The Limits of Influence: Gerald Ford, Yitzhak Rabin and the Reassessment
Period of 1975
by
Dr. Aaron T. Walter
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“We live under a system of tacit understandings. But the understandings are
not always understood.”1
This quote offers a sketch of the context to the strange and unique period of U.S.-Israeli
foreign relations in early 1975, a period referred to as reassessment. As the previous
chapters have discussed, the central figures were the leaders: Gerald Ford, president of
the United States, his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister
of Israel. These men, how each understood each other, and the role their nations
were to each other; meanwhile in this chapter how each were responsible for the resulting
crisis is explained and crucial in explaining current U.S.-Israeli relations including the
recently characterized frosty relationship between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu
government since 2009.
Low, Sidney. The Governance of England, rev. ed. (London: Ernest, Benn, 1914), p. 121
as quoted in Rose, R. (1989). Politics in England. 5th ed. Scott, Foresman and Company.
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Part 1: Reassessment
In the discussion on the relationship between the U.S. and Israel there is scholarship that
argues on its special nature, its strategic character, and with the publication in 2007 of
James Mearsheimer and Steven Walt’s The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, the
relationship between the two nations reflects one that is more disadvantageous for the
United States, more of a handicap. This assertion sparked an intense debate amongst International
Relation scholars, Political Scientists and Jews living in Israel and in the Diaspora.
The discussion was re-engaged in the spring of 2010 as U.S. President Obama
and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu experienced a series of diplomatic incidents that
made conservatives and liberals in both nations on the domestic-political scale question
the ‘strength’ of the relationship.
The focus of this research is on neither of the scholarship mentioned above, rather the
focus is a point in time considered the most dangerous in U.S-Israeli relations. In June
1974, United States Foreign Policy towards the State of Israel underwent a serious period
of reflection, nominally referred to as reassessment after Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger returned from his shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Egypt in defeat. While
there many reasons for the reassessment approach, the public remarks to this fact, shook
the foundations of U.S.-Israeli relations that had steadily grown since the Six-Day War of
1967 and as recently as the October War of 1973. From June 1974 to May 1977 the United
States, principally its president, Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Cabinet members struggled
to define and then influence this new relationship. Many scholars recognize the
1970s as a watershed in world history. The following book is about a specific time in2
that period of history and the struggle for influence linking the past as part of present
neoclassical realist theory.
Much of the 1975 reassessment period rests in the basic misunderstandings of personality
and interpretation of national politics. If, the “values, beliefs, and emotional symbols”
that make up the political culture constitute what Sidney Low described as ‘a system of
tacit understandings’ that make government… “safe, convenient, effective, and in the
main, satisfactory” then President Ford, his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and3
See Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narra2 tives
for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 3 (June 2000): 807-31; and
Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006).
Ibid, pg. 127.3
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Yitzhak Rabin each tried to mold the political culture and influence each other in the
process. Moreover, besides the misunderstanding there is a sense that “reassessment” was
an expression of frustration over Kissinger’s failure after his previous "diplomatic dialogues"
were viewed as initial achievements in Arab-Israeli relations.
When Rabin signed the second disengagement accord with Egypt in September 1975,
Israel had an agreement that a future pact between Israel and Egypt was the final peace
agreement and an assurance from the U.S. that in any forthcoming negotiations with Syria
only minor territorial concessions would be pushed and the U.S. would not press Israel
toward any partial treaty with Jordan. Moreover, this process and the stipulations that Israel
was able to gain regarding them showed the direction Israel wished to go regarding
its relations and the ‘regularizing’ of them with its Arab neighbors. Isolate Egypt from the
rest of the Arab world, retain the Golan Heights regardless of the agreement to abide by
Resolution 242, create a full peace with Jordan (though at this period of history, such a
settlement would have been unacceptable to Jordan) that in fact would lead Israel to retain
the West Bank and regarding other territories, except the Sinai, Israel would have a
freedom to deal with them without fear of Egyptian military threat. This offered Prime4
Minister Rabin ‘breathing room’ to deal with his domestic concerns.
Yitzhak Rabin’s meteoric rise, less than a year after his return to Israel from his posting in
the United States as Israeli ambassador was due to the Israeli Labor Party’s disarray following
the Yom Kipper war and Gold Meir’s resignation. The party bosses looked for a,
“fresh face, one unblemished by the war, and the by the process of elimination their gaze
settled on him.” Rabin was until his elevation to Prime Minister largely seen as, “compe5 tent
but bland technician” Several factors however conspired to help Rabin achieve the6
top position within Israeli politics. Rabin at the time of his appointment as Labor Party
leader, thus prime minister, was the only Israeli politician untarnished by the Yom Kipper
War. While this was reason enough for his selection, it had much to do with the fact that
he was not Shimon Peres, “the one party figure [Meir] she’d longest despised,” . There7
were two additional factors as well that supported his elevation to the premiership. The
first, Rabin was both a former IDF (Israeli Defense Force) Chief of Staff and a highly effective
ambassador to the United States, while second he was a sabra—born of the land
—a point Israeli citizens liked because Rabin was the first native Israeli ascending to the
prime ministership. For Labor leadership, particularly retiring Prime Minister Gold Meir,
See Matti Golan, Secret Conversations, pg. 229; and Quandt, Decade, pg. 261.4
Avner, Y. (2010). The Prime Ministers. The Toby Press, pg. 261.5
Slater, pg. 279.6
Burkett, pg. 366.7
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the fact of reduced plurality since the December 1973 elections, 39.6 percent and fiftyone
seats as opposed to 46.2 and fifty-six seats8
Foreshadowed Dispute
By the beginning of 1974, after the October 1973 war, the Israelis and Egyptians had
been engaged in negotiations over the Sinai where Israeli troops had remained. Egyptian
President Sadat demanded that Israel withdraw from the critical Giddi and Mitla passes
and the Um Hashiba alert station overlooking them in the Sinai. Rabin was willing to
withdraw from significant portions of the Sinai won in 1967 and defended in 1973 in return
for a non-belligerency agreement. But Sadat was willing to offer only “non-use of
force,” not a peace treaty, and Rabin was unwilling to relinquish the strategic passes for
such a tepid guarantee. Even so, he was ready to allow the Egyptians to advance to forward
positions at the western entrances to the passes, and to give up the Abu Rodeis oil
fields. The Americans, as records of discussions between Kissinger and Ford show, support
Sadat’s position. That fact was what made the agreement in January 1974 so promising.
It had assurances between the Israelis and Egyptians that if built upon, would
demonstrate a corner had been turned in the Middle East in defiance of obstacles and was
moving towards a final peace. Thus, when the diplomatic efforts collapsed in October of
1974 it was so disappointing and served as an opening footnote to the reassessment period
between the U.S. and Israel.
During March, 1975 the attempt to create a Sinai II with Egypt by convincing Rabin to
withdraw from the Sinai mountain passes of Gidi and Mitla, was rejected. The Middle
East shuttle diplomacy that was so famed in producing the Egyptian-Israeli accord of
1974 and had potential for peace with other neighbors such as Jordan and Syria, hit a
roadblock in the new Israeli government. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, according to a
condescending Kissinger “went shivering in fear” every time Jordan was mentioned dur9 ing
previous meetings. Now, according to Kissinger, “Israeli actions had imposed on us a
risk to our entire Middle East strategy making reassessment unavoidable.” The term,10
according to Kissinger, was part of a leak after Rabin had shared a letter written from
Ford, to his cabinet. The day after Kissinger arrived back in Washington, D.C. Ford defiSmith,
C. (1996). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. St. Martin’s Press, p. 232.8
Also see, the statistics in Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., Israel in the Middle
East Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations: 1948Present
(New York, 1984), appendices (unpaginated). See also Eric Silver, Begin, a Biography
(London, 1984), pp. 144-146.
Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 630-35.9
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 424.10
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antly repeated the term “reassessment” though in fact it had been used by a State Department
official at with the approval of Kissinger. Therefore, Reassessment ushered in a
tense phase in American-Israeli relations. On one level, it stated a truism: whatever the
label, the failure of the shuttle obliged us to take another look at our Middle East diplomacy.
At the same time, the term could be read to imply that our basic relationship with
Israel was up for review---which was not the American intention.” Regardless of inten11 tion
the ensuing row began in earnest in March, immediately following the time that
Kissinger had visited with Rabin. When Kissinger talked to President Ford laying the
blame on the Israelis.
An annoyed President Ford sent a cable to Jerusalem on March 21, “I am disappointed,”
Ford wrote “to learn that Israel has not moved as far as it might.” The American president
went further by threatening to reevaluate the U.S.’s entire Middle East strategy, including
“our policy towards Israel.” Such tough words from the American president “shell12
shocked” the new Israeli cabinet, but Rabin refused to be publically intimidated. On
March 22, 1975, after two weeks of commuting between Israel and Egypt, Kissinger gave
up. His shuttle diplomacy, an itinerary deliberately created for maximizing frenzy and
time included first Egypt and then Israel and then back to Egypt, “choreographed with an
eye to the psychological necessities and the margins for maneuver available to each
side,” acclaimed in the American press now lay in tatters. While the Americans had13
hoped for an Israeli leader in the mold of the “warrior Golda Meir” writes Douglas14
Brinkley based upon Walter Isaacson’s memoir of Kissinger, they were left with Rabin.
President Ford summarized the failure at a press conference:
“ Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our control, it did not turn out the way we wanted it…It is in
the national, as well as the international interest that we do everything we can with the emphasis
on peace. Although we have—on a temporary basis, hopefully—not achieved all that we had desired,
I continue to be an optimist, that the good judgment, the wise decisions of all parties will
result in the ultimate objective pace in the Middle East and its ramifications on a worldwide
basis.”15
This official version then; what of private thoughts? They mirrored the publicly stated
ones. Ford saw the negotiations as part of the final deal; meanwhile the approach by the
Israeli Prime Minister was decidedly short term. The March negotiations were allowed to
collapse, because of Rabin’s “belief that these could and would be picked up again before
long without any undue damage and possibly with important benefits,” though the situa-
Ibid.11
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 631.12
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pg. 809.13
Ibid, Years of Renewal, pg. 631.14
Ford, Public Papers, 1975, pp. 396-97.15
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tion after March 22 showed the U.S. present a behavior that “castigated and penalized
Israel and praised and supported” the Egyptian position causing the possibility of a further
round of negotiations to be undercut, which meant that Rabin was give the position
of seeking a limited agreement, “in favor another approach, or else of modifying what
they wanted to achieve from a limited agreement in the light of what was possible.”16
Unable to find a compromise, stalemate ensued.
Fragile Egos
Before leaving Israel, Kissinger and Rabin had met one last time. This scene recreated by
in Walter Isaacson’s biography of Kissinger shows the differences between them. Rabin
reminded Kissinger that his son was currently deployed on the Sinai front and refused the
American terms. The two men attacked each other personally. Kissinger accused Rabin of
failing the Jewish people, and being personally insulted: “You don’t understand, I’m trying
to save you….You are making me, the secretary of state of the United States of America,
wander around the Middle East like a Levantine rug merchant….Are you out of your
mind? I represent America,” he fumed. Rabin was firm, “you know very well we have
offered a compromise at every step along the way,” Rabin visibly angry continued, “you
know we have agreed to adopt your language on the ‘non-use-of-force’, which means
much less than a ‘termination of belligerency.’You know we have agreed to hand over
the Sinai oil fields. You know we have agreed, in principle, to pull back as far as the eastern
end of the passes. You know we have agreed to allow the Egyptian army to advance
from its present positions and occupy the buffer zone. And you know we have agreed
that they may set up two forward positions at the western entrances to the passes. After
all this display of goodwill and flexibility for the sake of the success of your mission—
and at great risk to ourselves—to then accuse us of causing the failure of your mission,
instead of laying the blame on Sadat’s intransigence, is a total distortion of the facts.”17
Kissinger boarded his plane, visibly upset, and informed his press team that Israel’s intransigence
caused the breakdown in negotiations.
Henry Kissinger was never one not to play the dramatic, but this incredibly tense
farewell, proved the point; exposed not only Kissinger’s faulty logic to Israeli negotiating
position, but also Rabin’s ability to express the political reality he faced though his inability
to influence Kissinger in a manner typified by his predecessor. The strained relations
between Ford and Rabin, which never reached the level of warmth shared by their predecessors,
Nixon and Golda Meir, was only a symptom of the diplomatic dispute.
Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, pg. 552.16
Avner, The Prime Ministers, pg. 280.17
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Yitzhak Rabin and Gerald Ford could not understand each other. This, coincidentally is
the key point of the crisis. President Ford thought that Rabin was inflexible. Rabin saw
the $750 million dollar military aid package negotiated with Kissinger and approved by
Ford as a bribe to, “extract peace concessions” and furthermore, Rabin felt that “Ford did
not exhibit Nixon’s passion for the concept of peace through strength; or harbor the exPresident’s
appreciation for Israel’s courage and will to survive.” When it was apparent18
that the shuttle diplomacy had failed, Kissinger was upset stating to Rabin: “this will be a
setback for me personally, certainly, but that’s not the point. The main thing is how the
President perceived it. The Soviets will be happy, and there will be an immediate ArabSoviet
demand to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Under the circumstances, I can’t
promise you anything about American policy.” It was more than semantics. It was also19
policy related.
The Ford Administration wanted to strike up an agreement between Israel and Jordan,
and achieve progress with Egypt. Rabin was hard pressed to meet Ford's wishes because
of precarious domestic situation Rabin faced back in Israel with this Cabinet. Disagreement
with long-time political rival Shimon Peres, his struggles with coalition partners in
particular the National Religious Party ensured little room to maneuver. This unfortunately
set the stage for the famously dramatic announcement by State Department spokesman
Robert Anderson, on orders from Kissinger, “unfortunately, the differences on a number
of key issues have proven irreconcilable...we, therefore, believe a period of reassessment
is needed so that all concerned can consider how best to proceed toward a just and lasting
peace.” The announcement language was picked up by President Ford who in a scathing20
letter to Rabin wrote, “I wish to express my profound disappointment over Israel’s attitude
during the course of the negotiations….I have given instructions for a reassessment
of United States policy in the region, including our relations with Israel, with the aim of
ensuring that our overall American interests are protected.” This was the most threatening
language an American president had used toward Israel since Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
verbal ‘barrage’ over the 1956 Suez crisis. To Rabin, reassessment, “an innocent-sounding
term that heralded one of the worst periods of American-Israeli relations.” If Ford21
had hoped that his sternly written letter would cause his Israeli counterpart to become
submissive he misjudged both Rabin and the political environment in the Israeli Knesset.
While the Israeli Cabinet was ‘shell-shocked’ at the tone of the letter, it remained resolute
in its support for the Israeli prime minister.
Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, pg. 31118
Ibid, pg. 316.19
Isaacson, Kissinger.20
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, pg. 261.21
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Opposition leader Menachem Begin publically supported Rabin’s suspension of negotiations
and Israelis closed ranks. Out of 120 member Knesset, 92 agreed with Rabin’s decision.
This indicated a phenomenon new to the American president, but not unlike the
“old-school” Irish or Italian-styled family criticism plus solidarity dynamic. When it was
clear that the letter had not had the intended effect, Ford issued orders to delay the delivery
of promised Lance surface-to-surface missiles and froze the request for F-15 fighter
planes. This all was done at the urging of Kissinger who viewed his status amongst the
Israeli cabinet and the American administration as both indispensable and crucial to any
treaty success. So, clearly the denial of weapons, the very things Israel needed most for
providing its security, and negotiated under the Meir government was intended to cause
maximum political damage to Rabin and force the Israelis to crawl back to the negotiating
table. In response to administration pressure, Israel launched a concerted campaign to
appeal to American public opinion and Israel’s allies in the American Congress. “Mediation
tempts the parties to advance extreme proposals and to blame the mediator for insufficient
effort if they are rejected or to use him as an excuse for their failure to put forward
what they know cannot be achieved. The Israeli cabinet was especially skillful in using
outside mediation as a foil for its decision-making.” When it was made public the divi22 sion
amongst the American Congress and the White House, Rabin gloated, “Ford and
Kissinger won’t like this one bit….we have to thank the American Jewish organizations
for this, particularly AIPAC.” This demonstrated pressure applied by Israel to the U.S.23
was not only internal, but held a successful external component too.
By March 26, days after the Rabin-Kissinger meeting, Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
appeared in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and held individual
“advocacy” meetings with all of its members. Diplomatic celebrities Moshe Dayan and
Abba Eban joined the official effort and embarked on worldwide speaking tours. Representatives
from the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee and the Conference of
Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations met in the embassy with Ambassador Dinitz
and coordinated a plan of action. In response, on March 31, the Americans doubled down
on their pressure with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declaring the United
States reluctance to enter new arms commitments with Israel. “March 1975 was a grim
month for American foreign policy…Middle East diplomacy, heretofore a success story,
stood deadlocked.” Later Kissinger admits that “the collapse of the March shuttle brought
us face to face with our gravest Middle East crisis since the Yom Kipper War. On the one
hand, America’s fundamental national interest had not changed. We still needed to isolate
the peace process from a combination of Soviet, European, and Arab pressures. Our supKissinger,
Years of Upheaval, pg. 814.22
Avner, The Prime Ministers, pg. 288.23
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port for moderate Arab leaders, especially for Anwar Sadat, remained crucial.”24
Kissinger and Ford saw the Israeli relationship with its neighbors as part of Egyptian
peace. The Israelis disagreed, and now attempted to influence the process by applying
pressure.
The Israeli efforts saw success. On May 22, 1975, 76 U.S. Senators sent a letter to President
Ford. It was stark: “Within the next several weeks, the Congress expects to receive
your foreign aid requests for fiscal year 1976,” they wrote. “We trust that your recommendations
will be responsive to Israel’s urgent military and economic needs. We urge
you to make it clear, as we do, that the United States acting in its own national interests
stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations, and that this
premise is the basis of the current reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East.” Sen25 ator
Henry Jackson of Washington followed the letter with an amendment to a defense
procurement bill stipulating that Israel receive potentially unlimited supplies of American
weaponry at low interest rates. This was a terrible blow to the president who had been in
office less than 12 months and showed a tear in the cordial relations that Ford had enjoyed
with Congress.
Yet, while Rabin could be happy he interpreted this as a victory of sorts against both
Kissinger and Ford, the American political system was a bit more complex for a full understanding
of Rabin. The letter was symbolic and its effect on the American-Jewish public
was significant, but with the checks and balance legislative system and the American
executive veto power, Ford was not really weakened. In fact, as explained in chapter 1,
Ford continued to pursue negotiations via Egypt meeting Sadat in Europe. What angered
the president, writes Evans & Novak, “was the presumption that pro-Israel publicists
could sway public opinion and Congress against the Administration”. Ford held Israel at26
arm’s length meanwhile trying to create dialogue with Egypt. The success that saw the
treaty signing in September was in fact, a series of highly sensitive compromises. The
location of the border, an Egyptian idea, was presented as an American one; while the
idea of American military personnel in key positions in the passes was Israeli, though explained
to the Egyptians as an American proposition. Still, the bruised egos of the main
cast of characters: Ford, Rabin and Kissinger compounded a delicate matter with disbelief
and misreading each other. In spite of attempts to break the impasse continued.
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 422.24
Berman & Sadot, (April 1, 2012) “Israel & America: The Eternal Return” Commentary.25
Rowland & Novak, (May 1, 1975). “Ford’s Tough Stance on Israel”. Free Lance Star.26
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One scholar has observed that “presidents’ styles, work habits, how they like to receive
information, the people they prefer around them and the way they make up their minds
are all key…” This proved most acute as the new American president, Gerald Ford kept27
Henry Kissinger as his foreign policy advisor. Therefore for Ford, having a trusted advisor
with experience was important and essential to his early foray into foreign affairs as
an untested leader. Kissinger, who was familiar with Ford from his days in Congress and
briefly as Vice-President, made himself available, the irreplaceable man. Ford’s personality
fit within the context of Kissinger ‘the teacher’ and their dealings with difficult Israel.
According to Kissinger, the issue for President Ford was no much substantive disagreement
as breaking faith with a friend. Ford explained this to the National Security Council
on March 28: “Since I have been in office, we have worked with Israel to try and get a
settlement. We acted in good faith and I assume they did, also, but when the chips were
down they showed a lack of flexibility which was needed for an agreement…I admire
them [the Israelis] and respect them. And I have never been so disappointed as to see
people I respect unable to see that we are trying to do something for their interest as well
as for our own. But in the final analysis our commitment is to the United States.” Schol28 ars
Thomas Preston and Margaret G. Hermann write of how, “the need for power is a personality
characteristic” and while it has been extensively studied seldom is it express29 30 ly
connected to president or prime minister. For the period under review in this chapter, in
fact this was of primary importance to the three antagonists. So we have a conflict of
power personality too.
Preston, T. & Hermann, M., “Presidential Leadership Style and the Foreign Policy Ad27 visory
Process,” in Wittkpf, E. & McCormick, J. (2004). The Domestic Sources of American
Foreign Policy. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 377.
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 426.28
Preston, T. & Hermann, M., “Presidential Leadership Style and the Foreign Policy Ad29 visory
Process,” in Wittkpf, E. & McCormick, J. (2004). The Domestic Sources of American
Foreign Policy. Rowman & Littlefield, pg. 377
See Winter, D. (1973). The Power Motive. Free Press; McClelland, D. (1975). Power:30
The Inner Experience. Irvington; House, R. (1990). “Power and Personality in Complex
Organizations.” In Personality and Organizational Influence, edited by Barry M. Staw
and L.L. Cummings. JAI Press.
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Part 2: Imperfect men: imperfect process
The reassessment period contained truthful sentiment, wrapped in harsh words. While the
Israelis may have claimed this was a new policy, and it was, the Israeli protest followed
the same charge initially done by Israel. In the spring of 1974 Israel protested the public
condemnation by the U.S. over the Israeli military response to an attack by Palestinian
guerrillas operating from Lebanon on the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona. At that
time it too was publicly referred to as a “shift in policy”, though it was viewed by the
U.S. as actions from a heightened beleaguered and insecure Israel. This does not mean31
the importance is anymore less than severe during the specific reassessment. Public and
private differences could no longer be ignored or whitewashed.
During this difficult period, the ‘core reality’ of American-Israeli relations was stripped
bare. The cavalier attitude that Americans disposed of territory perceived as part of Israeli
survival could not be changed by the easy camaraderie and frequent declarations of
friendship. In fact, Kissinger states the obvious in the final book of his White House
memoirs: “[U.S. policy] our preferred solution and impose it on Israel by the threat of
economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, thereby threatening its very existence.”32
This honesty brought the U.S. and Israel to the precipice.
When Ford and Rabin met on June 11, it was an attempt to defuse the tension built up by
rhetoric but also a chance for both actors to make personal appeals of influence to the
other. President Ford saw the meeting as an opportunity to ‘clear the air’ with the former
Israeli Ambassador to America and stress his opinion on the crisis in relations. This was
quintessential Gerald Ford.
Magnified misperceptions
Upon becoming president, Ford already knew the Israeli prime minister, who had previously
been Israel’s ambassador to the United States. This could have been perceived as a
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval pg. 104931
Ibid, pg. 428.32
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positive and indeed for Israeli lobbyists it was accepted as such. However, with Ford’s
decision to keep Kissinger in his double role as National Security Advisor and Secretary
of State, what personal role the president would play in future negotiations was uncertain.
Though Ford wrote in his memoirs that foreign policy was a chief concern, in particular
the situation in the Middle East, initially the relationship between the new president and
the domineering Kissinger was presented as the president as pupil and Kissinger the
teacher. President Ford inherited a strong foreign policy strategist in Henry Kissinger.
While, Ford was widely considered not to have firm opinions on foreign policy, in relation
to Israel and possible peace with its neighbors, however the president was specific. It
helped to have Kissinger offer opinion and analysis.
Therefore, President Ford was able to begin the process of creating a friendship, or at the
very least, a working relationship with the Israeli prime minister immediately upon taking
office. It should be noted the relationships created by world leaders, begun in its embryonic
stages, relied heavily upon analysis and memos from advisors. Kissinger, due to his
status amongst the Israeli Cabinet, and his shuttle diplomacy between the Arab capitals
and Jerusalem easily filled this role. Prime Minister Rabin therefore even before officially
meeting Ford fit into the sketch that Kissinger had drawn for the president.
Prelude to Reassessment
The first chance was at the state dinner on September 12, 1974 Rabin said, “we have taken
risks for peace,” but did not explain them, instead indicating that concessions would33
not be readily available. The meeting at the White House was an attempt to see what and
where Israel was willing to compromise in its dealing with Egypt over the Sinai. After
two days of meetings, no significant progress had been made between the U.S. and Israel.
In October 1974, Ford sent Kissinger back to the Middle East to try again. When this
round of diplomacy proved unsuccessful and the negotiations between Egypt and Israel
stalled, Ford became frustrated. This frustration had a foundation in equal measure exasperation
and misreading the man who held the executive job in Israel. It was not a personality
clash as much as a fundamental misunderstanding of the motivations behind the
words and actions of Prime Minister Rabin. This in turn lead to the tension between the
U.S. and Israel and the period known as reassessment. To get to that point, however, Ford
had to believe that Israel was not being flexible. As he states in his biography, “Negotiations
between Israel and Egypt about the return of the Sinai had reached a dangerous
stalemate. For the past twenty-five years, the philosophical underpinning of U.S. policy
toward Israel had been our conviction—and certainly my own—that if we gave Israel an
amply supply of economic aid and weapons, she would feel strong and confident, more
flexible and more willing to discuss a lasting peace…the Israelis were stronger militarily…yet
peace was no closer…so I began to question the rationale for our policy. I wanted
the Israelis to recognize that there had to be a quid pro quo. If we were going to build up
Ford, G. (1979). A Time to Heal. Harper and Row, p.183.33
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their military capabilities, we in turn had to see some flexibility to achieve a fair, secure
and permanent peace. What we wanted most was new momentum diplomatically.”34
Therefore, according to Ford, that momentum was being impeded by Rabin in his public
statements and the Israeli negotiating team.
In his autobiography, Ford writes that he expressed these sentiments in interviews to
Time and NBC-TV. During his interview with Time he stated, “there was a substantial
relationship at the present time between our national security interests and those of Israel”
adding however, “but in the final analysis, we have to judge what is in our national
interest above any and all other considerations.” While Ford knew that Israel was op35 posed
to the Geneva Convention Kissinger and Ford agreed that Geneva was for the purpose
to ratify previously negotiated bilateral agreements. This was part of Ford’s overall
strategy to influence the Israelis into negotiations with the Egyptians. To assist in showing
his seriousness, in his interview with NBC, Ford used blunt language, “the U.S.
would be “forced” to abandon our step-by-step approach, and we would have no alternative
but to turn to a comprehensive approach via a Geneva conference.” Clearly, Presi36 dent
Ford was creating a rhetorically hostile environment. Which side would signal first a
willingness. It was a strategy filled with risk and seemingly out of character with the
‘nice-guy’ persona that President Ford had built as a member of Congress. But the Ford
who had been in Congress and the Ford who was president, in this sense, were arguably
different men. President Ford didn’t have to wait long.
The strategy appeared to be working, because within days after the public remarks were
made signals from both sides that they were moving to a position where they would at
least talk about progress. In February, Kissinger went for 10 days to the middle east and
achieved reasonably encouraging results; Egyptian president Anwar sadat was flexible
and accommodating to Israeli concerns about their security. The Israelis were tough in
their demands. Rabin held a thin majority in the Israeli Knesset giving him little room to
negotiate. In March, Kissinger resumed shuttling between Cairo and Jerusalem and a
framework was agreed upon for a new accord. Israelis would pull back about thirty-five
miles from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and the new dividing line between the two
adversaries would be in the vicinity of the strategic mountain passes of Gidi and Mitla in
the Sinai desert. The Israelis would return the oil fields at Abu Rudeis on the Gulf of
Suez, and the Egyptians would be able to use a road that linked those fields to the rest of
the country. Both Rabin and Sadat knew this was a first step. However, further negotiations
were difficult for Ford since the crests of Gidi and Mitla were unable to be defined
on a map or where the oil field road lay. Rabin became less flexible. Ford was surprised,
Ibid.34
Ford, G. (1979). A Time to Heal. p.245.35
Ibid.36
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writing “he fought over every kilometer. I wouldn’t call it nitpicking—I don’t doubt for a
minute that he really wanted peace, and I recognized that the Israelis had a fundamental
reluctance about giving up any territory in return for what they saw as only promises of
good will—but he didn’t seem to understand that only by giving do you get something in
return.” Again, we return to Ford’s misunderstanding of Rabin’s position and his own belief
in the triumph of compromise. It was interpreted as stalling. Ford writes as much
along with his own feelings towards the Israeli attitude: “The Israelis kept stalling. Their
tactics frustrated the Egyptians and made me mad as hell. Both Henry and I had received
firm assurances from Rabin that a line could be drawn that would be acceptable to Israel.
But Rabin now seemed afraid of his Cabinet’s response.” Kissinger returned to the U.S.
on March 23 1975, deeply disappointed by the Israeli attitude. In this instance we see pattern
of American dealings with Israel that has been replicated up to the present twentyfirst
century. In the context of this reassessment period, now, as then is the hubris of
American thinking on the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Disappointment in Israeli leaders i.e.
Prime Minister, not listening to the advice of American diplomats and lacking the followthrough
on policy change and decision making recommended by the United States.
A War of Words: test of wills
Meeting in the Oval Office on March 27th, President Ford told Fisher, who was also
chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel and had helped bridge misunderstandings in the
past that it was “imperative that we see new momentum toward peace in the Middle East,
that my comments about reassessing our policies there weren’t’ just rhetoric. I was not
going to capitulate to pressure, and if the impasse continued, I might have to go public on
where we stood and why.” Fisher advised Ford to meet with American Jewish commu37 nity
leaders. It is clear from his comment that Ford was preparing for a test of wills. The
president was also preparing himself to counter any negative media spin. The ‘war or
words’ had begun.
According to Kissinger, Ford’s latent irritation was brought to the surface when Israel
protested a ‘off the cuff’ Ford statement actually intended to reassure Israel that there had
been no policy change. In his statement, the president had used the word ‘survival’,
rather than the usual ‘sacramental statement’ endorsing Israeli security. The Israeli objection
while having semantic merit saw a rare display of anger from the president in an
NSC meeting of May 15:
“I have used survival and security interchangeably and synonymously. But they have now
chosen to make a distinction, not I. I will therefore use survival and I do not want anyone
Ford, p.248.37
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else to paraphrase or explain away what I say.” In an interview with a team of CBS re38 porters
on April 21, President Ford summed up the options for American policy:
“Now, there really are three options. You could resume the suspended negotiations without
making a commitment to go to Geneva. You could go to Geneva and try to get an
overall settlement, which is very complicated matter—many people advocate it however.
But while you were going through this negotiation for an overall settlement, as a third
option you might have an interim negotiated settlement between two of the parties, such
as Israel and Egypt. We have not made any decision yet.” The president was trying to39
play hardball without fully understanding the point of view of his new opponent.
To refute the specific allegations that the reassessment of US policy towards Israel was
anti-Israel or anti-Semitic, a direct suggestion about the president’s attitude towards the
Jewish state, Ford told them:
“In all my public life, I have never wavered in my support for a free and secure
Israel. There was never one vote or one speech that could be interpreted other
wise. All of my life, I have had great respect for the Jewish people. I feel that way
today, and anyone who says I don’t doesn’t know me at all. If is because of my af
fection and admiration for the Jewish people and the state of Israel and I am so
concerned about the lack of progress toward peace in that part of the world. We
must have progress soon if we are to avoid another war, the fifth in thirty years.
Quite frankly, Israel’s leaders have not been as quick to recognize this as I had
hoped they would be. They have not been as forthcoming as I wanted them to be.
Now, I have always believed in maintaining the national integrity of Israel, but
always within the context of maintaining world peace and—above everything else
—within the context of protecting the national interests of the United States. What
this means is that the leaders of Israel and the American Jewish community here
simply can’t hold up a legitimate settlement and expect me as President to tolerate
it”40
President Ford was not alone in efforts by the Israelis to garner support to them and
against the American administration. Throughout April 1975, the Israelis engaged in a
subtle, but significant campaign to discredit Kissinger. These attacks came to contain a
question as to Kissinger as a Jew: “the Israeli hardliners said, he was bending over backward
to be “fair” to the Arabs. He was “out-Gentiling the Gentiles”; he was “sabotaging”
Israeli interests. The charges were utterly false, of course. No one had worked harder to
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 427.38
Interview with Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer of CBS News, April39
21, 1975 in Ford, Public Papers, 1975, pg.227.
Ford, pg.286.40
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achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East than Henry Kissinger, and to see him
attacked was reprehensible.” Only a year previous, Kissinger had been considered the41
savior of Israel with his efforts to end the Yom Kipper War, that resulted in Israeli victory,
but the idea that Kissinger was ‘leaning too hard on Israel’, cost him support in the American
Jewish community. In the media, there were attempts to damage his credibility by
using the recent Watergate scandal such as when, former assistant of his NSC staff, Morton
H. Halperin, filed a civil suit against him, that claimed Kissinger had approved wiretaps
by the FBI on seventeen individuals telephones during the Nixon years. This inevitably
brought up the question of Kissinger's personal integrity. While this may not
have been the intended aim by the Israeli leadership, Rabin clearly accepted the benefits
associated with the attempt to influence the American Secretary of State.
Within the Israeli Cabinet and in public Prime Minister Rabin took a determined and
combative posture in the face of the American pressures, insinuating that if American
viewed Israel actions as intransigence and the cause of the failed talks then a counter
campaign in the U.S. to refute the allegations took place with the public position that Israel
was not afraid to participate at oft-cited Geneva conference, while also calling upon
Israel’s friends in the American Congress to support its basic position and needs. as to his
own sentiment toward Kissinger, Rabin said, “though personal feelings are not preferred
tools for managing an international negotiation that is both rigid and demanding, I still
had a special regard for this unusual man. He felt that he was working for the benefit of
Israel, even when we had doubts about it.” “Rabin had, I many ways, the most difficult42
role to play. Rabin had more at stake than Ford and was far less in control of his domestic
situation than Sadat, and above all, that his country’s margin of survival was by far the
narrowest of any of the participants in the peace process. Battered by his domestic opposition,
assailed by competitors for leadership within his cabinet, press by his American
allies to move faster, Rabin held to his determination to bring about some progress toward
peace and not simply a new military arrangement.” Israel’s reaction to Kissinger’s43
failed shuttle in early 1974 played out domestically on two levels.
First, the Israeli Knesset approved the government’s stance in the negotiations, showing
solidarity with their leader, a signal to the opposition party as well as silencing critics.
Second, by universally favorable comments on it in the media and opinion polls. “Since
the end of the October War, Israelis had again and again heard their government solemnly
vow to stand firmly on this or the issue only to see it repeatedly back down after an
American intervention, intercession, mediation, or whatever. This time, the government
took a strong position and, for once, stuck to it and dared to say NO to Kissinger. That
pleased them immensely and the Prime Minister responsible for taking that stand, hitherIbid,
p.287.41
Rabin, Memoirs, pg. 258; Golan, pg. 241.42
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 458.43
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to viewed as a dullard and a fumbler, became a national hero overnight.” That national44
hero now had support overseas.
With efforts to influence Kissinger, the Israeli’s gained additional support surprising from
the American Congress when on May 21 1975, Ford received a letter signed by seventysix
Senators urging him to “be responsive” to the Israeli request for $2.59 billion dollars
in military and economic aid. While Ford, publicly welcomed the letter, privately he
fumed, stating that it “really bugged me….there was no doubt in my mind that it was inspired
by Israel. We had given vast amounts of military and economic assistance to Israel
over the years, and we had never asked for anything in return.” This comment from45
Ford best sums his personal opinion of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. While for the Israeli
government having this gesture by the American Congress, however symbolic it may be,
was according to the president poorly timed, ‘jeopardizing’ the opportunity for peace.
This episode offers a glimpse at a tactic replicated by the U.S. since: withhold weapons
until Israel follows the wishes of America.
This sentiment from President Ford existed because of the private strategy Ford and
Kissinger had been planning. Since, the public dispute was first aired, the president assisted
by his Secretary of State had been implementing a strategy of using American influence
to pressure the Israelis to create new ideas for a Sinai settlement. The hope before
the letter was made public had been to take those ideas, created under pressure, to the
Egyptian leader, Sadat, when Ford intended to meet him in June. Sadat, it was hoped
would be forced to offer his own ideas and with the U.S. playing mediator the negotiations
between Israel and Egypt could resume. With the letter President Ford saw the letter
as reversing the roles; giving Israeli confidence in American Congressional support and
Rabin remained unwilling to be flexible or in President Ford’s expression, ‘budge’ on offering
any new ideas for peace, privately Ford thought “the Israeli’s were overplaying
their hand.” So, for the rest of May and until Ford met Sadat in June there was stale46 mate.
Coincidentally, the “test of wills” between the U.S. and Israel expressed how47
friends disagreed. Public and private pressures had been employed. As the Israelis saw
the press campaign in the U.S as well as that in Congress not produce the end result they
wished by July Rabin began to soften his approach to the negotiations. It was at this time
that the Egyptian (American) idea was offered.
Safran, pg. 551.44
Ford, p.287.45
Ibid.46
Ford, p. 308.47
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Ford, Rabin, Kissinger: Side-stepping towards agreement
President Ford’s ability to deal effectively with parties was a psychologically determinant
in how he viewed his future dealings with both the Israeli’s and the Arabs. It also served
as an indicator to how much preference Ford would offer Israel. The political career that
Gerald Ford had created was one of agreement. He sought compromise. As Minority
leader he could be tough if the situation demanded it and there were a few stories, but
Ford’s reputation as a genial colleague endeared him to his peers and was the base of
what he wished his public appeal would be as president. Prime Minister Rabin saw the
meeting as a chance to sit down face to face with the former Vice-President and Minority
Leader. It offered him the time to press upon the new president the difficulty as a new
prime minister he faced, to clear the misunderstanding between them and apologize for
the leak to the Israeli press Ford’s letter to Rabin. After the niceties of official photographers
were dispensed with, in the Oval Office, Ford bluntly told Rabin that if Israel altered
its March position, that had sent Kissinger home in failure, then Israel could count
on continued American assistance and support. Ford spoke openly, “our reassessment was
not intended to penalize Israel, yet after the United States had made supreme effort to
achieve an agreement in the Middle East and failed to do so, we had to reconsider our
policies. I have reached my conclusion, but I thought it would not be fair to finalize them
before giving you a chance to offer your opinion. I tend toward favoring an overall Middle
East settlement to be achieved at the Geneva Conference…” but Rabin knew that
Ford was ‘twisting his arm’ and replied, “we must have defensible borders and those are
not the same as the June 4 lines. And we will defend this position at Geneva, if the conference
is convened.” So, while both men kept to the talking points an easing of tension48
had nevertheless started with Ford’s remark on American intentions though much work
remained.
The tension was high and showed that it was impossible to ‘synchronize’ Israeli and
American decision-making. “Ford was at every stage in a position to make decisions.
Rabin was on a short leash; he had to clear every change, however minor, with his cabinet.
Ford’s private and official views were identical.” Ford expressed his disappoint49 ment
and disillusionment and threatened to propose his own comprehensive peace plan,
including borders, presenting it publicly within ‘weeks’. Rabin avoided references to the
past, apologized for the leaking of the President’s letter and expressed that Israel wanted
peace. It was an impasse. But the meeting did have value.
The impact of Rabin’s presentation was important. For the first time, an Israeli explained
to him Israel’s subliminal worries instead “bickering over arms supplies or abstract lines
Kurzman, Soldier of Peace, pg. 321.48
Ibid, pg. 439.49
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the desert,” and this truth was even more key to potential influence over the president,50
because it came directly from the prime minister to the American leader. The dilemma
according to the Israeli’s were prolonged deadlock that would lead to tension that would
lead to war. The recent war in 1973 still fresh in the mind. To the Israeli leader, and consequently
to Israeli leaders since 1975, the dilemma is one not of absolutes, but rather
balance “between security conceived as a military balance and security including a political
and psychological component.” The failure on the part of the American leader was51
to recognize this.
According to President Ford, the American perspective was refined as a set of practical
decisions:52
“The problem is how much longer can the status quo be maintained without political movement?
It is a volatile situation. Either we have an interim settlement in a quick period of time-within two
or three weeks—in which there would not be a lot of shuttle back and forth; it would be necessary
to firm up things, to move fast, which would give us another span of time. Either we move in this
way, or my choice—with all of its pitfalls as you suggest—is to move toward an overall settlement.
The only way to bring about continued stability in the Middle East and keep all parties reasonably
satisfied, to give all the parties some hope of a permanent settlement being possible,
would be to move in this way. Your thoughts have been helpful. If we were to move in the direction
of an interim agreement, we would have to do so rapidly, otherwise we lose that option and I
would have no alternative but to go to an overall settlement.”
From that meeting between Ford and Rabin, Rabin met with Kissinger the following
morning at breakfast and reached tentative agreements on how to proceed. In the proceeding
meeting with Ford, Rabin summarized: Israel would move its defense line east of
the passes, ask for a guarantee from UN on peacekeepers and Israel would have uninterrupted
access to the oil fields. However, Rabin in his meeting with Kissinger coupled the
agreements with a “shopping list” for military and economic assistance and veto over53
proposals from the U.S. if a Geneva conference occurred. However, Rabin had taken the
wrong impression from his meeting with Kissinger, believing the Secretary of State in
tacit agreement with Israeli wishes. This was something that Kissinger was unwilling and
unable to guarantee.
Moreover, as President Ford deftly turned aside those requests pointing to what Ford saw
as his main influential point: Israel had to gain an atmosphere of trust, not an exemption
from the U.S. judgment that would then reduce the intensity the U.S. would insist on
them. Here is the clearest signal of the level of misunderstanding, division, and mistaken
influence that President Ford thought he, through Kissinger, had.
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 442.50
Ibid.51
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 443.52
Ibid.53
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As Kissinger wrote, “each side put forward the most complete and frank statement of its
real views and then work on reconciling differences. Verbal maneuvers based on ambiguous
assertions are the most certain path to an explosion—particularly for Israel, so dependent
on the United States for material, diplomatic, and psychological support…verbal
gymnastics about what constituted the end of the passes were more relevant to Israeli
domestic politics than to objective dangers…definitely not the way to deal with Ford.”54
On June 15 when informed of the Israeli negotiating team’s interpretation of the phrase
“eastern end of the passes” Ford picked up the phone and called Rabin. Rabin said he
would have to consult with his cabinet. Ford was upset, expressing his
“disappointment” to Kissinger in their meeting that afternoon. Not the first or last time55
an American president was at the mercy of Israeli Cabinet government.
On June 27, President Ford sent a letter to Rabin summing up all the previous misunderstandings
after the personal talks with the prime minister and asked Israel to reconsider
its latest position before July 11 when Kissinger was scheduled to meet the Soviets. The
Soviet Union had been pushing for negotiations based in Geneva with their involvement.
Based on the Israeli reply, Ford would decide whether the U.S would continue to block a
comprehensive approach or reassemble the Geneva Conference. The letter to Rabin was
rather undiplomatic and arguable, “explicit”:
“With the formulation of your latest position and President Sadat’s reply, we are now at a point
where fundamental decisions must be made. I do not regard standing still a realistic choice. It runs
an unacceptable risk of leading to another war and to a coalescence of the same international
forces which Israel faced in 1973 and early 1974. Since such a situation would jeopardize fundamental
U.S. interests—most of which are also of deep concern to Israel—the U.S. cannot be expected
to underwrite such a course of action…we must reserve our course on next steps, and explain
to our people the administration’s appraisal of our national interest in this manner.”56
Here is the clearest evidence of President Ford’s attempt to influence Rabin. The president
might have wished to scare Israel. It worked. Kissinger correctly points out in Years
of Renewal how these abrupt remarks had not been made since President Eisenhower.
Because the letter gave Rabin the evidence needed to show to the Israeli cabinet that Ford
meant what he had said to Rabin in their June meeting and to the Israeli ambassador over
the previous nine months, Ford was effectively influencing Rabin’s behavior towards a
final settlement terms.
On July 1, 1975, the Israeli Ambassador Dinitz told Kissinger that Rabin was determined
to proceed toward an interim agreement. But, the Israeli ambassador told Kissinger that
since neither the Israelis nor Egyptians could afford to fail again, Rabin needed to assure
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 44454
Ibid, pg. 44555
Ibid, pg. 44656
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himself of American precise views. Moreover, the Israeli Ambassador offered a proposal
from Defense Minister Shimon Peres that four American sensor-warning stations supervised
by American military personnel be placed in the passes. This would be important
for Israeli domestic politics. Rabin was under pressure in the Israeli press, in the Knesset
by opposition leader Menachem Begin and Rabin’s coalition partner, the National Religious
Party. The proposal if coupled with the Gidi and Mitla passes withdrawal lines
marked a breakthrough, in principle, to both the U.S. and Egyptian wishes for a settlement
and Israeli concerns over national security as defined as borders.
In speaking with President Ford on this development, Kissinger was able to effectively
point out the merit of having Peres in favor of the settlement and that the concept of the
warning system was good for the consensus of the Israeli cabinet that mollified Ford’s
fear that they could create a potential hostage situation. While in Europe to meet with the
Soviet Foreign Minister, Kissinger also met with Rabin at Schloss Gymnich on July 12.
The two of them went through the proposed settlement “like mountain climbers setting
out on a particularly difficult ascent” along with a review of access routes to the Abu57
Rudeis oil fields. Just at the point of success, the impasse broken, actual agreement in
sight, it all appeared to disappear.
Nothing can be considered complete in a Middle East negotiation; Kissinger after the
July 12 meeting had passed along the proposal to Egyptian president Sadat. The Israeli
cabinet appeared to be heading toward resolution and approval of the settlement plan indicated
by an increase in leaked information and cabinet members talking of victory. This
victory was false, since it rested on the construct that the U.S. had rejected Egyptian proposals
and were now backing Israeli views, which appeared designed to publicly humiliate
Sadat. Moreover, a senior Israeli asserted that Israeli armed forces would still be within
the passes. While astute observers of the domestic situation in Israel could understand
this language for what it was, the Americans did not take it at face value. President Ford
on August 4 sent out a telegram from Air Force One to Rabin that Kissinger has categorized
as ‘blistering’:
“The President has given the Egyptians his word, based on Israeli assurances that the Israeli
line is out of the passes. He will live up to that word and the Prime Minister should
have no misapprehension about that.” The text indicates that very little had changed in58
Ford’s view since the June meeting with Rabin. Ford did not understand Israeli concerns
over security. The national security of Israel, defined by its borders, had newly moved in
the aftermath of the 1973 war had placed ‘Israel’ within the Sinai. To prevent another
surprise attack like that of October 1973 meant controlling not only intelligence of enemy-neighbor
military movement, but controlling the initiative. The insensitivity by both
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 449.57
Ibid, pg. 451.58
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Kissinger and Ford in this regard is astounding when placed in Kissinger’s earlier success
and Ford’s record as a legislative negotiator.
Rabin reacted to the Ford telegram with restraint, suggesting a trusted aide to work with
Israeli officers and agree on entrances. Once the positions seemed close, the American’s
discussed having Kissinger travel and conduct another shuttle. With Kissinger suggesting
it and the President offering support Kissinger underwent his seventh shuttle between
Egypt and Israel. Before Kissinger left the mood in Israel was particularly ugly against
the United States and President Ford called expressing his concern while wishing luck:
Ford: It is ridiculous, Henry. I hate…to send you over there in that atmosphere.
Kissinger: I think it helps a little bit in this country. In this country, it makes it clear. In the Arab
world, it helps. It shows the Arabs we have been extending ourselves. It will be a great help with
Sadat.
Ford:…Take care of yourself and Nancy…Keep in touch. I have nothing but the highest faith that
you will do what is in the best interest of the country.59
One observes then from this recording the length of both men’s thinking on Israel and
Egypt. President Ford, after months of frustration was again letting Kissinger gamble on
his persuasive negotiating skills. This took place on August 20 1975.
President Ford approached problem solving with the same ideas that he had when the
Minority leader and freshman Congressman. Find the reasonable solution, maybe not the
best, but the best for that particular situation, work with like-minded people and delegate
if necessary to those trusted subordinates that can deliver. Despite earlier public efforts to
influence Kissinger and private hostility between Kissinger and Rabin, Henry Kissinger
was still the only acceptable intermediary to both the Israelis and the Egyptians. Therefore,
Kissinger was successful in convincing Sadat that Israel really wanted peace because
Israel agreed to disengagement plan offered by Kissinger.
First, however, two concessions were granted between the U.S. and Israel. “The first was
a written promise-a MOU-that before the U.S. moved in any direction affecting the future
of the region, we would notify [Israel].” The second was the amount of money the U.S60
offered to Israel in military equipment. Originally, the agreement was “for $1.5 billion
dollars in arms. They would have to pay us back half that amount; the rest would be a
loan with an understood forgiveness clause.” The money guaranteed security for Israel.61
Security had been since 1948 the overriding concern of every Israeli government. One
could draw the line of logic from security guarantees to peace negotiations. This misunKissinger,
Years of Renewal, pg. 452.59
Ibid, p.308.60
Ibid, p.308.61
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derstanding by both Ford and Kissinger early on might just have caused the previous
months very public discord.
When Israel agreed, the negotiations between it and Egypt began focused on minute details,
in particular where the mountain crests were. Once charts were able to pinpoint the
location of the crests of Gidi and Mitla, progress continued between Kissinger, Rabin and
Sadat. Between 100 and 150 U.S. civilian technicians were to be stationed in the buffer
zone to monitor activity in the vicinity of the passes. On September 1, 1975, Kissinger
called Ford with the news of success, a peace settlement. Ford’s response was positive,
“[this] a great achievement” was stating the obvious if not also an indicator of his per62 sonal
relief.
Ford told his old friend from Michigan, Max Fisher: “I don’t think I have ever been so
disappointed as when I heard Henry was coming back without a settlement [1974-5]. It
was a low as I have been in this office. The impression I had after my meetings with Allon
twice, with Rabin, with Golda, etc. was that we had been working so closely that
when the chips were down they would see how deeply this would affect the prestige of
the United States.” That disappointment was palpable and provided the kind of cover63
for President Ford to remain hopeful but not entirely optimistic. So it was with relief that
this time, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy worked.
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 309.62
Ibid, pg. 425.63
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Part III: Sinai II & the end of Reassessment
As explained, reassessment often took several forms, the most important of which was
restriction of arms supply and suspension of consideration of economic assistance. “The
United States had often used this kind of informal sanction in the past to induce Israel to
take some specific action; this time, however, the sanction appeared to be almost purely
vindictive since it came after the fact. Moreover, the action was particularly painful and
potentially damaging to American-Israeli relations because it came only a short time after
Kissinger had committed the United States to increased and more regular military assistance
to Israel in connection with the conclusion of the first Egyptian agreement…”64
Moreover, since the review of concepts and policy was necessary, one may claim, normal,
part of policy making there then was little significance of declaring a
“reassessment”. However, since Kissinger most likely needed time to reconsider available
options and seek advice from President Ford, the unfolding “test of wills” as Ford
mentions in his memoirs was meant to serve, “the purposes of gaining time and putting
psychological pressure on Israel to soften it up for whatever next move might be made.”65
It did not require the theatrics, leaked information, stories, the articles, and advice seeking
of scholars. However, this episode offers a prologue to the kind of personal relationships
Israeli and American leaders would experience in the decades since and nowadays
the standard tactics utilized to influence each. In fact, involvement of partisan politicos,
long-hours of negotiations often conducted to maximize personal strengths and egos at
the detriment of other parties has become the standard operational procedures in the alliance
between the United States and Israel.
The shuttle succeeded with the eastern entrance to the Giddi Pass finally agreed upon, the
American warning presence, and the Abu Rudeis oil fields transferred to Egypt. The “ebb
and flow” of the negotiations demonstrated the “incongruity between the mechanics of
bargaining and the movement of history, between the passions of the moment and the ultimate
fate of nations.” Least to forget the misunderstandings in language, bruised egos66
between friends, the imperfect process of negotiation, and the lengths to influence the
leaders took.
The Sinai II agreement was finally initialed on September 1, 1975. “Sadat promised not
to join a war if Syria attacked Israel, while Israel assured Egypt that Israel would not attack
Syria and the U.S. agreed to a commitment not to deal with the PLO until it recogSafran,
N. (1981). Israel: The Embattled Ally, pgs. 548-549.64
I bid, 549.65
Ibid, pg. 453.66
!25
nized Israel’s right to exist and accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.”67
Egypt turned towards a separate peace with Israel. When the historic Camp David Accords
were signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 the wars between Israel and an Arab
neighbor since 1948 finally ended. The agreement also highlighted the importance of the
Israeli-American relationship, in particular that between the chief executives. But, the
Camp David Accords could not have occurred without the Sinai II agreement occurring
which in turn would have been impossible if not for the tireless efforts of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state. The
agreement in September also closed the reassessment period, the most intense period of
animosity between Israel and the United States up to that point in the history of the two
nations. Israel focused on legally binding assurances. President Ford was ‘elated’ and
Kissinger writes in Years of Renewal, “under his aegis, we had concluded the most significant
Middle East agreement of both the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Ford’s persistence
had been a major factor in bringing about what became the decisive step toward
Israeli peace agreements first with Egypt and later with Jordan.” Kissinger’s comments68
were graceful, but belied the hard truth behind the crisis: personality clashes and misunderstandings
between Ford and Rabin and Kissinger over the previous five months.
Officially, the Sinai II Agreement allowed several things to occur. Prime Minister Rabin
closed “the hectic diplomatic movements triggered by the Yom Kipper War,” and69
touched upon Israeli yearning for peace in his telephone call with Ford, “we really hope
that it will be the beginning of something which we have not yet experienced in this area,
and we hope that the other side, the Egyptian side, feels the same.” Sadat generously70
spoke along similar nonbelligerent lines: “Let us create a new atmosphere…and let us
reach the state of non-belligerency officially and with guarantees.” Hinted at in Rabin’s71
remarks was a sigh of relief that he had survived the first major diplomatic test with
President Ford and the crucible of his Cabinet. And in the highest praise possible from an
aged diplomat on a former Israeli leader, Kissinger wrote, “Rabin was a significant
strategist. His gradualist approach moved his fractious cabinet and wary public to the
breakthrough that made the Camp David Accords of 1978 possible.” High praise in72 -
deed.
Ibid, pg. 456.67
Ibid, pg. 454.68
Avner, The Prime Ministers pg. 28669
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pg. 454.70
Ibid, pg. 454.71
Kissinger, Years of Renewal. pg. 458.72
!26
President Ford served as the moral guarantor of Egyptian and Israeli assurances to each
other. Sadat took the decisive turn not only towards non-belligerency, but a turn away
from the Soviet Union. Simply, he was tired of war and tired by Soviet promises. For Rabin,
his role in the Sinai II agreement was possibly the most difficult. His abrasive style
reflected the reality of his domestic situation. He had to “pace his own fragile political
base” while holding onto his determination to bring progress towards peace. As Kissinger
writes, “had he moved too quickly, his cabinet would have fallen apart, and new elections
would have had to be held; had he moved more slowly, he would have risked the American
alliance.” Rabin was a strategist and was successful in moving, through his gradual73 ist
approach, his fractious cabinet and wary public to peace.
American goodwill was a historic fact of life for Rabin, Israel had earned a claim on
America’s support by their suffering in the Holocaust and their democratic system of
government. This provides a small explanation as to the degrees that Israel was willing to
go to try to influence the United States, risking the relationship in this period of re-
assessment.
The diplomatic standoff and its conclusion showed the mutual creativity and innovativeness
involved in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Such a conclusion held also a strategic objective
for Ford and Kissinger and Rabin. The treaty allayed Israeli fears and enabled Sadat
to save face, and they kept the Soviets from bringing Egypt back into their sphere of influence.
For the president and his secretary of state, it affirmed their decision to maintain
unilateral diplomacy, Ford writes, “Kissinger had achieved significant success in easing
the Soviets out of the Middle East. I though they didn't want a bona fide settlement there
and that their only aim was to promote instability, so I wanted to keep them out.
Gromyko, of course, complained about this. But I decided that we could accomplish more
unilaterally by working with Israel and each of its Arab neighbors.” Israel and Rabin74
had further success from the United States in a separate Memorandum of Understanding,
including key concessions. “America promised not to recognize the Palestine Liberation
Organization until the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, pledged not to push Israel into a similar process with Syria,
and agreed that the next agreement between Egypt and Israel would be a full peace treaty.
It was a security alliance in all but name, as Richard Valerian of NBC News quipped, “the
best agreement money could buy.” The Knesset ratified the Sinai II agreement on Sep75 tember
3, 1975, paving the way for the eventual peace treaty with Egypt in 1979—and
Ibid, pg. 458.73
Ford, A Time to Heal, pg. 183.74
Brinkley, Gerald R. Ford, pg. 117.75
!27
transforming the U.S.-Israel relationship for all time. However, just how it has been76
transformed is still very much open to discussion. Likewise, if from this period there can
be seen a victor? As Haaretz reported then, Israel used American desire for peace to
‘squeeze’ further aid thereby achieving the strategic goals Rabin and his Cabinet had77
held before the reassessment period took place. The Americans used Israel and Egypt to
block creeping influence of the Soviet Union in the region. And the reassessment period
showed the cracks that have grown larger over the decades as American presidents and
Israeli prime ministers have each tried to influence the other using public and private
means.
Berman & Sadot, (2012, April). “Israel & America: The Eternal Return”. Commentary.76
Haaretz. (2006, December 28). Gerald Ford, the U.S. president who reassessed policy77
toward Israel, dies at 93.
!28
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18
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President Gerald Ford, Public Papers, 1975, pg. 227. Interview with Walter Cronkite, Eric
Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer of CBS News, April 21, 1975.
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