The Contingent Nature of Democracy
Promotion
Scott Walker
University of Canterbury, New Zealand
The set of works reviewed here suggest that the problems inherent in post-Cold War democracy promotion cannot
be explained solely by policy failures. Attempts to push for democracy have been met with resistance, whether in
response to the imposition of democracy or to ‘softer’ approaches. Collectively, the research in these volumes suggests
that if democratization efforts are to succeed, those who hope to promote them must be more reflective about their
own role in the process and cognizant of the fact that democracy promotion efforts are subject to political forces
at the domestic, global and intermestic levels.
Bridoux, J. (2011) American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction: Comparing Japan and Iraq. Abingdon: Routledge.
Burnell, P. and Schlumberger, O. (eds) (2012) International Politics and National Political Regimes: Promoting Democracy:
Promoting Autocracy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Zanotti, L. (2011) Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold
War Era. University Park PA: Penn State University Press.
Keywords: democracy;democracy promotion;peacekeeping;post-conflict reconstruction
During the period immediately following the end of the Cold War, optimism about
prospects for the advancement of global democracy reached a high-water mark. In the
1990s, Nils Petter Gleditsch described a collective sense in the field of international
relations that the world was entering a ‘liberal moment’ centered on three liberal bastions:
democracy, trade and international organization (Gleditsch, 2007, p. 691).The 1990s will
always be known for Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992),
which helped pave the way for a bevy of academic articles and books on the topics of
democracy and capitalism. Much of the language of the time referred to the idea of newly
democratizing countries as being in the midst of some sort of ‘transitional’ period,
referring to the fact that these polities appeared to be destined for some sort of
democratic, capitalistic end point.While democratic consolidation was not seen as inevitable,
many of the weaknesses we have seen with democracy promotion strategies
themselves were not foreseen. Democracy proponents held high hopes for the possibility
of promoting regime change – either via direct force or by ‘soft’ means such as aid,
sanctions, trade and support for democracy NGOs.
Fast forward more than twenty years. We have, both practically and academically
speaking, moved on quite a bit from Gleditsch’s ‘liberal moment’, and it is clear that a
good deal of resistance has emerged – much of it from unexpected sources. By the same
token, a good deal of learning has also occurred, and democracy scholars have had time
to reflect on the events of the past twenty-plus years. Our understanding of democratization
processes during the 1990s was heavily influenced by the recent successes of
southern Europe and Latin America as well as the early evidence from a number of
POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW: 2015 VOL 13, 2–10
doi: 10.1111/1478-9302.12032
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post-communist ‘transitions’. By 2013, however, we have seen a broad range of countries
attempting democratic transitions – everything from Color and Jasmine revolutions to
stable transitions in Mexico and Taiwan. As a result, democratization scholars are much
more conscious that democratization is not a linear or uniform process.The fact that two
countries take a first step toward democratization does not necessarily mean that they will
end up in a similar place in the long term.
Promoting democracy in countries unfamiliar with it is certainly proving to be
challenging. But to complicate matters, alternatives to American- or Western Europeanstyle
(or styled) liberal democracies are springing up – from China and Russia to Latin
America.Apparently, the End of History has not arrived yet. Even Fukuyama has recently
established a ‘Governance Project’, operating with the underlying rationale that ‘democracy
is not always a necessary ingredient for good governance and in some cases
authoritarian countries govern more effectively than their democratic counterparts’.1
The three books reviewed all focus on the difficulties of promoting democracy, and each
one examines a different variant of that strategy, namely, ‘soft’ democracy promotion,
peacekeeping efforts and reconstruction after direct military intervention. Each work sheds
light on the question of why so many attempts to push for democracy from the outside
seem to fail, stall or even reverse.The reality is that democratization is a contingent process,
subject to power relations at different levels – the global, the domestic and intermestic (the
intersection of international politics and the domestic politics of the target country). All
three volumes remind us that because of their inherently political nature, democracy
promotion attempts can take on a life of their own and have consequences that are not
foreseen in advance. Thus it is unrealistic to predict success at the onset of democracy
promotion efforts. However, it is important to be aware that the outcome of these attempts
will inevitably be different from what was anticipated at the outset.
Successful Post-war Reconstruction Must Account for
the Contemporary Global Power Structure
In American Foreign Policy and Postwar Reconstruction (2011) Jeff Bridoux illustrates that
military intervention and reconstruction strategies must take the global configuration of
power into consideration if they are to be successful in the long term. Using two cases of
a particular democratization strategy, the American effort to install a post-war liberal
democratic order via military occupation, Bridoux contrasts the successful reconstruction
of Japan after the Second World War with the not-yet-successful case of Iraq after the Iraq
War.
In Gramscian terms, the problématique such occupiers face is ‘how to reconstruct the
hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group, an apparatus which disintegrated as a result of
the war’ (Bridoux, 2011, p. 85). More than a series of technical steps to install a new
regime, nation building in the Gramscian sense involves the creation of a new political
and social system that reflects the interests of the dominant power. Success or failure in
post-war reconstruction thus largely hinges upon, first, whether the occupying actor can
use a proper ‘mix of coercive and consensual instruments of power’ and, second, ‘the
efficiency of the ideological message intended to generate consent to the new order’
(p. 68).
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Bridoux argues that US policy managed to achieve a workable balance between
coercion and consensus in the case of post-war Japan. An important key to this success
was the establishment of a capitalist and democratic historical bloc that led to a state
structure capable of maintaining a stable polity over the long run. Creating this structure
involved successfully accomplishing two tasks: the purging of many existing elements and
the subsequent installation of many new ones.The Japanese were forced to reject war as
an instrument of policy, and militaristic elements of the society were purged.The zaibatsu
were also destroyed and the Japanese economy was forced to open up, to be replaced with
something externally like a capitalist,American model, with an ideology that would fit in
with (if not be identical to) the American one.
However, post-war Japan was also notable for some of the features that were maintained.
In fact, Bridoux argues, the pre-existing state structure was also left reasonably
intact, which helps to explain the high level of continuity and stability that was exhibited
by the newly reconstructed Japanese state.
In the case of Iraq, Bridoux argues, the United States relied so much on coercion that
it left little room for developing consensus among elites, leaving it short of its goal of
establishing a neo-liberal historical bloc. He agrees that, given the ideological nature of the
Hussein regime, a high degree of initial coercion was justified (p. 99). However, as the
United States attempted to cleanse remnants of Saddam’s allies, it eliminated members of
the Ba’athist Party – which included many of the very individuals most likely to have the
skills to govern the new Iraq (p. 96).The subsequent fragmentation of power meant that
the structure of the new Iraqi regime would not allow for the provision of greater
security and stability (p. 108). Because of the lack of security and ability to manage the
economy (particularly the crucial oil production sector), the economy failed to provide
basic outputs for its citizens, which further damaged legitimacy. The US thus had to
divert valuable resources toward fighting the growing insurgency rather than to help the
new Iraqi government to deliver material outputs and economic performance.This put a
further strain on the legitimacy of the newly imposed regime.
Bridoux’s commentary thus suggests that powerful states must consider the current
global political context during reconstruction efforts. Awareness that states are coercive
entities that need to develop some sort of internal domestic consensus (what he calls
‘political society’) was almost completely absent during much of the Iraqi occupation,
although Bridoux points out that domestic politics has belatedly received some attention.
It follows from Bridoux’s argument that consensus generation which builds on domestic
elements that can fit in with the global power structure is essential for successful
reconstruction.
One wonders whether it is necessary to invoke Gramsci in order to underscore the fact
that the US intervention in Japan occurred under more propitious global conditions,
in a less coercive manner, and in a way that better suited the long-term geopolitical
interests of the United States and its allies than did the Iraq intervention. The fragmentation
of the Iraqi government and the resulting policy dysfunction that resulted from
de-Ba’athification policies is not a novel finding (see Diamond, 2004).
In addition, instead of offering just two cases from different time periods, Bridoux
might have selected from a number of more current cases of intervention. He claims that
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no two cases are directly comparable due to different global political and social conditions.
While he is of course correct, if Gramscian analyses are indeed so valuable, why
should we not look for more recent (and thus potentially more relevant) cases? A useful
counter-example in which coercion and consensus were used to good effect in a more
recent case (if there is such a case) would be more relevant to those studying democracy
promotion in the current context.
And it is difficult to say exactly how practical Bridoux’s work is. Is it possible for
powerful liberal actors or coalitions to possess the foresight to know that it is not wise to
intervene in the first place because there is little hope of achieving the proper mix of
coercion and consensus? Can they ultimately know when they should intervene and
when they should refrain from doing so, and exactly how a powerful state should balance
coercion and consensus in a given situation, given that each situation is unique? No
potential target of intervention in the near future is likely to be nearly as prepared for
being part of a new capitalist and democratic historical bloc as Japan was in 1945. For
instance, Japanese criminal codes and economic structures were much easier to reform
into a Western-style model than was the case in Iraq (or Afghanistan, for that matter). So
which potential cases would be promising examples of future intervention?
Analyzing the course of events in hindsight is easy, but is Bridoux’s analytical approach
capable of predicting whether future interventions will succeed? He argues that Iraq has
gradually found a better balance of coercion and consensus since the initiation in 2007 of
the New Way Forward program, which focuses on stability and basic service provision as
well as installing greater cohesiveness and coercive power for the state. Bridoux claims that
‘the prospect for a peaceful Iraq is ... gradually appearing’ (Bridoux, 2011, p. 186).Yet with
the luxury of a few years of hindsight, one might question whether this new strategy has
really had a significant impact on the country’s prospects for stability.
Peacekeeping Missions Need to be Aware of Political Interactions
between the Internal and External
Laura Zanotti also addresses the issue of reforming institutions after conflicts, but her
focus is on UN peacekeeping and reconstruction in the post-Cold War period (Governing
Disorder, 2011). Like Bridoux, Zinotti is aware that domestic power structures interact
with external forces. Her focus is on the intermestic relationship, that is, the interaction
between the domestic politics of the target country and the international community.
Zanotti claims that during earlier eras the goal of such peacekeeping missions was to
slay the authoritarian monster and replace it with a non-threatening one. However,
borrowing from Foucault’s analysis of the French penal system in the nineteenth century,
she argues that the triumph of liberal ideals in recent decades means that intervening
powers now see themselves as being responsible for rehabilitating or ‘normalizing’ the
monster rather than killing it.This correctional approach is designed to turn ‘rogue’ states
into entities that can ‘develop the capacity and assume the responsibility for governing
disorder within their borderlands and behave as productive and predictable actors of the
international community’ (Zanotti, 2011, p. 24).
Beginning with Kofi Annan in the 1990s, UN efforts to promote democracy and
human rights have relied on ‘good governance’ policies, which result in a continuing cycle
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of monitoring and reforming the monster rather than in a clear end point for the
intervention. The very fact that such policies of ‘governmentality’ are not structured to
have end points is one of the major causes of so much resistance to UN reforming
missions inside the state being rehabilitated, according to Zanotti.
Zanotti also illustrates how this rehabilitation strategy has bred resistance on the part of
domestic actors in post-conflict societies. She chooses two cases of UN intervention that
she has witnessed first-hand: the American occupation of Haiti (1994–5) in the aftermath
of Operation Uphold Democracy,and efforts to‘pacify and Europeanize’Croatia from 1996
to 2003 (p. 23). She argues that the ‘disciplinarity’ at the heart of these rehabilitation efforts
seems destined to result in resistance by the governments they are designed to reform.
In the cases of both Haiti and Croatia, Zanotti argues that resistance developed due to
the fact that local governments chafed at the post-Cold War strategy of ‘normalizing’
rogue regimes in the post-conflict stage. Attempts to impose rationality and neo-liberal
structures on ‘non-western’ targets are based on three ‘normalizing’ functions:
disciplinarity (‘mechanisms of control, reward, and punishment’), governmentalization
(‘the establishment of standardized ... rules of behavior for national governments’) and
biopolitics (‘the increasing focus of international organizations on populations both as a
subject of government and knowledge’) (p. 142). These three mechanisms of control,
which are reminiscent of those used in modern prisons, lead to ‘resistance and unintended
consequences’ (p. 142). In the case of Haiti, such attempts foundered, as these forms of
control are not well suited to cases of extreme poverty because they foster ‘disaggregation
of the state’ (p. 143). And in the case of Croatia, control mechanisms led not only to
resistance from the state, but also to the unintended consequence of oppression of the
Serb minority as part of an attempt to ‘disrupt the international agenda’ (p. 138).
Resistance is thus not necessarily an act of liberation, but a contingent factor capable of
delivering both ‘benign’ and ‘malignant’ effects (p. 144). Likewise, Zanotti does not believe
that we can predict the outcome of this interaction between the forces of ‘normalizing’
actors on the one hand and resistance on the other.Such outcomes are not overdetermined,
but are ‘contingent, negotiated, and always part of a continuing process’ (p. 146).
If one is looking to Zanotti for a definitive answer about alternatives to the policies of
disciplinarity, one is bound to be disappointed.The fact that the author has a good deal
of first-hand experience with each of the two cases of intervention is all the more
disheartening to those who might be expecting a ready policy prescription to arise from
Governing Disorder. What is potentially useful, in Zanotti’s own words, is her attempt to
dissect empirical cases of peacekeeping in order to understand ‘the modalities and effects
of a liberal rationality of government in the context of peacekeeping’ (p. 146). However,
while the author offers insights into how post-conflict peacekeeping efforts can operate
under different circumstances, it is ultimately up to policy makers themselves to draw any
ultimate conclusions about her study.
Democracy Promotion Must Overcome System-Level Forces as Well
as Domestic Ones
International Politics and National Political Regimes: Promoting Democracy: Promoting Autocracy,
edited by Peter Burnell and Oliver Schlumberger, makes clear that the challenge to
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democracy promotion extends beyond overcoming technical difficulties and containing
potential backlash to efforts by pro-liberalization forces. Successful democracy promotion
depends not only on understanding domestic political factors of the target country. It is
also necessary to appreciate the powerful yet under-researched role that global political
factors may play in determining possibilities for success.
In the lead essay, Burnell and Schlumberger argue that existing scholarship has not
satisfactorily addressed the role of international politics, which they believe includes both
international democracy promotion efforts and other ‘unintended’ factors such as mass
communication, migration or social networks (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2012, p. 5).The
authors also focus on the rise of a new set of challenges in the form of non- or
semi-democratic regimes.
Nicole J. Jackson argues that one of the key reasons why proponents of democracy
promotion have experienced so many disappointing setbacks is that their expectations
were often based on a ‘preconceived euphoria of wishful thinking’ about the supposedly
progressive nature of democratization (p. 102). A major weakness among social scientists
studying democratization processes, according to Jackson, is our reliance on our current
set of labels (‘pseudo-democracies, illiberal democracies, arbitrary autocracies, electoral
authoritarian states, competitive authoritarian states, delegative democracies, defective
democracies’) which may reflect preconceived notions of what we believe should happen
in the future (p. 102). Using the example of Russia’s political influence in Central Asia,
Jackson shows that many of the tools of democracy promotion – diffusion of norms and
ideas, the exercise of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, and the use of regional organizations – can
be used by illiberal states as well as liberal ones (p. 101). Challengers are also able to take
advantage of the post-9/11 backlash and the fact that many Western democratization
efforts have not been tailored to the specifics of local cultures (p. 114).
But surely these autocratic or semi-democratic challengers must struggle to achieve the
type of legitimacy that Robert Dahl suggests democracy can deliver via its ‘desirable
consequences’: economic prosperity, human development, political equality and general
freedom, to name a few (Dahl, 2000, p. 45). Dahl argues: ‘With all these advantages,
democracy is, for most of us, a far better gamble than any alternative available to it’ (Dahl,
2000, p. 61). André Gerrits argues, however, that legitimacy is actually a rather ‘thin’
concept, rooted much more in regime performance and less in depth of civil society than
most democracy scholars have been willing to admit:‘Economic performance and stability
... are not merely “distractions” from the lack of political legitimacy – they actually meet
citizens’ demands for national “recognition and respect” that can be received through
Russia being perceived as a “strong state” ’ (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2012, p. 39).
While there is strong public support for democracy in Russia, all things being equal,
opinion polls suggest that citizens are willing to tolerate a good deal of suppression of
human rights in return for stability (p. 41). Gerrits argues that leaders of illiberal
democracies are able to gain legitimacy in part because democratic actors within the
country are actually quite unpopular with the public. His point that democracy promotion
efforts need to focus on the legitimacy that semi-democratic regimes have managed
to amass, as well as on the development of democratic legitimacy, is one that both scholars
and practitioners would be wise to heed (p. 43).
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Perhaps the timeliest chapter in the volume is the one by Julia Leininger, who argues
that democracy assistance in ‘aid dependent states’ is flawed due to the political nature
of the process. Using the cases of Mali and Haiti (both of which have been highly aid
dependent on the international community for many years), Leininger posits that
democratic assistance is not residual or ‘external’ to the path that democratization takes.
In fact, the nature of democracy in the two countries is inextricably intertwined with
the politics surrounding democracy assistance. In the case of Mali, which until recently
was seen as one of the poster children for democracy in Africa and in the Muslim
world, the recently deposed regime never really emerged from the shadow of international
institutions (p. 67). Leininger points out that, despite the fact that the government
was seen to be both autonomous and democratic, budgetary planning in Mali was
contingent on perpetual negotiations between the government and the European
Union. Negotiations were thus an ‘informal precondition’ that resulted from Mali’s ‘high
aid dependency’ (p. 68). As a result, Mali never developed the capacity to handle its own
elections, finding it necessary to ‘reinvent’ its electoral institutions just a short time
before each election.
Leininger points to the fact that the politics of EU and UN democracy assistance in
Haiti frequently overshadowed domestic political processes. Overwhelming pressure for
success led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the first UN
peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) to work separately rather than to coordinate efforts
on civilian affairs. She argues that the UN created parallel institutions that bypassed
existing Haitian ones, offering the example of a UN entity designed to channel aid that
bypassed an analogous institution within the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (p. 70).
The provisional and tenuous form of governance that resulted partially as a result of
decisions by the international community may indeed help to explain the ultimate failure
of democratic regimes to gain legitimacy in Haiti and Mali.
Leininger would do well to offer more illustrations of how the democracy assistance
process actually played out in both countries. She offers generalities such as ‘the continuous
presence of international donors [in Mali] ... creates informal and long-lasting
networks’ (p. 68) and ‘there were organizational failures [in Haiti] that could have been
prevented if the UN entities had worked together’ (p. 70). Nonetheless, the failure of
Malian democracy is not surprising given the fact that politics so frequently interferes
with the deepening of democracy in poor states.
While the record of democracy promotion may be decidedly mixed,Wolfgang Merkel
argues that this does not necessarily mean that we are experiencing an ‘autocratic
rollback’. He points out that despite the claims of Steven Levitsky and Lucas Way (2010)
that the survival of autocratic regimes has been enhanced over the past twenty years with
the development of institutions (parties, parliaments and partially pluralist elections) which
have helped both to fragment power and to increase legitimacy, these same institutions
can also have a destabilizing effect (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2012, p. 27). Moreover,
Merkel points out that while the Third Wave of democratization may have exhausted itself
in the mid-1990s, since that time approximately as many ‘partly free’ regimes have moved
toward democracy as have moved toward autocracy (p. 28). While the evidence he
presents indeed suggests that we have no particular reason to expect an autocratic rollback
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in the near future, Merkel’s arguments that we should not expect a change in the next few
years in either direction are not supported with much evidence or argumentation.
Discussion
It is well to point out that if democracy promotion efforts are contingent, pro-democracy
actors should take the role of domestic, global and intermestic factors into consideration.
All three works successfully identify criticisms or problems with existing democracy
promotion efforts. However, while they serve as good critiques of existing practice, none
of them offers help toward concrete lessons for future attempts at democracy promotion.
Thus, readers may be left wondering what kernels of truth there may be to help maximize
the odds of such actions in the future.
Two related ideas come to mind after reviewing these works. First, it is important to
maintain awareness that regardless of the form they take, democracy promotion efforts are
always inherently political. It should appear to be no more than common sense that
democracy promotion efforts can have unintended consequences. Bridoux argues that
one needs craftily to insert one’s own political needs into the mix without being too
overbearing, while Zanotti argues that the resistance to multilateral democracy efforts can
engender unintended forms of resistance. Certainly, Bridoux is right to argue that too
much coercive force can be counterproductive, but Zanotti points out that creating
political openings as a result of disciplining ‘rogue’ regimes can also pave the way to
resistance. Daniel Levy’s 2010 study of the interaction between Argentina and the global
human rights regime in the aftermath of the fall of the military junta of 1976–83 suggests
that it is important to recognize that global norms can be endogenized in the periphery
(what Zanotti refers to as ‘borderlands’) through the process of what he calls ‘recursive
cosmopolitanization’. Essentially, Levy argues that global norms are only made relevant to
local populations when ‘intercrossings’ are allowed to develop between the global community
and local outposts (Levy, 2010, p. 594). A two-way street of norms emerges as
local problems are globalized, and a ‘cosmopolitan balance’ emerges (Levy, 2010, p. 579).
In the Argentinean case, the fact that the form of transitional justice that emerged was
deeply embedded in local norms and practices made the international human rights
regime more ‘politically and socially consequential’ (Levy, 2010, p. 584). Thus, minimization
of resistance to international norms of democracy and governance is most likely
when there is a balance between the local and the global.
Second, these works suggest that it may be necessary to redefine the goals of democracy
promotion. Zanotti’s finding that ‘normalizing’, ‘risk-minimizing’ policies are likely to
result in a non-ending correctional cycle of newer policies and re-evaluations should serve
as a warning that the road to hell may be paved with good intentions. The liberal
community clearly needs to keep in mind during future peacekeeping efforts that power
cannot easily be separated from the policies that it enables. In a sense, knowing that some
degree of resistance to these attempts to promote democracy is inevitable represents a step
forward. Bridoux’s work points out that the approach to and expectations of democracy
promotion will vary according to the global power arrangements at the time. This
realization that international political conditions may dictate how successful democracy
promotion can be should not be lost on policy makers or scholars.
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In her study of the fragile democracies of Central America, Sabine Kurtenbach argues
that the key to instituting reforms is not found in enhancing the ‘repressive capacity of the
state’, but in inclusion and participation (Kurtenbach, 2010, p. 106). She argues that while
we have seen a predominance of short-term strategies being pushed by ‘external actors
looking for exit options and needing to adjust their resources to global necessities or
priorities’, what is really needed is a long-term, patient approach that will allow reformoriented
‘drivers of change’ to align themselves with the global democracy movement
(Kurtenbach, 2010, p. 108). Finally, in a globalized world, we must be aware that without
a good deal of care, democracy promotion efforts may be overshadowed by the imperatives
of the market.
(Accepted: 2 June 2013)
About the Author
Scott Walker is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury,
New Zealand. His primary research interests are democratization and human rights, and he has written on these
topics in journals such as Human Rights Quarterly, Journal of Human Rights, Conflict Management and Peace Science and
International Interactions. He is currently writing a manuscript assessing the long-term effects of US military
interventions on human rights in target countries. Scott Walker, University of Canterbury, South Island, New
Zealand; email: scott.walker@canterbury.ac.nz
Note
1 ‘Stanford’s Fukuyama Launches New Project to Measure Governance’, Sarina A. Beges, 8 March 2012. Available from:
http://governanceproject.stanford.edu/news/stanfords_fukuyama_launches_new_project_to_measure_governance_20120308/
References
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Burnell, P. and Schlumberger, O. (eds) (2012) International Politics and National Political Regimes: Promoting Democracy:
Promoting Autocracy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Dahl, R. (2000) On Democracy. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Diamond, L. (2004) ‘What Went Wrong in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 83 (5), 34–56.
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Gleditsch, N. P. (2007) ‘The Liberal Moment Fifteen Years On’. Presidential Address, 49th Convention of the International
Studies Association, San Francisco, 27 March, International Studies Quarterly, 52 (4), 691–712.
Kurtenbach, S. (2010) ‘Why is Liberal Peacebuilding so Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America’, European Review
of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 88 (April), 95–110.
Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Levy, D. (2010) ‘Recursive Cosmopolitanization: Argentina and the Global Human Rights Regime’, British Journal of
Sociology, 61 (3), 579–97.
Zanotti, L. (2011) Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era.
University Park PA: Penn State University Press.
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