

CHAPTER 1

Ausländer in the *Heimat*: Ethnocentrism in Contemporary Germany

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“*Ausländer*” and “*Ausländerin*” (fem.), literally “out-lander” but meaning “foreigner,” are words suggesting that a social chasm separates immigrants from native Germans, and they appear to sustain the dominant image of Germany in the English-language literature as the “ethnic nation” par excellence (Brubaker, 1992). During the early 1990s, the image was solidified by a rash of attacks on immigrants, many of them occurring in the so-called *neue Bundesländer*, the states of the east, freshly reunified with those of the west (see Koopmans, 1996; Lüdemann and Ohlemacher, 2002, 67–95). Previously unremarkable places like Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Solingen attained notoriety far beyond Germany. Pictures of skinhead neo-Nazis parading through the streets evoked chilling memories of the 1930s.

Yet the reality is far more complex. In fact, if not in self-image, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has become an immigration nation since the end of World War II. According to the estimates of Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich in chapter 2, in this volume, a sixth of the population in the mid-1990s was of foreign birth. Not all are guestworkers (*Gastarbeiter*), the men (and later their families) who arrived during the 1950s and 1960s from Italy, Turkey, and other countries of the Mediterranean Rim. At the time, they were seen not as immigrants but as temporary workers needed to solve a transitional labor shortage in a country depleted by war of millions of able-bodied men and women.

As is by now a cliché, many of the guests never left (“We called for workers, and human beings came,” in the trenchant formulation of the writer, Max Frisch); and they are now entering the third generation on German soil. They, along with the Third World refugees who came to Germany during the 1980s and early 1990s owing to the liberal provision for refuge in its constitution, are the prototype of the *Ausländer* in the eyes of most Germans. Other immigrants appear not so foreign: thus, the millions of ethnic Germans expelled at the end of the war (the *Vertriebene*) from Eastern European countries, in which, in many cases, their ancestors had lived for centuries, were rapidly integrated into the native German population (Handl and Hermann, 1994). This has not so far been the lot of the other ethnic Germans (the *Aussiedler*), who have come since the fall of the Iron Curtain from Eastern Europe, as well as distant former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan. They stand out in German society, especially since many of them speak little or no German. But, unlike the *Gastarbeiter* and their families, they have received citizenship on arrival and benefited from resettlement assistance. Adding further to the mix are Jews from Eastern Europe, whose immigration is supported by a special quota.

Despite these streams of immigrants, Germany still has great difficulty coming to terms with its role as an immigration country, but in this respect it is not unlike most other members of the European Union (EU). One of the oft-repeated policy formulations and political slogans from the era of the Christian Democratic Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–98) is that Germany is not an immigration country (“*Die Bundesrepublik ist kein Einwanderungsland*”). Long a country of emigration that sent millions of emigrants across the sea, principally to the Americas, Germany has lacked an immigration law, one that would admit annually a given number of immigrants coming for economic reasons. In the early 1990s, 60 social scientists issued a manifesto calling for such a law and documenting its economic and demographic benefits (Bade, 1994b). Indeed, numerous population projections have demonstrated that without a substantial and regular flow of immigrants the population will shrink in coming decades and, even worse, the ratio of workers to those who depend on their economic output will drop precipitously, with potentially dire consequences for the large and growing population of cosseted retirees; similar prognoses have been made for other Western European nations. The numbers involved are not small: Recent projections suggest that Germany needs more than 300,000 immigrants per year just to maintain its population size (*Der Spiegel*, 2000).

In recent years, there have been some attempts to open the gates, or at least leave them ajar. The Social Democratic-Green government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implemented in 2000 an experimental “green card” program to admit high human-capital technology workers for periods of up to five years. In 2002, it sponsored an immigration law of limited scope, once again targeting highly educated workers in technological fields. Even though no more than a small number of permanent immigrants would be admitted each year, the law ignited political controversy. Its passage in the upper house of the legislature was clouded by a charge of a voting irregularity, and the law quickly became an issue in the 2002 elections, which the Schröder government barely survived. Soon afterward, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled the law invalid because its passage was illegal.

Citizenship is the other aspect of the legal landscape that has appeared to reveal Germany’s discomfort with immigration. Throughout the immigration era associated with late twentieth-century globalization, Germany has figured as the archetype of the *jus sanguinis*, or blood, principle in attributing citizenship at birth, fortifying its status as *the* ethnic nation. There is at least a touch of irony here, for the basic elements of citizenship law date back to 1913, when Germany was attempting to deal with the ramifications of its then role as an emigration nation (Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 2000). Consequently, the 1913 law defined as citizens the children of parents who were citizens and assigned no role to birth on German soil. These key elements survived the profound transformations of the German state that ensued, and *jus sanguinis* remained the principle governing birthright citizenship until the century ended. This situation gave rise to the characterization of Germany as a country where the children and grandchildren of immigrants remain foreigners even though raised there, while ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe become instant citizens even though they speak little or no German.

But the characterization oversimplifies. For one thing, roughly a quarter of resident foreigners are citizens of other EU countries and therefore, aside from voting in national elections, have rights approximating those of natives. Nevertheless, it is also true that for much of the *Gastarbeiter* era naturalization as a citizen was difficult, even for the German-born second generation. The demands were high, including a spotless record with the police, surrender of previous citizenship, and a hefty fee; and even when they were met, a positive decision was at the discretion of the bureaucracy, which could deny the application. But in the 1990s, the requirements were softened, particularly for the second

generation, and the discretion of officials was reduced—applicants who satisfied the main requirements now had the right to become citizens (Joppke, 2000). Moreover, Turks, for whom the requirement of giving up Turkish citizenship was a difficult hurdle because of inheritance laws, found a way around it. After giving up Turkish citizenship in order to become German, they could apply to regain their original nationality. This circumvention of the law became so much a part of the culture of naturalization that the magazine *Der Spiegel* published an article on how to do it. As a result of these changes, the number of naturalizations climbed steeply, though it remained annually at a small fraction of the eligible population (see Münz and Ulrich, this volume, table 4). The most radical innovation, the granting of provisional German citizenship to the German-born children of foreigners who have legally settled in Germany, came in 2000, after the data on which this book is based were collected. Its ultimate effects will not be known, in any event, for two decades, for the children who are affected will be forced to choose between their German and parental citizenships when they become adults.

Despite these particularities, Germany is in fact a suitable test case for the receptivity of Western European societies to immigration and its sequelae, which include the incorporation of the second and third generations. Like France, often cast as its opposite in terms of the legal infrastructure and ideology governing incorporation, and like other countries of the EU, Germany needs steady immigration to maintain economic strength and support a growing population past the age of work, but it has not yet created the policies and cultural climate that would generate regular streams of economic immigrants. Like France, too, the presence of many non-European immigrants, especially Muslims, has aroused xenophobia in some parts of the native population and a political opposition to immigration, manifest at its extreme in far-Right parties that enjoy some electoral successes. However, in Germany, the opposition to immigration has also been taken up by the mainstream parties of the Center Right, the Christian Democrats (the CDU and its sister party, the CSU). This institutionalization of opposition makes it especially difficult in the German case for the state to craft laws and policies that would accept immigration as a permanent reality.

Despite seemingly profound differences in the relevant legal, institutional, and ideological frameworks, both France and Germany illustrate the difficulties of incorporation in nations where there is a settled understanding of what constitutes the cultural and social mainstream. In both, the assumption is widespread that incorporation is one-sided,

requiring the adoption by immigrants and their children of the language and predetermined culture of the native society; little scope is allowed for contributions by the languages and cultures brought by the immigrants themselves. In the case of the French, this understanding is encapsulated in the so-called Republican model of assimilation, which posits that full citizenship is achieved by acceptance of the French language and culture (Schnapper, 1991). In the case of the Germans, there is no equivalently worked-out concept of incorporation, but a widespread understanding is signaled by politicians' calls for immigrant groups to accept the German "*Leitkultur*," or leading culture. When this phrase was uttered by a CDU politician in 2000, however, it generated controversy and opposition from some immigrant-friendly sectors of German society.

The problematic status of non-European immigrants is concretized in the inferior and contested position of Islam. Interestingly, even though the French and German states orient themselves in almost diametrically opposite ways to institutionalized religion, the effects on Islam are very similar. In France, the actions of the state are determined by the widely accepted concept of *laïcité*, which insists that the state remain aloof from matters of religion, and by the secular nature of French social life. However, this neutrality tacitly accepts the cultural paramountcy of Christianity, anchored in what Zolberg and Long (1999) refer to as the "historic settlement" of the society with its chief religious institution, the Catholic Church. Thus, public institutions, including schools, recognize the main Christian holidays; and Christian buildings and symbols, such as churches, are prominent in public places. However, any similar recognition for the holidays and symbols of Islam has so far been withheld; and, as the still unresolved foulard controversy demonstrates, even the wearing of symbols of Islamic faith can be challenged. In Germany, by contrast, the historic settlement involves the opposite of state aloofness. The main Christian religions and Judaism are financially supported by the state to the extent that it collects and passes along church taxes from believers. And public schools provide regular religious instruction for Christians, which is given by teachers who are permanent state employees. However, Islam has been unable to achieve state recognition and support in either respect. It has come closer in the sphere of public education, as several states (i.e., *Länder*) have established limited or experimental programs to provide suitable religious instruction for Muslim students (Engin, 2001). Yet, as the data analyzed in this book reveal (see chapter 5, in this volume, by Wasmer and Koch), there is strong public opposition to Islamic instruction in

the schools; though some of it comes from those who are against any religious instruction, they are unlikely to challenge the established programs for Christians. Ironically, in both countries, secularism rides high in the sense that levels of religious observance are generally quite low, but this has not helped Islam to overcome antipathy.

A unique factor complicating ethnocentrism toward immigrant groups in Germany is the unification accomplished in 1990. Unification brought economic dislocations to many parts of the east, as what had been state-run industries under the German Democratic Republic (GDR) went under in a capitalist economy. Guaranteed employment and other benefits melted away. Like the immigrant groups, the east Germans were expected to assimilate into the economic and cultural life of the west and to leave behind their previous sense of security. The bright promise of unification quickly became tarnished in the eyes of easterners, and, for some, economic resentments found an outlet in hostility directed at foreigners—hence, the depth of ethnocentrism in a region with a small immigrant population.

It should be obvious that one cannot infer from laws and state actions alone the reception accorded immigrants and the ensuing generations and the prospects for their successful incorporation. Clearly, incorporation is a process that works itself out on the ground, in myriad interactions that take place between the majority population and members of immigrant groups. Accordingly, much depends on the views held by the majority and the minority. Herein lies the rationale for the study reported in this volume, which uses as its base a body of survey data collected in 1996 throughout Germany under the auspices of the ALLBUS survey program (the acronym stands for “*Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften*,” or General Population Survey of the Social Sciences). This survey of attitudes toward ethnic minorities—immigrant groups and Jews—is one of the most extensive ever conducted in Germany.

The Survey

The ALLBUS series of biannual surveys is analogous to the General Social Survey (GSS) program in the United States, housed at the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Like the GSS, ALLBUS is oriented toward academic uses, both research and teaching. ALLBUS is constituted from a core of questions that are repeated each time—these mostly concern socioeconomic and demographic matters but also some opinions—attitudinal questions that are replicated at varied intervals, and a special-topics module. The special

topics rotate in a scheme that has them reappear at ten-year intervals. But, in 1996, in the aftermath of the attacks on immigrants during the early 1990s, a new topical module was developed to focus on attitudes toward immigration and ethnic minorities. (The appendix presents the main questions of this module in English and German, along with the distributions of responses.) Of course, 1996 is not the only year in which relevant items have appeared. Some of the chapters to follow will deploy, for instance, a well-known German scale of attitudes toward foreigners, whose items date back to 1980 (see Krauth and Porst, 1984).

The survey is designed as a random sample of the adult, German-speaking population, with an oversampling of the residents of eastern Germany to assure a large enough sample there for separate analysis. Since 1991 German citizenship is not a requirement for inclusion; the survey produces a small sample of foreigners, excluding only those whose German proficiency does not allow for interviews. (The foreigners' sample is analyzed by Steffen Kühnel and Jürgen Leibold in chapter 7, in this volume.) As far as technical mechanics are concerned, the survey was conducted as a two-stage sample. In the first stage, 104 west German and 47 east German communities were randomly selected according to probabilities proportional to their sizes. Then, random samples of residents in each community were drawn from the registers where residents of all German communities are legally required to report their addresses. The response rate, the percentage of successful interviews compared to the base of valid addresses from the registers, was 54.2 percent. This figure is low by U.S. standards (the completion rate for the GSS remains around 70–75 percent), but it is average for German conditions, since there is a relatively high rate of refusals by individuals who are approached by interviewers. Only a tiny percentage of interviews—1.5 percent in the west, 0.6 percent in the east—could not be completed for language reasons.

Richard Alba's involvement with the project began in the initial design phase, as he prepared a memorandum for the ALLBUS Board sketching a proposal for this module. It was then translated into specific survey terms by the staff at the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen in Mannheim who were responsible for conducting the survey. Peter Schmidt was at that time the leader of the ALLBUS group, and Martina Wasmer was (and is) one of its key members.

The Plan of the Volume

The chapters to follow present the major findings to emerge from the ALLBUS survey.¹ We open with two that sketch the immigration

backdrop necessary to an understanding of the attitudes of Germans. Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich (chapter 2) provide an authoritative account of the immigration streams since World War II, laying to rest the notion, widely believed by Germans themselves, that Germany is not a country of immigration. Indeed, if the portrait were extended further back in the twentieth century, it would demonstrate that one of the consistent aspects of the modern German experience has been contact with immigrant strangers. But frequently this contact has been ethnically accented: the willingness to integrate ethnic German immigrants, especially when they speak the German language and are familiar with the culture rooted in it, contrasts sharply with the treatment accorded many non-Germans. Shaping the mentality of some older Germans with respect to immigration is the contrast between the open-armed reception of the ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern European countries at the end of the war and the brutal subordination during it of the millions of slave laborers imported into the homeland from conquered countries or from prisoners of war.

Needless to say, the contrast has not been as extreme in the post-1950 immigrations. But the dimension of ethnic similarity and difference remains salient, crystallized in the contrast between the *Aussiedler*, the ethnic German immigrants coming from Eastern Europe, and the Turkish immigrant and second generations as well as Third World asylum seekers. Categories of official data frequently offer clues about underlying ideologies of immigration and incorporation. Like many European nations, German data recognize ethnic difference mainly in terms of nationality, that is, the nation of citizenship. Consequently, the ethnic Germans disappear immediately from the official categories that measure immigrants because they are accorded German citizenship on arrival, while the Turks have appeared, at least until the citizenship law changed for the second and subsequent generations in 2000, as forever “foreign” because they mostly retained Turkish citizenship regardless of birthplace.

The Münz and Ulrich analysis, which relies partly on data specific to ALLBUS, produces a substantial revision to the estimate of immigrants, that is, the foreign born, in the German population. The common estimate, taken from official data, is around 9 percent. However, the figure, which is in fact an estimate of the number of foreigners, that is, those without German citizenship, incorporates two kinds of major errors—on the one hand, it includes the German-born generations of the guest-worker immigrant groups, while, on the other, it leaves out ethnic-German immigrants. Taking advantage of an ALLBUS question that

collected detailed data on birthplace, Münz and Ulrich were able to estimate the size of the ethnic-German immigrant population. They found that 16 percent of the population was born outside of Germany's current borders; 14 percent was born in territory never considered part of Germany. Either way, the percentage of immigrants is higher than that in the United States, according to the 2000 census (11 percent).

Chapter 3, by Stefan Bender and Wolfgang Seifert, sketches the socioeconomic position of the largest immigrant groups (aside from the ethnic Germans, who because of data limitations cannot yet be studied in this way on a national plane). The chief source of data comes from the Federal Employment Office, which maintains records on all wage and salary earners covered by social insurance; like other official data, these records identify individuals in terms of their nation of citizenship. But the data are very informative about the groups that entered originally as guestworkers, because of their low rates of naturalization to German citizenship.

In general, the picture drawn by Bender and Seifert conforms to one truism about immigration: that immigrants take jobs that natives would prefer not to do and thereby generate upward mobility for a significant portion of the native population. Like many truisms, this one is only partly true, and contemporary immigration on a global scale includes many high human-capital workers. This element is also present in Germany, reflected in some of the immigrations from Western Europe, which are also legally privileged by virtue of the freedom of movement granted to citizens of EU nations.

In terms of ethnic minorities in Germany, however, the status of the former guestworkers and their children is key. Bender and Seifert show that the immigrants entered en masse the lowest rungs of the labor market, especially in the heavy manufacturing and mining sectors that the native German population was leaving. This pattern was still obvious in the 1990s, several decades after the guestworker arrivals. The implications of having immigrants take these jobs included a socioeconomic upgrading of a portion of the German population. Over time, this has been reflected by a shift in educational attainment of native Germans away from the lowest, most disadvantaging strata. There has also been a shift over time toward white-collar employment and toward work in service sectors.

The economic concentration of the former guestworker immigrants has brought with it substantial disadvantages. As Bender and Seifert note, the sectors with high immigrant concentrations include a number that have suffered considerable dislocation and shrinkage as the economy

has taken on an increasingly postindustrial configuration. The unemployment associated with these changes has been borne much more by immigrants than by natives. Moreover, the concentration of immigrants in sectors from which Germans are leaving implies a great deal of social segregation, as the interactions at work that might have given rise to regular interethnic relationships are reduced. This is clear from the data on the major guestworker groups that the authors take from the German Socio-Economic Panel: these show, through the 1980s, a persistence of limited German proficiency and of ethnically homogeneous friendship circles, along with a limited sense of integration into German society.

However, the situation is dynamic. The social and economic situation of the second generation, which has been raised in Germany, represents a clear advance over that of the first, even if it does not demonstrate parity with the ethnic majority. This is true not only in educational and labor-market terms, but also outside the world of work. Obviously, the competence of the second generation in the German language is much higher than that of the first. Accordingly, its ability to enter the social circles of Germans and to have interethnic friendships is greater. The second generation is much more committed to Germany as its home, though this is by no means a universal sentiment.

With chapter 4 by Michael Terwey, we enter a section composed of four chapters where the fundamentals of attitudes toward ethnic minorities are presented. Chapter 4 sets the stage through an analysis of what has become the standard index of ethnocentrism for Germany, four items that reflect the views of Germans on the place of “foreigners” in their society. Terwey draws on previous ALLBUS surveys to show that since 1980 a noticeable decline in the average level of ethnocentrism occurred, but it came to a stop in the mid-1990s, a conclusion that is supported in other data sources also. These data suggest also that many Germans hold immigrant-friendly attitudes—the expectation, for example, that foreigners should marry within their own groups is widely rejected. Of the four items in the scale, the one that meets with the greatest approval states that foreigners need to adjust more to the German “lifestyle.” It implies that a one-directional view of incorporation is held by the majority.

The impact of unification on ethnocentrism is revealed in the differences between east and west. The level of ethnocentrism is remarkably higher in the east than in the west, despite the very low percentage of immigrants living in the former GDR. The survey data are consistent with the map of violence against immigrants, which reveals a disproportionate number of attacks in eastern cities, such as Rostock. A careful

examination of regional differences appears to confirm that this ethnocentrism is an expression of the economic resentments felt by easterners in the aftermath of unification. A statement that foreigners should be sent home when unemployment rises receives widespread assent from easterners.

Further, Terwey also sheds light on a critical issue, that is, who holds ethnocentric attitudes and who does not. He considers a broad range of predictors, from sociodemographic characteristics to assessments of the economic situation and finds that a few of them constitute a rather powerful explanation of variations in ethnocentric attitudes. Age—older Germans are more ethnocentric—and education—the more educated are less ethnocentric—are two of these predictors; and they are variables that appear in virtually all analyses of ethnocentrism, whether in Germany or elsewhere. Other predictors are more specific to the German context. One is self-placement in terms of a Left–Right political spectrum, with those on the Right more ethnocentric. Such a variable would not, for example, correspond much with attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, where the editorial page of the conservative *Wall Street Journal* has famously argued for open borders. Another relevant measure of political stance is known as the “post-materialism index,” which, in the German context, appears to identify those who have drifted the furthest from a traditional political culture that emphasized order and authority.

Chapter 5 by Martina Wasmer and Achim Koch broadens the types of opinions about foreigners under consideration and introduces distinctions according to national origins—Italians, Turks, and asylum seekers are the specific foci of the survey questions. What the analysis makes immediately clear is that acceptance depends on origin and declines sharply from Italians to Turks, to asylum seekers. This ordering conforms broadly to the cultural distance of these groups from Germans: as Christian Europeans, the Italians are most easily accepted; largely composed of immigrants from Third World countries in Asia and Africa, the asylum seekers are the most rejected. The intermediate position of the Turks may owe something to their longer settlement in Germany and integration into its workforce. They are perceived to have made a contribution to the German economy, if not the society.

The substantive focus of chapter 5 is on the willingness to grant parity of rights to immigrant groups. This varies significantly by domain: unlike Americans, Germans are predisposed to accord immigrants the same access as citizens to the rights of the welfare state. In some other domains, equal rights are more controversial: Germans, both

east and west, are divided on whether foreigners should have the right to vote in local elections (and it should be noted that the data were collected after the Maastricht agreement gave such rights to EU nationals). Germans are also divided on the much-debated question of whether foreigners should be allowed to have dual citizenship, although this occurs more and more as *de facto*, just as in other immigration societies.

One striking parallel with attitudes in the United States concerns what Wasmer and Koch label a “principle implementation gap.” This occurs when respondents agree with general statements affirming equal rights but demur when asked about specific implementations of the equality principle. In the United States, such a gap appears in white attitudes toward blacks, due to the reluctance of many whites to approve of specific policies to achieve equal rights (Schuman et al., 1997). Its appearance in Germany also is quite significant, for this strongly suggests that, as in the United States, blatantly racist or ethnocentric discourse is stigmatized. Consequently, many respondents assent to, and in all probability believe in, fairly bland assertions of equal rights, while at the same time maintaining reservations about encroachments on the separation between groups. Yet the social stigmatization of open racism is, by itself, a nontrivial accomplishment.

The analogy with the U.S. situation is the point of departure for chapter 6 by Richard Alba and Michelle Johnson. Informed by U.S. research into new forms of racist attitudes, such as “symbolic racism” (e.g., Kinder and Sears, 1981), Alba and Johnson question whether the standard index of German ethnocentrism, with its dependence on the crude exclusionary attitudes of the guestworker era, is adequate to map fully the ethnocentrism at the end of the twentieth century. As an alternative, they consider a series of items that asks respondents for their perceptions of the consequences of immigration, such as its association with crime (a major theme in the German context). Even though a negative opinion on any single item can be seen arguably as a response to a social reality, negative opinions on the series evidently reflect ethnocentrism. However, the view offered by the new index is, absent a few nuances, very similar to that offered by the standard one. In fact, the two correlate very highly, and they yield very similar estimates of the proportion of the xenophobic, that is, the highly ethnocentric portion of the population: 11–13 percent in the west, and 18–19 percent in the east. Both indexes relate in similar ways to sociodemographic and political variables, which this and other chapters demonstrate are effective in explaining ethnocentrism.

The ethnocentrism scales are also very good predictors of the policies respondents favor toward immigrants and immigration and, somewhat

more surprisingly, of anti-Semitism. The correlations between the scales and anti-Semitism are very strong in the west (approaching .5), and they appear to indicate an unusual crystallization of attitudes toward ethnic minorities in general: those who view Muslim immigrants negatively also hold negative opinions about Jews; at the same time, those who are more open to immigrants are also likely to be free of anti-Semitic canards. Together with the strong relationship between ethnocentrism and political ideology, these tight linkages suggest that, to a degree not true in the United States, for example, ethnocentrism in Germany runs along a deep and probably stable fault line in the society.

Chapter 7 by Steffen Kühnel and Jürgen Leibold examines the German–*Ausländer* relationship from the other end: that of the foreigner. Since the ALLBUS survey is not restricted to German respondents, foreigners appear among its respondents in the proportion to their numbers in the population; the sole restriction is that they must speak German well enough to understand and respond to the survey questions. Still, the number of foreign-origin respondents is small.

Chapter 7 makes especially good use of questions that tap respondents' perceptions of the likelihood of discrimination against non-Germans in different domains: a restaurant, a place of employment, a government office, and a German home. The responses reveal a fair amount of consistency in the perceptions of Germans and various minority groups, with discrimination viewed as most likely in the private sphere. However, discrimination was also viewed as quite likely at the place of employment and in the government office. Though Germans and foreigners had similar perceptions, the latter rated the likelihood of discrimination significantly lower than did the Germans. The views of different immigrant groups were quite similar, despite the plausibility of the hypothesis that Turks are more likely to encounter discrimination in everyday life.

Foreigners differ greatly from Germans when it comes to questions of legal rights. They are very likely to believe that they should have equal rights as Germans in various domains, including the right to vote in local elections. Since the institutional pathway to equal rights runs through naturalization, the obvious next question is how foreigners and Germans view the requirements for citizenship. The surprise is that their views are rather similar on such matters as a clean police record and acceptance of a German lifestyle. The differences that occur concern the role of birth in Germany and German descent, the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* principles, respectively. That foreigners would assign a lower priority to the *jus sanguinis* principle than Germans would is to be expected. However, they are also more likely to reject the *jus soli* principle, even though its use

would help the second generation, whose members are represented in the “foreign” group.

Chapter 8 on anti-Semitism, by Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, is a segue into the final section of the book, constituted by chapters that examine in depth some particular facets of the ethnocentrism complex. Bergmann and Erb’s analysis, which is informed not just by ALLBUS but also by the extensive prior surveys investigating anti-Semitism, leads to a profoundly important conclusion: that the late 1990s was a period of transition for anti-Semitism in Germany. Previously, anti-Semitism, particularly in the west, had been anchored in certain traditional social milieus—specific professions, for instance—and in the socialization experiences of the generation that grew up under the ideological tutelage of the Third Reich. Though the level of anti-Semitic belief is still quite high among the members of this generation, they are now elderly and gradually passing from the scene. Bergmann and Erb find that anti-Semitism is increasingly correlated with other political and ideological stances; in their words, it has become socially more “diffuse,” harder to predict with social variables but more and more woven into an ideological complex that includes xenophobia as well.

The hand of history is still quite evident in one respect: in the differences between east and west. Although easterners are more ethnocentric when it comes to immigrants, they are considerably less predisposed to anti-Semitic belief. The difference between the regions is traceable to the way their postwar regimes dealt with the fascist past: its rejection was more complete in the east, where de-Nazification was more systematic. Nevertheless, the levels of anti-Semitism are not high in either region, and the majority consistently rejects anti-Semitic statements. Using a battery of questions on the willingness to accord legal equality to various groups and maintain close social relations with their members, Bergmann and Erb investigate also the willingness to exclude Jews from German society. This, too, is at modest levels, with two-thirds of Germans rejecting any exclusion. The willingness to exclude Jews is about the same as that toward the ethnic Germans coming from Eastern Europe and slightly higher than that toward Italians, one of the most favored of the immigrant groups. The willingness to exclude Turks or asylum seekers is much higher, by contrast.

Chapter 9 by Aribert Heyder and Peter Schmidt examines another historically important nexus: between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, a relationship that, in the 1950s, was posited to be of major significance by the Frankfurt School, in what was clearly an initial reflection on the widespread obedience to state madness under the Third Reich.

Given the very different evolution of the political systems in west and east after the war, they hypothesize that this nexus may differ in the regions of unified Germany.

Using a sophisticated methodology that allows for separate estimates of the relationships among latent constructs and of the measurement models that link constructs to their empirical indicators, Heyder and Schmidt find a very strong linkage of authoritarianism to ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is reflected here in anti-Semitism and pride in being German as well as in attitudes toward immigrant groups. However, despite the east–west differences in levels of anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism with respect to immigrants, the level of authoritarianism is similarly low in magnitude in the two regions. Differences between the regions, as detected by the models, lie more in nuances than in the core relationships. The linkage of authoritarianism to ethnocentrism seems somewhat stronger in the west, while the measurement of attitudes toward foreigners gives greater weight to economic discrimination in the east. In both respects, the findings seem consistent with those of other chapters.

Chapter 10 by Ulrich Rosar presses the investigation in another direction, electoral politics. With a focus that, in the light of the post-2000 elections in many parts of Western Europe, seems prescient, Rosar examines the role of ethnocentrism in Right-wing successes at the ballot boxes, exemplified by those of the *Republikaner* party during the late 1980s and the 1990s. In one sense, the relationship between the two is a loose one, since trend data reveal that ethnocentrism and Right-wing voting have followed rather independent trajectories. However, drawing upon the entire series of ALLBUS surveys, Rosar finds that the linkage between ethnocentrism and intention to vote for one of the far-Right parties strengthened during the 1990s, in tandem with their electoral success; and, perhaps more disturbingly, the political profile of Germans with ethnocentric views became more distinct, suggesting a drift away from the mainstream. While the analysis demonstrates overall that there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnocentrism and support for the extreme Right, it also sustains the notion that those holding ethnocentric views constitute the pool where the parties of the extreme Right can expect to fish most successfully for votes.

Chapters 11 and 12 explore the connection between ethnocentrism and place. Drawing upon a variety of survey data in addition to ALLBUS, Ferdinand Böltsken (chapter 11) examines the willingness of Germans and foreigners to integrate residentially with the other group. A priori, two competing hypotheses seem plausible. One, the famous

contact hypothesis, predicts that increased interethnic contact will reduce ethnocentrism and lead to greater willingness to integrate. The other, recognizing the social and legal gulf between Germans and foreigners, forecasts that those in areas where members of the other group reside nearby will be most resistant to integration.

The contact hypothesis wins, hands down. As some other chapters also reveal, ethnocentrism is lower among those Germans who have relationships with foreigners and is especially low when those relations are in the private domain of family. It follows that the willingness to integrate is higher where there is already exposure to minorities. This linkage is true in both west and east Germany, and it is consistent with the greater willingness to integrate found in the west, where more residential concentrations of foreigners exist. Nevertheless, willingness is also graded according to the perceived social and cultural distance between Germans and foreign groups: put succinctly, Germans are happier to have an Italian family as neighbors than a Turkish one. Foreigners are overall more desirous of integration than Germans, even though they perceive rather high levels of xenophobia in the German population. The contact principle applies to them as well, that is, their willingness to live with German neighbors is sharply higher when they have had relations with Germans.

Chapter 12, by Jürgen Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, develops a snapshot of the spatial variation of ethnocentrism, especially with regard to rural–urban and size-of-place dimension. Though the ALLBUS data lack some of the geographic detail one would need for a full analysis, Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik demonstrates that, even with other major explanatory variables controlled, there is a notable urban–rural gradient of ethnocentrism. Its level is significantly lower in the urban areas of both east and west Germany. This is only partly due to the greater contact with foreigners that takes place there; even urbanites who lack regular relationships to foreigners are less ethnocentric than their rural compatriots.

The overriding conclusion to emerge from these analyses is that ethnocentrism is not the prevailing attitude among Germans, despite the headlines justifiably garnered by attacks on immigrants and on Jews. However, deeply held ethnocentrism, while characteristic of a small minority, is woven into the texture of an ideological complex that includes anti-Semitism, especially in the states of the old Federal Republic, and an attachment to the Right-wing portion of the political spectrum. This nexus suggests that ethnocentrism is a fairly stable part of the total ideological fabric of Germany, one that can be exploited by political parties and is likely to gain the spotlight through the sporadic

success of the extreme Right. In this respect, it must be said, Germany appears scarcely different from much of Western Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Note

1. All the chapters have been shortened for this book. The fuller versions can be found in Alba et al. (2000). We are grateful to David Allison for his translations of four chapters, those by Wasmer and Koch, Rosar, Böltken, and Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik. The other chapters were translated by their authors. Richard Alba acknowledges the financial support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which gave him the time necessary to prepare a coherent volume from the original translations.