Frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space

Conflicts in the South Caucasus

Mediating role of the EU and USA, forms of cooperation

Types of the EU involvement Mandate of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia

Role of Russia, specifics of Russian approach Forms of involvement of the UN and OSCE

The European Union started to look for a role in the resolution of the frozen conflicts in the late 1990s.

In 1999, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia entered into force.

Mainly market reforms, the harmonization of national legislation with EU, while the resolution of the conflicts did not feature prominently.

The PCAs only stated that "Dialogue may take place on a regional basis, with a view to contributing towards the resolution of regional conflicts and tensions".

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh were not even mentioned and no concrete guidelines were provided for a comprehensive EU strategy on conflict resolution in the region.

The EU prioritized economic transition in post-Soviet states in the late 1990s and postponed confrontation with the complex challenges posed by unresolved conflicts to a later stage.

During the following decade, Brussels recognized the importance of solving the conflicts, both for the stability of post-Soviet countries and for its own security and strategic interests.

Consequently, the Union attempted to step up its role in the resolution of frozen conflicts.

In July 2003, a Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was appointed.

The EUSR's experience highlighted the gap between the EU's declared aim of playing a major role in conflict resolution in the region and its limited power on the ground.

The Union's weak leverage on the conflicting parties and the lack of coordination between Brussels and its representatives in the conflict regions weakened the EU's position.

These problems were compounded by the lack of internal coherence in the EU when addressing the frozen conflicts.

The member states' diverging interests and priorities, particularly with regard to Russia.

Consequently, the EUSR limited himself to supporting existing mediation efforts, proving that the EU lacked a proactive strategy for conflict resolution.

The EU lacked a proactive strategy for conflict resolution.

This also emerged clearly in the European Security Strategy (ESS), published in December 2003.

The ESS argues that the EU intends to make sure that its neighborhood "is peaceful and well governed".

The document fails to specify a clear strategy to achieve this objective.

It only includes vague statements on "dealing with the older problems of regional conflict" in order to tackle the often elusive new threats. Awakening

Shock that EU was unable to prevent the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 from occurring.

The outbreak of the 2008 war was a failure of dialogue, conflict prevention and early warning, including on part of the EU.

Results were positive changes of EU approach following the Russo-Georgian war.

The EU led the international response to the crisis mediation between the parties

- secured cease fire agreement,
- peace negotiations
- humanitarian assistance and the provision of substantial financial support.

The EU's Presidency at the time, led by President Sarkozy

French President was working with High Representative Solana, acted swiftly to mediate the Georgian-Russian Peace Plan negotiations.

Result was a 6-point agreement which aimed to stop the war and rebuild local confidence.

This was not the end but rather the beginning of the process.

The EU mandating the Special Representative to prepare international talks on security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to represent the EU in such a forum.

Mandate of the EUSR

- To develop contacts with governments, parliaments, other key political actors, the judiciary and civil society in the region;
- to encourage the countries in the region to cooperate on regional themes of common interest, such as common security threats, the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking and organised crime;
- to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in accordance with the principles of international law and to facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close coordination with the United Nations, the OSCE and its Minsk Group.

Mandate of the EUSR

With respect to the crisis in Georgia:

- to help prepare for the international talks (GID), including on arrangements for security and stability in the region, the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, on the basis of internationally recognised principles, and any other subject, by mutual agreement between the parties,
- to help establish the Union's position and represent it, at the level of the EUSR, in these talks.

Geneva discussions

This time the EU was involved at the forefront of the international mediation exercise.

The EU lead, among others, the negotiations with the major stakeholders involved in supporting the 'peace' process.

The format of the Geneva talks was essential to ensuring dialogue.

There have been 33 rounds of talks in Geneva since October 15, 2008.

The format includes the UN, EU and OSCE as mediators.

Meetings also include officials from Russia and the United States, as well as the EUMM.

The governments in-exile of Abkhazia and South Ossetia participate as part of the Georgian delegation.

The de facto authorities are present also.

Geneva discussions main advantage was that through constructive ambiguity it was multilateral and bilateral at the same time.

This allowed for example the US and the EU to hold (in the margin of the main discussions) separate dialogues.

With Russia and Georgia and representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the same framework.

The setup of such negotiations in a relatively short time was a huge achievement.

The discussions were focused on issues of security and humanitarian aid.

GD succeeded in keeping the participants from all parties engaged and was thus an achievement in itself.

The Geneva framework however had serious limits in terms of what it could deliver in conflict transformation.

The Geneva talks are a useful forum to prevent conflict escalation, but not for serious peace-settlement negotiations.

After the recognition by Russia of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU could not expect to have a significant impact on the territorial issue.

Also the EU Political and Security Committee's mandate was not to discuss the status of these territories.

The aim was rather to manage the EU's engagement in security (and indirectly, humanitarian) issues there.

EU Monitoring Mission

The EUMM provided a 'security chapeau' to the entire EU engagement in the field.

This has added a dimension of leverage (albeit not decisive) to mediation and dialogue at other levels.

With a very limited mandate and no access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EUMM succeeded in being perceived as the major guarantor of security vis-à-vis Russia in the area.

Moreover, the EUMM had added value of bringing in a confidence-building component.

Its field presence was and continue to be a major deterrent to possible violations.

Some disappointment expressed by the Georgian population that the EUMM did not represent a more robust security response by the EU.

The EUMM has continued to operate at the demarcation line between Tbilisi's separatist provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rump Georgia.

As a response to the EU's refusal to recognize them, the two secessionist regions have not allowed EUMM to access to their territory.

The EUMM has contributed to stabilize the ceasefire.

The EUMM perspectives were thus offered in the Geneva talks, co-chaired by the EUSR.

The original EUSR for the South Caucasus did not take part in the discussions, but was informed on them.

In addition, representatives of the South Caucasus EUSR and EUMM started to participate in the Delegation coordination meetings.

The existing setup for EU mediation and dialogue in Georgia was not purely framed in a top-down approach.

The room was left for proactive and creative bottom-up alignment among actors of different institutional backgrounds.

The aim was to bring forward initiatives and to ensure increased sensitization and awareness.

The outcomes of this framework were thus very much dependent on the power of initiative of personalities, especially when it came to attitude, visibility and exposure.

This was equally valid for the high-ranking officials; the mandate of the EUSR was a powerful one, and this had to fit the disposition of the person to use it.

The entrepreneurial spirit of single personalities proved to be essential.

They stimulated debate and forwarded the process through a creative, risk-taking.

Innovative approach that avoided the risk of becoming trapped in the EU's bureaucratic confines.

Other European Instruments

Outside of the formal channels for mediation and dialogue.

The EU has been involved in supporting engagement through Instrument for Stability (IfS) - funded initiatives in Abkhazia.

This has been particularly rewarding, especially in terms of the possibility of reaching out to different beneficiaries and promoting mediation and dialogue at a different level.

The IfS is more than just funded projects, but rather a political commitment to engagement including on sensitive issues.

The EU, through the variety of its tools, has been able to access Abkhazia and more delicately also South Ossetia.

In SO through funding of some projects implemented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which constituted a clear cross-border engagement.
The EU's range of capacities and instruments is very well placed to be present at different levels in mediation and dialogue.

Even if these kinds of support activities do not necessarily gain the headlines of the press due to the sensitivity of the politics in these areas.

The EU's ability to deploy different instruments to engage at different levels and in different contexts.

Acknowledged, however, that there is still significant room for improvement.

Non recognition and engagement policy

Proved to be effective in ensuring a common EU orientation.

Could have delivered more coherence if combined with stronger coordination between the different EU capacities deployed in Georgia and also with the Headquarters in Brussels.

Positive developments in the EU 'getting its family in order' have been observed in the post-Lisbon configuration with the different areas of the EU working better together.

In the past Georgia has been a crowded house with stakeholders confused as to 'who speaks for the EU'. Strategic cooperation between different levels was introduced into the inter-institutional modus operandi, allowing more strategic integration.

Personality problems and competition between the EU's major representatives in Georgia have limited in the past the EU effectiveness in mediation and dialogue, at least at the higher levels.

As the EU's relations with Georgia started becoming more strategically planned, the potential for EU leverage on issues such as visas and trade played a role, and coordination began to become more systematic.

This helped to shape a more coherent and effective EU approach to the country.

One of the main lessons learnt from the EU's engagement in Georgia was the progressive realization that when it comes to the EU, the total is always better than the sum of its parts.

That working toward a shared goal must imply a substantial level of cooperation between different institutional capacities.

The practicalities of this are not always easy to operationalize in practice, even if the post-Lisbon setup does offer greater opportunities.

The Council acknowledged this in its Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy.

Reference to the EU's engagement in Georgia as an example of what can be achieved when the EU and its Member States act collectively and with the necessary level of political will.

The EU has attempted to become more involved and claim a role in the resolution of these conflicts.

The appointment of Special Representatives and the deployment of civilian missions in and around the separatist entities.

Action Plans within the framework of the ENP, stipulate priorities for both sides to address the conflicts.

So far, EU policies on the ground have kept a low profile and focused mostly on the monitoring of borders and local economic rehabilitation.

Brussels has not been able to increase its role and implement its ambitious conflict resolution agenda in the region.

This is also due to the EU's lack of leverage in the conflicts and the reluctance of some member states, such as Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Cyprus, to challenge Russia's dominant position.

The EU is currently excluded from negotiations on the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict (FR) and has no influence on internal developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In spite of its declared ambitions, the EU cannot make a significant contribution to the conflict resolution process due to its lack of internal coherence, political will and economic and military leverage.

As a result of these deficiencies, it is highly unlikely that the EU will step up its efforts and play a more prominent role in any of these conflicts in the short and medium term.

In May 2010, the European Parliament adopted a report urging the EU to craft a strategy for the South Caucasus region.

The report "The Need for a Strategy in the South Caucasus" stressed the EU's obligation to be proactive with respect to stabilizing and encouraging the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Since then, the European Parliament held debates on the situation in the regions, but no concrete action followed as a result.

Furthermore, the EU still plays no role in the negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Russia is a country with a vision of its foreign policy goals and interests that, for a range of reasons, is in conflict of those with the western allies.

In recent years, Russia has demonstrated itself not only to have its own set of goals and preferences, but also to have little interest in the rules that the west has established, and that too frequently primarily benefit the west.

The frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space have become one of the instruments in the Kremlin's toolkit to prevent any further eastward expansion of NATO and the EU close to Russia's borders.

Neither the EU nor NATO would accept a new member state that lacks full control over its territory, is involved in internal conflicts with breakaway regions and has Russian troops on its soil.

Russia appears determined to keep its course of assertive, if not aggressive, neighborhood policy, increasingly approved on the part of its own population, notwithstanding sanctions, shrinking economy, obvious economic and political downslides inside the Eurasian Economic Union, and mistrust on the part of its closest allies.

For Russia, the South Caucasus is strategically significant both as an area within the post-Soviet space, which the Kremlin considers a top priority of its foreign policy,

And as a territory bordering with its own troublesome North Caucasian republics, which have recently witnessed secessionist wars, the spread of Islamic terrorism and a deep economic and structural crisis.

The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 provides the best example of the wider geopolitical significance of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

The "de-freezing" and rapid escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was mainly the consequence of US-Russian disputes in the international arena and the direct and indirect intervention of foreign powers in the conflicts.

Russia used its veto to terminate mandates of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for Abkhazia on June 15, 2009 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for South Ossetia (June 30, 2009).

Access of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is blocked by Russia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on August 26, 2008.

It entered into "bilateral" agreements with the newly recognized states signing Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance agreements on September 17, 2008.

Shortly after recognizing the independence of Abkhazia, Russia announced plans to build a naval base there to patrol 215 km of the Abkhazian maritime border.

The port Russia has chosen for that purpose is Ochamchire, which used to host a brigade of Coast Guard and training ships of the Soviet Navy.

Russia has deployed new weapons systems, including attack helicopters, tanks, and offensive rockets where they were not before the war.

Military bases in South Ossetia are manned by approximately 5,000 troops and security personnel. Another 5,000 are based in Abkhazia.

Under the agreements which South Ossetia and Abkhazia have signed with Moscow, Russia has been given a free 99-year lease of land for its new military base in South Ossetia, and a 49-year lease in Abkhazia.

In January 2009, Russia began unilateral demarcation and delimitation of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz borders with Georgia.

reinforcing the ABL

Two new departments have been set up in the Border Guard Service under the Russian FSB – one for Abkhazia, the other for South Ossetia.

The Abkhazia department will be in charge of a 160 km stretch of land border and 215 km of sea border. For this purpose, 20 frontier posts and a Coast Guard unit were created in Abkhazia, with 1,500 border guards.

Another 20 frontier posts were set up in South Ossetia, with over 1,200 border guards. To monitor Georgian military communications and movements.

reinforcing the ABL

Russia began the deployment of its border guards along the new frontier with Georgia immediately after the agreements were signed on May 1, 2009.

The first stage of the deployment in Abkhazia was completed by the end of May, and in South Ossetia by the middle of June 2009.

At present, the border guards are stationed in newly constructed permanent outposts. These outposts are autonomous and enable remote monitoring of the frontier with the help of technology.

The National Security Strategy of the RF to 2020 states that "The main threats to the border-related interests and security of the Russian Federation are the presence and possible escalation of armed conflicts near its state borders [...]"

Emphasizes the risks related to the spillover of illegal activities such as terrorism and arms and drug trafficking from the conflict areas to Russia's bordering regions.

RF continues to refuse to pull back its troops to their prewar locations.

Claims that the ceasefire agreements are no longer valid because of the "new realities" created by diplomatic recognition.

Considerable military importance of stationing Russian border troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Border guards deployed there are well equipped and well trained professional soldiers.

Armed with modern small arms, mortars, light and modern surveillance technology, thermal imagers and radars. They keep Georgian border areas under constant surveillance.

Russian determination to remain in the regions for a long years to come proved by build up of permanent military infrastructure and border guard posts across the ABL.

On the other hand Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are a political and financial drag on Moscow and keep throwing up awkward surprises.

In 2011 the Kremlin couldn't even get its own candidate elected as president of South Ossetia (population 30,000) on the first try.

The recognition of those two territories, not supported by any other major country, has shut down the chances of rapprochement with Georgia, which should have been a far bigger priority.

Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh the Russian position continues to be ambiguous.

In the nineties, Moscow was evidently comfortable with a low intensity conflict.

It kept (i) Yerevan in a state of dependency, (ii) Baku in insecurity, and (iii) competing influences - be it US, EU or other regional powers - at bay.

Nobody can say for sure that this line has changed. As usual, it depends on the balance of forces between the different "power verticals" in Moscow.

According to AZ President Aliyev, President Medvedev has, starting in 2010 up to the Kazan Summit, been sincerely working in favor of a solution, leading to some tense moments between him and MFA Lavrov.

V. Putin has been advocating a more pro-Armenian line since early 2010, possibly inspired by considerations related to negotiations of the agreement covering the future presence of the Russian military base in Armenia (Gyumri).

Russian and Armenian Armed Forces are to a certain extent integrated and Russia being the main arms provider of Yerevan.

The Russian military base in Gyumri was deployed on the territory of Armenia as early as 1996 (before that, the installation was still known as the 127th MRD of the Soviet Ground Forces).

In 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a far-reaching friendship treaty, which calls for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat to either party and allows Russian border guards to patrol Armenia's frontiers with Turkey and Iran.

The new Russian-Armenian agreement signed in August 2010, extended Russian military presence in Armenia until 2044.
The Russian FSB Border Service is in charge of Armenia's external CIS land borders with Turkey and Iran.

Russia was also very concerned about the risk of resumption of hostilities particularly before and during the Sochi Olympics.

Russia tries to shape dangerous situation around Nagorno Karabakh, but does not pull the strings.

Overall, Moscow has a strategic interest in resolving the conflict and has sometimes played the role of responsible peacemaker — most recently through the mediation of Dmitry Medvedev in 2011. But it has also periodically used the conflict to win tactical advantages over both Armenia and Azerbaijan and to keep a foothold in the South Caucasus.

During the 1990s war Russia played for both sides before assisting the Armenians in the last phase of the conflict.

More recently, Russia has reinforced its long-term alliance with Armenia, signing a new lease on the Gyumri military base that lasts until 2044 and inviting Yerevan into the Eurasian Union.

Simultaneously, it has grown closer to Azerbaijan and has started to sell the country heavy weaponry.

Alongside France and the United States, Russia is one of three mediators in the conflict, in the socalled Minsk Group of the OSCE.

Recently the Minsk Group has become a conflict management exercise, with little ambition or ability to achieve a full resolution of the conflict.

The quarrel between Russia and the West over Ukraine has further enervated the peace process and darkened the mood. As in Syria, they may share several goals but evidently have different ideas about how to achieve them — and very little trust in one another.

The important point is that Moscow cannot enforce its will in either country, especially on an issue as vital to national interest as Karabakh. Yet by selling weapons to each side and trying to play each against the other, Russia is destabilizing the peace its mediators made in 1994.

Russia's behavior makes it hard to stop escalation of incidents from occurring — but no one else currently has much capacity to stop that nightmare scenario either.



Why should the United States be concerned about Georgia's security, stability and sovereignty?

The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains volatile with detentions, killings, arson, and bombings occurring across the ABLs.

Deadly attacks combined with creeping annexation could spiral out of control.

A resumption of hostilities between Georgia and Russia would further negatively affect U.S.-Russia relations.

The status quo institutionalize a high level of instability, it sets a negative precedent by condoning the use of force to settle disputes and redraw territorial boundaries.

Accepting Russia's claim on spheres of influences contributes to neo-imperialist tendencies with potential impact on other countries in the region.

Leaving Abkhazia and South Ossetia in limbo creates black spots on the map.

South Ossetia is a center for organized crime and a trafficking hub.

There are also reports of nuclear materials from countries in the former Soviet Union being smuggled via Abkhazia.

Allowing any signatory to the Six-Point Cease-Fire Agreement to abuse its commitments is a negative example to parties in other conflict zones that enter into agreements to end violent conflict.

Failure to implement the agreement makes the European Union (EU) look weak, incapable, or insincere. Continuing confrontation between Russia and Georgia postpones indefinitely Georgia's NATO and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Georgia is a strong ally of the United States, with more than 1,000 troops in NATO's ISAF for Afghanistan.

U.S. credibility will be undermined by the failure to resolve Georgia's conflicts within its internationally recognized borders.

Preventing a renewal of hostilities between Russia and Georgia is the top priority.

To this end, the international community should call upon Russia to withdraw its armed forces from occupied territories in Georgia.

It should seek greater transparency of Russia's military activities in the conflict zones and expanded access by the EUMM.

The way forward involves gradually transforming the conflict through engagement between Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians.

Engagement will gradually build trust and foster reconciliation, while weaning Abkhaz and South Ossetians from Russia's control.

Regional economic development benefiting Georgia, Russia and the breakaway regions would establish a web of shared interests.

This report proposes specific transactions such as an Enguri Sand and Gravel Export Project; whose materials could be used for construction of facilities at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.

The restoration of agro-industries along the ABL, including tea plantations and processing facilities on both sides of the Enguri River as well as citrus and hazelnut production, would co-mingle populations and derive mutual benefit.

Restrictions on international air and sea connections to Abkhazia, especially ferry links to Turkey, should be relaxed.

The UN continues to have a strong position in the South Caucasus even though UNOMIG, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, was disbanded in summer 2009.

The UN had to discontinue the mission subsequent to the war that took place in Georgia in August 2008. The UN has an important role particularly in Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

Antti Turunen

United Nations representative to the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the international discussions in Geneva on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

The office of the Representative is located in Geneva, but his duties involve regular visits to the region. Turunen succeeds Johan Verbeke of Belgium.

Together with the EU and the OSCE, the Representative of the Secretary General chairs the Geneva international discussions on the conflicts in Georgia.

The Representative maintains regular contacts with the parties to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and key stakeholders.

The OSCE remains a key partner and platform for the EU in the South Caucasus.

The OSCE also has an important role in the conflicts resolution and mediation.

The clearest example of where the OSCE and the EU cooperate closely is in the Geneva talks where both organizations along with the UN co-chair the discussions, as well as the Minsk Group negotiations.

There is untapped potential for further involvement of the EU with the Nagorno-Karabakh file and support to the Minsk Group.

regarding Georgia

The OSCE, together with the UN and EU, co-chairs the international Geneva Discussions in the wake of the conflict in Georgia (the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-office for the South Caucasus).

It also, with EUMM, co-facilitates the meetings of the Dvani/Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) dealing with matters that affect the daily life of populations on the ground.

regarding Nagorno Karabakh

The so-called Minsk Group mediates the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh.

The presidents of France, Russia and the US have since 1997 been co-chairs of this group.

regarding Nagorno Karabakh

The Minsk Group's Co-Chairs (ambassadors level) visit the region regularly to conduct high-level talks with the parties to the conflict, and hold meetings with the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and the Minsk Group members to brief them on the process.

They are mandated to provide an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in the way of assuring the negotiation process; to obtain conclusion by the Parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict in order to permit the convening of the Minsk Conference; and to promote the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces.

For the sixths year in a row the three presidents of the Minsk Group have urged that there be "no delay" in implementing a peace agreement for Nagorno Karabakh.

According o them "Further delay would only call into question the commitment of the sides to reach an agreement." Conclusions

For the EU the main goal continued to be achieving international security arrangements and taking Russia on board in Non-Use of Force pledge. NUF is a key and the most difficult issue.

Another important issue is pressing Russia for more security and military transparency and approval of De factos to include visits of the head of EUMM to breakaway regions. The way forward involves gradually transforming the conflict through engagement between Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians.

Engagement will gradually build trust and foster reconciliation, while weaning Abkhaz and South Ossetians from Russia's control.

In order to play a more active role in these conflicts, the EU needs a coherent "Eastern Neighbourhood Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy", clearly defining its interests, a common strategy and concrete road maps for implementation.

The strategy should reiterate the EU's commitment to territorial integrity under international law, but simultaneously offer guidelines for an increased dialogue and cooperation with the separatist entities. With regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU needs to define a consistent and coherent policy that applies to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly on the issue of reconciling the principles of self-determination of peoples and states' territorial integrity.

The current ENP Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan are contradictory in this respect. The EU should also make sure that it gains direct access to the negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group, either by taking over France's seat or at least by acquiring observer status. Questions ?

Thank You !



Tools solving the frozen conflicts - Conflict in Georgia

Geneva International discussions (GID) preparation of individual rounds, trips to the region, composition of the negotiating teams, setting goals for each round of the GID and the main objectives for the next period

Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) examples of response to concrete security and humanitarian situation at place, impact on stabilizing the situation

The EU civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia genesis and its basic objectives the experience of previous work