The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention

NICHOLAS THOMAS & WILLIAM T. TOW*

Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong & International Relations and Asian Politics Research Unit, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

'Human security' is a promising but still underdeveloped paradigmatic approach to understanding contemporary security politics. We argue that tension between those embracing the politics of development and those supporting the human security paradigm has intensified because the *transnational* dimensions embodied within the latter approach have been under-assessed. The idea of 'threat' also needs to be identified with more precision for the human security concept to accrue analytical credibility. We focus on how transnational behaviour addresses the central human security problems of vulnerability and immediacy. Human security's utility for confronting crisis is also evaluated via the application of two case studies of humanitarian intervention: the 1994 multinational operation in Haiti and the 1999 intervention in East Timor. We conclude that, while general security politics includes both domestic and international issues, human security allows us to transcend sovereign prerogatives and to address emerging transregional threats more effectively.

Introduction

Put bluntly, our accepted definition of the limits of national security as coinciding with national borders is obsolete.[1]

What is needed today … is not so much territorial security – the security of the state – but human security, the security of the people in their everyday lives.[2]

THE END OF THE COLD WAR generated a major re-evaluation of normative and policy assumptions as these apply to international relations (IR). In particular, new attempts were undertaken to explain what made people 'secure'. Historically, security was understood in terms of threats to state sovereignty and territory. Alternative explanations of security politics were introduced throughout much of the 1990s, spanning such concerns as

access to basic foodstuffs, the quality of the global environment and the economic welfare of populations inhabiting developing countries. These alternative explanations of security generated discussion about how far the security paradigm could be widened and about what is the most appropriate way to achieve this expansion. As one respected observer has noted, security politics was focusing increasingly on the problem of how to neutralize 'threats without enemies'.[3] Put somewhat differently, the term 'human security' has been developed as an idea that can be contrasted with 'national security' and that can direct attention to an emerging and wider spectrum of security issues.

The human security orientation was perhaps initially embraced in a landmark 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security*.[4] This report offered a model that incorporated seven broad categories of the security *problematique* – economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political and food. Although primarily an analysis of development crises facing the post-Cold War world, it also adopted a key postulate that, if applied, would have major implications for security politics: A 'secure state' untroubled by contested territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people. International security politics, the report clearly implied, must widen its focus and include not only 'the security of borders [but] also ... the security of peoples lives'. Another seminal document, prepared by the UN Commission on Global Governance the following year (1995), argued that recent episodes of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere by collective security entities (i.e. NATO and the UN) necessitated a widening of the security concept to recognize the 'unrelenting human costs of violent conflicts' *within* boundaries.[5] 'Human security', then, emanates from the challenge of reconciling internal developmental and external threat components.

In this article, we argue that if the term 'human security' were defined more narrowly, it would accrue greater analytical and policy value. This is because it would then represent a distinct class of security problems – separate from those embraced by traditional national security criteria – that have become more urgent in recent years. Our proposed definitional approach to human security has three interlocking features. First, it entails recognizing that transnational threats to international norms arising from inadequacies in internal state systems make individuals and groups within states more vulnerable. Second, it asserts that states and individuals confronting such vulnerabilities often cannot address them effectively on their own. This leads to the third component of our approach: these states and people require some form of international intervention to gain freedom from fear and want (the fundamental objective of human security). This approach imposes constraints on state sovereignty through the mobilization of international civil society to safeguard international norms 'and the sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalising world'.[6]

This approach is also conceptually distinct from those traditionally applied to national security, human development and other aspects of IR. It involves focusing on those events that *transcend* state borders in terms of their impact on different societies and diverse individuals. Within a given state, events or problems such as those relating to food distribution, gender discrimination and basic shelter are usually contained and resolved within the state's sovereign boundaries and are thus best viewed as development problems. An event or crisis becomes a truly human security problem, however, when the ramifications of not overcoming it cross a state's borders and assume a truly international significance, affecting other societies and individuals. This is particularly so when that event is 'non-linear' – where causes and effects beyond the immediate area of the threat must be considered and where the postures and resources of a single state are inadequate to resolve the problem at hand. Cross-border terrorism, pollution, refugees and genocide are all clear examples of threats that undermine international peace and security. In this context, the 'levels of analysis' question of where human security is best conceptualized – international society, the state or the individual – is rendered less central to the human security paradigm than many of its investigators have claimed. 'Peacebuilding' operations rationalized on both traditional and human security grounds are materializing more often at the non-state level in the post-Cold War environment, rendering efforts to demarcate a unique human security paradigm more difficult.[7] We see our task here as assessing how the *evolution* of human security might proceed in ways that coexist with more traditional approaches, rather than advocating the former outlook's complete revision.

To test our argument in the following pages, we will initially examine how human security represents a departure from the traditional perspectives of security studies. Transnational behaviour addressing the problems of the vulnerability and immediacy of human security will then be discussed. We underscore the relevance of a more confined approach to human security through an examination of two case studies on humanitarian intervention, in Haiti and East Timor, where a potential or real threat required peacebuilding action by the international community. The article will conclude with some observations about the future utility of the human security paradigm for the study of international security politics.

Developing the 'Human Security' Paradigm: Prioritizing Threats Beyond the State

In terms of human security, the problem of 'threat' is not necessarily constrained within the confines of state conflict. To the extent that they were

considered at all after World War II, human security factors were couched
within the ongoing debate between 'orthodox' or 'alternative' development
theorists. This tendency still emerges in some contemporary investigations.
(Harvard University's Project on Human Security, for example, defines
human security as 'the expected number of years of life spent outside the state
of generalized poverty'.[8] This fairly specialized basis of measurement tends to
omit critical referents of transnational human security – such as political pris-
oners, refugees and victims of environmental or pandemic tragedies – that,
again, transcend individual sovereign boundaries and agendas.) Other ana-
lysts, however, became more prepared to contest the idea of security as the
exclusive domain of those concerned with sovereign or territorial threats.
Calls were increasingly made for a broader, more integrative security pur-
view. This would encompass the 'governance and protection of political
communities with broader goals of individual welfare and invulnerability'
against such unstructured threats as environmental degradation, human
rights violations or forced migration.[9] Such a widened view of security
required a new set of norms addressing the plights of victims who were either
trapped in the numerous limited conflicts that emerged during the 1990s or
suffered owing to other civil and natural disasters. This broader focus on secu-
rity competed with the predictable rationalist views that dominated the era of
Soviet–US geostrategic competition.

 'New' sets of security concerns included a formidable array of non-military
factors resulting from globalization.[10] A view developed that the time and
space in which actions took place had been reduced – that an event in one part
of the world could have a much more immediate effect on distant states, socie-
ties or individuals than was previously possible.[11] Foreign policy planners
from various 'middle power' states in the UN, such as Canada and Norway,
quickly seized upon this 'human security' rubric and equated it with 'humani-
tarian' issues of IR. The acceleration of UN involvement in humanitarian
interventions throughout the 1990s was a watershed in expanding the security
paradigm, as was the increased interest taken by the UN Secretary-General in
building up that organization's humanitarian infrastructure. As the United
Nations expanded its collaboration with private sector humanitarian organiza-
tions, the old bloc politics of the Cold War evolved within a few short years (at
least in an institutional sense) into what analysts labelled 'embedded humani-
tarianism'.[12]

 This trend, in turn, spawned greater efforts to conceptualize and implement
a more precise 'human security' concept. This imperative was underscored by
the need for states to ensure that their citizens were made as secure as possi-
ble. Even when states were not securing their citizens, it was the responsibility
of other international actors to enforce compliance with humanitarian norms.[13]
The humanitarian-based international norms underwriting the human secu-
rity approach also fostered the belief that the international community was

responsible for safeguarding individual rights where individual states failed to do so.[14]

When Is a Threat a Human Security Threat?

If traditional explanations of security give way to more egalitarian and less state-centric notions of today's security challenges, it still remains all too easy for policymakers 'to force new problems into familiar categories'.[15] Human security can certainly be applied to meeting urgent threats emanating from external sources, but it has also been concerned with overcoming vulnerabilities of individuals incurred at other levels (e.g. domestic politics). Its most fundamental application is to concentrate upon enhancing the physical security and economic welfare of *all* the world's human inhabitants, notwithstanding their sovereign status or individual identity.

   If the human security concept is to be analytically useful, it must meet a fundamental criterion relative to threat definition: it must provide tangible threat parameters against which relative security environments and situations can be measured. The seven criteria stipulated in the aforementioned 1994 HDR represented an initial effort to establish such parameters since these focused on how to decrease the vulnerability of international actors. Although targeted at the level of the individual, the report acknowledged that vulnerability also encompassed societies and states. Yet the implied breadth of this application may have devalued the human security aspect by broadening the idea beyond measurable limits. Recent human security research has tended to project human security as either a general label for assessing non-military threats or as a descriptive itinerary of challenges to individuals' quality of life.[16] Reconciling the concepts of threat entertained by the traditional security and human security paradigms remains problematic as long as the latter approach is subject to vague and logistically inconsistent applications.

   The approach to 'threat' thus underscores the tension between earmarking the individual as the key unit of analysis and retaining the state as the central actor or referent within the human security paradigm. This tension is only partially resolved by assuming that the state is not unitary. It can be viewed at the domestic level as comprised of a coalition of interests (the state, the society and the individual) that is responsive to a particular human security issue only when a dominant political majority agrees. In a majority of cases, this dominance will emanate from the state, but it can be influenced by opinions held by other domestic actors given the state's resource capacity. In addition, any subset of this coalition may develop transborder relations with subsets in other countries to influence public policy.

The causes and effects beyond the immediate area of threat must also be considered in a human security context. Environmental crises are illustrative. 'Environmental decline occasionally leads directly to conflict.... Generally, however, its impact on nations' security is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability.'[17] Yet it is very difficult to measure the cumulative effects that other, non-environmental factors have had in either creating a new threat or in generating spillover effects relative to existing ones. In dealing with an event from a security perspective, limits must be placed on the analysis lest the human security paradigm become too amorphous and therefore questionable. Rather than attempt to measure the relative value of each factor that constitutes a human security threat, it is more useful to demonstrate how these factors might operate separately or in tandem during specific crises.

A related and key problem that emerges in human security is the status accorded to state sovereignty. Most important here is the imperative to apply an objective evaluation to the process of threat intensification – how rapidly a threat materializes and how serious it will be to populations that transcend national borders. Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh have pinpointed what are perhaps the two most critical factors that exacerbate human security threats in our time: (1) the increased rate and degree of unfettered human mobility; and (2) transnational access to goods, services and technology on a global scale, compromised only by corporate interaction or 'globalization'.[18] These factors can be critical in a human security context because they may compromise a state's natural propensity to provide maximum security for its own citizens.

Implementing Threat Responses

Clearly, there are too many and too diverse a range of human security issues for them all to be resolved through the application of a single macro-strategy. The primary considerations for prioritizing one human security challenge over another, however, appear to be those of extreme vulnerability and imminent danger. Three broad categories clearly relate to these considerations: (1) victims of war and internal conflict; (2) persons who barely subsist and are thus courting 'socio-economic disaster'; and (3) victims of natural disasters.[19] These categories, either by themselves or in combination, generate urgent and compelling humanitarian emergencies that demand attention.

Responding effectively to human security contingencies involves demarcating between 'general' and 'specific' threats.[20] General threats in a human security context are those that are broadly based and recurrent, such as hunger or disease. They tend to increase the vulnerability of a greater number of individuals over time but may be less urgent in terms of demanding action by states or other referent groups than specific threats, such as a single terrorist

act or a particular natural disaster. However, their modification or resolution may benefit more individuals on a transnational basis. Specific threats are single actions that have an immediate effect on the safety or welfare of victims and demand immediate remedy. The puzzle confronting policymakers with regard to how to prioritize between general and specific threats lies in the calculation of trade-offs: does a specific threat, if left unresolved, have such immediate and overwhelming ramifications as to outweigh the implications of relegating a general threat competing for attention and resources to the back-burner?

National policymaking elites frequently confront this dilemma. Adequate transnational instruments for prioritizing and acting against the myriad of human security problems now emerging in our world are often lacking because states have yet to adapt effectively to an increasingly complex and multilevel international security environment. In evaluating past responses to crises that, in retrospect, can be identified as being of a human security nature, illustrative approaches can be highlighted. 'Peacekeeping' (the act of instilling confidence and cooperative behaviour among potentially adversarial parties by non-military means), for example, emerges as a major catalyst for the operationalization of the human security approach. Yet, to derive a comprehensive picture of those security situations that evolve into interventions, peacekeeping must be considered in tandem with more overt forms of peace-enforcement behaviour. In this context, human security politics often dovetails with more traditional (state-centric) responses to crises, as the latter are frequently found in the area of humanitarian interventions.

Case Studies

For the purposes of this article, we will tailor our analysis to two specific intervention episodes that can be viewed as 'complex coercive contingency operations' undertaken to achieve human security goals.[21] The US-led intervention in Haiti in 1994 and the Australian-led East Timor operation in 1999 embody appropriate peacebuilding and enforcement characteristics. Both were human security contingencies that involved elements of vulnerability and immediate danger. Both also involved choices, for those who intervened, between responding to general or to specific threats.

It should be recognized that peacebuilding operations are a comparatively recent innovation compared with traditional state-centric peace-enforcement or peacekeeping operations. Indeed, peacebuilding operations have largely come into their own in the post-Cold War era with the recognition that states no longer have the absolute capacity to create peace but need to rely upon peaceful, secure societies as well. The problem is that an artificial division

remains between the two forms of operation, hampering the generation of enduring stability in insecure environments. The fact is that the more success-ful operations, such as Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and UNTAET (East Timor), have combined both facets – either simultaneously or in phases.

Haiti 1994

In 1994, the United States led a multinational effort to return ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.[22] This operation had initially evolved from a US determination to displace a military regime led by General Raoul Cedras, who had previously ousted an elected civilian government headed by Aristide in September 1991. Subsequent UN Security Council reso-lutions had imposed economic sanctions against the Cedras regime. Haiti's already struggling economy was devastated, leading to a major humanitarian crisis and prompting refugee flows to the USA and other regional countries. In July 1994, UN Security Council Resolution 940 was passed, authorizing the use of 'all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership' on humanitarian grounds.[23] Following the deployment of a US-led intervention force, Cedras left the country in mid-October, and Aristide returned to power a month later. US forces handed over military operations in Haiti to a UN force in March 1995.[24]

The intervention (code-named Operation Uphold Democracy) was, for its time, an unusual combination of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases. The first phase of the operation went largely as foreseen. Helped by the abdication of Cedras immediately prior to the landing of the first peace-keepers, the restoration of the Aristide regime was readily accomplished. The second phase, to secure democracy in Haiti, was far more difficult – requiring a long-term commitment that arguably only partially succeeded in meeting its objectives.[25] This phase attempted to build the capacity of Haiti's economic, social and legal institutions to provide for sustainable peace and development, both domestically and regionally.[26]

Although undertaken at a time when human security was just being concep-tually born, the Haitian operation was based upon an operational configura-tion that is now prevalent in the human security discourse. The operation's policy planners in the USA and the UN recognized that peace was not pro-vided solely by the state but was dependent upon social and economic actors within civil society. From this starting point, Operation Uphold Democracy implicitly acknowledged that the provision of sustainable security for the Haitian population relied upon a myriad of actions that were interconnected at both social and state levels. To build peace and security in Haiti necessi-tated a multifaceted process that allowed the various participants a degree of autonomous (but interdependent) sovereignty. The aim of the Haitian inter-vention was to restore to power a democratically elected regime. This implies

an obligation upon states not only to adhere to certain international norms of governance but also to take necessary measures to ensure that such norms are upheld by other states.[27]

East Timor

The East Timor crisis exploded in late summer 1999. It was the culmination of an imbroglio over Indonesian sovereign authority that had lasted nearly a quarter of a century. Indonesian troops had occupied East Timor in 1975 following Portugal's departure as the colonial power for that territory. The UN had never recognized Indonesia's 1976 annexation of East Timor, and a protracted insurgency war waged by indigenous Timorese against Indonesian forces continued to undermine Jakarta's authority in the province. With President Suharto's resignation in May 1998 and the subsequent political turmoil in Indonesia, Suharto's successor, Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie, surprised everyone by announcing that a referendum would be conducted in East Timor under UN auspices in August 1999. Nearly every eligible East Timorese voter exercised the right to vote, and 78% chose the independence option. In the aftermath, pro-Indonesian militias terrorized an East Timorese populace that had voted overwhelmingly to secede from Indonesia.[28]

   A 'coalition of the willing' was quickly fashioned to create the International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) intervention force. Around 11,550 troops were deployed to secure East Timor against further atrocities. Authorized by the UN Security Council to safeguard East Timorese independence, INTERFET – and a successor peacekeeping contingent, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – successfully moved the fledgling state towards full autonomy. Although the USA did not provide land forces, it contributed vital airlift and maritime capabilities to facilitate the movement and support of INTERFET ground personnel.[29]

   Australia underwrote this peacekeeping operation's initial costs, but an international trust fund was later founded to smooth the transition from peacekeeping to nation-building. The transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding was well under way by January 2000, when UNTAET supplanted INTERFET as the operational UN peacekeeping entity. The UN assumed responsibility for nation-building and the organization of East Timor's civil services. It also coordinated delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance.[30]

Comparisons

The holistic nature of human security offers a framework for removing the conceptual division between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Rather than assessing a conflict as simply requiring either a peacekeeping or a

peacebuilding operation to resolve the situation, a human security approach merges elements of both. As Elizabeth Cousens has observed with respect to the post-Cold War era, 'Both the conditions that gave rise to [wars] and those that resulted from them argued for a more holistic approach to keeping peace that went beyond military and security priorities to address issues of governance, democratic legitimacy, social inclusion, and economic equity.'[31] This list of domestic issues is in keeping with the new humanitarian norms that, as discussed above, link a state's internal affairs to their perceived impact on the well-being of the international community.

By creating coalitions of actors able to address macro- as well as micro-level concerns, there is a greater potential for realizing broader conditions for a sustainable peace. Such actors include (but are not limited to) the military, civil society organizations (CSOs) and business groups, all of which must operate in conjunction with the host state. At different stages (or to achieve different objectives), different configurations may be congenial. Thus, in East Timor, immediately after the vote for independence, the military, CSOs and the UN operated in coalition with the representatives of the East Timorese leadership to enforce, keep and then build the peace. In the period leading up to the first general elections in August 2001, various business–CSO–East Timorese coalitions emerged, under a UN umbrella, to create an environment conducive to the alleviation of human insecurity. It was hoped that transnational insecurities (between East Timor and Indonesian West Timor) could be mitigated through the creation of an economically stable domestic environment.[32]

Both operations (Haiti and East Timor) also relied upon economic forces to generate conditions for sustainable security. In Haiti, economic stability was initially of lesser importance than restoration of the Aristide regime. An embargo, which preceded Operation Uphold Democracy, shrank the economy by 30%. However, during the peacekeeping phase, the United States and other international donors pledged compensatory funding.[33] Although these funds partially reversed the economic decline, many social and economic indicators (such as unemployment levels and foreign direct investment) remained below pre-coup levels.[34] In East Timor, an economic 'jump-start' was considered vital if the newly emergent state was to remain viable. Economic growth was directly tied to social cohesion and political stability. UNTAET thus emphasized the creation of training and education programmes to complement a central job bank that matched labour tasks with the approximately 80% of the East Timorese population that were without means of support.[35]

In both Haiti and East Timor, the economic conditions for security were not sustainable without supporting political structures. As Chetan Kumar noted with regard to Haiti, 'Clearly, in the absence of a political process to absorb and manage it, economic assistance [alone] cannot be a reliable path to building international peace.'[36] East Timor's economic recovery has been hampered by the absence of a representative political system able to generate policies on

behalf of its citizens. This lack of popular representation, and hence legitimization, has slowed down reconstruction efforts and led to dissatisfaction with the UN authorities.[37]

In addition, also in both Haiti and East Timor, there were systemic domestic problems that led to the creation of transnational tensions that overwhelmed the afflicted states' capacity to resolve their own political crises. This led to coalitions being formed to address the crises, seeking a return to a condition of state security that would reinforce international security. However, to resolve the transnational problems, domestic-level issues also had to be addressed. This required top-down structures in the form of peace-enforcing/peacekeeping operations along with bottom-up projects to build peace and security. These bottom-up projects drew upon domestic and international civil society organizations to help resolve the crises. In Haiti, the UN made an explicit attempt to incorporate 'international and humanitarian organizations' in 'sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase'.[38] In the case of East Timor, Security Council Resolution 1264, passed in mid-September 1999, called for UN members to meet 'the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance'. The Australian government had already put together a A\$3 million aid package to facilitate the delivery of emergency relief supplies by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Caritas to both East Timorese and large numbers of displaced people camping in West Timor. Australian, British, French and World Food Programme (WFP) transport aircraft were subsequently used to conduct airdrops of food rations and blankets to the besieged outer areas of the former province.[39] In both Haiti and East Timor, the operations of civil society organizations supplemented the capacity of domestic and international institutions.

In both crises, strong lobbying efforts preceded the initiation of peace operations. In the case of Haiti, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the regional Caribbean community (CARICOM) actively lobbied the Haitian regime to change its practices. Immediately after the coup d'état that ousted President Aristide in 1991, the OAS sent a mission to Haiti to meet with General Cedras to seek a return of the elected regime.[40] Later, the member-states of CARICOM supported UN Security Council Resolution 940 as a group and committed themselves to contributing military personnel to the multinational force.[41] In the United States, state and civil society representatives actively lobbied the Clinton administration to take action. An example of this was seen in the actions of the black caucus in the US Congress, which undertook a campaign to encourage the administration to take action against the coup leaders.[42]

In East Timor, the United States applied decisive pressure on the Habibie government in Indonesia to authorize a peacekeeping operation on its soil. This facilitated efforts by Australian diplomats at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Auckland to secure logistical support from the USA for the operation and, as importantly, to mobilize international opinion

to favour military intervention in the crisis. Illustrative was a press statement issued by the US–Korea–Japan Trilateral Summit, held just prior to APEC, that called for the Indonesian government to take prompt measures to relieve the crisis and for the members of the international community to work toward that end. From mid-September, Australia worked closely with representatives from the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to facilitate the emergency relief assistance of other NGOs in the most oppressed areas of East Timor.[43]

Hence, from the outset, both interventions relied on transnational lobbying at both the state and societal levels to achieve their objectives. In addition to the traditional state-to-state efforts, local and international CSOs were co-opted to pressure the host state in an attempt to create a space in which policy change could occur. Without these efforts, the alleviation of insecurity would undoubtedly have been less effective.

In traditional security terms, these lobbying efforts were a clear imposition on the sovereignty of the host states (Haiti and Indonesia). Despite this, both cases under review here were internationally sanctioned operations. In part, this was because of perceived violations of international norms by the Haitian government and the Indonesian-backed militias. There was also concern that these crises might spill over the borders of the affected states and threaten other countries (in the Caribbean and Australia, respectively). In both instances, these violations and insecurities encompassed human rights abuses and forced immigration flows as well as state-sanctioned breakdowns in governance and economic development. Hence, the lobbying efforts represent an evolution in crisis resolution. Not only do these activities represent a weakening of sovereignty, whereby the state is no longer free to act in a manner it sees as appropriate within its own borders; they also demonstrate that the international community now includes a broad range of non-state organizations that are viewed as having a legitimate purpose in security contingencies.

Lessons Learned

In examining possible options for the resolution of human security crises, certain factors become apparent from the two cases examined here. First, human security threats do not confine their genesis to a particular catalyst, such as a military confrontation, a health epidemic or an environmental disaster. There are always other factors that lead to the emergence of a particular threat. It is no longer sufficient simply to send in troops to restore peace between warring groups or to stop forests from being illegally logged. Systematic programmes that link political and economic reforms to social development must be implemented to correct the underlying deficiencies.

Second, in the post-Cold War era, the international community has decided that some areas of security and well-being overlap domestic and international

boundaries. Where this occurs, the international community has a legitimate right to lobby for change. State sovereignty still exists, but it is no longer a compelling deterrent against intervention to affect change. These factors mean that, from a security viewpoint, the world must be seen in a more complex fashion than traditional security paradigms have allowed. However, various aspects of traditional security approaches also remain relevant. By combining peace-enforcement with peacebuilding, human security provides one, potentially significant, framework for reconciling security needs within the contemporary international security environment.

Conclusion

This article has argued that human security could become an important approach to managing contemporary IR if it were to be applied with more precision and were focused on transnational threats. It could be especially useful for explaining and justifying humanitarian interventions by underscoring the causes that generate the conflicts that invite such action. Security politics as a whole should be seen as a mix of domestic and international issues. In identifying those issues that transcend a purely sovereign locale, however, a more inclusive definition of security can be applied to international security problems. Even though this structure challenges traditional prerogatives of sovereignty, it must be recognized that this entity was already being tested in a number of IR arenas. Such a trend neither delegitimizes the state nor devalues sovereignty, but rather places both in a contemporary setting where their relative worth as security agents can be more accurately assessed.

Human security can thus be considered a valid paradigm for identifying, prioritizing and resolving emerging transnational security problems. There remain policy limitations, however, on its conceptual and empirical utility. Most notably, policy communities rarely have the resources to reach micro levels of analysis and resolution. An increasing array of socio-political, cultural and economic problems that lead to security crises represents a substantial challenge for both policymakers and their polities to address and overcome. But human security can be applied through successive processes of learning and help resolve the core problems underlying potential threats before they intensify. This may require marshalling resources that exceed the capacity of single contributing states or parties. In such instances, coalitions of additional actors (for example, CSOs) can help meet the capacity shortfall. This has already taken place in various humanitarian interventions, as we have demonstrated in the cases of Haiti and East Timor.

Ultimately, the fact remains that traditional interpretations of security cannot fully meet the international security community's present needs. A human

security approach to transnational security problems offers an alternative analytical framework. State sovereignty remains a key element in contemporary IR. However, the security requirements of the international community are being increasingly linked to the internal behaviour of its individual member-states. If international security is to be achieved, it must address the behavioural challenges that are emerging. The human security model offers a way to respond to these challenges – upholding the contemporary international order without devaluing its most important function: safeguarding and improving the quality of life of those individuals and groups that constitute the state's reasons for being.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

  * Nicholas Thomas is a Research Officer for the China–ASEAN Project at the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR. He received his PhD from the University of Tasmania. William T. Tow is Professor of International Relations and Director of the International Relations and Asian Politics Research Unit (IRAPRU) at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

 1 Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 162–177.

 2 Inge Kaul, 'Peace Needs No Weapons: From Military Security to Human Security', *Ecumenical Review*, vol. 47, no. 3, July 1995, pp. 313–319, on p. 313.

 3 A theme found consistently throughout James Hamill's 'From Realism to Complex Interdependence? South Africa, Southern Africa and the Question of Security', *International Relations*, vol. 14, no. 3, December 1998, pp. 1–30.

 4 United Nations Development Programme (HDR), *New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

 5 Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Sverre Lodgaard, 'Human Security: Concept and Operationalization', paper prepared for Expert Seminar on Human Rights and Peace, Geneva, 8–9 December 2000 (available from Harvard University's Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at http:// www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/lodgaard.pdf). We have also developed this point from anonymous reviewers' comments on an earlier draft of this article and are grateful to the reviewers for their input.

 6 Lodgaard, ibid., p. 4.

 7 As noted by William T. Tow & Russell Trood, 'Linkages Between Traditional Security and Human Security', in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur & In-Taek Hyun, *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 22–24.

 8 Gary King & Christopher Murray, 'Rethinking Human Security', Program on Human Security, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 4 May, 2000, as posted at http://www.cbrss.harvard.edu/hs/measuring.htm.

9   George Maclean, 'Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 3, November 2000, pp. 269–276.

10 See, for example, Maclean, ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Astri Suhrke, 'Human Security and the Interest of States', *Security Dialogue,* vol. 30, no. 3, September 1999, pp. 268–269.

13 This point is emphasized by Francis Abiew, 'Assessing Humanitarian Interventions in the Post Cold War Period: Sources of Consensus', *International Relations*, vol. 14, no. 2, August 1998, p.62.

14 Chris Brown, 'Moral Agency and International Society: Reflections on Norms, the UN, Southampton FC, the Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign', paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, CA, 14–18 March 2000.

15 Richard A. Matthew & George E. Shambaugh, 'Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29, no. 2, June 1998, pp. 163–175, on p. 166.

16 A thoughtful discussion of the human security paradigm's methodological problems to date is Roland Paris's 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security,* vol. 26, no. 2, Autumn 2001, pp. 87–102.

17 Matthews (note 1 above), p. 166.

18 Matthew & Shambaugh (note 15 above), p. 167.

19 Suhrke (note 12 above), p. 272.

20 Matthew & Shambaugh (note 15 above), pp. 172–173.

21 See Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cherly Benard & Matthew Waxman, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 9–10. This study identifies complex coercive operations as 'being at the high end of the scale of contingencies' and as entertaining 'two main goals: (1) provid[ing] humanitarian assistance without trying to resolve conflict and (2) try[ing] to resolve conflict, typically through enforcement of a peace plan'.

22 Jean-Germain Gros, 'Haiti's Flagging Transition', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4, October 1997, pp. 94–109.

23 Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War,* Adelphi Paper 305 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 23–24.

24 For a detailed account of this military intervention, see John T. Fishel, 'Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities', *Military Review*, vol. 77, no. 4, July–August 1997, pp. 22–30; available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/fishel.htm.

25 Merlye Gelin-Adams, 'Holding Up Democracy', *The World Today,* vol. 56, no. 5, May 2000, pp 14–16; Ambassador James F. Dobbins, 'Haiti: A Case Study in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping', remarks at the ISD Conference on Diplomacy and the Use of Force, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 21 September 1995 (available at http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/haiti.htm.

26 The text of UN Security Council Resolution 940 made the link between Haiti's domestic stability and the regional security environment. This resolution determined 'that the

situation in Haiti … [constituted] a threat to peace and security in the region'. It was adopted by the Security Council at its 3413th meeting, on 31 July 1994.

27   David Malone, 'Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study', *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 126–146.

28   Leonard C. Sebastian & Anthony L. Smith, 'The East Timor Crisis: A Test Case for Humanitarian Intervention', *Southeast Asian Affairs 2000* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 64–86.

29   James Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention', *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 127–142; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *East Timor in Transition 1998–2000: An Australian Policy Challenge* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), pp. 140–154.

30   DFAT (note 29 above), p. 157.

31   Elizabeth Cousens, 'Introduction', in Elizabeth Cousens & Chetan Kumar, eds, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 1–20, on p. 1.

32   See the subsection on 'Civil Service' in DFAT (note 29 above), p. 161; and David Devoss, 'East Timor: The Little Country That Wants to Be', *Los Angeles Times*, 26 August 2001, p. M-2.

33   See David Crary, 'Donors Pledge $900 Million To Boost Democracy', Associated Press, 31 January 1995.

34   Gelin-Adams (note 25 above), pp. 14–16. An example of this partial reversal can be seen in Haitian unemployment statistics, which dropped from around 75% once Aristide was returned to office to approximately 65% by 1998.

35   DFAT (note 29 above), p. 162.

36   Chetan Kumar, 'Peacebuilding in Haiti', in Cousens & Kumar (note 31 above), pp. 21–52, on p. 42.

37   John McBeth, 'Whose Future Is It Anyway?', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 163, no. 45, 9 November 2000, pp. 68–71.

38   UN Security Council Resolution 940 (note 26 above).

39   DFAT (note 29 above), pp. 149–150.

40   Agence France Presse, 'OAS Envoy Says Haiti Talks to Continue Outside the Country', Agence France Presse, 14 November 1991.

41   US Department of State Dispatch, *US–CARICOM Efforts To Support UN Security Council Resolution 940* (statement by Strobe Talbott and John Deutch), 5 September 1994; available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki/Military/military.htm (under Case Studies/Haiti/UN Observer Mission in Haiti [UNMIH]).

42   Virginia W. Leonard, 'Back to the Future: Haiti in 1915 and 1994', *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, vol. 6, no. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 64–75.

43   DFAT (note 29 above), pp. 135–137, 150–152; Cotton (note 29 above), pp. 132–133.