

Political Culture in Germany

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17 Changing Aspects of National Identity in Germany

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At first glance, the question of whether East and West Germans have developed different national identities may seem to be answered by the overall support for German unification. This impression has been reinforced by first results from empirical research in both parts of Germany, which showed a great similarity of attitudes and provoked the question of whether 40 years of separation in fundamentally different political, economic and social systems really could have had no effect on people's political orientations. In the following we try to identify similarities and differences in the collective political orientations of East and West Germans in 1990.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: NATIONAL IDENTITY AS PART OF POLITICAL SUPPORT

Research on national identity often deals with the problem of either the use of too narrow concepts – for example, the concept of national character – or its use as a catch-all variable (Wuthe 1987). Looking at national identity from a certain perspective will only cover some aspects of the collective self-definition, but it can lead to a more clearly defined research question and conceptualization. National identity is included in Easton's model of political support (1965, 1975), which has reached some prominence as background for empirical research (see Chapter 16) and will be used here as well.

Whereas Almond and Verba (1963) thought of a congruence between political structure and political culture as the condition of system stability, Easton modifies this thought by proposing that the different categories of support (the combinations of an object and a mode of support) have distinctive relevance for stability. This idea of a hierarchy of stability assumes that specific support for the political

authorities can vary in the short term, and may even be lacking altogether without affecting the system as a whole, provided there exists diffuse support of the higher ranking objects (that is, the political regime and the political community).

In this concept national identity is restricted to support of the political community, which is either value-based and affective or instrumental. For the purpose of studying national identity, the most relevant advantage of this concept is the systematic integration of different attitudes towards the object (political community) into the political system, which allows us to relate these attitudes to an evaluation of the regime and the authorities.

However, for theoretical reasons as well as due to previous empirical research findings it seems to be necessary to modify this concept in some of its parts. With respect to the context of German unification only some of the problems can be outlined, and these will now be discussed.

A first problem arises with the definition of societal sub-systems. Supposing there is an increase of entanglements and interdependencies between the societal sub-systems in extremely complex societies, would studying only attitudes towards the political system be appropriate when investigating processes connected to political legitimacy on the whole? With regard to this problem two points are of special importance: (1) the structural interdependency of the political and the economic system, and (2) the entanglement of the culture of the political system and the social system (see introduction above). Thus, concerning the demand for German unity and support for democratic forms of government by the East Germans, it is crucial to decide how far this support has been motivated politically and how far it has been motivated economically. Conversely, the influence of political, economic and also social motives of West Germans for their support, rejection or scepticism with regard to the question of German unity and their new fellow-citizens has to be considered.

A second problem is the assumption of a congruence of the political structure and the political culture as the core condition and indicator for stability. This presupposition is directed towards a stable situation and does not sufficiently take into account developmental aspects. As a consequence, it does not reflect the importance of reciprocity between the culture and the structure of a political system, when non-simultaneous developments of both elements (as well as external impacts on the political system) are taking place. A political system can be at least temporarily stabilized, in spite of a pronounced

incongruence between structure and culture, not only by force but also by the effects of other societal sub-systems. Moreover, a total and uninterrupted congruence of structure and culture may also indicate a stagnation of the political system. Whenever important changes occur outside a particular political system, such an uninterrupted congruence might even be a source of danger for the political system because of its lack of ability to adjust.

The preceding arguments suggest the following modifications of Easton's model of political support: (1) the inclusion of non-political sub-systems in order to integrate their possible influences on political support, and (2) the inclusion of retrospective and prospective attitudes in order to integrate a developmental perspective at a given point in time.

For these reasons, questions arise about the constitutive impact of such attitudes on the political identity, about their relation to attitudes towards other political objects, and about the possible effects for political legitimacy in general.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE GERMANS' NATIONAL IDENTITY

The following analyses of attitudes towards the political community attempt to give some hints about to what extent the proposed extensions of the model of political support correspond to empirical evidence. However, the available data base only covers small parts of the theoretically distinguished categories of support. Furthermore, these analyses will mainly be restricted to East Germany, because similar indicators of national identity for East and West have only been investigated in different years. As a consequence, a methodologically stringent comparison is not entirely possible.¹

Attitudes towards German Unification and the Regime

In conceptual terms, German unification can be regarded as the creation of a new political community. It involves both constitutive elements of this object: the territories of two formally independent states and their populations have been united to form a single state. Nevertheless, this event happened under a set of particular premises, which may have effects on the subjective perception of this process. On the one hand, considering the former unity of both states, German

unification could be subjectively perceived as 'reunification' of elements belonging together. On the other hand, with regard to the 40 years of separation and the development of contrasting political systems it could subjectively appear as a 'unification' of two actually independent and heterogeneous elements. Furthermore, according to Article 23 of the West German constitution, it might appear – from a West German point of view – just as an extension of the existing political community. In contrast, from an East German point of view, it could be conceived as a complete dissolution of the previously existing political community and an integration of its members into another political community. Moreover, this dissolution of a political community coincides with an almost complete change of the regime and the political authorities for the East German population. Therefore the question of a loss or transformation of identity is posed much more strongly for the East Germans than for the West Germans.

Since the foundation of the FRG there has been a basically positive diffuse support for an eventual reunification by the majority of the population. The somewhat lower support in the younger cohorts was interpreted by some authors not to be a generational, but a life-cycle effect (Jansen 1990). However, such figures may have been inflated by the fact that unification was becoming increasingly less probable and less important as a political issue. A growing identification with the social system and the political and cultural integration into Western societies had become more important. Therefore the general support for unification by 70–80 per cent of the citizens decreased to 50–60 per cent if international neutrality was to be the condition for reunification (*Politbarometer West* 11/1989). With the wave of emigration from the GDR to the FRG since the summer of 1989 the importance of the issue of unification rose enormously and support was growing as well.² However, since the question of a transformation of the political and economic system was never posed to the West Germans, the indicators of how deep this support was anchored in their belief systems seem to be ambivalent.

On the one hand, there is an ever-increasing support in principle (see Table 17.1) for reunification (up to 93 per cent of the population in October 1990: *Eurobarometer* 34/0). On the other hand, we find somewhat less support with regard to more differentiated questions and in the case of the affective dimension (see Table 17.2), as well as much scepticism with respect to the speed of the unification process (see Table 17.3). On the whole, however, a majority supported unification, although they clearly perceived disadvantages at the

Table 17.1 Diffuse support for German unification (column percentages)

		FRG												GDR												
		8/89	1/90	2/90	3/90	4/90	5/90	6/90	8/90	3/90	4/90	5/90	6/90	8/90	9/90	8/89	1/90	2/90	3/90	4/90	5/90	6/90	8/90	9/90		
For		79	74	78	82	81	83	83	85	91	89	93	94	95												
Indifferent		12	10	12	6	8	8	6	7	3	3	3	3	3												
Against		8	14	8	10	10	8	10	7	5	6	4	3	2												
MD		1	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	-	-	-												
Total (n)		1002	1016	1006	1020	1023	1008	1028	1018	1450	933	723	969	1105												

Source: Politbarometer (and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1/90, weighted).

present time (see Table 17.4a). The fact that they saw more advantages than disadvantages in the long run (see Table 17.4b) indicates the importance of prospective instrumental evaluations for this diffuse support. At the same time, it indicates the possible danger of eroding diffuse support for German union in case these optimistic outlooks should be disappointed.

Opinion poll data about the GDR before the autumn of 1989 must be interpreted with care (Peter 1990; Thomas 1990). Nevertheless, they seem to indicate conflicting orientations of the citizens towards their

Table 17.2 Affective support for the German unification (column percentages)

Independently of concrete regulations, Germany will be unified. How do you feel about it? Are you...?			On 3 October both German states united. Are you...?		
<i>Apr/May 1990</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>	<i>October 1990</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>
Very pleased	18.8	40.8	Pleased	77.4	83.1
Pleased	54.8	50.0	Indifferent	13.7	9.7
Indifferent	11.8	5.6	Angry	6.2	5.6
Not pleased	13.9	3.3	MD	2.7	1.6
MD	0.8	0.2			
Total <i>n</i>	1700	808	Total <i>n</i>	1015	1581

Source: FGW

Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, *Politbarometer*, weighted.

Table 17.3 Opinions on the speed unification (column percentages)

Should the reunification come about very fast or rather slow?						
<i>Month/year</i>	<i>March 1990</i>		<i>April 1990</i>		<i>May 1990</i>	
	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>
Very fast	15	35	14	31	20	28
Slow	66	56	66	58	61	61
MD	19	9	20	11	19	11
Total <i>n</i>	1020	1450	1023	933	1008	723

Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1/90 *Politbarometer*, weighted.

Table 17.4 Instrumental support for the German unification at present and in the long run (column percentages)

(a) Do you think the unification of the two German states will bring the (FRG: West German; GDR: East German) population advantages, disadvantages or both at present?
 (b) And which will be the case in the long run?

	<i>March</i> 1990		<i>April</i> 1990		<i>May</i> 1990		<i>September</i> 1990	
	GDR	FRG	GDR	FRG	GDR	FRG	FRG	
(a) at present								
Advantages	21	12	14	14	17	12	10	
Both	46	34	43	36	37	30	38	
Disadvantages	27	52	35	49	41	56	50	
MD	6	2	8	1	4	2	2	
(b) in the long run								
Advantages	58	47	56	46	55	48	49	
Both	38	40	38	41	39	39	39	
Disadvantages	4	9	5	8	5	7	10	
MD	0	4	1	5	1	6	3	
Total <i>n</i>	1450	1020	933	1023	723	1008	1009	

Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1/90 *Politbarometer*, weighted.

political system. In 1987, when 71 per cent of the population was in favour of reunification, only 4 per cent preferred a Western democratic regime and only 25 per cent preferred the socialist system of the GDR, whereas 58 per cent pleaded for a 'Third Path' between socialism and democracy (Stern 1987). Surveys commissioned by GDR institutes indicate that a certain level of subjective legitimacy of socialism and pride in the GDR began to erode in the 1970s and later faded away almost completely because of disappointed hopes aroused through *perestroika* in the Soviet Union (W. Friedrich 1990).

However, against this background, indicators of political support of reunification by the East Germans are more ambiguous than one might expect. At the end of 1989, when unification became increasingly probable, only 27 per cent of the GDR's citizens supported it, whereas 71 per cent preferred the GDR to remain a sovereign state (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1989, p.119). At the same time 71 per cent of the GDR's citizens evaluated the idea of socialism as very good or good (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1989, p.1), which might reflect a

preference for the 'Third Path' also discussed at the Round Table (see Chapter 13 in this volume; Herles and Rose 1990; Thaysen 1990b). This apparently substantial support for socialist ideals faded away in a very short period of time. In the election for the Volkskammer, which has been interpreted as a vote for unification (Kaase and Gibowski 1990, see also Chapter 14), representatives of the 'Third Path' won only very few votes. In March 1990 only one-quarter of the GDR's population still favoured the socialist idea very strongly or strongly, whereas at the same time half of the GDR's population evaluated democracy in the FRG as very good or good (see Table 17.5). Causes for these rapid changes in attitudes might be the first positive experiences with democracy and freedom. Moreover, the building-up of democratic structures in the GDR might have shown an extreme need for resources such as time, experience and money, all of which West Germany could provide. It seems reasonable to suppose that this has boosted demands for unification.

Nevertheless, when we compare support for reunification in principle (Table 17.1) with more differentiated and affective aspects of support (Table 17.2) and opinions on the speed of the unification process (Table 17.3), we still find some scepticism on the part of the GDR's citizens in 1990. Certainly, the consequences of unification are evaluated even more positively than by West Germans, especially in the long run (Table 17.4). However, these expectations are mainly directed towards the economic system: to an open-ended question on hopes linked to the unification almost all answers mentioned economic advantages, whereas only 44 per cent referred to the realization of democratic rights.

In view of the great hopes connected with unification, disappointment seemed unavoidable. Indeed, it came about fast and still persists in both East and West Germany (see Tables 17.6 and 17.7). It is difficult to predict in which way these disappointments will develop in future and how they will affect political legitimacy as a whole.

Affective Ties to Political Communities

In addition to these instrumental orientations and attitudes in principle, the affective dimension can be regarded as particularly relevant for the support of the political community. The indicator most often used for this dimension, national pride, shows a very low rate for the FRG in international comparisons: only about 60 per cent of the population are proud to be German. This is largely due to a perceived

Table 17.5 Support for democracy and socialism by the citizens of the GDR (column and row percentages)

		<i>March 1990 (n = 1422)</i> <i>Democracy in the FRG</i>					<i>Sept./Oct. 1990 (n = 805)</i> <i>Democracy in the FRG</i>						
<i>Idea of socialism</i>		<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Negative 5</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Negative 5</i>	<i>Total</i>
Positive													
1		1.3	7.1	17.3	9.3	64.7	11.0	1.0	8.3	20.8	19.8	50.0	11.9
		2.0	4.1	6.7	7.1	22.9		2.1	5.1	7.7	16.0	21.5	
		4.4	14.3	26.3	18.8	36.2	40.4	4.0	16.6	31.7	17.4	30.3	43.5
2		24.8	30.5	37.7	51.4	47.2		29.8	37.2	42.7	51.3	47.5	
		9.4	24.1	34.7	12.7	19.0	40.3	8.2	26.0	35.6	11.3	18.8	36.3
3		53.5	51.3	49.6	34.8	24.7		51.1	48.7	40.0	27.7	24.7	
		14.1	31.8	20.0	14.1	20.0	6.0	9.8	23.5	39.2	9.8	17.6	6.3
4		11.9	10.0	4.2	5.7	3.9		10.6	7.7	7.7	4.2	4.0	
Negative													
5		23.5	32.4	20.6	5.9	17.6	2.4	18.8	12.5	31.3	6.3	31.3	2.0
		7.9	4.1	1.7	1.0	1.4		6.4	1.3	1.9	0.8	2.2	
Total		7.1	18.9	28.2	14.8	31.0	100.0	5.8	19.4	32.3	14.8	27.7	100.0

Source: IVS, weighted.

Table 17.6 Fulfilment of expectations towards the unification (column percentages)

<i>Month year</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>GDR</i>
	<i>Oct. 1990</i>	<i>March 1991</i>	<i>April 1991</i>	<i>May 1991</i>	<i>May 1991</i>	<i>June 1991</i>	<i>June 1991</i>
Better	42	10	7	7	14	7	12
As expected	39	26	51	46	42	45	38
Worse	17	63	40	45	44	46	49
NA	2	1	2	2	—	2	1
Total <i>n</i>	1015	1130	1017	1004	1115	1042	1036

Source: Politbarometer, weighted.

Table 17.7 Satisfaction with the unification with respect to personal situation expectations (column percentages)

<i>GDR Month/year</i>	<i>March 1991</i>	<i>May 1991</i>	<i>June 1991</i>
Fulfilled	37	47	45
Not fulfilled	62	52	53
NA	1	2	1
Total <i>n</i>	1130	1115	1036

Source: Politbarometer, weighted.

ambivalence of such feelings, either because they have been exaggerated and exploited in the NS period of and/or because of the division of Germany (Rose 1985; Noelle-Neumann 1987). Against the expectations of some observers a significant change in national pride of the West Germans could not be found either after November 1989 or after the actual unification (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1989; Conradt 1991). However, this indicator does not distinguish explicitly between 'Germany as a whole' and the 'Federal Republic of Germany'. Consequently we do not know whether rejections of national pride refer to a different meaning of the object compared to the affirmative answers. We do know, however, that respondents stating pride in specific aspects of the FRG in the 1960s primarily mentioned the economic reconstruction, whereas in the 1980s their pride was primarily directed towards the constitution (51 per cent), followed by social security (40 per cent) (Topf, Mohler and Heath 1989). This may

be interpreted as the development of an authentic political identity as citizens of the FRG.

In contrast to what the above-mentioned data from GDR institutes suggest, we do not find a total collapse of pride in the GDR after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In March 1990, nearly half of the population in the GDR was very proud or proud to be a citizen of the GDR. Though the majority subjectively did not primarily see themselves as citizens of the GDR but as Germans, only one-sixth of them did not feel any pride in being a citizen of the GDR (see Table 17.8). In December 1990, after the Bundestag elections, when asked for specific topics of pride in the GDR, 70 per cent of the answers mentioned the socio-political services (47 per cent of all respondents). With respect to the united Germany the pride of the former citizens of the GDR was concentrated in the economy (60 per cent), followed by scientific (56 per cent) and cultural achievements (47 per cent) as well as sports (41 per cent), whereas political characteristics were clearly mentioned much less frequently (the constitution by 22 per cent and Parliament by 11 per cent of the respondents). This can be interpreted as a 'new myth of social welfare in the former GDR' and hints at a political instability in the eastern part of Germany, comparable to the one in the FRG in the 1960s (Mohler 1991). However, there may be a certain problem in understanding the indicator contributing to this distribution of answers: in case people link the stimulus 'pride' to their own performances – and this is at least the case for reasonable parts of the younger generations in the FRG (Westle 1990) – it is less possible for the new than for the old citizens of the FRG to mention the constitution, which was created by the politicians of West Germany 40 years before, and Parliament, which was shaped by Western politicians as well. But the first economic successes in the new *Bundesländer* can more easily be ascribed to citizens of the former GDR themselves, and performances in culture and sports could possibly include the past of both German states.

Additional indicators of affective diffuse support for the political community showed a relatively stable ranking of collective political identities in the FRG between the mid- and the late 1980s (see Table 17.9). The strongest affective ties were to be found with respect to the town or local community, followed by the *Bundesland*. The national level takes the third position, but is clearly more strongly supported than the supranational level of the EC. Since there are no adequate data available, we cannot compare affective ties to the FRG with those to the united Germany.

Table 17.8 National pride and feeling of belonging by citizens of the GDR in March 1990 (column percentages)

<i>Degree of pride</i>	<i>Feeling as</i>		<i>Total</i>	<i>n</i>
	<i>Citizen of GDR</i>	<i>German</i>		
Very proud	18.5	6.1	10.8	153
Proud	48.8	31.2	37.9	536
Somewhat proud	24.4	27.0	26.0	368
A little proud	5.9	19.5	14.3	202
Not at all proud	2.4	16.3	11.0	155
Total % (<i>n</i>)	38.4 (541)	61.7 (873)		1414

Source: IVS and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1/90, weighted.

Table 17.9 Affective ties to political communities on the part of the FRG citizens in 1985/86 and 1989 (column percentages)

Note we would like to know how you feel towards your commune (town) and its citizens?

Do you feel very attached to ...? (*Land*, FRG, EC)

<i>Degree of attachment</i>		<i>Local community</i>		<i>Land</i>		<i>FRG</i>		<i>EC</i>	
		<i>1985/86</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1985/86</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1985/86</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1985/86</i>	<i>1989</i>
Very much	7	36.9	39.2	26.1	29.1	27.8	29.6	9.8	8.2
	6,5	40.2	37.7	44.6	42.4	40.4	42.0	26.7	31.1
	4,3,2	19.6	21.6	26.6	27.1	28.6	27.0	53.8	53.0
Not at all	1	3.3	2.0	3.1	1.4	3.3	1.4	9.8	7.7
Mean		5.51	5.62	5.20	5.34	5.18	5.33	3.93	4.01
MD <i>n</i>		42	65	36	62	35	34	61	63

Note Total n 1985/86: 1843; 1989: 1939.

Source: SFB 3 A-7, weighted.

Similar survey questions asked in the GDR in March and in September/October 1990 showed a comparable distribution (see Table 17.10): the strongest affective support was directed towards the sub-national level and the weakest to the supranational level of Eastern and Western Europe, with the level of the GDR being ranked in the middle. To conclude on the basis of similar findings that 'there is no nation of the GDR, but there are Sachsen and Mecklenburger, who feel as Germans as well' (Scheuch 1990, p.751) seems to be a

Table 17.10 Affective ties to political communities on the part of GDR citizens in 1990 (column percentages)

Now we would like to know how you feel towards your commune (town) and its citizens?

Do you feel very attached to...? (*Land*, GDR, Germany as a whole, Western Europe, Eastern Europe)

<i>Degree of attachment</i>	<i>Local community</i>		<i>Land</i>		<i>GDR</i>		<i>Germany</i>		<i>West Europe</i>		<i>East Europe</i>	
	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>Sept./Oct.</i>
Very	38.9	40.7	48.5	47.4	32.1	27.2	50.0	38.6	16.1	11.9	8.8	8.5
Rather	37.4	38.6	30.3	37.0	42.9	39.0	32.3	42.2	34.1	37.9	31.3	32.5
A little	19.3	16.3	13.5	11.7	19.6	22.8	16.2	16.7	37.8	39.5	44.2	47.3
Not at all	4.3	4.3	7.7	3.9	5.5	10.9	1.7	2.5	12.1	10.7	14.5	11.7
Mean	1.89	1.84	1.80	1.72	1.98	2.17	1.70	1.83	2.46	2.49	2.65	2.62
MD <i>n</i>	18	52	22	50	19	52	20	50	22	48	18	60

Total *n* March 1990: 1450; Sept./Oct. 1990: 897.

Source: IVS, weighted.

precipitate interpretation, which just considers distributions and thereby sticks to the surface. The more positive values for the local community and the *Land* or region could be due to their unproblematic roles in the context of German unification. However, because they at least partially did not exist as political entities in the GDR and because their political status in a united Germany was not defined until then, the intensity of affective ties on the sub-national level is not trivial and might point to a latent stability of historically grown affiliations (see Chapter 7).

As was to be expected, the strongest affective support of East Germans is directed towards Germany as a whole at both points in time. Against the background of these strong affective ties to a united Germany and the dominant wish for German unification the rather strong affective ties to the GDR are surprising and indicate identity conflicts, or at least insecurity regarding this identity. This impression is confirmed by the stronger decline in the most intense ties to Germany between the spring and autumn of 1990 compared to the one directed towards the GDR, which may hint at an exaggeration of affective ties to Germany as a whole, due to the very politicized and emotional atmosphere in the spring. Therefore one should consider the possibility that identities which have been developed over a longer period of time will come out again more strongly in the future, and possible 'overadaptions' may fall back to a more 'normal' level.

Conflicting or Multiple Identities and Support for German Unification

Affective ties to political communities at the sub-national, national and supranational levels can be seen as multiple identities of the West Germans which are positively linked to each other and mutually reinforcing (Westle 1989).³

With respect to the citizens of the GDR we find insecurity and conflict between the objective citizenship of the GDR and the coming German union in their affective ties to the distinct political communities. Whereas in the spring of 1990 they perceive the local community and the *Land* either in the same way as the GDR or Germany as a whole (dependent on the inclusion of multiple indicators for the different levels), in the autumn of 1990 clear differences between the sub-national, the national and the supranational level became apparent. Correlations between the different identities show a low, but consistent, East–West difference between national pride in the GDR and tie to the GDR on the one hand, and

Table 17.11 Internal structure of affective ties for citizens of the GDR (tau b)

	<i>Pride in GDR</i>	<i>Tie to local community</i>	<i>Tie to Land</i>	<i>Tie to GDR</i>	<i>Tie to Germany</i>	<i>Tie to West Europe</i>	<i>Tie to East Europe</i>
<i>Pride in GDR</i>	1	0.10	0.03	0.43	-0.14	-0.12	0.08
<i>Tie to local community</i>	1	1	0.28	0.46	0.14	0.11	0.14
<i>Tie to Land</i>		1	1	0.16	0.28	0.23	0.13
<i>Tie to GDR</i>			1	1	-0.05	-0.06	0.15
<i>Tie to Germany</i>				1	1	0.43	0.10
<i>Tie to West Europe</i>					1	1	0.45
<i>Tie to East Europe</i>						1	1

Note: The first figure in each column is for March 1990; the second is for September/October 1990.
Source: IVS, unweighted.

the tie to Germany as a whole and to Western Europe on the other hand (see Table 17.11). Looking more closely at the relationship of the affective ties to the GDR and to Germany as a whole, we find on the intra-individual level about 14 per cent of the respondents with a primarily GDR identity at both points in time, compared to 20 per cent and 27 per cent with a primarily German identity, and 62 per cent in the spring and 53 per cent in the autumn with a multiple identity, and a slight increase from 4 per cent to 7 per cent without any more distinct territorial political identity (on the basis of dichotomized data; see Table 17.12). Such discrepancies between identities need not be in conflict. However, in the case of political communities which exclude each other they involve potential internal conflicts and social or political conflicts.

Table 17.12 Affective ties to the GDR and to Germany as a whole for citizens of the GDR (cell percentages)

(a) March 1990					(b) September/October 1990				
<i>GDR</i>	<i>Germany as a whole</i>		<i>Not at all</i>		<i>GDR</i>	<i>Germany as a whole</i>		<i>Not at all</i>	
	<i>Very</i>	<i>Rather</i>				<i>Little</i>	<i>Very</i>		
<i>Very</i>	17.1	8.4	6.5	0.8	<i>Very</i>	12.3	7.8	6.1	0.7
<i>Rather</i>	18.8	17.3	6.3	0.8	<i>Rather</i>	10.9	21.6	6.3	0.7
<i>Little</i>	9.8	5.4	3.3	0.1	<i>Little</i>	9.0	8.8	4.6	1.0
<i>Not at all</i>	4.2	1.0	0.2	–	<i>Not at all</i>	5.1	3.7	1.0	0.1

Source: IVS, unweighted.

These perceptions of, and the relations between, instrumental, affective and support in principle of the political communities conform to more general expectations: factor analyses and moderate correlations show that respondents perceive the affective and the support in principle as different sub-dimensions of one mode of (diffuse) support, whereas the instrumental evaluations are perceived as a different dimension. However, the relationship to attitudes towards unification come out most clearly (see Table 17.13): strong affective ties to Germany as a whole (and to Western Europe) are connected with the general support of unification and with the expectation of advantages, whereas affective ties to the GDR show the opposite relationships. Ties to Eastern Europe do not have any effect on the support for the unification.

Table 17.13 Relations between affective ties to political communities and attitudes towards the unification for citizens of the GDR (tau b)

	<i>Pride in GDR</i>	<i>Tie to local community</i>	<i>Tie to Land</i>	<i>Tie to GDR</i>	<i>Tie to Germany</i>	<i>Tie to Western Europe</i>	<i>Tie to Eastern Europe</i>
Diffuse support	-0.16	0.04	0.09	-0.10	0.27	0.16	0.05
Speed	-0.28	0.00	0.10	-0.24	0.34	0.24	0.02
Instrumental support at present*	-0.11	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.23	0.18	0.01
Instrumental support in long run	-0.16	0.04	0.04	-0.10	0.23	0.13	0.01
Affective support	-	-	0.14	-0.13	0.29	0.15	-0.03
Expectation fulfilment	-	-	0.05	0.01	0.17	0.12	-0.02

* in March general, in September/October personal advantages/disadvantages.

Note: The first figure in each column is for March 1990; the second is for September/October 1990.

Source: IVS, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1/90 and 2/90, unweighted.

Relationships between Support of Political Communities and other Political and Economic Orientations

In the 1980s citizens of the FRG clearly distinguished between support for the political authorities, the regime and the political community. Because of the modest, but regularly positive relations between these different categories of support and the above-mentioned development of the reasons for national pride it has been assumed that the multiple identities of the FRG's citizens are a consequence of overflows from an enduring relative satisfaction with policy outputs and the way democracy works (Westle 1989).

In contrast to that, the citizens of the GDR do not clearly distinguish between the different components of the political system, community, regime and authorities. However, the relationships between these different evaluations again are as expected (see Table 17.14): affective ties to the GDR and scepticism towards unification are linked to positive evaluations of the socialist idea, negative evaluations of democracy in the FRG, dissatisfaction with the changes in the GDR since the opening of the borders and negative evaluations of the FRG's government as well as the new GDR government.

Going beyond Easton's model of political support and including economic orientations as well, we find an even stronger fusion of different categories of support. Furthermore, we can discern quite a strong link between economic expectations and support for the FRG's government, the affective tie to Germany as a whole and hopes for German unification. This again points to the importance of economic motivations for the demand for German unification by the East German population. Finally, the present economic situation in the GDR is slightly correlated to its present government, but not linked to the socialist idea as such. This may hint at the future potential of a revival of socialist ideas (see Table 17.15).

Altogether, the differentiation between theoretically distinguishable categories of support in the perception of the East Germans is very weak (see Table 17.16). However, the moderate correlations between the individual indicators may indicate that this 'non-structure' is not a problem in principle. Analyses referring to age, education, qualification and ideological self-placement on the left-right continuum indicate expected effects of the socialization in the GDR on these political attitudes (Westle 1991). Therefore the confusion of different political objects by the respondents may at least partly be explained by their socialization in a society which explicitly connected the political regime

Table 17.14 Relations between affective ties to political communities, attitudes towards German unification and attitudes towards political regimes and political authorities for citizens of the GDR (tau b)

	Democracy in FRG	Idea of socialism	Changes since open border	Govern- ment of the GDR	Govern- ment of the FRG	SPD open position in FRG
Pride in GDR	-0.23	0.29	-0.05	-	-	-
Tie to local community	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.08	-0.03
Tie to <i>Land</i>	0.13	-0.10	0.11	0.6	0.09	-0.00
Tie to GDR	-0.21	0.26	-0.03	-0.15	-0.09	0.06
Tie to Germany	0.33	-0.29	0.24	0.26	0.16	-0.02
Tie to Western Europe	0.27	-0.22	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.01
Tie to Eastern Europe	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
<i>Unification</i>						
Diffuse support	0.23	-0.17	0.14	-	-	-
Speed	0.38	-0.32	0.21	-	-	-
Instrumental support at present*	0.26	-0.24	0.20	0.33	0.23	-0.03
Instrumental support in long run	0.25	-0.18	0.12	-	-	-
Affective support	-	0.37	-	0.24	0.23	0.01
Expectation fulfilment	-	0.19	-	0.24	0.21	-0.00

* In March general, in September/October personal advantages/disadvantages.

Note: The first figure in each column is for March 1990; the second is for September/October 1990.

Source: IVS, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2/90, unweighted.

Table 17.15 Relations between orientations towards the political system and economic orientations for citizens of the GDR in September/October 1990 (tau b)

<i>Political orientations</i>	<i>Present economic situation in the GDR</i>	<i>Future economic situation in the GDR</i>	<i>Personal situation in one year</i>
Affective tie to local community	-0.00	0.09	0.07
Affective tie to <i>Land</i>	0.01	0.13	0.13
Affective tie to GDR	0.02	-0.05	-0.10
Affective tie to Germany	-0.01	0.23	0.22
Affective tie to Western Europe	-0.01	0.19	0.15
Affective tie to Eastern Europe	-0.01	0.05	-0.01
Instrumental support of the unification at present*	0.04	0.24	0.37
Affective support of the unification	0.02	0.26	0.31
Expectation fulfilment by the unification	0.10	0.16	0.22
Democracy in the FRG	0.01	0.20	0.24
Idea of socialism	0.03	-0.12	-0.19
Satisfaction with changes in the GDR	0.05	0.19	0.25
Government of the GDR	0.20	0.17	0.19
Government of the FRG	0.08	0.21	0.26
SPD opposition in the FRG	0.10	-0.02	-0.02

* In March general, in September/October personal advantages/disadvantages.
Source: IVS and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2/90, unweighted.

and the economic system, and moreover defined its political community as a 'socialist nation'. However, the assumption that socialization effects do not tell the whole story seems plausible; instead, the real political developments since 1989 might have impeded their ability to distinguish between different elements of political systems. The overwhelming experience since then has been the rapid sequence of a change of authorities, a change in concrete policies, the replacement of bureaucratic socialism by democracy and a market economy and finally the dissolution of the political community. We may assume that this not only influenced the perceptions of the East Germans in the way that the political and economic system seemed to be just one and the same, but that this also had some effects on the perceptions of the West Germans. This is a question that will have to be studied further in the future.

CONCLUSION

Although parts of the present analysis had to be conducted on an insufficient data basis, rather clear conclusions can be drawn with respect to the modification of the model of political support. The inclusion of non-political sub-systems and non-political orientations is confirmed by the obviously great relevance of economic motives for the support for the German unification (see Chapter 14) and the fusion of the political and the economic spheres in the perceptions of the respondents. Furthermore, the finding that expected future advantages of unification seem to have a stronger impact on the diffuse support for unification than the perception of present disadvantages hints at an inclusion of orientations not only directed towards the present, but towards the future and the past as well.

An often used pattern of interpretation of East Germans' political orientations is the comparison with the attitudes of the West Germans until the early 1960s (Korte 1989; Rytlewski 1989a; Bauer 1991; Feist 1991). However, for some areas of political attitudes this comparison may lead to insufficient conclusions. The situation of being confronted with the democratic political system and the market economy is distinctively different for West Germans and East Germans. With respect to the attitudes towards the political community the following aspects can be mentioned.

Citizens of the former GDR have already developed affective ties to their new political community. However, these are not overflow consequences from satisfaction with politics and democracy or primarily motivated politically. On the contrary, they are either rooted in historical experience and social relations or closely linked to the economic benefits that are expected from belonging to this political community. With regard to this latter aspect these ties will be affected by any disappointment of economic hopes.

Moreover, for substantial proportions of citizens of the new FRG their affective ties to the united Germany conflict with their identity as East Germans. Therefore a revival of this identity and its political affiliation with socialist ideas is not impossible in the case of economic or political dissatisfaction.

Finally, in contrast to the citizens of the FRG in its early years, the East Germans could have a democratic pride in their 'peaceful revolution'. This pride could be seen as a possible starting point for a development towards an affectively anchored and authentic political tie to the new political community. Whereas the development of politically

0.09	0.55	0.12	0.02	Changes since opening of the borders	0.52	-0.03	0.19	0.04	0.22
-	-	-	-	Satisfaction with democracy in the GDR	0.39	0.12	-0.07	0.57	-0.00
-	-	-	-	Satisfaction with GDR government	0.48	0.10	0.08	0.52	0.08
-	-	-	-	Satisfaction with FRG government	0.65	0.05	0.01	0.31	0.22
-	-	-	-	Satisfaction with SPD opposition (FRG)	-0.26	-0.05	-0.02	0.60	0.23
-	-	-	-	Present economic situation in the GDR	0.09	-0.02	0.02	0.61	-0.21
-	-	-	-	Future economic situation in the GDR	0.22	0.14	0.06	0.08	0.68
-	-	-	-	Personal situation in one year	0.15	0.00	-0.01	-0.10	0.76
3.6	2.02	1.23	1.05	Eigenvalue	4.66	2.17	1.51	1.14	1.10
25.0	14.4	8.8	7.5	Explained variance by factor in %	23.3	10.9	7.6	5.7	5.5

Source: IVS, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1/90 and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2/90, unweighted.

motivated support for the community was comparatively slow in the FRG, because democracy was primarily not the creation of the West German people, developments in East Germany could follow a different path: only if the economic and, more importantly, the democratic reconstruction of East Germany were no longer perceived purely as a colonialization by the West Germans, but also as an achievement by the East Germans themselves, could the East German population develop politically motivated diffuse support for the political community faster than the West Germans after the foundation of the Federal Republic.

Notes

1. The following studies have been used for analyses: *Studie zur Volkskammerwahl in March 1990* (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1/90), and *zur Wahl in den neuen Bundesländern in September/October 1990* (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2/90), both in the GDR, by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., Mannheim; our own questions have been implemented in these studies by the Lehrstuhl für Politische Wissenschaft und International Vergleichende Sozialforschung (IVS); Study of the Forschungsgruppe zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, Mannheim, in April/May 1990 after the Volkskammerwahl in the DDR, implemented in the GDR and in the FRG; representative surveys in the FRG in 1985/86 und 1989 from the projekt A-7 'Welfare aspirations' of the Sonderforschungsbereich 3 'Mikroanalytische Grundlagen des Gesellschaftspolitik' (Sfb 3 A-7); publications of the monthly *Politbarometer* by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.
2. Overviews of data on subjective relevance, perceived chances of realization and support of unification in the FRA are to be found in Kaase (1989), Herbert and Wildenmann 1990, Szumi, Lichtleitner and Bauske (1990) and Jansen (1990).
3. The following factor analyses for the GDR population are not shown in the table (see Westle 1991): distributions of additional indicators for the factor and correlation analyses are shown in publications of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1990b,c).