Frozen conflicts
in the post-Soviet space
1
Mediating role of the EU and USA,
forms of cooperation
Types of the EU involvement
Mandate of the EU Special Representative for the
South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
Role of Russia, specifics of Russian approach
Forms of involvement of the UN and OSCE
2
Conflicts in the South Caucasus
Role of the EU
3
The European Union started to look for a role in the
resolution of the frozen conflicts in the late 1990s.
In 1999, the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia entered into force.
Mainly market reforms, the harmonization of
national legislation with EU, while the resolution of
the conflicts did not feature prominently.
4
Role of the EU
The PCAs only stated that “Dialogue may take place
on a regional basis, with a view to contributing
towards the resolution of regional conflicts and
tensions”.
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh
were not even mentioned and no concrete
guidelines were provided for a comprehensive EU
strategy on conflict resolution in the region.
5
Role of the EU
The EU prioritized economic transition in postSoviet
states in the late 1990s and postponed
confrontation with the complex challenges posed
by unresolved conflicts to a later stage.
During the following decade, Brussels recognized
the importance of solving the conflicts, both for the
stability of post-Soviet countries and for its own
security and strategic interests.
6
Role of the EU
Consequently, the Union attempted to step up its
role in the resolution of frozen conflicts.
In July 2003, a Special Representative (EUSR) for
the South Caucasus was appointed.
7
Role of the EU
The EUSR’s experience highlighted the gap between
the EU’s declared aim of playing a major role in
conflict resolution in the region and its limited
power on the ground.
The Union’s weak leverage on the conflicting
parties and the lack of coordination between
Brussels and its representatives in the conflict
regions weakened the EU’s position.
8
Role of the EU
These problems were compounded by the lack of
internal coherence in the EU when addressing the frozen
conflicts.
The member states’ diverging interests and priorities,
particularly with regard to Russia.
Consequently, the EUSR limited himself to supporting
existing mediation efforts, proving that the EU lacked a
proactive strategy for conflict resolution.
9
Role of the EU
The EU lacked a proactive strategy for conflict
resolution.
This also emerged clearly in the European Security
Strategy (ESS), published in December 2003.
The ESS argues that the EU intends to make sure
that its neighborhood „is peaceful and well
governed“.
10
Role of the EU
The document fails to specify a clear strategy to
achieve this objective.
It only includes vague statements on “dealing with
the older problems of regional conflict” in order to
tackle the often elusive new threats.
11
Role of the EU
Awakening
12
Shock that EU was unable to prevent the RussoGeorgian
war in 2008 from occurring.
The outbreak of the 2008 war was a failure of
dialogue, conflict prevention and early warning,
including on part of the EU.
Results were positive changes of EU approach
following the Russo-Georgian war.
13
Role of the EU
The EU led the international response to the crisis
mediation between the parties
• secured cease fire agreement,
• peace negotiations
• humanitarian assistance and the provision of
substantial financial support.
14
Role of the EU
The EU’s Presidency at the time, led by President
Sarkozy
French President was working with High
Representative Solana, acted swiftly to mediate the
Georgian-Russian Peace Plan negotiations.
Result was a 6-point agreement which aimed to stop
the war and rebuild local confidence.
15
Role of the EU
This was not the end but rather the beginning of
the process.
The EU mandating the Special Representative to
prepare international talks on security in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to represent the EU in
such a forum.
16
Role of the EU
• To develop contacts with governments, parliaments, other
key political actors, the judiciary and civil society in
the region;
• to encourage the countries in the region to cooperate on
regional themes of common interest, such as common
security threats, the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking
and organised crime;
• to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in
accordance with the principles of international law and to
facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close
coordination with the United Nations, the OSCE and its
Minsk Group. 17
Role of the EU
Mandate of the EUSR
With respect to the crisis in Georgia:
• to help prepare for the international talks (GID),
including on arrangements for security and stability
in the region, the issue of refugees and internally
displaced persons, on the basis of internationally
recognised principles, and any other subject, by
mutual agreement between the parties,
• to help establish the Union's position and represent
it, at the level of the EUSR, in these talks.
18
Role of the EU
Mandate of the EUSR
Geneva discussions
19
This time the EU was involved at the forefront of
the international mediation exercise.
The EU lead, among others, the negotiations with
the major stakeholders involved in supporting the
‘peace’ process.
The format of the Geneva talks was essential to
ensuring dialogue.
20
Role of the EU
There have been 33 rounds of talks in Geneva since
October 15, 2008.
The format includes the UN, EU and OSCE as
mediators.
Meetings also include officials from Russia and the
United States, as well as the EUMM.
The governments in-exile of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia participate as part of the Georgian
delegation.
The de facto authorities are present also.
21
Role of the EU
Geneva discussions main advantage was that
through constructive ambiguity it was multilateral
and bilateral at the same time.
This allowed for example the US and the EU to hold
(in the margin of the main discussions) separate
dialogues.
With Russia and Georgia and representatives of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the same
framework.
22
Role of the EU
The setup of such negotiations in a relatively short
time was a huge achievement.
The discussions were focused on issues of security
and humanitarian aid.
GD succeeded in keeping the participants from all
parties engaged and was thus an achievement in
itself.
23
Role of the EU
The Geneva framework however had serious limits
in terms of what it could deliver in conflict
transformation.
The Geneva talks are a useful forum to prevent
conflict escalation, but not for serious peacesettlement
negotiations.
24
Role of the EU
After the recognition by Russia of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, the EU could not expect to have a
significant impact on the territorial issue.
Also the EU Political and Security Committee’s
mandate was not to discuss the status of these
territories.
The aim was rather to manage the EU’s engagement
in security (and indirectly, humanitarian) issues
there.
25
Role of the EU
EU Monitoring Mission
26
The EUMM provided a ‘security chapeau’ to the
entire EU engagement in the field.
This has added a dimension of leverage (albeit not
decisive) to mediation and dialogue at other levels.
With a very limited mandate and no access to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EUMM succeeded
in being perceived as the major guarantor of
security vis-à-vis Russia in the area.
27
Role of the EU
Moreover, the EUMM had added value of bringing
in a confidence-building component.
Its field presence was and continue to be a major
deterrent to possible violations.
Some disappointment expressed by the Georgian
population that the EUMM did not represent a
more robust security response by the EU.
28
Role of the EU
The EUMM has continued to operate at the
demarcation line between Tbilisi’s separatist
provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rump
Georgia.
As a response to the EU’s refusal to recognize them,
the two secessionist regions have not allowed
EUMM to access to their territory.
The EUMM has contributed to stabilize the
ceasefire.
29
Role of the EU
The EUMM perspectives were thus offered in the
Geneva talks, co-chaired by the EUSR.
The original EUSR for the South Caucasus did not
take part in the discussions, but was informed on
them.
In addition, representatives of the South Caucasus
EUSR and EUMM started to participate in the
Delegation coordination meetings.
30
Role of the EU
The existing setup for EU mediation and dialogue
in Georgia was not purely framed in a top-down
approach.
The room was left for proactive and creative
bottom-up alignment among actors of different
institutional backgrounds.
The aim was to bring forward initiatives and to
ensure increased sensitization and awareness.
31
Role of the EU
The outcomes of this framework were thus very
much dependent on the power of initiative of
personalities, especially when it came to attitude,
visibility and exposure.
This was equally valid for the high-ranking officials;
the mandate of the EUSR was a powerful one, and
this had to fit the disposition of the person to use it.
32
Role of the EU
The entrepreneurial spirit of single personalities
proved to be essential.
They stimulated debate and forwarded the process
through a creative, risk-taking.
Innovative approach that avoided the risk of
becoming trapped in the EU’s bureaucratic
confines.
33
Role of the EU
Other European
Instruments
34
Outside of the formal channels for mediation and
dialogue.
The EU has been involved in supporting
engagement through Instrument for Stability (IfS) funded
initiatives in Abkhazia.
This has been particularly rewarding, especially in
terms of the possibility of reaching out to different
beneficiaries and promoting mediation and
dialogue at a different level.
35
Role of the EU
The IfS is more than just funded projects, but rather
a political commitment to engagement including
on sensitive issues.
The EU, through the variety of its tools, has been
able to access Abkhazia and more delicately also
South Ossetia.
In SO through funding of some projects
implemented by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which constituted a
clear cross-border engagement.
36
Role of the EU
The EU’s range of capacities and instruments is very
well placed to be present at different levels in
mediation and dialogue.
Even if these kinds of support activities do not
necessarily gain the headlines of the press due to
the sensitivity of the politics in these areas.
37
Role of the EU
The EU’s ability to deploy different instruments to
engage at different levels and in different contexts.
Acknowledged, however, that there is still
significant room for improvement.
38
Role of the EU
Non recognition and
engagement policy
39
Proved to be effective in ensuring a common EU
orientation.
Could have delivered more coherence if combined
with stronger coordination between the different
EU capacities deployed in Georgia and also with the
Headquarters in Brussels.
40
Role of the EU
Positive developments in the EU ‘getting its family
in order’ have been observed in the post-Lisbon
configuration with the different areas of the EU
working better together.
In the past Georgia has been a crowded house with
stakeholders confused as to ‘who speaks for the EU’.
Strategic cooperation between different levels was
introduced into the inter-institutional modus
operandi, allowing more strategic integration.
41
Role of the EU
Personality problems and competition between the EU’s
major representatives in Georgia have limited in the past
the EU effectiveness in mediation and dialogue, at least
at the higher levels.
As the EU’s relations with Georgia started becoming
more strategically planned, the potential for EU leverage
on issues such as visas and trade played a role, and
coordination began to become more systematic.
This helped to shape a more coherent and effective EU
approach to the country.
42
Role of the EU
One of the main lessons learnt from the EU’s
engagement in Georgia was the progressive
realization that when it comes to the EU, the total is
always better than the sum of its parts.
That working toward a shared goal must imply a
substantial level of cooperation between different
institutional capacities.
The practicalities of this are not always easy to
operationalize in practice, even if the post-Lisbon
setup does offer greater opportunities.
43
Role of the EU
The Council acknowledged this in its Report on the
Implementation of the European Security Strategy.
Reference to the EU’s engagement in Georgia as an
example of what can be achieved when the EU and
its Member States act collectively and with the
necessary level of political will.
44
Role of the EU
The EU has attempted to become more involved
and claim a role in the resolution of these conflicts.
The appointment of Special Representatives and
the deployment of civilian missions in and around
the separatist entities.
Action Plans within the framework of the ENP,
stipulate priorities for both sides to address the
conflicts.
45
Role of the EU
So far, EU policies on the ground have kept a low
profile and focused mostly on the monitoring of
borders and local economic rehabilitation.
Brussels has not been able to increase its role and
implement its ambitious conflict resolution agenda
in the region.
46
Role of the EU
This is also due to the EU’s lack of leverage in the
conflicts and the reluctance of some member states,
such as Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Greece and
Cyprus, to challenge Russia’s dominant position.
The EU is currently excluded from negotiations on
the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict (FR) and has no
influence on internal developments in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
47
Role of the EU
In spite of its declared ambitions, the EU cannot
make a significant contribution to the conflict
resolution process due to its lack of internal
coherence, political will and economic and military
leverage.
As a result of these deficiencies, it is highly unlikely
that the EU will step up its efforts and play a more
prominent role in any of these conflicts in the short
and medium term.
48
Role of the EU
In May 2010, the European Parliament adopted a
report urging the EU to craft a strategy for the
South Caucasus region.
The report “The Need for a Strategy in the South
Caucasus” stressed the EU’s obligation to be
proactive with respect to stabilizing and
encouraging the development of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
49
Role of the EU
Since then, the European Parliament held debates
on the situation in the regions, but no concrete
action followed as a result.
Furthermore, the EU still plays no role in the
negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group for the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
50
Role of the EU
Role of Russia
51
Russia is a country with a vision of its foreign
policy goals and interests that, for a range of
reasons, is in conflict of those with the
western allies.
In recent years, Russia has demonstrated itself
not only to have its own set of goals and
preferences, but also to have little interest in
the rules that the west has established, and
that too frequently primarily benefit the west.
52
Role of Russia
The frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space have
become one of the instruments in the Kremlin’s
toolkit to prevent any further eastward expansion of
NATO and the EU close to Russia’s borders.
Neither the EU nor NATO would accept a new
member state that lacks full control over its
territory, is involved in internal conflicts with
breakaway regions and has Russian troops on its
soil.
53
Role of Russia
Russia appears determined to keep its course of
assertive, if not aggressive, neighborhood policy,
increasingly approved on the part of its own
population, notwithstanding sanctions, shrinking
economy, obvious economic and political
downslides inside the Eurasian Economic Union,
and mistrust on the part of its closest allies.
54
Role of Russia
For Russia, the South Caucasus is strategically
significant both as an area within the post-Soviet
space, which the Kremlin considers a top priority of
its foreign policy,
And as a territory bordering with its own
troublesome North Caucasian republics, which
have recently witnessed secessionist wars, the
spread of Islamic terrorism and a deep economic
and structural crisis.
55
Role of Russia
The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 provides
the best example of the wider geopolitical
significance of the frozen conflicts in the postSoviet
space.
The “de-freezing” and rapid escalation of the
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was mainly
the consequence of US-Russian disputes in the
international arena and the direct and indirect
intervention of foreign powers in the conflicts.
56
Role of Russia
Russia used its veto to terminate mandates of the
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) for Abkhazia on June 15, 2009 and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) for South Ossetia (June 30, 2009).
Access of the European Union Monitoring Mission
(EUMM) is blocked by Russia and the de facto
authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
57
Role of Russia
Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states on August 26, 2008.
It entered into “bilateral” agreements with the
newly recognized states signing Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance agreements on
September 17, 2008.
58
Role of Russia
Shortly after recognizing the independence of Abkhazia,
Russia announced plans to build a naval base there to
patrol 215 km of the Abkhazian maritime border.
The port Russia has chosen for that purpose is
Ochamchire, which used to host a brigade of Coast Guard
and training ships of the Soviet Navy.
59
Role of Russia
Russia has deployed new weapons systems,
including attack helicopters, tanks, and offensive
rockets where they were not before the war.
Military bases in South Ossetia are manned by
approximately 5,000 troops and security personnel.
Another 5,000 are based in Abkhazia.
60
Role of Russia
Under the agreements which South Ossetia and
Abkhazia have signed with Moscow, Russia has
been given a free 99-year lease of land for its new
military base in South Ossetia, and a 49-year lease
in Abkhazia.
In January 2009, Russia began unilateral
demarcation and delimitation of the South
Ossetian and Abkhaz borders with Georgia.
61
Role of Russia
Two new departments have been set up in the Border
Guard Service under the Russian FSB – one for Abkhazia,
the other for South Ossetia.
The Abkhazia department will be in charge of a 160 km
stretch of land border and 215 km of sea border. For this
purpose, 20 frontier posts and a Coast Guard unit were
created in Abkhazia, with 1,500 border guards.
Another 20 frontier posts were set up in South Ossetia,
with over 1,200 border guards. To monitor Georgian
military communications and movements.
62
Role of Russia
reinforcing the ABL
Russia began the deployment of its border guards along
the new frontier with Georgia immediately after the
agreements were signed on May 1, 2009.
The first stage of the deployment in Abkhazia was
completed by the end of May, and in South Ossetia by the
middle of June 2009.
At present, the border guards are stationed in newly
constructed permanent outposts. These outposts are
autonomous and enable remote monitoring of the frontier
with the help of technology.
63
Role of Russia
reinforcing the ABL
The National Security Strategy of the RF to 2020
states that “The main threats to the border-related
interests and security of the Russian Federation are
the presence and possible escalation of armed
conflicts near its state borders […]”
Emphasizes the risks related to the spillover of
illegal activities such as terrorism and arms and
drug trafficking from the conflict areas to Russia’s
bordering regions.
64
Role of Russia
RF continues to refuse to pull back its troops to
their prewar locations.
Claims that the ceasefire agreements are no longer
valid because of the “new realities” created by
diplomatic recognition.
65
Role of Russia
Considerable military importance of stationing Russian
border troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Border guards deployed there are well equipped and well
trained professional soldiers.
Armed with modern small arms, mortars, light and
modern surveillance technology, thermal imagers and
radars. They keep Georgian border areas under constant
surveillance.
66
Role of Russia
Russian determination to remain in the regions for a long
years to come proved by build up of permanent military
infrastructure and border guard posts across the ABL.
On the other hand Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are a
political and financial drag on Moscow and keep throwing
up awkward surprises.
67
Role of Russia
In 2011 the Kremlin couldn’t even get its own candidate
elected as president of South Ossetia (population 30,000)
on the first try.
The recognition of those two territories, not supported by
any other major country, has shut down the chances of
rapprochement with Georgia, which should have been a
far bigger priority.
68
Role of Russia
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh the Russian position
continues to be ambiguous.
In the nineties, Moscow was evidently comfortable
with a low intensity conflict.
It kept (i) Yerevan in a state of dependency, (ii)
Baku in insecurity, and (iii) competing influences be
it US, EU or other regional powers - at bay.
69
Role of Russia
Nobody can say for sure that this line has changed. As
usual, it depends on the balance of forces between the
different "power verticals" in Moscow.
According to AZ President Aliyev, President Medvedev
has, starting in 2010 up to the Kazan Summit, been
sincerely working in favor of a solution, leading to some
tense moments between him and MFA Lavrov.
70
Role of Russia
V. Putin has been advocating a more pro-Armenian
line since early 2010, possibly inspired by
considerations related to negotiations of the
agreement covering the future presence of the
Russian military base in Armenia (Gyumri).
Russian and Armenian Armed Forces are to a
certain extent integrated and Russia being the main
arms provider of Yerevan.
71
Role of Russia
The Russian military base in Gyumri was deployed on the
territory of Armenia as early as 1996 (before that, the
installation was still known as the 127th MRD of the Soviet
Ground Forces).
In 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a far-reaching
friendship treaty, which calls for mutual assistance in the
event of a military threat to either party and allows
Russian border guards to patrol Armenia’s frontiers with
Turkey and Iran.
The new Russian-Armenian agreement signed in August
2010, extended Russian military presence in Armenia until
2044.
72
Role of Russia
The Russian FSB Border Service is in charge of
Armenia’s external CIS land borders with Turkey
and Iran.
Russia was also very concerned about the risk of
resumption of hostilities particularly before and
during the Sochi Olympics.
73
Role of Russia
Russia tries to shape dangerous situation around
Nagorno Karabakh, but does not pull the strings.
Overall, Moscow has a strategic interest in resolving
the conflict and has sometimes played the role of
responsible peacemaker — most recently through
the mediation of Dmitry Medvedev in 2011. But it
has also periodically used the conflict to win
tactical advantages over both Armenia and
Azerbaijan and to keep a foothold in the South
Caucasus.
74
Role of Russia
During the 1990s war Russia played for both sides
before assisting the Armenians in the last phase of
the conflict.
More recently, Russia has reinforced its long-term
alliance with Armenia, signing a new lease on the
Gyumri military base that lasts until 2044 and
inviting Yerevan into the Eurasian Union.
Simultaneously, it has grown closer to Azerbaijan
and has started to sell the country heavy weaponry.
75
Role of Russia
Alongside France and the United States, Russia is
one of three mediators in the conflict, in the socalled
Minsk Group of the OSCE.
Recently the Minsk Group has become a conflict
management exercise, with little ambition or ability
to achieve a full resolution of the conflict.
76
Role of Russia
The quarrel between Russia and the West over
Ukraine has further enervated the peace process
and darkened the mood. As in Syria, they may share
several goals but evidently have different ideas
about how to achieve them — and very little trust in
one another.
77
Role of Russia
The important point is that Moscow cannot enforce
its will in either country, especially on an issue as
vital to national interest as Karabakh. Yet by selling
weapons to each side and trying to play each against
the other, Russia is destabilizing the peace its
mediators made in 1994.
Russia’s behavior makes it hard to stop escalation of
incidents from occurring — but no one else
currently has much capacity to stop that nightmare
scenario either.
78
Role of Russia
Role of the USA
79
Why should the United States be concerned about
Georgia’s security, stability and sovereignty?
The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
remains volatile with detentions, killings, arson,
and bombings occurring across the ABLs.
80
Role of the USA
Deadly attacks combined with creeping annexation
could spiral out of control.
A resumption of hostilities between Georgia and
Russia would further negatively affect U.S.-Russia
relations.
The status quo institutionalize a high level of
instability, it sets a negative precedent by
condoning the use of force to settle disputes and
redraw territorial boundaries.
81
Role of the USA
Accepting Russia’s claim on spheres of influences
contributes to neo-imperialist tendencies with
potential impact on other countries in the region.
Leaving Abkhazia and South Ossetia in limbo
creates black spots on the map.
South Ossetia is a center for organized crime and a
trafficking hub.
82
Role of the USA
There are also reports of nuclear materials from
countries in the former Soviet Union being
smuggled via Abkhazia.
Allowing any signatory to the Six-Point Cease-Fire
Agreement to abuse its commitments is a negative
example to parties in other conflict zones that enter
into agreements to end violent conflict.
83
Role of the USA
Failure to implement the agreement makes the
European Union (EU) look weak, incapable, or
insincere. Continuing confrontation between
Russia and Georgia postpones indefinitely Georgia’s
NATO and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Georgia is a strong ally of the United States, with
more than 1,000 troops in NATO’s ISAF for
Afghanistan.
84
Role of the USA
U.S. credibility will be undermined by the failure to
resolve Georgia’s conflicts within its internationally
recognized borders.
85
Role of the USA
Preventing a renewal of hostilities between Russia
and Georgia is the top priority.
To this end, the international community should
call upon Russia to withdraw its armed forces from
occupied territories in Georgia.
It should seek greater transparency of Russia’s
military activities in the conflict zones and
expanded access by the EUMM.
86
Role of the USA
The way forward involves gradually transforming
the conflict through engagement between
Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians.
Engagement will gradually build trust and foster
reconciliation, while weaning Abkhaz and South
Ossetians from Russia’s control.
87
Role of the USA
Regional economic development benefiting
Georgia, Russia and the breakaway regions would
establish a web of shared interests.
This report proposes specific transactions such as
an Enguri Sand and Gravel Export Project; whose
materials could be used for construction of facilities
at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics.
88
Role of the USA
The restoration of agro-industries along the ABL,
including tea plantations and processing facilities
on both sides of the Enguri River as well as citrus
and hazelnut production, would co-mingle
populations and derive mutual benefit.
Restrictions on international air and sea
connections to Abkhazia, especially ferry links to
Turkey, should be relaxed.
89
Role of the USA
Role of the UN
90
The UN continues to have a strong position in the
South Caucasus even though UNOMIG, the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, was
disbanded in summer 2009.
The UN had to discontinue the mission subsequent
to the war that took place in Georgia in August
2008. The UN has an important role particularly in
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.
91
Role of the UN
Antti Turunen
United Nations representative to the Joint Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism and the
international discussions in Geneva on security and
stability and the return of internally displaced
persons and refugees.
The office of the Representative is located in
Geneva, but his duties involve regular visits to the
region. Turunen succeeds Johan Verbeke of
Belgium.
92
Role of the UN
Together with the EU and the OSCE, the
Representative of the Secretary General chairs the
Geneva international discussions on the conflicts in
Georgia.
The Representative maintains regular contacts with
the parties to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and key
stakeholders.
93
Role of the UN
Role of the OSCE
94
The OSCE remains a key partner and platform for
the EU in the South Caucasus.
The OSCE also has an important role in the
conflicts resolution and mediation.
95
Role of the OSCE
The clearest example of where the OSCE and the
EU cooperate closely is in the Geneva talks where
both organizations along with the UN co-chair the
discussions, as well as the Minsk Group
negotiations.
There is untapped potential for further involvement
of the EU with the Nagorno-Karabakh file and
support to the Minsk Group.
96
Role of the OSCE
The OSCE, together with the UN and EU, co-chairs the
international Geneva Discussions in the wake of the
conflict in Georgia (the Special Representative of the
OSCE Chairperson-in-office for the South Caucasus).
It also, with EUMM, co-facilitates the meetings of the
Dvani/Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism (IPRM) dealing with matters that affect the
daily life of populations on the ground.
97
Role of the OSCE
regarding Georgia
The so-called Minsk Group mediates the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno
Karabakh.
The presidents of France, Russia and the US have
since 1997 been co-chairs of this group.
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Role of the OSCE
regarding Nagorno Karabakh
The Minsk Group’s Co-Chairs (ambassadors level) visit the
region regularly to conduct high-level talks with the parties
to the conflict, and hold meetings with the OSCE
Chairperson-in-Office and the Minsk Group members to
brief them on the process.
They are mandated to provide an appropriate framework for
conflict resolution in the way of assuring the negotiation
process; to obtain conclusion by the Parties of an agreement
on the cessation of the armed conflict in order to permit the
convening of the Minsk Conference; and to promote the
peace process by deploying OSCE multinational
peacekeeping forces.
99
Role of the OSCE
regarding Nagorno Karabakh
For the sixths year in a row the three presidents of
the Minsk Group have urged that there be “no
delay” in implementing a peace agreement for
Nagorno Karabakh.
According o them “Further delay would only call
into question the commitment of the sides to reach
an agreement.”
100
Role of the OSCE
Conclusions
101
For the EU the main goal continued to be
achieving international security arrangements
and taking Russia on board in Non-Use of
Force pledge. NUF is a key and the most
difficult issue.
Another important issue is pressing Russia for
more security and military transparency and
approval of De factos to include visits of the
head of EUMM to breakaway regions.
. 102
The way forward involves gradually transforming
the conflict through engagement between
Georgians, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians.
Engagement will gradually build trust and foster
reconciliation, while weaning Abkhaz and South
Ossetians from Russia’s control.
103
In order to play a more active role in these conflicts,
the EU needs a coherent “Eastern Neighbourhood
Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy”,
clearly defining its interests, a common strategy
and concrete road maps for implementation.
The strategy should reiterate the EU’s commitment
to territorial integrity under international law, but
simultaneously offer guidelines for an increased
dialogue and cooperation with the separatist
entities.
104
With regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the
EU needs to define a consistent and coherent policy
that applies to both Armenia and Azerbaijan,
particularly on the issue of reconciling the
principles of self-determination of peoples and
states’ territorial integrity.
The current ENP Action Plans with Armenia and
Azerbaijan are contradictory in this respect. The EU
should also make sure that it gains direct access to
the negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group, either
by taking over France’s seat or at least by acquiring
observer status.
105
Questions ?
106
Thank You !
107
Tools solving the frozen conflicts - Conflict in Georgia
Geneva International discussions (GID)
preparation of individual rounds, trips to the region, composition
of the negotiating teams, setting goals for each round of the GID
and the main objectives for the next period
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)
examples of response to concrete security and humanitarian
situation at place, impact on stabilizing the situation
The EU civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia
genesis and its basic objectives the experience of previous work
108
The next lecture
October 30, 2015