2 The EU's role in international crisis management

Innovative model or emulated script?

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The last decade has seen the emergence and consolidation of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) together with its wide range of crisis management tools. The EU has thus shifted towards an active international role in crisis management. Crucially however, the success of CSDP has relied to a great extent on the expansion of its civilian aspect, initially encompassing police reform and rule of law with the inclusion over time of security sector reform. This has driven the development of the policy despite a more controversial, and initially hardly expanded, military dimension and provided sufficient impetus while the military and civilian-military projects were far from operational (Kurowska 2008). Simultaneously, we have witnessed a robust externalization of the EU's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) wherein border management issues and readmission agreements constitute an important way of shaping systemic reform in the EU's neighbourhood. These represent an instance of EU's statebuilding practices with statebuilding understood as the externally-assisted construction and reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure. Highly invasive forms of external regulation, they are regarded as a legitimate way of assisting disadvantaged communities if they are sought or requested. With the example of the EU, we see however that policies of statebuilding have become an important crisis management, or better put crisis prevention, strategy.

Different forms of non-military intervention aimed at moulding the outside environment in the pursuit of one's own security are hardly a novelty in international politics. Yet the EU's civil-military crisis management and external dimension of JHA acquire their own if contentious contours vis-à-vis the EU's rebranding on the global stage. The phenomenon seems to render moot the question whether the rise of ESDP demolishes the civilian character of the EU. What we witness instead is an accommodation of EU's purported strengths (e.g. development assistance, promotion of good governance and security sector reform) in the context of what Anderson and Seitz term the new global insecurity environment (NGIE) (2009). Surely, the EU is hardly the sole actor in this conundrum. Its role has emerged in tight interaction with other players. In the chapter, we use the heuristic perspective of the EU-US-UN dynamics to draw out this shifting interdependence of expectations and roles. We outline a pattern of role assignments that has emerged and consider the strategies of statebuilding demonstrated by EU and US to examine

whether they represent different approaches to shaping 'the other' and thus an attempt to protect 'the self'.

We start with an outline of the role approach and its analytical purchase for grasping the politics of the international crisis management of today. We then go on to the analysis of different meanings of multilateralism which are significant for the understanding of the international role assignments as they correspond to visions of justifiable international cooperation. Substantively, we then look into statebuilding as a crisis management strategy of an increasing importance and differentiate it from the US label of nation-building. The EU's approach is thus juxtaposed with a historical background of the US case. This is to discuss in the conclusion whether the EU and US models are indeed radically different in their strategies of statebuilding, and if the latter inevitably smacks of 'imperialism'. In this context, we consider whether the EU's conduct represents an innovative model, or it rather borrows from the US historical experience, even if not deliberately, or to the same effect. As we argue, the existing differentiation, based to a large extent on the international perception of EU and US, should be played upon towards a more effective cooperation and division of labour.

Role approach to the EU internationality

International politics is inherently a theatre of contention, a daily struggle over meaning permeated by strategic interaction undertaken by actors in pursuit of particular agendas. Here role performance proceeds through intense image management where commitments declared are extensively framed to be followed. However, the image of meticulously designed and religiously implemented strategies is misleading for understanding the rules of the game underpinning international politics at any given time. So might be the notion that the international role of a post-Westphalian actor depends on how it conceptualizes itself (Larsen 2002: 286) and that for the postmodern state, as for the individual, identity is a matter of choice (Cooper 2003: 173). These fail to capture the social nature of role formation. Roles refer in this context to patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour and are determined both by an actor's own conceptions and the role prescriptions of others (Holsti 1970: 238–39). A role of an internationally present actor thus involves a claim on the international system, recognition thereof by other international actors, and a conception of an identity (Le Prestre 1997: 5–6). While 'the sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions' (Wendt 1999: 227), the roles an actor engages in are an effect of learning and socialization in interactive negotiation processes where self-conceptions are confronted with expectations (Aggestam 2004b). Expectations thus emerge in the process of interaction and in the dense web of meanings that each of the partners assigns to its own and others' position in international security. Accordingly, the establishment of roles is only possible within the engagement with other actors. While role assignments are not inherently malleable since their very existence induces a degree of orderly arrangement, they are hardly constant.

This process has multiple sources and, rather than being a result of a structural distribution of power, it takes shapes through the interplay of overlapping and cross-fertilising (self-)expectations, thereby allowing for considerable scope of 'role-playing' and room for manoeuvre. The shifting meanings of multilateralism and the differentiated perception of the EU and US in international crisis management illustrate the point.

Whereas the current 'distribution of expectations' in the EU-US-UN triangle has deep historico-ideational roots, the consolidation of the EU crisis management projects, conspicuously through ESDP and more quietly via the external dimension of JHA, sets new parameters for role-taking by the partners to the relationship. One may ask whether a specific cluster of role assignments amounts to a new international/security order. Depending on the definition of an international order adopted, i.e. whether we are after its thick version or remain satisfied with any indicators of quasi-orderly arrangement, the answer varies significantly. Similarly, the conceptualization hinges on whether the state-centeredness is a nucleus of the approach, or whether transnational and domestic dimensions are factored in. The proposition of the EU-US-UN functionally differentiated triad as a useful take on the problem deviates from the state-centred view. After Buzan and Little (2000: 87), we argue that it is functional units' differentiation, i.e. the specialization within a system, that is key to understanding change in international systems. Here the differentiation is expressed by the role assignment that becomes stabilized through contextual recurrent patterns of interaction that give rise to practices regulating the code of conduct in international politics. This further indicates the possibility of many such arrangements simultaneously unfolding, overlapping and permeating each other.

The analysis of the EU's crisis management initiatives and their recognition (including condescension towards it) is instructive for understanding one such instance. The initial US suspicion towards CSDP has evolved towards a pragmatic recognition of its value. The UN has embraced the development of EU crisis management capacities and advocated for its more extensive employment. The development of CSDP remains the venture point of the analysis but it should be seen against the broader EU's statebuilding repertoire. This reflects a more contextual picture of CSDP where a security and defence policy is mobilized to influence the systemic reform in the neighbourhood via civilian projects rather than expeditionary statebuilding of a military nature.

Performers – the EU and its significant others

Arguably, the EU is unique in a number of aspects: in its constitutive features and the character of its goals and values; in the configuration of political instruments used; and in its peculiar institutional construction (Elgström and Smith 2006: 2). Still, and as the neorealist argument has it (Hyde-Price 2006: 222),[1] similar to traditional great powers, the EU's objectives are framed as milieu goals which aim to shape the environment in which the actor operates (Hyde-Price 2006). Less sympathetic critics of the EU's assertiveness maintain that this ambition of

shaping the neighbourhood reveals a policy of nascent neo-colonialism, even if vigorously denied (Chandler 2006). The enhanced focus on effective multilateralism with the aim to transfer the European miracle to the rest of the world would here be a current version of Europe's new 'mission civilisatrice' (Kagan 2004: 61). This would fit hand in glove with a traditional utopianism of projecting an EU as an ideal model (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002), seeing the EU as a 'force for good' in international relations (Pace 2008) and CSDP as a mission for humanity (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006).

In order to generate a more rigorous insight, rather than embracing the structural argument to counter the claim of the EU's uniqueness, we conceive of the EU's role within interaction with its significant others. Here the European Security Strategy (ESS) shows that the EU's rebranding does not unfold in isolation. Approached as the EU's international mission statement and the reflection of its self-perception, it was conceived as a response to the US international politics of George W. Bush administration.[2] The substance of the ESS thus unravels the mediation of the EU's image in relation to its significant others. Within the contours of the EU-US-UN relationship, the EU finds itself between a 'thin' global organization – with diluted influence and fraught with charges of inefficiency – and traditional modern state, with international preponderance and high degree of traditionally conceived efficiency. The character of each participant's agenda setting and the part played therein of the doctrine of multilateralism is instructive for drawing out these features.

The UN pursues an open security agenda, focussing on particular salient issues and with minimal degree of strategic agenda development. The established practice of swallowing the most devastating blows to its reputation has made the UN less susceptible to reputational concerns than is the case with other political entities. The UN can somehow afford to fail, which is a highly useful quality in the world of crisis management and humanitarian intervention. The experience of failure has not, however, been acknowledged to the extent of emasculation. With attempts at reform occurring regularly, the organization remains at the heart of maintaining global security and a useful reservoir of international legitimacy. The EU agenda is more streamlined which allows for deliberate investigation of opportunities for asserting the interests of the polity. The framing of the agenda, heavily focused on the ethical dimension and traditionally connected with the urge to civilize international politics, involves the moral obligation to respond to the conscious-shocking situations if the EU credibility is to be upheld. The US fares much better in the messianic respect, however. Rather than implicitly hinting at its superiority, the US, as a modern state with clearly formulated objectives, is not shy about its perceived supremacy. Whereas the UN can somehow afford to fail out of habit, the US can afford to fail thanks to its status as a superpower. An evocative quote concerning the US's performance in Iraq is illustrative:

> America will remain the world's most powerful country regardless of how Iraq turns out and how much US foreign policy is blamed for it. The US will continue to enjoy a benign international context in which it faces no great

power rival, as it did throughout the Cold War and as great powers have traditionally done throughout history.

(Haass 2006)

Failure affordability does not appear so generous in the EU case. Perpetually charged with ineffectiveness and inability to deliver on its promise to contribute to international security, the EU's role creation via CSDP acquires an air of urgency as it functions under considerable pressure to perform. This, rather than smothering the policy, has proven a momentous factor behind its creation and consolidation, with the recurring pronounced responsibility for the developments in the Balkans. The argument of the necessity for quick response amidst an international crisis has proven instrumental in making the policy a reality in international politics.[3]

Multilateralism and its meanings

The aspiration to multilateralism and the demand to build partnership has always been at the core of the ESDP endorsement. If we regard multilateralism as an organizational form, which links contextual practices and focuses predominantly on pragmatic usefulness (Kratochwil 2006: 140), we can look at the intricacies of the EU-US-UN triad through the lenses of one of the ESS's strategic objectives, i.e. 'the promotion of an international order based on effective multilateralism'. As expressed by one of ESDP ideational shapers:

> Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value [. . .] Multilateralism – for which the EU stands and which is in some way inherent in its construction – is more than a refuge of the weak. It embodies at the global level the ideas of democracy and community that all civilized states stand for on the domestic level.

(Cooper 2003: 164, 168)

The quote further indicates how multilateralism's core revolves around the claim to superior legitimacy as it is currently conceived in international relations. It involves seeking the UN Security Council authorization for any operation carried out by a regional organization. While this perhaps exceeds the requirement of the UN Charter, which requires obtaining consent only for forceful action, it reflects the current conceptions of the role of the UN. Here, effective multilateralism demands meaningful and consistent communication with the UN throughout the course of the operation as a reflection of Article 54.[4]

The UN puts forward an elaborate understanding of what the role of the EU could be with regard to its newly developed capabilities and ambitions (Annan 2005). The report by the UN Secretary-General delineates the EU's possible contribution to the UN-conceived understanding of security system. First, the EU, as a regional organization, can help the UN in peacekeeping where the UN capacity is stretched, in particular due to the preference to supply capabilities to *ad hoc* ventures. Second, *qua* watchdog, the EU could work for spreading the adherence

to international norms. Third, the EU could adopt significant functions in implementation by leading by example and thereby solidifying some codified practices. Along these lines, the UN welcomes the EU as an intimate ally with converging interests in terms of advancing multilateral international relations. While in need of substantial support, the UN promises a tangible reward in return. Joining forces with the UN on upholding global values effortlessly brings rhetorical legitimacy. It conveys an impression of integrity and goodness, which may be implicitly played out in the interaction with the 'mighty' significant other (US). Yet, appearances aside, it is rather the EU that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the relationship which is demonstrated through the divide between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer. Seemingly, the UN can be taken advantage of to seize global opportunities and thereby broaden and provide the EU agenda with an aura of righteous legitimacy. The UN further conjures up a slant of weakness, which may be brought into play in order to highlight the EU unique approach. 'We are not the UN!' was a mantra adopted by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) planning team to Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the mission's launch (Orsini 2006: 9). It illustrates the EU's desire to differentiate itself from the UN on the ground as well as to find its own niche in the international policing/rule of law 'market'.

While Brussels has invariably supported the UN as a champion of effective multilateralism, CSDP has given it (potentially) even more powerful means than those available to the UN to promote values shared by both institutions. Illustratively in this respect, CSDP provides 'oxygen for the United Nations' (House of Lords Minutes of Evidence 2004: 7). The EU upholds the principle of the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and it commits to contributing to the objectives of the UN in crisis management in accordance with the UN Charter.[5] Despite this acknowledgment, while the UN plays the role of a legitimizing body for CSDP, its consent may not always be indispensable (Tardy 2005: 49–51). The examples of CSDP operations launched without a UNSC resolution are numerous, both in Europe, such as the EU police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia, and beyond, for example with Themis (Georgia), EUJUST Lex (Iraq) and EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo). Whereas the EU recognizes the primacy of the UN, it does not want to be bound too strongly to it by means of an explicit mandate for each of its operations (Chinkin 2004: 1). There emerges a telling dualism where the recognition of primacy has to be reconciled with the EU's drive to set its own principles of cooperation (Novosseloff 2004: 7–8). The imbalance between the two is well captured through the UN insistence on institutionalising the cooperation and the EU recoiling from this. As Tardy illustrates, the UN has advocated an institutionalized partnership with the EU which would not be confined to the subcontracting model and *ad hoc* assistance, but committed the EU to direct contribution to the UN operations (2005: 67). While confirming the necessity of this cooperation, the EU favours its flexible, case-by-case variation, where its political autonomy would prevail and with no guarantee that the UN needs will ever be met (Tardy 2005: 67–68). In effect, through CSDP, the EU has become a major saviour of the

UN's reputation and an endorser of its declaratory politics, while at the same time forging a distinct profile for itself.

The relationship with the UN seems a reverse to the modalities of the EU-US relationship. A distinct appeal of the UN is their unswerving recognition of the EU's role in international crisis management. This differs significantly from the EU's position vis-à-vis the US or its protégé NATO, where the EU is compelled to strive to assert its standing. Quite apart from President's Obama recognition that 'on certain critical issues, America has acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others' (Obama 2009), Washington's fundamental approach to multilateralism has yet to shift significantly from the position it assumed in the Cold War. The US continues to presume that it should play the leading role in multilateral security institutions and assumes that it remains uniquely qualified to do so. This unquestioned assumption was originally a product of American exceptionalism and a view developed among elites throughout the early twentieth century of America's unique role in world affairs (Chotard 1997). The catalyst that hardened these presumptions of American leadership into the foundation stone of foreign policy was the onset of the Cold War, and the perceived high-stakes competition between the two superpowers emerging from the Second World War. Internal documents and memoranda of this period make repeated references to the magnitude of the threats embodied in that competition, as well as to America's lot as the *only* actor on earth capable of saving the world from domination by the competing superpower and its 'fanatical faith', communism.[6] Arguably, Washington's continuing assumption for itself of *the* leading role in security matters reflects a role conception shaped by the insecurity environment of the early Cold War and the relative positions of Europe and the UN within that environment. Largely unquestioned, this assumption continues to undermine effective multilateral security efforts long after the Cold War has given way to a markedly different insecurity environment.

Paradoxically, the EU's positioning as an agent amicably containing the US's vigorous unilateralism added particular legitimacy to the EU's action. It enhanced its image as a good-natured crisis manager, sending the signal of a non-confrontational posture and the desire to make the world a better place in an agreeable fashion. The rhetoric of the EU's uniqueness in the triangle re-emerges continuously in efforts at positioning and differentiating itself. The most fundamental message in this process is the implicit historical superiority disguised under rhetoric of equality. This finds its expression on the ground of the missions where the EU's approach, however ineffective and admittedly flawed with numerous imperfections, is framed to fare better as it embodies the 'European' solution. It remains to be seen whether the new US administration, leaning towards the necessity to forge some kind of progressive multilateralism, should redraw this picture.

The EU-US division of labour

The evolution of the American attitude towards CSDP has been an important factor in the development of the policy. Initially concerned with the potential of

CSDP to undermine NATO (Giegerich *et al.* 2006: 388),[7] the US has evolved into an important backer of the enterprise. Previous attempts by the EU to design its own security were approved provided they involved defence capabilities development within the European pillar of NATO, and that they aimed at transatlantic burden sharing. Now, despite the abandonment of the NATO option in favour of autonomous policy, the US sees ESDP as instrumental in cases when its status as the sole superpower and its correlated international image prevent it from effective crisis management. The EU is thus welcome as a deputy, preaching the same values but doing so in a less confrontational manner, which makes its involvement in certain regions more acceptable.

To be sure, the shift in the US approach has been an incremental and contested development. The context of launching Althea in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a UN-mandated and NATO-supported first CSDP operation, illustrates the US's wavering position. The possibility of the EU taking over in Bosnia and Herzegovina was first suggested at the European Heads of State Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, following the conclusion of negotiations on the 'Berlin-plus' agreement. Initial reactions to the proposal were mixed. The UK and France strongly advocated the move, while the US expressed concern over the EU's ability to take over the Bosnia operation successfully. Following extensive negotiations, NATO foreign ministers announced in December 2003 that the transition to a new EU-led mission within the framework of 'Berlin-plus' would nevertheless be undertaken. Apparently, the decision to conclude SFOR and accept the possibility of the EU takeover had been made with reticence. The International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that 'even though the US military, severely overstretched, was eager to palm-off one of its many commitments, the Istanbul agreement on actually doing so was more than a minor achievement'(Ward 2004). More than a desire for burden-sharing, this arrangement reflects the realization that the American international posture has tied the US hands in many areas. A possible way of squaring this circle is to rely on an ally that is ideologically close and increasingly capable of particular (unthreatening) security actions. Illustratively, an honest broker image of the EU emerged in the case of EUBAM Rafah in autumn 2005, where it was the US side, and Condoleezza Rice personally, that negotiated EU involvement in the monitoring of the Israeli-Palestinian border. The question was first discussed with the EU Special Representative for this region, who subsequently reported the issue to the Political and Security Committee.[8] Reporting on the US image in the region, *European Voice* concluded in September 2006 that:

> Because of Iraq, Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the feeling is that the US has been discredited in the Middle East to such a degree that it is unable to act decisively [. . .] Many now question whether high-profile US engagement is still desirable or even possible [. . .] While the US has its hands tied, actors in the region are increasing turning to the EU. After years of favouring US involvement, Israel has [. . .] showed a willingness to see the EU play a greater role.
>
> (Beatty 2006)

The US now sees the EU as fit to become involved in a number of areas where the US's own engagement would prove an irritant but the EU's seemingly neutral approach is acceptable for the third party and politically secure for the US. This instrumental recognition of EU capabilities has given rise to a shift in role assignments and it paints an interesting picture of the transatlantic link in the EU-US-UN triad. The high-flying rhetoric on the EU's role coming from the Solana office could hardly acknowledge a somewhat secondary part to play.[9] Still, CSDP performers are happy to seize and skilfully build upon the distinctive scope of possibility that has emerged with respect to both the US and the UN (Kurowska 2008, 2009).

Statebuilding as a crisis management strategy: Different approaches, different roles?

Externally-assisted state-building is often defined as the construction of legitimate and effective governmental institutions in the state-recipient. It may however also seen as aiming to shape the governance system of the neighbours according to the model embraced by a particular entity in order to create a favourable environment for the latter. As such, statebuilding may be construed as an elaborate and long-term strategy geared toward preventing, and in some instances managing crises in the neighbourhood. Both EU and US are engaged in such projections but it remains an empirical question how the approaches adopted by these two differ considering their historical grounding and actual practice in today's politics.[10] We discuss it in brief to consider the potential for fruitful EU-US cooperation in crisis management that the differentiated, or perceived as such, approaches give rise to.

US policy in recent years represents a return to, or perhaps, a rediscovery of earlier approaches developed during the Cold War. Regrettably, the lessons of overseas internal security efforts instituted during the 1950s and 1960s[11] have been omitted from recent scholarship and analyses of US state/nation-building approaches.[12] As mentioned earlier, the Obama administration came into office in the face of almost unprecedented expectations – at home and abroad – for *change*, including expectations of a fundamental change in his approach to foreign policy. In large part, his presidency was greeted with worldwide enthusiasm because he signalled a break with the policies of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Bush and his most egregious policies in effect became symbolic of US foreign policy as a whole, and with the accession of Barack Obama, any change was presumed to be for the better.

In fact, one could observe significant changes in policy in the second Bush administration. Having reached the limits of their earlier, overtly military approach in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration began to talk of security in terms of not only defence, but also 'democracy and development' (Rice 2008; Gates 2009). In the final years of the Bush Presidency, the link between security and development abroad and security of the US itself had been rediscovered and returned to the fore of US foreign policy. This represents a change of tack, back onto a course pursued by Cold War presidents up to Richard Nixon.

This earlier policy was itself shaped by the international environment of the time. Washington had by then assumed for itself its leading role as the sole force standing between the free world and communist domination. In the context of the aforementioned high-stakes competition between the 'free world' and 'communist bloc', the emergence of newly independent states in less developed areas of the world posed an enormous security challenge. Informed by what Robert Packenham later called 'poverty theses' (1973), American leaders were convinced that economic and political instability in these areas – and the radicalization it could cause – played into the hands of the competing superpower. In their analysis, these leaders perceived a link between American security and the internal security of these new states. Accordingly, policy makers formulated programmes to stabilize these new states internally, rendering them resistant to 'subversion' and, ultimately, domination by and 'loss' to the opposing camp.

These efforts began modestly as police reform programmes. Such programmes were intended to reform local paramilitaries by instilling American-style police ethics as well as tactics, or as one planning document put it, 'to replace the culture of the submachine gun with that of the handgun' (White House Office, 1955). Other objectives included developing police forces as institutions separate from the military in recipient countries, and helping to create in each country an independent judiciary to help control the security forces. However, analyses of the situation on the ground in recipient countries caused these programmes to broaden into ambitious, multi-agency state/nation-building efforts, ranging from Defence Department projects to train local security forces to the State Department's efforts to improve relations between dissident ethnic groups and central governments in recipient states.

The economic assistance needed to support these efforts was also motivated and shaped by the actions of the competing superpower. Washington had shown little real inclination toward providing economic assistance to developing areas until the USSR instituted such programmes in the mid-1950s. The Soviets' economic aid to new states focused US policy makers' attention upon the need for development assistance as a *security* instrument. Tellingly, the Eisenhower administration's aid programmes for 1957 represented something of a turning point. In that year, for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the administration's aid funding requests contained more for programmes of an ostensibly development nature than for military hardware (Rostow 1985: 86–87; Kaufman 1982: 135).

With the accession of the Kennedy administration, US striving for prestige in the developing areas reached its peak. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, state/nation-building approaches coalesced around modernization theory. The mostly young men making up the senior members of Kennedy's team saw theirs as a time of 'revolutionary change', especially in developing areas, which the decolonization process was reshaping in ways 'at least as significant as the breakdown of the Concert of Europe. They also felt that their communist competitors were trying to evict the US from its 'rightful place' in 'the vanguard of the revolution of rising expectations' (Schoenbaum 1988: 264–65). Their response to this challenge was the United States Overseas Internal Defence Program (USOIDP),[13] the overall

policy framework that operationalized modernization theory in nation-building and counterinsurgency policy. The USOIDP was broader and more ambitious than earlier efforts, and like earlier efforts, was implemented in dozens of developing countries. The programme featured efforts to reform security institutions while simultaneously relying on local militaries as 'modernizing elites' tasked with carrying reforms forward. It also relied on local militaries as well as US military units to conduct 'civic action' duties, involving infrastructure development and social projects. USOIDP also sought to identify and develop local human resources that could drive further development. The programme supported institution building, from various levels of government to intellectual groups.

In the early years, these programmes were largely uninformed by theory, other than presumptions that development was largely a matter of economic growth and that growth was largely a matter of attracting private sector investment. Even after modernization theory became the backbone of these approaches, there was little questioning of the universal applicability of US approaches, norms or institutions. When questions arose regarding models against which local institutions would be judged, those benchmark models would be Western, if not American. There was little debate over whether there existed a sufficient degree of shared ethos between the US and elites in recipient countries regarding the best approaches to governance and development.[14] This was true even when those elites, upon which the US was relying to implement change, had a considerable stake in keeping things as they were. More recent internal security programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere suggest this same lack of reflection. Even when the forms, trappings and rituals reflect local culture, the essential nature and ethos of institutions seems firmly rooted in the Western and especially American experience. Finally, thorny questions regarding the relationship between order and development continue to plague policymaking.

On the growing mythology that sees the EU as a key transferable model for all future reconstruction efforts (Williams 2007: 549), the EU has been endorsing its self-image as a 'force for good' (Pace 2008). The Brussels policy-makers have been busy continuously validating and reproducing this representation, and the academic constructions of the EU as a normative or transformative power and thus necessarily benign, have reinforced this image (Pace 2008). This may play to the advantage of the EU as a crisis manager and statebuilder: the reputation of an honest broker is a crucial ingredient in the process. Yet, it dangerously hinders a more sustained discussion about the EU's statebuilding practice. First, the EU remains committed to the taken-for-granted legitimacy and responsibility to project its model of good governance. Second, in spite of relative openness to criticism about implementation, there has developed an assumption that the EU does indeed possess the most adequate package of capacities in civilian and military crisis management, the right mix of tools that makes it a major player in this realm. In this context and despite declared cooperation with UN, EU actors present themselves as insufficiently versed in a wider debate on peace- and statebuilding. Third, these have stifled the EU's engagement with the local politics while amplifying the tendency to overestimate the accomplishment of the EU's

projection. The mantra of local ownership is repeatedly compromised, although at times as a result of implicit pact between the EU actors and the local elites.[15] Strangely enough, this depiction seems to emulate the kind of hubris demonstrated in the US practice. It is all the more paradoxical as the EU's framing rests on an attempt to differentiate its image from that of the US. Is there therefore but little innovation in the EU's approach to crisis management?

This might be too hasty a conclusion. Despite the self-aggrandisement that the EU is prone to, there are indeed some features inherent in its system that may make it a viable and sustainable crisis manger of different than US qualities. The intrinsic multinational diversity of the EU and the necessity of multilevel continuous negotiation in its system of governance make it potentially more likely to forging solutions based on difference and compromise rather than imposing a template. The EU-level policy discourse endorses the notion of the EU 'best practice' and the implementation documents are subsequently framed in terms of 'bringing the stockholders' governance in line' with the latter. The officers on the ground however readily recognize the futility of such an approach. Obviously, no such thing as the EU-wide best practice in any policy area exists. Conceptual confusion and ensuing inefficiency are frequently blamed for the EU's underperformance. Yet this common absence of ready-made solutions on the part of the EU may encourage designing bottom-up benchmarking schemes that rely on the knowledge and experience of field officers co-located in national institutions and exposed to their daily functioning. This by no means denotes a radical shift away from imposing templates. The proposition rather is that the 'exercise in Europeaness' that they undergo while working in EU environments and the 'lived experience' of difference may translate onto corresponding relationships with non-EU actors, creating opportunities for local ownership that amount to more than a pretence.

Conclusion

In the chapter, we relied on the EU-US-UN heuristic perspective to illustrate the shift in the international role assignment in the realm of crisis management. A distinct appeal of the UN is their unswerving recognition of the EU's consolidating role in international crisis management. The resort to the UN legitimising capacity is mutually beneficial. The EU obtains a mandate for action, an ally in championing the effective multilateralism, and simultaneously provides the UN oxygen for acting, becoming the latter's reputational saviour. This differs significantly from the EU position vis-à-vis the US or its protégé NATO, where the EU has been compelled to strive to assert its standing. Yet the shift towards a greater recognition of the EU's role has been facilitated by the notoriety that the US earned under the George W. Bush administration. The US is barely able to act unilaterally so it looks to the EU where its direct and evident participation would merely exacerbate tensions. The EU's image is meanwhile acceptable and thus capable of influencing the situation in the direction favoured by the US. It ultimately denotes a pragmatic recognition of the EU's role for crisis management where US involvement is not welcome. This role relies on the acknowledgment of ideological affinity between

the two and the diffusion of shared ideals, even if in evidently dissimilar ways. While this should not be construed as an entirely harmonious marriage, it reveals a relationship reading from common script. Further still, it allows the EU to play out its strengths in crisis management and carve out a sustainable international security role.

Referring to the (ultimately) effective combination of European and American efforts in stabilising Bosnia, Andrew Williams declared: '[t]he blend of American hard power and European soft power that made that happen in the former Yugoslavia needs no explanation here, but it cannot be underestimated as a source not only of effectiveness but also of widely accepted legitimacy' (2007: 548–49). And yet, such US-EU 'symbiosis' has been difficult to recreate. As described earlier, challenges comprising the NGIE have brought the EU's emerging foreign policy strengths and crisis management capabilities to centre stage, while US security planners, having confronted the limits of largely 'kinetic' operations, have of late been moving in a similar direction.

As the challenges of the NGIE exceed the capability of either the US or the EU, cooperation is essential. The question that remains is, how best to establish an effective division of labour? The issue is in all cases bound to be sensitive among the peoples in regions where interventions take place and no less so among the peoples of Europe and the US. On one hand, successful EU missions in Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown labour can be divided in terms of workload or in terms of the type of mission and the capabilities required. However, there is already a vague and unpopular notion that too often in international crises the US 'cooks the meal', leaving Europe to 'do the dishes'. On one hand, Europeans bristle at the seemingly open-ended commitments and unglamorous nature of the job, while Americans balk at bearing the brunt of combat casualties in initial security efforts. Similarly, we have argued that foreign policy behaviour by the US, particularly during (but not limited to) the George W. Bush years, has severely impacted the image and thus the effectiveness of the US as a crisis manager in the Middle East and other areas. In these contexts, local perceptions and sensitivities allow the EU to involve itself more effectively, safely and legitimately than the Americans. However, this ultimately represents a geographic division of labour, requiring great care to avoid evoking an apparent renaissance of imperialism in the style of the late nineteenth century.

Perhaps the most difficult question is whether state-building in the cause of crisis management is itself a form of imperialism. Whether undertaken by the US or the EU, these programmes tend to involve the reform or even establishment of institutions considered integral to 'good governance'. Both US and EU programmes strive to transfer or develop 'best practices' through training and mentoring. Whether a key, overt element of the overall security effort, as in George W. Bush's goal of transferring democracy to the Middle East, or something to be consciously guarded against, as often seems the case with the EU, these programmes seem bound to transfer – if not impose – elements of the donor's ethos and political culture. Are these state-building projects by their very nature imperialism? Williams states that such efforts are driven by a 'norm of reconstruction':

'if it is imposed it is imperialist but if it is welcomed then it is no more imperialist than Kantian thinkers and practitioners want it to be' (2007: 551). If state-building will prove effective in addressing or preventing the threats that emanate from 'weak, failed or failing states' (Gates 2009), then the stakes in such efforts can be very high. At the same time, the world cannot allow Iraq or Afghanistan to be the paradigm for crisis management through state-building.

The European Union in particular must be cautious to avoid fanning the anti-imperialist sentiments that still smoulder in many former colonial areas. In part, this is because much of the world has come to expect the worst from the US while expecting the EU to be a non-confrontational honest broker in its crisis management approach. Should high-profile actions by the EU, or anyone representing the EU, tarnish this polished image, those actions would undermine the development of the EU as a global actor as well as its own internal identity-building project (Anderson 2008; Seitz and Anderson 2008). Much of the power driving both of these comes from perceived differences between the EU and the US. This would be truly unfortunate, for perhaps nothing so much as the rise of the EU as a prominent and effective international actor could cause the US to rethink its own Cold War-era role conception and make way for a truly multilateral approach to security and crisis management.

Notes

1 Kurowska would like to thank the editors for this reminder.
2 For an analysis along these lines, see e.g. Bereskoetter 2005.
3 For an analysis of the policy's entrepreneurs, see Kurowska 2009.
4 For the requirements of effective multilateralism as currently set by the UN, see Guéhenno 2005.
5 See e.g. Council of the European Union 2003c.
6 For a classic example and clear articulation of this rationale, see US Department of State (1950).
7 The American insistence on the three Ds (no decoupling of European security from that of America's; no duplication of effort and capabilities; and no discrimination against the allies who are not the EU members) marked the US approach at the ESDP conception (see Albright 1998), although they feature less in the current debate.
8 Interviews in the office of the EC representative to the Political and Security Committee, 25 November 2005.
9 Javier Solana has addressed the transatlantic relationship numerous times, pointing in particular to partnership of choice wherein both parties possess dissimilar yet complementary assets (Solana 2003), or insisting that no single country can tackle today's problems on its own (Council of the European Union 2003d).
10 For the sake of clarity in terminology, it is important to add that some American policy analysis confuses statebuilding and nation-building (e.g. Dobbins *et al.* 2003) and predominantly uses the latter term. We see these as very distinct although connected concepts: the efforts towards moulding the outside environment go hand in glove with self-fashioning and external recognition. This contributes to the consolidation of the internal project, although not necessarily along the 'nationhood' lines, of which the EU is a very good example.
11 The broadest, most ambitious programs of this era were the NSC 1290-*d* program, initiated in December of 1954 and re-designated the Overseas Internal Security Program in

1957, and the United States Overseas Internal Defence Program, adopted with NSAM 182 in 1962.

12 James Dobbins and his collaborators, for example, in their book *America's Role in Nation Building from Germany to Iraq* (Dobbins *et al.* 2003) jumps from post-war Germany and Japan to Somalia in the 1990s.

13 The USOIDP was accepted by the President as policy in National Security Action Memorandum 182 in August of 1962.

14 Even when officers in the field raised such issues. See OCB Report pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d, 23 November 1955.

15 For an example of one such instance in the conception and implementation of European Union Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova, see Kurowska and Tallis 2009.