21
Post-Communist Europe: Concluding
Comparative Reflections
GIVEN THE continuing tumultuousness of events in post-Communist
Europe, especially in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, many
readers will no doubt believe that we should conclude this book with reflections
on conflict and not on democracy. However, our conceptual approach is concerned
with conflicts over power, the state, and citizenship and whether, out of
these contestations, democratic practices can become the "only game in town .."
From this perspective all of the countries of post-Communist Europe can and
should be at least briefly compared . To be sure, in some of the twenty-seven postCommunist
countries (e.g., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or the Serbian-dominated
rump Yugoslavia), a realistic evaluation must lead to the conclusion that the
country is currently (1995) nondemocratic and that few weighty actors are even
trying to put democracy, as we have defined it, on the agenda .' However, in some
other countries in post-Communist Europe (e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and possibly even Lithuania), democratic practices are near to becoming the only
game in town. Thus, it is indeed relevant to discuss democracy in this conclusion,
but we have to develop the critical categories, frames of reference, and evidence
that will allow us to attempt comparisons within post-Communist Europe .
i. However, while it is true that rump Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, and the former province of
Kosovo), as presently constituted, is nondemocratic, it is useful to recognize that there are more pressures
for democracy in rump Yugoslavia than Western policy makers and public opinion normally recognize .
TiborVarady, the minister of justice in the Milan Panič government in the rump Yugoslavia, says that, when
Prime Minister Panič challenged Miloševič in the December 1992 presidential election, the West sent fewer
than thirty election observers, and most arrived just days before the election . In contrast, in the plebiscite
in Chile in 1988 that led to the defeat of Pinochet, the West sent thousands of observers, many of whom
were involved months before the election. Why this difference? Commentary in the West in essence assumed
that Serbia was univocally for Serbian expansionism and that "primordial nationalism" was so
strong that Slobodan Miloševič was unbeatable . But, even with the abstention of the Muslims of Kosovo
(about to percent of the potential electorate), election day technical fraud by Slobodan Milosevič
of possibly5-1o
percent of the vote, and the lack of election observers and financial and technical support from the
West, Panič still won 43 percent of the vote . Our point is that Miloševič in December 1992 was not politically
unbeatable. Some analysts, when confronted with the Chilean-Serbian comparison, shrug their shoulders
and say, "So what, Miloševič never would have respected the elections ." This again misses the point.
Power is always relational. If Miloševič had actually lost and then annulled the election, he would have been
domestically and internationally weakened in relation to democratic opponents and the myth of univocal
support for aggressive nationalism would have been unmasked .
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 435
As our contribution to the development of such critical categories, frames of
reference, and evidence, we want to develop three points . First, we will discuss what
we see as the danger of "inverting the legitimacy pyramid" by activists and analysts
who believe that the market will legitimate democracy . We will argue that the history
of successful democratization indicates that the reverse normally occurs . Democracy
legitimates the market (especially capitalism) . Second, many activists and
analysts also argue that not only is there the well-known simultaneity problem
(which we accept), but also economic and political results must be achieved simultaneously
or poor economic results will rapidly derail support for democratization
(which we do not accept) . We will give empirical data and a theoretical explanation
to support our cautiously optimistic hypothesis concerning support for democracy
as it relates to East Central Europe and our much less optimistic hypothesis for democratization
in the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union . Third, much
of the popular press saw the return to power of former Communist political leaders
and parties in such vanguard transitions to democracy as Poland, Hungary, and
Lithuania as a "return to Communism" and as a major reversal of democracy. We
will argue why such an analysis is faulty, both conceptually and politically .
ON THE DANGER OF AN INVERTED LEGITIMACY PYRAMID
In the conclusion to part 2 on southern Europe, we argued that the Spanish
sequence of political reform, socioeconomic reform, and then economic reform
was probably optimal for the consolidation of democracy in that country . Generally,
we are of course reluctant to insist on any sequence because historically quite
different sequences have in fact worked .
Most analysts of post-Communist Europe, especially policy advocates, implicitly
rejected a Spanish-like sequence as unfeasible because of their perceived need
for simultaneous economic and political change. Indeed, despite frequent obeisance
to this simultaneity imperative, domestic and foreign activists and advisors often
privileged economic change first. Solid research is just beginning on the question
of sequence in post-Communist politics, but on theoretical (and now historical)
grounds we believe that more consideration should have been given in the postCommunist
cases to the cost of neglecting political reforms, especially state
reconstruction. Why?
Theoretically, because, as we argued, the issue for modern democracies is not
the creation of a market, but the creation of an economic society. Further, logic implies
that a coherent regulatory environment and a rule of law is required to transform
command economies into economic societies . If this is so, then a major priority
must be to create democratic regulatory state power .2 In this respect the two
2. In addition, it is debatable that the privatization of all or most of publicly owned property is necessary
for the creation of a functioning market economy . Post-World War II Austria and Italy immediately
436
	
Post-Communist Europe
empirical extremes presented in this book are Spain and the USSR . Attention to
electoral sequence and constitutional change contributed to effective power creation
and state reconfiguration in Spain. Inattention to electoral sequence (by
Gorbachev) and constitutional change (by Gorbachev andYeltsin) contributed to
power erosion and a decomposing state in the USSR and Russia .
Empirically, post hoc studies (as opposed to ex ante doctrinal advocacy) of privatization
and structural economic change are just beginning to appear for the region.
However, the best studies of the region are confirming a pattern about state
power already documented in Latin America, that effective privatization (often
mistakenly equated with "state shrinking") is best done by relatively strong states
that are able to implement a coherent policy. The essence of a rich body of research
on privatization and state restructuring shows that effective privatization
entails less state scope but greater state capacity.3 In a context of a post-Communist,
postcommand economy, a state with rapidly eroding capacity simplyy cannot
manage a process of effective privatization .4
come to mind as countries that retained a large public sector but were more or less efficient democratic
market economies.
3. Four important studies of this phenomenon are Albert Fishlow, "The Latin American State," Journal
of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 3 (í99o): 61-74; Hector Schamis, "Re-forming the State: The Role of Privatization
in Chile and Britain" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, Department of Political Science, 1994) ; Peter
Evans, "The State as a Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in
Stephan Haggard and Robert R . Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints,
Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),139-81; and Joan
M. Nelson, ed., Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), especially the article by Jacek Kochanowicz, "Reforming
Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies," 195-226 . China in the first half of the 199os allowed the emergence
of a robust private sector in some areas while maintaining a strong command economy in other sectors
and overall near totalitarian practices concerning politics, the media, and even family reproductive
decisions.
4-We need more comparative studies of variation in state capacity vis-A-vis privatization and economic
restructuring . Such variation could range from significant state reconstruction that increases state capacity
and efficacy vis-á-vis privatization, to states that have had modest but unsatisfactory state reconstruction
that has led to the creation of new postreform problems and the threat of a low-level equilibrium trap, to the
extreme case of near state disintegration and virtually no state capacity for structuring change . East Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union provide examples of all of these possible variations. The most popularly
supported privatization in Central and Eastern Europe has been in the Czech Republic, which was also
the case, despite some corruption, of the greatest transparency and where the freely elected government
worked longest at such socioeconomic reforms as job retraining and state restructuring. In contrast, in a
country like Romania, where the state has not been reconstructed, some nontransparent privatization has
occurred, but there is a danger of a low-level equilibrium trap . In the Ukraine and parts of Russia, a new state
had not been constructed, but the old state manifested strong disintegrative tendencies and low capacities in
the 1992-93 period . See, for example, the empirically grounded comparative analysis of the Czech Republic
and Romania by Olivier Blanchard, Simon Commander, and Fabrizio Coricelli, "Unemployment and Restructuring,"
World Bank, 1993,mimeo. Also see the chapter on Czechoslovakia in Roman Frydman, Andrzej
Rapaczynski, and John Earle, eds., The Privatization Process in Central Europe (Budapest: Central European
University Press, 1993), 40--94, and Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, and John Earle, eds., The Privatization
Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1993) .
The case studies of Ukraine and Russia underscore the difficulties of orderly, effective, and non-mafia privitization
if the state is in disarray. Also see Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern
Europe: Is the State ÍlrtheringAway? (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1994).
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 437
Note, the key is a strong state and not necessarily a democracy . A strong nondemocratic
state in Chile privatized reasonably effectively. However, in a postCommunist
setting such as Russia, where the old Communist party-state has imploded
or is no longer effective, privatization can proceed in an orderly way only
after the state has been reconstructed. Once the totalitarian or post-totalitarian
state, with its extensive command economy, has collapsed, given up, imploded, or
disintegrated, state structures must be put in place. But many of the nondemocratic
ways of restructuring the state are less available as alternatives than normally
thought .
Some people argue (particularly in Russia) that a Pinochet is needed. But in
Russia and many other countries of the former Soviet Union, a coherent state and
a unified military organization of the sort that supported Pinochet no longer
exists An authoritarian or perhaps a semifascist party-state in Russia is also
sometimes held up as a powerful alternative ruling model . However, a single party
with ideological legitimacy and the resources to assume and implement nondemocratic
power would require the emergence and construction of a state-wide
hegemonic semifascist movement, and this also seems unlikely. In our judgment,
even an authoritarian or semifascist Russia would still be an example of what Ken
Jowitt describes as a polity with a weak state and a weak society 6 The quiescence
of Franco's post-civil war Spain is a less likely outcome of a Russian fascist government
than is a series of Chechnyas and Afghanistans. Some people argue for a
China-type solution, but the Chinese model, which could possibly have been a
pre-perestroika alternative, is also no longer available as an alternative in Russia .
Unlike in Russia, the Chinese nondemocratic regime and state never broke down .
Indeed, the Chinese regime never initiated or even considered a process of democratization
and underwent only a very selective and partial process of liberalization .
Our conclusion is that, for Russia, the cost of a weak democratic state is high,
but at the same time many of the nondemocratic solutions either are not available
or would probably entail a repressive but still weak state . In Steven Lukes'
useful formulation, such a state might have power over but not power to. For
example, a semifascist Russian state might have repressive power over more people
but still lack the power to reconstruct a prosperous and peaceful Russia .?
Thus, in a context where the party-state has imploded and a command economy
5. In Alfred Stepan's frequent visits to Russia in 1991-95, the subject of a Pinochet or a Chinese alternative
frequently came up as possible alternatives for Russia in conversations with Russian analysts and policy
makers. But in fact, even before the disorderly behavior of the Russian military in Chechnya, only 3 percent
of Russian respondents in an April 1994 poll "completely agreed" and only 7 percent "generally agreed"
with the statement that "the army should rule" as an alternative political formula for Russia . See Richard
Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Russian Barometer III : The Results," Studies in Public Policy 228 (1994),
question 31b .
6. Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992), esp. 249-331-
7. For this important approach to power, see Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London : Macmillan,
1974) •
438
	
Post-Communist Europe
is no longer feasible, the state must be reconstructed . Our argument is that, far
from being an irrelevance, some degree of democratic legitimacy can be a way of
helping in this state reconstruction .
This leads to our central argument about legitimacy and privatization . In their
rush to move away from state-controlled economies, some free market enthusiasts
have endorsed privatization as the most important component of the post-1989
process. Privatization, however it is accomplished, is often seen as creating the key
structural prerequisite for market democracies and the economic foundation for
new democracies. We disagree . Repeated surveys in democracies show that at the
apex of a hierarchy of democratic legitimacy are the overall democratic processes
(e.g., elections, multiple parties, and free speech). At a lower level in the legitimacy
hierarchy are incumbents (e.g., parliamentarians). Political institutions related to
democracy are normally more legitimate than such economic institutions as market
economies-which are always more legitimate than capitalist economies, if
they are so labeled in surveys. Furthermore, economic institutions (e.g., market
economies) are always more legitimate than economic actors (e.g., capitalists) .$
Thus, on theoretical grounds, the endeavor to legitimate the new post-1989 democracies
by the efficacy of the new capitalists and thus by increasing by whatever
means the number of new capitalists is to invert the legitimacy pyramid .
Such an inverted legitimacy pyramid is especially problematic in those countries,
such as Russia, where privatization has been virtually unregulated, highly
unequal, and often illegal .9 In such contexts, the former holders of political
power-such as the "red bourgeoisie" in the state enterprises or state financial or
trading institutions-have been in a privileged position to transform their former
political power into new types of economic power by numerous forms of
"spontaneous" privatizations or thefts. Comparative surveys repeatedly show that
in most societies some legitimacy is given to earned or inherited private property
and to entrepreneurship . However, the new Russian capitalists of the former red
bourgeoisie cannot draw upon these principles of legitimation . Indeed, the origins
of their new wealth are often condemned as an illegitimate appropriation of
public property and may leave a legacy of distrust both of market economies
(which will be seen as mafia economies) and of the democracies that tolerated or
even created these mafia economies . Much more political, theoretical, and research
attention should be given to evaluating the democratic consequences of attempting
to build new democratic polities and economic societies on this inverted
legitimacy pyramid . The essence of the empirical findings and historical
studies of Western democracies has always been that political systems of democ-
8. For a detailed analysis and ample documentation of this phenomenon, see Juan J. Linz, "Legitimacy
of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System, in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies:
Strains on Democracy (Boulder Colo: Westview Press, 1988), 65-u3.
9. See, for example, Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafia," Foreign Affairs (March-April 1994)
83-96.
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections
	
439
racy legitimate market economies, not the reverse . This is so because, as long as a
democratic majority does not question private ownership of the means of production
when it can do so legally, that property is protected. to
ON SIMULTANEITY OF RESULTS VERSUS THE COMPARATIVE
POLITICS OF DEFERRED GRATIFICATION
The assumption that economic reform-the market and privatization-can
legitimate the new democracies is also based on the dubious assumption that economic
success and the creation of greater wealth can be achieved simultaneously
with the installation and legitimation of democratic institutions . We believe that,
for imploded command economies, democratic polities can and must be installed
and legitimized by a variety of appeals before the possible benefits of a market
economy actually materialize fully. Many analysts and political advisors dismiss
the argument for prior state restructuring because of their assumption that because
of people's demands for material improvements, economic and political
gains must not only be pursued, but occur, simultaneously. Some even argue that,
though simultaneous economic and political reforms are necessary, such simultaneity
is impossible.) l We can call these two perspectives about the relationship
between economics and democratization the tightly coupled hypothesis and the
loosely coupled hypothesis.12
By loosely coupled we do not mean that there is no relationship between economic
and political perceptions, but only that the relationship is not necessarily one
to one. For at least a medium range time horizon, people can make independent
and even opposite assessments about political and economic trends . We further believe
that, if assessments about politics are positive, they can provide a valuable
cushion against painful economic restructuring.13 What evidence do we have
10 . See Linz, "Legitimacy of Democracy."
11. The title of a widely disseminated article by Jon Elster captures this perspective, "The Necessity and
Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform," in Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N . Katz,
Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C . Wheatley, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the
Contemporary World (New York : Oxford University Press, 1993), 267-74. In our own judgment, the reasons
for the impossibility of simultaneity are not necessarily those advanced by Elster but may be the fact that
the time necessary for successful economic change is inherently longer than the time needed to hold free
elections and even draft a democratic constitution . An important survey-based critique of the Elster hypothesis
and an argument for the empirical reality of respondents' multiple time horizons and their "political
economy of patience" are given by the Hungarian political scientist László Bruszt in "Why on Earth
Would East Europeans Support Capitalism?" (paper presented at the XVth World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Berlin, August 21 -24,1994) •
12. We presented a preliminary discussion of this relationship under "The Political Economy of Legitimacy
and of Coercion" in chapter 5 .
13. The voters might, because of negative economic performance, vote incumbents out of office, but the
overall economic policies of their successors might well continue to be roughly the same . Poland in 1993-95
and Hungary in 1994-95 (especially after the reform acceleration of1995) come to mind. Democratic alternation
of governing coalitions might in fact give more time to the policies of economic change while at the
440
Table 21 .1 . GDP, Industrial Output, and Peak Inflation Rates in Post-Communist Countries . 1989-1995
Post-Communist Europe Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections
Table 21 .1. (continued)
441
Source: The yearly 1989-95 data were supplied by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, January
1995. The figures for 1994 are estimates ; those for 1995 are projections . A common method was used in the data collection.
The 1993 industrial output data in relation to a baseline of 100 for 1989 are from Jacek Rostowski, Macro-economic Instability
in Post-Communist Counties (Oxford : Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, forthcoming) . No data were available for Bosnia .
The data on inflation rates are also from Rostowski . The figure for inflation in Yugoslavia 13.72 times 10 to the 13th power)
computes to one of the all-time world hyperinflation rates of over 37 trillion .
concerning the relationship between economics and democratization in the first five
years of post-Communist Europe? Certainly, if we just look at relatively hard economic
data, of the twenty-seven countries in post-Communist Europe, no country
(except Poland) experienced positive growth in 1992. Indeed, all post-Communist
countries in 1993 were still well below their 1989 industrial output levels (table 21.1).
If we look at the subjective perception of economic well-being in the six East
Central European Warsaw Pact countries we have analyzed in this book, the mean
positive rating (on a +loo to a -loo scale) among those polled between November
1993 and March 1994 for the Communist economic system was 60.2. But the
mean positive rating for the post-Communist economic system was only 37.3, a
drop of almost 23 points. The tightly coupled hypothesis would predict that the
attitudes toward the political system would drop steeply, even if not the full 23
points. What does the evidence show? In the same survey, the mean positive ranksame
time giving some valuable room for accommodation to the political sentiments or fears of those most
hurt by the fundamental socioeconomic changes being undertaken by the new democratic regime .
GDP % change
Industrial
Output
1993
Inflation
Rate (at
peak year
during1994
	
1995
Country Measure 1989 1990 1991 1992
	
1993 (estimated) (projected) (1989=100) 1989-93)
Slovakia GDP 1 .4 -0.4 -14.5 -7.0
	
-4.1 3.5 3.0 55 581911
Industrial -0.7 -3.6 -17.8 -14.0 -10.6 5.5 na
Slovenia
production
GDP -1 .8 -4.7 -8.1 -5.4
	
1 .0 5.0 6 46 247 [911
Industrial -0.1 -10.3 -11 .3 -12.0
	
-2.6 6.6 5.1
Tajikistan
production
NMP -2.9 -1 .6 -12.5 -33.7 -28 na na 56 7344 [931
Industrial 1 .9 1 .9 -7.4 -35.7
	
na na na
production
na 2.0 -4.7 -5.3
	
-7.6 -10.0 -5.0 90 1875 [93]Turkmenistan GDP
Ukraine GDP 4.1 -3.4 -12 -17.0 -14.0 -23.0 -5.0 79 10155
[93]
Industrial 2.8 -0.1 -4.8 -6.5
	
-8.0 -30.0 na
Uzbekistan
production
GDP 3.7 1 .6 -0.5 -11 .1
	
-2.4 -2.6 2.0 94 927 [93]
Industrial output 3.6 1 .8 1 .8 -12.3
	
-8.3 na na
Yugoslavia Industrial output na na na na
	
na na na 35 3.72x10 13
[93]
GDP % change
Industrial
Output
1993
Inflation
Rate (at
peak year
during1994
	
1995
Country Measure 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 (estimated) (projected) (1989=100) 1989-93)
Albania GDP 9.8 -10.0 -27.1 -9.7 11 .0 7.0 5.0 52 237 [921
Industrial 5.0 -7.6 -36.9 -44.0 -10.0 na na
Armenia
production
GDP 14.2 -7.4 -11 .0 -52.0 -15.0 0 na na 10900
[93]
Azerbaijan GDP na -11 .7 -0.7 -22.6 -13.0 -15.0 -10.0 na 1174 [921
Belarus GDP 8.0 -3 .0 -1 .2 -9.6 -11 .6 -26.0 -10 76 2775 [93]
Industrial na
	
na -6.8 -10.2 -6.0 na na
Bulgaria
production
GDP 0.5
	
-9.1 -11 .7 -5.6 -4.2 2 4 na 339 [911
Industrial -1 .4 -16.5 -27.3 -22.0 -10.0 4 na
Croatia
production
GDP -1 .6
	
-8.6 -14.4 -9 -3.2 1 6 57 1150 [921
Industrial na -11 .3 -28.5 -15.0 -6.0 -3.0 6
Czech
production
GDP na
	
-0.4 -14.2 -7.1 -0.3 3 6 57 52 [911
Republic Industrial na
	
-3.5 -22.3 -10.6 -6.3 0 na
Estonia
production
GDP -1.1
	
-8.1 -11 -14.2 -3.2 5.0 6.0 54 965 [921
Macedonia GDP na
	
-9.9 -12.1 -14.0 -14.1 -7.2 0 na 1691 [921
Industrial na -10.6 -17.2 -16.1 -17.2 na na
Georgia
production
NMP -4.8 -12 .4 -20.8 -43.4 -40.0 -35.0 na na na
Industrial -6.9 -29 .9 -24.4 -43.4 -21 .0 na na
Hungary
production
GDP 0.7 -3.5 -11 .9 -4.3 -2.3 3.0 3.0 69
Industrial gross -1.0
	
-9.6 -18.2 -9.8 -4.0 9.0 6.0
Kazakhstan
output
GDP -0.4 -0.4 -13.0 -14.0 -12.0 -25.0 na 68 1925 [931
Kyrgyzstan GDP 3.8
	
3.2 -5.0 -25.0 -16.0 -10 1 .5 53 1354 [931
Industrial na
	
na 0.0 -27.0 -25.0 na na
Latvia
production
GDP 6.8
	
2.9 -8.3 -33.8 -11 .7 3 3 38 958 [911
Gross mfg output na
	
na 0.4 -48.7 -32.6 na na
Lithuania GDP 1.5
	
-5.0 -13.1 -37.7 -16.2 4 4 na 1175 [921
Industrial na
	
na na -50.9 -42.7 na na
Moldova
production
GDP 8.8
	
-1 .5 -11 .9 -25.0 -14.0 -20.0 0 837 [931
Poland GDP 0.2 -11 .6 -7.6 1 .5 3.8 4.5 5.0 69 640 [891
Industrial -1.4 -26 .1 -11 .9 3.9 5.6 na na
Romania
production
GDP -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -13.6 1.0 2.0 3.0 47 296 [931
Industrial output -5.3 -23.7 -22.8 -21 .9 1 .3 2.0 na
Russia GDP na na -13.0 -19.0 -12.0 -15.0 -7.0 60 2138 [921
Industrial na
	
-0.1 -8.0 -18.8 -16.0 -21 .0 -12.0
production
442
	
Post-Communist Europe
Table 21 .2. Percentages Expressing Positive Attitudes toward Communist versus Post-Communist
Economic Systems and Political Systems : Responses from Six East Central European Countries
Percentage of Positive
	
Percentage of Positive
Question
	
Country
	
Responses for 1989
	
Responses for 1993-94
"Here is a scale ranking how the economy
	
Bulgaria
	
66
	
15
works : the top, plus 100 is the best;
	
Czech
	
42
	
66
the bottom, minus 100 the worst." Hungary 75 27
Poland 52 50
Romania 52 35
Slovakia
	
74
	
31
Mean
	
60
	
35
"Here is a scale ranking how government Bulgaria 51 59
works : the top, plus 100 is the best; Czech 23 78
the bottom, minus 100 the worst ."
	
Hungary
	
58
	
51
Poland
	
38
	
69
Romania
	
52
	
60
Slovakia
	
50
	
52
Mean
	
46
	
62
Source: Richard Rose and Christian Haerfer, "New Democracies Baromester III : Learning from What Is Happening," Studies in
Public Policy 230 (1994), questions 22-23, 32-33. Percentages are rounded off. The polls were administered in these countries
between November 1993 and March 1993 .
ing of the Communist political system was 45.7. A one-point drop in political
evaluation for every point drop in economic evaluation (a perfectly coupled correlation)
would yield a positive evaluation of the political system of only 22.6.
However, positive ranking for the post-Communist system did not fall as the
tightly coupled hypothesis would expect but rose to 61.5, or 38.9 points higher
than a perfectly coupled hypothesis would predict, (table 21.2) .
How can we explain such incongruence? First of all, human beings are capable
of making separate and correct judgments about a basket of economic goods
(which may be deteriorating) and a basket of political goods (which may be improving).
In fact, in the same survey, in all six countries of East Central Europe
the citizens polled judged that in important areas directly affected by the democratic
political system their life experiences and chances had overwhelmingly improved,
even though in the same survey they asserted that their personal household
economic situation had worsened (table 21.3).
We do not believe that such incongruence can last forever ; however, it indicates
that, in a radical transformation such as is occurring in East Central Europe, the
deterioration of the economy does not necessarily translate rapidly into erosion
of support for the political system . 14 Table 21.2 indicates that the perceived legit-
14. In fact, in a regression model of their data, William Mishler and Richard Rose conclude that "our regression
model shows that it takes a four point fall in either current or future economic evaluation to produce
a one point fall in evaluations of the [political] regime." Their major explanation of this result is that
Post-Communist Europe: Concluding Comparative Reflections 443
Table 21 .3 . Incongruent Perceptions of the Economic Basket of Goods versus the Political Basket of
Goods in the Communist System and the Current System : Six East Central European Countries
Source: Same as for figure 21 .1, questions 26, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42 . Where the percentages do not add up to 100 the
respondents answered "equal ."
imary of the political system has given democratic institutions in East Central
Europe an important degree of insulation from the perceived inefficacy of the
new economic system . 15 Indeed, most of the people in East Central Europe in
1993 had a fairly long-time horizon and expressed optimism that by 1998 both the
East Europeans have a fairly long time horizon. See their "Trajectories of Fear and Hope : The Dynamics of
Support for Democracy in Eastern Europe," Studies in Public Policy 214 (1993) 27 •
15 . Some readers might recall that one of us, in a study of the breakdown of democracies-particularly
in Europe in the interwar years-posed a more direct relationship between efficacy and legitimacy without
data to prove that relationship . In fact, some of the data assembled later showed that the relation was true
only for a few countries, particularly for Germany and Austria, but not for Norway and the Netherlands .
Why the apparent difference today? We would call attention to the presence in the interwar years of alternative
"legitimate" models for the polity : the Soviet-Communist utopia, the new Fascist Italian and later
German model, the corporatist-authoritarian-catholic "organic" democracy, the prewar bureaucraticmonarchical
authoritarianism, and even (in Spain) the anarchist utopia . They all appealed as alternative
answers for inefficacious democracy . Up to now there are no such appealing alternatives to "difficult
democracies" today. See Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
Percentage of Respondents answering "better now"
versus those answering "worse now"
Question Bulgaria Czech Slovakia Hungary Poland Romania
Economic Basket:
"When you compare your overall 16/58 23/49 18/62 6/76 17/62 21/65
household economic situation with five
years ago, would you say that in the
past it was better, the same, worse?"
Political Basket:
"Please tell me whether our present
political system by comparison with the
Communist is [better, the same or
worse] in the following areas :"
"People can join any organization they 95/5 90/1 88/3 81/2 79/2 94/1
want."
"Everybody is free to say what he or she 90/11 84/3 82/4 73/8 83/4 94/2
thinks ."
"People can travel and live wherever they 95/5 96/1 87/2 75/4 75/7 90/2
want ."
"People can live without fear of unlawful 88/11 73/4 62/5 59/4 71/5 81/1
arrest ."
"Each person can decide whether or not 97/3 84/0 81/1 n/a 69/5 92/1
to take an interest in politics."
"Everybody is free to decide whether or 98/2 94/0 96/1 83/1 70/6 95/1
not to practice a religion ."
444
	
Post-Communist Europe
80 -
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20
Communist Regime
I -Political Regime
	
Economic System)
Fig . 21 .1 . Percentage of People Giving a Positive Rating to the Economic System and to the
Political Regime in the Communist System, the Current System, and in Five Years : Six East Central
European Countries .
Source: Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Russia Barometer III, - Studies in Public Policy 228 (1994), questions 24
and 34 .
performance of the new democracy and the performance of the new economic
system would improve significantly (figure 21.1) .
In East Central Europe the evidence is thus strongly in favor of the argument
that deferred gratification and confidence in the future is possible even when
there is an acknowledged lag in economic improvements . Simultaneity of rapid
political and economic results is indeed normally extremely difficult, but fortunately,
as figure 21.1 shows, the citizens of East Central Europe did not perceive
such simultaneity as necessary . The overall implication of the tables and figures
presented thus far in this chapter seems to us further evidence of the potential
danger of policies based on thinking that reflects the inverted legitimacy pyramid .
79
69
Current Regime
	
In Five Years
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 445
Before turning to the former Soviet Union, we should note briefly two other
factors that help explain the surprisingly high degree of political support for the
new political regime (political regime, not necessarily political incumbents), despite
economic hardship. None of the former Warsaw Pact countries of East Central
Europe (unlike the former USSR) experienced widespread bloodshed over
stateness problems . Also, unlike Russia, there is no ambivalent legacy about the
loss of an empire or the disintegration of the USSR .
How do the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union compare with the
Warsaw Pact countries of East Central Europe on the same set of dimensions concerning
satisfaction with the pre- and post-Communist economies and political
systems? Unfortunately, we have data only for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, but
the differences are striking, especially in the substantially lower ranking accorded
to current support for the post-Communist political system (figure 21.2).
A panel of outside observers also notes a set of very different patterns within
countries of East Central Europe, in contrast to the former Soviet Union, with respect
to their political development . An annual publication of Freedom House
has developed a common method to evaluate political rights and civil liberties for
almost all of the countries of the world. 16 Freedom House uses a 7-point scale to
rank countries concerning political rights and a 7-point scale to rank political liberties.
A score of 1 indicates the highest rights and liberties and 7 the lowest . For
purposes of our argument about democracy, if a country is ranked no lower than
2 on political rights and no lower than 3 on civil liberties, we will label it as above
the democratic threshold for that year . If a country is given a 4 or lower on political
rights and/or a 5 or lower on civil liberties, we will consider it as below the
democratic threshold for that year . Countries between the two categories will be
labeled as on the border of the democratic threshold. In short, the lower the number
the better the results for democracy. How does post-Communist Europe rank
on this scale? See table 21.4.
To make table 21.4 a bit more useful for a comparative analysis of post-Communist
Europe, let us separate these twenty-six countries into three broad categories:
East Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia .
Within the former Soviet Union, we will make a further subdivision between
those countries that had been a part of the former Soviet Union since the early
1920s and that are now, with Russia, a part of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and those countries that became a part of the Soviet Union only after 1940
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and that refused to join the CIS . The classification
results are presented in table 21.5.
The implications of the numerous tables and figures we have presented in this
chapter, as well as of the qualitative evaluations made in previous chapters, will
16 . We discussed the methodology, sources, and panels utilized in this annual Freedom House publication
in chapter 3, especially notes 4 and 5 .
446
	
Post-Communist Europe
80 -
70 -
60 -
50 -
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
o
Communist Regime Current Regime In Five Years
Political System-
	
Economic System-
	
Political System-	Economic System-
Russia
	
Russia
	
Ukraine
	
Ukraine
Fig . 21 .2. Percentage of People Giving a Positive Rating to the Economic System and to the
Political System in the Communist Regime, the Current Regime, and in Five Years: Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus.
Source: For Russia see Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Russia Barometer III," Studies in Public Policy 228 (1994),
questions 15-17 and 27-29 . For Ukraine see Rose and Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer III," questions 22-24, 32-34 .
The data far Belarus are roughly similar to those for Ukraine . Positive evaluations of the economic system under communism,
in the present, and in five years are 78, 11, and 47, respectively, and positive evaluations for the political systems in these
three periods are 64, 28, and 56, respectively. Sources same as cited for Ukraine .
have to be elaborated and analyzed more fully by the new generation of comparativists
conducting research into European post-Communist politics . However,
we can at least note some patterns.
Respondents in the six former Warsaw Pact countries of East Central Europe
gave a mean positive rating of 62 to the post-Communist political system (a rise
of 16 points over the positive rating they gave to the Communist political system) .
In sharp contrast, in the three former Soviet Union countries (Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus), a mean of only 29 gave the post-Communist political system a posPost-Communist
Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 447
Table 21 .4. Rating of Twenty-six Countries of Post-Communist Europe on the Freedom House Scale
of Political Rights and Civil Liberties for the Year 1993
Source: Raymond D. Gastil, ed ., Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1993-1994 (New York : Freedom
House, 1994), 677-678.
itive rating (a decrease of 26 points from those who gave the Communist system
a positive rating) . 17
Another finding is that none of the twelve CIS countries that had been part of
the Soviet Union were above the minimal threshold of democratic practices, according
to the 1993 annual Freedom House poll . In fact, three of the twelve countries
(Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), received the lowest possible
scores of 7 on political rights and 7 on civil liberties . 18 In contrast, four of the six
17. Even here we should note a partial confirmation of the loosely coupled hypothesis in that the positive
evaluation of the current post-Communist political system was 18 .7 points higher than the evaluation
of the current post-Communist economic system.
18. For the reader to get an idea of how far actual practices are from being democratic in Turkmenistan,
Country
Political
Rights
Civil
Liberties
Democratic Threshold Rating :
"Above," "Below," or 'Border'
Armenia 3 4 Border
Azerbaijan 6 6 Below
Belarus 5 4 Below
Bosnia-Herzegovina 6 6 Below
Bulgaria 2 2 Above
Croatia 4 4 Below
Czech Republic 1 2 Above
Estonia 3 2 Border
Georgia 5 5 Below
Hungary 1 2 Above
Kazakhstan 6 4 Below
Kyrgyzstan 5 3 Below
Latvia 3 3 Border
Lithuania 1 3 Above
Macedonia 3 3 Border
Maldova 5 5 Below
Poland 2 2 Above
Romania 4 4 Below
Russia 3 4 Border
Slovakia 3 4 Border
Slovenia 1 2 Above
Tajikisten 7 7 Below
Turkmenistan 7 7 Below
Ukraine 4 4 Border
Uzbekistan 7 7 Below
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 6 6 Below
Summary 6 of 26 Above
7 of 26 Border
13 of 26 Below
448
	
Post-Communist Europe
Table 21 .5. Comparative Democratic Threshold Rating of Post-Communist Europe : The Countries of
East Central Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and the Former Yugoslavia (1993)
Source: Same as Table 21 .4 The only country of post-Communist Europe not included is Albania, which did not start its transition
until quite late. It also does not fit easily into any of the three geographical-historical categories utilized in the table . In
our judgment, Albania as of mid-1995 would score "below" the democratic threshold.
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 449
East Central European countries were above the threshold . Romania received the
lowest scores of the six former Warsaw Pact countries of East Central Europe,
with 4 on political rights and 4 on civil liberties. Thus, it seems accurate to say that
both the "ceiling" and the "floor" of democratic practices in East Central Europe
were substantially higher in 1993 than in the CIS countries.
We must also note that, in contrast to the six East Central European countries,
economic and political judgments are more tightly coupled in the CIS countries .
There is thus a much lower propensity for deferred gratification in the non-Baltic
parts of the former Soviet Union than in East Central Europe .
What explains such sharp contrasts between East Central Europe and the nonBaltic
countries of the former Soviet Union? Let us begin with the question of deferred
gratification . No doubt the pattern of difference is partly due to the extreme
severity of the drop in positive economic assessments . (In East Central
Europe the mean positive evaluation only dropped from 6o to 37, whereas the
post-Soviet mean of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus dropped from 71 to 10.) Timing
and perception of the future were also probably important . According to table 21.1
the worst year in East Central Europe in terms of economic decline was 1991. The
worst year in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus was 1994, afterthe poll. The year 1995
will probably be economically somewhat better than 1994, but in late 1993 people
might not have seen any light at the end of the tunnel .
We are almost certain, moreover, that economic historians will eventually document
the fact that the severity of the stateness problem in the USSR and the subsequent
state disintegration and widespread armed conflicts played an independent
role in objectively deepening economic disarray. The continuation of such
conflicts in 1995 in some CIS countries inevitably also decreased the subjective
confidence as to whether deferred gratification was merited . After all, a politics of
deferred gratification is rational only if some signs of potential gratification can
be discerned . In a context of very weak and contested states, the confidence in the
future that was an important ingredient reinforcing the "politics of deferred gratTajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, we can say that they are significantly less pluralistic in regard to democratic oppositional
electoral activity than in rump Yugoslavia (see the evidence for a degree of pluralism in Yugoslavia
we supplied in note i of this chapter) . In contrast to rump Yugoslavia, where the opposition presidential
candidate received 43 percent of the vote in December 1992, open democratic contestation in
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was de facto insignificant in 1994. According to the Economist's
useful political synopsis of the twelve members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkmenistan
is described as a "one-party state . All members of the parliament, elected in December 1994, were
unopposed . In February 1994, 99.99% voted to extend [President] Saparmurat Niyazov's term of office
until 1999. Only 212 Turkmen voted No, officially." The Economist summarizes politics in Uzbekistan thus :
"Main opposition parties banned ; media under state control . Ruling party won over 80% of seats in parliamentary
elections in December '994 ;99.96% of the electorate voted on March 26, 11995] to extend (President]
Islam Karimov's term of office until 2000." The Economist notes of Tajikistan: "Imamali Rakhmonov
confirmed as president last November [1994] in an election at which most opposition parties were banned .
Widespread vote-rigging alleged ." See "Less Poor, Less Democratic," Economist, April 22-28, 1995, 48 •
Clearly, no serious theorist should consider that the above three countries are involved in any form of a
democratic transition. They are all dear cases of the mere "electoralism" we discussed in chapter 1.
Classification
	
Country
Political
	
Civil
	
Democratic Threshold Rating
Rights Liberties ("Above," "Border," or "Below")
East Central Europe
	
Czech Republic 1 2 Above
Hungary 1 2 Above
Poland 2 2 Above
Bulgaria 2 2 Above
Slovakia 3 4 Border
Romania 4 4 Below
Summary 4/6 Above
The former Soviet Union
	
Lithuania 1 3
1/6 Border
1/6 Below
Above
(since the 1940s, not CIS members) Estonia 3 2 Border
Latvia 3 3 Border
Summary 1/3 Above
The former Soviet Union
	
Russia 3 4
2/3 Border
0/3 Below
Border
(since the 1920s, now CIS members) Armenia 3 4 Border
Ukraine 4 4 Border
Kyrgyzstan 5 3 Below
Belarus 5 4 Below
Maldova 5 5 Below
Kazakhstan 6 4 Below
Azerbaijan 6 6 Below
Georgia 6 6 Below
Tajikistan 7 7 Below
Turkmenistan 7 7 Below
Uzbekistan 7 7 Below
Summary 0/12 Above
The former Yugoslavia
	
Slovenia 1 2
3/12 Border
9/12 Below
Above
Macedonia 3 3 Border
Croatia 4 4 Below
Bosnia-Herzegovina 6 6 Below
Yugoslavia (Serbia 6 6 Below
and Montenegro)
Summary 1/5 Above
1/5 Border
3/5 Below
450
	
Post-Communist Europe
ification" in East Central Europe was understandably weaker in the former Soviet
Union and in much of the former Yugoslavia . To be sure, Czechoslovakia had a
stateness problem, but because of the orderly and reasonably well-planned velvet
divorce, no armed violence was involved and no significant economic downturn
occurred in either the Czech Republic or Slovakia .'9
Stateness problems and not just economic problems critically affect democratic
outcomes. This becomes clear when we note that, of the twenty-two independent
countries that emerged out of the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union and the former Yugoslavia, only two-Lithuania and Slovenia-are above
the democratic threshold rating (see table 21 .5) . Both of these countries are exceptions
that prove the rule concerning the importance of stateness problems for
democratization. As we stressed in the last chapter, Lithuania's economy is not as
robust as that of Estonia, but Lithuania was the only Baltic country to grant inclusive
citizenship to all residents, whether they were ethnic Balts or not . This policy
has enabled Lithuania to manage its potential stateness problem in a more
democratic fashion than Latvia or Estonia and, thus, Lithuania has, correctly, received
a higher score for "political rights" than has Latvia or Estonia .
Of the five countries in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia is the only country not
to have a significant stateness problem . Slovenia does not have a significant ethnic
minority population, so it has not been embroiled in actual or potential conflicts
over a Serbian (or Albanian) irredenta of the sort that have occurred in Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovenia, and rump Yugoslavia, where armed conflicts have contributed
to widespread curtailment of political rights and civil liberties . Macedonia,
more than Slovenia, has potentially severe stateness problems (with Albania and
Serbia and even Bulgaria and Greece), and this has contributed to its less-thaninclusive
citizenship and language policies .
Another factor that has no doubt contributed to greater support for the postCommunist
regimes in East Central Europe (in contrast to Russia and to some
extent Belarus) is that Russian citizens may be happy to be independent but feel
nonetheless a sense of geopolitical loss and anger about the way the USSR disintegrated.
Among other things, the disintegration of the USSR has left twenty-five
million Russians as often beleaguered and sometimes stateless minorities in other
countries. Also, unlike the citizens of the Czech Republic, who believe that the
velvet divorce improved Czech standards of living, the Russians are convinced
that the dissolution of the USSR contributed to the decline of their standard of
living (table 21 .6) .
We can infer that, in contrast to Russian citizens' sense of geopolitical loss over
1991, the citizens of the "outer empire" in countries like Poland no doubt feel a
19 . In fact, positive GNP growth in the Czech Republic was projected to be 3 percent and 6 percent for
1994 and 1995 and to be 3 .5 percent and 3 percent for Slovakia. In contrast, for the same years the Russian
figures were -15 percent and -7 percent and the . Ukrainian figures were -23 percent and -5 percent. See
table 21 .1
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections
Table 21 .6. Russian Attitudes in 1994 about the Dissolution of the USSR in 1991
451
Source: Rose and Haerfper, "New Russian Barometer III," questions 57-59 . We believe a similar phenomenon is at work in
Belarus as in Russia . The only deputy in the Belarus parliament to vote against independence, Aleksandr Lukashenko, was
elected president in 1994. In May 1995 he sponsored a referendum in which he argued, "If people call for it, we will also
have a political union that is even closer than the Soviet Union was . For the moment I am talking about economic union ." See
Matthew Kaminski, "Belarussians Seek the Future in the Past," Financial Times (May 17, 1995), 3 . Lukashenko won support for
all questions on the referendum. In the same article the Financial Times correspondent noted that "over three-quarters of
Belarussian voters in a national referendum chose to bring back Soviet-era national insignia, make Russian the state language,
and support economic integration with Russia."
sense of geopolitical gain due to the events of 1989 . This is one of the reasons why
citizens in Poland had a much stronger preference for the present political system
than do those in Russia and thus more willingly accepted the politics of deferred
gratification (table 21.7) .
We do not want to overstress the preference for the old system in Russia, however.
Many people in Spain believe that they lived better under Franco but would
not like to return to that political system . The key question in politics is the desired
future alternative. Russians, in fact, see the political basket of goods we reviewed
in table 21 .2 as better under the new political system, but they feel this by
a smaller margin than do respondents in East Central Europe .20 Thus, despite
their sense of ambivalence and loss concerning the dissolution of the USSR, only
a small percentage say that they would like to return to Communism and an even
smaller percentage prefer military rule as a desired future alternative (table 21 .8) .
Other important explanatory factors for democratization differences in postCommunist
Europe for future researchers to explore are, of course, those related
20. For example, the better/worse ratio concerning freedom to travel was 95/5 in the Czech Republic,
75/7 in Poland, and only 41/28 in Russia . The better/worse ratio for freedom from unlawful arrest was 73/4
in the Czech Republic, 71/5 in Poland, and only 23/15 in Russia . We believe these results, among other things,
accurately reflect the stresses for individuals due to the continuing stateness crisis in Russia that we discussed
in chapter 19 . Data are from table 21 .2 in this chapter and Rose and Haerpfer, "New Russia Barometer
III, questions 3oc and 3oe .
% at Age:
Question iB-29 30-59 60+ Total
"In December 1991 leaders of Russia, Belorussia and the
Ukraine decided to dissolve the USSR and found the CIS .
What do you think of that now?"
It was the right decision . 16 12 8 12
It was the wrong decision . 57 70 75 68
Difficult to answer. 28 18 17 20
"How has the disintegration of the USSR
affected Russian living standards?"
For better . 5 4 3 4
For worse. 68 76 83 76
Na change . 11 8 5 8
Difficult to answer. 16 12 9 12
452 Post-Communist Europe
Table 21 .7. Preferences for Old and New Political Systems in Russia and Poland in JanuaryFebruary
1992
Source : Irina Bolva and Viachesev Shironin, "Russians between State and Market," Studies in Public Policy 205 (1992): 19-22.
Table 21 .8. Russian Attitudes toward Restoring the former Communist System : April 1994
Source : Rose and Haerfpfer, "New Russia Barometer III," question 31a . In the same poll, only 3% competely agreed and only
7% generally agreed with the statement that "the army should rule ." Question 31b . The army is thus clearly not a desired
alternative.
to time, prior regime types, and the presence or absence of a usable democratic
legacy. The USSR lasted for about seventy-five years, during much of which totalitarian
practices predominated. East Central Europe was a part of the Soviet subsystem
for only forty years . In Poland for much of this period, authoritarian, not
totalitarian, political realities predominated . In Hungary, mature post-totalitarianism
evolved. Finally, pre-Communist history must be analyzed comparatively.
Czechoslovakia, for example, was democratic from independence in 1919 until the
Nazi interventions of 1938. There is virtually no such usable pre-Communist democratic
past in the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union . This does not
mean that democracy is impossible in these countries ; it does mean, however, that
there will be longer and more perilous journeys toward constitutionalism and state
reconstruction before democracy becomes, if ever, the only game in town .
The astute reader has no doubt noted that we have not built religion into our
explanation of the comparatively weaker progress toward democratization in the
CIS countries and the former Yugoslavia . We have not done so for two reasons.
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 453
First, it is becoming increasingly popular among analysts to make certain religions,
by themselves (e.g., Orthodox Christianity, Islam, or Confucianism) a major explanation
for difficulties in democratization in many parts of the world .21 The
factors we have mentioned in this chapter, in themselves, are sufficient to explain
the sharply different results of democratization in the non-Baltic countries of the
former Soviet Union versus East Central Europe . Second, in an excursus on comparative
religion, resistance, and civil society in chapter 16, we have already advanced
the argument that religions differ in the range of their autonomously controlled
resources and their relationship to the state . We noted that Roman
Catholicism as a transnational, hierarchical organization can potentially provide
material and doctrinal support to a local Catholic church to help it resist state oppression.
To the extent that a Catholic church might resist the state, it could be
considered a support for a more robust and autonomous civil society. Empirically,
in the resistance stage of democratization we analyze in this book, the
Catholic church played a supportive role in Poland and Lithuania, as well as in
Chile and Brazil and in the last years of Franco in Spain. Protestantism, with its
emphasis on individual conscience and its international networks, can also play a
role in supporting civil society's opposition to a repressive state, as in East Germany
and Estonia. Concerning civil society and resistance to the state, Orthodox
Christianity is often (not always) organizationally and doctrinally in a relatively
weak position because of what Max Weber called its "caesaropapist" structure, in
which the church is a national as opposed to an transnational organization . In
caesaropapist churches, the national state normally plays a major role in the national
church's finances and appointments . Such a national church is not really
a relatively autonomous part of civil society because there is a high degree, in
Weber's words, of "subordination of priestly to secular power."22 Having acknowledged
this, we do not believe that Orthodox Christianity is an inherently
antidemocratic force. That is to say, if the leaders of the state are committed to democracy
and follow democratic practices, the caesaropapist structures and incentives
should lead to loyal support of democracy by the Orthodox Christian
church, as in Greece since 1975. However, if the leaders of the state and political
society are antidemocratic, the democratic opposition in civil society will not
normally receive substantial or effective support from a national Orthodox
church. We hope to develop our thinking on the role of the world's religions and
democracy in a future project .23
21. For an argument concerning the tension or even hostility between Orthodoxy, Confucianism, Islam,
and democracy, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization," Foreign Affairs 72, no . 3 (1993) :
22-49 . Also see his The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 298-311 .
22. For Max Weber's discussion of caesaropapism, see his Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1978), 2:1159-63, quote from 2:n61.
23. Islam (unlike Confucianism) is an important value system in parts of post-Communist Europe . A
complete argument concerning Islam would have to be much more complex than our argument concern-
Preference
at Age :
Preferring Present
System over Old SystemTo 29 30-59 Over 60 Total
In Russia
Present system better 43 39 21 36 -18
Old system better 45 52 71 54
Don't know 12 9 8 10
In Poland
Present system better 74 +51
Old system better 23
Don't know 3
Agreement with Statement, "it would be better
to restore the former communist system ."
% Response at Age :
To 29 30-59 60+ Total
Completely agree 5 8 18 9
Generally agree 8 14 19 14
Generally disagree 30 29 23 28
Completely disagree 41 36 22 34
Difficult to answer 16 13 19 15
454
	
Post-Communist Europe
DEMOCRACY AND THE RETURN OF COMMUNISM
Some interpreters have seen the "return of Communists" to power in Poland,
Hungary, and Lithuania-countries that played a vanguard role in democratic
transitions-as proof that economics and politics are so tightly linked that economic
decline means democratic decline . For countries where there has been at
least one legitimate victory by democratic electoral forces (and in many countries
there has never been such a victory), we believe a more nuanced judgment is ap-
propriate.
By the definitions of democracy we have advanced in this book, the return
to power of reformed Communist Party-led coalitions in Lithuania in 1992, in
Poland in 1993, and in Hungary in 1994, while a setback for some policies that
were deepening democracy (such as local government reform in Poland) was not
in itself an example of nondemocratic regime change . We say this because, by
almost all reliable accounts as of this writing (July 1995) the reform Communist
coalitions accepted the democratic rules of the game in how they contested the
election and later in how they ruled . Also, very importantly, they were accepted as
legitimate victors and rulers by the parties they defeated . In this sense there was
not a regime change away from democracy as political scientists normally use the
term. Strictly speaking, in comparative terms, the Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian
elections represented a peaceful democratic alternation of power .
From a long historical perspective, it may even turn out that these elections actually
strengthened democracy in Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary in one important
respect. They indicated to victors and losers alike that democracy was
becoming the only game in town . In fact, precisely because democracy was perceived
in 1992-94 as the only game in town, the reformed Communists in Lithuania,
Poland, and Hungary were extremely eager to demonstrate that they would
govern as democratic parties. Their calculation was that, by so governing, they
would be perceived, when they in turn were out of office, as part of the loyal democratic
opposition and thus as a legitimate alternative government .24 To make
this point they are holding themselves in some respects to somewhat higher staning
Orthodox Christianity. However, we note that the West's fear of fundamentalism has frequently contributed
to its shoring up of and even legitimating antidemocratic governments or movements that are
seen as bulwarks against the spread of fundamentalism. This is so even when the Islamic parties were
elected democratically and had not violated democratic practices . Nowhere was this clearer than in the
West's implicit and even explicit endorsement of the military coup in Algeria after Islamic forces had won
the first electoral round in 1991. Thus, for geopolitical reasons, authoritarian governments in the former Soviet
Union that share borders with Iran and/or Afghanistan (e.g., Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan)
are to some extent treated by Western policy makers and commentators with a democratic "double
standard:'
24. This point was stressed in a conversation between Alfred Stepan and Jerzy Wiatr, who chairs an important
congressional committee for the former Communists in the Polish parliament . Wiatr stressed that
"the most important thing we should accomplish in our government is that we prove we are a legitimate
democratic alternative ." Conversation in Warsaw, November 5,1993 .
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 455
dards of civil liberties than did their predecessors in Hungary and Lithuania, who
occasionally violated civil liberties in the name of their nationalist and anti-Communist
"mandates." For example, the reform Communists in Hungary are in
coalition with the liberal Free Democrats and the coalition's overall policy toward
the media has been less flawed than that of the first democratically elected government.
In Lithuania, the leader of nationalist independence, Vytautas Landsbergis,
pursued his anti-Communist nationalism to such an extent that Anatol
Lieven, in his excellent book, referred to him as a "backward-looking, religiouscolored
nationalist . . . [who] left the nation more divided than when he became
its leader."25 His reform Communist successor, Algirdas Brazauskas, has paid
somewhat more attention to providing a "political roof" of individual rights to all
citizens and pursuing a politics of inclusion .
Conceptually and politically, what does the phrase "the return of Communists"
to power mean and not mean in Central Europe in the mid-199os? In the
full sense of the word, a Communist regime in Central Europe before 1989, even
in mature post-totalitarian Hungary or authoritarian Poland, meant a powerful,
dependent alliance with a nondemocratic hegemonic world power. In the mid-
199os there is no such alliance, and Russia is not a hegemonic world power . In this
new geopolitical context, the reform Communists' best chance for power is to
present themselves as-and to be-"social democrats ."26 Even if some of the reformed
Communists might not actually have undergone profound changes in
their mentality (and many, of course, have not), the external reality to which the
reform Communists must respond has changed profoundly. As long as democracy
is the only game in town, the incentive structure of those who seek governmental
power is derived from the democratic context.
Finally, since voters play a crucial role in weighting the incentive system, what
25. Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 274•
26 . In 1989-9o the social democratic political space in post-Communist Europe was not effectively occupied
in elections . The historic social democrats were too tarnished and too weak and the neoliberal discourse
was too hegemonic . In1992-94, some reformed Communist parties who were out of power partially
restructured themselves to fill this space as the reaction to neoliberalism set in . Also, with the collapse of
Communism, the Socialist International sought new allies in post-Communist Europe . The reform Communist
parties could gain Socialist International certification and support only if in fact they ruled as democrats.
In December 1994, the Council of the Socialist International, meeting in Budapest, recommended
that the reform Communist party in Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Party, be admitted as a full member
of the Socialist International . For an astute analysis of the political and structural reasons for the social
democratic turn, while out of office, of the Hungarian and Polish post-Communist parties, see Michael
Waller, "The Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social Democratization?"
(paper prepared for a conference on Political Representation: Parties and Parliamentary
Democracy, Central European University, Budapest, June 16-17,1995) . At the same Central European University
conference, the president of the Lithuanian Political Science Association, Algis Krupavicius, wrote
that, for the Lithuanian post-Communist party that came to power in 1992 (the Democratic Labour Party),
"the period in opposition was an extremely favorable opportunity to renew their membership [which
dropped from 200,ooo in 1989 to 8,ooo in 19951, organizational structures, and ideological identity." The
quotation is from his conference paper, "Post-Communist Transformation and Political Parties,"12-13.
456
	
Post-Communist Europe
did they actually want? Did they actually want a return to Communism? 27 The
Polish voters, two months after the elections that had supposedly "returned" the
former Communists to power, believed, correctly in our judgment, that they had
not actually returned the old Communists to power . Polish respondents recognized
the fundamental discontinuity in global and national power relations between
1988 and 1993. To the question, "Does the formation of the SLD-PSL [the
reform Communist Party and their old Peasant Party ally] government coalition
signify the return to power of persons who ruled prior to 1989?"; 63 percent answered
"no," 13 percent said "difficult to say," and only 24 percent of the population
answered "yes ."28 We believe this answer is geopolitically, politically, and historically
correct . An observation from the Spanish case may clarify our reasoning .
If sometime in the 199os-as seems probable-the Partido Popular, a party that
is perceived by a segment of the electorate as representing a continuity with the
right wing that governed with Franco, wins control of the government after an
election, their victory in the changed Spanish environment would not signify a
"return to francoism" as much as an alternation in power, in which a modern
democratic conservative party has won the election with a mandate to rule dem-
ocratically.29
While we are happy to end this book on a somewhat optimistic note concerning
the future of democracy in East Central Europe, we want to insist again that
27. In both Poland and Hungary, as we have already discussed, the electoral laws resulted in the reform
Communist parties or coalition receiving many more seats than votes. Seats therefore were not a solid indicator
of voters' intentions . In Poland in 1993, 35.8 percent of the votes for the reformed Communists and
their coalitional peasant allies yielded 65.8 percent of the seats . In Hungary in 1994, the reform Communist
party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, received 33 percent of the vote in the first round but an absolute majority
of seats after the second round .
28. Poll published by the Polish Public Opinion Service, Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, in November
1993, P. r. Moreover, in late 1993 and early 1994 when a random sample of the population in Poland
and Hungary was asked to comment on the statement, "We should return to Communist rule," 47 percent
of those polled in Poland "strongly disagreed" and 35 percent "somewhat disagreed" with this statement .
The sum total of respondents in Hungary who disagreed was an identical 82 percent . See Rose and
Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer III," question 43 . The highest percentage of respondents in East
Central Europe who "strongly agreed" with the statement was in Bulgaria, with 9 percent . The next highest
was Romania, with 4 percent.
29. For many readers the November 1995 victory in Poland of a former communist party leader, Aleksander
Kw8niewski, in the second round of the presidential elections might seem a more clear victory for
communism . From the viewpoint of democratic consolidation, the two most important questions for
Poland's future are : 1) Will the post-communists (who as a result of the 1993 and 1995 elections had a twothirds
majority in the parliament and controlled the presidency) rule democratically? and 2) Will the anticommunist
forces accept the legitimacy of the free election results? While not happy with the November
1995 elections, Timothy Garton Ash was more worried about the second question than the first : "Morally,
as well as aesthetically, the triumph of the post-communists in Poland is deeply distasteful, but is it dangerous?
Not, I believe, so far as their aims and policies are concerned . . . Kwašniewski and his friends want
desperately to be seen not as eastern post-communists but as regular western social democrats ." Concerning
the second question, Garton Ash cites a number of post-election declarations by the Polish episcopate
and Lech Walesa and concludes that the greatest danger in Poland is "a large right-wing extraparliamentary
movement around Lech Walesa, supported by the Church and Solidarity, and simply not accepting President
Kwašniewski as the legitimate head of Poland's Third Republic." See Timothy Garton Ash, "`NeoPagan'Poland
, New York Review of Books (January 11,1996),10-14, quotes from 12 and 14.
Post-Communist Europe : Concluding Comparative Reflections 457
we do not embrace a geopolitical or philosophical perspective of democratic immanence.
It is probable that in some of the countries we have analyzed democracy
will never be consolidated . In other countries democracy might become consolidated
but will eventually break down . We also unhappily acknowledge that
some countries will consolidate democracy but will never deepen democracy in
the spheres of gender equality, access to critical social services, inclusive citizenship,
respect for human rights, and freedom of information . They might, indeed,
occasionally violate human rights .
All serious democratic thinkers and activists are now also aware that the much
vaunted democratic Third Wave has already produced some dangerous undertows,
not only in post-Communist Europe but also in Western Europe .30 In the
United States, influential ideologues of liberty are at times too simplistic and
mean spirited for a healthy democratic polity. In this context democratic triumphalism
is not only uncalled for but dangerous. Democratic institutions have
to be not only created but crafted, nurtured, and developed . We think that we have
made abundantly clear that to create an economic society supportive of democracy
requires more than just markets and private property . It is time to problematize
and transcend "illiberal liberalism" and also to theorize and socially construct
integrative identity politics, as opposed to endlessly fragmenting identity
politics. Further, to argue that democracy is better than any other form of government
once alternatives have been in crisis is not sufficient. Democracy has to
be defended on its own merits . Clearly, more research should also be devoted to
learning about the great variety of democratic regimes that actually exist in the
world. Most important, new political projects, as well as research endeavors, must
be devoted to improving the quality of consolidated democracies .
30. Three excellent articles in a special issue of Daedalus called "After Communism : What?" (Summer
1994) are devoted to the unexpected crisis Western and Eastern European democrats began to experience
after they had lost their legitimating enemy or "other" after the collapse of Communism . Many problems
that had long been deferred or denied came on the agenda . For this new and challenging "paradigm lost"
situation, see Tony Judt, "Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era," 1-20; Elemér Hankiss,
"European Paradigms : East and West, 1945-1994," 115-26; and István Rév, "The Postmortem Victory of
Communism," 157-70 . Claus Offe, Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts: Erkundungen derpolitischen Transformation
im Neuen Osten (Frankfurt : Campus Verlag,1994) throughout the book, and particularly in chapter 10,
raises similar questions .