

# Evolution of EU crisis management

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# Content

- EU as a security actor: what we are talking about?
- Establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy: when & why?
- European Security Strategy & the comprehensive approach to crisis management
- EU crisis management: civilian & military dimension
- EU crisis management operations: an overview
- Added value of EU crisis management
- Role of EU crisis management operations
- EU's performance in crisis management: main features
- Current developments

# European Union as a security actor: any ideas?



- EU as “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a **military worm**“?



- **Saint-Malo Declaration (1998)**
  - “The European Union needs to be in a position to play its **full role on the international stage.**”
  - “...the Union must have the **capacity for autonomous action**, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”
  - “...**Atlantic Alliance** ... is the **foundation of the collective defence** of its members.”
  - “Europe needs... a strong and competitive **European defence industry** and technology.”

- → Establishment of **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)** in 1999
  - = A new chapter in EU history
- **Crisis management** as a core part of the ESDP/later CSDP
- Start of a process of:
  - **Institutions building**
  - **Capacities building**
- Two basic lines:
  - **Military** crisis management
  - **Civilian** crisis management



- **Previous attempts:**
  - Brussels Treaty (1948) and the Western European Union
  - European Defence Community (1950s)
  - Fouchet Plan (1962)
  - European Political Cooperation (1970s)
- → Any idea **why** the EU has decided to establish its own security and defence policy?

# Reasons for the establishment of ESDP:

- 1) logical outcome of the end of the Cold War
- 2) change of US attitude
- 3) desire of the EU to be a fully-fledged international actor
- 4) change of British and French attitudes (Blair + Chirac)
- 5) reappearance of military conflict in Europe (performance of the EU very weak)
- 6) high public support for EU action



# European Security Strategy




Javier Solana

# European Security Strategy

- “A Secure Europe in a Better World” (2003)
- Expression of normative strategic thinking
- Lack of any coherent strategy
- Adoption considered politically unfeasible
- High symbolic value but little real impact?
- Tactical use of the strategy
- To overcome the “Iraq divide” – acceptable for both Europeanists and Atlanticists

- Introduction:
  - “...the European Union is inevitably a **global player.**”
  - „Europe should be ready **to share in the responsibility** for global security and in building a better world.“
- Global Challenges & Key threats
- Strategic objectives
- Policy implications
- **Comprehensive approach** to crisis management!
  - EU as a *special* security actor

5 Potential Dimensions of an  
**EU Comprehensive Approach**  
 (Once the "Why" question is answered)



# Comprehensive approach to EU crisis management in practice:

“EU NAVFOR Atalanta”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMS-7mwuXgY>





- EU approach to the security in the Horn of Africa:  
**What are the features of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management?**



# EU crisis management as a flagship of CSDP

## I. Civilian crisis management

- **police** (fulfilling advisory, assistance and training tasks)
- **rule of law** (capable of both strengthening and substituting local judiciary/legal system)
- **civilian administration** (providing basic services that the national or local administration is unable to offer)
- **civil protection** (offering assessment, coordination and intervention teams)
- **monitoring capabilities** (i.e. border monitoring, human rights monitoring, observing political situation)
- **generic support capabilities** (supporting the work of EU Special Representatives or forming part of an CSDP mission; include experts in the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform, mediation, border control, disarmament, media policy etc.)

## II. Military crisis management


- **“Petersberg Tasks” (1992):**
  - Humanitarian and rescue tasks
  - Peacekeeping tasks
  - Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking
- **“Berlin Plus” (2003):**
  - Agreement with NATO for the use of NATO structures, mechanisms, and assets to carry out military operations if NATO declines to act
- **Lisbon Treaty (2009):**
  - Expanding Petersberg Tasks to include:
    - Joint disarmament operations
    - Military advice and assistance tasks
    - Tasks in post-conflict stabilization




- **EU Battlegroups:**

- 2004 UK, France and Germany
- A BG = cca 1 500 troops (+ combat support elements), high state of readiness, highly military effective
- Formed by one nation or a group of nations (a roster)
- 2 BGs take responsibility for a six-month period
- No use so far → doubts
- “Costs lie where they fall” principle
- Reform of financing

# Overview of the current EU mission and operations (October 2017)



# EU missions since 2003



Source: ISIS Europe

CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 143, November 2013 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)




# Types of EU CMO

- **Police missions**
  - E.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL DR Congo
- **Rule of law missions**
  - E.g. EULEX Kosovo, EUJUST Lex, EUJUST Themis
- **Monitoring missions**
  - E.g. EUMM Georgia, Aceh Monitoring Mission
- **Capacity building missions**
  - E.g. EUCAP Sahel, EUCAP Nestor
- **Advisory missions**
  - E.g. EUAM Ukraine, EUAM Iraq
- **Security sector reform missions**
  - E.g. EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RD Congo
- **Training missions**
  - E.g. EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA
- **Stabilizations missions, incl. peace enforcement**
  - E.g. EUFOR Althea, EUFOR TCHAD, EUFOR RCA, EUFOR RD Congo
- **Naval operations**
  - Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Somalia), Sophia (EUNAVFOR MED)


# EU crisis management operations

- More than 30 crisis management operations
- Some in EU's extended neighbourhood
- Cooperation with other IOs on the ground
- Quality X quantity
- Limited size
- Majority civilian missions, small support missions
- Only few comparable to NATO/UN missions
- Vast majority initiated before 2009

## Total CSDP Seconded Civilian and Military Staff (2003-2013)




## Civilian vs. military personnel in UN and CSDP missions 2000-09



Strategic Trends 2010 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich)  
Sources: SIPRI; EU



# Numbers of personnel in EU missions in comparison to other IOs





# Added value of EU crisis management

- EU's comparative advantage – decisive contribution in **three types of situations**:
- The EU was willing and capable to act...
  - **1) where other organizations were not**
    - Others not willing / politically capable of acting (Kosovo, Georgia)
    - Others could not deploy quickly enough to stabilize the situation (“bridging operations” Tchad, CAR, DR Congo)
    - European presence → mitigating effects (EUFOR DRC)
    - EU MSs offered specific capabilities (EUNAVFOR Atalanta)
    - EU contribution linked to its geographical scope (Horn of Africa, Sahel, the Balkans)

**– 2) when there was a specific demand for the EU to intervene**

- EU perceived as particularly legitimate to help solve a conflict in its neighbourhood (the Balkans, Georgia)
- EU perceived as more neutral (Aceh, Rafah)
- EU acting as a mediator in the conflict (Aceh, Georgia)
- EU covering specific needs which others did not address: security sector reform, rule of law, border management, airport security
- A broad range of diplomatic, civilian and military tools was needed to deal with the situation + presence of an EU Delegation on the ground

– **3) in low- to medium-intensity conflict environments**

- Mostly pre- or post-conflict situations
- NATO – high intensity conflicts
- UN – needs peace to keep before deploying

– **Otherwise...**

- EU serves as a clearing house for member states' contributions (e.g. Lebanon, Haiti)
- EU contributes to UN PK or monitoring missions by other means
- EU builds the capacity of other regional organizations (e.g. AU, ECOWAS, Arab League of States)

# Role of EU crisis management operations

- EU crisis management missions & operations (CMO) = **major vehicle for realizing EU security policy**
  - From an instrument at the service of the CFSP to a major driving force of the EU's external policy
  - ESDP as a boost of CFSP which lacked the tools to deliver
  - ESDP relatively isolated; rapid development; British-French tandem
- Serve the broader aim of **positioning the EU on the international stage**
  - CMO as a symbol of the search for a niche on the world stage
  - CMO as the most significant / defining feature of the ESDP

- **What EU CMO are?**
  - Formally = reactions to crisis on the ground
  - X More than crisis management tools
  - Provide important building blocks in the construction of an EU security policy
    - Artemis (autonomous military operation)
    - Aceh MM (“going global”)
    - The Balkans/ME (commitment to the neighbourhood)
- Deployment decisions as a **strategic search for opportunities**, directed towards the **external as well as internal audience**
- EU CMO as a **response to an international security issue** & a **political means** to advance a particular agenda
- EU looking for deployments that promise to generate **maximum political capital** & avoiding challenges that might end up in total disaster
- = Strategic approach → **EU CMO as a success story**



# EU's performance in crisis management: main features

## Civilian crisis management

- ...
- ...
- ...

## Military crisis management

- ...
- ...
- ...

# Current developments

## EU Global Strategy (EUGS)

- Unfortunate timing (June 2016)
- Defines **common ends** of the EU's external action and identifies **means to achieve them**
- Presents a fairly **realistic, pragmatic and cautious picture** of what the EU does, and can do
- Goes back to the basics and puts the immediate **interests of European citizens** first
- While **normative power** Europe is perhaps dead, **civilian power** Europe is very much alive
- Has created a **momentum on EU security and defence**
- „**Resilience**“ as a new leitmotif of the EU's external action
- Broadens the understanding of the **comprehensive approach** to crisis management

## Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

- Treaty of the EU (Lisbon Treaty), Articles 42(6) and 46
- A Treaty-based framework and process **to deepen defence cooperation** amongst EU MSs who are capable and willing to do so
- Key requirements:
  - To enhance coordination in defence affairs
  - To increase investment in defence
  - To increase cooperation in developing defence capabilities
- Binding commitments undertaken by participating MSs
- Participation voluntary
- Decision-making in the hands of participating MSs (unanimity)
- November 2017 – 23 MSs signed a **common notification on the PESCO** = the first formal step to set up the PESCO (now waiting for a Council decision establishing PESCO)



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