Frozen conflicts
in the post-Soviet space
1
November 13, 2015
2
October 30, 2015
Conflict in Georgia, tools to use for mediation
Geneva International discussions, participants,
preparation of individual rounds, trips to the
region
Setting goals for each round of the Geneva
international discussions, main topics and
objectives
Frozen conflicts
3
November 13, 2015
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, mediation tools
The role of the OSCE Minsk group
The role of the EUSR in Nagorno Karabakh
mediation
AZ and AM approaches
Frozen conflicts
4
The NK conflict led to hostilities in 1988. Full-scale
fighting erupted in 1992 and came to an end after a
ceasefire was agreed upon in 1994.
The ceasefire left ethnic Armenian forces in control of
most of the former Soviet NK Autonomous Oblast
(district).
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The most of the seven Azerbaijani districts
surrounding NK remain occupied, thousands of
refugees
AM side benefiting from territorial continuity
between Armenia and Karabakh
Gaining a large stretch of the Iranian-Azerbaijani
border.
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6
7
Azerbaijan only retains a small part in the East and
the North East corner of the former Autonomous
Oblast
AZ expelled the ethnic Armenian population from
villages north of NK, as well as from other parts of
Azerbaijan, most notably Baku.
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8
The active phase of hostilities ended after a Russiansponsored
ceasefire agreement in 1994. The RF was to a
certain extent instrumental in the conquest. The 1993 marks
a turn in RF military policy in the Caucasus, as the Army
became more powerful following their support to former
President Yeltsin.
This consolidated Armenian control of conquered
Azerbaijani territory.
In both countries, political legitimacy was also consolidated
vis-a-vis the conflict.
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9
Consolidation in Armenia, followed after the Prime
Minister Sargsyan, together with several ministers and
MPs, was killed in a shootout in the Armenian
Parliament in 1999.
The aim of this bloodshed was to prevent adoption of the
American-led Minsk Group compromise proposal based
on an exchange of territory.
Karabakh-Armenians and security services have, since
then, held political power in Yerevan.
Frozen conflicts
10
On the AZ side the late Azerbaijani President Heydar
Aliev may have been powerful enough to impose a
painful solution on his own constituency
He was able to think in terms of exchange of territories
and populations.
Ilham Aliyev, at least during the first years after
succession had not enough consolidated power and
courage to go for compromise.
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11
The OSCE Minsk Group
12
The OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992 by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE, now Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, OSCE)
The aim was to encourage a peaceful, negotiated
resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
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13
Intention was to provide an ongoing forum for
negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the
crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments and
provisions of the CSCE.
The Peace Conference was to take place in Minsk. It
was never convened.
The Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE's efforts to
find a political solution to the conflict in and around
Nagorno-Karabakh involving AM and AZ.
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14
The formula of a permanent trilateral Minsk Group
Co-Chairmanship (France, Russia, US) was instituted
in 1996, after the refusal of the then acting OSCE
Chairman-in-Office to support other arrangements
within the organisation.
A competition between alternative candidates for the
Co-Chairmanship complicated the issue.
An initial German candidacy was rebuffed by both
sides to the conflict.
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15
The sides instead opted for France, thereby triggering
strong US opposition.
The current Troika results from a compromise
between the Europeans (who did not like the idea of
an exclusive Russia/US format) and the Americans.
Ambassadors of the Russian Federation, of France,
and of the USA.
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The three Co-Chairmen visit the region regularly to
conduct high-level talks with the parties to the
conflict.
They also hold meetings with the OSCE Chairpersonin-Office
and the other members of the Minsk Group
to brief them on the process.
Frozen conflicts
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The Minsk Group format is very political and directly
engages the presidents of the Co-Chair countries in its
active phases, preceded and followed by long periods
of low activity.
The permanent members of the Minsk Group include
the following participating States:
Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey
as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating
basis, the OSCE Troika.
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Azerbaijanis have long distrusted the OSCE's Minsk
group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United
States. All three countries have large Armenian
diasporas and are considered to favor Armenians in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Many Azerbaijanis accuse the Minsk group of not
putting enough pressure on Armenia to return
Nagorno-Karabakh territory to Azerbaijan, and of
prolonging the negotiations indefinitely.
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The Minsk Group Phases
20
American phase, based on Strobe Talbott's territorial
exchange plan that failed in 1999, after the killing of
Armenian PM Sargsyan.
The plan had the merit (for the US) and the drawback
(for Russia) of ensuring territorial continuity from
Turkey to the Caspian Sea and to cut Russia off from
communication to Iran through Armenia (this stretch
of border, the Meghri band, becoming the corridor
linking the Nakhichevan enclave to mainland
Azerbaijan).
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22
French phase, under the direct involvement of
President Chirac, which was based upon the premise
that Azerbaijan would accept the secession of
Karabakh. It failed after the succession from Heydar
to Ilham Aliyev.
The Russian phase began in spring 2010 in the
margins of the Saint Petersburg Forum, which was
followed by many other summit meetings. President
Aliyev believed that President Medvedev sincerely
worked in favour of a solution; resulting to some
tense moments between him and MFA Lavrov.
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23
Madrid Principles
24
The current phase is based upon the so-called Madrid
Principles, whose original 14 non-public principles
were proposed by the Co-Chairs in the margins of the
OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in November 2007.
These have been since outlined by six public
principles in the declaration of the three Presidents of
the Co-Chair countries at the G8 summit in L’Aquila
(2009), recalled at the G8 summit of Muskoka 2010
and during the OSCE summit in Astana (2010)
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The Basic Principles reflect a reasonable compromise
based on the Helsinki Final Act:
1) Non-Use of Force or threat of force
2) Territorial Integrity
3) The Equal Rights and Self-Determination of
Peoples.
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2009 L’Aquila Declaration
27
The Basic Principles call for:
return of the territories surrounding NagornoKarabakh
to Azerbaijani control
an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh
providing guarantees for security and self-
governance
a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
L’Aquila Declaration
28
future determination of the final legal status of
Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding
expression of will
the right of all internally displaced persons and
refugees to return to their former places of
residence
international security guarantees that would
include a peacekeeping operation
L’Aquila Declaration
29
2010 Muskoka Statement
30
Welcoming as a significant step the recognition by
both sides that a lasting settlement must be based
upon the Helsinki Principles and the elements
proposed in connection with G8 statement at the
L’Aquila Summit on July 10, 2009, relating to the six
principles.
Muskoka Statement
31
1. The return of the occupied territories surrounding NK
2. Interim status for NK guaranteeing security and self-
governance
3. A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
4. Final status of NK to be determined in the future by a
legally-binding expression of will
5. The right of all internally-displaced persons and
refugees to return
6. International security guarantees, including a
peacekeeping operation
Muskoka Statement
32
A more precise text (also non public), the so-called,
"modified Madrid Principles", was presented to the
parties in December 2009 during a discrete meeting of
the Co-Chairs with the two presidents at the French
Consulate in Munich.
The proposal was preceded by long preparatory
work, through OSCE expertise, including a visit to the
road through Lachin by a Greek general in order to
establish the parameters of a safe corridor from
Armenia to NK.
Frozen conflicts
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President Aliyev claims that he has accepted the deal,
though the number of caveats expressed at the time by the
Azerbaijani side casts some doubts about this pledge.
Surprisingly, the Armenians blatantly refused the deal,
asking that the restitution of the two occupied Azerbaijani
districts in-between Armenia and Karabakh (Kelbajar,
Lachin) be made contingent on the fixation of a date for the
"legally binding expression of will" in NK - an obvious
non-starter for President Aliyev, who earlier had
nicknamed the consultations a "neverendum".
Frozen conflicts
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The Armenian walk-out from the Munich proposal in
early 2010 was supported by Russia. In a meeting
with French PM Fillon in January 2010, V. Putin
stated that "pressure on the Armenians was counter-
productive”.
It seems that the Russian move was linked to the
renegotiation of the Gyumri base agreement.
Once this result was achieved (for 49 years...), Russia
resumed talks and President Medvedev engaged
personally in the long series of summits leading to the
Kazan meeting in June 2011.
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.
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After Kazan the sides began an intensive blame game
regarding the failure. President Aliyev claims that
last-minute changes were giving the edge to the
Armenian side on all most sensitive issues.
The Armenians allege that President Aliyev made the
deal impossible with a whole set of new demands
(which might have actually been Azerbaijani red lines
expressed well before).
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Without direct access to the rolling text, and given the rather
manipulative nature of the sides, it is very difficult to
ascertain who is right or wrong.
From conversations with the Presidents and the Co-Chairs, it
may be deducted that:
- There might have been some pro-Armenian bias in the
Russian text, more actually in its initial versions than in the
late ones. That triggered Azerbaijani suspicions vis-a-vis
Lavrov due to his Armenian roots. President Aliyev noted
some personal tension between MFA Lavrov and President
Medvedev and suspects that the former might not be entirely
loyal in the tandem configuration of Russian power;
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- Blame can be put on some mismanagement in the
Russian mediation, due to the applied methodology.
As a usual pattern of behaviour, Russian diplomats
begin with writing down the agreed part of a deal
(taking the percentage of agreed text as an indicator of
performance) and solve the remaining issues by using
ambiguous language.
Frozen conflicts
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Whereas the Co-Chairs were proposing solutions (like
on the width of the Lachin corridor), Sergey Lavrov
introduced ambiguity.
The method might have worked well in the case of
the Russia WTO negotiations with Georgia.
However, given the deeply paranoid attitude towards
ambiguity by both sides, it failed in the case of NK.
Frozen conflicts
40
From the same contacts, it could be understood that
two particular points blocked the deal in Kazan:
1) Ambiguity on the Lachin Corridor. In the balance
of Madrid modified, the existence of the Corridor is
linked to the date of the "legally binding expression of
will", i.e. the definitive status of Karabakh.
Frozen conflicts
41
President Aliyev understood that Armenia could use
the ambiguity in the text to keep control of the Lachin
district and half of Kelbajar district as hostage to the
definitive status of NK.
The enhancement of an alternative road from
Armenia to Karabakh through Kelbajar encouraged
such an interpretation.
Frozen conflicts
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2) Reference to UN Charter Chapter 7 as the legal
basis for the peace-keeping operation and to
consensus of the parties to determine who will
compose the peace-keeping forces (PKF).
Until the Kazan meeting, the formula was for the
sides to "veto the willing", which allows the
Azerbaijanis to veto Russia, the Armenians to veto the
Turks and both of them to veto the US.
Frozen conflicts
43
With referring to consensus and Chapter 7, President
Aliyev fears that Russia, whose strategic objective is
to keep its boots in the South Caucasus, could bargain
its participation in the PKF against its agreement on
the UNSC resolution.
The history of Kazan reflects the nature of the
negotiation: a deal on a reasonable plan is possible,
but the main obstacle to it is the complete absence of
confidence between the two countries.
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Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian
counterpart Serzh Sargsyan may meet again before
the end of this year.
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The role of the EUSR
46
Frozen conflicts
On Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), the EUSR, in
implementing his mandate and in line with the
Council's conclusions of 27 February 2012
continued to act in support of and in
complementarity with the OSCE Minsk Group
and to offer the readiness of the EU for more
active engagement.
47
The EUSR's frequent visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan
for meetings with their leaderships and engagement
with local stakeholders contributed to enhancing
dialogue, as well as the EU outreach and visibility.
He also maintained contacts with other relevant
stakeholders in the region and beyond, in particular,
in Russia and with representatives of the United
States.
Frozen conflicts
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The EUSR held regular exchanges with the OSCE
Minsk Group Co-chairs,
as well as with the Personal Representative of the
acting OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the conflict and
high-ranking OSCE officials.
Frozen conflicts
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In his activities, the EUSR emphasised to the
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships the EU
messages pertaining to the unacceptability of the
status quo and of threat or use of force, the support
for re-engagement in high-level meetings facilitated
by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and for steps to help
move towards peace.
Frozen conflicts
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The EUSR continued to underscore the importance of
restraint. The need for it was illustrated by the
tensions in recent time and, especially, by the
unprecedented escalation along the Line of Contact
(LoC) for the past 20 years.
Prevention, which is essential for enabling progress in
the negotiations beyond the status quo, continues to
be a core component of the activities of the EUSR on
behalf of the EU.
Frozen conflicts
51
The EUSR conveyed to the sides the EU's
encouragement and support for the resumption of
meetings of the Presidents of the two countries, who
met on 19 November 2013 in Vienna following almost
a two-year pause and for the continuation of this
dialogue.
Such support was expressed with regard to
subsequent meetings in Sochi (10 August), Newport,
Wales (4 September) and, in particular, in relation to
the Paris Summit (27 October). All meetings in 2014.
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In complementing the efforts of the Minsk Group CoChairs,
the EU has established itself as main
facilitator and contributor to confidence building
across the conflict divide.
The EUSR supported efforts to help overcome the
persisting disconnect between the official levelrestricted
negotiation process and civil society
activities across the conflict divide, and expanded
inclusive contacts with local stakeholders with a focus
on conflict-affected communities.
Frozen conflicts
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In the Nagorno-Karabakh context, the high-level
dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is
key to progress toward a settlement is yet to resume
after the 27 October 2014 Paris Summit. The OSCEreported
increased tensions, casualties and use of
heavier equipment (120 mm mortars) in the first
months of 2015 led to international calls for restraint,
including through the EUSR during his regular visits
to Baku and Yerevan.
Frozen conflicts
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The EU and the international community did not
recognise the framework and results of the 3 May
"parliamentary elections" as affecting the NagornoKarabakh
legal status. Tensions on the ground
decreased around the centenary commemorations on
24 April 2015, which dominated the political agenda
in Armenia, and in particular around the subsequent
first European Olympic Games held in Baku from 12-
28 June 2015.
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In the run-up to the Riga Eastern Partnership Summit,
increasing frustrations from the side of Baku
developed around the perception that the EU applied
"double standards" regarding the territorial integrity
of its partners. The attempts of the Russian Federation
to use this to lure Baku into the Eurasian Union in
exchange for support in the Nagorno-Karabakh
context should not be underestimated.
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At the same time, Russia is clearly interested in
keeping the issue as open as all the other protracted
conflicts in its neighbourhood.
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In response to the sides' mutual accusations
pertaining to tensions along the Line of Contact and
the international border after the Paris Summit and in
the lead-up to the 24 April Armenian centennial
commemorative event of 1915 and the First European
Games in Baku (12-28 June 2015), the EUSR
emphasised the need for restraint on actions and
statements in order to prevent escalation and enable
dialogue.
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The EUSR regularly raised the issue of access to
Nagorno-Karabakh, on which the approaches of the
sides continued to differ. He also addressed pending
humanitarian cases with the sides and the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
Frozen conflicts
59
With a focus on conflict-affected stakeholders, the
EUSR pursued inclusive contacts with Azerbaijani
IDPs representatives, including from the 'Public
Union of the Azerbaijani Community of the NagornoKarabakh
region of Azerbaijan', and also met following
prior discussions with the Azerbaijani
leadership - with the Nagorno-Karabakh de facto
foreign minister, as well as with civil society activists
across the conflict divide, including specifically
women representatives.
Frozen conflicts
60
The EUSR met with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs
individually and collectively, and maintained contacts
with the Personal Representative of the acting OSCE
Chairman-in-Office on the conflict and high-ranking
OSCE officials. On the settlement process, the Minsk
Group Co-Chairs stated that they continued to work
together closely.
Frozen conflicts
61
In complementing the Minsk Group efforts, the EUSR
also actively supported confidence-building activities
on Nagorno-Karabakh, funded by the Instrument for
Stability (now Instrument contributing to Stability
and Peace) within the European Partnership for the
Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over NagornoKarabakh
(EPNK) II programme.
Frozen conflicts
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In addition to promoting the EU visibility and EUSR's
contacts, the EU-funded activities demonstrated the
existence of reasonable local interlocutors who, in
case of political will, could support progress in the
negotiations and help overcome the persisting
disconnect between the official level-restricted
negotiations and the civil society. The EUSR attended
key activities in the framework of the EPNK II,
(European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of
the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)), which
expired in 2015.
Frozen conflicts
63
He addressed with the Azerbaijani side specific
restrictive problems faced by EPNK II (European
Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)) local partners,
stemming from the adverse environment in the wake
of an increasingly rigid approach of the government,
in particular to civil society human rights activists.
After EUSR's clarifications on EPNK activities,
officials indicated that restrictions on local partners
would ease after the European Games, which has to
be further monitored throughout the autumn.
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The EUSR actively engaged in preparation of the
EPNK follow-up, strongly encouraging quick
transition to an EPNK III programme, the
design/modalities of which are currently being
discussed with interested NGO partners.
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65
The reporting period highlighted the increased
impact of the deteriorating local and regional
contexts, which also affected the partners' bilateral
relations with the EU. In the lead-up to the Riga
Eastern Partnership Summit, Armenia sought to
eliminate references to the principle of territorial
integrity. On the other hand, Azerbaijan strongly
insisted that the EU applied the same approach to
Nagorno-Karabakh as to the conflicts in Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova as regards territorial integrity.
It protested against what it called EU "double
standards" in a separate statement on the summit's
declaration.
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66
Nagorno-Karabakh related issues remained among
the key challenges in both partners' exchanges with
the EU on new bilateral documents. Armenia sought
such an early document in addition to its membership
in the Eurasian Economic Union. In Riga, Azerbaijan
proposed a draft of a Strategic Partnership
Agreement, which could lead to re-engagement on
partnership at the time of suspended institutional
dialogue and open differences on human rights and
freedoms.
Frozen conflicts
67
Concurrently, enhanced Russian-Azerbaijani dialogue
indicated Russian offers for a solution on NagornoKarabakh
in exchange for membership of the
Eurasian Economic Union. These developments fit
into Russia's increasingly assertive policy in the
region. The Armenian leadership confirmed to the
EUSR that Russia had offered Azerbaijan to join the
Eurasian Economic Union but hoped that neither
Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh would have to pay
the price for that.
Frozen conflicts
68
On regional cooperation, the EUSR in implementing
his mandate continued to encourage the South
Caucasus countries to cooperate on regional themes
of common interest, such as common security threats,
the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking and
organised crime.
Frozen conflicts
69
The Azerbaijani leadership reiterated that it would be
prepared to consider regional cooperation and reopening
of borders, contingent on the partial or full
withdrawal of Armenian forces from its occupied
territories. The Armenian leadership supported
regional cooperation and de-isolation of the country
as a priority, however, not at the expense of its
position on NK conflict settlement and on the
normalisation of relations with Turkey.
Frozen conflicts
70
The Armenian leadership supported regional cooperation
and de-isolation of the country as a priority, however, not
at the expense of its position on NK conflict settlement and
on the normalisation of relations with Turkey. Turkish
officials continued to offer confidence building measures to
the Minsk Group and the EUSR, including the
rehabilitation of road and railway transport corridors via
Armenia, regional engagement in response to natural and
man-made calamities and indicated Ankara's continued
interest in normalising relations with Yerevan. Armenian
officials remained reluctant to consider such proposals
ahead of Turkey's ratification of the protocols on the
normalisation of bilateral relations.
Frozen conflicts
71
According to FM Nalbandian opportunities for a
breakthrough had been missed several times at the
summits in:
St Petersbourg (June 2010)
Sochi (March 2011)
Kazan (June 2011)
Astrakhan (October 2011)
Frozen conflicts
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AZ and AM approaches
73
On the NK conflict settlement, AZ blame Armenia for
the recent escalation and its attempts to maintain the
status quo.
President Aliyev expressed readiness in principle to
meet with President Sargsyan, but there is great
scepticism on reaching a peaceful settlement within
the Minsk process..
AZ and AM approaches
74
The use of heavy weapons and recourse to "preemptive
strikes" increase the risk of the situation
getting out of control with unintended consequences.
The EUSR reiterated the EU calls for toning down
rhetoric, refraining from military escalation and reengaging
in high-level negotiations.
AZ and AM approaches
75
The President expressed readiness to participate in a
summit, if the Minsk Group Co-Chairs proposed a
date. It might be possible after the constitutional
reform in Armenia in November.
However, he was sceptical regarding prospects for a
settlement while Sargsyan remained in power. Aliyev
pointed to the lack of reactions by the Co-Chairs and
the EU on statements such as Sargsyan’s recent claim
that Armenia and NK are "inseparable".
AZ and AM approaches
76
The status quo in NK was unacceptable to Azerbaijan,
especially in a worsening regional security
environment, the President stated.
The recent escalation along the Line of Contact and
the international border was provoked by Armenia.
Aliyev assured that Azerbaijan had no plans to
escalate the tension.
AZ and AM approaches
77
Aliyev considered the Co-Chairs’ statements on the
recent events to be ambiguous. Their suggestion on an
incident-investigation mechanism would not work
unless the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani
territories had been addressed.
AZ and AM approaches
78
Aliyev raised the issue of territorial integrity. He
considered that Azerbaijan, in contrast to Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, was treated differently.
“Nobody says clearly that NK is part of Azerbaijan”,
he complained. He expected a clear position from the
EU. This was a reason why negotiations on the
Association Agreement had not moved forward.
AZ and AM approaches
79
The Armenian leadership recognized the escalation
and risks involved, but appeared less worried about
the recent military activities on the ground, involving
use of heavy weapons (artillery) for the first time
since the 1994 ceasefire agreement.
AZ and AM approaches
80
The main concern in Yerevan at this stage was the
potential impact of the report of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europa (PACE) released
on NK.
A PACE resolution, based on this report and expected
in January 2016, would contain language that
Armenia is 'occupying' NK and would call for the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from NK and
surrounding territories. This is seen as a heavy blow
against Yerevan.
AZ and AM approaches
81
President Sargsyan noted the considerable escalation
of tension, which is impacting on the security of
civilians and military personnel on both sides of the
LoC and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.
Welcoming the visit of the EUSR, he stressed that it is
now more important than ever that the EU maintains
its balanced approach on the NK conflict.
AZ and AM approaches
82
President Sargsyan did not harbour great expectations
as regards the outcome of the summit, as President
Aliyev had 'maximalist' demands. Progress is only
possible through non- use of force by Azerbaijan and
mutual compromises, he stated.
AZ and AM approaches
83
Sargsyan stated that Aliyev was accusing Armenia of
seeking to preserve the status quo. He maintained
that this was not in Armenia's interest. Armenia
wants conflict settlement.
But it cannot be on Azerbaijani terms, which would
mean capitulation, full Azerbaijani control over NK,
and 'cleansing' its 120.000 population, as done with
Nakhichevan. The international community does not
expect Armenia to agree to such a scenario, so it has
to take measures to prevent it.
AZ and AM approaches
84
Addressing the lack of progress and high-level
meetings in 2015, Sargsyan referred to the
deteriorating environment, in particular Azerbaijan’s
continued ceasefire violations and its disregard of the
five statements of the Presidents of the Minsk Group
Co-Chair countries. If one party is not interested in a
settlement, it must be held accountable. During their
visits to the region, the Co-Chairs reiterated that only
the parties can resolve the conflict. However, a
settlement cannot be decided exclusively by the
presidents. People are losing faith in the prospect of
peace.
AZ and AM approaches
85
Sargsyan focused on attempts by Azerbaijan to deny
what has been achieved in the Minsk process. A new
report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (PACE) served this purpose. The President
said that the rapporteur, Robert Walter, had not
visited Armenia and NK and had recently adopted
Turkish citizenship. He was also violating established
PACE procedures in order to get a resolution adopted
quickly.
AZ and AM approaches
86
For the President, it is incomprehensible how the
report could talk about occupation of NK, deny the
right to self-determination and insist on an
exclusively peaceful settlement of the conflict,
without acknowledging the 'peaceful NK referendum
of 1991'.
It is true that Armenia is supporting NK economically
and through security measures, but it is doing this to
protect NK Armenians from another massacre.
AZ and AM approaches
87
Armenia has not seen the Co-Chairs taking adequate
steps to stop the adoption of the PACE resolution. The
President requested that the EU maintains its
balanced approach and prevents its adoption.
He assumed that PACE is trying to balance and give a
blow to Armenia on the NK issue following the
European Parliament resolution on Azerbaijan in
September.
AZ and AM approaches
88
On his statement that NK was an inseparable part of
Armenia, President Sargsyan specified that he had
referred to NK, not the 'Nagorno-Karabakh Republic'.
The statement was a reaction to the use of 122-mm
artillery by Azerbaijan in the attack on an Armenian
training camp located 5 km away from the LoC.
The statement was meant to indicate that such action
by Baku left no option for Yerevan but to defend NK,
especially as the 'impartial' appeals by the Co-Chairs
had not helped.
AZ and AM approaches
89
Addressing the follow-up of the Paris Summit,
President Sargsyan stated that Armenia had given
consent to the ICRC project on missing persons.
He stressed that options for a settlement were
discussed, but there was no agreement by Armenia to
cede territory back to Azerbaijan.
AZ and AM approaches
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What can the EU concretely do?
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Two wrong ideas should be dispelled:
1) Change the format
Temptation is high in certain circles to denounce the
format as unproductive, biased and Russian-led. The
Minsk Group Co-Chairs epitomise everything that
some of the EU opinion makers dislike:
big powers negotiating in secret,
beyond any international or democratic control
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The lack of sympathy is reciprocated:
The Minsk Group negotiating community sees the EU as
slow, complicated and incapable of keeping discretion.
Those perceptions are, of course, exaggerations.
Both leaders in Azerbaijan and Armenia risk their lives
in such negotiations, as the 1999 tragedy in Yerevan
showed, therefore they cannot risk having the details of
the negotiation publicised or exposed.
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From an institutional point of view, changing the
format is for the sides to the conflict and the OSCE to
decide, not the EU.
It would trigger a whole set of new and old claims for
participation, for example from Turkey (already a
fourth, invisible member of the mediation, through
Azerbaijan).
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Armenia may want to see Iran included, although not
an OSCE member state.
The sides would be distracted from substantial
negotiations for quite a while and nobody would be
able to close such a Pandora’s box of procedural
issues.
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From a structural point of view, the current Co-Chair
format has a strong rationale: the engagement of the
diasporas, which are part of the problem and the
solution.
In this conflict, Armenia is the side which would need
to be reassured if the Madrid concept of basic
principles was to be implemented, being the first to
hand over its buffer zone as main security asset.
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2) Change the plan
There is, fundamentally, no peaceful alternative to the
Madrid principles, which is the only concept that the
sides tacitly agreed with the L’Aquila/Muskoka
declarations.
There is no other way to reconcile the contradictory
principles (territorial integrity and self-determination)
and conflicting state projects.
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The Madrid principles do not actually resolve the
issue; they are rather a road map out of a war
situation.
If and when agreed upon, the biggest portion of work
will still need to be discussed, agreed upon and
implemented.
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We should have no illusions: Neither the EU nor the
Minsk Group will solve the conflict as long as the
sides see alternatives to compromise, which is
currently the case.
All reconciliation efforts, be it in Europe or elsewhere,
have been top-down processes, and there is no
apparent history of a successful bottom-up
reconciliation.
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The Minsk Group has delivered what it could, namely
a concept, but the real strategic task is now to
convince the sides to implement it by restoring trust
and create incentives to peace.
The reality is that the EU would be best suited for that
task by its skills and experience. If the EU does not
succeed in time to prevent the threat of war, nobody
will.
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Main lines of EU action in the mid-term could be the
following:
- Strengthen the cooperation with the Minsk Group, which
should accept and consider the EU as the main
implementing partner of any deal that it may obtain, and
further support OSCE projects aimed at stabilising the
security situation along the Line of Contact.
- Engage those of our strategic partners who are the main
providers of arms in the region, namely Russia, Turkey,
Israel and Ukraine, to raise their awareness regarding the
risk of an accidental war as a consequence of the ongoing
arms race.
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Chances to get a de facto arms embargo are limited
and possibly not desirable as an imbalance between
the opposing forces is just as dangerous as the further
procurement of arms).
But arms providers should be made more aware of
their responsibilities, particularly as regards to the
sale of offensive, first-strike heavy equipment.
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- Raise the political profile of the EU in the two
countries.
The mere perception of Europe as being only about
lifting visa regimes and enabling free trade is no
longer acceptable. The Energy Dialogue could for
instance be used to consolidate the understanding
among partner countries, especially Azerbaijan, of the
necessity of a stable environment for successful
economic development.
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- Developing dialogue on reconstruction and
economic perspectives of a peaceful Caucasus,
connected to the EU, in order to underline,
particularly to the Armenians, the real costs of missed
opportunities.
- Further support already existing initiatives and
create others to open further windows of
opportunities to the societies.
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A strategic paper could be elaborated along those
lines and others to be developed.
A Council conclusion would help to consolidate
consensus, mobilize resources and elaborate projects.
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Questions?
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Next
Geneva International Discussions
Role Play
We need participants group
Co-chairs (3), Georgians, Abkhaz,
S.Ossetians
US, Russians
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