The Role of European
Integration in National
Election Campaigns
Hanspeter Kriesi
University of Zurich, Switzerland
A B S T R A C T
This study asks how and to what extent political parties in
six West European countries – Austria, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK – have addressed the
process of European integration in national election
campaigns since the 1970s. Based on a content analysis of
newspaper data, the results show that Eurosceptic mobilization
in national election campaigns has become most
pronounced in countries where the public have always been
rather apprehensive about European integration. In line with
the ‘new cleavage’ hypothesis, in Switzerland and the UK
mobilization around European integration is primarily driven
by conservatives and/or the new populist right. In countries
where the process of European integration is politically less
salient, conservatives and/or the new populist right have
been less Eurosceptic and their mobilization efforts have
been more limited. While providing mixed support for the
‘new cleavage’ hypothesis, the study provides scant support
for the received wisdom that Euroscepticism among political
parties is essentially dictated by ‘opposition politics’.
8 3
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507073288
Volume 8 (1): 83–108
Copyright© 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
K E Y W O R D S
᭿ cleavage structure
᭿ electoral campaigns
᭿ Euroscepticism
᭿ political parties
᭿ transformation of party
systems
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Introduction
According to the conventional wisdom, the impact of the European integration
process on West European party systems has been very limited. Thus,
critics of the European ‘democratic deﬁcit’ maintain that European integration
has been effectively organized out of the electoral process at both the
European and the national levels. These critics argue that European Union
(EU) elections are widely perceived as ‘secondary elections’ that do not really
reﬂect voters’ preferences about representation at the European level
(Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996), and national electoral contests also fail
to register voters’ preferences on the content and direction of EU policy
(Mair, 2001). As Follesdal and Hix (2005) point out, there is no electoral
contest for leadership at the European level or the basic direction of the EU
policy agenda.
As far as the impact of European integration on national party systems
is concerned, Mair (2001) arrives at the conclusion that European integration
has had very little impact on either the format or the mechanics of national
party systems thus far. Based on the ﬁnding that party competition still lacks
a European dimension, he maintains that Eurosceptic parties – such as the
Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), the French
National Front (Front National, FN), the Italian National Alliance (Alleanza
Nazionale, AN) or the Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) – cannot be
reduced to their anti-European appeal, and that their anti-European positions
are merely part and parcel of their general oppositional stance. As Taggart
(1998) and Sitter (2001) have already shown, Euroscepticism is characteristic
of parties outside the mainstream, both on the extreme left and on the extreme
right. Drawing on these studies, Mair doubts whether European integration
has had any direct effect on how national party systems operate.
On the other hand, some authors have questioned this position. Ferrara
and Weishaupt (2004) demonstrate that EU elections are, at least in part, about
Europe. More generally, Bartolini (2005) points out that, in European postwar
electoral history, few issues have had comparably large and standardizing
effects across European party systems. Although accepting that the impact
of European integration on national party systems should not be exaggerated,
Bartolini argues that ‘the EU could indeed be a strong unifying catalyst’ in
the context of the prevailing ‘strange amalgam of discontent across the
traditional political spectrum’. In a replication of their previous study, Van
der Eijk and Franklin (2004) support this hunch. Based on the 1989 European
election survey, these authors conclude that, with respect to European integration,
the positions of parties and their voters were closely aligned. By the
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end of the 1990s, however, they found a high, unrepresented, conﬂict
potential among voters on the issue of European integration – a ‘sleeping
giant’ waiting to be exploited by a political entrepreneur.
In my opinion, the mobilization potential of the European integration
issue should be considered in the context of a larger set of processes that are
weakening the boundaries of nation-states and that are also likely to have a
profound impact on West European party systems. These processes are
generally referred to under the heading of ‘globalization’ or, perhaps more
appropriately, ‘denationalization’ (Zürn, 1998). According to this perspective,
the process of European integration is part and parcel of broader processes
of political competition (the construction of new supranational centres of
authority), economic competition (liberalization and market integration,
immigration, delocalization) and cultural competition (immigration and its
multicultural consequences), all of which put the national political
community under strain. As we have argued elsewhere (Kriesi et al., 2006),
these processes are likely to give rise to a new structural conﬂict between the
winners and losers from these transformations. The likely winners of these
competitive processes include owners and highly qualiﬁed employees in
sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens.
The probable losers comprise citizens with a strong attachment to their
respective national communities and traditionally protected economic sectors
that ﬁnd themselves increasingly exposed to foreign competition, as well as
those who lack the professional and/or cultural skills to function successfully
in a globalizing world. The winners are expected to support the opening of
borders, including European integration, while the losers are more likely to
mobilize not only against European integration but also against immigration
and its consequences, against the cultural liberalism of the new social movements,
and for the defence of national traditions, national privileges and
national sovereignty. Under these conditions, this new structural conﬂict
between ‘integration’ (into the European or global community) and ‘demarcation’
(of the national community) will become a more salient issue for West
European parties and have a profound impact on national party systems.
More speciﬁcally, I expect that this new mobilization will be driven by the
parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of the losers
in the new structural conﬂict – including the Eurosceptics. In other words, in
contrast to the hypothesis that Eurosceptic mobilization is simply part of the
politics of opposition, I am positing a new cleavage hypothesis, according to which
mobilization for and against European integration is part and parcel of a new
structural conﬂict that is fundamentally transforming West European party
systems altogether.
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Parties mobilizing the political conﬂict potential linked to
European integration
But which parties are mainly organizing the losers, and thus becoming the
driving force behind the transformation of these party systems? In order to
address this question, it is important to distinguish two aspects of the
integration/demarcation conﬂict – its economic and its cultural dimensions.
This distinction has been of critical importance in the debate about what drives
public opinion on the European integration process. This debate has reached
a consensus that both dimensions are important for determining public
opinion, but that cultural factors related to national identities and fear
of/hostility towards other cultures are particularly important at the individual
level.1 Moreover, this distinction is important for understanding the distinct
challenges facing different types of established parties, because, as Marks and
Wilson (2000: 437) argue, ‘the social cleavages that have historically shaped
political parties and competition among them inﬂuence the policy positions
of parties on each of these dimensions of European integration’.2
On the left, mainstream parties tend wholeheartedly to embrace the
cultural dimension of the (European) integration process, but they face a
dilemma when confronted with its economic side. Whereas the cultural
aspects of denationalization coincide with the left’s internationalist tradition,
economic integration in Europe and beyond poses a threat to the left’s social
achievements at the national level. Although the social democratic leadership
of all European parties has come to accept European integration, social
democrats remain internally divided on the economic dimension, as is the
left in general.
We can distinguish between a classic left position, which remains
Eurosceptic and opposed to globalization, and the position of a modernized
left, which roughly corresponds to the ‘Third Way’ that was formulated by
the British Labour Party and later informed political discourse in other
countries – especially in Germany. The traditional social democratic and
radical left opposition to the opening of borders corresponds to the position
of the classic left and primarily represents a response to the threat that
economic liberalization poses to the left’s achievements at the national level
in the domains of social policy and industrial relations. The Third Way, by
contrast, constitutes a novel attempt to come to terms with the problems
posed by the integration/demarcation conﬂict more generally: Third Way
politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it,
and seeks to combine a neo-liberal endorsement of free trade with a core
concern for social justice (Giddens, 1998: 64ff.).
Compared with the left, the opening of borders seems to constitute
less of a challenge for Christian democratic and liberal parties. As noted by
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Marks and Wilson (2000: 451), Christian democratic parties have been more
closely associated with the founding of the EU than any other party family.
More generally, they tend to take an intermediate position with regard to both
the cultural and the economic dimensions of globalization. As far as the
liberals are concerned, we can distinguish at least two currents (Smith, 1988):
liberal radicalism and liberal conservatism. Faced with denationalization, liberals
generally tend to support market liberalization, but differ with regard to
cultural integration. Whereas liberal radicals tend to support this dimension
of the process, liberal conservatives are usually reluctant to accept supranational
political integration (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 448–50).
Conservatives face a similar dilemma to the liberal conservatives – one
that is precisely the opposite of that confronted by mainstream parties of the
left (Marks and Wilson, 2000): economically they tend to endorse liberalization
but politically and culturally they are likely to be nationalists and
opposed to the opening of borders. Cultural and political integration
threatens national traditions and national sovereignty – values that conservatives
traditionally defend. Accordingly, their positions are likely to vary,
especially along the cultural dimension. Depending on the perceived threat
of integration to national identity, conservatives will be more or less opposed
to integration.
Moreover, as with the left, we can distinguish between classic conservatives
and an updated variant. Unlike the left, however, in this case the new version
is the more radical, with the new populist right having staked out a clear position
against European integration (and globalization more generally), in both political
and cultural terms. The new populist right’s ideology is not primarily
Eurosceptic, but opposition to European integration ﬁts into its general defence
of national privileges. Its main characteristics are its opposition to immigration
in Western Europe and its populist appeal to widespread resentment against
mainstream parties and political elites. Right-wing populists build on the fears
of those who are likely to lose from a further weakening of national borders
and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made solutions. Economic issues
tend to be secondary for such parties (Betz, 2003; Kitschelt, 2001: 435; Kriesi
et al., 2006).
This discussion can be summarized in a set of hypotheses about the role
of European integration for different types of party in national election
campaigns. These hypotheses build on previous work (Hooghe et al., 2002)
and provide an opportunity to elaborate the new cleavage hypothesis introduced
above.3 First, mainstream social democratic, radical liberal and
Christian democratic parties can be expected to support European integration
in spite of the serious dilemmas that it tends to generate, which gives rise to
severe intra-party tensions. These mainstream parties have generally been the
main pillars of the ‘permissive consensus’ that has facilitated European
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integration to date. Second, given this mainstream consensus in favour of
European integration, Eurosceptic mobilization in national election
campaigns can mainly be expected from the classic left and the new populist
right. Third, given that the Euroscepticism of the new populist right is
embedded in a broader, electorally successful challenge on behalf of the losers
from denationalization, it is expected to have a strong impact on the positioning
of the mainstream parties that most closely approximate its positions, i.e.
the liberal conservative and national conservative parties. These parties are
most likely to take an accommodating stance toward the Eurosceptic message
of the new populist right in particular, and toward the losers’ programme
formulated by these challengers more generally in order to close off their
niche in the electoral market (Meguid, 2005). Consequently, the issue of
European integration is expected to be most salient for liberal conservative
and national conservative parties and for parties of the new populist right,
which make the most explicit appeals to the fears of the losers from
denationalization.
Country-speciﬁc conditions for mobilization against
European integration
The meaning of European integration and the institutional setting of the party
systems vary from one country to the next. Accordingly, the hypotheses that
follow take these variations into account.
First, public opinion on European integration has been closely tracked by
regular Eurobarometer surveys. In part, variation among countries can be
explained in terms of the relative economic costs and beneﬁts that accrue to
different countries from EU membership. More importantly, however, these
differences have deep cultural roots. As Diez Medrano (2003: 249) has
observed, European citizens’ image of the EU and of the European integration
process is ﬁltered by national and subnational cultures. In other words, public
attitudes and opinions about the EU are shaped by cultural repertoires that,
in turn, are rooted in national histories and collective experiences. Thus, for
Spaniards, membership in the EU represents a path towards modernization,
greater international prestige and a way out of the isolation of the Franco years.
For the British, on the other hand, EU membership is viewed as a necessary
evil at best (Haller, 1999).
In this study, I compare the positioning of political parties with regard to
Europe in six countries. It is important to note the fundamental differences
in these countries’ perceptions of Europe and of the process of European integration.
For different reasons, in four of these countries – Austria, Germany,
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France and the Netherlands – the population has traditionally viewed
European integration quite favourably. Germany, France and the Netherlands
are among the six original members. Austria is a latecomer to the EU – its
neutrality was the main reason for its delayed application – but, when its
population was given the opportunity to express itself on the EU in the 1994
referendum, it embraced membership with a two-thirds majority. Since then,
the Austrians have become decidedly more Eurosceptic (Dolezal, 2006).
However, even their Euroscepticism is far less critical than that of the citizens
of the two remaining countries in my study – Switzerland and the UK. The
Swiss have not yet joined the Union, and the British are very reluctant
members. The former are afraid of losing their national identity, just as the
latter fear the threat to their national sovereignty that an ‘ever closer union’
implies. In these two countries, cultural heritage provides a fertile opportunity
for Eurosceptics to mobilize on the basis of the cultural dimension, i.e.
for the Eurosceptics from the right. Conservatives in these countries should
therefore be particularly tempted to adopt a Eurosceptic position. More
generally, I expect the salience of the European issue to be higher and that
Eurosceptics on the right will be more successful in the UK and in Switzerland
than in the other four countries.
Second, as far as institutional differences are concerned, the national
electoral system is naturally of prime importance. Most importantly, majoritarian
electoral systems reduce the signiﬁcance of the challenge from the new
populist right. For example, the British majoritarian system is a major reason
the populist right in the UK has never achieved signiﬁcant electoral success
(Ignazi, 2003: 186). However, majoritarian systems still provide two strong
incentives for the transformation of mainstream parties. On the one hand,
mainstream parties are more heterogeneous in such systems than under
proportional representation, which increases the likelihood of major shifts in
their internal power relations and therefore in their political orientation.
Second, the lot of the opposition is particularly hard in such a system, which
increases mainstream parties’ incentives to exploit opportunities to revise their
proﬁles in order to regain power. These conditions suggest that conservative
parties that are out of power in majoritarian systems are particularly likely to
seek to expand the scope of conﬂict on issues associated with the new cleavage,
i.e. to adopt a more radical stance with regard to such issues. The reorientation
of the British Conservatives – in spite of their traditional emphasis on
the unity of the British nation against peripheral nationalism, disestablished
churches and class conﬂict (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 457) – illustrates this
general idea. In France, our second majoritarian country, the situation has been
more complicated for the mainstream conservative parties (Union pour la
démocratie française, UDF, and Rassemblement pour la République, RPR),
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because the new populist challenger – the Front National – beneﬁted from the
introduction by President Mitterrand of the proportional electoral systems for
national elections during the FN’s rise to national prominence, a change that
was later undone by Jacques Chirac.
In proportional systems, the situation for the transformation of mainstream
conservative parties is particularly favourable in federalist states. In these states,
territorially fragmented party systems allow more room for parties to experiment
with the potential of new issues to mobilize voters at the regional level.
Successful experiments at the regional level of a conservative party may lead
to a transformation of the party platform at the national level. This pattern
was followed by the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) in
Austria, which started its transformation in Carinthia – Haider’s home base –
in 1989. Its 1990 victory on a nationalist platform marked a turning point for
the party’s proﬁle at the national level (Ignazi, 2003: 113). Similarly, the Swiss
People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), a conservative mainstream
party, began its rise in the canton of Zurich at the end of the 1970s. The Zurich
leadership gradually imposed itself in spite of strong resistance from the
traditional leadership of the party and set out to consolidate its position
throughout Switzerland in subsequent elections.
Germany is the only country under examination here in which the new
challengers have not managed to score a direct electoral victory or to pressure
either of the mainstream parties to move closer to their positions on the
challenges of denationalization.
Data
The data used here are from a larger project on the impact of globalization
on the national political space (see Kriesi et al., 2006). This comparative
study focuses on national elections, since these are still generally considered
to be the key events around which national politics is structured. The study
covers three elections since the 1990s and one electoral contest per country
from the 1970s. This earlier election serves in each case as a point of reference
from a period before national politics began to confront the challenges of
globalization and before the permissive consensus on European integration
began to break down. The data used here concern the supply side of electoral
competition, i.e. parties’ positioning within the national political space.
I assume that the most appropriate way to analyse how parties position
themselves and how they deal with the new issues associated with globalization
and European integration is to focus on the political debate during
national electoral campaigns, as reﬂected in the mass media. Furthermore, I
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consider both the salience with which parties address certain issues and the
positions (for and against) that they take. Although extensive research based
on party manifestos has shown that parties tend to avoid direct confrontation
and that they primarily distinguish themselves through selective emphasis of
priorities (see Budge, 2001, for a review), we also know that new issues
usually do not have a strong valence character, and that direct confrontation
– with parties advocating diverging positions on political issues – is much
more pronounced in the media and during electoral campaigns than is usually
the case in party programmes (Budge and Farlie, 1983: 281). Perhaps most
importantly, voters generally view parties in confrontational terms.
The obvious disadvantage of this methodological choice is that we had to
produce our own data. In order to identify the salience of the campaign issues
for the various parties and their issue-speciﬁc positions we relied on a content
analysis of the editorial section of major daily newspapers. We chose a quality
paper and a tabloid for each country.4 All the articles related to the electoral
contest or to politics in general were selected in both newspapers for the two
months prior to the four elections examined in each country. The headlines,
the ‘lead’ and the ﬁrst paragraph of the selected articles were then coded
sentence by sentence using a method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his
collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings,
2001). This method is designed to code every relationship between ‘political
objects’ (i.e. either between two political actors or between a political actor and
a political issue) that appears in the text. For this study, I am interested only
in relationships between political actors, on the one hand, and political issues
on the other. Each sentence is reduced to its most basic structure (the ‘core
sentence’), indicating only its subject (political actor), its object (issue) and the
direction of the relationship between the two. The direction is quantiﬁed using
a scale ranging from –1 to +1 (with three intermediate positions).
In party research, it is still quite unusual to rely on newspaper coding in
order to determine parties’ issue-speciﬁc positioning and their mobilization
effort (salience) on particular issues. Critics are quick to mention the
selection bias of the press ( the selectivity of the newspapers’ reporting) and
to its description bias (the erroneous reporting of relevant information). In
research on social movements, where content analysis of the press has a more
venerable tradition, numerous studies have attempted to assess the relevance
of these two forms of bias (Earl et al., 2004; Rucht et al., 1998). These studies
conclude that press reports are generally accurate, although conﬁrming arguments
in favour of caution when using newspaper event data (the kind of data
most relevant for social movement studies). Overall, however, Earl et al. (2004:
77) conclude that newspaper data, although not without ﬂaws, do not deviate
signiﬁcantly from accepted standards of quality and therefore remain a useful
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data source. Having observed the high selectivity of the German press with
regard to protest events – small events and/or those that relate only to local
issues are largely left out – Rucht and Neidhardt (1998: 76) suggest a
compelling theory about why this is not as problematic as critics might think.
According to their argument, although protests that go unnoticed by the media
may be signiﬁcant for the protesters themselves and their immediate audience,
they simply do not matter for the rest of the public. Similarly, pronouncements
by political parties in national election campaigns that go unreported by the
media remain largely irrelevant for voters, who depend heavily on the media
for political communication (Swanson and Mancini, 1996).
I have attempted to cross-validate the results obtained here with manifesto
data. Only the general trend in salience could be replicated, in contrast
to the cross-country and cross-party variation in salience and the corresponding
variation in positioning, which conﬁrms the relative weakness of manifesto
data in capturing salience (Netjes and Binnema, forthcoming) and
position (Marks et al., forthcoming) on European integration. Even the
improved digitized coding of manifesto data by Pennings (2006: 262) does
not provide similar cross-country variation. I interpret this as an indication
that the relative ‘depoliticization’ of the process of European integration in
national elections should be examined using data that explicitly consider the
mobilization efforts of political parties.
Political actors are coded according to their party membership. For the
present analysis, I have regrouped them into a limited number of categories
or limited my analysis to the most important parties. These parties or groups
of parties are:
• Austria: greens (Die Grünen–Die Grüne Alternative), social democrats
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), liberals (Liberales Forum),
Christian democrats (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), new populist
right (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ).
• UK: social democrats (Labour), liberals (Liberal Democrats), Conserva-
tives.
• France: radical left (Parti communiste français, PCF, and Trotskyite
parties), greens (Les verts), social democrats (Parti socialiste, PSF),
Christian democrats (Union pour la démocratie française, UDF), radical
liberals (Mouvement des radicaux de gauche, MRG), conservative
liberals (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR), new populist right
(Front National, FN).
• Germany: radical left (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS),
greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), social democrats (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands, SPD), liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP),
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Christian democrats (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale
Union, CDU/CSU).
• Netherlands: greens (De Groenen, GroenLinks), social democrats (Partij
van de Arbeid, PvdA), Christian democrats (Christen-Democratisch
Appèl, CDA), radical (D66) and conservative liberals (Volkspartij voor
Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), new populist right (Lijst Pim Fortuyn,
LPF).
• Switzerland: greens (Grüne Partei der Schweiz), social democrats
(Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, SPS), Christian democrats
(Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei, CVP, and other minor centrist
parties), liberals (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei, FDP, and Liberale
Partei der Schweiz, LPS), conservatives (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP,
and the new populist right).
Note that, for the reasons discussed above, the conservatives and the new
populist right will be grouped together into a single party family. This ‘conservative’
family will include the British Conservative Party, the Swiss People’s
Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List and the French
National Front. There is no German party in this group.
For the political issues, I used a detailed coding scheme consisting of 200
or more categories (depending on the country). For the analysis presented
here, I have regrouped these into 12 categories, one of which is support for
European integration (including enlargement) or for European membership
in the case of Switzerland and Austria (Europe). The other categories relate to
the expansion of the welfare state and resistance to welfare state retrenchment
(welfare); budgetary rigour (budget); support for deregulation, competition
and privatization or opposition to economic protectionism (economic
liberalism); support for the goals of the new social movements, with the
exception of the environmental movement (cultural liberalism); support for
education, culture and scientiﬁc research (culture); support for tough immigration
and integration policy (immigration), for the military, including NATO
(army), and for law and order (security); and support for environmental protection,
institutional reform and improved infrastructure. The ﬁrst three
categories refer to the traditional economic opposition between state and market,
i.e. to the class-based opposition between left and right. On this dimension,
the left tends to defend the welfare state whereas the right tends to support
economic liberalism and budgetary rigour. The next four categories all refer
to the cultural dimension; the remaining three are not clearly associated with
either of the two basic dimensions.
All categories are formulated in such a way that they have a clear
direction. Thus, a party that supports Swiss accession to the EU has a positive
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relationship (+1) with the category ‘Europe’. On the other hand, a party that
advocates an increase in state expenditures has a negative relationship (–1)
with the ‘budget’ category. These kinds of data offer valuable information on
two central aspects of the supply side of electoral competition: the positions
of political parties on various issues and the salience of these issues for each
party. The position of an actor on an issue category is determined by computing
the average of all core sentences that contain a relationship between this
actor and any of the issues in the category. The salience of an issue category
for a particular party is determined by the relative frequency with which it
takes a position on issues in the category. It is important to understand that
both position and salience are necessary for an adequate description of the
political space. Parties vary not only in terms of the positions they advocate,
but also with respect to the priorities they set. It is also important to note that
salience can be computed in different ways. In this study, party–issue relationships
are analysed in the context of speciﬁc campaigns.
Results
Salience
As expected, European integration increased in salience between the 1970s
and the 1990s. On average, issues related to European integration made up
only 2.5% of all issue-related statements in the 1970s campaigns, but close to
7.0% in the campaigns of the 1990s. However, although Europe has become
more prominent over time in the parties’ national electoral campaigns, it is
still not a key theme. The three most salient issue categories remain the same
as in the 1970s, although they now make up a considerably smaller share:
welfare, 16.4% (down from 19.9% in the 1970s); cultural liberalism, 12.4%
(versus 13.9%); and economic liberalism, 12.0% (versus 20.4%). The share of
cultural issues has generally increased and, most importantly, Europe is one
of the three issues with the most pronounced increase, together with two other
issues traditionally associated with the new populist right – immigration
(6.3%, up from 1.6%), and security (9.8%, up from 5.2%).
Substantial country-speciﬁc differences remain with regard to the salience
of European integration in national election campaigns (see Figure 1).
Although European integration has become more salient in all six countries,
as expected, the increase has been most substantial in the two most Eurosceptic
countries – the UK and Switzerland – where Europe became one of
the key issues in the electoral campaigns of the 1990s, with 11.2% and 12.2%
of all issue-speciﬁc statements, respectively.
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Figure 2 presents the salience of Europe in the seven party families for
the two time periods. As this ﬁgure makes clear, most but not all parties have
paid increasing attention to the process of European integration.5 The most
important increase in mobilization with regard to Europe has been among
conservatives and the new populist right (the radical right, rr). This conﬁrms
my hypothesis that it is the Eurosceptics on the right who drive mobilization
on Europe in national election campaigns. As discussed above, three of these
parties – the British Conservatives, the Swiss People’s Party and the Austrian
Freedom Party – were mainstream parties that redeﬁned their ideological
proﬁle in response to the new structural conﬂict. All three of these parties
experienced an intensiﬁcation of internal conﬂict over European integration
in particular and the party’s position with respect to the purported new
cleavage more generally, and they resolved these conﬂicts by transforming
the party’s position in favour of Euroscepticism. Both the British Conservative
Party and the Austrian Freedom Party had originally supported
European integration, whereas Europe was originally a non-issue for the
Swiss People’s Party. The other two parties in this group – the French National
Front and the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List – are parties of the new populist right
that have been both xenophobic and Eurosceptic from the beginning.
Looking more closely at the mobilization patterns of the parties in the
two most Eurosceptic countries – Switzerland and the UK (Figure 3) – we
ﬁnd that conservatives in both of these countries mobilized heavily on the
European issue in more recent elections. In the 1990s, one in seven issuespeciﬁc
statements by the British Conservatives was about Europe, and one
Kriesi The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns 9 5
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
D NL A F Average UK CH
Country
Salience(%)
1970s
1990s
Figure 1 The salience of Europe in six European countries, 1970s and 1990s.
Notes: No. of cases – D: 756 (1970s)/3713 (1990s); NL: 1436/5883; A: 762/3160; F: 1737/5412;
UK: 726/2671; CH: 845/3634.
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in ﬁve of the Swiss People’s Party’s issue-speciﬁc statements addressed
Switzerland’s relationship with Europe.6 In fact, it is only in these two
Eurosceptic countries that conservatives mainly mobilize around the
European integration process. In Austria, the Freedom Party was concerned
with Europe only in the 2002 elections, when one-seventh of its issue-speciﬁc
statements addressed European integration. In the two previous elections,
institutional reform (in 1994) and the welfare state (in 1999) were its main
concerns. Meanwhile, the French National Front has devoted most of its
mobilization efforts to combating immigration, and seriously addressed the
European issue only in the 1995 elections. Finally, the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List
was only minimally concerned about Europe.
We can summarize these results with a multiple regression analysis at
the aggregate level, where a party in a given country constitutes a case for
the 1970s and one for the 1990s. Table 1 presents the results. This analysis
shows that the salience of Europe generally increased by three percentage
points between the 1970s and the 1990s. But we cannot conclude from this
that the Eurosceptic parties7 or the opposition8 are driving the increased
politicization of Europe in national election campaigns. The effect for the
Eurosceptic parties points in the expected direction, but is not signiﬁcant, and
the effect for the opposition is signiﬁcant but weak. In contrast, the countryspeciﬁc
effects are highly signiﬁcant and more substantial: the salience of
European Union Politics 8(1)9 6
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
Radical
left
Greens Social
democrats
Christian
democrats
Radical
liberals
Conservative
liberals
Conservatives–
rr
Party family
Salience(%)
1970s
1990s
Figure 2 The salience of Europe in seven party families, 1970s and 1990s.
Notes: No. of cases – radical left: 309 (1970s)/662 (1990s); greens: 54/1116; social democrats:
1338/6337; Christian democrats: 1449/4122; radical liberals: 250/357; conservative liberals:
896/3920; conservatives–radical right: 609/3334
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European integration has been particularly high (+3%) in Switzerland and the
UK and has increased especially among conservatives and the new populist
right (+9%) in these two countries. In the other countries, however, conservative
parties have not been particularly eager to mobilize around the issue
of European integration. The ﬁnal indicator in the model controls for the
outlier of the Swiss greens (see note 6). These results contradict the opposition
hypothesis, which maintains that mobilization with regard to Europe
is simply the result of opposition politics, and they provide mixed support
for the new cleavage hypothesis, according to which conservatives and the
new populist right are the driving force behind the politicization of European
Kriesi The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns 9 7
Figure 3 The salience of Europe by country and party family: UK and Switzerland
compared, 1970s and 1990s.
Notes: UK – Labour: 176 (1970s)/1241 (1990s); LDP: 37/245; Conservatives: 346/1073. Switzerland –
radical left (1990s): 29; greens: 230; social democrats: 501; Christian democrats: 563; liberals: 874;
conservatives–radical right: 1013.
(a) UK
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Labour Conservatives
Party
Salience(%)
1970s
1990s
(b) Switzerland
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Radical
left
Greens Social
democrats
Christian
democrats
Liberals Conservatives–
rr
Party
Salience(%)
1990s
LDP
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integration at the national level. The latter holds true only in Switzerland and
the UK, where European integration is particularly contested.
Direction
The direction of the mobilization displays analogous country-speciﬁc
differences: as expected, Euroscepticism (indicated by negative average values
in Figure 4) dominates political debate in Switzerland and the UK. In the UK,
Euroscepticism was already predominant in the 1970s, whereas the Swiss did
not discuss Europe at that time. The tone of the debate in the other four
countries was predominantly pro-European in the 1970s and remained so in
Germany, France and Austria. In the Netherlands, pro- and anti-European
statements almost cancelled each other out in the campaigns of the 1990s.
Turning to party positions, we ﬁnd the familiar inverted U-curve for the
1990s (Hooghe et al., 2002: 968–71), with mainstream parties at the centre of
the political spectrum taking a predominantly pro-European position, while
the radical left and the greens (regrouped into a single category) and the
national conservatives and the populist right are predominantly Eurosceptic
(Figure 5).9
For a more systematic test of the competing hypotheses, I performed
another set of multiple regression analyses at the level of the core sentences.
The ﬁrst model tests the opposition hypothesis. As the results in Table 2
indicate, this model is not entirely wrong but its explanatory power is quite
weak. The effect of the opposition indicator is highly signiﬁcant but relatively
weak: while governing parties are moderately pro-European (indicated by the
European Union Politics 8(1)9 8
Table 1 Determinants of salience
B Std. error
Constant 0.02** 0.008
Direction –0.04 0.021
Year 0.03*** 0.007
Opposition –0.02* 0.010
Conservatives–populist right 0.00 0.011
UK, CH 0.03** 0.010
Conservatives–populist right, UK, CH (1990s) 0.09*** 0.023
Swiss Greens 0.20*** 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.72
Notes: n = 56. Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients. Signiﬁcance levels: * = .05; ** = .01;
*** = .001.
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Kriesi The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns 9 9
Figure 5 Direction with regard to Europe of seven party families, 1970s and 1990s.
Notes: No. of cases – radical left–greens: 85; social democrats: 351; Christian democrats: 262;
liberals: 279; conservatives–radical right: 413.
Figure 4 Direction with regard to Europe in six European countries, 1970s and
1990s.
Notes: No. of cases – D: 8 (1970s)/118 (1990s); F: 47/309; A: 7/179; NL: 58/327; CH: (3)/443;
UK: 34/300.
–1.0
–0.8
–0.6
–0.4
–0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
D F A NL Average CH UK
Country
Direction
1970s
1990s
–0.80
–0.60
–0.40
–0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
Radical
left–greens
Social
democrats
Christian
democrats
Liberals Conservatives–
rr
Party
Direction
1990s
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constant: 0.35), the opposition parties are slightly Eurosceptic
(0.35–0.53=–0.18). The model also includes an effect for a time trend, which
turns out to be insigniﬁcant: our data do not show any increase in Euroscepticism
in the parties in our six countries between the 1970s and the 1990s.
Model 2 adds the effect of the new cleavage hypothesis to the list of independent
variables, i.e. a dummy variable for each radical left/green party and
conservative/populist right party. Adding these effects greatly enhances the
explanatory power of the model. Both effects, but especially the effect for
conservative and populist right parties, are highly signiﬁcant and point in the
expected Eurosceptic direction. Regardless of whether they are in the opposition
or not, the conservative and new populist right parties are much more
Eurosceptic than all the other parties. Model 3 takes the speciﬁc situation of
the two particularly Eurosceptic countries into account. Both the opposition
hypothesis and the new cleavage hypothesis hold most clearly for these two
countries. Once we consider this, the corresponding direct effects are considerably
attenuated – especially the opposition effect. This suggests that, as
far as the direction of the mobilization with respect to Europe is concerned,
the opposition hypothesis may not be generally applicable, whereas the new
European Union Politics 8(1)1 0 0
Table 2 Determinants of direction with regard to Europe
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.35* 0.36* 0.40**
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14)
Year –0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Opposition –0.53*** –0.59*** –0.28**
(0.06) (0.06) (–0.09)
Conservatives–populist right . –1.23*** –0.73***
. (0.04) (0.10)
Radical left–Green . –0.59*** –0.43***
. (0.09) (0.09)
UK, CH . . –0.14**
. . 0.06
Opposition (UK, CH) . . –0.49***
. . (0.12)
Conservatives (UK, CH) . . –0.49***
. . (0.12)
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.37 0.41
Notes: n = 1495. Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: * = .05; ** = .01; *** = .001.
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cleavage hypothesis seems to be applicable beyond the two particularly
Eurosceptic countries of Switzerland and the UK.
These results on the direction of the debate are based on the average of
each party’s coded positions. However, many parties are internally divided
over European integration, which means that their average position may not
be as meaningful as the preceding discussion suggests. This is resolved by
operationalizing the degree of fractionalization of a given party with the
standard deviation of its position on European integration in a given election.
The standard deviation increases as the statements attributed to the party on
this issue during the campaign become more heterogeneous. Crum (in this
issue) argues that opposition parties are most likely to be internally divided
over European integration. He supports this hypothesis by arguing that proEuropean
opposition parties are most prone to factionalism, since they can
be accused by their followers of ‘sleeping with the enemy’. Table 3 presents
the results of a multiple regression analysis used to predict such internal
factionalization. The results do not conﬁrm Crum’s argument. Instead they
indicate that pro-European parties and opposition parties are generally more
likely to be internally cohesive on the issue of European integration. There is
a signiﬁcant interaction effect between direction and opposition, which to
some extent offsets the cumulative effect of these two conditions and corresponds
to Crum’s predicted effect. However, the combined impact of these
three effects is that the pro-European forces in opposition are least internally
divided, whereas the anti-European forces in government are most divided.
‘Sleeping with the enemy’, therefore, appears to be more dangerous for
Eurosceptics joining the government than for pro-European oppositions
colluding with the government. However, conservative parties in Switzerland
and the UK are particularly cohesive in this respect, whether they are in
government (Switzerland) or not (UK). Opposition to the EU seems to have
become a common denominator that holds these parties together.
The insertion of Euroscepticism into the overall national
party space
In our analysis of the overall national political space (Kriesi et al., 2006), we
have used these data to study the positioning of political parties in the six
countries under examination here. We have analysed their positioning on the
12 issue categories with a weighted metrical multidimensional scaling
procedure (WMMDS). The weights were based on the salience of these issues
for each party. In other words, the more important an issue for a given
party, the more its positioning on this issue counted in the overall solution.
Kriesi The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns 1 0 1
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We found two-dimensional solutions – with an economic and a cultural
dimension – for the national party space in all six countries and all the
elections. In some cases, such as Switzerland and France, the two dimensions
turned out to be partially correlated, but they never coincide. Second, we also
found that parties’ positions usually vary as much along the cultural
dimension as they do with respect to the economic one. Both dimensions are
polarizing. Furthermore, the cultural dimension (and not only its European
integration aspect) has generally been gaining in importance, becoming the
primary basis for new parties or renovated established parties to mobilize
their electorate. Finally, and most importantly, from the point of view of this
analysis, we also found that over the course of the 1990s the cultural
dimension, which was originally deﬁned in terms of cultural liberalism and
the military, has become increasingly associated with the immigration issue
in all these countries except the UK. Moreover, in the two most Eurosceptic
countries – Switzerland and the UK – European integration now trumps
cultural liberalism as the issue most clearly opposed to cultural closure (which
usually means tougher immigration policies). We interpret this transformation
of the meaning of the cultural dimension as strong evidence of the
structuring capacity of the purported new integration/demarcation cleavage.
However, we also conclude that the structuring capacity of this cleavage is
not usually based on Euroscepticism. In fact, it is associated with Euroscepticism
only in the two most Eurosceptic countries – Switzerland and the
UK – and in Austria.
This result is conﬁrmed by the simple bivariate correlations between the
parties’ average positioning with regard to Europe and their positioning with
regard to the two most important issues of the cultural dimension – cultural
European Union Politics 8(1)1 0 2
Table 3 Determinants of internal factionalization (standard deviations of positioning)
B Std. error
Constant 0.83*** 0.08
Direction –0.49*** 0.11
Opposition –0.57*** 0.15
Direction*opposition 0.35* 0.17
Conservatives–populist right 0.18 0.16
UK, CH 0.09 0.13
Conservatives–populist right, UK, CH –0.76** 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.44
Notes: n = 39. Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients. Signiﬁcance levels: * = .05; ** = .01;
*** = .001.
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liberalism and immigration policy – which are presented in Table 4. These
correlations are calculated only for the 1990s. In Switzerland, the UK and
Austria, the parties’ positioning on European integration is positively correlated
with their positioning on cultural liberalism. Moreover, in Switzerland
and Austria, but not in the UK, it is negatively correlated with their positioning
on immigration policy. The UK exception is owing to the fact that the UK
parties largely abstained from mobilizing on this issue until the last general
election in 2005. Thus, there is not a single statement on immigration for the
Liberal Democrats in our data set.
In France and the Netherlands, by contrast, the positioning of the parties
on Europe barely correlates with their positioning on cultural issues. This
suggests that, contrary to the situation in Switzerland, the UK and Austria,
European integration is not part of the cultural dimension in France and in
the Netherlands. In Germany, the European issue is also strongly associated
with the cultural dimension but not in the expected direction: in Germany,
support for European integration goes together with opposition to cultural
liberalism and with support for tougher immigration policies. In this context,
it is important to keep in mind that Germany is the only country in our set
without a conservative or new populist right party mobilizing against Europe.
This may explain why, of all our cases, Europe has been least salient in
German electoral campaigns (see Figure 1). The unexpected reversal of the
sign of European integration on the cultural dimension can be attributed to
the fact that the closest approximation of a conservative party in the German
system – the CDU – has always been strongly pro-European, while becoming
strongly opposed to immigration in the 1990s and taking a middle-of-theroad
position on cultural liberalism.
Kriesi The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns 1 0 3
Table 4 Structure of the national political space: Correlations between European
integration and other key cultural issues
Correlations n
Cultural Cultural
Country liberalism Immigration liberalism Immigration
CH 0.80 –0.34 18 17
A 0.64 –0.34 13 11
UK 0.53 0.01 7 5
F 0.21 –0.12 16 14
NL 0.05 –0.17 16 16
D –0.53 0.71 8 8
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Conclusion
This analysis has shown that Eurosceptic mobilization in national election
campaigns has been most pronounced in Switzerland and the UK, where
public attitudes have always been more or less Eurosceptic. Consistent with
the new cleavage hypothesis, in these two countries this mobilization is
primarily driven by conservatives and/or the new populist right. Moreover,
European integration is most politically salient in countries where it has been
clearly articulated in cultural terms. Overall, the results lend only weak
support to the opposition hypothesis, and provide mixed support for the new
cleavage hypothesis. European integration has not (yet) come to constitute
the primary battleground for the conﬂict between the losers and winners from
the opening of national boundaries. The relative importance of Euroscepticism
in the national political space depends on the deep cultural roots referred
to by Diez Medrano (2003). In countries such as the UK and Switzerland,
where Euroscepticism resonates with deep-seated national anxieties, it has
been able to stimulate a restructuring of the party system – with the conservative
or new populist right becoming the decisive restructuring force. On
the other hand, where European integration has less potential to mobilize
along the new cleavage, conservatives and/or the new populist right have
been less Eurosceptic to date. As a result, their anti-European mobilization
and intra-party cohesion on this issue have been more limited in national
election campaigns, with the corollary that European integration has become
less clearly embedded in the cultural dimension of the transformed twodimensional
structure of the national political space. This does not preclude
conservatives and the new populist right from picking up this issue in other
countries as well. Nor does it mean that the salience of the European issue in
the UK and Switzerland is not largely a result of mobilization by these
Eurosceptic forces. In line with the reciprocal mass–elite linkages on European
integration demonstrated by Steenbergen et al. (in this issue), the salience of
European integration in a given country is certainly not independent of the
mobilization efforts undertaken by conservatives and the new populist right.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that these political forces chose to mobilize
around the issue of European integration in precisely the two countries where
the issue has been (potentially) most salient.
Notes
1 Carey (2002), Christin and Trechsel (2002), Diez Medrano (2003), Hooghe and
Marks (2004) and Kriesi (2002) provide empirical support for this idea.
European Union Politics 8(1)1 0 4
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McLaren (2004), on the other hand, shows that, although fear of loss of
national identity has an impact on individual support for the EU, this impact
is not very strong. Indeed, both individual utilitarianism and the beneﬁts that
accrue to various countries have a greater impact on levels of support for
the EU.
2 My argument is similar to that of Marks and Wilson, but not identical, since
they distinguish between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ integration. The cultural
side of the European integration process is, of course, intimately connected
to the political one, given the importance of national identities in this context.
3 Although the new politics dimension of party competition, ranging from
GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) to TAN (traditional/authoritarian/
nationalist), introduced by Hooghe et al. (2002) is closely related to the new
cleavage introduced here, it is not entirely identical. It mixes the new cleavage
within the new middle class that has been articulated by the new social movements
of the 1970s and 1980s and the Green parties with the new cleavage
that separates the new middle-class winners from the old middle-class and
working-class losers from denationalization articulated by the new populist
right and its national conservative allies since the 1980s and especially since
the 1990s.
4 The selected newspapers were Die Presse and Kronenzeitung in Austria, The
Times and the Sun in the UK, Le Monde and Le Parisien in France, Süddeutsche
Zeitung and Bild in Germany, NRC Handelsblad and Algemeen Dagblad in the
Netherlands, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Blick in Switzerland.
5 The radical left and the two parties of the liberal radical family (the Dutch
D66 and the French MRG) are exceptions. However, these exceptions are
based on very few cases in the 1970s and should therefore be treated with
caution.
6 In the 1990s, the Swiss greens paid even greater attention to this issue than
the conservatives did. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, conservatives dominated
the Swiss debate on Europe.
7 The effect of Euroscepticism is indicated by the effect of the average
direction of all the claims attributed to a given party.
8 The opposition indicator equals 1 if a party is in opposition at the time of the
national elections, and 0 otherwise.
9 For the 1970s, we do not have sufﬁcient data. For the 1990s, the radical left
and the greens as well as the two liberal currents had to be grouped together.
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About the author
Hanspeter Kriesi is Professor of Comparative Politics, Department of
Political Science, University of Zurich, Seilergraben 53, CH-8001 Zurich,
Switzerland.
Fax: +41 44 634 4360
E-mail: hanspeter.kriesi@pwi.unizh.ch
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