Institutions for divided societies

Lesson 8

Nationalism and ethnicity

What is a nation?

- Psychological bond that joins people
- Self-identification based on shared ethnicity, language, culture, history, religion
- Imagined community

Few Nation-States

Type of state	Percentage of all states
Nation-state: almost all citizens belong to one nation	9%
One ethnic group > 90% of population	19%
One ethnic group between 71% and 89%	19%
Largest ethnic group between 50% and 74%	24%
Largest ethnic group < 50% of population	30%

Nations arise in 19th c.

- Before people don't feel themselves to be part of nation
 - Limited horizons
 - Lack of national language and culture
 - Society split vertically (upper versus lower classes)
- Demands of industrial revolution
 - Mobile labor
 - Education and literacy
- Creation of common culture
 - Print capitalism is key
- Bottom Line: "Making Peasants into Frenchmen"

Invented traditions

- Nationalists often borrow or adapt tradition and pass them off as age-old customs of entire group
 - Scottish kilt
 - Chinese traditional medicine
 - Japanese martial arts
 - Hungarians named Attila
- Establish social cohesion through common history

Dangers of nationalist conflict

- Nationalism = belief that nation should have its own state
 - If other nation living in your state, they must leave
 - If part of your nation living in other state, they must join you
- Hard to compromise: all or nothing
- Portray opposition as threat to state
 - They are traitors allied with people from other countries
 - They want to change boundaries
- Danger of "Nationalizing policies"
 - national language or religion have special privileges


Ethnic conflict and democracy

- Can democratization cause ethnic conflict?
 - Elections are conflict
 - Nationalism effective in mobilizing masses
 - Who controls flow of information?
- Democratizing states most conflict prone

Market-dominant minorities

- Minority that controls large percentage of country's resources
 - -Chinese in the Philippines
 - Lebanese in Sierra Leone
- When introduce democracy
 - -small minority has economic but not political power
 - large majority has political but not economic power

Ethnic conflict is explained more by instrumental calculation than cultural factors




Institutional solutions to ethnic conflict

Worries about majoritarian rule for divided societies

- Potential for permanent exclusion of minority
- No room for shifting coalitions
- Ethnic outbidding
- Elections very high stakes

Consociational solution

- An extreme version of consensus patterns
- Based on broad agreement and powersharing among elites
- Assumes that ethnic identity is permanent
- Encourages cooperation among elites





Consociational institutions

- Grand coalition: all groups included in cabinet
 - Also possible: surplus majority, council (Switzerland)
 - Can it work with presidentialism?
 - Government versus opposition depends on shifting coalitions and floating voters which may not exist
- Mutual veto: all groups can veto legislation
 - How does it avoid immobilism?
 - Can be limited to certain policies
- Proportionality: elections, civil service, and financial resources
 - Quotas for groups
- Segmental autonomy and federalism
 - Each group has own territory and governs itself
 - Cultural and group rights

Problems with consociationalism

- Not democratic no opposition
- Groups can be oppressive to own members
- Requires organized elites and deferential non-elites
- Immobilism, slow decisions
- Creates large, non-merit-based bureaucracy
- Reifies ethnic identity
- Encourages secession
- Requires cultural traditions of accommodation that may be foreign to developing countries

Where can consociationalism work?

- Leaders committed to unity, cooperation
- Leaders can control followers
- Balance of power: 3-4 groups without single majority
- Multiparty systems that represent segments
- Better for small countries
 - External threat, personal relations, fewer decisions
- Cross-cutting cleavages
- Overarching loyalties
- Clear boundaries
- Traditions of elite accommodation

Overlapping vs Cross-Cutting Cleavages

	Rich	Poor
Protestant	XX	
Catholic		XX

	Rich	Poor
Protestant	X	X
Catholic	X	X

Successful cases?

- Belgium
- Austria
- Switzerland
- Lebanon
- Malaysia

Centripetal/integrative approach

- Accommodation through position shifts
- Tries to break down salience of ethnicity
- Creates incentives for interethnic cooperation
 - Force parties to center
 - Encourage alternative alignments
 - Moderation
 - Contact => engagement





Integrative institutions

- Vote pooling: alternative vote or mixed lists
 - Strong incentive for multiethnic coalitions and moderation
- Presidential system
 - But require broad support for election
- Federalism with heterogeneous units or unitary state
 - Local politics as training ground
 - Encourages party proliferation
 - Disperse conflict
 - Cooperation on low-stakes issues
- Ethnicity-blind policies

Preference voting

- Rank candidates in order of preference first, second, third...
- Forces parties to seek support from supporters of other parties
- Plurality version: alternative vote (instant runoff)
 - If one candidate gets a majority of first preferences, then wins
 - If not, then eliminate candidate with fewest and redistribute their second preferences
 - Requires that districts don't have a majority of one group
- Proportional version: single transferable vote

You may vote in one of two ways	BALLOT PAPER				COMMONWEALTH • OF • AUSTRALIA	
By placing the single figure 1 in one and only one of these squares to indicate the voting ticket you wish to adopt as your vote	or Nuclear Disarmament Party	B or Liberal	C or National Party	or Australian Labor Party	er or Australian Democrats	
Or By placing the numbers 1 to 23 in the order of your preference	A Nuclear Disarmament Party PEARSON Hardd STACHOWICZ	B Liberal HARKER John BRUJIC Milan SMITH Philips CACCIA Max Max	C National Party ATTW000 Nancy GROOMS Eric McNULTY Samuel HOWLAND	D Australian Labor Party TURPIN Thomas PARADOPOLOUS Spinos CHOWDHURY Prakash WALFORD Partick	E Australian Democrats SPURR Christne JACOBS Frank GEON	Ungrouped HAHNN Rose GBB Angela PAPAGEORGOU George David Alber Alber

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BALLOT PAPER HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WESTERN AUSTRALIA

MOORE MOORE

Number the boxes from 1 to 5 in the order of your choice. LLOYD, Alan R AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS WATSON, Mark GREY POWER FILING, Paul LIBERAL STEELS, Brian THE GREENS (W.A.) BLANCHARD, Allen AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP) Remember...number every box

Figure 3.2 An Australian alternative vote ballot paper

to make your vote count.

Australian Electoral Commission

What does it achieve?

- Political learning
- Fairness
- Mass not elite based
- Broad, multiethnic parties
- Centralism
- Arenas of bargaining => civility, cooperation

Problems with integrative approach

- Few empirical examples
 - Papua New Guinea? Fiji?
- Will politicians respond to incentives
 - Do they gain or lose by being moderate
- Will voters cross ethnic lines if advised by leaders
- Minorities excluded
 - Will they accept being represented by others
- Does contact => understanding and trust?
- Assumes part of electorate moderate

Where might it work?

- Party proliferation: as many as possible
- Heterogeneous districts: groups dispersed and intermingled
 - Settler and immigrant societies
- Can't have genocidal hatred
- Hard for illiterate
- Ethnic divisions mutable
- Groups internally fragmented

Comparison


Consociationalism

- Obstacles to conflict
 - Good fences make good neighbors
- Everyone gets a piece of the pie
- Elites are key

Integrative/Centripetal


- Incentives for cooperation
 - We can all get along
- Everyone gets a fair opportunity
- Citizens are key

Consociationalism is the best available solution to ethnic conflict



Other options

- Assimilation
 - "Making Peasants into Frenchmen"
 - Too illiberal for modern times
- Partition/secession
 - Good fences make good neighbors
 - But hard to draw correct boundaries
 - Global norm against territorial changes



Can we design a constitution?

- Often countries choose the opposite of what they need
 - Countries that need restrictions on executive power often choose powerful executives
 - Countries that need representation of minority group get majoritarian institutions
- How to get a good solution adopted?
 - External pressure and advice?
 - Private drafting of constitution?
 - Wise leaders