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
EXPEDITIONARY NATO

This dependence on uniquely American capabilities became more evident as the Alliance reoriented its strategy toward other peace-support operations in Europe or expeditionary warfare beyond. A redefinition of peacekeeping proceeded against the backdrop of revolutionary changes in the conduct of war, demonstrated in the UN-mandated campaign to reverse the Iraqi invasion of the Persian Gulf state of Kuwait in August 1990, to which select NATO members made contributions. Both required capable, mobile, flexible, self-reliant, and tailored-to-need forward-deployed forces, usually on short notice, for rapid deployment in joint and often multinational operations. Although the mounting of multinational expeditionary operations overseas was a common practice of imperial powers in the nineteenth century, the limited wars and humanitarian interventions of the late twentieth century were governed by a different moral universe, in which the success or failure of military actions were judged according to exacting ethical and operational criteria.[1] New standards were themselves made conceivable by the emerging technologies and accompanying operational concepts commonly if somewhat sloppily referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These standards simultaneously ratcheted up accepted measurements of military success, highlighted the widening "capabilities gap" within NATO, and provoked debates on the appropriate application of force.

Peace-support and political trusteeship missions in Yugoslavia made the most immediate contributions to NATO's transformation. The Alliance's intervention in Bosnia had the effect of eclipsing its traditional role of collective defense in favor of a version of collective security. In contrast to the disinterested and altruistic Wilsonian approach, NATO's presence in Bosnia was the result of "multilateral intervention, undertaken with the implicit or explicit consensus of the major powers, directed against international aggression or internal conflict or disorder."[2]

The revision of collective security found in the United Nations Charter does not assume selfless motives on the part of the intervening powers. It provides that action can take place in cases that are not a matter of dispute among them. The Alliance intervened in Bosnia not to thwart the UN goals there but rather to pursue them more robustly. When the Clinton administration took the steps that lead to the Dayton Accords, altruism was not entirely absent. The United States had little of substance to gain by ending the fighting and little to lose by allowing it to continue.[3] The 1991 Persian Gulf War, by contrast, had the hard interest of the free flow of Middle Eastern oil as a primary motive for collective action. Yet its prosecution was as purely Wilsonian as a war is ever likely to be. It involved a collective response to a naked act of territorial aggression in violation of international law and was mandated by a succession of UN Security Council Resolutions. The defeat of Iraqi forces, lastly, was followed by a return to the international *status quo ante*.

What the Bosnian and Persian Gulf operations had in common was a significant qualification of coalitional warfare. Both were so dependent on American military capabilities and leadership that they would have been impossible in the absence of the requisite determination in Washington. Both operations were undertaken in the unusual international atmosphere of the immediate post–Cold War years, yet neither delivered a fundamental improvement in security—the 1991 Persian Gulf War was refought in 2003, while the jury remains out on the viability of a self-governing Bosnia. What is important for our purposes here is their profound impact on NATO as a military alliance and political community.

DESERT STORM

In organizing an international diplomatic response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States benefited from the liquidation of the Cold War order in Europe, above all in the form of Moscow's new policy of cooperation with the West. As a result of that cooperation the UN Security Council was able to meet its mandate in a fashion that had been impossible since the Korean War. By August 9, 1990, it had approved trade sanctions against Baghdad; when the combination of sanctions and diplomatic pressure failed to prompt an Iraqi withdrawal, the Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 678 authorizing "all necessary means" by member states to "restore international peace and security in the area" and set January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraqi compliance.

The international coalition fashioned by the Bush administration to put a credible threat of force behind the UN demands on behalf of the international community was extraordinary, as was the success of *Operation Desert Storm* in evicting the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Altogether, 540,000 personnel from 31 countries contributed in some capacity. Although *Desert Storm* was not a NATO operation, a sufficient number of member states were involved to make the Alliance a vehicle for the coordination within the coalition during the campaign and to raise the issue afterward as to whether NATO should remain regional or aspire to global reach.[4]

The radical implications of the latter for an organization shaped by fifty years of territorial defense of Western Europe are obvious. Among the states composing the multinational force for *Desert Storm*, only a minority offered wholehearted support of the war. Many governments wanted to demonstrate fidelity to the UN resolutions but were simultaneously troubled by ambivalent public opinion concerning the use of force. Besides the United States, a grouping of "Anglo-Saxon" countries—NATO members Britain and Canada, joined by Australia and New Zealand—demonstrated a readiness for war unmatched by other groups.[5]

Britain was far and away the most significant in the robustness of its diplomatic position and the size of its military contribution. The Thatcher government, backed by public opinion in favor not only of liberating Kuwait but also of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein, saw part of its role as a buttress to American resolve and contributed to the military effort an armored division amounting to almost a quarter of the entire British army. British forces were also fully integrated with U.S. forces and demonstrated from the outset a determination to be in the thick of the action.[6]

The French role in *Desert Storm* was in many respects a mirror image of the British. The notion that France needed to buy political influence within the coalition by making a serious military contribution was controversial within the Mitterrand cabinet. Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement consistently sought to limit the French role and to distance it as far as possible from Anglo-American actions. The posture was adopted possibly to give France standing in the event of a last minute search for a settlement, yet succeeded mostly in annoying the coalition allies and the French army itself. On the eve of the January 15 deadline for Iraqi compliance with Resolution 678, France made new proposals to the UN Security Council, calling for Iraqi withdrawal and suggesting a Middle East peace conference for some undetermined date in the future—a gambit of which France's European partners were not notified at a meeting the EC Foreign Ministers held that very morning. President Mitterrand ultimately put French forces under U.S. command, but the impression of half-heartedness created prior to the campaign was then reinforced by the modest contribution French aircraft were able to make due to technical shortcomings and interoperability problems once it was underway.[7]

Preoccupied with reunification, Germany was singularly slow to wake up to the growing probability of war in the Middle East. The Kohl government was further hampered by the largest antiwar demonstrations in Europe and a national intellectual community ostentatious in its concern for a nation cleansed of its militarist past. As a consequence, Germany's contribution was primarily financial, accounting for ten percent of the total cost of the war. But the revelation that German companies had been involved in supplying Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons program—a guilt aggravated by Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel—had as much to do with the size of Germany's subsidy as the merits of the international case against Iraq as an aggressor. In fact, Germany's hesitation regarding its obligation to defend Turkey, a NATO ally, in the event of Iraqi attacks suggested that the

post–Cold War Alliance might encounter "cohesion problems" even in subregional collective defense contingencies. The opposition Social Democrats were joined by some members of the governing coalition in arguing that by permitting U.S. aircraft to operate against Iraq from Turkish bases, Turkey had provoked Iraq to possible retaliation and thereby nullified German obligations under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Those who took this position under conditions of a UN-mandated war "appeared to run away from any German political or moral obligation whatsoever, let alone political debt" when Germany was being asked "only to grant a small fraction of the support which it had received over four decades."[8]

The contributions of smaller European states to the coalition effort in the Gulf varied considerably. The Netherlands backed military action due to the importance of the territorial integrity of the Middle Eastern states to Europe; its government put two frigates under U.S. command and sent Patriot missiles and support personnel to Turkey. At the other extreme, Belgium delayed sending naval vessels to the Gulf and sought a WEU blessing for doing so. Late in 1990 Belgium actually refused to sell ammunition to Britain. Prime Minister Thatcher characterized the European contribution to *Desert Storm* as "patchy and disappointing" and did not miss the chance to argue that it gave the lie to the many statements about a common foreign and security policy.[9]

At the time this verdict was somewhat premature, as was the expectation that NATO would be able to project power into the Persian Gulf with anything other than overwhelmingly American military capabilities. Euro-Atlantic perceptions and institutions had only just begun to adjust to post–Cold War reality. For that reason NATO's experience in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more telling in terms of the implications of the expeditionary era for the gap in military capabilities between the United States and its European allies. Whereas the first Persian Gulf War was an international crisis of the first order, the conflict in Bosnia was a regional European contingency that became a crisis in alliance management.

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA

Between 1992 and 1995 Bosnia divided NATO to an extent that imperiled the Clinton administration's slowly emerging vision for Europe. Inconsistency and genuine differences over policy, even among the Europeans, were partly to blame for this. In the first phase of Yugoslavia's disintegration, German support for Slovenian and Croatian secession ran up against open French sympathy for Serbia. When the Slovenian and Croatian episodes led to the secession of Bosnia-Herzogovina, Britain and France dispatched troops under UN auspices to provide humanitarian aid in the republic while the United Nations embargoed all military aid to the Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslim parties to the conflict. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia painfully constructed by the United Nations and the European Community then proposed to partition Bosnia into ten ethnically based cantons.

The Clinton administration rejected the Vance-Owen Plan on the grounds that it essentially rewarded Serbian military successes and was unfair to Bosnia's Muslims both in its ethnic definition of nationhood and the unequal impact of the arms embargo.[10] Its preference for a "lift-and-strike" approach in defending the Muslim population, lifting the embargo on arms supplies to them while subjecting the Serbs to such punitive air strikes as would motivate them to negotiate—failed to secure European participation due to the vulnerability of lightly armed British and French troops in Bosnia to retaliation by Serb forces.

Clinton also sought to separate events on the ground in Bosnia, along with transatlantic differences about how to respond, from the issue of NATO enlargement as he moved toward a decision in 1994. At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December of that year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher insisted that the continuing chaos in Bosnia "does not diminish our responsibility to build a comprehensive European security architecture that consolidates stability."[11] The fact that Bosnia could render such an architectural enterprise irrelevant, however, brought Clinton to realize that, even if Bosnia itself was not so vital as to justify the deployment of American ground troops, the unity of NATO was. He therefore pushed the United Nations aside to end the Bosnian bloodshed but also to end NATO disunity. *Operation Deliberate Force*, NATO's precision bombing of Serb military positions, broke the siege of Sarajevo and paved the way for the peace accord brokered by Clinton at Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, among the three parties to the Bosnian conflict for a multiethnic and federal Bosnian republic. Its guarantee was the deployment of 60,000 NATO troops, 20,000 of them American. The Dayton Accords had the effect of ensuring NATO's transformation in two critical ways. First, it stressed the new priority of extending the stability of Western Europe eastward and did so with a military presence involving American boots on the ground. Second, it underscored the commitment to NATO enlargement and drew together its two strands, formal admission and regional crisis management, when discussions convened with the Visegrad states about the terms of Alliance membership even as the implementation of Dayton made Bosnia a NATO protectorate.[12]

The Bosnian episode was, additionally, "the means by which the Europeans trapped the United States into taking a role of leadership toward the conflict,"[13] a goal dating to Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and a measure of European military impotence. It was less NATO than American airpower that brought Serbia to heel. Of a total of 3,515 sorties flown, the United States accounted for 2,318 or 65.9 percent; of the 1,026 bombs and missiles used, the fact that 708 were precision-guided munitions (PGMs) permitted the air campaign to achieve the fastest possible results while minimizing collateral damage and casualties. *Deliberate Force* expended in total about the equivalent of a busy day's munitions for *Desert Storm* and required nowhere near an equivalent expeditionary capacity from the participating forces.[14] Yet the precision needed for the application of force in what was in large part a humanitarian effort "highlighted the mismatch between the EU's declared foreign policy objectives and the means available to achieve those objectives"[15] in a fashion that *Desert Storm* never could have.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept approved by the Brussels summit of 1994 was an integral part of the effort to adapt the Alliance's political and military structures to non–Article V missions and to reflect the aspirations of the European states for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO through the European institution of the Western European Union (WEU). The fact that a good deal of fudge was applied in order to win consensus on the change — such as the statement that WEU and NATO functions were to be "separate but not separable" — testifies to the urgency given to institutional innovation for building the European pillar without appearing to qualify Atlantic unity. If an ESDI worthy of the name was nowhere in evidence prior to the Dayton Accords, the history of failure before 1995 could be compensated somewhat by genuinely joint efforts in enforcing Bosnia's peace. A de facto CJTF emerged in the form of the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the enforcement of the military aspects of the accords. Both IFOR and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which replaced it in December 1996, were NATO-dominated multinational forces that included non-NATO members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).[16] If the purpose of CJTFs during a transitional phase in NATO's life was to raise the European while lowering the American profile, however, the contribution of IFOR and SFOR was limited. When the schedule was initially set for SFOR to operate from December 1996 to June 1998, the European Allies, including France, insisted that the force would have to include American ground forces. In early 1998 the Clinton administration acknowledged that a deadline for the withdrawal of American troops would be unrealistic and effectively "relinquished the vain hope that Europeans would carry the military burden while Americans provided only communications and logistical services."[17]

THE CAPABILITIES GAP

In the defense and security community the discussion of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its possible impact on NATO's effectiveness and cohesion meanwhile became the *basso continuo* of the Alliance's missions in the 1990s. Among the more serviceable definitions of an RMA is that it occurs "when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict."[18] For a wide swath of opinion among defense intellectuals in the United States there was a consensus that "such an RMA is now occurring and those who understand it and take advantage of it will enjoy a decisive advantage on future battlefields."[19] While other analysts considered this judgment "eminently contestable," the revolutionary potential of advanced technologies — in particular "the use of information technology to gain strategic advantage by networking one's forces, gaining complete knowledge of the battle, and striking from any range with near-perfect precision"[20] — assumed a position of privilege in Washington's vision of the military future. In that vision, the use

of dispersed yet integrated forces enables one to attack all enemy targets from all ranges while it remains comparatively more difficult for the enemy to engage effectively in response. As important as the possession of technologies is, it is the development of innovative doctrine, tactics, training, and organization for their use that produces transformative results.

The evolution of modern war suggests that decisive advantage can turn out to be a strangely elusive goal when too much is expected from technology alone. To expect that technological or conceptual innovation will eliminate either the "friction" or "fog" of war could turn out to be the gravest of follies.[21] During the 1990s Americans and Europeans differed significantly over the meaning of airpower, precision munitions, and information technology for the future of war. The disagreement was to some extent explained by the wide differential in technological capabilities alone. But it was also influenced by a difference in strategic culture and the stress that the American way of war has historically placed on exploiting technological advantage to the fullest. "In and of itself, a quest for technical improvement is strategically innocent," notes a prominent critic of American strategic tradition, but if "the benefit of better military tools becomes an article of faith in the power of machines, great harm can be done."[22] Moreover, although progress in electronics and computer systems is genuinely revolutionary, it is much slower in other areas equally important in the prosecution of war: propulsion systems, aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, the explosive power of conventional ordnance, and the strength of armor.[23] Among military professionals most qualified to make experienced judgment, there is prudent caution about — tinged with healthy curiosity about the potential of — new technologies with direct or indirect military applications.

The major European Allies did not really counter American enthusiasm with skepticism. Rather, a general consensus among them that Europe needed to contribute more flexible and mobile forces to NATO's capabilities, both for the sake of genuine burden-sharing and of a stronger and more influential European pillar, ran up against the fact that none of them individually had the economic and technological base to pursue a national RMA, while any collective will to do so was tentative at best. Despite the enormous progress made in integration since the mid-1980s, the New Europe lagged well behind the United States in the exploitation of information technologies as well as in the adjustment to economic globalization.[24] The global commitments shouldered by the United States since the 1950s pushed Washington's defense planners to think instinctively about the application of new technologies to force mobility and flexibility. The narrower strategic horizons of post-Suez Europe and NATO's internal division of labor during the Cold War undercut any European need to do the same.

Still, to the extent that the development of post–Cold War doctrine in NATO stresses the development of highly mobile rapid reaction forces, European states with an expeditionary military tradition will be conversant with American strategic thinking and interested in acquiring certain new capabilities. A selective European abstinence from revolutionary technologies, meanwhile, is not of itself terminal to NATO effectiveness and unity. As long as a basic conceptual coherence

is present, rooted in general agreement on the most probable adversaries and deployment scenarios—as well as on the most appropriate array of political and military means with which to act—allies can function in unison and yet disagree on the longer-term military implications of what they accomplish together.[25] The CFTFs developed in line with NATO's *New Strategic Concept* during the mid-1990s reflected such an agreement. Based on the assumption that non-Article V regional crisis-management scenarios on the European periphery as in Yugoslavia would be the alliance's most common deployment scenario of the future, the borrowing of "separable but not separate" NATO assets for missions from which the United States might want to abstain represented a commitment to flexibility in fashioning coalitions-of-the-willing for non-Article V missions.[26] Also implied was the notion that NATO might become involved in crises beyond Europe and would have to work together with non-NATO countries.[27] Although the CJTFs were intended for operations such as peacekeeping and crisis intervention, they could in principle be developed for a wider spectrum of contingencies, including large-scale power projection and high-intensity conflict. In theory, then, the requirements identified for effective CJTFs could focus attention on the specific RMA capabilities—and non-RMA capabilities—needed by the European allies in order to operate in coalition with each other and the United States. European forces would need greater flexibility and mobility for rapid deployment, along with the command and communications that would enable them to work with each other as well as with U.S. forces. The capabilities gap could be narrowed *à la carte*.[28]

Yet it is unlikely to satisfy the appetite of European capitals for either the symbol or the substance of greater European self-reliance. The Eurocorps, a Franco-German initiative dating to 1983 was made official by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in 1991 with the announcement that a European force would be built upon the foundation of the 4,200-strong Franco-German Brigade. French interest in the Eurocorps was linked to a genuine concern about over-reliance on the United States, while the German government viewed its integrative aspect as a worthwhile political end in itself rather than a step toward enhanced European capabilities.[29] Given the size of the Eurocorps, its value could be deemed primarily symbolic, but to leave it at this is to obscure important differences between French and German policy in the 1990s. Unapologetic for the commitment of considerable fiscal resources to robust military capability and determined to redress its military liabilities in the first half of the twentieth century, France has since de Gaulle maintained strong conventional and nuclear forces and has placed a premium on autonomy and freedom of independent action. The presidencies of Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac attempted to renegotiate France's relationship with NATO, in order to engage closely in Alliance affairs and exert influence on its strategic orientation in a post–Cold War environment while simultaneously promoting ESDI to reduce European reliance on the United States. Mitterrand's promotion of rapid reaction forces was a skilful but modest diplomatic exploitation of the European security crisis of the 1980s, characterized from the French perspective by Washington's confrontational stance with Moscow and the growth of the

German peace movement in response. His efforts to renew the Franco-German partnership, revitalize the Western European Union, and develop the Eurocorps were a corollary to his 1983 speech to the Bundestag supporting the Kohl government on the INF deployments. Stiffening West German resolve while developing a security partnership with Bonn was Mitterrand's contribution to the Gaullist tradition—a balance-of-power policy that was also revisionist in that it promoted greater European unity between the superpowers.[30]

His successor, Jacques Chirac, attempted a strategic revolution. He did this by building upon the Europeanization begun by Mitterrand but also by exploiting changed perceptions brought on by post–Cold War crises in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia. Simply put, French forces under Chirac "changed from focusing on territorial, nuclear deterrence to conventional force projections beyond the national territory."[31] The Gulf War was of cardinal importance in bringing this about. In 1991 France had 670,137 armed forces personnel (300,000 professionals and 240,000 conscripts) of whom 20,000 were involved in *Operation Desert Storm*. Yet their deployment was so awkward in the execution due to inappropriate equipment and inadequate logistics that the campaign has been cited as the moment when first-order military reform was placed on the national agenda.[32]

Certain trial-and-error initiatives, such as the gambit to place NATO's AFSOUTH under European command, failed spectacularly. But generally the Chirac reforms involved improvements to the conceptual vision of the 1994 White Paper on Defense prepared under the Mitterrand presidency. They were broadly in harmony with ESDI as well as the modular command structure and expeditionary mission of NATO's CJTF blueprint. Not least of all, the White Paper acknowledged explicitly that NATO represented the principal organization of Europe's defense and proposed a strengthened WEU for a complementary role. Although France initially opposed direct NATO involvement in Yugoslavia for fear that it would turn into a military confrontation with the Serbs and possibly antagonize Russia, by the summer of 1993 Paris had agreed to the deployment of a large peacekeeping contingent to Bosnia.[33] When progress on the reforms was stalled by Chirac's loss of a legislative majority in 1997, the Kosovo crisis of 1998–1999 permitted him to roll with the punches and realize new gains. To a considerable extent, *Operation Allied Force* in Kosovo, the subject of more detailed attention in Chapter 4, made the projects of French doctrinal reform and enhanced European defense capabilities one and the same undertaking.

In sum, the Chirac reforms were revolutionary because they placed a new stress on conventional force projection as opposed to national and nuclear priorities, sought a new relationship with NATO, and signaled a transition toward expeditionary warfare.[34] By the end of the decade France constituted in American eyes, a "pivotal security partner," with 46,000 military personnel outside its borders or in its territories, engaged diplomatically and militarily in NATO's Yugoslavian commitments.[35] The French government remained painfully aware of the capabilities gap and of the implications of the RMA for any ESDI worthy of the name, but on-the-ground changes were very significant. France remained officially committed to

a unilateral capacity to secure national interests, but the renovation of its forces were increasingly focused on a smaller, professionalized army; the need to project expeditionary forces; and the imperative to provide corresponding joint and protect expeditionary forces to work with allied forces. In confronting operability theater command resources to work with allied forces. In confronting operability problems, the French army stressed three areas of special attention: equipment, information systems, and procedures.[36] Projects such as the Helios satellite intelligence system were considered European investments; on the other hand, France's new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, *Charles de Gaulle*, was designed to be compatible with U.S. Navy F/A 18s and had the same catapult and arresting gear as American *Nimitz*-class carriers.[37]

It is worth noting that Chirac's ambitions for military reform were influenced by the superior performance of British forces during the Gulf War. If France began in the 1990s to move its conventional forces in the direction of expeditionary warfare conducted by highly mobile, rapid-reaction forces in joint operations with NATO allies, the armed services of the United Kingdom provided much of the model for change. That being the case, the *Strategic Defence Review* completed by the government of Tony Blair in 1998 was among the most important national documents of the decade dealing with European security. Its chapter on Defence Missions and Tasks highlighted peacetime security, overseas territories, defense diplomacy, wider British interests, peace support and humanitarian operations, regional conflicts outside NATO, regional threats to NATO, and strategic attack on NATO.[38] The SDR planned for a new generation of military equipment by 2015, including attack helicopters; long-range precision munitions; digitized command-and-control systems; a new generation of aircraft carriers, submarines, and escorts; the Eurofighter, a successor to the Tornado bomber; and a replacement Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing aircraft (STOVL) to replace the Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft—the latter covered (as of January 17, 2001) by the U.S.-UK agreement on the Joint Strike Fighter.[39]

On the impact of new technologies, the SDR did not accept the RMA as a given in the sense common to American defense intellectuals. It noted that "there is a growing body of opinion, particularly in the United States, that we are approaching a Revolution in Military Affairs," and concluded that "leaving aside the academic debate on whether or not a revolution is underway," it is clear that exploiting new technologies will "lead to significant improvements in military capability."[40] Neither did the SDR focus on closing the transatlantic gap in defense capabilities. It advised instead that, if Britain and the European allies can "tap into" technology led by the United States, "the result will be more effective coalition operations."[41] The price of failing to do so intelligently could turn out to be high:

> There is a potential for multinational operations to become more difficult if compatible capabilities are not preserved. This could lead to political as well as military problems. Our priority must therefore be to ensure that we maintain the ability to make a high quality contribution to multinational operations and to operate closely with U.S. forces throughout the spectrum of potential operations. To do this

> we need to be selective about the technologies we develop nationally or on a European basis, and be prepared to use U.S. technologies in other areas. . . .[42]

Selectivity between developing or purchasing new capabilities was at the root of what the UK Ministry of Defence called "smart acquisition." Smart acquisition was based on the notion that acquiring new capabilities rather than new weapons was the goal of defense investment. By "leaving the supplier greater freedom to determine how best to deliver the desired outcome," the customer could get more "value for money"—defined as the solution that meets the capability requirement at the lowest through-life cost.[43] In other words, the SDR was concerned primarily with acquiring new, even "revolutionary," capabilities without a dramatic increase in defense expenditure and was only secondarily interested in whether new technologies are American or European in origin. The market was to compete for Her Majesty's defense budget. Of equal importance to the strategic vision in the 1990s is the fact that Prime Minister Blair intended to redirect British policy on the EU away from the Euro-skepticism dominant in the Conservative governments of the Thatcher-Major years. The question of British membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) had divided and weakened Conservative governments. It was over the issue of an American or European partnership for the ailing Westland helicopter manufacturer that the Thatcher government had lost its Defence Minister, Michael Heseltine, who unsuccessfully advocated the European option and later became a threat for the Tory leadership.[44]

On coming to office in 1997, furthermore, Blair had been dismayed by the lack of collective defense capacity among the EU's major powers. His summit meeting with President Chirac in Saint-Malô summit therefore represents a landmark event in that, after nearly fifty years of opposition to the idea, the United Kingdom consented in principle that the EU should have a role in defense and security. As Chirac put it, such a role would not be effective without "the two countries which are amongst those with a strong tradition, both diplomatically and militarily."[45] Beyond the possession of nuclear weapons, the common tradition to which Chirac referred was the maintenance of comparatively robust conventional forces with an expeditionary culture. The great virtue of the meeting at Saint-Malô was as a public expression of impatience. In a contest between the goals of European integration and the imperative of enhanced European military capacity, it was evident that any Anglo-French initiative genuinely serious about the latter could not wait for the EU's plodding multilateralism to deal with a challenge that could at least be engaged bilaterally. Two years after the Saint-Malô meeting a British parliamentary progress report on ESDI observed both that European defense budgets remained too modest for the EU to become less dependent on NATO and that France and the UK "have provided the driving force behind the reinvigorated search for a more capable European defence pillar."[46] At the very least the summit reflected the Blair government's conviction that the United States would no longer underwrite European security as dutifully or as comprehensively as during the Cold War. Putting muscle on the bones of an ESDI—or a bilateral program dressed up as an ESDI—is a hedge

against American disengagement from Europe.[47] By the late 1990s intensive Anglo-French cooperation constituted *the* critical factor in any measure of European self-reliance, for without it there could be no ESDI.

This is because Germany will for the time being remain more of a spectator than a participant in any effort to reconfigure European defense capabilities to the requirements of expeditionary warfare. In so far as the *Bundeswehr* was a political and military creature of the Cold War, constituted as a peoples' army and equipped for the territorial defense of Western Europe against Soviet invasion, it is singularly ill-suited to the challenge of mobile crisis management. In the mid-1980s the *Bundeswehr* constituted by far the most powerful conventional force among the eight armies that together composed NATO's central front in Europe. Its total strength stood at 700,000, the hard core of which organized 345,000 men into 36 fully manned brigades forming 12 divisions in 3 main army corps.[48] One particularly sound observation about post–Cold War Germany is that its armed forces have already been through a revolution of sorts. In addition to the heavy costs of national reunification, a good deal of the burden of reintegrating Eastern Europe into the liberal-democratic world has also been shouldered by Germany. This included the absorption of the East German *Nationale Volksarmee* and the contraction of its manpower strength from 495,000 to 340,000. The air force was reduced to 500 combat aircraft, well below its CFE ceiling of 900. In 1993, financial constraints were cited as the reason for still further reductions.[49] Collectively, the changes imposed on the *Bundeswehr* were the most radical since its creation by the Adenauer government of the 1950s.

What they did not constitute, however, was a structural transformation from territorial defense to expeditionary warfare. The verdict of *Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur* Harald Kujat as of March 2001 was that Germany's forces needed both revenue and revitalization "from the foundations up" to punch their weight among NATO allies.[50]

The most comprehensive recent review of the *Bundeswehr's* current condition and future needs is that of the commission headed by former *Bundespräsident* Richard von Weizsäcker. Released in the spring of 2000, the commission's recommendations were sweeping. They were based not only on the assumption that Germany's security circumstance has changed fundamentally but also that the change was likely to be durable, especially as it would take a recidivist Russian Federation a decade to again pose a credible danger to Germany's security.[51] The document maintained furthermore that the size, and to a certain extent the structure, of British and French conventional forces ought to be the benchmark goal of *Bundeswehr* reform, while acknowledging that Germany was presently in no position to approximate the capabilities of either country.

Nonetheless, the commission advised that reform should concentrate on building a rapid reaction capability to prosecute coalition warfare in two crises simultaneously.[52] While the report also featured the customary platitudes concerning Germany's Atlantic and European responsibilities — insisting that regional crisis management and Article V missions receive equal attention — the

thrust of its substantive recommendations stressed the former: smaller and much more mobile forces featuring a much lower percentage of conscripts. While overall strength would be cut from 338,000 to 240,000 troops, the preference for a radically improved crisis-management capacity was most visible in the recommendation that operational strength jump from 60,000 to 140,000 troops.[53] The shopping list of procurement priorities was long. Integral to the logic of the report was that — barring an unlikely steep increase in defense expenditure — the proportion of new investment in the total defense budget should be increased through savings in personnel and maintenance costs.[54]

Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping and the *Bundeswehr* Inspector General found the report too radical. In defense review studies of their own they rejected the Weizsäcker recommendations on force strength and base closures, arguing that the *Bundeswehr* was the biggest employer in many of Germany's rural districts and that enabling conscripts to do their service close to home would preserve the military's relationship with civil society. Both reports favored the retention of a balance of collective defense and peace support capacities and shied away from the changes that would transform the *Bundeswehr* into a power projection force.[55] Although the Weizsäcker commission suggested a reconstitution of the draft into a system of selective service rather than outright abolition, Scharping opposed the change as inconsistent with the constitutional legitimacy of the *Bundeswehr* and had the support of the CDU-CSU opposition on this point. Because the retention of conscription limited the savings to be realized by force reductions — even though the Defense Ministry acquiesced in austerities on the defense budget imposed by the Finance Ministry — Germany found it difficult to meet the goals of the Scharping report and was further still from those proposed by the Weizsäcker study.[56]

Not surprisingly, the prediction of one of the most extensive scholarly studies of German security policy concluded that it "will continue to be marked by a degree of multilateralism, anti-militarism, and reticence that will make it exceptional for a country of Germany's size and resources."[57] To the politico-cultural limitations to radical change clearly evident in Sharping's thinking, however, must be added the significance of the structural changes a modern *Bundeswehr* would require, according to the Weizsäcker commission, and a national fiscal environment that prohibits them. The defense debate in Germany in the 1990s was *not* driven by the RMA and a national strategic vision of Germany's role within it. Rather, the issue of a restructured *Bundeswehr* was a continuation of post–Cold War downsizing running into a good deal of political resistance — and running well behind strategic reality.[58]

The more grotesque inconsistencies of Germany's post–Cold War adjustments were over by the late 1990s, and there was official recognition in principle that Germany and Europe had a responsibility to take on an equitable share of international security tasks. Still, any attempt to professionalize Germany's armed forces — as in France, Belgium, or the Netherlands — would be very sensitive politically. By the end of the decade, official American skepticism that the European NATO states were genuinely prepared to assume a greater military burden usually cited

the case of Germany, the EU's largest economy, committing roughly 1.3 percent of its GDP to defense expenditure.[59] A robustly multilateral European effort also had little chance, and there was scarce evidence that this was about to change any time soon. Instead, there was a trend among the European states, due to the modest defense budgets, toward differing degrees rationalizations brought on by modest defense budgets, toward differing degrees of defense national specialization and bilateral innovations based on regional interests or compatible capabilities—the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force and the German/Netherlands Corp HQ representing two examples.

Of the major European allies most attractive militarily to the United States as coalition partners—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—Germany is currently a poor candidate for anything beyond the most modest participation in RMA capabilities. For their part, France and the UK were strong promoters of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) established at the 1999 EU summit a year after the Blair-Chirac meeting at Saint-Malô.

The issues of distinctly European defense and security robustness and the gap in alliance capabilities came to the fore of the Atlantic agenda in NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI was primarily concerned with the gap in a wide array of military capabilities between the United States and its European allies, many if not all of which are related to the RMA. By September 2001 the DCI had listed no fewer than 59 decision areas grouped into five categories: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of force and infrastructure; NATO-level command, control, and communications (C^3). The HHG called for the creation by 2003 of a European force capable of undertaking the full range of "Petersberg Tasks,"[60] including the most demanding operations. In concrete terms this meant a force of 50–60,000 troops with provision for support and rotation, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year. The relationship between the DCI and the HHG is clear: In order even to approximate the latter, serious progress would have to be made through the long shopping list of the former. While virtually all of the DCI's five priority areas spoke to the requirements of CJTFs and were thus adjustments to the post–Cold War security environment from territorial defense to expeditionary missions, the last three—effective engagement, survivability of force and infrastructure, and C^3— were *necessarily* connected to the advanced technologies associated with the RMA. This meant in principle that both the cause of greater European self-reliance and the goal of narrowing the capabilities gap would be served by concentrating resources on those technologies critical to the effectiveness of CJTFs, for contingencies ranging from peacekeeping to coalition war fighting.

The DCI and HHG initiatives, influenced by the vision of NATO's *New Strategic Concept* and the concrete experiences of Bosnia and the Persian Gulf, concentrated overwhelmingly on narrowing the differential in capabilities between the United States and the European allies, both in pursuit of more effective coalition operations and of a higher degree of European self-reliance. The onset of the third stage of Yugoslavia's disintegration demonstrated again the validity of both concerns. But additionally, it broadened yet again the horizons of change for the

Atlantic Alliance by provoking debate on the legitimacy of waging "humanitarian war," its appropriate prosecution, and the sacrifices NATO states were prepared to accept in order to satisfy the humanitarian impulse.

HUMANITARIAN WAR

When events in Bosnia in 1992 introduced the term *ethnic cleansing* to the popular Western vocabulary, the Bush administration warned Belgrade that the United States would consider unilateral military action in response to similar atrocities carried out by the rump Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in its southern province of Kosovo. The warning might have been forgotten after Bush's departure from office, had it not been reiterated by the Clinton administration the following year. The fact that ethnic Albanian Muslims constituted 95 percent of the population in Kosovo meant that conflict there had a greater potential to involve neighboring states, among them NATO allies and hereditary foes such as Greece and Turkey, than was the case in Bosnia. Washington could not consider ethnic cleansing in Kosovo a purely Serbian affair.[61]

And yet the Dayton Accords of 1995 contributed indirectly to the probability of just such a contingency. The province had never been a republic of the Yugoslav federation but had nonetheless enjoyed a degree of self-governing autonomy—an autonomy of which it was stripped by the Serb nationalist government of Slobodan Milošević in 1989. Dayton's attention to ethnic consociational governing arrangements for Bosnia, and its comparative neglect of politically charged ethnic tensions in Kosovo, left the Albanian Muslims of the province a despised minority within the larger Serb republic. This undercut the position of the moderate federalists in Ibrahim Rogova's Democratic League of Kosovo and prompted the more militant Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to carry out assassinations of Serbian army and police personnel in 1996. Dayton told autonomists in Kosovo that the diplomatic metal was not hot enough to make the principle of self-determination work for them, so the KLA decided to make it glow. Events in the Drenica region of the province from February 28 to March 7, 1998—starting with small engagements between KLA units and Serb police and ending in retaliatory actions by the latter against the Albanian villages of Prekaz i Ulët and Llausha, in which whole families and clans were killed—transported Kosovo beyond the point where a peaceful settlement was likely.

A "Contact Group," initially composed of the United States, Russia, Britain, and France to deal with Bosnia but enlarged to include Germany and Italy, turned its attention increasingly to Kosovo during 1998. Britain and France then cosponsored negotiations between Serb and Albanian representatives under the auspices of the Contact Group at Rambouillet Castle near Paris in February 1999. More important, however, was a statement issued January 30 by the North Atlantic Council on NATO's behalf in which events in Kosovo were designated "a threat to international peace and security." The statement expressed NATO's determination

to avert a "humanitarian catastrophe," and demanded that the Milošević government reduce the Serb army and police presence in Kosovo or face NATO air strikes.[62] The parallel development of plans for a 30,000-strong NATO-led implementation force to maintain peace in Kosovo reflected the lessons of Bosnia, in terms both of skepticism that Belgrade could be trusted to hold to any agreement or that the United Nations could enforce it. The Rambouillet talks may have been interpreted in Belgrade as a partial climb-down from the intervention threats posted earlier by Bush and Clinton.[63] Whatever its reasoning, the Milošević government did not take Rambouillet seriously. It rejected outright any deployments of NATO forces to Kosovo to monitor compliance with an agreement and was supported diplomatically by Russia in its rejection. Even as the talks proceeded, the Milošević government made plans for a new round of repression in the province.[64]

The change in Western attitudes on Kosovo relative to Bosnia were quite striking. At Rambouillet it was not the EU but Britain and France, militarily the most powerful West Europeans, whose governments most forthrightly represented the viewpoint of the New Europe. Additionally, the Bosnian experience encouraged the Clinton administration to be at the ready with threats of force, both unilateral and through NATO, and to influence the proceedings at Rambouillet with such threats. The memory of Bosnia still fresh, the scale of the suffering in Kosovo too was such that the grounds for a justification for intervention were shifting. As the Rambouillet talks failed, NATO eclipsed all other international organizations officially mandated with crisis management and peacekeeping and finally brushed aside the very principle of sovereignty under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

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