Chapter 1
Introduction
There are many ways in which, in principle, a democracy
can be organized and run; in practice, too, modern democracies
exhibit a variety of formal governmental institutions,
like legislatures and courts, as well as political party and
interest group systems. However, clear patterns and regularities
appear when these institutions are examined from the perspective
of how majoritarian or how consensual their rules and practices
are. The majoritarianism-consensus contrast arises from the
most basic and literal de�nition of democracy—government by
the people or, in representative democracy, government by the
representatives of the people—and from President Abraham Lincoln’s
famous further stipulation that democracy means government
not only by but also for the people—that is, government in
accordance with the people’s prefererences.1
De�ning democracy as “government by and for the people”
1
1. As Clifford D. May (1987) points out, credit for this de�nition should
probably go to Daniel Webster instead of Lincoln. Webster gave an address
in 1830—thirty-three years before Lincoln’s Gettysburg address—in which
he spoke of a “people’s government, made for the people, made by the
people, and answerable to the people.”
2 INTRODUCTION
raises a fundamental question: Who will do the governing and to
whose interests should the government be responsive when the
people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences? One
answer to this dilemma is: the majority of the people. This is
the essence of the majoritarian model of democracy. The majoritarian
answer is simple and straightforward and has great appeal
because government by the majority and in accordance with the
majority’s wishes obviously comes closer to the democratic ideal
of “government by and for the people” than government by and
responsive to a minority.
The alternative answer to the dilemma is: as many people as
possible. This is the crux of the consensus model. It does not differ
from the majoritarian model in accepting that majority rule is
better than minority rule, but it accepts majority rule only as a
minimum requirement: instead of being satis�ed with narrow
decision-making majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these
majorities. Its rules and institutions aim at broad participation in
government and broad agreement on the policies that the government
should pursue. The majoritarian model concentrates political
power in the hands of a bare majority—and often even merely
a plurality instead of a majority, as Chapter 2 will show—whereas
the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and limit power in
a variety of ways. A closely related difference is that the majoritarian
model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial,
whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness,
bargaining, and compromise; for this reason, consensus
democracy could also be termed “negotiation democracy” (Kaiser
1997, 434).
Ten differences with regard to the most important democratic
institutions and rules can be deduced from the majoritarian and
consensus principles. Because the majoritarian characteristics
are derived from the same principle and hence are logically connected,
one could also expect them to occur together in the real
world; the same applies to the consensus characteristics. All ten
variables could therefore be expected to be closely related. Previ-
INTRODUCTION 3
ous research has largely con�rmed these expectations—with one
major exception: the variables cluster in two clearly separate dimensions
(Lijphart 1984, 211–22). The �rst dimension groups �ve
characteristics of the arrangement of executive power, the party
and electoral systems, and interest groups. For brevity’s sake, I
shall refer to this �rst dimension as the executives-parties dimension.
Since most of the �ve differences on the second dimension
are commonly associated with the contrast between federalism
and unitary government—a matter to which I shall return shortly—
I shall call this second dimension the federal-unitary dimension.
The ten differences are formulated below in terms of dichotomous
contrasts between the majoritarian and consensus models,
but they are all variables on which particular countries may be at
either end of the continuum or anywhere in between. The majoritarian
characteristic is listed �rst in each case. The �ve differences
on the executives-parties dimension are as follows:
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets
versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty co-
alitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is
dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional
representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition
among groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest
group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.
The �ve differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the
following:
1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized
government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature
versus division of legislative power between two equally strong
but differently constituted houses.
4 INTRODUCTION
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities
versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary
majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the �nal word on the constitutionality
of their own legislation versus systems in which
laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality
by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent
central banks.
One plausible explanation of this two-dimensional pattern is
suggested by the classical theorists of federalism—Ivo D. Duchacek
(1970), Daniel J. Elazar (1968), Carl J. Friedrich (1950, 189–
221), and K. C. Wheare (1946)—as well as by many contemporary
theorists (Colomer 2011, 85–100; Hueglin and Fenna 2006; Stepan
2001, 315–61; Watts 2008). These scholars maintain that federalism
has primary and secondary meanings. Its primary de�nition
is: a guaranteed division of power between the central government
and regional governments. The secondary characteristics
are strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and strong judicial
review. Their argument is that the guarantee of a federal division
of power can work well only if (1) both the guarantee and the exact
lines of the division of power are clearly stated in the constitution
and this guarantee cannot be changed unilaterally at either the
central or regional level—hence the need for a rigid constitution,
(2) there is a neutral arbiter who can resolve conflicts concerning
the division of power between the two levels of government—
hence the need for judicial review, and (3) there is a federal chamber
in the national legislature in which the regions have strong
representation—hence the need for strong bicameralism; moreover,
(4) the main purpose of federalism is to promote and protect
a decentralized system of government. These federalist characteristics
can be found in the �rst four variables of the second
dimension. As stated earlier, this dimension is therefore called the
federal-unitary dimension.
INTRODUCTION 5
The federalist explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however,
for two reasons. One problem is that, although it can explain the
clustering of the four variables in one dimension, it does not explain
why this dimension should be so clearly distinct from the
other dimension. Second, it cannot explain why the variable of
central bank independence is part of the federal-unitary dimension.
A more persuasive explanation of the two-dimensional pattern
is the distinction between “collective agency” and “shared
responsibility” on one hand and divided agencies and responsibilities
on the other suggested by Robert E. Goodin (1996, 331).2
These are both forms of diffusion of power, but the �rst dimension
of consensus democracy with its multiparty face-to-face interactions
within cabinets, legislatures, legislative committees, and
concertation meetings between governments and interest groups
has a close �t with the collective-responsibility form. In contrast,
both the four federalist characteristics and the role of central
banks �t the format of diffusion by means of institutional separation:
division of power between separate federal and state institutions,
two separate chambers in the legislature, and separate
and independent high courts and central banks. Viewed from
this perspective, the �rst dimension could also be labeled the
joint-responsibility or joint-power dimension and the second the
divided-responsibility or divided-power dimension. However,
although these labels would be more accurate and theoretically
more meaningful, my original labels—“executives-parties” and
“federal-unitary”—have the great advantage that they are easier
to remember, and I shall therefore keep using them throughout
this book.
The distinction between two basic types of democracy, majoritarian
and consensus, is by no means a novel invention in political
science. In fact, I borrowed these two terms from Robert G.
Dixon, Jr. (1968, 10). Hans Hattenhauer and Werner Kaltefleiter
2. A similar distinction, made by George Tsebelis (2002), is that between
“institutional veto players,” located in different institutions, and
“partisan veto players” such as the parties within a government coalition.
6 INTRODUCTION
(1986) also contrast the “majority principle” with consensus, and
Jürg Steiner (1971) juxtaposes “the principles of majority and
proportionality.” G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1982), distinguishes between
majoritarian and broadly “representational” forms of democracy
and, in later work, between two “democratic visions”:
majoritarian and proportional (Powell 2000). Similar contrasts
have been drawn by Robert A. Dahl (1956)—“populistic” versus
“Madisonian” democracy; William H. Riker (1982)—“populism”
versus “liberalism”; Jane Mansbridge (1980)—“adversary” versus
“unitary” democracy; and S. E. Finer (1975)—“adversary politics”
versus centrist and coalitional politics.
Nevertheless, there is a surprisingly strong and persistent tendency
in political science to equate democracy solely with majoritarian
democracy and to fail to recognize consensus democracy
as an alternative and equally legitimate type. A particularly
clear example can be found in Stephanie Lawson’s (1993, 192–
93) argument that a strong political opposition is “the sine qua
non of contemporary democracy” and that its prime purpose is
“to become the government.” This view is based on the majoritarian
assumption that democracy entails a two-party system (or
possibly two opposing blocs of parties) that alternate in government;
it fails to take into account that governments in more consensual
multiparty systems tend to be coalitions and that a change
in government in these systems usually means only a partial
change in the party composition of the government—instead of
the opposition “becoming” the government (Lundell 2011).
The frequent use of the “turnover” test in order to determine
whether a democracy has become stable and consolidated betrays
the same majoritarian assumption. Samuel P. Huntington
(1991, 266–67) even proposes a “two-turnover test,” according to
which “a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party
or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of
transition [to democracy] loses a subsequent election and turns
over power to those election winners, and if those election winners
then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later
INTRODUCTION 7
election.” Of the twenty countries with the longest democratic
history analyzed in this book, all of which are undoubtedly stable
and consolidated democratic systems, no fewer than three—
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—fail even the
one-turnover test during the more than sixty years from the late
1940s to 2010, that is, they experienced many cabinet changes
but never a complete turnover, and six—the same three countries
plus Belgium, Finland, and Germany—fail the two-turnover test.
This book will show that pure or almost pure majoritarian democracies
are actually quite rare—limited to the United Kingdom,
New Zealand (until 1996), and the former British colonies
in the Caribbean (but only with regard to the executives-parties
dimension). Most democracies have signi�cant or even predominantly
consensual traits. Moreover, as this book shows, consensus
democracy may be considered more democratic than majoritarian
democracy in most respects.
The ten contrasting characteristics of the two models of democracy,
briefly listed above, are described in a preliminary fashion
and exempli�ed by means of sketches of relatively pure cases of
majoritarian democracy—the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and
Barbados—and of relatively pure cases of consensus democracy—
Switzerland, Belgium, and the European Union—in Chapters 2
and 3. The thirty-six empirical cases of democracy, including the
�ve just mentioned (but not the European Union), that were selected
for the comparative analysis are systematically introduced
in Chapter 4. The ten institutional variables are then analyzed in
greater depth in the nine chapters that comprise the bulk of this
book (Chapters 5 to 13). Chapter 14 summarizes the results and
places the thirty-six democracies on a two-dimensional “conceptual
map” of democracy; it also analyzes shifts on the map over
time and shows that most countries occupy stable positions on the
map. Chapters 15 and 16 ask the “so what?” question: Does the
type of democracy make a difference, especially with regard to
effective policy-making and the quality of democracy? These chapters
show that consensus democracies score signi�cantly higher
8 INTRODUCTION
on a wide array of indicators of democratic quality and that they
also have better records with regard to governing effectiveness,
although the differences in this respect are not as large. Chapter
17 concludes with a look at the policy implications of the book’s
�ndings for democratizing and newly democratic countries.
Chapter 2
The Westminster Model
of Democracy
I
n this book I use the term Westminster model interchangeably
with majoritarian model to refer to a general model of
democracy. It may also be used more narrowly to denote the
main characteristics of British parliamentary and governmental
institutions (G. Wilson 1994; Mahler 1997)—the Parliament of
the United Kingdom meets in the Palace of Westminster in London.
The British version of the Westminster model is both the
original and the best-known example of this model. It is also
widely admired. Richard Rose (1974, 131) points out that, “with
con�dence born of continental isolation, Americans have come
to assume that their institutions—the Presidency, Congress and
the Supreme Court—are the prototype of what should be adopted
elsewhere.” But American political scientists, especially those in
the �eld of comparative politics, have tended to hold the British
system of government in at least equally high esteem (Kavanagh
1974).
One famous political scientist who fervently admired the Westminster
model was President Woodrow Wilson. In his early writings
he went so far as to urge the abolition of presidential government
and the adoption of British-style parliamentary government
9