COMMENT
Should Transitologists Be Grounded?
Valerie Bunce
This commentary is based upon a larger study
investigating methodological issues in the
comparative study of democratization . I would
like to thank the National Endowment for the
Humanities for support of this project . 1 would
also like to thank Bela Greskovits for his comments
on this paper .
The collapse of state socialism in eastern Europe 1 has led to a proliferation of studies analyzing aspects of
democratization throughout the region . Central to many of these studies (particularly those by nonspecialists) is an
assumption that posteonmlunism is but a variation on a larger theme, that is, recent transitions from authoritarian to
democratic rule .
In a recent issue of SLAVICREVIEW, Philippe C . Sclimitter and Terry Lynn Karl provide a spirited defense of this
assumption by arguing that democratization in -éastern Europe can and should be compared with democratization in
southern Europe and Latin Ainerica .2 Their case rests on three points. First, they resurrect the old debate about
comparative analysis versus area studies and argue in support of the former and against the latter. This is relevant to
the question at hand, in their view, because :
1) many of the objections to comparing democratization in
the east with democratization in the south are made on
traditional area studies grounds ; and
2) transitology, as a branch of comparative politics,
features all the methodological advantages of
comparative inquiry .
They then turn to the "difference debate ." Here, they argue that, while there are some differences between south and
east, the differences do not by any means rule out a comparison among countries in Latin America, southern Europe
and eastern Europe. Diversity is welcome, they contend, especially when, as witli these cases, it involves Variation
around a common and unifying theme, that is, recent transitions from authoritarian rule . Finally, Schniitter and Karl
argue that there is much to be learned from comparing democratization in Latin America, southern and eastern
Europe. Such comparisons, they contend, help us define more clearly what is similar and what is different in recent
transitions to democracy, sensitize us to new factors and new relationships, and allow us to test a wide range of
hypotheses. As I shall argue below, their first claim is wrongheaded and irrelevant to the issue at hand ; the second is
debatable; and the third, while valid in some respects, nevertheless misrepresents both the costs and the benefits of
adding eastern Europe to comparative studies of democratization .
Is the debate about the validity of comparing democratization, east and south, really a debate between area
specialists and comparativists as Sclunitter and Karl contend'? I think not, since those who question such
comparisons do NOT do so on grounds of traditional area studies but rather on grounds familiar to any
comparativist.3 Wliat is primarily at issue is comparability . For exainple, when Sally Terry catalogues the many
differences between transitions to democracy in the south versus exits from state socialism in the east, she is not
adopting what Sclunitter and Karl have tenured an area studies perspective . Instead, she is engaging THE central
question of comparative analysis . Are we comparing apples with apples, apples with oranges (which are at least
varieties of fruit) or apples with, say, kangaroos'? What Teny is arguing is that the many differences between eastern
and southern transitions suggest that comparisons between the two involve at best apples and oranges (which would
place important limits on comparison), and, at worst, apples and kangeroos (which would call the entire enterprise of
comparison into question) . Thus, Schmitter and Karl (and other transitologists) have a burden of proof. They cannot
justify their comparisons of east and south by simply stating that these cases meet "certain definitional
requirements" (178) or by arguing that we sliould compare first and worry about comparability second.4
If issues of comparability are a common theme in critiques of tran- sitology, then so are other issues that lie at the
heart of comparative inquiry--in particular, problems involving case selection, coding decisions and conceptindicator
linkages . For example, in their investigations Schmitter and Karl include--for unspecified reasons--some
posteonmiunist cases and exclude others . This is a problem. As every social scientist knows, sample selection
determines which hypotheses can be tested and the kinds (as well as the quality) of the conclusions that can be
drawn. To take another issue : on what grounds do Sclunitter and Karl distinguish between pacted versus mass
mobilization transitions (a distinction cnicial to their investigations), given the considerable blurring between the
two in the eastern European experience? Finally, if the communists--now ex-communists--continue to occupy
important posts in eastern Europe and if the media in most of these countries is still subject to undue control by the
government in office, then is it accurate to argue, as Schmitter and Karl do, that these regimes have moved from the
transition period to a period of democratic consolidation?6
All of this suggests, Schmitter and Karl to the contrary, that the debate about transitology is in fact a debate among
comparativists about comparative methodology . To label critics area specialists, then, is to misrepresent the
concerns that have been voiced about comparative studies of democratization, east and south. It is also, perhaps not
accidentally, to skirt responsibility for answering some tough questions .
More generally, one can observe that it is a familiar rhetorical technique to reduce the issue at hand to a choice
between positive and negative stereotypes . This is precisely what Schmitter and Karl do by juxtaposing comparative
analysis to its "other," that is, area studies . In their rendition, comparativists emerge as "the good gals ." They know
what constitutes important questions and the data necessary to answer them, they strike the right balance between
theory and empirics, and they are in the mainstream of their social science disciplines . Because transitology is
branch of comparative politics, moreover, it is innocent by association, that is, it features all of the positive traits of
comparative study. By contrast, those who object to transitology are not comparativists--by definition . Instead, they
are area scholars. This is a category which combines a number of undesirable characteristics . In their view, for
example, area specialists take "refuge in'empirie' "(184); they are allergic to theory ; they only know one case and
presume it to be unique ;7 they are isolated from their disciplines and "clannish" in their behavior (177, note 6);8 and
they automatically privilege explanations that are "particularistic," "cultural" and "ideational" over explanations that
are generic and structural.
Thus, one emerges from Schmitter and Karl's account with a sense that one can be no more "for" area studies,
"against" comparative and, thus, "against" transitology than be "for," say, crime, polio and war, or "against"
fatherhood and apple pie . In drawing a sharp and valueladen contrast between area studies and comparative analysis
they have tried to reduce the question at hand to a valence issue . However, it is not a valence issue . Some
comparative studies are good and some are bad . Similarly, work by area specialists can be good or bad . The
QUALITY of the specific study in question, then, and not the genus to which it belongs, is what matters .
It is also important to recognize that the distinction between comparative and area studies, especially as drawn in
sharp relief by Sclmiitter and Karl, is to a certain extent a false dichoton . In practice, comparativists and area
specialists often_ work hand in hand . For example, comparative studies can only be igood as their data bases and
area specialists (by most definitions) are the ones that provide much of the data for comparative work (even for
Schnútter and Karl). 9 In addition, any list of the most influential theories in the social sciences reveals that a good
number of them were authored by area specialists and were based for the most part on extended field work in their
particular countries, if not counties of expertise . 10 Here, I am thinking, for instance, of work by Benedict
Anderson,James Scott and Clifford Geertz, as well as by Guillermo O'Donnell, Robert Putnam and Philippe
Schmitter. I l Finally, it is by now well established that among the best studies in political science and sociology are
those that combine comparative methodology with area studies expertise . Indeed, this is the strength of the recent
volumes on transitions from authoritarian rule, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence
Whitehead. 12
A final concern I have with framing the debate as one between area studies and comparative analysis is the tone
adopted by Schmitter and Karl . What seems to be implied in their defense of comparative analysis in general and
transitology in particular, as well as their attack on "North American specialists" in eastern Europe, is that eastern
European studies is a social science backwater (see 177) . That is why, in their view, specialists in the region object
to transitology and, just as importantly, why Schmitter and Karl feel it necessary to take on the burden of
propagating the comparative message to the unconverted readers of SLAVIC REVYEW. Their arrogance in this regard
parallels the attitudes some western economists have taken when holding forth on the transition to capitalism in
eastern Europe . Just as they have advocated "designer capitalism," 13 so Schmitter and Karl, and other
transitologists, seem to be advocating "designer democracy"--if not "designer social science ." 14 What Schmitter
and Karl do not seem to know is that the wall separating eastern European studies from comparative politics came
down long before the collapse of the wall separating eastern from western Europe 15--and, thus, considerably before
the arrival of "democracy," let alone transitology and consolidology, to the region . 16 Schnútter and Karl are
unaware of this because they are new to this field . Moreover, theiapproach to democratization--which concentrates
on elites and on the liberalized present and ignores other players, processes and the socialist past--automatically excludes
from their purview most of the literature in eastern European studies . All of this testifies, more generally (if
we may turn a common observation on its head), to the long and unfortunate isolation of marry comparativists from
the rich research tradition of eastern European studies . l7 Thus, by preaching the comparative message to eastern
European specialists, Schmitter and Karl appear to be generals fighting the last war . Is it accidental, one might ask,
that the academic battle they are waging happens to take place in a bipolar world'?
Much more relevant to the question of democratization, east and south, is Schmitter and Karl's response to the
"difference" debate. Here, they do an excellent job of reviewing many of the differences between democratization in
eastern Europe versus southern Europe and Latin America. They conclude that these differences do not rule out the
incorporation of eastern Europe into comparative studies of recent democratization because :
1) the temporal clustering of these cases argues for
cross-regional processes at work, which, in turn,
suggest some commonalities across these regions ;
2) comparative study benefits from variance ;
3) the differences between east and south have been
exaggerated (as have the similarities among the
southern cases) and represent, in fact, variations
on a common process of transition and consolidation ;
and, therefore
4) comparison among these countries is valid and valuable .
I have several responses to the first point. Let us accept for the moment the assumption that democratizations in the
south and east occupy roughly the same temporal space and that this speaks to the presence of similar dynamics of
change. If this is so, then why should we employ approaches to the analysis of democratization (such as those
offered by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, as well as by Schmitter and Karl) that IGNORE the very
explanatory factors that would seem to follow logically from these assumptions'? Here, I refer to both international
and economic variables that would appear to operate in virtually all these cases--for example, the development from
the early 1970s onward of international norms supporting human rights and democrac_y,18 the destabilizing
consequences of the global debt crisis and structural adjustment policies, 19 and the political fallout from longtenn
pursuit in the second and third worlds of import substitution policies . What I am suggesting, then, is that there is a
contradiction between the rationale offered for comparing democratization, east and south, and the approaches
tr_ánsitologists take when carrying out their studies .
Second, did these transitions actually occur at roughly the same time and thus in roughly the same context'? It is true
that they are closer in time to each other than, say, democratization after Franco and democratization in Great
Britain. However, it is also true that a few years can make a big difference in the causes and context of
democratization. Let us take the examples of Spain and Hungary, two countries which share some similarities in the
mode of transition. The transition in Spain occurred in a stable, bipolar international environment and Spain reaped
enormous benefits from this (as well as its geographical location) . In particular, the new regime had massive infusions
of international economic aid, which allowed Spain to delay by ten years painful economic reforms .
Moreover, Spain was assured of eventual entry into the European Community and NATO ; the only question was
whether Spanish political leaders and Spanish publics would support such actions . By contrast, Hungary has
received far less international economic support and has had to deal immediately with destabilizing economic
reforms. In addition, the end of the cold war, the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have created for Hungary (and its
neighbors) a very uncertain international environment . Solutions to this problem, moreover, are slow in coming,
given the many difficulties involved today in expanding membership of NATO and the European Union to include
Hungary and other members of the former socialist world . What I am suggesting, then, is that the decade or so
separating these two transitions made a significant difference in their international contexts . These differences,
moreover, had direct domestic repercussions, creating very different processes of democratization in Spain and
Hungary.
Schmitter and Karl's second point is more compelling . They are quite right in arguing that variety is the spice of
comparative inquiry. Without variation, we cannot develop robust concepts, identify key explanatory factors or
construct good explanations. However, there is a catch. Meaningful comparative study requires that differences be
joined with similarities ; otherwise, too much is in motion to trace relationships and to draw meaningful conclusions .
Moreover, we can no longer assume in such circumstances that what we are analyzing in one context is the same as
what we are analyzing in another . The key question, then, is whether the differences constitute variations_ on a_common
process--that is, transitions from dičtatorship to democracy--or altogether different processes--that is,
democratization versus what could be termed postcommunism . Šcfimitter and Karl take the first-position and their
critics the second .
l is not easy to reach a decision on this matter . Social science lacks the sophistication needed to distinguish between
differences in degree and differences in kind . One análýsťs democratization is another's postcommunism-- and a
third might question whether postcommunism is so "post." However, what can be concluded is that the differences
between postcommunism and the transitions in the south are FAR more substantial than Sclunitter and Karl's
discussion seems to imply . Let me highlight just the most important of them .
First is the nature of authoritarian rule . What distinguished state socialism from bureaucratic authoritarianism and
other forms of dictatorship in Latin America and southern Europe were its social stricture, its ideology and
ideological spectrum, its political economy, its conf
	
~}
	
t
	
f ildiffe
1flafIcMgtV i !Qs vě~řýu
	
natiť Pď Ý i
	
lt3• sř~ ~ ~`
	
MRS , JRhJq? ~ I A ÁP31
~
g
southernZAgop$1~ss>~l~~t~e ~ spa ar,>boq áfi~š aróg > ~d~i~tgtis ea t> ~ x
democracy i ; a4 e ~ § grLU { cY Ť~č t era Y f~ťt é ~s~Q i •"~ ZaA1TA
traditio
	
~,-
	
y t
	
t tPueše f tors
	
"ancu2iut
a ~á
	
i
	
Vu a uz a V,
history' inso ara~ m crate 10 is ~tué
	
,o Just at ue s ru u r~ gen
	
raí~si iorin~tu~éQ~
interes~5~ t ~~šbtt~r~é ~u1~ 8f' cR>
	
~I sit é~3 u> ~~ u%psq
	
%H lpéj ~RVHgrR Son, the
8
transition to capitalism and the like . It is also that the boundary separating the authoritarian past from the liberalized
present is a very porous one in eastern Europe .
There are also significant differences in the mode of transition. For instance, there is no equivalent in the southern
cases either to the diffusion prócsšeš vě saw in eastern Europe in 1989 or thus to the role of international factors in
ending the Communist Parry's political monopoly .22 It is crucial as well to understand the end of state socialism as a
process of national liberation--whether that was a consequence of the end of the Soviet bloc or the end of an internal
empire (as with the federal states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) . In this sense, state, nation
and identity were--and are--at the very center of these processes of change in eastern Europe .
Ano eř difference is in the international context of transition. To summarize an earlier point: the eastern European
transitions are taking place in an international švštémwhich is itself in transition. What needs to be added to this is
the very different economic and strategic position in the international system of eastern Europe versus southern
Europe and Latin America. At the time of transition, eastern European countries were not full members by any
means of the international capitalist economy, and they were not allied in any institutional sense with the west .
The most striking contrast, and the one that bears most directly on the question of democracy, is in the transitional
agenda. In southern Europe and Latin America, the issue was democratization, that is, a change in political
regime.23 Indeed, the circumscribed character of political change in southern Europe and Latin America is one
reason why students of comparative democratization could reduce democratic transitions to a process involving
interactions among a handful of political elites . By contrast, what is at stake in eastern Europe is nothing less than
the creation of the very building blocks of the social order . What is open for negotiation is not just the character of
the regime but also the very nature of the state itself 24 not just citizenship but also identity, not just economic
liberalization but also the foundations of a capitalist economy .25 What is also at stake is not just amendment of the
existing class structure but the creation of a new class system ; not just a shift in the balance of interests, therefore,
but something much more fundamental the very creation of a range of new interests . Finally, what is involved in the
eastern European transitions is not just modification of the state's foreign policies, but also a profound redefinition of
the role of the state in the international system .
We can draw two conclusions from this brief summary. First,, if we are interested in balancing similarities and
differences, and-in-maintaining at the same time a reasonable mnnber of cases, then we would not engage in
comparisons between east and south . Rather, we would compare all or some of the 27 eastern European cases with
each other . Second, we must be very cautious when comparing democratization, east and south : at best, such
comparisonswonproduce a limited range of benefits ; at worst, we could be placing ourselves in the uren- viable
and enviable position of sampling simultaneously on the independent and dependent variables .
This leads us to Schmitter and Karl's final set of arguments . What do we gain when we compare democratization,
east and south'? I agree with them that such comparisons can enrich our understanding of democracy. In particular,
they remind, us of the sheer diversity of ways young democracies come into being and evolve, and they help us
define the essential characteristics of democratization by alerting us to differences, as well as to similarities, among
democratic orders. Such comparisons also reveal a number of factors that were missing from prevailing theories of
democratization . 26 All of these benefits flow quite naturally from a comparative project that is rich in cases and rich
in diversity. What Schmitter and Karl do not mention, however, is a final advantage to such crossregional
comparisons . They can provide a powerful critique of prevailing understandings of democratization . They may not
simply refine the common wisdom, they may overturn it . 27
When one looks more closely at transitology from the vantage point of eastern Europe, one is struck, first, by the
fact that this is a l iterature rich in description but relatively poor in testable hypotheses . An example of this is
constitutional design--an issue of great importance to many transitologists .28 How can we test the relative benefits
of parliamentary versus presidential systems if most of the systems in eastern Europe are in fact a combination of
both, that is, a variation on the French Fifth Republic model? Moreover, how can we evaluate whether constitutional
design matters if we have no measure of impact that differentiates among recent cases of democratization and if the
purported consequences of constitutional developments could also be judged to be its causes'? For instance, is it
correct to argue that Hungarian democracy is more secure than Russian democracy because Hungary opted for a
parliamentary system and Russia did not, and because the rules of the political game were formalized more clearly
and earlier in Hungary than in Russia'?29 Or does it make more sense to argue that the problems surrounding the
transition in Russia are far greater than in Hungary and that it is this fact that has produced both different
constitutional trajectories and differences as well in the seeming prospects for democratic consolidation'?
A second problem is that what is offered in transitions literature is not, in fact, a theory of democratization--a series
of "if, then" claims that can be tested--but rather an approach to the analysis of democratization-that is, a statement
about what should be analyzed and how . All that this literature gives us is advice : we should look at strategic
interactions among elites and treat democratization as a highly contingent process that is fraught with considerable
uncertainty . What it does not give us is any explanation of why sonic authoritarian states democratize and others do
not, why the process of democratization varies across cases, or why some democracies take root and others do not.
Since this literature is a series of claims about how we should approach the study of democratization, can we then
argue at least that the approach offered is a sound one'? Let me suggest one answer to this question by expanding on
a point already mentioned. the addition of new variables to the equation . By joining eastern Europe with southern
Europe and Latin America, we discover a number of crucial factors that are missing in the recent theories of
transitologists--in particular, the interaction between economic and political transformation, the importance of the
media in the process of democratization, the powerful influence of international factors, the key role of mass publics
in transitions (as well as in consolidation),30 the centrality of national identity and nationalism in the process of
democratization, the importance of the left as well as the right in shaping democratic prospects and, finally, all those
thorny issues having to do with the state, its boundaries, its strength and its place within the international order . This
is a long list of missing variables, which focuses our attention on this question : at what point can we no longer tack
on these factors to the prevailing approach to the study of democratization and should we decide instead, given the
desire for parsimony and the considerable implications these additions hold for our very conception of
democratization, that a completely different approach to the study of democratic transitions is required'?
We can also judge the soundness of the prevailing approach by concentrating on what it includes rather than on what
it lacks. Central to the approach of Schmitter, Karl, O'Donnell and their associates is the assertion that elites are
central and publics peripheral. Thus, transitions to democracy are understood to be elite affairs and the more elitist,
transitologists argue, the better . However, when we add eastern Europe to the equation, we begin to wonder about
this emphasis since :
1) publics were important actors in ending communist
party hegemony in many of these cases ;
2) bargaining among elites is--especially before the
fact--a very hard process to trace ;
3) it is very difficult--again, especially before the
fact--to determine elite interests and elite
resources and
4) pacted versus mass mobilization modes of transition
do not explain patterns of success in democratic
consolidation in the postcommunist world .
More generally, one has to wonder whether, in focusing so heavily on the machinations of elites, transitologists have
not committed the very transgression they have lamented in the work of area scholars: the preference for a
particularistic and voluntaristic understanding of social reality over one which is more general and structural .
Just as elites and their interactions are central to the approach developed by Schmitter, Karl and their associates, so
are the core concepts of democratic transition, democratic consolidation and, finally, uncertainty . In each of these,
once we add eastern Europe to the calculus we find a number of problems . Transition implies change that is
circumscribed and directional, in these discussions, either towards or away from democratic governance . The first
aspect does not fit the inherently revolutionary nature of postcommunism and the second leads to a
misrepresentation of eastern European developments by forcing us :
1) to draw too sharp a distinction between the authoritarian
past and the transitional present,
2) to privilege the democratic dimension over all
other dimensions of change,
3) to assume that political change is separate from,
say, economic and social change and
4) to code any and all major developments as factors
necessarily affecting movement to or away from democracy .31
Consolidation is also a problematic concept . First, it is unclear what "consolidation" means in an empirical sense,
aside from a vague notion that "consolidated democracies" are those that, following transition, seem to promise
longevity. Is democratic consolidation, then, just a matter of time'? How do we factor in capacity to withstand crises'?
Is it the absence of dem- ocratic collapse or the presence of certain features, such as a democratic political
culturé?32 Does consolidation entail political stability and, if so, what does this mean'? Is it the absence of such
factors as significant anti-system protest, the govermnent's loss of its coercive monopoly and sharp divisions among
citizens and among political leaders, or is it the presence of such factors as relatively durable governing coalitions
and widespread public support for the institutions and procedures of democracy'? There is a final problem. If
democracy is a process, not a result, and if the democratic project can never be completed, then how can we
understand the term "consolidation" with its implication of democracy as an end state?
The final member of the conceptual triumvirate in transitions literature is uncertainty . Here, again, we encounter a
certain dissonance between concept and reality . On the one hand, transitologists have made a great deal of the
uncertainties surrounding democratization . Indeed, this is the foundation for much of the theorizing about transitions
from authoritarian rule . On the other hand, we see a clear pattern in the many new democracies that have come into
being since the 1970s : an extremely high survival rate. If the democratic enterprise is so fraught with difficulties, as
transitologists repeatedly assert,33 then how do we explain this? It is not a sufficient response to argue either that
these new democracies are still in the throes of consolidation or to presume that the durability of new democracies
speaks in effect to a global bounty of "heroic princes ." Rather the response should be to question whether democracy
(today at least) might be easier than many have thought--or, at least, whether the imposition of authoritarian rule
might be more difficult than many seemed to have assumed .34
All of these examples suggest that the addition of eastern Europe to comparative studies of democratization has one
major benefit, aside from those outlined by Schmitter and Karl . It introduces serious questions about the reigning
paradigm of democratization . This leads us to the final point of this commentary . If Schmitter and Karl have been in
some respects too conservative in estimating the value of comparing east and south (particularly when it involves
"SAMOKRITIKA"), then they have been in other respects too liberal in their assessment of what can be learned from
such comparisons . It is here that we must switch our discussion from the benefits of diversity to its costs .
The striking contrasts between transitions to democracy in the south and postcommunism in the east suggest that
certain kinds of comparative exercises are highly suspect . First, there is a danger in presuming fundamental
similarities when the similarities posited are in fact superficial and highly misleading . Ethnic diversity is a case in
point. To equate Peruvian, Spanish and Portuguese edmic diversity with that of the former Yugoslavia and the
former Soviet Union (or even contemporary Russia, for that matter) is to skim over a number of distinctive features
of ethnopolitics in eastern Europe. Here, I refer, for instance, to the sheer magnitude of diversity in the region and its
correlation with religious, political, socio-economic and spatial markers ; the powerful historical meanings attached
to ethnicity, nation, religion and state, the role played by state socialist regimes in developing national
consciousness, as well as national elites, national institutions and proto- states within states : the central place of
ethnicity, national identity and national movements in ending the communist experiment the role of ethnicity in not
just the process of nation and state building and democratization, but also in the transition to capitalism ; the
powerful impact of ethnicity on definitions and practices of citizenship ; and the ways in which ethnicity in eastern
Europe affects not just domestic politics and economics, but also interstate relations throughout the region . To be
succinct: there is a former Yugoslavia, a former Czechoslovakia and a former Soviet Union, and there could be as
well in the future a former Russia. There is, however, no "former Peru" or "former Spain."
Another danger is to transplant onto eastern European soil arguments developed in response to the very different
conditions existing in Latin America and southern Europe. Take, for instance, the argument developed in the
southern context that publics are demobilized during transitions to democracy and that this contributes in positive
ways to the democratization process. This argument makes little sense in eastern Europe, if only because of the
pronounced role of average citizens as well as intellectuals in many of these transitions. Moreover, an argument can
be made for the eastern European case, at least, that mobilized publics may very well be assets, not liabilities in the
process of democratization . They may exert needed pressures on elites to adhere to the democratic rules of the game
and they may provide the necessary political capital for the transition to capitalism . 3 5
This leaves us with a final problem . If such different contexts call into question the transfer of concepts and
arguments from south to east, then they most assuredly challenge the validity of using the southern experience to
PREDICT developments in eastern Europe . For instance, Guillermo O'Donnell, as well as Philippe Schmitter and
Terry Karl, have voiced considerable pessimism about the future of democracy in eastern Europe. In particular, they
have argued that many of the democracies in the region are incomplete and superficial, that these new democracies
will take a long time to consolidate and that there are grounds for expecting at least some to revert back to
authoritarian rule.36 There are ample reasons, of course, to wonder about democracy's future in eastern Europe .
However, one must ask whether transitologists are engaged in a careful reading of trends in eastern Europe, or
whether their pessimistic conclusions are an artifact produced by measuring the east against the southern standard .
Does eastern Europe have a problem with democracy or is it simply that eastern Europe is not Latin America or
southern Europe?3_7
Thus, my arguments are four : first, the debate over comparisons between east and south cannot be reduced to the old
debate between area studies and comparative analysis . Second, Schnaitter and Karl are wrong when they portray
comparative and area studies as polar opposites . Third, there are substantial differences between the east and the
south, and this creates far more problems for comparing the two than Schmitter and Karl recognize . Finally, there
are nonetheless some good reasons to engage in such comparisons . The most important reason, however, is not
addressed by Schmitter and Karl the ways in which the addition of eastern Europe to comparative studies of
democratization alerts us to fundamental problems in how transitologists have understood and analyzed transitions
from authoritarian rule--in the east and, one could argue, in the south as well .
Notes
1 . In this commentary, the term "eastern Europe" will be used to refer to all the postcommuuist countries that during
the cold-war era made up the Soviet Union and eastern Europe .
2. "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists : How Far to the East Should They Attempt to
Go?" Slavic Review 53, no . 1 (Spring 1994) : 173-85 . Their article is a response to criticisms not just by specialists in
eastern Europe, but also by specialists in southern Europe and Latin America_ However, this commentary will focus
primarily on eastern Europe.
3 . This, at least, is how I read the literature questioning the validity of comparing east and south . See, for example,
M. Steven Fish, Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton :
Princeton University Press, 1994) ; David Bartlett and Wendy Hunter, "Comparing Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe : What Have We Learned and Where Are We Going'?" paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 September 1993, Washington, DC ; Piotr
Sztompka, "Dilemmas of the Great Transition," Sisyphus 2 (1992) : 9-27; Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Thinking About
Post-Communist Transitions : How Different Are They'?" Slavic Review 52, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 333-37; Grzegorz
Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," British Journal of
Political Science 21 (July 1991): 285-313; David Ost, "Shaping a New Politics in Poland : Interests and Politics in
Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series no . 8, Minde de
Gunzburg Center, Harvard University, 1993 ; David Ost, "Labor and Societal Transition," Problems of Communism
41, no. 3 (May-June 1992) : 22-24; Ken Jowitt, "The New World Disorder," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Winter
1991): 11-20 ; Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertainty and the Transition : Post- Communism in Hungary,"
East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 240-75; Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi,
"Uncertainty and the Transition : Post-Communism in Hungary," East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 1
(Spring 1993) : 240-275; Valerie Bunce, "Can We Compare Democratization in the East Versus the South'?"Journal
of Democracy, forthcoming.
4. This is the thrust of their discussion of sample selection in "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and
Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 128 (May 1991): 269-84.
5 . This problem also emerges in some of the Latin American cases, where pacts were a consequence of mass
mobilization. My thanks to Cynthia McLintock, Bela Greskovits and Hector Schamis for pointing this out .
6. This is not to argue that state socialism is still fully intact . Rather it is to argue that what we have seen in eastern
Europe since 1989 is the end of communist party hegemony . Whether that is equal to what has been understood in
theory and practice as a transition to democracy is, however, quite another question . See, for example, Lilia
Shevtsova, "Postkommunisticheskaia Rossiia : Muki i lobyshkoi transformatsii," unpublished ms ., Institute for
International Economics and Politics, Moscow, September 1993 ; and Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery,
"Romania after Ceausescu: Post-- Communist Communism'?" Eastern Europe in Revolution, ed. No Banac (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1992).
7 . Schmitter and Karl seem to have misunderstood what their critics mean when they claim that state socialism and
"post-state socialism" are unique. The argument is not that each eastern European country is unique or that these
unique characteristics are derived from, say, distinct national cultures . Rather the argument is a structural one . The
focus is on the distinctive political, economic and social characteristics that all of these countries share as a
consequence of state socialism .
8 . The use of the term "clan" is reminiscent of the linguistic games the western imperial powers played when they
decided in the nineteenth century to draw a clear line between the "civilized" west--which had nations-- and
backward Africa--which no longer had nations, but, instead, had tribes, clans and the like (see Philip D . Curtin, The
Image ofAfrica [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964]). Similar linguistic games-- which allocate power,
modernity and responsibility--characterize many of the recent western analyses of the former Yugoslavia and, more
generally, the Balkans (see Maria Todorova, "The Balkans : From Discovery to Invention," Slavic Review 53
[Summer 19941: 453-82).
9. This does not guarantee, however, that generalists will render an accurate reading of the data . For example, James
Fearon's recent formal analysis explaining the outbreak of war in Croatia rests entirely upon a particular reading of
the political beliefs of the Serbian minority in Croatia . This is a problem on two grounds : first, such beliefs are
extremely hard to decipher in the absence of survey dam ; second, his rendition of these beliefs rests entirely on a
minimal and quite biased sampling of journalistic (not scholarly) accounts of these beliefs . See his "Ethnic War as a
Commitment Problem," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5
September 1994, New York. Moreover, Sclmútter and Karl regularly miscode Bulgaria in their investigations . See,
for example, "Modes of Transition", and "What Kinds of Democracy are Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe,
South and Central America?" (unpublished ms) . Finally, by my calculation (which takes the former Soviet Union
into account and recent developments in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, as well as measures of influence which are
less obvious than formal membership in a governing coalition), the ex-communists emerge as a far more donúnant
political force in eastern Europe than Schmitter and Karl seem to recognize (see "The Conceptual Travels") .
10. My thanks to Michael Kennedy for making this point in another context .
11 . See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991); James Scott, Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia (London: Frank Cass, 1986); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures:
Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1993); Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century
of Corporatism?" The Review of Politics 36 (January 1974).
12. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Sclmútter and Laurence Whitehead, eds ., Transitions From Authoritarian
Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) ; idem., Transitions From Authoritarian
Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); idem., Transitionsftom Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe C. Schnútter, eds ., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule : Tentative Conclnsions about Uncertain
Democracies (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
13 . David Stark, "A Sociologist's Perspective : Can Designer Capitalism Work in Central and Eastern Europe'?"
Transition: The Newsletter aboutReforming Economies 3 (May 1992): 1-4.
14 . Is this response to Schmitter and Karl just a matter of turf defense? There is an element of truth to their implied
point that some eastern European area specialists are quite resentful of the recent reduced- entry costs to claiming
expertise in eastern European studies. These feelings sometimes surface, for example, in discussions behind closed
doors with rakija on the table . Just as obscurity had its costs, it appears, so does notoriety . However, by "designer
social science" I mean something quite different and, I think, less contentious . First, empirical grounding is a
necessary condition for conducting sound research and for offering sound advice . Second, social science is not so
developed that it can predict what will happen in the future, let alone dictate what should happen . Third,
postcommunist transitions are without historical precedent yet social science theories are based in large measure on
historical precedents . This, plus their multiple and interactive character, suggests that there are clear limits on the
ability of social scientists to speak confidently about these transitions. Finally, there is a certain irony in the notion
that, having rejected scientific socialism and thus the orchestration of social, political and economic developments
"from above," the new regimes in the region are now being told by some from the west that there is "scientific
capitalism" and "scientific democracy," and that 'they can be imposed "from above ." This is despite the purported
virtues of regulation through the hidden hand in liberal orders . Humility, in short, and not arrogance should be the
order of the day.
15. It is interesting to note in this regard that, prior to 1989, comparative analyses were more common in the eastern
European field than in, say, Latin American studies . This is because of the homogenizing effects of state socialism
and, thus, the extent to which eastern Europe--far more than Latin America--provided a natural laboratory for
comparative study.
16. This was less true for Soviet studies, where single-case analysis was more the norm, where comparative theories
were not widely employed and where the assumption of studying a unique case was more widespread . This seems to
have reflected the confluence of several factors : the sheer size and thus complexity of the former Soviet Union
(which, after all, occupied nearly one fifth of the world's land mass) ; the difficulties of procuring data ; the absence
of a strong social science tradition within the Soviet Union (in contrast to, say, Poland, Hungary and the former
Yugoslavia); and the academic politics of studying a super power (which led American studies in the same
direction). At the same time, some Soviet specialists identified with the country they studied and thereby dismissed
as irrelevant to their research all those little colonies to the west of the Soviet Union . However, these generalizations
are less relevant to contemporary scholarship on Russia and the successor states . Comparative studies, expressed
either as comparison of cases or utilization of comparative theory in singlecase analysis, are now becoming the norm
in post-Soviet studies .
17. This isolation was expressed in marry ways--some of which were imperial . Witness, for example, the pervasive
practice during the cold- war period of western European specialists using the term "Europe" in the titles of their
books, articles, courses and even institutes, when the focus in virtually every case was only on the western half of
Europe. To take another example: it has been common practice for courses surveying comparative politics to be not
just Euro-centric (which is enough of a problem) but also western Euro-centric . This reflected the widespread
assumptions within the discipline of political science that : 1) the only Europe that counted was western Europe and
2) western Europeanises were more scientific and more comparative in their analyses than their counterparts in other
area studies.
18. See Dan Thomas, "Nornis, Politics and Human Rights : The Helsinki Process and the Decline of Communism in
Eastern Europe," Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Cornell University .
19. For an insightful analysis of how international economic pressures prefigured the outbreak of war in the former
Yugoslavia, see Susan L . Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1995) .
20 . This was even true for "deviant" Yugoslavia . See, for example, Vesna Pusic, "Dictatorships with Democratic
Legitimacy : Democracy Versus Nation," East European Politics and Societies 8 (Fall 1994) : 383-401 . Contrary to
Schmitter and Karl, the distinctions between state socialism and other forms of dictatorship did not wither away
when state socialism "softened" (see, for instance, Maria Csanadi, From Where to Where? The Party-State and the
Transformation [Budapest : T-Twins and Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1995]) .
21 . See, especially, Csanadi, From Where to Where . The key article giving rise to the "proto-science" of transitology
(aside from earlier works by Machiavelli, according to Schmitter and Karl) emphasized the importance of historical
context in the process of democratization. See Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics
2 (1970): 337-63 . However, transitologists such as Schmitter and Karl have tended to delete the adjective
"historical" from this argument and concentrated, as a result, simply on current context .
22. This is not to reduce the events of 1989 to the "Gorbachev effect ." Rather it is to argue that the Gorbachev
reforms were a necessary but not suifficient condition for the end of state socialism in eastern Europe . For an
explanation--before the fact-of both the Gorbachev reforms and the collapse of state socialism in eastern Europe, see
Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back : The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc From a Soviet Asset to a Soviet
Liability," International Organization 39 (Winter 1984/1985): 1- 46.
23. See, especially, Robert Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime : Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy,"
World Politics 42 (April 1990) : 422-40.
24. The centrality of state building in postcommunism reflects not just the inextricability of state and regime in state
socialism and thus the powerful effects on the state of the end of communist party hegemony, but also two other
factors : the presence in the region of so many new or newly liberated states and the necessarily powerful
consequences for the state of a transition to capitalism . On the latter point, see No Bicanic, "The Economic Causes
of New State Formation during Transition," East European Politics and Societies 9 (Winter 1995) : 2-21 .
25 . It is true that economic-liberalization and structural- adjustment policies play an important role in the process of
democratization, south as well as east . However, one cannot very easily equate economic reform in Latin America
and southern Europe with economic transformation in the east . This is, first, because the issue in the south is
amending a capitalist economy already in place, whereas the issue in the east (though Hungary provides a valuable
middle case) is construction of a capitalist economy with state socialism--its virtual opposite--serving as the point of
departure. There are, moreover, other key economic differences, all of which place unusual economic burdens on
eastern Europe--for example, the collapse of the Soviet market, the primitive character of eastern European
economies and the difficulties imposed by the process of building new national economies in so marry cases .
26. This is evident, for instance, in some recent reflections on democratization by transitologists (see, for instance,
Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems,[A Latin American View
with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries]," World Development 21 [1993] : 1355-69 ; idem., "Delegative
Democracy?" Working Paper No . 172, Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies, Notre Dame, March 1992 ;
Philippe Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilenunas of Democracy," Journal ofDemocracy 5 [April 1994] : 57-74).
27. My thanks to the remarks made by Gail Lapidus, Shari Cohen, Carol Tinnko, Karen Dawisha, David Ost, Jan
Kubik and Georgii Derlugian at the panel, "Shooting Cautions at the Canons" at the Annual Meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 18 November 1994, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania .
28. See, for example, Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990) : 51-69;
Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-
1991" in Flying Blind, ed. Gyorgy Szoboszlai (Budapest : Yearbook of the Hungarian Political Science Association,
1992) : 99-113 ; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation :
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46 (October 1993): 1-22.
29. If the latter factor were so important, then how do we explain, for instance, the developmental trajectories of,
say, Bulgaria and Romania (with their early settlement of constitutional issues) versus Poland and the Czech
Republic (given their continuing problems with resolution of the piles of the political game)?
30. See, for example, Daniel V . Friedheim, "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory : Pact
Making and Regime Collapse," East European Politics and Societies 7 (Fall 1993): 482-512; and Sidney Tarrow,
"Social Movements and Democratic Development," forthcoming in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, vol.
1, Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandous and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds .
31 . Symptomatic of the pervasiveness of these assumptions has been the tendency of scholars (primarily on the OpEd
page of The New York Times) to pronounce either that Russia has turned the comer on democracy or that
democracy is finished in Russia .
32. A survey of longstanding democracies would seem to suggest that : 1) there is great variety in what constitutes a
democratic political culture ; 2) it is very hard to distinguish between durable beliefs, values and behaviors and more
short-term attitudes and the like ; 3) some democracies feature by some standards a less than democratically minded
public; and 4) the key to democracy might be mass culture but it also might be elite political culture . See, for
example, Putnam, Making Democracy Work .
33 . See, especially, Philippe C . Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," Journal ofDemocracy 5 (April
1994): 57- 74.
34 . See, especially, Guiseppe Di Palma, "Democratic Transitions : Puzzles and Surprises from West to East,"
Research on Democracy and Society 1 (New York: JAI Press, 1993) : 27-50 ; Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the
Lessons of Dictatorship," Comparative Politics 24 (April 1992): 273-91.
35 . See Valerie Bunce, "Sequencing Economic and Political Reforms," East-Central European Economies in
Transition (Washington: Joint Economic Committee, 1994) ; Bela Greskovits, "Is the East Becoming the South'?
Where May Threats to Reforms Come From'?" paper presented at the XVI World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Berlin, 12-15 August 1994 .
36. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State" ; Schmitter and Karl, "The Conceptual Travels" ; Sclunitter, "Dangers
and Dilemmas", Schmitter and Karl, "Modes of Transition" .
37. To this must be added one more point . A major problem in theories of democracy (of older, as well as of more
recent vintage) is that they under-predict the incidence of democratic government . There are in effect too many
democracies, whether our theoretical perspective is that of, say, Seymour Martin Lipset; Barrington Moore; Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens. or Guilleruo O'Donnell, Phillippe Sclunitter and Laurence
Whitehead. This suggests that : 1) our theories of democracy may be over-specified, 2) there may be no single path
to a democratic order, 3) democratization may be best understood in highly vol untaristic ternls and/or 4) democracy
may not be as difficult a project as has been commonly assumed .