Language, religion and the politics
of difference*
ROGERS BRUBAKER
University of California, Los Angeles, USA
ABSTRACT. Language and religion are arguably the two most socially and politically
consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world. Yet there have
been very few efforts to compare the two in any sustained way. I begin by aligning
language and religion, provisionally, with ethnicity and nationhood, and by sketching
�ve ways in which language and religion are both similar to and similarly intertwined
with ethnicity and nationhood. I then identify a series of key differences between
language and religion and draw out their implications for the political accommodation
of cultural heterogeneity. I show that religious pluralism tends to be more intergenerationally
robust and more deeply institutionalised than linguistic pluralism in western
liberal democracies, and I argue that religious pluralism entails deeper and more
divisive forms of diversity. The upshot is that religion has tended to displace language
as the cutting edge of contestation over the political accommodation of cultural
difference – a striking reversal of the longer-term historical process through which
language had previously displaced religion as the primary focus of contention.
KEYWORDS: religion, language, pluralism, multiculturalism, ethnicity, immigration
I am deeply honoured by the invitation to deliver the Ernest Gellner Nationalism
Lecture. I did not know Gellner well, but I have been reading and
teaching his works with pleasure and pro�t for a quarter of a century. And I
owe my long and fruitful association with the Nationalism Studies Program at
the Central European University, in a sense, to Gellner, for after his death I
helped set up the program as a successor to the Center for the Study of
Nationalism that he had founded at the newly established university in 1992.
Gellner was a deep thinker, a profound analyst not only of nationalism, but
also of modernity and Muslim society, conspicuously treating all three –
contrary to current fashion – in the singular, not the plural. He was also a great
stylist: witty, sharp, irreverent and contrarian, fond of irony, paradox and
antithesis, with a remarkable gift for memorable formulations.
* Editor’s note: this is a revised version of the ASEN / Nations and Nationalism Ernest Gellner
Nationalism Lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science,
26 March 2012.
Note: Corrections added on 3 December 2012 after initial online publication on 22 November
2012: some minor errors in the text have been corrected in this version of the article.
bs_bs_banner
EN
ASJ OURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY
AND NATIONALISM
NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM
Nations and Nationalism 19 (1), 2013, 1–20.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00562.x
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
My lecture brings together two subjects about which Gellner had profoundly
interesting things to say: language and religion. Language is obviously
at the heart of his theory of nationalism, which highlights the need for
context-free communication, identi�cation with literate high cultures, and
exo-socialisation through state-organised school systems. And the famous
Ruritanian parable turns centrally on language.
Religion is less obviously central to Gellner’s theory of nationalism, and
Gellner’s unapologetic Enlightenment rationalism no doubt made him even
more �religiously unmusical’ – to use Max Weber’s famous self-description –
than Weber himself. Yet religion plays a considerably larger role in Gellner’s
theory of nationalism than is evident on the surface. The theory turns not on
language per se, but on culture and communication; and Gellner emphasises
that some forms of religious high culture – notably the scripturalist, egalitarian
high culture of Islam – are deeply compatible with nationalism, and indeed
often fused with nationalism. What Gellner calls �deeply engrained religiouscultural
habits’, moreover, are central to the extended discussion of �entropyresistant
traits’ and enduring inequalities in Nations and Nationalism. Beyond
the theory of nationalism, religion was also of course central to Gellner’s
�eldwork in Morocco and to his synoptic book on Muslim society.
My own interest in language and religion arises from a longstanding
concern with the social organisation and political expression of cultural difference.
Language and religion are arguably the two most socially and politically
consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world. The
study of the political accommodation of cultural difference – or what might be
called the political sociology of multiculturalism – would therefore seem to
require sustained attention to both.
Yet there have been few efforts to compare language and religion, the
outstanding exception – and an important inspiration for this paper – being
a paper by Zolberg and Long (1999). Language and religion are of
course often discussed together in the literatures on ethnicity, nationalism,
minority rights and multiculturalism. But most such discussions involve
passing juxtaposition rather than sustained comparison, and the more sustained
discussions (see notably Bauböck 2002) tend to be normative rather
than empirical.
It might be suggested that the lack of sustained comparison is not surprising,
since language and religion are simply not comparable. Now I do not want
to get sidetracked here by a discussion of the meaning of comparison or the
conditions of comparability. My interests are substantive, not methodological.
One can certainly construe religion and language in such a way that they are
not comparable. If one were to de�ne religion in terms of beliefs and rituals,
for example, there would be little leverage for comparison. And religion (at
least �organised religion’) obviously has an organisational dimension and a
structure of authority that language lacks. But I want to argue that one can
nonetheless construe language and religion in a way that makes comparison
both possible and fruitful.
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© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
My strategy for doing so is to begin by aligning language and religion,
provisionally, with ethnicity and nationhood, and by sketching �ve ways in
which language and religion are both similar to, and similarly intertwined
with, ethnicity and nationhood. I will then identify a few key differences
between language and religion and draw out their implications for the politics
of difference. I obviously cannot undertake a full comparative analysis here,
but I hope that the friction of comparison produced by reading one domain of
cultural practice against another can suggest some potentially fruitful lines of
analysis. In particular, I will argue that religious pluralism tends to be more
intergenerationally robust and more deeply institutionalised than linguistic
pluralism in contemporary liberal societies, and that religious pluralism entails
deeper and more divisive forms of diversity. The upshot, I will suggest, is that
religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation
over the political accommodation of cultural difference – a striking reversal of
the longer-term historical process through which language had previously
displaced religion as the primary focus of contention.
Language and religion in relation to ethnicity and nationhood
So let me begin by aligning language and religion with ethnicity and nation-
alism.1
To begin with, both language and religion are domains of categorically
differentiated cultural practice that simultaneously unite and divide. By �categorically
differentiated’, I mean that language and religion are understood by
participants and observers alike as partitioned into discrete categories, rather
than as a continuous spectrum of variation. (That they are so understood is of
course a product of history and politics, not least a history and politics of
objecti�cation, individuation and boundary-drawing that has carved out distinct
�languages’ from dialect continua, and constructed and institutionalised
distinct �religions’ from fluid and varying sets of practices.2
) In popular understandings,
both language and religion sort people into distinct, bounded and
largely self-reproducing �communities’, and in this respect they are both analogous
to ethnic groups and nations and variously intertwined with them.
Second, language and religion are basic sources and forms of social, cultural
and political identi�cation. They are ways of identifying oneself and others,
construing sameness and difference, and naming fundamental social groups.
Language and religion are again both analogous to ethnicity and nationalism
in this respect and pervasively intertwined with them. Language, religion or
both are generally understood as central to or even constitutive of most ethnic
and national identi�cations, and they frequently serve as the key diacritical
markers, emblems or symbols of such identi�cations.
Third, the family is a primary site of linguistic and religious socialisation, as
it is of ethnic and national socialisation. Indeed language and religion are
ordinarily more central to primary socialisation in the family than are ethnicity
and nationality. Language and religion are therefore often deeply taken for
Language, religion and the politics of difference 3
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
granted and embodied identi�cations, and both are routinely represented as
primordial.
Yet fourth, neither religion nor language is in fact primordial or �xed. As
we know from the burgeoning constructivist literature, the same holds for
ethnicity and nationhood. Like ethnicity and nationhood, religion and language
are powerfully shaped by political, economic and cultural processes, and
they change as circumstances change. From an individual point of view, as
Anderson (1991: 145) said of nations, both religions and languages are �joinable
in time’, and in the contemporary world, both are increasingly chosen
rather than given. This shift is particularly marked for religion. Although initial
religious identi�cations continue to be inherited, modalities and degrees of
religious engagement can no longer be taken for granted, but – in the West at
least – are increasingly reflexively negotiated and embraced (or rejected)
(see e.g. Taylor 2007).
Finally, many of the claims made in the name of religious or linguistic
groups are similar to – and again, also intertwined with – claims made in the
name of ethnic groups or nations. These include claims for economic
resources, symbolic recognition, equal representation, cultural reproduction
or political autonomy. Such claims-making is part of a more encompassing
process of the politicisation of culture and the culturalisation of politics.
In all these respects, language and religion are both similar to ethnicity and
nationalism and similarly intertwined with them. This has led many scholars of
ethnicity to treat language and religion – implicitly or explicitly – as functionally
equivalent. Indeed ethnicity was constituted as an object of study precisely
by abstracting from the speci�cities of language, religion and other ascriptive
markers such as phenotype, region of origin and customary mode of livelihood.
In the words of Joseph Rothschild – whose 1981 study Ethnopolitics was
one of the �rst, and remains one of the best, to survey the �eld – it would be
pointless to �separate out the notion of ethnic consciousness, solidarity, and
assertiveness from religious, linguistic, racial, and other so-called primordial
foci of consciousness, solidarity, and assertiveness’. If this were to be done,
�it is dif�cult to see what precisely would be left to, or meant by, the residual
notion of ethnicity and ethnic groups’ (Rothschild 1981:9; cf. Geertz
1963:109ff; Horowitz 1985:41).
The call to abstract from cultural content was given its strongest formulation
by Barth (1969), who argued that the study of ethnicity should focus
on the nature and dynamics of ethnic boundaries, not on what he somewhat
dismissively called the �cultural stuff’ these boundaries enclose. This perspective
on ethnicity has been immensely fruitful, and it has been important for
my own work. But it is also inevitably flattening, for it neglects, by design,
the speci�c cultural practices, understandings and institutions that are implicated
in the construction and working of ethnic identities and boundaries.
It is not fruitful, I believe, to talk about multiculturalism or the politics of
difference in terms of highly generalised notions of ethnicity, culture, identity
or difference. It is necessary instead to attend to the speci�c logic and
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© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
properties – the speci�c �affordances’ – of differing modes of cultural difference.
So in this paper, following the lead of scholars such as Cornell (1996) and
Jenkins (1997: chapter 8), I want to return the �cultural stuff’ – speci�cally
language and religion – to the centre of analytical attention.
I want to register two caveats, however, about doing so. First, the phrase
�cultural stuff’ is potentially misleading if it is taken to imply an opposition
between culture and social organisation. I treat language and religion not only
as cultural forms but also as modes of social organisation and media of
interaction. Second, the speci�c con�guration of the contemporary politics of
difference has been shaped not only by the intrinsic properties of language and
religion – not only by the cultural and social-organisational �stuff’, considered
as an ahistorical constant – but also, and indeed more profoundly, by the
speci�c historical trajectories through which states understood as �liberal’ and
�national’ emerged, and were transformed, in and through their confrontation
�rst with religious and later with linguistic heterogeneity.3
Before proceeding further, it is worth underscoring that religion is a much
more elusive analytical object than language. For all their complexity, linguistic
phenomena have a de�niteness and regularity that religious phenomena
lack. We know what we are talking about when we talk about language, but
the same cannot be said for religion. It is not accidental that linguistics is a
relatively well-de�ned discipline, while religious study is a loose congeries of
undertakings. Some have argued that �religion’ is meaningless or useless as an
analytical category (see e.g. Bloch 1996); I am not aware that anyone has made
this claim about language.
While fully acknowledging that �religion’ is a problematic and deeply contested
category – contested both as a category of analysis and as a category of
practice – I do not want to enter here into the debate about the category. Since
the scope of my argument is limited to contemporary liberal polities, I am
content to work here with a relatively unreflexive, common-sense category of
�religion’ (cf. Casanova 2009: 5), limiting my attention primarily to what we
call �organised religion’, and within that �eld primarily to the Abrahamic
religions.
Trajectories of politicisation and depoliticisation
I want to begin with an observation which suggests that language should be
more deeply and chronically politicised than religion under modern conditions.
Language, after all, is a universal and pervasive medium of social life,
while religion is not. If one de�nes religion broadly enough, to be sure, then
religion too can be seen as a universal social phenomenon. But it is not
universal in the same way.4
Language is a pervasive, inescapable medium of
social interaction; religion is not.5
Moreover, language is a necessary medium
of public as well as private life. It is an inescapable medium of public discourse,
government, administration, law, courts, education, media and public signage.
Language, religion and the politics of difference 5
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
However one de�nes religion, it cannot be said to be an inescapable medium or
necessary ground of action in any of these domains.
Public life can in principle be a-religious, but it cannot be a-linguistic. The
modern state is characterised by direct rule, intensive interaction with citizens,
universal public education and a public sector that provides large numbers of
jobs. As a result, the rules and practices that govern the language of public life
directly affect the material and ideal interests of people with differing language
repertoires (Zolberg and Long 1999: 21). This holds a fortiori in an economic
context in which work is increasingly �semantic and communicative rather
than physical’ (Gellner 1997: 85), involving the manipulation of meanings,
not of things. Language is therefore chronically and pervasively politicised
in linguistically heterogeneous modern societies (May 2001; Patten and
Kymlicka 2003).
Religion is also politicised, but it is politicised in different ways and for
different reasons. The state must privilege a particular language or set of
languages, but it need not privilege a particular religion, at least not in the
same way and not to the same degree. Complete neutrality, to be sure, is now
widely recognised as a myth (Bader 2007: 82ff), not least because the state
cannot help taking a position on the question of what counts as �religion’.6
Moreover, one can easily identify pervasive traces of Christianity in the public
life of western liberal democracies, even in those with the strongest traditions
of separation of church and state or of laicité (Alba 2005). One need think only
of such taken for granted frameworks as the reckoning of dates according to
the Christian calendar, the organisation of holidays or the privileging of
Sunday as a day of rest – the domain of what Torpey (2010) calls �latent
religiosity’. Yet contemporary liberal polities – even those that still have some
kind of established church – have made substantial, although contested, moves
in the direction of a more neutral stance towards differing religions. Such
moves have no counterpart in the domain of language. The state can approach
neutrality with respect to religion, even if such neutrality can never be fully
realised in practice; but it cannot even approach neutrality with respect to
language (Zolberg and Long 1999: 21; Bauböck 2002: 175–6).
There is a second reason for thinking that language should be more deeply
and chronically politicised than language in the contemporary world. According
to secularisation theory, modernity has entailed the progressive privatisation
and hence the depoliticisation of religion. Events of the last three decades
have made simplistic versions of secularisation theory ripe targets for criticism.
But as several leading analysts of religion have argued (Casanova 1994; Gorski
and Altinordu 2008; Koenig 2011; Martin 2005; Taylor 2007; Turner 2011),
secularisation theory is more complex, interesting and robust than many critics
suggest, and it cannot be dismissed out of hand. For many in the modern
world, religion has indeed become a more individual, subjective and private
experience. To the extent that this is the case, religion indeed becomes depoliticised,
and religious pluralism can flourish in the private realm without
generating conflicts in the public sphere. Over the course of the last several
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© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
centuries, religion has indeed become much less central to public life and less
politically contentious in the West, while language has become much more
central and more contentious.
Yet while secularisation theory captures an important long-term trend,
there is a powerful medium-term counter-trend towards the deprivatisation
and therefore the repoliticisation of religion (Casanova 1994). On a time scale
of decades rather than centuries, conflicts over religion have intensi�ed, while
conflicts over language, as I will argue later, have eased.7
As a result, while
religion is not necessarily, chronically and pervasively politicised the way
language is, the challenges posed by religious pluralism today – or at least by
some forms of religious pluralism – tend to be more complex and dif�cult than
those posed by linguistic pluralism.
I want to develop this argument in two stages. I will begin by arguing that
religious pluralism tends to be more robust than linguistic pluralism in contemporary
liberal societies and polities. I will then argue that religious pluralism
entails deeper and more divisive forms of diversity than linguistic
pluralism.
The robustness of religious pluralism
So let me begin with the greater robustness of religious pluralism. This results
from the differing ways in which religious and linguistic pluralism are generated,
reproduced and institutionalised in contemporary liberal societies. I will
consider each in turn, starting with the generation of pluralism, and then
moving on to address the reproduction and institutionalisation of pluralism.
1. Conquest, colonization, and especially (in the contemporary world)
migration generate religious and linguistic pluralism in similar ways, by
importing it from without. But religious pluralism is also generated from
within. I am not concerned here with relatively rare cases of religious splits and
foundings, although historically these have been important internal sources
of religious pluralism. I am concerned rather with routine individual-level
changes in religious af�liation and identity.
Individuals routinely change their linguistic repertoires as well as their
religious af�liations. But they do so in differing ways, and with differing
consequences. For adults, at least, language change is mainly additive,
although there may of course be some attrition of pro�ciency in languages that
are seldom used. Religious change, on the other hand, is often substitutive and
transformative. When adults add a new language to an existing repertory of
languages, this may inflect their identity, but it is unlikely to transform it. Yet
when they convert from one religion to another or from one form of religious
engagement to another, this can involve a basic transformation of identity.
People do not ordinarily simply add a new religion to a repertory of religions,
notwithstanding the flourishing of various forms of hybridity and syncretism,
nor do they ordinarily �convert’ from one language to another.
Language, religion and the politics of difference 7
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
For children of immigrants, to be sure, language change is often substitutive
rather than additive; but this reduces heterogeneity within the receiving
country, while religious conversion often increases it. Conversion can also
reduce heterogeneity, and some immigrant groups to the USA, notably Taiwanese,
exhibit high rates of conversion to Christianity. But pressures and
incentives for conversion to the prevailing religion are on the whole relatively
weak in contemporary liberal societies, while incentives to learn the prevailing
language are strong. A whole series of factors, in addition to immigration,
promote religious pluralisation in contemporary liberal societies: new religious
movements, organised proselytism, transnational religious networks, an open
religious marketplace and a general climate of spiritual experimentation.
There are no analogous forces generating linguistic pluralisation from
within.
So religious conversion, broadly understood, is an important source of
politically signi�cant cultural heterogeneity, while individual-level language
change is not. In contemporary liberal societies, new forms and degrees of
linguistic pluralism are almost exclusively imported (through immigration),
while new forms and degrees of religious pluralism are both imported and
endogenously generated through conversion.
2. The second reason for the greater robustness of religious than linguistic
pluralism is that religious pluralism is more easily reproduced. Here I
shift my perspective from intragenerational to intergenerational change and
reproduction.
In premodern societies, linguistic pluralism was more or less selfreproducing.
Linguistic socialisation occurred in families and local communities,
and it did not require any specialised apparatus. Political authorities made
no effort to impose linguistic homogeneity (although they often did impose
religious homogeneity).
In contemporary liberal societies, the situation is reversed. It is now religious
pluralism that is more or less self-reproducing. Religious socialisation
occurs in families and local religious communities, and political authorities
make no effort to impose religious homogeneity. But linguistic reproduction
now requires what Gellner (1983: chapter 3) called exo-socialisation. It
requires prolonged and expensive schooling on a scale that only the state is
ordinarily in a position to provide. So the state is much more central to
linguistic than to religious reproduction.
Children often acquire basic competence in a minority language from their
parents and extended families, and this can be reinforced by minoritylanguage
media. But without comprehensive schooling in that language – and
I mean schooling with that language as the medium of instruction, not simply
as the object of instruction – it is dif�cult for the minority language to be fully
reproduced. Some countries with long-established, territorially concentrated
linguistic minorities do provide comprehensive minority-language schooling.
But even this is not suf�cient to ensure full reproduction. Minority-language
populations are shrinking even where such schooling is available – as it is for
8 Rogers Brubaker
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
the Swedish minority in Finland or the Hungarian minority in Romania. This
happens as some children opt out of minority-language school systems and as
intermarriage often leads to intergenerational assimilation (Brubaker et al.
2006: 297–8, 370–1).
Beyond comprehensive minority-language schooling, a linguistic regime
that constrains people’s choices may be necessary to ensure the reproduction
of minority languages. This is what van Parijs (2009: 163ff) has called a
�linguistic territoriality regime’. An example is the Quebec policy that restricts
who can attend English-language schools (and notably requires almost all new
immigrants to attend Francophone schools). This underscores the crucial role
of the state in linguistic reproduction.
This argument might seem to be blatantly contradicted by sharp increases
in linguistic pluralism in the USA and other countries of immigration, which
do not provide comprehensive minority-language schooling, or other strong
state support for immigrant languages. Immigration does of course generally
increase linguistic heterogeneity, and the effect is intensi�ed when immigrants
cluster in metropolitan areas that sustain dense networks of mothertongue
institutions. But this speaks to the generation of pluralism, not to its
reproduction.
Continuing large-scale immigration masks substantial intergenerational
linguistic assimilation. The Fishman model of language shift among secondand
third-generation immigrants, set forth a half century ago (Fishman
1966; Veltman 1983), remains valid in its broad outlines. Thickening transnational
ties, weakening assimilationist pressures and the growth of substantial
foreign-language media markets may have slowed down the process,
at least for some groups. As Alba et al. (2002) and others have shown, this
is notably the case for the descendants of Spanish-speaking immigrants in
the USA. But even in this group, a majority of the third generation speak
only English at home.8
Huntington’s (2004) alarmist scenario of ethnonational
conflict in the American southwest, based on a deepening language
divide, has no basis in fact.
So the reproduction of minority languages in contemporary liberal states
requires a massive and ordinarily state-provided educational apparatus, and it
may also require a territorial regime that limits language choice. Such arrangements
are in place in some historically multilingual states, as a legacy of earlier
nationalist struggles over the language of public life. Examples include
Canada, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland and India. But no such arrangements
protect minority languages generated by recent immigration. The various
limited forms of de facto bilingualism or multilingualism that have emerged in
the USA and other countries of immigration are signi�cant as pragmatic
ways of accommodating linguistic pluralism, but they neither aim at, nor are
capable of, reproducing that pluralism intergenerationally.9
The religious pluralism generated by immigration is more easily reproduced.
Of course it is not automatically reproduced. The religious landscape
of contemporary liberal societies is fluid, especially in the USA, and
Language, religion and the politics of difference 9
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
I noted above the importance of conversion. But the intergenerational
transmission of minority religions requires no state apparatus like a
minority-language school system. And it requires no particular legal regime
beyond the commitment to religious freedom that is a constitutive element of
liberal polities. The transmission of religion, moreover, is not particularly
costly. The transmission of a language – beyond what is simply picked
up in the home – requires a major effort and carries a substantial opportunity
cost. But the transmission of a religious af�liation or identi�cation does
not.
What is transmitted, to be sure, may be little more than a nominal religious
af�liation or identi�cation (Gans 1994). But this nominal identity can later be
revived or reconstructed. Some second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants
in western countries are more pious than their parents or grandparents
or have constructed new forms of Muslim religiosity (Roy 2004;
Duderija 2007); the same has been true of many American immigrant
groups (Hirschman 2004).10
The intergenerational staying power of religion
results in signi�cant part from the ways in which religious practices can be
flexibly adapted to changing circumstances. This has no real analogue in
the domain of language.
So the religious pluralism generated by immigration is more likely to be
intergenerationally persistent than the linguistic pluralism so generated.
Admittedly, one should distinguish between nominal and substantive religious
pluralism. In the USA, immigration has sharply increased the nominal pluralism
of an already pluralistic religious landscape; but at the same time, immigrant
religions have become Americanised, notably by adopting prevailing
congregational forms of religious organisation and worship (Yang and
Ebaugh 2001).
Still, among descendants of immigrants, religion offers a more enduring
locus for cultural pluralism than language does.11
This is especially true in the
American context, characterised by high levels of religiosity. But elsewhere too
there is nothing in the domain of religion analogous to the characteristic
pattern of language shift for second- and third-generation immigrants. While
linguistic competences and identi�cations erode substantially across generations,
religious practices and identi�cations are more likely to persist and in
some cases may even grow stronger.
3. The �nal reason for the greater robustness of religious than linguistic
pluralism is that religious pluralism is institutionalised and legitimated as an
enduring presence in liberal societies in ways that linguistic pluralism is not.
Both ideologically and institutionally, as Zolberg and Long (1999: 31) have
observed, contemporary liberal states tend to be pluralist with respect to
religion, and monist or assimilationist with respect to language. Their stance
towards religion is an attenuated pluralism, to be sure. A more far-reaching
pluralism is found in some empires and postcolonial polities, where differing
systems of personal law govern members of different religious communities.
But this kind of legal pluralism is �incompatible with the structural character
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of modern nation-states’ (Zolberg and Long 1999: 14; see also Hirschl and
Shachar 2009). Still, even this attenuated pluralism towards religion represents
a sharp reversal of the historical pattern in the Christian world, in which states
were strongly monist with respect to religion and pluralist with respect to
language (or, more precisely, simply indifferent to linguistic diversity).
Ideologically and normatively, the clearest expression of this difference in
the stance of contemporary liberal states towards religion and language is that
immigrants are not expected to adopt the prevailing religion, but are expected
to learn the prevailing language (or one of the prevailing languages). The
liberal state is expected to be neutral with respect to religion, even if it can
never be fully neutral in practice; but there is no such expectation of neutrality
with respect to language. Language tests for citizenship are routine, but a
religious test would be unthinkable in a liberal polity.
Enduring religious pluralism is not simply normatively accepted in liberal
states, but institutionally supported. To be sure, as I noted above, some
historically multilingual states provide strong institutional support for linguistic
pluralism.12
But this strongly pluralist stance nowhere applies to immigrants.
I do not mean to suggest that liberal states generally adopt harshly or even
actively assimilationist stances towards immigrant languages, although there
has been a shift in the last decade back towards a moderately assimilationist
stance (Brubaker 2001). The point I want to underscore here is the sharp
distinction, both normative and institutional, between endogenous and
imported linguistic pluralism. International minority rights regimes mandate
expansive protections for long-established minority languages, but only
minimal protection for immigrant languages. And states that provide elaborate
institutional support for historically established minority languages
provide nothing comparable for immigrant languages.13
Liberal countries of immigration do of course accommodate the linguistic
pluralism generated by immigration in various ways. They may provide
signage, information, voting materials or bureaucratic forms in minority languages;
translators in medical, legal or administrative settings; or various
forms of bilingual education. But these pragmatic accommodations are categorically
distinct from the comprehensive parallel school systems or regimes
of territorial autonomy that seek to facilitate the long-term reproduction and
preservation of multiple languages within a single state.
So there is a sharp distinction between endogenous and imported linguistic
pluralism. But there is no sharp distinction between endogenous and imported
religious pluralism. I want to underscore this point, so let me restate it in
differing form. Rights and protections for long-established minority languages
are nowhere extended to immigrant languages. Linguistic settlements, in
other words, are not expandable to include immigrant-borne languages. But
religious settlements are expandable: not easily or automatically expandable,
but expandable nonetheless. Many of the rights and recognitions enjoyed by
long-established religions have been extended to immigrant religions. Liberal
states have differing historically conditioned modes of accommodating
Language, religion and the politics of difference 11
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
religious pluralism. But whatever their established mode of accommodation,
they face nontrivial pressures to accommodate immigrant religions on similar
terms. And these pressures have no counterpart in the domain of language.
The most salient contemporary instance of course concerns the accommodation
of Islam in northern and western Europe. It is impossible to do justice
to this vexed and complex issue here. But consider just one example, from the
domain of education. Accommodation on similar terms would mean providing
or permitting Islamic education in public schools in countries in which
religious instruction in public schools is the norm, or subsidising private
Islamic schools in countries where such subsidies are provided to other private
religious schools. Moves to accommodate Islam in this and other domains
have been halting, uneven and controversial; many Muslims claim with considerable
justice that the measures taken have not even come close to realising
equal treatment. And of course one can point to spectacular counter-examples
in other domains, such as the ban on the face-covering niqab that has been
enacted in France and is under discussion elsewhere, and the Swiss referendum
banning the construction of minarets. Yet if one looks beyond cases of highly
mediatised contestation, one can see a steady if slow, contested and often
grudging movement towards accommodation in the educational sphere and in
other domains. This has been driven by the courts on the one hand, which
have been receptive to parity claims (Koenig 2010; Joppke and Torpey
forthcoming), and by a statist and securitarian concern to manage and supervise
Muslim populations on the other (Laurence 2012).
So to sum up this part of the argument: normative expectations, institutional
frameworks and individual incentives converge in fostering a deeper and more
robust religious than linguistic pluralism in liberal societies. Not simply immigration
but other factors too make for increasing, persistent and institutionalised
religious pluralism. Immigration generates at least as much linguistic as
religious pluralism, but this migration-generated linguistic pluralism is neither
intergenerationally persistent nor institutionally supported. Continuing immigration
and clustered settlement patterns sustain the appearance of increasing
and persistent linguistic pluralism, but an ongoing intergenerational language
shift tends to prevent the consolidation of self-reproducing linguistic minorities.
Religious pluralism and deep diversity
Having argued that religious pluralism tends to be more robustly generated,
reproduced and institutionalised than linguistic pluralism, I want to move on
to argue that the accommodation of religious pluralism in liberal polities is
also more likely to generate dif�cult and sometimes intractable problems of
what political theorists in a line of work deriving most immediately from
Rawls’ (1993) Political Liberalism (e.g. Galston 1995) have called �deep
diversity’.
This is obviously not true for all forms of religious pluralism. Insofar
as religious pluralism involves individualised, �subjectivised’ or otherwise
12 Rogers Brubaker
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
privatised forms of religious experience, it is easily accommodated in liberal
polities. Much of the recent pluralisation of the religious landscape in liberal
societies has involved the proliferation of new forms of individualised religiosity
and spirituality that do conform to the expectations of secularisation
theory about the long-term privatisation and depoliticisation of religion. But
as I mentioned earlier, recent decades have also witnessed a signi�cant
counter-trend towards the de-privatisation and re-politicisation of religion.
And I am concerned here with public, organised and collective forms of
religious life, not with private, individualised forms.14
Much of the discussion of public or political religion has focused on Islam,
and for good reason. Privatised and individualised forms of religiosity are
more common among Muslims, especially those living in the West, than
essentialist accounts of Islam as an intrinsically public and political religion
would suggest (Cesari 2002). But these have been overshadowed by the centrality
of various forms of public or political Islam to political contestation in
both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority settings. Public religion is of
course not unique to Islam. Strong forms of public religion can be found in
Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Buddhist traditions, among others. Yet the
claims of public Islam pose a particularly dif�cult challenge to liberal
states.
But I want to keep the focus on religion and language more generally. In the
era of modern nationalism, language has been widely understood as the chief
criterion and main cultural substrate of nationhood. Territorially concentrated
linguistic minorities have therefore been understood – by ethnopolitical
entrepreneurs on the one hand, and central state elites on the other – as
potential nations, and linguistic pluralism has therefore been construed as a
threat to the national identity and territorial integrity of the state. Even where
secession or territorial autonomy has been implausible, language conflicts
have been endemic. The expansion of state employment, the introduction of
universal schooling and universal male military service, and the growing
importance of what Gellner (1983: chapter 3) called �context-free communication’
in an urban, mobile, literate society have made language a crucial form
of cultural capital, a central focus of personal and collective identity and a key
terrain of political struggle.
Yet I want to argue that language conflict has lost some of its intensity and
transformative potential in recent decades, as the high noon of language-based
nationalist conflicts appears to have passed. The vast reorganisation of political
space along national (and for the most part broadly linguistic) lines throughout
Europe and Eurasia has reduced, although of course not eliminated, the scope
for new language-based nationalist claims. This has involved not only the
disintegration of multinational empires into linguistically more homogeneous
successor states, but also the internal reorganisation of multilevel states to
create linguistically more homogeneous constituent states, as in India. It also
includes forms of federalism and devolution that have allowed autonomous but
nonsovereign polities like Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Wales to
Language, religion and the politics of difference 13
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
pursue their own language agendas. Older language-based nationalist and
ethnopolitical conflicts of course remain alive, but–with some exceptions—they
have become less urgent and less destabilising.
In the geopolitically relaxed zones of northern and western Europe, the
USA and Australia-New Zealand, states no longer seek to impose the tight
coupling of culture, territory and population that was central to the nationalising
projects of a century ago; linguistic diversity is not only tolerated, but in
some cases even celebrated. Even in central and eastern Europe, historically
the locus classicus of nationalist language conflicts, the eastward expansion of
the European Union and the institutionalisation of minority-language rights
have taken some of the edge off formerly intractable ethnolinguistic conflicts.
In the USA, conflicts over the status of Spanish flare up periodically, focused
in many cases on bilingual education or the symbolic question of an of�cial
language. But more striking is the continuing piecemeal, pragmatic and largely
uncontested accommodation of Spanish and other languages in a variety of
less visible settings.
Language continues to be a terrain of chronic struggle in multilingual
polities worldwide, especially where linguistic minorities are territorially concentrated.
But in liberal polities, those struggles – again with some exceptions,
most obviously in Belgium – have become less intense and intractable. Yet
while language conflicts have eased somewhat in recent decades, conflicts over
religion have intensi�ed, driven by the resurgence of public religion.
As a universal and inescapable medium of public life, language can never be
fully privatised or depoliticised. Religion could in principle be fully privatised
and depoliticised, but the mid-twentieth century Western vision of a fully
privatised religion has proved entirely chimerical. And to the extent that
religion is not privatised or depoliticised, the conflicts arising from religious
pluralism tend to be deeper and more intractable than those arising from
linguistic pluralism.
The reasons for this are found in the most elementary differences between
language and religion. Language is a medium of communication; it is not a
structure of authority, and it has no intrinsic normative content. Defenders
of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis – the idea that language constitutes thought,
culture and world views – would argue with this characterisation. But strong
versions of Whor�anism have long been discredited, so this would be
an argument only at the margins. Whatever normative content languages
might carry is relatively thin.15
But religion (and especially public religion)
often involves an authoritative, binding and comprehensive set of
norms.
These norms do not simply regulate private behaviour. They reach into
the public realm, addressing such matters as gender, sexuality, family life,
education, social policy, the economy and even international affairs and war.16
Gender, sexuality and family life are particularly important (and of course
contested) domains of religious regulation (Friedland 2002; Casanova 2009:
17–8). Some religious norms constitute systems of law that directly and
14 Rogers Brubaker
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
comprehensively regulate family matters, as Jewish and Islamic norms do for
marriage, divorce and inheritance. But nearly all forms of organised religion
seek to regulate gender, sexuality and family life.
The claims of public religion to provide binding and authoritative norms
for the regulation of public and private life challenge the state’s claim to
monopolise the regulation of public life (and to authoritatively regulate
certain areas of private life as well). They also create conflicts with competing
forms of public religion and with those segments of the public (including
those who profess the same religion) who reject the claims of public religion.
These are often deep conflicts of principle, involving fundamental differences
of world view. It is these that warrant speaking of �deep diversity’.
Language conflicts do not involve such conflicts of principle or world view. As
Gellner (1983: 117–8) put it in another context, they are conflicts between
people who �speak the same language’, as it were, even when they do not speak
the same language.
Liberal states are committed to a far-reaching accommodation of religious
pluralism, but this commitment can generate quandaries. Liberal states may be
obliged to accommodate forms of religion that promote illiberal ideas or
practices; or they may be obliged to act illiberally in restricting religious
or other freedoms in the name of other values (see e.g. Joppke 2009: 4–5;
Triada�lopoulos 2011).
Consider a few examples from the domain of education. Should the state
exempt Christian children from exposure to �secular humanist’ views in school,
as some fundamentalist Christian parents in Tennessee requested (Stolzenberg
1993)? Should it exempt Muslim children from coeducational physical education
classes, as some Muslim parents in European countries have requested
(see e.g. German Islam Conference 2009: 20–2)? Should it allow teachers or
students to wear religious clothing, including the face-covering niqab (Joppke
2009; Joppke and Torpey forthcoming: chapter 2)? How much leeway should
it grant, and what kind of �nancial or other support should it provide, to
conservative religious schools (or to forms of home schooling) that cultivate
ways of life at odds with the state’s interest in fostering the development of
autonomous individuals and responsible citizens (Reich 2002: chapter 6)? Or
consider the question that was brought into focus by the Rushdie affair in the
late 1990s and revived by the Danish Cartoon affair some years later: should
the state restrict potentially hurtful or offensive speech or expression so as to
protect the sensibilities of members of religious communities (Parekh 2000:
chapter 10)? No comparable quandaries arise in the domain of language.
Conclusion
Language and religion have seldom been studied together in a sustained way.
To specialists in either subject, language and religion have seemed too
different, while to students of ethnicity, they have seemed too similar. I have
Language, religion and the politics of difference 15
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
argued that language and religion are similar enough, if construed in a certain
way, to make comparison possible, yet different enough to make it interesting.
As fundamental domains of cultural difference, language and religion have
much in common. Both are ways of identifying oneself and others, of construing
sameness and difference. In Bourdieusian language, both are basic principles
of vision and division of the social world. Both divide the world, in
popular understandings, into distinct, bounded and self-reproducing communities.
And claims are made in the name of both kinds of communities for
recognition, resources and reproduction.
These and other similarities have led students of ethnicity to treat language
and religion as functionally equivalent, and as theoretically uninteresting
forms of �cultural stuff’, signi�cant primarily as grist for the mill of ethnic
classi�cation and boundary formation. But this perspective is flattening. It
neglects important differences in the social organisation and political expression
of language and religion in liberal societies and polities.
Language is an inescapable medium of public as well as private life; religion
is not. The state must privilege a particular language or set of languages, but it
need not privilege a particular religion. Language is chronically and pervasively
politicised in the modern world, while much of religion has become privatised
and depoliticised. Yet deprivatisation is an important counter-trend, and the
claims of public religion to authoritatively regulate public and private life have
no counterpart in the domain of language. Immigration generates new forms
and degrees of both linguistic and religious pluralism, but the religious pluralism
generated by immigration is more intergenerationally robust and more
deeply institutionalised than the linguistic pluralism. The result is that religion
has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the
political accommodation of cultural difference in Western liberal democracies –
a striking reversal of the longer-term process through which language had
previously displaced religion as the primary focus of contention.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Kristen Kao and Amy Zhou for research assistance,
and Regina Bendix, John Bowen, David Gellner, Phil Gorski, Ann Swidler
and Andreas Wimmer for helpful comments. I am particularly indebted to
Matthias Koenig and Peter Stamatov for their detailed and insightful comments
on an earlier draft, and to Susan Ossman, with whom I talked through
much of the argument.
Notes
1 For an alternative perspective on the commonalities of religion and language, see Safran
(2008).
2 On language, see e.g. Haugen (1966); on religion, Beyer (2001).
16 Rogers Brubaker
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
3 To analyse these trajectories is beyond the scope of this paper. From the large literature, see
illustratively Kaplan (2007) and Madeley (2003) on religion, and Hobsbawm (1990) and Barbour
and Carmichael (2000) on language.
4 Whether or not one accepts Chomsky’s notion of a universal grammar, language is universal
not only in the sense that it is found in all human societies, but also in the sense that all humans
ordinarily develop pro�ciency in at least one language. This has no clear analogue in the
domain of religion. While everyone may have a capacity for religious experience (depending on
how this is de�ned), it cannot be said that everyone is pro�cient in at least one religion. Quite
apart from explicit irreligiosity or anti-religiosity, people differ much more widely in religiosity
than in basic �linguosity’. Of course people differ substantially in linguistic pro�ciency or linguistic
capital as well, but the differences in religious quali�cation are much greater and more
consequential; they are among other things the basis for the opposition between virtuoso and
mass religiosity that is central to Weber’s sociology of religion.
5 In traditions of virtuoso religiosity, religion may be normatively understood as pervasively
relevant to all aspects of life, but that does not make religion a universal medium of social life in
the sense that language is.
6 On the broader debate in political theory about the ideal of state neutrality vis-Ă -vis competing
understandings of the good, see Koppelman (2004). Koppelman acknowledges the incoherence of
the idea of complete neutrality, yet he af�rms the continued relevance and value of neutrality as
an ideal.
7 This is obviously a gross generalisation, and exceptions spring immediately to mind. Still, it
and the equally gross generalisation in the preceding paragraph hold up pretty well for the
Western world on a time scale of decades and centuries, respectively. But one would need to shift
to another level and mode of analysis altogether, of course, to account for the varying contexts,
contours and trajectories of conflicts over language and religion in particular places and
times.
8 Merle et al. (2010) present their study as a challenge to Fishman, but their �nding that only a
third of migrants’ grandchildren in Basel and Geneva understand or speak the language of their
grandparents seems broadly consistent with Fishman.
9 This is not to minimise the thoroughgoing institutionalisation of Spanish in the USA,
anchored not only in government policies but also, as was already evident to Zolberg and Long
(1999: 26), in a substantial media market. Yet as noted in the text, the process of intergenerational
language shift continues among the children and grandchildren of Spanish-speaking immigrants.
10 The literature that points to new or intensi�ed forms of religiosity among some second- or
third-generation Muslim immigrants is largely ethnographic (see e.g. Glynn 2002). Intensi�ed
religiosity may be highly visible, but there is no evidence that it is broadly representative. Quantitative
studies have reported intergenerational stability in levels of religiosity (Diehl and Koenig
2009, examining Germany), or slight intergenerational declines (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2009,
considering Germany, France and The Netherlands). Kashyap and Lewis 2012, interestingly, �nd
both decreased observance among younger British Muslims and an increased salience of Islam for
personal identity.
11 This point was already made by Herberg (1960), and has more recently been emphasised by
Warner (1993) and Kurien (1998).
12 In many of these cases, however (e.g. in India, Switzerland, Belgium and Canada, or at least
Quebec), linguistic pluralism on the statewide level coincides with linguistic monism – or at least
with the strongly institutionalised primacy of a single language – at the level of federal component
states or provinces. Linguistic pluralism, in other words, generally exists as a collection of lowerlevel
linguistic monisms. This observation supports the argument of Zolberg and Long that
modern states (or at least their component substate polities) tend towards monism in the domain
of language.
13 Political theorists are divided about the justice of this sharp difference in the treatment of
long-established and recently imported linguistic pluralism; see e.g. Kymlicka (1995); Patten
(2006).
Language, religion and the politics of difference 17
© The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism © ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
14 Deprivatisation and ongoing privatisation are not mutually exclusive; given the complexity of
the contemporary religious landscape, it is not surprising that both are happening at the same time
(Casanova 2009: 29).
15 To underscore the relative normative and cultural �thinness’ of language vis-à-vis religion is
not to deny that language may carry �thicker’ cultural meanings and commitments in some
contexts than in others. See Carens (2000: 128–9) and Bauböck (2002: 177–8) on �thin’ and �thick’
theories of language in relation to cultural meanings and commitments.
16 The meanings of and boundaries between �public’ and �private’, to be sure, are richly
ambiguous and chronically contested (Casanova 1994: chapter 2).
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