A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission

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This article seeks to determine why the UN has been more successful in managing some internal conflicts than others. First, success is defined broadly – limiting violence, reducing human suffering, and containing the conflict as well as fulfilling the mission's mandate. Second, a broad set of potential determinants of success collected from the literature is tested using an analysis of 17 peacekeeping missions from 1945 to 1998. This study confirms the hypotheses that mission success is tied to UN commitment, absence of external support for the belligerents, successful diplomatic efforts, and a low degree of mutual antagonism. Contrary to expectations, the involvement of great powers or regional organizations, the presence of military stalemate, and the absence of an ethnic component did not appear to be correlated to success. Specific characteristics of missions such as duration and size did not appear to have an effect.

Peacekeeping has proved to be one of the most important tools at the disposal of the international community for dealing with the violent conflicts characteristic of the post-cold war period. The UN has consistently been the primary candidate for legitimate involvement. The UN's peacekeeping record is, however, decidedly mixed. Does this record indicate an inability to deal entirely with certain kinds of civil wars, or perhaps certain phases of civil wars? Is there a particular combination of factors that can lead to a successful performance?

Using a new methodology, this article seeks to determine why the UN has been more successful in managing some internal conflicts than others. First, criteria for assessing the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions are defined, with an analysis that adds to Duane Bratt's criteria in considering why missions ended up being successful, partially successful, or wholly unsuccessful.[1] Next, 12 hypotheses are derived from the peacekeeping literature and tested using a qualitative assessment of 17 UN peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1998. Finally, the results are aggregated and conclusions drawn about what they suggest for future missions.

Criteria for Success

What does 'success' in peacekeeping mean? There is considerable debate among scholars and members of the peacekeeping community about how to assess the UN's performance.[2] The simplest approach is to evaluate whether each mission fulfilled its specific mandate. However, many authors advocate 'the need for qualitative criteria and the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world peace, justice, and the reduction of human suffering'.[3] As Bratt contends,

peace is not only the cessation of conflict but is also closely related to 'the number of lives that have been saved from likely death' and the improvement of political, economic, and social justice by 'defending human rights, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic and social cooperation'.[4] Nevertheless, it is important to begin with the mandate because, as Anthony Lake reminds us, the political success of the mission is also crucial to overall success.[5]

The criteria employed in this study therefore address both aspects of 'success': they factor completion of the mandate to address the political issues, while the broader criteria allow for the evaluation of the mandate itself and the mission's contribution to the UN's broader goals of international security and reduction of human suffering.

Prioritizing objectives is often problematic in evaluating peacekeeping success. For instance, Bratt, William Dixon, and Paul Diehl et al. prioritize peace goals over justice goals. For these authors, peacekeeping missions are successful if they limit armed conflict and promote conflict resolution.[6] However, these narrow criteria leave little room to evaluate a mission's contribution to the UN's permanent goals. For example, can the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) be called successful because its mandate was nearly satisfied and it prevented the recurrence of war, even though violent deaths increased during the mission's deployment and the conflict spread beyond the borders of the Congo? The broad criteria of success developed below are a response to such questions.

- *Criterion 1*: Limiting violent conflict in the host state is the primary goal of peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers are often deployed after a ceasefire agreement is in place, the peacekeepers' task is often to maintain that peace. This is a particularly challenging task in intrastate conflicts where various military factions may continue fighting despite any general ceasefire and where international borders that might separate warring parties are absent. This criterion is applied by analysing whether a mission succeeded in curbing large-scale violence, sustaining ceasefire agreements, reducing the number of conflict-related casualties and supervising demobilization, and by assessing the progress of disarmament.
- *Criterion 2*: Reduction of human suffering is another primary goal of peacekeeping missions. The UN is supposed to prevent atrocities against civilian populations, and peacekeeping missions are a major instrument towards achieving this goal. This criterion is operationalized by estimating the extent of any reduction in human rights abuses and the mission's success in resettling refugees.
- *Criterion 3*: Preventing the spread of conflict beyond the object state's borders is also important for ensuring regional security. An internal conflict can spread to other countries in the region by the process known as 'contagion'. Violence against civilians often creates refugee flows, and diaspora populations can cause competition for resources, provoking further conflict in neighbouring countries. To evaluate this criterion, the study assesses the extent to which the integrity of neighbouring countries has been kept intact.
- *Criterion 4*: Promoting conflict resolution is a final measure of the effectiveness of the UN mission. For peacekeeping, it requires the creation of a stable

environment that is capable of preventing the recurrence of hostilities after the peacekeeping mission withdraws. This criterion will thus be assessed according to the extent to which the environment fostered by peacekeepers inhibits future violence.

Approaches based on similar sets of criteria have been taken elsewhere. Bratt, for instance, uses a similar set in judging success and failure but applies it to a different set of missions. He builds upon the criteria proposed by Michael Brown and Paul Diehl by including the additional criterion of limiting violent conflict resulting in casualties.[7] Of the 17 missions considered here, Bratt has evaluated ten. His conclusions corroborate the ones presented here and demonstrate that these criteria can produce consistent results between studies.

Analysis

All 17 of the UN peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1998 in which UN troops were deployed have been used in this study (see Table 1). These missions have been examined according to the criteria described and classified on this basis as successful, partially successful, or failed.

According to the criteria described earlier, UNTAG, ONUMOZ, UNTAES, UNSMIH, UNMIH, UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP succeeded; UNFICYP, UNTAC and ONUC partially succeeded; while UNAVEM III, UNIFIL, UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNCRO, UNPROFOR-Bosnia and UNAMIR failed. Successful missions implemented most elements of their mandates, sustained ceasefires, prevented outbreaks of major violence, reduced the number of casualties, assisted resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and created safe environments in which large-scale violence did not recur when peacekeeping missions left.

During the deployment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), for example, all major violence ceased. Demobilization was partially implemented, and the overall security situation prior to the elections was improved. A detailed investigation by UN peacekeepers on human rights abuses further contributed to stabilization of the situation, which in turn created a stable environment for the return and resettlement of refugees. After the mission's withdrawal, large-scale violence did not recur and Mozambique began the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction, yielding impressive results in just a few years.

Failed missions, on the other hand, tended to exhibit the opposite features. Violence persisted, even during the deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), largely due to the absence of demobilization and disarmament. War-related casualties continued without significant reduction, and both warring parties committed severe human rights abuses. In this unstable situation, the return and resettlement of refugees and national reconciliation was virtually impossible. Additionally, the warring parties participated

TABLE 1:
COMPARISON OF MISSIONS' SUCCESS

Mission	Mandate complete?	Limiting violence (ceasefire violations/ armed clashes)	Violent deaths	Refugees and IDPs	Spread of conflict	Return to war	Success/ Failure
ONUC/Congo July 1960–June 1964	Nearly	Major/No change	Many/Increase	No change	Some	No	*Partial*
UNFICYP/Cyprus March 1964–Present	Partially	Some/Decrease	Medium/Decrease–Increase	Returns	No	N/A	*Partial*
UNIFIL/Lebanon March 1978–Present	Nearly	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	No change	Yes	N/A	*Failure*
UNTAG/Namibia April 1989–March 1990	Yes	Few/Decrease	Few/Decrease	No change	No	No	*Success*
UNTAC/Cambodia March 1992–Sept. 1993	Partially	Major/Increase	Many/No change	Returns	No	Partial	*Partial*
UNPROFOR/Croatia March 1992–Dec. 1995	Partially	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	Outflows	Yes	No	*Failure*
UNPROFOR/Bosnia March 1992–Dec. 1995	No	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	Outflows	Yes	No	*Failure*
UNPROFOR/Macedonia March 1992–Dec. 1995	Yes	No/No change	No/No change	Returns	No	No	*Success*

ONUMOZ/Mozambique Dec. 1992–Dec. 1994	Yes	No clashes/Decrease	Few/Decrease	Return	No	No	*Success*
UNOSOM II/Somalia March 1993–March 1995	No	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	Outflows	No	Yes	*Failure*
UNMIH/Haiti Sept. 1993–June 1996	Nearly	No/Decrease	Few/Decrease	Returns	No	No	*Success*
UNAMIR/Rwanda Oct. 1993–March 1996	No	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	Outflows	Some	No	*Failure*
UNAVEM III/Angola Feb. 1995–June 1997	Begun	Major clashes/No change	Many/No change	Outflows	Some	Yes	*Failure*
UNCRO/Croatia March 1995–Jan. 1996	No	Major/Increase	Many/Increase	Outflows	Yes	No	*Failure*
UNPREDEP/Macedonia March 1995–Feb. 1999	Yes	No/No change	No/No change	Returns	No	No	*Success*
UNTAES/Croatia Jan. 1996–Jan. 1998	Yes	Few/Decrease	Few/Decrease	Returns	No	No	*Success*
UNSMIH/Haiti July 1996–July 1997	Nearly	No/No change	Few/No change	Returns	No	No	*Success*

Source: Darya Pushkina, 'United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars: Conditions for Success', unpub. PhD thesis, University of Maryland at College Park, 2002.

in conflicts in Zaire, thus entering a vicious cycle of regional destabilization. After the UN mission withdrew, even larger-scale violence erupted.

Some missions contributed significantly to conflict management yet failed in other respects. The UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC), for example, is classified as 'partially successful'. UNTAC partially fulfilled its mandate: it managed a successful withdrawal of foreign forces and the implementation of free and fair elections, yet it failed to achieve disarmament and demobilization or maintain law and order. During its deployment there was a substantial return of refugees and IDPs (about 365,000 returned), and violence did not spread beyond national borders. On the other hand, numerous ceasefire violations occurred and the number of casualties remained high.

Several observations can be made based on this evaluation of success. In general, no particular region of the world has proved particularly resistant or conducive to conflict resolution – contrary to conventional wisdom that conflicts in Africa are particularly resistant to management. In addition, in terms of limiting violence, the intensity of conflict, and preventing refugee flows, the peacekeeping missions examined here demonstrated approximately the same distribution of successes and failures. In contrast, UN peacekeepers were quite successful in preventing the spread of conflict: it was prevented in ten of the 17 cases.

Despite certain limitations, the criteria for success can contribute significantly to developing a more systematic analysis of UN peacekeeping performance and help to provide a more complete picture of which factors generally contribute to peacekeeping success. The criteria described here address both peacekeepers' performance in the field – mandate fulfilment – as well as the mission's contribution to the goals of international peace and security. To score highly in all of these areas, it seems clear that certain conditions must be present. It seems unlikely that success would simply be an arbitrary phenomenon. The rest of this article determines these conditions and the practical consequences that might be derived from them.

Determinants of Success

Previous studies of success and failure in UN peacekeeping missions have erred by looking at either international or domestic determinants but not at both in combination. Drawing on the literature, 12 relevant domestic and international factors are identified and each is presented as a hypothesis for the success of peacekeeping missions. The core of the research presented here is a qualitative evaluation of each of the 17 missions on each of the factors. This enables us to draw conclusions from the comparative evidence about the relative importance of the 12 factors in shaping mission outcomes.

Hypothesis 1: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when UN members demonstrate consistent commitment to resolving the conflict.[8]

To test this hypothesis, UN commitment is measured in terms of the degree to which peacekeeping forces are (a) given the resources necessary to fulfil their

mandates (these include both military and logistical support as well as the supply of personnel) and (b) provided the resources in a timely manner. Passing resolutions and handing out mandates to peacekeepers does not alone evince strong commitment. Consistent political will and economic support are superior indicators. Thomas Weiss, for example, has argued that 'the most essential benchmark to measure success would be a judicious correlation between resources and rhetoric'.[9] Christine Gray has found such a correlation increasingly lacking in peacekeeping efforts, especially with regard to recent 'failures' in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone: 'The demand for peacekeeping is outpacing capacity and resources; the UN has undertaken massive commitments without the means to carry them out'.[10]

The evidence supports the assertion that UN peacekeeping is more successful when UN members demonstrate commitment to the mission in the form of timely supply of troops and financial resources. (For this and all further hypotheses, refer to Table 2 below, p. 146.) Commitment was 'high' in six of the seven successful missions (ONUMOZ had a 'medium' level); furthermore, the level of commitment was 'medium' or 'low' in six of the seven failures (all except UNCRO). The correlation is not exact, however: on two missions in which UN commitment was 'high' (UNFICYP and UNCRO), failure or partial success resulted.

An example of a high level of commitment yielding success was the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). In this case, UN members demonstrated a high level of commitment to the mission from the very beginning, supplying most of the necessary finance, troops and logistical resources in a timely fashion.[11] This commitment did not diminish throughout the duration of the deployment, and it is likely that this was a primary reason for the mission's overall success.

A contrary example is the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in which commitment decreased from medium to low. At the beginning of the mission's deployment, Security Council resolutions were followed by the supply of some, but not all, of the necessary resources. Several countries, for example, contributed troops but not logistics.[12] There was also a delay in the provision of finances. After attacks on UN peacekeepers in June 1993, the level of commitment further declined: major delays in the supply of resources continued, followed by the final withdrawal of most resources by the United States and Western European countries. This lack of sustained UN commitment to the resolution of the Somalia conflict contributed directly to the overall failure of UNOSOM II.

According to this analysis, a high degree of UN commitment to the resolution of a particular civil war, expressed through a timely supply of necessary resources and consistent dedication, is strongly associated with the success rate of peacekeeping operations.

Hypothesis 2: UN peacekeeping is less successful in civil conflict management when one or both of the warring parties is supported militarily and/or politically by outside states or groups during the period of UN mission deployment.[13]

External support for belligerent parties, whether material, ideological or political, is widely cited in the peacekeeping literature as a primary enabling factor in the

instigation and continuation of ethnic and other forms of internal conflict.[14] This factor is assessed according to both the type and degree of support supplied, while also taking into account the source of the support in each particular conflict.

The findings confirm that external support to warring parties correlates with a lower success rate. In all seven successful missions the warring parties enjoyed little or no external military support (although ideological support was present during the UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP missions), whereas in all cases of failed or partially successful missions the warring parties did receive external military support.

In Haiti under UNMIH and UNSMIH, no outside military support was offered to the conflicting Haitian parties, to the Cedras government, or to Aristide's government in exile. The departing Cedras government had no international support, and the UN embargo successfully prevented the supporters of the conflicting parties from receiving arms.

In the case of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), both warring parties received extensive funds and supplies from Greece and Turkey, and the mission resulted in failure. One of the most blatant demonstrations of external support, the Turkish invasion in 1974, greatly escalated the intensity of the conflict and led to a de facto partition of the country. Although there has been no sustained resurgence of violence in Cyprus, the conflict ended in stalemate.

Hypothesis 3: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management if a major power takes the lead in a particular situation.[15]

To assess this factor it must be determined whether and to what degree a major power (usually equated with, but not necessarily limited to, the Security Council P5) provided political will and economic support in seeking to resolve a particular conflict. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat contends that major-power intervention is a strong factor in determining any UN involvement in internal conflicts. Fen Osler Hampson goes further and argues that 'only major powers have the resources and capacities to intervene in internal conflicts'.[16]

However, the evidence suggests that there is no substantial association between the presence of a major power (defined here as a permanent member of the Security Council) taking a lead role and the success of UN peacekeeping. Major powers took a lead role in five successful missions (UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNPROFOR-Macedonia, UNPREDEP and UNTAG), but also in six failed missions (UNOSOM II, UNAVEM III, UNIFIL, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNPROFOR-Croatia and UNCRO). The results are even less conclusive when it is noted that two successful missions (ONUMOZ and UNTAES) had no definitive political leadership from any member of the Security Council. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ succeeded without the command of a major power. In Somalia, conversely, the US provided initial political and military support, yet UNOSOM II failed.

Hypothesis 4: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when coupled with regional organization cooperation.[17]

The cooperation of regional organizations has increasingly been cited as a factor contributing to the success of peacekeeping missions.[18] Alan Henrikson, for example, has argued that without regional involvement peacekeeping is 'likely to lack continuity and consistency'.[19] Ian Bellamy et al. have argued that such organizations – under the right conditions – can provide agreed-upon rules within which peacekeepers must operate, demand accountability from participating states, and provide institutional memory.[20]

The findings, however, suggest that the extent of cooperation between regional organizations and both the UN and domestic peacekeeping actors was not a major factor in determining the success of the 17 UN missions. There was some regional organization involvement in all the missions, but the degree of involvement is unrelated to the outcomes. Of the missions with greater-than-marginal support from regional organizations, six succeeded (ONUMOZ, UNTAG, UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR-Macedonia), one partially succeeded (UNTAC), while the other five failed (UNIFIL, UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNOSOM II and UNAMIR). Overall, the actions of regional organizations do not appear to be strongly associated with UN peacekeeping performance, probably because actions taken by regional organizations have in most cases typically been minor.

Hypothesis 5: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when accompanied by effective diplomacy.[21]

The analysis shows that peacekeeping success is not closely associated with the *level* of diplomatic efforts that take place either prior to or during a mission. Of the ten failed and partially successful missions, major diplomatic efforts were made prior to and during the deployment of peacekeepers in three (UNFICYP, UNPROFOR-Bosnia and UNAVEM III). Conversely, in four successful missions, diplomatic efforts were much weaker (ONUMOZ, UNTAES, UNPROFOR-Macedonia and UNPREDEP). Missions can fail when sustained diplomatic efforts are made and can succeed when only minor efforts take place, leading to the conclusion that the level of diplomatic effort cannot be taken as a major factor in mission success.

On the other hand, the findings presented here are that missions are more likely to be successful when accompanied by *effective* diplomacy, which is taken to be exemplified by the negotiation of meaningful settlement agreements that address most or all of the issues underlying the conflict. Of all seven successful peacekeeping missions, all signed formal agreements addressing some of the major issues underlying the conflict and three (UNPROFOR-Macedonia, ONUMOZ and UNPREDEP) signed agreements that addressed most or all issues outstanding. What is more, all missions in which the diplomatic situation worsened in the course of UN deployment ultimately failed. The correlation is not exact, however, as three missions classified as failed overall (UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNAVEM III and UNCRO) were successful in securing partial agreements, while each of the three partially successful missions made differing levels of progress toward full agreements (though all made at least some progress).

Hypothesis 6: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when the warring parties give their consent to and cooperate with the UN peace-keeping mission. [22]

Many authors have stressed the importance of local parties' consent for the success of UN peacekeeping. Durch, for example, contends that consent is crucial and depends upon 'local perceptions of the impartiality and moral authority of the UN'.[23] Consent to and cooperation with peacekeeping imperatives are evaluated both on the level of rhetoric (parties' formal acceptance or disapproval of UN actions) and action (for example, whether peacekeepers were fired upon by belligerents).

The analysis demonstrates that the higher the level of warring parties' consent and cooperation with the UN mission, the more likely the UN mission will succeed. In all seven successful UN missions, the warring parties demonstrated a high degree of consent and cooperation initially (for example, ONUMOZ), or cooperation increased during deployment (UNTAG), or cooperation was high throughout most of the mission but declined after a certain point (UNSMIH). Of the seven failed missions, warring parties either did not cooperate with the UN mission from the beginning (for example, UNPROFOR-Bosnia) or the level of cooperation decreased (for example, UNAVEM III).

In the case of the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), for example, the overall degree of consent and cooperation was high, and the warring parties – South Western Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Namibian regime (South Africa) – consented to UN involvement and eventually lent support to it. After an early defection from their professed support, SWAPO's level of cooperation significantly increased during UNTAG's deployment, which made possible the mission's overall success.

In Bosnia on the other hand, all three of the warring parties – Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs – demonstrated a low level of cooperation with the UN mission. The leaders of all three groups challenged the validity of the mission, took advantage of ceasefires and protection zones, hijacked UN personnel and supplies, and even physically attacked peacekeepers. Consent to the UN mission was low from the beginning and failed to improve. This lack of cooperation contributed to the general failure of the UN mission.

Hypothesis 7: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when there is a perception on the part of all of the warring parties that conflict should be resolved by non-violent means.[24]

This hypothesis was inspired by the view held by scholars such as William Zartman that third-party interventions can only succeed when conflict is 'ripe for resolution'.[25] This is taken to mean that peacekeeping can only be successful when warring parties perceive that military means are no longer effective in achieving their goals. In order to gauge such perceptions, the study determined whether parties demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and if so whether negotiated ceasefires were adhered to.

Analysis of these factors supports Hypothesis 7. The level of mutual antagonism is considered to be high when parties refuse to negotiate, express their demands in zero-sum terms, conduct military attacks during negotiations, or refer to their opponents in dehumanizing terms. The study also takes into account the level of human rights violations. In all seven successful missions, the parties demonstrated a belief in the resolution of conflict by non-violent means (ethnic Albanians under UNPREDEP are a strong example). In the seven failed missions (for example, UNAMIR), the parties believed they could achieve their goals by military means. During UNAMIR the degree of mutual antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi was extremely high. Even though the warring parties met to discuss the implementation of the Arusha Accords, they maintained rigid positions and demanded satisfaction of most of their demands. Hate propaganda by the Hutus called for extermination of all Tutsis.[26] These actions by extremists and their commitment to violence precipitated the failure of the peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda.

Hypothesis 8: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when there is a balance of force on the battlefield.[27]

This hypothesis stems from arguments made by authors such as Barbara Walter that military stalemates are conducive to successful peacekeeping because it is at such times that 'groups are well-prepared to defend against attack, and this makes both successful aggression and surprise attack unlikely'.[28] This hypothesis tests the actual situation on the battlefield and the relative military strength of the warring parties. It is suggested that when belligerents have equal military strength, they cannot gain anything from continuing military exchange since their opponent has the same potential.

Relative military equality was not found to be strongly associated with the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. Belligerents' military strength, for example, was roughly equal during two failed missions (UNPROFOR-Croatia, UNAVEM III) and highly asymmetrical during the deployment of one successful mission (UNTAES). Furthermore, only one of the three missions that were partially successful exhibited a military balance (UNTAC). This clearly contradicts Hypothesis 8.

Hypothesis 9: The longer a UN peacekeeping mission is deployed, the more successful it is in civil conflict management.[29]

This study also tests the claim that UN peacekeeping missions are more successful when they are given sufficient time to achieve their objectives and forces are able to acclimatize themselves to the particularities of specific conflicts.

Most missions lasted between two and five years and were a mix of failures, partial successes, and successful missions that follow no clear pattern when length is taken as an independent factor. Out of two missions that lasted for 11–12 months, for example, one (UNTAG) succeeded while another (UNCRO)

failed. Furthermore, within the 2–5 years category, there were five successes and five failures.

However, it is interesting to note that no mission lasting longer than five years has ever been concluded. The two longest peacekeeping missions deployed in civil conflicts are UNIFIL in Lebanon (238 months by 2001) and UNFICYP in Cyprus (406 months). While UNFICYP has been partially successful, UNIFIL largely fails in its tasks. In Lebanon, the mission's presence seemed neither to prevent large-scale violence nor to prepare the environment for conflict resolution. In contrast, the missions in Namibia (UNTAG; 12 months) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ; 30 months) both achieved their tasks and set up the environment for a peaceful tran-sition after their withdrawal, although it took one mission twice as long as the other. The analysis suggests that the mere length of a mission is not an accurate indication of the likelihood of either success or failure.

Hypothesis 10: UN peacekeeping success in civil conflict management varies with the type of mission.[30]

According to the evidence, specific types of missions are not strongly correlated with different degrees of UN performance. There is a wide distribution of suc-cesses and failures for almost all types of missions. Initial evidence suggests, however, that conflict prevention *may* work. The only two preventive missions, UNPROFOR–Macedonia and UNPREDEP, both in Macedonia, succeeded. The fate of 'traditional' peacekeeping missions is usually much worse. Of the five peacekeeping missions that began long after hostilities, none could claim com-plete success: two (UNFICYP and ONUC) partially succeeded, and three failed (UNIFIL, UNPROFOR-Bosnia and UNPROFOR-Croatia). Finally, multifunc-tional peacekeeping missions, the most common type of mission deployed in civil wars, resulted in four failures (UNAVEM III, UNAMIR, UNCRO, UNOSOM II), one partial success (UNTAC), and five successes (ONUMOZ, UNTAG, UNTAES, UNMIH, UNSMIH).

It is difficult to draw any general conclusions from this distribution except perhaps that, given the right circumstances, multifunctional peacekeeping can succeed. Definite claims cannot be made for traditional and preventive missions because too few missions fall into these categories to make generalizations.

Hypothesis 11: UN peacekeeping is more successful in civil conflict management when the mission has strong enforcement capabilities.[31]

The evidence shows no strong relationship between an enforcement clause in a mandate and the relative effectiveness of UN missions. Most mission mandates did not provide for the use of force and these demonstrated varying degrees of success: of the five missions 'with teeth', three failed (UNAMIR, UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR-Bosnia), one achieved partial success (ONUC), and one suc-ceeded (UNMIH). In most cases, even when UN peacekeepers are given enforce-ment capabilities, a regional organization, such as NATO, or an individual power, like the US, will step in. NATO acted in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later

in Kosovo with controversial results. US-led multinational forces in Haiti contributed to the success of UN peacekeeping there. The outcome was different in Somalia: in December 1992, 31,000 American troops were sent to Somalia to create a 'secure environment' for humanitarian food delivery. After its soldiers were targeted and several were killed, the US withdrew its support for UNOSOM II, which itself later withdrew with most of its goals unaccomplished.

Enforcement capabilities, whether granted directly to the UN mission or to a multinational force, are therefore not strongly associated with UN performance in the 17 missions studied. This seems to provide evidence against the 'strong enforcement' theories, which claim that only enforcement powers can guarantee peaceful resolution of civil wars.

Hypothesis 12: UN peacekeeping is less successful in civil conflict management when conflict is 'ethnic'.[32]

The analysis does not support the hypothesis that ethnic conflicts are more resistant to peacekeeping. Instead, the distribution is rather balanced. In the cases of seven non-ethnic conflicts, UN missions failed in two (UNAVEM III and UNOSOM II), partially succeeded in one (ONUC), and succeeded in four (UNMIH and UNSMIH, both in Haiti, ONUMOZ and UNTAG). In conflicts that had strong ethnic components, peacekeeping missions failed in five cases (UNCRO and UNPROFOR, both in Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, UNAMIR and UNIFIL), partially succeeded in two (UNTAC and UNFICYP), and succeeded in three (UNPROFOR-Macedonia, UNPREDEP, also in Macedonia, and UNTAES).

Somalia is an example of a non-ethnic conflict in which peacekeeping failed. Somalis are ethnically homogenous and share a single language and a common religion, Sunni Islam. Divisions instead took place along the lines of clans, sub-clans and families.[33] On the other hand, two successful peacekeeping missions in Macedonia all had strong ethnic components.

Conclusion

The main conclusion is that UN peacekeeping can be successful in civil conflict management provided that certain conditions are met. The analysis shows that specific conditions were present in nearly all of the successful cases and absent in the failed ones. Often these conditions result from proper planning and initiative on the part of the United Nations and the involved states, which suggests that policies designed to promote these conditions may improve a mission's chances for success.

To this end, scholars and policy makers should pay careful attention to the definition of success developed here. The classifications of missions as successes or failures presented here were made using a set of criteria that included not only the fulfilment of a mission's mandate but also its contribution to the broader goals of limiting violence, reducing human suffering, containing the conflict, and promoting conflict resolution.

In pursuit of these goals, this study found some of the hypotheses developed in the peacekeeping literature to be unsupported: the actions of regional organizations, leadership by members of the Security Council, and belligerents' relative military strength are not correlated with the outcome of peacekeeping operations, nor were the characteristics of the missions themselves: the length of the mission, type of mission, and enforcement capabilities. Furthermore, the ethnic component does not seem to make conflict more or less resistant to peacekeeping efforts.

This does not mean that these factors are to be ignored; each has some influence over nuanced situations on the ground. The findings given here, however, suggest that other factors should be emphasized. For instance, relative military strength was not found to be determinative of success in itself, because, as Hypothesis 7 suggests, as long as the warring parties are determined to resolve the conflict by military means and continue building up their arsenals with foreign donations, peacekeeping is not likely to succeed. In another example, no correlation was found between martial enforcement capability and effectiveness, because, as careful examinations of the five enforcement missions show, in most cases where enforcement powers were necessary the mission ended in failure rather than success. (In this case, Hypotheses 6 and 7 were the dominant modes of assuaging dissenting violence.)

TABLE 2:
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis	Is the hypothesis correlative to mission success?
1: level of UN commitment	Yes
2: outside support	Yes
3: involvement of a major power	No
4: involvement of a regional organization	No
5: successful diplomatic efforts (signed CSA)	Yes
6: consent and cooperation of warring parties with UN mission	Yes
7: commitment of warring parties to non-violent means (low degree of mutual antagonism)	Yes
8: relative military strength	No
9: duration of mission's deployment	No
10: type of mission	No
11: mission's enforcement capabilities	No
12: characterization of conflict as 'ethnic'	No

On the other hand, the findings confirm that success is correlative with consistent commitment on the part of the UN, isolation of the conflict from external support, effective negotiation processes, and the commitment of the warring parties both to the UN mission in particular and non-violent methods of resolution in general as well as their ability to cement this commitment with a formal agreement. These findings suggest several policy prescriptions: special attention should be paid to halting external support as well as building mutual trust among the parties early in the conflict to get parties to the negotiating table. The latter, while difficult, could be attained by promoting transparency between the parties, which can help to alleviate security dilemmas by assuring

belligerents that opponents will not suddenly attack. Access to information may also prevent a population from being manipulated by elites who often use fear and distrust to suit their interests.

The consistency of the results suggests that the failure of any one of these five tests may imperil the effectiveness of the mission: all but one successful mission exhibited all five of these attributes (ONUMOZ had a 'medium' UN commitment level). This suggests that failure of any of these five tests may imperil the effectiveness of a mission. For instance, even when a climate of transparency is promoted by a well-supported mission, warring parties are still likely to believe that their goals can be achieved through military means if one or both of them continues to receive external support.

This study shows that judging success based on mandate fulfilment and concentrating only on a small set of potential factors for success may ultimately be of little value in making general claims about UN peacekeeping. By judging success and failure based on a broader set of criteria than has traditionally been employed, by considering a wide array of potential influences on rates of success, and by analysing missions from the perspective of both international involvement and the situation faced by peacekeeping forces, we can question a number of widely held views. However, much work remains to be done in determining how exactly these conditions contribute to the success of a mission as well as how they can be implemented in current and future conflicts.

NOTES

1. See Duane Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.4, 1997, pp.64–81.
2. See Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; William Dixon, 'Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement', *International Organization*, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.653–81; Duane Bratt, 'Peace Over Justice: Developing a Framework for Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts', *Global Governance*, Vol.5, No.1, 1999, pp.63–78.
3. Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, 'Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, p.152.
4. Bratt (see n.2 above), pp.64–5.
5. Anthony Lake, 'Peacekeeping: Defining Success', *Peace Colloquy*, No.1, 2002, pp.8–9, accessed at www.nd.edu/ ∼ krocinst/colloquy/issue1/feature_lake.html.
6. Bratt (see n.1 above); Dixon (see n.2 above); Paul Diehl, William Durch and Steven Ratner, 'Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, pp.151–65.

7. Bratt (see n.1 above).
8. *Hypothesis 1* advanced by William Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993; William Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990's*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996; Christine Gray, 'Peacekeeping After the *Brahimi Report*: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Vol.6, No.2, 2001, pp.267–88; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 'Intervention: Trends and Challenges', 1996, accessed at www.unu.edu/millennium/oudraat.pdf; Barbara Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, Vol.51, No.3, 1997, pp.334–64; Michael Wesley, *Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes and Failures of UN Missions to Civil Wars*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
9. Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p.197.
10. Gray (see n.8 above), p.271.
11. The mission received all 5,000 troops authorized and 561 of the 700 uniformed observers and policemen. United Nations, 'Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium: Facts and Figures', accessed at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untaes_p.htm.
12. David D. Latin, 'Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention', in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 160–63.
13. *Hypothesis 2*: Lincoln Bloomfield and Allen Moulton, *Managing International Conflict*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997; Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (see n.8 above); Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996; Donald Rothchild, 'Third-Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention', in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.35–66.
14. See arguments in Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.94, No.4, 2000, pp.779–801; Bloomfield and Moulton (see n.13 above); David Carment and Patrick James (eds), *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, Pittsburgh, IL: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997; Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele MacIver, 'The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.23, No.2, 1991, pp.127–42.
15. *Hypothesis 3*: Bloomfield and Moulton (see n.13 above); Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (see n.8 above); Hampson (see n.13 above); Lise Morjé Howard, 'UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.9, No.1, 2002, pp.99–132.
16. Hampson (see n.13 above), pp.729–33.
17. *Hypothesis 4*: Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004; Alan Henrikson, 'The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations', in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organizations and International Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Neil S. MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss, 'The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Regional Security', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.15, No.2, 1994, pp.277–95; Connie Peck, *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997; Thomas G. Weiss, *Beyond UN Subcontracting*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
18. MacFarlane and Weiss (see n.17 above); Peck (see n.17 above); Weiss (see n.17 above).
19. Henrikson (see n.17 above), p.125.
20. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (see n.17 above).
21. *Hypothesis 5*: Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, New York: Random House, 1971; John Groom, 'The Quest for Peace and Security', in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *International Institutions at Work*, London: Pinter, 1988, p.95; David Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', *International Security*, Vol.21, No.2, 1996, pp.41–75; Michael Lund, 'Conflict Prevention is Happening: Learning from "Successes" as Well as "Failures"', in Albrech Schnabel and David Carment (eds), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004, pp.289–304; Stephen J. Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991; Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995; William Zartman, *Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995.
22. *Hypothesis 6*: Diehl (see n.2 above); Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (see n.8 above); Milton Esman and Shibley Telhami (eds), *International Organization and Ethnic Conflict*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995; Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*,

Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995; Michael Steiner, 'Seven Principles for Building Peace', *World Policy Journal*, Vol.20, No.2, 2003, pp.87–93.

23. Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (see n.8 above), p.12.
24. *Hypothesis 7*: Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (see n.8 above); Stephen Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, 1996, pp.5–53; William Zartman, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments', *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol.1, No.1, 2001, pp.8–18.
25. Zartman (see n.21 above), pp.8–18.
26. Christopher Taylor, *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994*, Oxford: Berg, 1999, p.84.
27. *Hypothesis 8*: Roy Licklider (ed.), *Stopping the Killing*, New York: New York University Press, 1993; Barbara Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization*, Vol.51, No.3, 1997, pp.334–64; Wesley (see n.8 above).
28. Walter (see n.27 above), p.359.
29. *Hypothesis 9*: Ibid.
30. *Hypothesis 10*: Diehl (see n.2 above); Ryan (see n.22 above).
31. *Hypothesis 11*: Carment and James (see n.14 above); Diehl (see n.2 above); Jean Krasno, Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, 'Leveraging for Success', in Krasno, Daniel and Hayes (eds), *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp.235–47; Walter (see n.27 above).
32. *Hypothesis 12*: Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, 'Saving Failed States', *Foreign Policy*, no.89, Winter 1992–93, pp.3–20; Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*, New York: Harper & Row, 1975; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; Walter (see n.27 above).
33. This accords with Michael Brown's distinction between ethnic and clan-based warfare:

> the term 'ethnic conflict' is often used loosely to describe a wide range of intrastate conflicts that are not, in fact ethnic in character. The conflict in Somalia, for example, is occasionally referred to as an ethnic conflict even though Somalia is the most ethnically homogeneous country in Africa. The conflict in Somalia is not between rival ethnic groups, but between rival gangs, clans, and warlords, almost all of whom belong to the same Somali ethnic group.

Michael E. Brown, 'Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications', in Chester Crocker et al. (eds), *Turbulent Peace*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p.210.