.".4 Journal , f •'> o^'Ctil' - has not always been grasped, as a result of which certain constitutions have been tailored in favor of an irremovable "chief," and othew-revised so .-as-to ensure the durability of ihc. regime in power and make : it practically impossible, for power io change hands. Frt this context, the institutionalization- of polisfcal power .means: ensuring tint leaders conform -to regular and - pteextablishcd laws, with no provision tor. changes to sail their persona? whims or dynastic ambitions.-Ttey-anr thus compelled to recognise that ihey are only the representative* of the : nation, and that sowaeigaty is.not something thai belongs so them, The Regional Environment Democratic regimes are frail and cannot long survive jo j bostjk environment In Africa, she regional spread of pluralism amid help to strengthen, ihem by resaiing them from dangerous isolation Political : pluralism may be consolidated all the mote easily when it - extends/ across several adjacent states. It may thus be strengthened by the/ emergence of politically homogeneous areas, initially formed of tt«> or . three democratic stales and subsequently .expanding gradual!) ui ir.ciude sieighboring states. Politicians and activists seeking this geal can draw on the support of international instruments guaranteeing human rights. The universality of human rights does not preclude the setting up of regional triAtriimenis . genuinely aimed at thdi protection. These instruments would be modest to terms of the geographical area they covered, but this would make •-. thera all the more acceptable -to Africans and therefore more effect-v~ :.; The establishment of regional or sub-regional bodies bringkg together pluralistic and one-party regimes could also be contemplated, ftitil u view to persuading the latter • class of governments so- umfertdle the % transition toward democratic pluralism on a step-by-seep basis, / The renewed mteresi in pluralistic democracy that roaf.t Afik.jp • countries are showing marks a turning point in the history of the/-cnrtlment. If they -can achieve it pluralistic democracy will set th„-n oh . the path toward the comprehensive modernization of then pn!r»ic?l -systems and make Item competitive m international terras. At i« 1 > - ' • agénSS, n lie tit accepte: implem ' inr <. fit fand tu us in order ti e r ~ to meet, or unacceptable, for still ofcss. The scope of an insiituiTvn is the degree to which it incorporates and exclades its set of potentials;, relevant agents. 2) Institutions shape the probability distribution of outcome*. As Adam' Pracworski has noted, institutions "process" only certain a dors and resources, and do so under certain rules.4 This predetermine the range of feasible outcomes, and • their likelihood within thai range Democratic institutions, for example, preclude the use or threat of foice and-the outcomes .that this wotak! generate. -On the other Saaad. the subset of democratic institutions based ors the universality of the wile, as Philippe Sehrnifter and Wolfgang Strecck have argued, is 'not good at processing the intensity of preferences.5 Institutions of- inlerest: representation are better at processing the intensity of preferences, although at ihe expense of the universaHsm of -voting and citizenship and, often, of the "{lemocrattcntW of their decision making. 3) /«WB«i«u tend to aggregate, mid to stabilize the aggregation of, the level of action and organization of agents interacting with them. The rules established by institutions influence strategic decisions bj agents as to the degree of aggregation thai is marc efficacious .for them in-terms <>f the likelihood of favorable outcomes. Institutions, or lather the persons wito occupy decision-making roles within them, have- limited information-processing capabilities and attention spans. Consequently, those persons prefer to interact with relatively few agents and issuer at a time* This tendency toward aggregation is another reason for the exclusionary side of every institution. 4) Institutions induce, patterns of representation. For ihe same reasons, institutions favor the transformation at the many .po4e:st.ai voices of their constituencies into a few that can claim to speak as their representatives. Representation involves, on the one hand, the acknowledged right to speak for some relevant others and, on the other, the ability to deliver the compliance of those others wills what Ihe representative decides. Insolar as this capability is demonstrated and the given rules of the game are respected, insolations and their mi torn representatives develop an interest in their mmmi coexistence interacting agents. 5) institutions stabilize agents/representatives and their expectations Institutional leaders and representatives come to expect behaviors w.thiii a relatively narrow range of possibilities front a s*a of" actors that ihe) expect to meet again in the next round of iffletacttOM. Certain aesn:» may not like the nanowing of expected heh-ni L tt t! <, ustfaittt that deviations from such expect »tmr«- i« 1 kd» to be oouJiscrprodiictivc. This is trie point ai i kvh ,1 n i' K. , id »iu jn irtstittitioi) (which probably has become a K rn i mi/ i ii 1 i mg. The institution fs in equilibrium: ii is ja n it "1, s i i' it<-i * i' u*j is, except in incremental and tetcaiW conscji.sua! wav>. HI ■ 6} Institutions fcngtkw the time-horizons of actors. Hie stabilization of agents and ..expectations- -entails' 'a time ditriensron; institutionalized interactions are.expected to continue-into Utc future among the same (or a slowly arid rather-predictably changing) set ofagercis. This, -together with a high level of aggregation of representation and of control of Shear constituencies, as the foundation for the "competitive cooperation" that characterizes iBsftationaiiwd democracies: one-shot prisoner's diteriiroas can -'he tweitwk^-'hargaming; (including logrolling) is fisdtitated, various trade-offs over time becomefeasible, and 'sequential attention to issues makes it possible to accommodate ahotherwise unmanageable agenda, Trie establishment of these practices further strengthen*!, the —willingness of all relevant agents to recognise one .mother as valid interlorators, istad:enhances-the value that they attach to the instttMion that shapes their 'interrelationships; This virtuotis clrcie is completed when most democratic institutions achieve not only reasonable scope and strength but also a high density of rnpliiple '-and1 stabilized interrelationships. This makes these' institutions important points of decision in the overall political process, and a-consolidated, institutionalized - democracy thus emerges. A way u>- summarize -what 1 have said is that, in' Ibe- Tya'cakming of coraemporairy," complex societies, democratic political insiitut sorts provide a crecial level of mcdiafjoii-' aW n^egalicW b<^Ccn, -oh one -side-structural factors and, on the other,'not only individuals bur also the diverse groupings wider'which society organizes its multiple iniea^ts and rtfentriies. This raterttt*sdiate---i:e'.', institutional—level has an important impact on the patterns of organisation of society, hesiow'ing representation upon sorae participants in the political prtsecss and excluding others. Insskutlonalization undeniably entails heavy costs-^aot only exclusion but also the recurring, and all too real, nightmares of buTeausotizaliCtti' and boredom. The alternative, however,: submerges social and political fife in the hell of a 'colossal prisoner's dikmras. This is, of course, asi ideal typical description, bat 1 fmd it uscftil for tracing, by way of contrast, the peculiarities of a situation where there is a dearth of democratic irtsdtbtbns. A noiiinstitutioBaliaied democracy is characterized by the restricted scope, the weakness, and the low density of whatever polities! institutions exist. The place of well-functioning institutions is taken by other unformalized but strongly operative practices—clienieiissti, patrimoniah'Mii, and coiruption. Characterizing Delegativc Democracy IJelegaive democracies rest- 6» the premise that whoever wins election-'to the presidency is thereby entitled !o govern as lie -or she sec* fit. const-rained only .by-taw hard facts of easisrin'g power relations and- by 0 cobsfitutionally liottted term-of office. The president is -taken (if! to be the embodiment of tb« nation and the stiairi .cuypdian and ddnrkr of its interests, .T1» policies of his government need biar no resemblance to the promises' of his campaign—has aot tht president been authorized lo govern as he (or. she) thinks best? Since this pifcmal figure is supposed to sake care of the. whole nation, bis pcijjtictl ba<*. must be a movement, the supposedly vibrant ouwsmne nt the factionalism and conflicts associated . with_ parties, 'ivpicjftv winning ptfesideniial candidates in DDs present. themselves as abo>* buth political parties and oiganized interests. How could it be ofherw is* lor somebody who .claims- to embody the whole of the nation? In ih,s \ie» Other institutions.—cowls and legislatures, for instance—art tmtsanto. that come attached to the domestic; and international advantages i>l bung 4 democratically elected president. Accountability to *>adi msdtituijoiis appears is a mere impediment to the full authority .h it the president has been delegated (o exercise. Delegativc democracy is tkh alien to the democrat!.. i«ji, i« js more, democratic, hut Jess libera!, than representative democracy OD is strongly majoritarian. It consists in constituting, through clean electrons, a majority that empowers someone to become, for a given number of years, tl1e.en1bedHUCiU.at1d interpreter «f the high inter' of the nation Often. DDs use devices such as runoff elections if tht firM Fiiur,d ut elections does nrjt generase a cieat-ew majority.* This riiiordi must he creased to support the myth of legitimate, delegation. I artHtinnre DP is strongly individualistic, but more in a Hohbesian rhm -1 Locks'an way: voters m supposed to choose, irrespective of the r idtrtrtn-s nd affiliations, the rndrvidual who is most fit to lake respi nsuKhty :ot the destiny of the country. Elections in DDs are a very enormia: and 1 lert stakes event: candidates compel for a chance to nd*. etna] \ fr<-^ nl all constraints save those imposed by naked, noninsti ilonihmi r.o*er relations. After the election, votere/deSegators are. cx"tel.J to rrvorru. a passive but cheering iu.idi.cr.ee of what The president does. Kxircme individualism in constituting executive po'. hli) *iUl the orgatiicism of the Leviathan. The- nation ant* 1 <■ iislhentic ' political expression, the leader ami his "Moveroem," »n. pt~,tiL»!ce .is living organisms." The leader has to heal the natit* hi nn • ng its dispersed fragments info a harmonious whole. Since ne 1 \b poluu. > d administering the unpleasant medicines thai will restore la t^d\ '> »il the nation, h'or ibis view, it seems obvious that oolv the Lt, I ir^ 1, iiie.*-!he {^resident and his most misted ^1 f- th ipr* 1 ii rh ni**^' of politics. Furthermore-, some of iK ,i ».J \ L = ill ' km hi trb he soh'cd by highly lechcical crih. i / cs-hu^U ii ve«.r»n poltcy, rtmsl be politically shielded ^ k rrt idt » j_ U « 1 »»t o 1. t<»fa$&nct of iocieiy. hi the 1 1111 1 1 ii n is rjj sv —-h it 1 rn n*, lss f a] u 1 f r t1- mic v I ups 01 \ is t lb str t.—h t3 te t^iu td Th tis?»m cfi £tl 1 1 lv m h tn dv r^mtn ot tre ! thutrifs aji-J *ic Tn\'h of 1 !,rtOi is cs iTtUs, tht j re idi IE i ohtes hanisUt ir rn trie* ( I t eal I tstitutio s :nrj > uam^ec 3 lit es S 1*1 irs s ;le rtspot )biUl\ f h Mio. ssL nil > iiures ot ins po as It >. ui ou. ^lei a 11 or^ tcsk 11 kefm icrwtie ecinefboTis \v r ent ir retell tUJcmcriSi iuib nl n t lejne \lthturn Hie ! t ? (but r t th orsian Lish jueta^hcr } % is dttcreni ih oni-ef ton"; ^ r tKi pa nt in t mrs uriisi rcim s Bn tl ic f 1 ! tit Mlcrtn t eiv\eeii thesi. am s nd DDs In DDs pmse*-I an res <*nd the p ess re uenera! If t i 1 v ict tber Lfihusttv re rres the c irt* imt v,h I th ext :ti\t tep v il dispi ss s <; st s rorrrsih 1 e s it" hixi. iirtonsh utii nJ pt he " Vicrkw s J tpiidists is-, ttitiots rsflta rrp' n Siu^h Th p m { r It ri hit elis th pre Jtmdsi s Vu 1 -h 1 ss (I 1 fpah it\ 1 1 r Ijt p"ili "lLn! tt, >-uj_pcit [01 the p ill scs h is iesislcd D i 11 lh nt * s is 1 dsual isfl n 1 1 she pr tdent his I 1 ill s 11 utin s s '-It e i t iJtiD ni h s pr nLi s s sd {; uok Me rn,p! Hit iont,its *»ni Hber mstt ti iu is Jki t s r ssdr t ti itif u < bl n kes ttprcs"ntit t is 11 a 1 dlu it ni it d I tt! e c*>ism Riprcs am l s rl imn s i kn*.rt >l d I % ti v thro h blc to the balks box, but also horizontally, across a network ot rcJativdy autoaomous powers (i.e., other insiiluiioiK) that can calJ into question, and- eventually psirjish, iniprtsper «faw of dbejiarging the fcspiMisibiiitics of a givers official. Rfpresentation aral itcaniniabitity cniail Ok republican dimension «f dumooacy; the cxistewa; aisd enforcement of a careful distinaios between the pubik and ite private inswests of afltos holdm. VesiicaS accnuntabiliSy, along with the freedom to farm parties a«d to try to iftfleeiic* public opinion, exists in both (epresmuttfw aad deiegativc 'Jcoweracie;;. Bui' the botteottftt accowWabilitj? diatactcriutk' of iej-jteseFitative d«raocr;iicv in eMreit»cly weai or nonexistent in. deiegative ikmocractes. f-urmsrinorc, ■ since ib< iiwtitiitie>, rtnd ■ they have a reasonably good chance of being implemented: moreover. ■ responsibility for mistakes tends to be widely shared. As noted. DD ' implies weak institutionalization and, at best, is indifferent toward strengthening it. DD gives the president the apparent udvHuugi. of ; having practically no horizontal accountability. DD has the additional apparent advantage of allowing swift policy making, but at the expense -of a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, of hazardous- implementation, and of concentrating responsibility for the outcomes on she president Not surprisingly, presidents in DDs tend In suffer wild swings in popularity: one day they arc acclaimed as providential saviors, and the next they are cursed as only fallen gods ran be. Whether it is due to culture, tradition, or historically-strait ifeti learning, the plebiscitary tendencies of dcle-gative- deraoem) nt.' detectable in most Ustin American (and, for that matter, rtjaut posl-cornni»P}st. Asian, and Airican) countries long before the present social and economic crisis. This kind of rule has been analyzed as « chapter in the study of authoritarianism, under such names as eacsansm, bonapartism, tuudifUsmo, populism, and the like. But « should ako he seen as a peculiar type of democracy that overlaps with awl dttiers from those authoritarian forms in interesting ways. Even if DD belong-to the democratic genus, however, it could hardly hu less congenial to Ehe building and strengthening of democratic political iiWituiioits. Comparisons with the Past The «c great wave ot uemoi.Tatij;atJc>n. .-wr tt hi i wC arc witnessing occurred after World War H.} w m}«»ilif f i y the Alfieí mm mm im powers on defeated Germany, Italy, Japan, and to some extent Austria. The resulting conditions were remarkably different from the ones faced today by. laittr .America and the. .postcornsnmhtf -cerontries: 1) En -the •,va!ic of the destruction wrought by the war. the economic expectations of lite people probably were very moderate. 2). There v»ere massive injections of capital, principally.but not exclusively (e.g., the forgiving of Germany's foreign debt) through the- Marshall Plan. 3) As a consequence, and helped by an expanding world economy, the former Axis powers soon achieved rapid tales .of economic growth. These were nos the only factors at .work, but they greatly aided ia the consolidation of democracy in those countries. Furthermore, these same factors contributed - to political stability and to síítbie public policy coalitions: •;i took about. 20 years for a change of the governing party in Germany, and the dominant parties in Italy and Japan held sway for nearly half :i ceniuiy, In contrast, in the transitions of the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting the much less congenial context in which tbe-y occurred, victory in the first election after the demise of she authoritarian regime guaranteed that the winning, party would be defeated, if not virtually disappear,-in the next election.- This happened in Spain, Portugal. Greece, Argentina, .Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru.. Uruguay, Korea, and the .Philippines. Out this pattern appears.-together with important variations in the social and economic performance of the new governments. Mosi of-these countries inherited serious socfoeeononiie. difficulties from the preceding authoritarian regimes, and were severely affected by the worldwide ceniiomic troubles of the 1970» and early WSOs. lis all of them, the socioeconomic problems af some point reached crisis proportions and »cre heea to require decisive govemraeni action. Yet however serious the economic problems of flic i')70s in Southern Europe may have been, they appear mild when compared to those, besetting the newly democratized postcoromuBisf arid L-aiift Amesicin countries (with Chile as a partial exception). Very high inflation, economic stagnation, a .wvcre financial crisis of she state, a huge foreign and domestic pttblie debt, increased inequality, and a sharp deterioration of social policies mu welfare provisions are all aspects of this crisis. Again, however, important differences emerge among the Udin American countries. During its first democratic govemntenl under Presides Sanguine Hi, the Uruguayan economy performed quite weli: the ■imvsá rate of inflation dropped from three to two digits, while GNP, investment, and real wages registered gradeaJ increases. The government pursued iiKremeisigl economic, policies, most of ihem negotiated with congress and various orgajri/ed interests. ChiEe antler President Aylwin has followed the same path. By cnturast. Argentina, Bw.il, and Peru opted for drastic; and niiprising economic starst'li/aboa- "packages'": the Austral í'lŕän, in Argentína, the iZw/.sxéo Mania BfukI, and the lr»i Plan in Peru. Bolivia!, too, adopted this kind of stabitíxation oackape in the r980s-: Although this program—closer than the prtvu uslv. mentioned ' ones to the prcseriptioas of the international' financial organizations, -has been praised for its success in controlling inflation, GNP nud mv eMmeat growth remain anemic. Moteover, the brutality with which, worker; proteste' against the program were suppressed ts.jri.lv qu.Oifics as democratic. These-"packages" have been disastrous. They- did mil solve am in the inherited problems; rather, it is difficult to find a single uni. that ; they did not worsen. Disagreement lingers about whethw these ptogMms) were intrinsically flawed, or-suffered from corrigible delects, or were i sound bu! undone by "exogenous" political factors. JJmvotr th,4 may; be, it is dear thai the experience of these failures icitiUirecd the decision by the democratic leaders of Chile to avoid this ruinous toad, " This makes Uruguay—a country that inherited from '-11 .luihonknian regime a situating (hat was every hit as bad as Asgvnlm.i y or; Brazil's—a very interesting case. Why did the Urupunan government ?. not adopt its own stabilization package, especially durum the euph«ti»:; that followed the first stages of the Austral and she Cimm*. ~0.ns% Was ; it because President Sangtitnctti and his collaborators were wiser---or';. belter informed than, their Argentinean, Bra/Jlim, md fVrunun l:: counterparts? Probably not, The difference is that Uruguay is. a case .of I retkmaemtbatien, where Congress went to work eftei.mdi as "-n m ,re \ democracy was restored. Facing a strongly institutionalized legislature..; and si series of (^institutional restrictions and hisiorindh tmbedded * practices, no Uruguayan president could have gotui .ivwív wdh'.'.'i decreeing a drastic stabilization package, tn Uruguay, tor :he .nutm nt::} of many of the policies typically contained in tShi'^e pack-iet- 'he:.: president must go through Congress. I-'urihermo't pijig t! tough : Congress means having to negotiate not only vntn pm> V"-it-r <->?— it xl.'; I've democracy-—Argentina, Brazil, ;íi"ti < rj i*- r i r i i• r. to ln,i it depth of the crista, thai these eiuuitnei inherited- I row i'u-'i rcsfr •!),„ authoritnrian regimes. Such-a crisis generates a, strong .sense of urgency and provides fertile-terrain-for unleashing she ddegative propensities that way be present in a given country. Problems and demands mount up before inexperienced governments that must operate through a weak and disarticulated (if not disloyal) bureaucracy. Presidents gel elected hy promising ttet they—being strong, courageous, above patties and interests, machos—-will save the country. Theirs is a "government of saviors" (ialvadares de fa /w/rar), This leads to a "magical" -style of policy making: the deiegjuiive "mandate" supposedly bestowed by the majority, strong political wtH, and technical knowledge- should suffice to fulfill the savior's mission—the '"packages" follow as a corollary. Toe toDgcr. and deeper the crisis, and the less the confidence that the £overmnent will he able to-solve it, the more rational it becomes for everyone to act: 1) in a highly disaggregated ---manner, e&pecially in mlaticw to stale agencies that may. help to alleviate, the cottscquesnces of the csisss for a given group or sector (thus. further weakening and corrupting the state -apparatus); 2) with extremely short Jime-horfeons; and 3) wkh she assomplion that everyone else will do the same: In short, there is a general scramble for narrow, short-term advantage. This prisoner's dilemma is the exact opposite of the conditions that foster both strong democratic -institutions. and .reasonably effective ways of dealing with pressing national problems. Once the initial hopes are dashed and She first packages have foiled, cynicism about politics, politicians, and government becomes the pervading mood, if such governments vvish to retain some popular support, they must both control' inftetioa' and implement social policies which show that, even though they cannot rapidly solve most of the underlying- problems, they do care abo»t the fate of the poor and {politically mote important) of the recently impoverished segments of the middle class. Bat minimal though 'it may be, ihis is a very tali order. These two gmU are extremely difficult to harmontze. at least us tie short run—and for sbcIi flimsy govcraraeBrs little other than the short ran counts. Governments like to enjoy sustained popular .support, and politicians want to se reelected. Only if the predicaments described above were solvable within the brief compass of a presidential, term would electoral success be a trhimpn iastcmf of a euise. Bow does one win election' .•Mid" bow. juice elceted. dce> one govern in this type of sitnation"? Owi'c ohviouKlv—and most riestructrvely in icrms of the building of public tfust thfct helps ti (temomcy to eucs,s!ii»ate—hy saying one thing during 8»e campaigtt 'and doing- the contrary when in office. Of course, t'%6:ifttiio!!a!tee»1 democracies arc not immune to this trick, but the ci>ííS.eí|uences are more devastating wbe?. there iftKtitutioas and a deep socioeconbtnie aisis afflicts the ooumry. Presidents have gaiRci elecuoa.-in <\tgenttna. liolivja, Ecuador, and Peru <.■■-> JewKal a) /Awswiki by promising expansions! economic polities and many other gnoo things to come with them, only to enact severe stabilization packages jnimcdfetdy or shortly after .entering, office. Whatever ihc merits of such . policies for a given country at a given time, their surprise adoption docs nothing lo promote public trust, particularly if their immediate and most visible impact farther depresses the already low standard of living-of.--most of the papulation. Moreover, the virtual exclusion of panics imd congress from socii momentous decisions has several malign consequences. First, when the--executive finally, and inevifaWy, needs legislative support,.he is bound , to find a congress that is. resentful and. feels no responsibility for policies it had no hand in. making. Second, the congress, is further weakened hy its own hostile ami aloof attitude, combined with the . executive's public condemnations -of its slowness and "irresponsibility." , Third, these squabbles promote ;t sharp decline in the prestige t.i nU parties and politicians, as opinion polls from many Latin American and ; postcomwttnist countrics abundantly show. Finally, the resulting . instiiwionai weakness makes, h ever more rtifftcuil 1" achieve the other magical solution when the packages fail: the socioeconomic pact, From Omnipotence to Impotence 11' we consider thai the logic of delegation also means that She executive docs noshing to strengthen the judiciary, the nssujting .deartii of effective-and. autonomous institutions places immense responsibility . oil the president. Remember that the typical incumbent in a. DD hav won election by promising to save the country without much cost to anyone, yes soon gambles the fete of his government on policies that entail substantial costs for many parts of the population. This results in policy making under conditions of despair: the shift from wide popularity to general vilification ears be as rapid as it is - dramatic. '.Ih. result is a curious mixture of governmental omnipotence and impotenpe.' Omnipotence begins with the spectacular enactment of the Una policy packages and comiuues wish a flurry of decisions aimed at complementing those packages and, unavoidably, correcting their numerous unwanted consequences. This accentuates the :«Mi-instttutionu! bias of Dt>s ami ratifies traditions of high personaSiKstion uv-conccntnuiOB of power in the executive. The other side of the coin extreme weakness i« making those decisions into effective long-term regulations of societal hfe. As noted above, institutionalized democracies are slow at mating decisions. But once those decisions arc made, they arc relatively more likely to be impteme«tes. iit contrast, we witness a decision-making frenzy, what in Latin America »v cati de.rretismo. Bu'ca-.'se Mich hasty, unilateral executive orders - are likely to uffcnd important and politically mobilized, interests, they are unlikely to be implemented. Jo- the- midst of a severe crisis and increasing-popular unpasieace, the upshot is usually new flurries of decisions; which, because of the experience many, sectors have had in resisting the pievious ones; arc even less likely to be iropfcmemed. Furthermore, because of the way those decisions are- made, most political, social, and economic agents can disclaim responsibility. Power was delegated-to-the president, itnil he did what.he deemed best. As failures accumulate., She country finds itself stock with.a widely reviled president whose goal is just to hang on until the end of his' term, lite resulting period of passivity--and disarray of public policy does nothing to help the .situation :>f she country. Given this scenario, the '"natural" outcome in Latin America iri the past would have been a successful coup,d'etat. Clearly, DDs,-.because of then institutional weaknesses ..-and ertatic pattern* of policy making, are more prone to interruption and breakdown ihan representative democracies. At the moment, however---for reasons mostly linked.to the international cotaext, which 1 cannot discuss -here—DDs exhibit .a rather remarkable capacity for endurance. With the partial exception of Peru, where the -constitutional -breakdown was ted by its delcgatSve president, no successful coups d'etat have take*? place; The economic policy 'widenaketi ..by DDs-is not always-.condemned it.) be widely perceived as a failure.' particuiairly in the aftermath erf hyperinflation or long periods.of extremely high inflation..14. This is-the case in Argentina today under President.Menem, although it is not clear how sustainable the improved economic situation is. But such economic -scirievemeriEs, as well as the more short-lived oties 5f Colku (Brazil), Alfonsfn (Argentina), and Garcia (Peru) at the height of the. apparent successes of their economic packages, can lead a president to givcrthe ultimate proof of the existence, of a delegalve democracy. As long as itiesi policies are recognized as successful by eJectorally weighty segments of the papulation, delegntive presidents find it simply abhorrent that their terms should be constitatioaally limited; how could these "formal limitations" preclude the continuation of their providential mission'' Consequently, they promote—by means that further weaken whaever horizontal accountability still exists—constitutional reforans Hat woeid allow their reelection or, failing this, their continuation at the apex of government as prime miaistcr* iri a parlimtentar) regime- Oddly ewmah, successful deiegative presidents, at least while they believe they aie successful, may become- proponents of some form of paritameittarisis. In sntwas!, this kind of maneuver was out of the question in the caves of the q»fte .successful President Sanguinctti of Urugtiay and the very successful President AyKvit* of Chile, however much they niigh; have Hkcti to contione. in power. Again, we find a crucial difference- between representative and delegativc democracy.'' As noted, among the recently democratized countries of Latin-: America only Uruguay and Chile, as soon- as-they redemocrauacrj. revived earlier political itumtwiotis that the other J-aJin Arner.Ldn. countries (as welt as mos! pustconuntmlsl ones) lack. 'Hits Is iht rub:: effective institutions and congenial practices cannot be built in a .ia\ As consolidated democracies stow, the emergence, .strengthening, and;-; !egs!irn;Hiofi of these practices and institutions take time, during' winch-:-a complex process of positive learning occurs. On the other h.mc!. So : deal effectively with the tremendous economic and-social crists fcvtd'• by most newly democratized countries would require that such? institutions already be in place, Yet the. crisis itself severely hinders she ■ arduous task of insritwionaMwttwfi. This is, she: drama of countries bereft of a democratic tradiinin Ukt' ail emerging democracies, past and present, they must cope *i'b the? matiifoid negative legacies of their authoritarian past, white wr-estssrsp with the kind of extraordinarily rvw social and -economic prtrtlems.1-that few if any of the older democracies fsceii ai their inception. Although' this essay fins been confined largely 'to a typulofen-.il ; exercise I believe that there is some value in identifying a new species, especially since in some crucial dimensions it does not behave as other-'' types of democracy do. Elsewhere 1 have further elaborated jn mr. relationship between DDs and socioeconomic crisis and on related \ theoretical issues,'" and I inicnd to present more contprehcnsiM.- urns'-in the future. Here 1 can only add that an optimist viewing the-cvcles.,-1 have-described would find that they possess-a degree .of predictability, thus supplying sonic growtd on which longer-term perspectives con o V built. Such a view, however, begs the question of how long tb„ biK of the population will be willing to play Ibis son of game.. Another optimistic scenario would have a decisive segment of the political leadership recognizing the self-destntclivc quality of those cycles, and agreeing to change the terms on which they compete and govt'r i ns seems to me practically the only way out of the problem, but the obstacles lo such a roundabout bm ultimately happy outcome- are mairv. NOTES r i \ K J r j i iii! J i I tr ] t J it I f. ftsrv Uim KMl ar to t 1 I / r f >- r Ij ) «; I 1 S If „ , 1 I t r hit 1 j I tr. i 11 t i r Ji n r i I r t>rwiiily Press, SSS>. l.araw funhw Uitli-Bettnas concemuig v«tivn, c>»r«aoisli» ut ««j*v*«*ks » recent japer witiltei "Cm fbs State, DeihiKtartastinn ami &*iw Oweeptial PM*«ws tA tatm Anit'itew' Vfc* wjtfc Gto«tt a Some P(»-!-C«am.sfiisi Comma), '.ibrlrf Dvxhpmifr.lS\ (I'm* 1355-63 (a!s> puWishetf as Kellogj iBStane-Woriciag Paper Jso. !'*Z (April WW). 3. P• ""Itansiiioms, CniHtmi&icK anu PiuatoM*" in Scuff Mmnarariag, Gisilmfio-Ofnitnclt, mil J. Samuel Valtnanrla, ert>., {\iwpxrMt-^ ^r^pcah'tr {KMTC Darra.'. l&i&ui.i:- UnlvcFsisy N<.trc. Dsrftg Press, 1^9-;. 17-56 Attam f^q^-d^kL ~DeEKiCTK-¥ iis 3 Coatins»e-rU OsiWirsc at' Onflict^." *r. J^ms lister u;td RyrTK- St?.g.stsd, csis., Gv&^ifttffwtfjfem f«?v/ Democracy IC;tmblif%£: Cambridge Univwsiiy frisss. 1983), .W-«0. \. Hjj»). 5>lt-">. ««1 li..lifp- t. S-hn..ttc. C.um-rai,. MjA... i(, .l-^tJ Tiic P pr| t t I t ns \ r f WjisBins .Snrn-lt :t;ii5 Pndipjxi c. sehwuitF. ak >. I n s s. H \ f 1 s i I S*s Jam t a J if Fofm ,\ N 1 Tt F in \ r 1 n ( n II ^cril-i inyat Ives ba t t n r- u 1 c t r clhdcss pr t f m iT^SjVi^lVC 6i 1 it th r J t ^ r lit iavcifliftis tSat save jo n» k ArTturtj ^ ! 1 1 r ^ h n 1 1 t. Peru H I "i f s r Ail-.-:. 5i1s5 d t i p r C i.f "HI i!i<.-:> i^l L.J lie' Ainerkaii wwiiw. See b Eftni. sis. ai*i Soriirt A rt rr L i i mh \ Tl t P i s Hu t i I!>;; iflC^-- thtrStK 1 rn 1 1 -fsfams,-- «lt) ftsrSatr caianna. r 1 t t r i f rJ it t n it or nr. tferir'CuTi^i:^^.'!^^'^. i..^h j«ia:ft)is Bowcwar. if dul^^fis lit p:i^!S!T5t!ri!llJV SVS3CI^;: CitU t. Own or.es dMtissrt h« d be ialhe 1 I I