Understanding variation in public support for European integration

MATTHEW GABEL[1] & HARVEY D. PALMER[2]
[1]*Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA;* [2]*Economics Department, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA*

Abstract. Much of the research on the European Community focuses on elites and institutions and as a result downplays the importance of the mass public in determining the direction of European integration. A common justification for this viewpoint is that members of the public provide a stable reservoir of strong support for European integration. Recent political events, however, raise doubts about this depiction of a 'passive public'. Consequently, there is a need for a fuller understanding of European attitudes. We specify a number of hypotheses dealing with the effects of international trade interests, security concerns, and demographic characteristics on cross-national and cross-sectional variations in public support for European integration. Using Eurobarometer surveys and OECD data on EC trade from 1973–1989, we investigate these hypotheses in a pooled cross-sectional model. Our statistical results reveal that an individual's level of support is positively related to her nation's security and trade interests in EC membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labour, and money.

Introduction

Until recently, both practical experience and scholarly research indicated that the public of the European Community provided a 'permissive consensus' for European integration, passively acquiescing to national elite decisions on actual integrative steps (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970; Inglehart 1970; Hallstein 1972; Slater 1983). Public opposition to the Treaty on European Union as well as public protest over the EC-GATT accord, however, reveals that the public is neither as supportive of European integration nor as deferential to elites on EC issues as previously assumed. European integration, it appears, is not merely an elite process, but depends on fluctuations in public sentiments as well. Consequently, determining what factors influence Europeans' attitudes towards the EC is essential to understanding the dynamics of European integration.

Previous research has addressed this issue. Several studies have investigated cross-national variation in public support for European integration, identifying consistent differences in the levels of support among the EC members (Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Mathew 1980; Hewstone 1986; Dalton & Eichenberg 1991; Palmer & Gabel 1993). Dalton & Eichenberg (1991)

offer a theoretical explanation for cross-national differences, arguing that Europeans assess their EC membership based on evaluations of their personal and national economic situation. Their aggregate-level analysis shows some statistically significant positive relationships between evaluations of the national economy (retrospective and prospective) and public support for EC membership, but these estimated relationships have only minor substantive significance.[1] Cross-sectional variation in support for integration has received considerably less scholarly attention. Inglehart, Rabier & Reif (1991) find consistent differences among EC citizens according to partisan attachments, income, occupation, and political skills, but there are no thorough and convincing theoretical explanations for cross-sectional variation in support. In short, while there are several empirical regularities identified by previous research, there is no cohesive theoretical framework for understanding variations in support for European integration among EC citizens. Our study addresses this gap in the literature.

In this paper, we develop and test a series of hypotheses specifying why EC citizens vary in support for European integration. We posit that public attitudes toward integration reflect the perceived costs and benefits of EC membership. We theorize that EC support varies in consistent ways with cross-sectional and cross-national differences in evaluations of EC membership. We specify statistical hypotheses dealing with the effects of international trade interests, security concerns, national economic evaluations, and demographic characteristics on individual-level support. Using Eurobarometer surveys and OECD data from 1973–1989, we test these hypotheses in a pooled cross-sectional model.[2] Our statistical results reveal that an individual's level of support is positively related to her nation's security and trade interests in EC membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labour, and capital.

Public evaluations of European integration

Before developing our theoretical framework, it is useful to consider Dalton & Eichenberg's (1991) economic voting model of EC support. We agree with Dalton and Eichenberg that economic interests influence public support for European integration. However, we differ with them over how Europeans determine their economic benefits from European integration. According to Dalton & Eichenberg, Europeans evaluate the EC on the basis of their perceptions about the general economic situation. We believe this is an inappropriate characterization of the process by which Europeans evaluate supra-national institutions such as the EC. EC policies are only one of several factors that influence personal and national economic welfare. The impact of EC policy is probably secondary to the impacts of domestic politics and exogenous changes in the world economy. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the European public holds the EC primarily responsible for their nation's

Table 1. Issue positions, economic situation, and EC membership

Issue position	EC membership is			
	good	neither	bad	N
Favour free trade	77.3	16.6	6.0	7005
Favour trade restrictions	57.2	25.3	17.5	2115
Favour price supports for agriculture	79.8	15.8	4.4	6425
Oppose price supports for agriculture	52.9	26.5	20.6	2426
Understanding between EC nations has increased	84.2	11.6	4.1	3192
Understanding between EC nations has decreased	48.3	26.6	25.0	1051
Nation has benefited from being an EC member	86.7	9.6	3.7	28362
Nation has not benefited from being an EC member	32.1	33.7	34.1	12183
Country's general economic situation is better	75.1	14.6	10.3	9493
Country's general economic situation is worse	59.8	22.2	18.0	12623

Questions on trade and agriculture were asked in Eurobarometer 30 (November 1988); question on understanding between EC nations was asked in Eurobarometer 26 (November 1986); questions on benefiting from EC membership and national economic situation were asked in Eurobarometers 22, 24, 26, 28, and 30 (Fall 1984–88).

economic well-being. Eurobarometer survey evidence supports this contention. When asked to name the major cause of their country's current economic problems, only 12.3 percent of the respondents blamed EC economic policies, while 39 percent cited worldwide recession, 23.4 percent blamed developments within their country, and 16.4 percent mentioned American economic policies.[3] In sum, national economic evaluations are 'noisy' measures of EC policy implications, and thus will be weakly correlated with EC support.[4]

Rather than being evaluated as an institution responsible for general economic outcomes, we contend that the EC is judged in terms of the policies it enacts. At the national level, there are two general areas in which EC membership has important policy implications. First, the EC, as a customs union, facilitates trade through the elimination of tariffs and protectionist regulation. Second, the EC promotes European peace and stability by establishing institutional links between the EC nations and their government elites. Table 1 indicates that Europeans' support for EC membership is consistent with their preferences on those issues over which the EC is directly responsible.

Table 1 also indicates that respondents who claim that their nation has benefited from EC membership are more likely to evaluate it as a good thing. We believe that the 'benefit from EC membership' question is a proxy for the national-level implications of EC policy, and thus will be correlated with EC support. Consistent with this contention, Table 2 shows that Eurobarometer respondents' attitudes on specific EC issues are consistent with their general evaluation of the national benefits from EC membership.

Given the results in Tables 1 and 2, we expect public support to vary consistently with the perceived benefits from EC policy.[5] The following

Table 2. Issue position and national benefit from EC membership

Issue position	As an EC member my country has		
	benefited	not benefited	N
Favour free trade	77.4	22.6	6352
Favour trade restrictions	59.4	40.6	1915
Favour price supports for agriculture	81.1	18.9	5850
Oppose price supports for agriculture	53.7	46.3	2225
Understanding between EC nations has increased	77.3	22.7	2953
Understanding between EC nations has decreased	52.0	48.0	986

discussion presents several 'policy appraisal' hypotheses that specify how the differential effects of EC policies are related to variations in Europeans' evaluations of the EC. First, we believe the liberal international trade policy of the EC benefits nations differently. By making trade more dependable and efficient, mutual liberalization constitutes a larger advantage for nations that depend heavily on intra-EC commerce. Therefore, we posit that support for European integration is positively related to the relative importance of intra-EC commerce as part of the nation's overall international trade. In addition, those nations that enjoy a trade surplus with other EC members benefit from increased access to profitable markets. Thus, we expect a positive relationship to exist between an individual's support for European integration and her nation's trade balance with the other EC nations. We refer to these propositions as the 'mercantilist' hypotheses.

The formation of the European Economic Community was not motivated solely by economic concerns. European cooperation was also motivated by a Western European desire to institutionalize links between its states in order to neutralize the divisive nationalism that led to two world wars. Consequently, we expect cross-national differences in support for European integration to be influenced by the public's concern over insuring European peace and stability. In turn, we posit that an individual's support for European integration is correlated with her nation's death toll in the Second World War. We refer to this proposition as the 'security' hypothesis.

EC policies also affect individuals differently according to their ability to benefit from the liberalized labour and financial markets. Prior to liberalization, occupation and investment opportunities were greatly limited by national controls. By restructuring the traditional distribution of Europe's resources and production, EC policies affect Europeans in two general ways. First, they alter the traditional labour market. The EC's competition policy diminishes the national governments' ability to subsidize national industries, thus reducing a traditional form of job security. Furthermore, workers now have to compete with a larger pool of EC citizens for the same jobs. Second, EC policies constrain the social welfare state. The anti-inflationary bias of the European Monetary System and the competitive downward pressures

on tax-rates introduce fiscal constraints on national social policies. This is exacerbated, to some extent, by the free movement of capital, which eliminates national controls over the export of money. In sum, EC membership is equivalent to an economic programme that deregulates the labour and financial markets and places a priority on monetary and fiscal policies that are anti-inflationary.[6]

We assert that EC support varies consistently with cross-sectional differences in an individual's potential benefit from the aforementioned EC policies. Specifically, we posit that occupational skill and education levels are positively related to the potential benefits from EC policies and thereby to support for European integration. We refer to this as the 'human capital' hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on the premise that certain individual skills are more valuable and transferable in an advanced industrial economy. Europeans with higher education levels and more marketable occupational skills are better prepared to apply their talents in diverse international settings and to adapt to economic changes in their production sector and region. In contrast, less educated and poorly skilled Europeans have less valuable job experiences, possess less mutable skills and qualifications, are less likely to seek additional job training, and are more expendable in times of economic down-turn (see Becker 1980). For these reasons, we expect well-educated individuals in professional positions to be more optimistic about new job opportunities and less fearful of unemployment resulting from an open labour market. There is evidence that Europeans perceive the EC in these terms. In a 1987 Eurobarometer survey, 68 percent of professionals thought that the EC would create job opportunities compared to 54 percent of manual workers. Also, 17 percent of professionals considered higher unemployment from competition as the most striking development of the EC while 28 percent of manual workers held this opinion.

One occupational group, farmers, is directly influenced by EC policy. The Common Agricultural Policy provides farmers with export subsidies, protection from foreign trade, and guaranteed commodity prices. Although there is some variation in how this policy affects large versus small farms, on average, this policy supplies farmers with economic advantages. Consequently, we expect farmers to be more supportive of the EC.

EC citizens with higher income levels are also more likely to benefit from EC policies since they prefer low inflation, less public sector spending, and a larger and more open financial market. On the other hand, EC citizens with low incomes are generally more dependent upon social welfare programmes. EC policies limit spending on social welfare programmes by constraining fiscal policy, and thus EC citizens with low incomes benefit less from them.[7] Consequently, we expect income levels to be positively related to support for European integration. We refer to this proposition as the 'capitalist' hypothesis.

The EC may also influence Europeans differently depending on where they reside. We posit that Europeans who live near borders with other EC

members benefit more from the increased economic interaction between the neighboring countries and thus are more likely to support European integration. Because of their proximity to foreign markets, residents of border regions may have greater opportunities to exploit liberalized commodity, labour, and financial markets, while the negative effects of economic competition do not vary systematically with geographic location. We refer to this as the 'proximity' hypothesis.

Finally, we hypothesize that an EC citizen's support for European integration is greater when a European Parliament (EP) election occurs. Since turnout for EP elections is often considered as an indicator of the EC's popular legitimacy, EC officials and EP candidates have vested interests in dispersing positive messages about the EC, its policies, and the value of further integration prior to EP elections. We expect these barrages of positive information to be associated with generally more optimistic evaluations of EC policies and greater support for integration among all EC citizens.

Data and methodology

In order to investigate the hypothesized relationships discussed above, we have pooled cross-sectional data from 1973–1989. In constructing the data set, we utilize the Eurobarometer opinion surveys to measure public support for European integration and OECD data on trade among EC members to measure a nation's economic interests in further integration. The dependent variable in our analysis is individual-level support for European integration. This variable is constructed from responses to two questions in the Eurobarometer surveys. These questions are worded as follows:

Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing?
In general, are you (very much/to some extent) for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?

Responses to these questions were coded so that higher values correspond with greater support. To calculate the dependent variable, each individual's coded responses were summed, then standardized by the maximum possible total, and finally multiplied by one hundred, so that the individual-level measure of EC support ranges from zero to one hundred.

Some readers may wonder why we use two survey items rather than a single question to construct the EC support variable. Other EC researchers employ a single question to measure public support for European integration and even differentiate between questions as separate measures of affective and utilitarian support (for example, see Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Mathew 1980; Dalton & Eichenberg 1991). We adopt a different approach, however,

based on the belief that while there may be different types of public support, the Eurobarometer questions are too vague and broadly worded to be precise measures of these distinct components. We believe that the survey questions are complex measures that tap more than one underlying dimension. It is very likely that an individual's responses to these questions are correlated with both her affective and utilitarian support for European integration.[8] Consistent with this perspective, responses to these questions are strongly correlated for all Eurobarometer surveys in which both questions were available, with an overall correlation of 0.43 (N = 159,223). Furthermore, by utilizing both survey questions, we create a more precise and discriminating measure of EC support that is less plagued by the statistical problems associated with measurement error.[9]

The explanatory variables in our analysis are designed to measure the effects of international trade interests, security concerns, and demographic characteristics. The coding of these variables is relatively straight-forward and is described in the Appendix. Descriptive information for the dependent and explanatory variables is also presented in the Appendix. The reader should note that 'EC Support' has a mean of 72.6 and a standard deviation of 27.2. This means that most of the variation in EC support across individuals is within 30 percent of the mean. Since each explanatory variable accounts for only a fraction of this variance, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients may appear small relative to the 100 percent scale. The reader should keep this in mind when considering the substantive significance of the estimated relationships.

Empirical results

The paper's statistical analysis seeks to explain cross-sectional and cross-national variation in individual-level support for European integration. Toward this end, we use two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to estimate the hypothesized relationships discussed above. The estimated OLS coefficient on an explanatory variable indicates the direction and strength of its linear relationship with the dependent variable, when the remaining explanatory variables are held constant. In turn, an OLS coefficient is analogous to a partial correlation coefficient. The standard error of an OLS coefficient reflects the reliability of the estimated relationship. The smaller is the standard error relative to the estimated coefficient, the more precise is the estimate of the true relationship.

The OLS results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Model 1 tests Dalton and Eichenberg's economic voting hypothesis while controlling for policy-related factors. If national economic evaluations are merely 'noisy' proxies for assessments of EC policy implications, then the estimated coefficient on National Economic Situation will be small and inconsequential. Model 1 reveals that this is the case, with the difference between the most negative

Table 3. Effect of national economic evaluations on EC support

Variable	Model 1	
	Coefficient	S.E.
Intercept	48.12*	0.64
EC national benefit	28.27*	0.27
National economic situation	1.14*	0.11
WWII deaths (per capita)	42.15*	9.12
Income	1.11*	0.12
Education	1.25*	0.14
Professional	0.32	0.66
Executive	2.00*	0.57
Business owner	0.34	0.44
Manual worker	–2.16*	0.34
Unemployed	–1.15	0.62
Farmer	–1.21	0.61
Border region	2.04*	0.26
Denmark	–21.56*	0.45
Great Britain	–4.29*	0.44
Italy	5.38*	0.41
Portugal	7.62*	0.54
Spain	18.75*	0.60
Adjusted R-squared	0.38	
N	32331	

The dependent variable is individual-level EC support. This model also includes control variables for age, urban/rural residence, and being retired, a student, or a housewife. Respondents from Eurobarometers 22, 24, 26, 28, and 30 are used to estimate the model. Asterisks denote the coefficients that are significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).

and most positive evaluations amounting to only a 4.6 percent increase in EC support. In contrast, the large coefficient on EC National Benefit indicates that individuals who believe their nation has benefited from EC membership are much more supportive of European integration.

The results in Model 1 are also generally consistent with the cross-sectional hypotheses. These results, however, should be interpreted with caution due to the correlation between the cross-sectional variables and the EC National Benefit variable.[10] This multi-collinearity reduces the precision of the coefficient estimates (inflating the standard errors) because both the cross-sectional variables and the EC National Benefit variable are measuring individual-level appraisals of the EC. The EC National Benefit variable was initially included because, as an individual-level proxy for national benefits, it is an important control variable in testing the economic voting hypothesis.[11] When this variable is replaced by objective measures of national benefit in Model 2, the coefficients for the cross-sectional variables increase in strength and precision.

Model 2 tests the 'policy appraisal' hypotheses concerning the implications of EC membership. Focusing first on cross-sectional variables, the results

Table 4. Effects of national and individual economic interests on EC Support

Variable	Model 2	
	Coefficient	S.E.
Intercept	58.28*	0.71
EC trade balance	0.019*	0.002
EC trade %	12.08*	1.00
WWII deaths	108.91*	6.11
EC parliament election	1.20*	0.18
Income	1.68*	0.07
Education	2.02*	0.08
Professional	3.08*	0.39
Executive	3.37*	0.31
Business owner	0.27	0.26
Manual worker	–3.82*	0.19
Unemployed	–3.96*	0.42
Farmer	1.16*	0.34
Border region	2.29*	0.15
Denmark	–20.95*	0.30
United Kingdom	–11.71*	0.31
Italy	11.68*	0.27
Portugal	13.78*	0.50
Spain	10.97*	0.54
Adjusted R-squared	0.16	
N	145317	

The dependent variable is individual-level EC support. This model also includes control variables for age, urban/rural residence, and being retired, a student, or a housewife. Asterisks denote the estimated coefficients that are significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).

are consistent with the 'human capital' hypothesis. Respondents in higher status occupations, such as executives and professionals, have greater EC support than manual workers or the unemployed. Holding all other variables constant, manual workers are more than seven percent less supportive than executives. As expected, education is positively related to support. Everything else being equal, respondents with the lowest level of education are, on average, six percent less supportive than the best educated respondents. Farmers, when compared with respondents from other professions, are only moderately supportive of the EC. The results are also consistent with the 'capitalist' and 'proximity' hypotheses. Respondents whose income falls in the lowest quartile are, on average, five percent less supportive than the wealthiest respondents. Residents of border regions are generally more than two percent more supportive of the EC than residents of non-border areas.

Turning our attention to the national-level variables, the results of Model 2 are consistent with the 'security' hypothesis. Since war deaths per capita give an approximate reflection of the relative national suffering endured during World War II, this measure should serve as a proxy for the relative national importance of European integration as an instrument for peace

among the EC members. As expected, the analysis reveals a positive relationship between war deaths and EC support. For instance, EC support in West Germany, France, and Luxembourg is significantly stronger (by 6.1, 2.5, and 1.9 percent respectively) than in nations that experienced minimal WWII deaths.

With respect to the 'mercantilist' hypothesis, the results of Model 2 are generally consistent with expectations. For instance, a one standard deviation (one-SD) increase in the intra-EC trade portion of a nation's international trade (11.1 percent) is, on average, associated with a 1.3 percent increase in EC support. Similarly, a one-SD increase in a nation's intra-EC trade balance ($34.33 per capita) is associated, in Model 2, with a 0.7 percent increase in EC support.

Finally, the estimated coefficients on the EP Election and national dummy variables deserve mention. The hypothesis related to the impact of EP elections is supported by the evidence in Model 2. On average, EC support is 1.2 percent higher among all EC citizens in the years of EP elections. Compared to EC citizens in other nations, those in Italy, Spain, and Portugal are generally more supportive, while those in Denmark and the United Kingdom are generally less supportive of the EC (theoretical explanations for these trends are discussed in the Appendix).

The substantive impact of the cross-sectional variables is more dramatic and impressive when a comprehensive comparison is made. For instance, a poor, low-educated, and unemployed respondent residing in a non-border region, is 17 percent less supportive of the EC, on average, than a well educated, wealthy executive living in a border region. The significance of this difference is highlighted by comparing it with the coefficients on the national dummy variables. In sum, the cumulative impact of the cross-sectional variables is similar in magnitude to the widely recognized national differences in EC support (such as the difference between public support in Italy and the United Kingdom).

Discussion

In general, the analysis reveals strong evidence for the 'policy appraisal' hypotheses of public support for European integration while casting doubt on the appropriateness of the economic voting model. Across all statistical models, the individual advantages of European integration derived from human capital, income, and proximity are consistently associated with greater levels of support. In addition, national differences in support for European integration vary consistently with the 'mercantilist' and 'security' benefits of EC membership.

Our results have several theoretical implications for the process of European integration. Given the public's democratic control over the elected officials responsible for international relations and EC policy, national politicians must be attentive to public concerns over policies. If public opinion

were easily manipulated by politicians, this process of democratic control would exercise no effective constraint. The results of our analysis suggest, however, that the public forms attitudes that are consistent with their inherent interests in European integration. Thus, the analysis suggests that EC elites and national politicians, when developing and implementing policy, should pay particular attention to how integration differentially affects Europeans' economic welfare.

These results also have implications for the institutional design of the EC. Although national economic and security concerns appear to be important aspects of EC citizens' assessments of the EC, the results for the cross-sectional hypotheses suggest that continued support for integration will depend on the EC's ability to respond to the economic demands of its citizens. In other words, those least able to benefit from EC membership should not be expected to support the EC solely because the EC is advantageous for their nation as a whole. The increased power of the EP in the EC decision-making process, as proposed by the Maastricht Treaty, may facilitate the more direct representation of these socio-economic interests.

Finally, these results have implications for evaluating the integration of the national publics into a supra-national community. Ultimately, the EC's founding fathers envisioned economic cooperation inspiring an integration of public loyalties towards a collective European identity. For Putnam (1983: 89), this entails a decline in the saliency of territorially-defined interests on European issues in favour of pan-European concerns. A fully integrated European public might evaluate EC policy using factors that transcend national boundaries (such as, class, gender, age, and ideology). Although we find common cross-sectional concerns on EC issues, our analysis indicates that national concerns remain important components in EC citizens' evaluations of EC issues and thus suggests that supra-national public integration has not yet been achieved.

Assuming the attainment of such a public integration is desired, one instrumental institutional modification would be to further strengthen the power of the EP to initiate legislation.[12] By allowing political influence beyond traditional national channels, this may promote transnational coalitions of Europeans in order lobby the EP agenda. These transnational concerns, in turn, may elicit cross-national allegiances of the sort Putnam (1983) envisioned.

Appendix

The paper's statistical analysis utilizes pooled cross-sectional data for the group of EC nations from 1973–1989. Most of the variables in this data set are constructed using Eurobarometer opinion surveys (conducted twice a year) and OECD trade data. The EC nations during this period are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West Germany with the additions of Greece in 1980 and

Portugal and Spain in 1986. In the present analysis, Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as a single nation, since the OECD combines the trade data for Luxembourg with that for Belgium.

While the dependent variable is described in the paper's text, there are several important details about its measurement that should be noted here. For most years, the EC support variable is constructed from the 'EC membership good/bad' and 'for/against European unification' questions. Unfortunately, the 'European unification' question is not available in Eurobarometers 5–9 from Spring 1976 to Spring 1978. For this reason, we made several adjustments in our data. For 1978, only respondents in Eurobarometer 10 (Fall) are included. For 1976 and 1977, another question is substituted for the 'European unification' question in our measure of EC support. The substituted question addresses the 'speed' of unification and is worded as follows: 'Personally, do you, yourself, think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?' Responses to this question are strongly correlated with those to the 'EC membership' and 'European unification' questions. In those surveys where both of the relevant questions are available, the correlation between the 'speed of unification' and 'for/against European unification' responses is 0.44 (N = 34,741), and the correlation between the 'speed of unification' and 'EC membership' responses is 0.36 (N = 60,216).[13]

Those individuals who did not respond to either of the two questions are not included in the statistical analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, a high percentage of individuals were willing to express their opinion on EC membership and European integration. In the Eurobarometer surveys that we used, 91.6 percent responded to the 'EC membership' question, 81.2 percent responded to the 'for/against European unification' question, and 77.1 percent responded to both questions. For 1976 and 1977, 83.6 percent responded to the 'speed of unification' question, and 80.4 percent responded to both questions.

Table A1 presents descriptive information for the dependent and explanatory variables used in our statistical analysis. The measurement of the explanatory variables is described below for each variable:

EC Trade Balance is a nation's intra-EC trade balance divided by its population, measured in US dollars per capita. *Sources*: OECD, *Foreign trade by commodities and Main economic indicators*.

EC Trade % is the ratio of a nation's intra-EC trade to its total international trade, measured in US dollars. *Source*: OECD, *Foreign trade by commodities*.

WWII Deaths is a nation's military and civilian deaths per capita in the Second World War. When calculating this variable, estimates of the EC nations' 1939 (pre-war) populations were used. *Sources*: Sivard, *World military and social expenditures 1985*; Snyder, *Louis L. Snyder's historical guide to World War II*; and Keegan, ed., *The Times Atlas of the Second World War*

Table A1. Variable means and standard deviations

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value
EC support	72.59	27.17	0	100
EC trade balance (per capita)	3.12	34.33	–60.76	101.32
EC trade %	0.542	0.111	0.239	0.741
WWII deaths (per capita)	0.015	0.016	0	0.056
Income	1.59	1.10	0	3
Education	1.03	0 94	0	3
Professional	0.033	0.180	0	1
Executive	0.061	0.239	0	1
Business owner	0.094	0.292	0	1
Manual worker	0.264	0.441	0	1
Unemployed	0.029	0.168	0	1
Farmer	0.059	0.236	0	1
Border region	0.341	0.474	0	1
EC parliament election	0.175	0.380	0	1
National benefit	0.70	0.46	0	1
National economic situation	–0.16	1.29	–2	2

EC National Benefit is coded 1 if the respondent thinks that her nation, taking everything into consideration, has benefited from EC membership, 0 otherwise. This variable is a proxy for the general policy implications of EC membership.

National Economic Situation represents the respondent's evaluation of the national economic situation over the past 12 months. It is coded from –2 (got a lot worse) to 2 (got a lot better) with 0 indicating no change.

EP Election is a dummy variable for the European Parliament elections. It is coded 1 for 1979, 1985, and 1989, 0 otherwise.

Income is coded from 0 (low) to 3 (high) according to the income quartiles reported in the Eurobarometer.

Occupation: Each of the following categories is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent's head of household is employed in this occupation. The 'white collar' category is used as a baseline for comparison.

    a. farmer, fisherman
    b. professional – lawyers, accountants, etc.
    c. business – shop owners, craftsmen, proprietors
    d. manual worker
    e. executive, top management, director
    f. retired
    g. housewife, not otherwise employed
    h. student, military service
    i. unemployed

Education is coded 0 for respondents who completed their education before the age of 15; 1 for those who completed their education between the ages of 14 and 19; 2 for those who completed their education between the ages

of 19 and 21; and 3 for those who completed their education after the age of 21. Any respondent who was 'still studying' was classified by her age. *Border* is coded 1 for respondents who reside in a region that borders on another EC member.[14]

The pooled design has become infamous for the methodological problems associated with it (see Stimson 1985; Sayrs 1989; Beck & Katz 1993). However, our study utilizes individual-level rather than aggregate-level data, and thus many of these methodological problems do not apply to our statistical analysis. For instance, the time serial problems (i.e., autocorrelation) that plague pooled models of cross-national data are not applicable to our statistical design which pools a series of independent cross-sections. One remaining concern, though, is the potential methodological problems attributable to fixed effects for particular nations and years. In order to assess the existence of fixed effects, we checked the residual means for each year and nation.[15] Fortunately, the residual means for each year are close to zero, and thus there is no evidence of fixed effects associated with particular years. However, we found some significant fixed effects for respondents from certain nations. For those nations with persistently large residual means, we introduced dummy variables to correct for these national differences in the dependent variable and to prevent idiosyncratic national effects from biasing parameter estimates on the other explanatory variables.

Although the inclusion of these dummy variables seems like an *ad hoc* adaptation of the model in order to eliminate potential estimation problems, there are some convincing theoretical reasons to believe that citizens from certain countries are generally more or less supportive of the EC. For instance, the positive image of EC membership as responsible for Italy's economic resurgence coupled with public frustration over political reform, has been credited with Italians' widespread support for a more federal European state (see Barzini 1983). Similarly, Portugal's recent democratic reforms and the redirection of its economic interests from the Atlantic to the continent may explain strong Portuguese support for European integration, which legitimizes Portugal as a member of Europe's democracies and gives it access to a larger market. Like Portugal, Spain highly appreciates the democratic reinforcement of EC membership and the disproportionate economic assistance it receives from the EC's regional development programmes. In contrast, Denmark's Scandinavian attachments may explain Danish respondents' less enthusiastic EC support. Similarly, low EC support among British respondents may be attributable to the United Kingdom's commercial links with the Commonwealth nations and its traditional commitment to an independent world position which clashes with the goal of 'European unity' (see Hewstone 1986: 6).

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. Dalton and Eichenberg measure a nation's EC support by subtracting the percent of its respondents believing their nation's EC membership is a 'bad thing' from the percent who believe it is a 'good thing'. The results of the analysis indicate that the increase in EC support associated with a complete swing in a nation's aggregate economic perceptions from worse to best is never more than one percentage point. The reader should note, however, that the question used as the dependent variable also includes a third response category, 'neither good nor bad'. Since respondents choosing this third category are not represented in the dependent variable, this measure of EC support may be misleading. For example, a nation with 15 percent of its respondents choosing 'good thing' and 5 percent choosing 'bad thing' will have the same score as a nation with 55 percent of its respondents choosing 'good thing' and 45 percent choosing 'bad thing'.
2. The Eurobarometer data were originally collected by Jacques-Rene Rabier, Helene Riffault, and Ronald Inglehart, and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the collectors of the Eurobarometer data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the interpretations presented here. The economic data were compiled by the authors using two sources provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: *Foreign trade by commodities* (1973–1989) and *Main economic indicators* (various years).
3. This question was asked in Eurobarometer 22 (October 1984).
4. It is likely that EC policies will contribute to national economic welfare and, consequently, evaluations of EC policies will be correlated with evaluations of the national economy. In turn, evaluations of the national economy serve as an indirect or 'noisy' measure of evaluations of the EC's policies.
5. Since EC citizens are generally viewed as being poorly informed about EC policies, some readers may question whether they can form consistent beliefs about European integration. In a different context, this issue has been widely debated in the International Relations literature. Due to the public's low level of political sophistication, some scholars contend that the public does not have well-behaved and consistent beliefs, particularly on foreign policy issues (see Rosenau 1961; Converse 1964; Neuman 1986). However, recent research challenges this conclusion. Page & Shapiro (1992), Russett (1990), and Wittkopf (1990) find that the American public forms consistent collective opinions on US foreign policy, despite being generally uninterested and poorly informed.
6. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) has been dominated by the German Mark and, consequently, has required low inflationary policies by all ERM members. Although not all EC members have been members of this regime, non-members have adjusted to attain membership, thus producing a convergence in inflation-rates across the EC members during the period of this analysis, 1975–1989 (Tsoukalis 1989).
7. The experience of France in the ERM is particularly poignant in demonstrating this. The dramatic shift to austerity orchestrated in the early 1980s under President Mitterrand and the Socialist Government in response to pressure to devalue the Franc (and leave the ERM), illustrates the constraints on social programmes and fiscal policy implicit in ERM membership (see Petit 1989; Hall 1986). More generally, the ability of businesses in a

common market to move their production to the most lucrative site creates an atmosphere of competition among the EC member governments to limit taxes so as to retain and attract investment and industry.

8. A factor analysis, including responses to several questions concerning support for the EC, confirms that these two questions tap both utilitarian and affective dimensions of support. In addition, responses to more specific questions concerning integrative efforts – such as the creation of a common defense, foreign policy, and single currency – are also highly correlated with our EC support variable. Thus, this variable represents a proxy for general support of integrative efforts (Gabel 1993).

9. Polychotomous variables are imprecise proxies/measures of an underlying continuous spectrum of opinion. As the number of categories increases, a proxy variable is better able to capture the full range of underlying attitudes, thus decreasing the likelihood of measurement error. In turn, our index allows for a broader range of categories than either question alone, so as to better measure the underlying spectrum of support.

10. Not surprisingly, many respondents associate their nation's benefit with their own benefit. For instance, wealthy, well-educated respondents from high status occupations may believe their nation benefits from a liberalized market for labour, goods, and capital, while deriving personal benefit from these economic conditions.

11. The reader should note, though, that the substantive impact of national economic evaluations is not much stronger when EC National Benefit is excluded from the model.

12. The Maastricht Treaty empowers the EP to oblige the Commission to propose legislation on issues that the EP deems relevant.

13. Despite these strong correlations, we are somewhat wary about using the 'speed of unification' question, because it does not directly measure a respondent's level of support for the present state of European unification. Yet, we have not discovered any significant bias associated with this adjustment in the measurement of EC support.

14. For the exact coding by nation, see question 530 in Eurobarometer 31.

15. The residual means are available from the authors upon request.

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Address for correspondence: Harvey Palmer, Economics Department, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA
Phone: (703) 993 1151/1130; Fax: (703) 993 1133