy. Conclusions Making visible complex inequalities and global processes requires ike deconstrucuon and rebuilding of the conceplu alization and theorizalion of polities and democracy. It also requires the use of the broader concept of polity rather tbzin the narrower one of state, the rejection of the misleading concept of nation-state, and the understanding that polities overlap and do not saturate I heir territory. It demands differentiation of the depth of democracy so as to capture variations in the access to political power of different groups at different times. The concept of state is too narrow and should he replaced by the broader concept of polity, which encompasses a variety of forms including states, nations, organized religions, empires, and hegemons in order to facilitate the visualization of conflicts between political projects involving complex inequalities such as ethnicity and gender more fully. Any one polity rarely saturates its territory. Instead nations, stares, religions, and hegemons ovedap, contesting and accommodating in the same geographical space. Different polities carry differently gendered, classed, and ethnicized projects, so the contestation between these polities has implicate jns for the nature of gender and ethnic relations as well as that of class. The concept of the nation-stale with its purported settlement of one nation and one state misleads since this is rarely fully achieved. It is preferable to disaggregate the different polities to be able to examine the implications of their lack of mapping onto each other, such as the militarized conflict associated with nation-stale projects when a nation, state, and religion do not map (jMo each other, the myth of purity associated with the nation-state project is a terrible driving force in history when combined with the low likelihood of its achievement. Global pn fc-'-es^es w ill c.v.i.l- new iniK:- - l.md^:Lpe^ wiskin ^Jik li ^■JiLipeting polities variously thrive or decline. Emerging and contesting ^'"ba] hegemons are key to setting up the rules of such global landscapes. The concept and operationalization of democracy are revised so as to include issues related to complex inequalities. Ten indicators of the depth of democracy are identified: no hereditary or unelected positions, including a monarch and members in either chamber of parliament: no colonies, that is, no governance of territories that do not also meet these criteria; no powers of governance held by additional non-democratic polity, for example organized religion; universal suffrage, de facto as well as de jure; elections, especially those that are free, fair, and competitive; a context of free speech and free association and developed civil society associations; a low cost for electioneering, either by law or by custom: an electoral system with proportional representation; an electoral system with quotas For under-represented groups such as women; a proportionate presence in parliament for women and minorities: a range of institutions {e.g. welfare services) governed by the democratic polity. Democracy may be shallow or deep: suJTrage-demacracy though conventionally equated with democracy is its most shallow variant- presence-democracy in which women and minorities are present in governing institutions is a deeper form: the deepest of all is broad-democracy, where a broad range of institutions {welfare, employment, military) is governed by democratic practices. Weoliheralism typically has no more than suffrage-democracy, while social democracy has both pTescnce-demtKjracy and broad-democracy. The development tjf democracy rarely happens all at one point in lime for all social groups, despite the convention of dating democracy from the year of mens suffrage. Even suffragt-democracy was usually al different times for men and women in the North, though more often simultaneous during the decolonization of the South. Presenor-democracy is still rather uncommon, found in few countries other than the Nordic ones. Broad-democracy is confined to St vul de-nLOiT.ll.i1 l (-li r.l :k-:-. Vi'h.h' ■^liir.l^-l'-dem-. vim it lor mui i:-often linked to economic development, MitTnige-rHemtxTiky for women is not. although presence-democracy is.