

The Ambivalence of Identity

*The Austrian Experience of
Nation-Building in a Modern Society*

by

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Catalyst or Precondition

The Socioeconomic Environment of Austrian Nation-Building

FOR MUCH OF THE POSTWAR ERA, the scholarly interpretation of contemporary Austrian history centered on the concept of an Austrian nation that had finally found its destiny, guided by political leaders who had overcome their former disagreements for the good of the country.¹ The differences between the interwar and the postwar developments gained particular attention; Austria's second republic was demarcated from its first. The modest Alpine republic with the historic name that had arisen from the ashes of the Habsburg Monarchy had been described as the "the involuntary state," as reflected in the title of Reinhard Lorenz's study, and "the state that no one wanted," as Hellmut Andics named his popular book.² Drawing on the latter title, the reemerged republic of the postwar era would widely be characterized as "the state that everyone wanted."³

Leading foreign analysts of Austrian nation-building also respected these interpretative perimeters.⁴ William Bluhm's classic *Building an Austrian Nation* introduced valuable tools of analysis into the Austrian debate; indeed, its contribution is greatest from a methodological point of view. The American political scientist utilized polls for the broader picture of Austrian public opinion but also conducted individual interviews with members of the political elites. He examined the structural dynamics of postwar Austrian society and contrasted them with earlier time periods. Ultimately, however, he remained bound to an analytical

approach that juxtaposes a successful postwar integration with a previous history of disintegration and does not probe the contractual consensus model that informs it. Peter Katzenstein's technically refined study *Disjoined Partners*, which traced out the development of Austro-German relations throughout the past two centuries, also focused more on the structural workings and the public representation of Austrian life than on underlying motivations and contexts.

The Austrian political scientist Wolfgang Mantl summarized the foundations of the Second Republic in the important 1992 study *Politik in Österreich*:

The Second Republic demarcates itself positively from its predecessor through a consensus on fundamentals, which grew steadily after 1945, through internal peace (the Second Republic is a definite rejection of the readiness to wage civil war that characterized the First Republic), through national identity and independence, but also through prosperity. These factors support that diffuse *legitimacy* which is not merely a rigid function of respective successes and expectations of prosperity and thus supports the stability of a political system relatively independent of its efficiency.⁵

In a similar assessment, the prominent Austrian scholar and politician Norbert Leser listed cross-party cooperation, the absence of the internecine military confrontation that had marred the interwar years, and a positive attitude toward the state as the major contributions to this success.⁶ Leser, who with his Catholic and moderately social democratic outlook occupied a central position within the Austrian postwar elite spectrum, reflected the dominant sentiments of these elites vis-à-vis the Austrian state and its development. The Austrian population had freely expressed its desire for Austrian nationhood and embraced the concept of Austrian national identity. From being a country torn apart by political strife and national self-doubt, the Austrian republic had turned into the archetype of democratic consensus politics and popular integration, which could serve as a promising example to be emulated by other nations.⁷

There are a number of factors that can support this established view of twentieth-century Austrian history and its internal changes and subdivisions. Notwithstanding the external similarities of two early-postwar settings, the two Austrian republics arose from quite disparate origins: the Austrian social and political environment of 1945 differed

in important respects from its counterpart in 1918. At the end of World War I, it was the Austro-Hungarian empire that collapsed and was dismembered; Germany, although defeated as well, still held the promise of eventual recovery. World War II, by contrast, concluded with what appeared to be the end of Germany and perhaps the German nation as such. For all practical purposes, the German state had ceased to exist, whereas the independent Republic of Austria had reappeared on the map of Europe. Moreover, while Germany's eastern borders were moved westward, and the indigenous German population with them, Austria seemed able to preserve its reestablished territorial integrity.⁸

Under the circumstances of the time, the Austrians were not the only ones to refer to their national individuality. In the western German Saar region, notions of separate development gained a considerable degree of support, and the northern border district of Schleswig witnessed a steep increase in pro-Danish sentiment. In Saarland, the Christian People's Party (CVP), which had endorsed the region's economic integration with France "to lead the land out of its misery, prevent the dismantling of industries and economic exploitation as a consequence of the lost war, and thus regain the foundations of life,"⁹ received 230,082 of a total of 449,565 valid votes in the 1947 provincial elections.¹⁰ In Schleswig, the party of the small Danish minority gained as many as 99,500 votes in 1947, that is, 33.5 percent of the overall and—deducting the refugees from Germany's eastern provinces—more than half of the local vote. By 1962 this vote had again decreased to 26,883, which lies much closer to the actual number of resident Danes.¹¹

With regard to Austria, the Moscow Declaration of November 1943 had announced the Allies' intention to restore an independent country.¹² Notwithstanding the persistence of alternative policy options among Anglo-American leaders, in particular, Austria's separation from Germany was widely seen as an Allied war goal. Any references to Austria's German associations tied the Austrian to the more complex German question and thus threatened to complicate a swift and satisfactory international settlement. These foreign policy considerations suggested some pragmatic resolutions to Austrian policy makers. If the country was to regain full political sovereignty and achieve the withdrawal of the Allied troops that had divided it into four zones of occupation, differentiation from Germany, indeed from things German in general, seemed a patriotic imperative. As the prominent Austrian historian Erich Zöllner expounded, "[A] distancing from Germanness was a political necessity. Otherwise, territorial losses would have been

unavoidable, and the State Treaty that was ultimately attained in 1955 would probably have been unthinkable.”¹³

In the early postwar period, the Austrians thus possessed concrete incentives for stressing their independence and separate identity. The new national conception profited from the disappointments of the union experience, but it also promised to soften the material and political hardships of occupied Austria. Such pragmatic realities aided the acceptance of Austrianist concepts among segments of both the political leadership and the general populace that had previously been unreceptive to them.¹⁴ In the long run, however, they had to be supported by more enduring signs of Austria’s political and economic viability. These political and economic developments have been described as the Austrian success story and came to assume a prominent part in the symbolism of Austrian identity.

Internal stability was a central characteristic of Austria’s postwar political system.¹⁵ A grand coalition of the two major parties governed the country from 1945 to 1966.¹⁶ Throughout this period, the respective Austrian governments could always rely on 87 percent or more of the parliamentary representatives, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Parliamentary Basis of Austrian Governments, 1945–1966
(Grand Coalitions)

Period	Number of Deputies Supporting Government: Opposition	Percent in Support of Government
1945–1947	165 : 0	100
1947–1949	161 : 4	97.6
1949–1953	144 : 21	87.3
1953–1956	147 : 18	89.1
1956–1959	156 : 9	94.6
1959–1966	157 : 8	95.1

Source: Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, ed., *Republik Österreich, 1945–1995* (Vienna, 1995), 290.

After a four-year interlude of Conservative majority governance, the Social Democrats assumed the leading political role in 1970.¹⁷ For

much of the subsequent decade and a half, the SPÖ governed with an absolute majority in the Austrian parliament. In 1987 the two major parties returned to the grand coalition, which thus represented the clear model of choice throughout the five decades of Austrian postwar history. Whereas the two dominant parties in the Austrian political system had previously opposed each other to the point of open civil war, they could now appear as inseparably linked; even during periods of single-party governance, the institutional concertation of the party-dominated economic interest groups guaranteed the continued participation of the political counterpart in many decision-making processes.

The intertwining of the economic interest groups and the major political parties expressed itself most visibly in the extensive representation of interest group functionaries in government and parliament: in 1956, 33 percent of the members of the Austrian government were affiliated with economic interest groups. While the numbers gradually declined to 30 percent in 1966, 25 percent in 1970, and 19 percent in 1983 (SPÖ-FPÖ coalition), they rose again thereafter, reaching 33 percent in 1987 and 50 percent in 1991.¹⁸ On average, the corresponding numbers for members of parliament are even higher, as seen in Table 2.

Table 2: Average Percentage Share of Interest Group Functionaries in the Austrian Parliament

Grand Coalition (1945-1966)	43.8
Conservative government (1966-1970)	54.0
Social Democratic government (1970-1983)	51.2
SPÖ-FPÖ government (1983-1986)	64.5
Grand Coalition (1986)	64.5
Grand Coalition (1991)	43.7

Source: Joseph Marko, "Verbände und Sozialpartnerschaft," in *Politik in Österreich*, ed. Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna, 1992), 462.

Regardless of the political composition of the government, the mutual integration of political parties and economic interest groups preserved a high degree of accordation. Such a concentration of political power, while not always advantageous from a societal perspective, undoubtedly provided the population with the political stability it widely desired.

The country's policy of neutrality contributed to the consolidation of the Second Republic as well. Like Germany, the reestablished Austrian republic had been divided into four zones of occupation by the victorious Allies of World War II. Unlike their German neighbors, however, the Austrians could install a federal government that overarched the zonal divisions. This Austrian government, then, tried to steer the country through the political hazards of the incipient Cold War toward the goal of full sovereignty.

The Four Powers, for their part, had their own interests to consider. Realizing that the sympathies of an independent Austria would lie with the Western alliance, the Soviet Union in particular insisted on military and political safeguards before agreeing to withdraw its forces of occupation.¹⁹ The Austrian political leadership was willing to assure its Soviet counterpart that a troop withdrawal would not be detrimental to Soviet military security and entered into negotiations about the international status of a fully independent Austrian republic. These negotiations resulted in the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955, in which the Austrian government agreed that a sovereign Austria should be neutral. The State Treaty of Vienna, which formally reestablished Austrian sovereignty, was signed on May 15 of the same year, and by October 25, the foreign troops had left the country.²⁰ The next day, the parliament in Vienna declared Austria's state of permanent neutrality.²¹

Although it was in point of fact an international precondition for the reinstatement of Austrian sovereignty, the concept of neutrality became immensely popular with the Austrian public.²² After two world wars and the enormous human and material losses they entailed, the Austrians were more than ready for a policy that promised to keep them out of future military conflicts. Situated at the front line between the two military blocs that were opposing each other in the Cold War, the Austrians had no desire to become the spearhead of either side—not even of the West, with whom they otherwise identified. Moreover, neutrality offered tangible rewards for the small neutrals of Cold War Europe, who could function as mediators, bridge builders, and meeting grounds in affairs political as well as economic. For Austria, the estab-

lishment of important United Nations institutions in Vienna represented the most visible dividend of neutrality.²³

Finally, the Austrian system of social partnership extended the concept of stability into the economic and social spheres.²⁴ The economic imperatives of the reconstruction era supported the establishment of institutionalized cooperation between the economic interest groups, which came to be known as the “social partners.” Employers and employees were organized in mandatory associations termed chambers; these chambers were entrusted with negotiating fundamental economic issues. Both the chambers and the trade unions set up centralized internal structures; since the leadership of the economic interest groups formed an integral part of the two political parties united in a grand coalition, the extension of cross-party cooperation to the social partners could build on established contacts and mechanisms.

At the center of Austria’s neocorporatist structure stands the Joint Commission for Price and Wage Questions, which consists of representatives delegated by the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the chambers of labor, commerce, and agriculture. Its German abbreviation, namely, *Paritätische Kommission* (Parity Commission), reflects the careful parity between employers and employees and—unofficially, but not less importantly—between the two major political parties that characterizes its composition. The Parity Commission is headed by a nonvoting government member; its decisions are made unanimously.²⁵ Although the Commission cannot itself enforce its agreements, it has practically determined central economic issues such as the levels of wages based on collective bargaining and of prices subject to price control (mainly of food and energy).

The institutionalized cooperation between the professional associations of employers and employees reduced open labor conflict and contributed to the low ratio of strike-hours in the Austrian postwar economy. A comparison of industrial disputes in select European countries of similar size during the 1970s underscores the relative peacefulness of Austrian labor-management relations. In 1970, Austria lost 26,616 working hours to such disputes while Norway lost 47,204, the Netherlands 262,810, Ireland 1,007,714, and Belgium 1,432,274 hours. In 1979, the gap had widened, with Austria losing a mere 764 working hours as compared to 7,010 hours in Norway, 306,730 in the Netherlands, 615,484 in Belgium, and 1,548,322 in Ireland.²⁶ A focus on strike-minutes per employed person allows comparisons with larger countries and further confirms Austria’s unusually cooperative labor climate (Table 3).

Table 3: Strike-Minutes per Employed Person in Select Countries

Year	Austria	France	Great Britain	Italy	USA
1966	14.5	82	48.5	579.5	190.5
1970	5	54	230	679	451
1975	1	110	127	949	195
1980	3	45	250	545	178
1985	4	20	143	127.5	37

Source: Jim Sweeney and Josef Weidenholzer, eds., *Austria: A Study in Modern Achievement* (Aldershot, England, 1988), 304.

Even more important for the popular identification with the existing political structures than economic stability were the improvements in living conditions and the economic progress experienced by postwar Austria. The country had suffered grave social and economic crises in the interwar period. The international depression that followed the stock market crash of 1929 hit Austria particularly hard and resulted in the collapse of leading Austrian financial institutions. World War II left large parts of Austria's industrial capacity in ruins; industrial production in 1945 had fallen to barely a quarter of the already low prewar level.²⁷ Through the efforts of its population as well as the boost received from the general Western European economic upswing and the funds provided by the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), Austria experienced an "economic miracle" of its own. The value of Austria's exports increased from 29.1 billion Austrian schillings in 1960 to 226.2 billion in 1980; even in constant (1964) prices, the rise from 30 to 136.7 billion schillings remains substantial.²⁸ Austrian personal income climbed steadily throughout the postwar decades, with an average yearly increase in net wages corrected for inflation of 5.25 percent during the 1950s and 5.13 percent during the 1960s.²⁹

This economic ascent can be seen in comparative international as well as in domestic terms. Beginning at the passage from the 1940s to the 1950s, Austria's economic conditions advanced relative to those of many other European countries. Although it ought to be remembered

that the Second Republic started out at a relatively low level, the rise in the gross domestic product (GDP), as illustrated in Table 4, remains impressive, both in absolute and in relative terms.

Table 4: Nominal Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Select Countries in 1950, 1973, and 1992 (1990 International Dollars)

Country	1950	1973	1992
Austria	3,731	11,308	17,160
Czechoslovakia	3,501	7,036	6,845
France	5,221	12,940	17,959
Hungary	2,480	5,596	5,638
Ireland	3,518	7,023	11,711
Sweden	6,738	13,494	16,927
United Kingdom	6,847	11,992	15,738
United States	9,573	16,607	21,558

Source: Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy* (Paris, 1995), 23.

By the early 1990s, the Austrian gross domestic product per capita was comparable to that of Belgium or the Netherlands; it was higher than that of large Western European countries such as Italy and Great Britain, more than twice the size of the Czech and three times the size of the Hungarian per capita GDP.³⁰ At the same time, this economic expansion was not accompanied by excessive rates of inflation. Whereas the average yearly rate of inflation between 1960 and 1970 among the European member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was 3.93 percent, its Austrian equivalent amounted to 3.58 percent. For the decade of the 1970s, the difference was especially pronounced: 11.03 percent among European OECD countries, 6.29 percent in Austria. And between 1980 and 1990, Austria's 3.51 percent of average yearly inflation lay again noticeably below the European OECD average of 7.63 percent.³¹

If one supplements the data on economic growth and stability with a comparison between the high rates of unemployment in interwar Austria and their much lower counterparts in the postwar decades, as

shown in Table 5, the greater popular appeal of the Second Republic becomes tangible.

Table 5: Unemployment in Austria in Select Interwar and Postwar Years

Year	Total number of employees	Total number of unemployed	Unemployment rate in %
1925	2,010,000	220,000	9.9
1930	1,937,000	243,000	11.1
1935	1,626,000	515,000	24.1
1950	1,946,900	128,700	6.2
1960	2,281,900	79,300	3.4
1970	2,389,200	45,100	1.9
1980	2,788,700	53,200	1.9

Source: Felix Butschek, *Die österreichische Wirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1985), 223f.

The socioeconomic data illustrate that with regard to the basic social and material benefits enjoyed by its citizens, the two Austrian republics displayed few similarities. The Second Republic was in a markedly better position to gain the acceptance of its population than its interwar predecessor.

The Second Austrian Republic was characterized by stability and prosperity, and a continually growing segment of its population began to abandon a broader German sense-of-self in favor of a more exclusively Austrian national consciousness.³² It appears legitimate to draw a direct line from the political and economic progress to the development of national identity, as many analysts of postwar Austrian identity have been inclined to do. According to a well-established scholarly interpretation, Austrian postwar national identity grew naturally out of the country's economic prosperity and political stability and in particular out of its distinct structural features, such as its status as a permanently neutral country and its policy of economic concertation. And indeed, it

is difficult to imagine that a fundamental change in national consciousness could have taken place without the support it received from the socioeconomic developments described above.

But societal parameters that legitimize a process do not necessarily induce it. In order to evaluate the causative role of socioeconomic factors in the changes in Austrian identity, it does not suffice to establish that they were essential preconditions or that they created public acceptance for these changes. Upon close inspection, most of these wider social phenomena do not appear stable or even uniquely Austrian enough to have functioned as autonomous pillars of national identity.

Neutrality, for all its symbolic value for the Austrian sense-of-self, was a direct consequence of Austria's geopolitical position at the front lines of the East-West conflict. It originated during the Cold War and lost much of its significance at the end of this period of history. Indeed, Austria's increasing integration into European cooperation, most visibly its membership in the European Union, has begun to put the country's neutral status into question. Moreover, Austria's policy of neutrality becomes a less plausible explanation for changing perceptions of identity if one considers the diachronic origins of these two phenomena. Austrian nation-building commenced in 1945 and had considerable impact during the decade of Allied occupation; when Austria regained its sovereignty and declared its neutrality in 1955, every second Austrian had already accepted the new national conception.³³ Clearly, the policy of neutrality could not have accomplished this initial national reorientation before it had been implemented.

The social partnership, too, is not as uniquely Austrian as it sometimes appears from a domestic perspective. Peter Katzenstein, John Freeman, and others have analyzed the appeal of neocorporatist structures for the smaller Western European countries of the postwar years.³⁴ Katzenstein argued that the crises of the 1930s and 1940s convinced the political and economic leadership in those countries of the advantages of a policy of economic compromise and power-sharing.³⁵ For the conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, Gerhard Lehbruch delineated a range of politico-economic categories among OECD countries from the "pluralism" of the United States via the "weak corporatism" of Great Britain and Italy and the "intermediate-level corporatism" in countries such as Germany and Belgium to the "strong corporatism" of Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Austria.³⁶ In spite of the inherent distinctions among the different forms of neocorporatism situated between the poles of a more liberal-capitalist and a more statist variety, the politics of economic concertation

cannot be seen as a purely Austrian phenomenon; they constituted a common feature particularly of small-country political economy in postwar Western Europe.³⁷

The more fundamental questions about earlier interpretations of Austrian nation-building surface in a comparative view. Not only were the political and economic advances of postwar Austria part of a wider Western European trend, but they were most closely interrelated with West German developments. Many of the political changes that distinguished Austria's Second Republic from its interwar predecessor are also reflected in the relationship between Bonn and Weimar Germany. The turmoil and internal strife that had characterized Germany's interwar republic—no less than it characterized its Austrian counterpart—was replaced by the pragmatic stability of the post-1945 Federal Republic. The West German economic data largely resemble the Austrian, and the rise of overall German GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars) from 4,131 in 1950 to 19,351 in 1992 is comparable to the Austrian increase from 3,731 to 17,160 over the same period.³⁸ The convergence rates towards the United States per capita GDP from 1950–1992 are almost identical: 1.71 in Austria; 1.67 in Germany.³⁹ The rate of unemployment tended to be somewhat higher in Germany than in Austria but was balanced by a somewhat lower rate of inflation.⁴⁰ Unlike the German Democratic Republic, Austria was not separated from the Federal Republic by a growing political and economic disparity; the similarities in political, economic, and cultural life between postwar Austria and neighboring Bavaria remained too encompassing to permit the conclusion that these conditions were inherently responsible for the change in Austrian popular consciousness.

Even more so than the developmental similarities, it is the nature and extent of Austria's economic *relationship* with postwar Germany that cautions against overestimating the role of economic factors in the crystallization of Austrian national identity. The economic ties between Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany increased substantially during the postwar era. Considering that Austria, unlike the FRG, did not belong to the European Community and that the State Treaty of Vienna imposed particular restraints on the Austrian *economic* relationship with Germany, the commercial interweaving of both countries seems especially significant. In the course of European reconstruction, Germany became Austria's largest trading partner by far.

Table 6: Foreign Trade Austria-Germany, 1955–1992

Year	Imports in millions ATS	% of total imports	Exports in millions ATS	% of total exports
1955	8,481	36.1	4,870	26.8
1962	17,564	41.2	9,579	29.2
1972	51,374	41.2	21,136	23.6
1982	137,895	40.8	80,848	30.3
1992	254,635	44.5	194,136	39.8

Source: Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, ed., *Republik Österreich, 1945-1995* (Vienna, 1995), various pages.

In a number of areas, the level of economic intertwining exceeds the figures given in Table 6. Because western Austria is more closely connected with the Federal Republic of Germany than the eastern part of the country and almost 40 percent of Austrian exports to the FRG in 1988 went to Bavaria, the Bavarian–western Austrian region represents a particularly integrated economic sphere.⁴¹ Close relationships also reveal themselves to be industry specific; for example, Austria is intimately tied in with the German automotive industry. Nearly half of the motor vehicles imported by Austria in the late 1980s were produced in the FRG; at the same time, Austrian manufacturers provided the German automotive industry with component parts whose combined monetary value approximated the value of Germany’s car exports to Austria.⁴² The strong position of German-made motor vehicles on the Austrian market could not be shaken by the substantial expansion of Japanese brands, who largely gained market shares from companies based in third countries.

The Austrian tourism industry—of fundamental importance in reducing the country’s chronic balance of trade deficit—depends heavily on the German market. In the course of the 1950s, West Germans began to eclipse visitors to Austria from all other countries, as shown in Table 7 below. Since the end of that decade, West Germans have commonly represented between 60 and 75 percent of the foreign guests. The value of the tourist industry in general and of visitors from Germany in particular

Table 7: Percentage Share of Overnight Stays by Non-Austrians in Austria, 1950–1959

Year	Italy	France	USA	Britain	Netherlands	Switzerland	Germany
1950	16	8	7	16	4	15	17
1951	12	9	5	13	6	11	27
1952	8	8	5	10	6	7	42
1953	5	7	5	8	6	4	51
1954	3	5	4	8	6	3	57
1955	3	5	4	8	6	2	59
1956	3	6	4	8	6	3	56
1957	2	5	3	7	5	2	66
1958	2	3	4	7	5	2	69
1959	2	4	3	6	5	2	72

Source: Anton Tautscher, ed., *Handbuch der Österreichischen Wirtschaftspolitik* (Vienna, 1961), 229.

for the Austrian economy is visible in the absolute numbers of overnight stays by non-Austrians; in 1990, there were close to 95 million such stays, out of which German visitors accounted for approximately 57 million, far outdistancing the nine million Dutchmen and the five million Britons who contributed the next largest shares.⁴³ Due to the influence of diversified city tourism, especially in Vienna, this overall statistical representation does not even fully reflect the singular importance of West German vacationers for many Alpine vacation destinations.

As might be expected in view of the language tie, the degree of Austro-German cooperation is particularly high in the sphere of media and culture. German publishers have long dominated the Austrian market. Every third Austrian household is a member of the Donauland book club, which is controlled by the West German media giant Bertelsmann, and over 80 percent of books imported into Austria originate from the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴⁴ Since Austrian authors are commonly

published by West German publishers, it is difficult to differentiate fully between Austrian and West German publications; in essence, a unified book market exists throughout the German-speaking countries.

In the 1980s, the print media were drawn into this sphere of interconnection. German media corporations became part owners of Austrian daily newspapers that control approximately two-thirds of the national market.⁴⁵ The *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* secured a 45 percent share of the two most popular Austrian daily newspapers, the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* and the *Kurier*.⁴⁶ The Axel Springer Publishing Company, Germany's largest media conglomerate, acquired 50 percent of the *Standard* and 45 percent of the *Tiroler Tageszeitung*.⁴⁷ The fact that the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* accounted for 39.4 percent of the country's overall newspaper circulation, followed by the *Kurier* with 16.3 percent, documents the dominant position that daily newspapers in joint Austro-West German ownership occupy in the Austrian media environment.⁴⁸ A less common counterexample of Austrian media expansion northwards was the participation of Hans Dichand, the majority shareholder of the *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, in the *Hamburger Morgenpost*. In the sphere of magazines, the political border plays an even smaller role, and West German magazines such as *Bunte*, *Brigitte*, *Burda Moden*, *Schöner Wohnen*, and many others have long been seen as a natural part of Austrian daily life.⁴⁹

From its inception in 1955, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) cooperated extensively with its West German counterparts, particularly with the Second German Television (ZDF).⁵⁰ Television programs are often produced for a single German-speaking market. In recent years, the spread of cable television has made (West) German channels available in ever wider sectors of the Austrian market; the Vienna cable network alone supplied 250,000 connections in the late 1980s.⁵¹ With the SAT 3 channel, the ORF co-produces a satellite channel with its German-speaking sister companies ZDF in Germany and Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SRG) in Switzerland. The ongoing privatization of the European television market continues to intensify the integration of this important cultural sector in German-speaking Central Europe.

The closeness of the Austro-German economic interrelationship displays not a static but a dynamic dimension. A chronological comparison shows that beginning in 1938 and resuming in the late 1940s after the disruptions of the early postwar years, Germany's absolute and relative

significance for the Austrian economy increased substantially, above all with regard to Austria's regional integration with neighboring countries.

The Republic of Austria cannot be economically subsumed under a Habsburgian structure termed "Mitteleuropa" or "Danube Basin." Even in earlier periods, Austria's ties to the east had not completely eclipsed its association with other German-speaking territories, but in the postwar era, the country's orientation towards Western Europe and especially Germany becomes unmistakable (Table 8).

Table 8: Comparative Shares of Selected Countries' Foreign Trade with Austria in Percent, 1924-1990

	Imports				Exports			
	1927	1937	1955	1990	1927	1937	1955	1990
Germany	16.7	16.1	36.8	43.7	18.2	14.8	26.8	36.7
Czechoslovakia	17.7	11.0	1.7	1.2	11.5	7.1	1.5	1.9
Hungary	9.3	9.0	2.2	1.6	9.7	9.1	2.2	2.2
Yugoslavia	5.5	7.9	2.0	1.2	7.5	5.4	2.8	2.7
Great Britain	4.2	4.5	4.5	2.6	3.6	5.3	3.7	3.9
Italy	4.1	5.5	8.0	9.1	8.0	14.0	16.1	9.8

Source: Felix Butschek, "EC Membership and the 'Velvet' Revolution: The Impact of Recent Political Changes on Austria's Economic Position in Europe," in *Austria in the New Europe*, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, N.J., 1993), 76-78; and Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich*, various issues.

If one adds Poland to the three successor states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, the East Central European countries received 33.6 percent of all Austrian exports in 1929, 26.1 percent in 1937, and 17.5 percent as late as 1948; in 1990 the figure was just 7.7 percent.⁵² These numbers will certainly rise in the coming decades, and linear comparisons between postwar and interwar conditions cannot always tell the whole story. Some countries have fundamentally changed; in 1927, Czechoslovakia's population was approximately one-fourth German,

and a sizable portion of Czechoslovak-Austrian trade and particularly travel was attributable to the Sudeten Germans. Moreover, the decline of trade with Eastern Europe was based less on a conscious turning away from these countries than on the political and economic framework that was created by World War II. This framework forms the basis of Austrian postwar development in its entirety, however, including the country's political dissociation from Germany. Furthermore, the role played by world politics cannot sufficiently explain why the declining share of Austrian trade with the east shifted more to Germany than to other Western European countries. The share of Italian exports to Austria rose to the higher but static level of its imports from there; Great Britain's relative significance for Austrian trade even witnessed a slight decline; overall, the relative importance of Germany as an Austrian trading partner increased within Western Europe as well.

Austria's economic cooperation with West Germany manifests itself not only in a growing volume of trade, but also in economic policy decisions. For decades, the Austrian government followed the German hard-currency policy; in spite of the substantial rate of currency fluctuation that characterized the international monetary markets, the schilling-Deutschmark exchange rate remained almost unchanged after 1970 (Table 9).

Table 9: Bilateral Exchange Rates, 1970–1987

Year	Austrian Schilling/ Deutschmark	Austrian Schilling/ US-Dollar
1970	7.09	25.85
1975	7.08	17.42
1980	7.12	12.94
1985	7.03	20.69
1987	7.03	12.64

Source: Georg Winckler, "Geld und Wahrung," in *Handbuch der osterreichischen Wirtschaftspolitik*, ed. Hanns Abele et al., 3d ed. (Vienna, 1989), 264. The exchange rates are computed as yearly averages.

The comparison between schilling-Deutschmark and schilling-U.S. dollar exchange shows the Austrian currency orientation toward its

German neighbor particularly well. Interest rate levels displayed a similar tendency. Austria has become more deeply integrated with the German economy than in earlier historical periods; the resulting importance of German economic developments for their own well-being has given the Austrians a logical interest in cooperating with their larger neighbor.⁵³

The political and economic stability that has characterized Austria's postwar development and has been associated with images such as neutrality, social partnership, and economic viability has undoubtedly supported the evolution of a distinctly Austrian national consciousness. It would have been difficult for the reemerged republic to gain popular acceptance if its everyday reality had been marred by internal and external strife and by a lack of economic stability and prosperity. But the new national consciousness in Austria cannot simply be seen as a natural constituent of the country's socioeconomic success story. The fact that West Germany shared the political and economic advances reminds us that they were not intrinsically related to rejecting Germanness; Austria did not prosper *because* it had rejected its German affiliations. Austrian prosperity might have been a precondition for Austrian national reorientation, but Austrian national reorientation was not in itself a precondition for Austrian prosperity. The successes of the postwar republic did not inherently create a sense of national identity; they formed a basis on which policies of national identity formation could build.

That socioeconomic development in an apolitical sense is not intrinsically linked to national identity can be seen most interestingly in the Austro-German trade relationship. It is noteworthy also from a theoretical perspective that the integration of the West German and Austrian economic spheres has proceeded on its course, while the political and attitudinal relationship developed quite differently.⁵⁴ Whereas fewer Austrians than ever consciously define themselves as part of a larger German community, their country is integrated more deeply into the German economic sphere than in earlier historic periods.⁵⁵ The combination of economic integration and psychological dissociation is, moreover, no mere extension of the geopolitical environment, which was determined by the State Treaty of Vienna's guideposts for Austria's political and economic rather than its human and psychological relationship to Germany.⁵⁶ The Austrian postwar leadership successfully adjusted foreign mandates to its own national objectives. Austrian nation-building relied on geopolitical support, but it developed an internal momentum of its own.⁵⁷

If abstract economic and political developments cannot sufficiently account for the changes in Austrian national consciousness, what can? It has been a popular hypothesis that the success of Austrian nation-building lay in its focus on a political independence that did not challenge the established popular sense-of-self. Some observers held up the Austrian experience as an example of voluntary, contractarian identity formation—instead of “self-consciously trying to fashion a national political culture,” the emergent countries of postcolonial Africa should emulate the Austrian way.⁵⁸ But the Austrian elites, too, followed a conscious policy of nation-building. Utilizing the contemporary geopolitical environment, Austria’s political leadership set out to bolster Austria’s political identity by promoting a more comprehensive national identity to support it. These policy measures represent the most interesting aspect of Austrian nation-building; their analysis provides a better understanding of both the specifically Austrian course of identity formation and the more general mechanisms of this process.

The social and economic progress of postwar Austria formed a precondition for the development of an Austrian national consciousness. Political measures provided the catalyst. The nation-building policy of the Second Republic was based on two cornerstones:

1. the formulation of a uniquely Austrian historical and national imagery and its dissemination in the general public, and
2. the adaptation of public discourse to the national objective.

These pivotal elements of postwar Austrian politics will be examined in the following chapters.

Notes

1. See, for example, Rudolf Neck, “Innenpolitik,” in *Das neue Österreich: Geschichte der Zweiten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, Austria, 1975), 60. This assessment is particularly true for the Austrian interpretation itself, but relates to a substantial part of international scholarship as well.

2. Reinhold Lorenz, *Der Staat wider Willen* (Berlin, 1941); Hellmut Andics, *Der Staat, den keiner wollte* (Vienna, 1962).

3. Norbert Leser put an article on the Second Republic under the heading “In contrast to the state that no one wanted.” [Norbert Leser, “Im Kontrast zum Staat, den keiner wollte,” *die republik* 11:1 (1975): 22–30.] Hanspeter Neuhold related that “instead of being a state that no one wanted like in the aftermath of World War I, Austria reemerged after the even more devastating Second World War, in which large parts of the country itself had been destroyed, as a state that

almost everyone approved of.” [Hanspeter Neuhold, “Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung und ihre Folgen,” in *Das ausserpolitische Bewußtsein der Österreicher*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold and Paul Luif (Vienna, 1992), 28.] Lonnie Johnson literally named the relevant chapters of his popular *Understanding Austria* (Riverside, Calif., 1989) “The First Republic: The State No One Wanted,” and “The Second Republic: The State That Everyone Wanted.”

4. See Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany since 1815* (Berkeley, 1976), and William Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation* (New Haven, Conn., 1973). In his 1993 dissertation, which partially examines the development of national consciousness in Austria, Matthew Berg is more skeptical about Austrian postwar consensus historiography; yet even Berg does not direct his focus to the nation-building policies: Matthew Berg, “Political Culture and State Identity: The Reconstruction of Austrian Social Democracy, 1945–1958” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1993).

5. Wolfgang Mantl, “Die Signatur der Veränderung,” in *Politik in Österreich*, ed. Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna, 1992), 992f.

6. Norbert Leser, “Das Österreich der Ersten und Zweiten Republik,” in *Genius Austriacus* (Vienna, 1986), 17–30.

7. See William Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation* (New Haven, Conn., 1973), 256.

8. Another difference was that the system of government that had been overthrown in 1918 had clearly been an *Austrian* phenomenon, whereas the discredited government of 1945 was largely seen as *German*.

9. Winfried Becker, “Die Entwicklung der politischen Parteien im Saarland 1945 bis 1955 nach französischen Quellen,” in *Die Saar 1945–1955: Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte*, ed. Rainer Hudemann and Raymond Poidevin (Munich, 1992), 259. Insight into the cultural and historical arguments made in the Saar region can be gained from Maria Zenner, “Region—Nation—Europa. Untersuchungen zur historisch-politischen Argumentation saarländischer Politiker: Johannes Hoffmann,” *Revue d’Allemagne* 18 (1986): 5–24.

10. Winfried Becker, “Die Entwicklung der politischen Parteien im Saarland 1945 bis 1955 nach französischen Quellen,” in *Die Saar 1945–1955*, ed. Rainer Hudemann and Raymond Poidevin (Munich, 1992), 256. If one adds the votes for the Social Democratic Party of the Saar (SPS), which largely supported the CVP position, the combined share of proautonomy parties exceeds 80 percent. It should be noted, however, that these tendencies enjoyed the support of the French authorities and that in 1955, a majority of the local population expressed its opposition to separation from the Federal Republic of Germany.

11. Thomas Schäfer, *Die Schleswig-Holsteinsche Gemeinschaft 1950–1958* (Neumünster, Germany, 1987), 77–93. John Fitzmaurice described the psychological background of postwar Schleswig sentiment in the following manner: “The collapse of the National Socialist regime led to a complete collapse in German morale and with it, shifts in attitudes among the local population. There was a desire to escape the unpleasantness of defeat, near starvation, military occupation and denazification.” [John Fitzmaurice, *The Baltic: A Regional Future?* (New York, 1992), 73.]

It is not without interest that Schleswig-Holstein was by no means a region

that had shown particular resistance to National Socialism. On the contrary, the voters of Schleswig-Holstein supported the NSDAP to a noticeably higher degree than Germans in general in the last three *Reichstag* elections of the Weimar Republic (51 percent in July 1932 as opposed to 37.3 percent in all of Germany; 45.7 in November 1932 as opposed to 33.1; 53.2 percent in March 1933 as opposed to 43.9 percent of the countrywide vote). [Jürgen Falter, Thomas Lindenberger, and Siegfried Schumann, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik* (Munich, 1986), 73–75.]

Several of the very counties in northern Schleswig-Holstein where Danish sentiments surfaced most strongly had supported the NSDAP in even greater numbers; in July 1932, when the national average was 37.3 percent, 68.6 percent had voted National Socialist in Husum County, 70 percent in Flensburg surroundings, and 70.2 percent in (City of) Schleswig County. [Christian M. Sörensen, “Das Aufkommen der NSDAP in den Kreisen Husum und Eiderstedt—Phasen und Ursachen,” in *Nationalsozialismus in Nordfriesland*, ed. Thomas Steensen (Bredstedt, Germany, 1993), 47.]

12. The “Declaration on Austria” at the War Conference at Moscow, which is commonly termed Moscow Declaration, was adopted on October 30 and published on November 1, 1943. It stated:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation. [United States Government Printing Office, *House Documents*, 78th Congress, 1st session, 1943, House Document Nr. 351, 6.]

In his study *Austria in World War II* (Kingston-Montreal, 1988), Robert Keyserlingk documented in great detail, however, that the Moscow Declaration originated as an instrument of psychological warfare and was not seen as a binding policy statement. As a consequence, alternative postwar scenarios persisted among Western policy makers.

13. Erich Zöllner, *Der Österreichbegriff: Formen und Wandlungen in der Geschichte* (Vienna, 1988), 93. It would be difficult to fully understand the initial phase of national reorientation without taking its international framework into account. How strong this necessity to distance Austria from the German Question had remained nine years after the war can be seen in foreign secretary

Leopold Figl's parliamentary account of the Berlin Conference of February 1954:

The Austrian delegation declared anew that it supported Article Four [prohibition against union with Germany] as delineated in the draft treaty and emphasized the clear and unambiguous will of the federal government and the Austrian people to obey its stipulations. Furthermore, we refused anew to link the future fate of Austria in any way to one of the most difficult problems of world politics, upon whose solution Austria has no influence whatsoever. [Bundesministerium für Unterricht, ed., *Freiheit für Österreich: Dokumente* (Vienna, 1955), 50.]

14. It is important to separate the two groups. Early Austrianist activists legitimately object to having their intentions described as rooted in political expediency. These activists represented a small minority, however, and it is essential to examine why larger segments of both the political leadership and the general population listened to them in 1945 after they had widely ignored them in earlier periods.

15. For an overview of the Austrian political system, see Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser, eds., *Das österreichische Parteiensystem* (Vienna, 1988), and Wolfgang Mantl, ed., *Politik in Österreich* (Vienna, 1992).

16. Between 1945 and 1947, the grand coalition actually was an all-party government, because it also included the then only other parliamentary party, the Communists. For a discussion of the grand coalition era from 1945 to 1966, see Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei: Die große Koalition in Österreich 1945-1966* (Vienna, 1987). Also helpful is Peter Gerlich and Wolfgang Müller, eds., *Zwischen Koalition und Konkurrenz: Österreichs Parteien seit 1945* (Vienna, 1983).

17. The terms "Social Democrats" and "Social Democratic party" will be used consistently in this study, notwithstanding the fact that the official party name changed over the decades. Varying designations, such as Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP), Socialist Party, and Social Democratic Party did not impact the continuity of the political movement, which currently calls itself Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ). Similarly, the term "Conservatives" includes both the postwar Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and its Christian Social predecessor.

18. Joseph Marko, "Verbände und Sozialpartnerschaft," in *Politik in Österreich*, ed. Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna, 1992), 465. The FPÖ (Freedom Party) was the main postwar representative of the National-Liberal bloc and usually considerably smaller than the two central parties. For a more detailed introduction to the Austrian political system, see also chapter 4.

19. The Austrian elections of 1945, which gave the Communists a mere five percent share of the vote, dispelled any illusions the Soviets might have had about the sympathies of the Austrian population.

20. The actual date of the final troop withdrawal depends on the definition of the term "foreign troops." October 25/26, 1955, in any case, became the symbolic date of this event.

21. The central stipulations of this neutrality are to be found in Article I of

Austria's Neutrality Law:

Article 1.

1. In order to lastingly maintain its external independence and ensure the inviolability of its territory, Austria out of its own free will declares its permanent neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this neutrality with all the means at its disposal.

2. In order to uphold these goals, Austria will for all the future refrain from joining military alliances and from permitting the establishment of military bases by foreign countries on its territory. [*Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 26. Oktober 1955 über die Neutralität Österreichs, Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich 1955, Stück 57, Nr. 211.*]

For a concise description of the content and origin of Austria's status of neutrality, see Alfred Verdross, *Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs* (Munich, 1978).

22. In a 1972 poll, 90 percent of the interviewees believed that neutrality only brought Austria advantages. This extremely positive assessment of Austria's neutrality has decreased in recent years, however. In 1991, 51 percent of the interviewees supported the "purely advantageous" position, whereas 33 percent believed that neutrality had both positive and negative effects. [Hanspeter Neuhold and Paul Luif, eds., *Das aussenpolitische Bewußtsein der Österreicher* (Vienna, 1992), 97.]

23. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union consequently reduced the value of neutrality for those small neutral countries. In Austria, it led to membership in the European Union and even to debates about NATO membership. The identity crisis of the European neutrals is evident in many of the contributions in Hanspeter Neuhold, ed., *The European Neutrals in the 1990s: New Challenges and Opportunities* (Boulder, Colo., 1992).

24. The extensive literature on the Austrian social partnership can only be briefly addressed here. Gerald Stourzh and Margarete Grandner, eds., *Historische Wurzeln der Sozialpartnerschaft* (Vienna, 1986), and Theodor Tomandl and Karl Fuerboeck, *Social Partnership* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986) provide an overview of origins and functioning of the Austrian social partnership. Anton Pelinka, *Modellfall Österreich? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Sozialpartnerschaft* (Vienna, 1981); Peter Gerlich, Edgar Grande, and Wolfgang C. Müller, eds., *Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise* (Vienna, 1985); and Emmerich Talos, ed., *Sozialpartnerschaft: Kontinuität und Wandel eines Modells* (Vienna, 1993) also examine the limitations of the Austrian model of neocorporatism. For two recent brief English-language examinations of the origins and the societal ramifications of the social partnership, see Randall Kindley, *From Class Conflict to Class Cooperation: The Evolution of Austrian Concertation*, Working Papers in Austrian Studies 92-2 (Minneapolis, 1992), and Ewald Nowotny, *The Austrian Social Partnership and Democracy*, Working Papers in Austrian Studies 93-1 (Minneapolis, 1993). The literature on the international aspects of neocorporatism is addressed at a later point in this chapter.

25. Joseph Marko, "Verbände und Sozialpartnerschaft," in *Politik in Österreich*, ed. Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna, 1992), 451 and 454.

26. International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1980* (Geneva, 1980), various pages.

27. Alois Brusatti, "Entwicklung der Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik," in *Österreich: Die Zweite Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalník (Graz, Austria, 1972), 1:424.

28. Helmut Haschek, "Trade, Trade Finance, and Capital Movements," in *The Political Economy of Austria*, ed. Sven Arndt (Washington, D.C., 1982), 177.

29. Felix Butschek, *Die österreichische Wirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1985), 230f. The percentages for individual years were 5.4 in 1950; 7.9 in 1951; 0.5 in 1952; 10.0 in 1953; 4.6 in 1954; 7.3 in 1955; 6.3 in 1956; 5.5 in 1957; 1.1 in 1958; 3.9 in 1959; 5.6 in 1960; 6.3 in 1961; 4.2 in 1962; 5.3 in 1963; 5.0 in 1964; 3.9 in 1965; 7.4 in 1966; 5.0 in 1967; 3.8 in 1968; and 4.8 in 1969.

30. See Central Intelligence Agency, ed., *The World Factbook 1994* (Washington, D.C., 1994).

31. For all the inflation numbers listed, see Hans Seidel, "The 'Economic Miracle' in Austria," in *Economic Performance: A Look at Austria and Italy*, ed. Bernhard Böhm and Lionello F. Punzo (Heidelberg, Germany, 1994), 16.

32. For a detailed analysis of the changes in national consciousness, see chapter 5.

33. In 1956, 49 percent of the Austrians participating in an identity survey declared that the Austrians are not Germans, but a people of their own. [Georg Wagner, *Österreich Zweite Republik* (Thaur/Tirol, Austria, 1987), 2:1432.] These polls will be discussed more extensively in chapter 5.

34. See Peter Katzenstein, *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985); John Freeman, *Democracy and Markets: The Politics of Mixed Economies* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1979).

35. See Peter Katzenstein, *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), 9f.

36. Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Sozialpartnerschaft in der vergleichenden Politikforschung," in *Sozialpartnerschaft in der Krise*, ed. Peter Gerlich, Edgar Grande, and Wolfgang C. Müller (Vienna, 1985), 89.

37. What does remain unusual about Austria's policy of concertation is the high degree of elite influence on societal life in general. In Austria, the cooperation between employers and employees and between the political and the economic leadership is reinforced by the cooperation between the dominant political parties themselves. Indeed, it is difficult to separate the leaders of the social partners from the leadership of the two dominant parties, of which they form an integral part. This specific aspect of Austrian concertation came to assume significance for Austria's policy of nation-building, but not so much as a symbol of national identity, but as a facilitator of political measures in support of this policy.

38. Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992* (Paris, 1995), 23.

39. *Ibid.*, 25.

40. *Ibid.*, 84.

41. Margit Scherb, "Wir und die westeuropäische Hegemonialmacht," in *In deutscher Hand?* ed. Margit Scherb and Inge Morawetz (Vienna, 1990), 39.

42. *Ibid.*, 35.

43. Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich 1991* (Vienna, 1991), 325.

44. Hans Heinz Fabris, "Media Relations between Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Unequal Partners*, ed. Harald von Riekhoff and Hanspeter Neuhold (Boulder, Colo., 1993), 250.

45. *Ibid.*, 243.

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*, 245.

48. Verband Österreichischer Zeitungsherausgeber und Zeitungsverleger, ed., *Pressehandbuch 1991* (Vienna, 1991), 22. Incidentally, there are, so far, no indications that German coownership has changed the editorial orientation of these newspapers toward Germany.

49. See Verband Österreichischer Zeitungsherausgeber und Zeitungsverleger, ed., *Pressehandbuch 1991* (Vienna, 1991), 17.

50. Hans Heinz Fabris, "Media Relations between Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Unequal Partners*, ed. Harald von Riekhoff and Hanspeter Neuhold (Boulder, Colo., 1993), 248.

51. *Ibid.*, 249.

52. Data from Hannes Hofbauer, *Westwärts: Österreichs Wirtschaft im Wiederaufbau* (Vienna, 1992), 25-27; and Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich 1991* (Vienna, 1991), 310.

53. The introduction of a common European currency has created a new monetary environment and ties in Austria more closely with Germany, but also with other European countries. It remains to be seen whether this will increase or decrease the relative significance of Austro-German cooperation.

54. This development seems to contradict economy-based theories of nationhood, which focus on economic integration as the primary element of nationhood.

It should be pointed out, however, that the high level of economic integration between Austria and West Germany cannot in itself be cited as sufficient proof for a continuous inclusion of the Austrians in a concept of German nationhood. Other countries in Germany's vicinity, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, are deeply intertwined with the German economy as well. The similarities and the intertwining of Austrian and West German postwar developments do not establish the national community of these two countries, but they relativize the significance of abstract socioeconomic parameters for the formation of a separate identity in Austria. The foremost difference between the Austrian and, for example, the Dutch situation is that no one has argued that Dutch national identity is based on the country's postwar socioeconomic conditions.

55. For the numbers on the Austrian sense-of-self, see the polls in chapter 5.

56. The State Treaty of Vienna imposed a number of restrictions on Austria's political and economic relationship with Germany. Article IV, the central passage that regulates this relationship, is quoted in full in chapter 4.

57. Considering the internal Austrian as well as the international political environment, the postwar Austrian population was limited in its political choices. It was, however, offered a way out of Germany's military and moral collapse. At a time when Germans in many regions of Central and Eastern Europe lost their homelands, Austria was granted the status of being Germany's first victim.

58. William Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation* (New Haven, Conn., 1973), 256.

The Writing of History and National Imagery

The Intellectual Foundations of Austrian Nation-Building

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS provided essential images for the formation of Austrian national consciousness after 1945.¹ As it illustrates the political capacity of history, the Austrian national debate becomes of particular interest in the fundamental meta-historical discussion about the nature of the discipline. The place of history in the system of coordinates delineating scientific and creative production has been the subject of an ongoing theoretical debate ever since the appearance and advance of the (new) social sciences began to undermine the scientific foundations of historical methods. Critical scholars such as Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that historians do not discover facts but produce them, that they choose and arrange information and do not merely present it. In its most explicit form, this viewpoint implies that history consists exclusively of interpretation.²

History as a discipline borders on the social sciences on one side and on (imaginative) literature on the other. It distinguishes itself from fictional literature through its obligation to *strive* for truthful representation and to adhere to methodologies that support this goal; it distinguishes itself from the social sciences by not asserting to make human behavior predictable and explicable by systematic laws.

As a consequence, history has come under attack from two opposite directions. On the one hand, it has been accused of being speculative

and lacking scientific rigor. If the field wants to stand its ground academically, it needs to be able to legitimate itself on scholarly—some would say, scientific—grounds vis-à-vis fictional literature. One group of historians has tried to accomplish this by adopting the methodologies and theoretical paradigms of the newer social sciences. These disciplines attempt to discover prognosticative, generally applicable structural patterns. The multifaceted and often unpredictable course of historical developments, however, will not always fit into such rigid structures. Moreover, the methodologies of sociology and political science may themselves face questions as to whether their claim to scientific rigor is built more on technique than on results; in other words, as to whether the main focus of these disciplines has been on the internal conclusiveness of the theory and the proper application of the methodology rather than on the actual soundness and significance of the empirical findings.³

At the same time, there have been attempts to incorporate historical writings conceptually into the body of creative literature. With regard to form, traditional history books resemble works of creative literature—indeed, the historical novel can be seen as literature's counterpart to textbook history—and the development of the motion picture industry has further obscured the differences between fictional and scholarly dissemination of historical knowledge. One can safely surmise that the general public's view of history is shaped to a larger extent by fictional than by academic accounts.

The integration of history into literature has been advanced further by its gradual adoption of literary theory and similar more speculative modes of analysis. Cultural historians have proven particularly receptive to literary paradigms. The introduction of research tools that focus on semantics and textual structure could, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, contribute to the assimilation of historiography into fictional literature. In an interesting twist, theorists who reprove history for being but a form of fiction frequently advance theoretical propositions that might indeed result in such a resolution.

Hayden White has drawn attention to the role of literary techniques in historiography.⁴ One can observe a continuum ranging from historical evidence via the narrative interpretation of such evidence to imaginative literature inspired by such evidence. This continuum demystifies the distinctions between different styles of history-based discourse, but does not justify the reversal of its logical direction: it still does not permit the treatment of academic historiography exclusively

as literature. While historical writing can profit from the strength of its narrative, it distinguishes itself from imaginative literature through its special responsibility toward historical evidence. Historical writing that does not sufficiently reflect this responsibility, however, indeed blurs the distinction between academic history and creative literature.

In this light, the intertwining of historical writing and national mythology deepens the crisis of legitimacy faced by contemporary historians. In postwar Austria, this universal dilemma was exacerbated when historians were entrusted with the task of validating a new national conception—not an easy task in view of Austria’s close ties to German *history*, in particular. In one of the central studies of Austrian national identity, the Austrian-born historian Felix Kreissler openly explained his analytical approach:

The present study is strongly engaged: its purpose was the radical destruction of the legend of the “German Austrian” or even of the Austrian as the “better” German, and the portrayal of the growth and consolidation of the Austrian nation. This process requires the final eradication of pan-German ideology. In the course of its realization, such a comprehensive intention must ignore no suggestion, contribution, or assistance—wherever it might come from.⁵

A research design of this nature raises questions because of its somewhat belligerent tone, but especially because it might be seen as predetermining the outcome of its examination *before* the actual collection of historical evidence. Distinctly Austrianist historiography tended to envision a national purpose: it wanted to develop a comprehensive national conception and imagery and establish it among the population at large.

The Historical Outline

A historical introduction to the territories that today form the Republic of Austria must precede any examination of the national imagery that surrounds the country’s sense-of-self. This is not the place for a “History of Austria,” not even for a comprehensive overview. Nor can this outline follow the development of Habsburg territories that did not become part of the twentieth-century Republic of Austria. A brief look at the contours of human settlement and political structure in the eastern Alps

is a necessity, however, because these two elements assume a prominent place in the debate about Austrian national and historical identity.⁶

Although human settlement in Austria can be traced back for more than one hundred thousand years, the bronze-age Illyrians are considered the first population group known by name. The proto-European population was superseded by this early Indo-European wave, and it, in turn, by later arrivals. In the final pre-Christian centuries Celts dominated the eastern Alps, until their tribal kingdoms succumbed to the expanding power of early imperial Rome. In Roman times, natives and settlers melted together into a Latin-speaking provincial populace that, in spite of its partial withdrawal along with the Roman administration, came to constitute one element of the emerging Austrian population of the early Middle Ages.

During the period of migration, the eastern Alps had shifting Germanic tribal rulers; most eminent among them was Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths. At the close of this tumultuous era, three groups had assumed control of the Austrian regions. A small strip to the west of the Lech river had been settled by the Germanic Alemanni. The remainder of western and central Austria had become Bavarian, whereas eastern and southern Austria had fallen to the Alpine Slavs.

The subsequent centuries brought an expansion of Bavarian rule and the beginning of Austrian history as such. By the end of the eighth century, the Slavic population began to be assimilated by the Germanic settlers; the Magyar invasion could only temporarily delay this process in northeastern Austria. Bavaria became part of the Frankish kingdom and of the Holy Roman or Roman-German Empire that succeeded in its eastern half. In 976, Carinthia was separated from Bavaria and elevated to the rank of an independent duchy within the empire. By the year 1000, when the Roman-German empire barely reached beyond the Elbe river in the northeast, Austria was firmly integrated into its structures.

During the late Middle Ages, the small German territories of the eastern Alps were consolidated into larger units. At first, the name Austria only designated an area that corresponded roughly to the modern Austrian province of Lower Austria and its historical capital of Vienna.⁷ The Franconian Babenberg dynasty joined Styria to this configuration. After the death of the last Babenberg duke in 1246, neighboring princes tried to inherit his territory. When the powerful ruler of Bohemia, Přemysl Otakar II, lost his life battling the German king, the victor acquired Austria for his own family and enfeoffed his sons with it in 1282. The name of the king was Rudolf of Habsburg;

his dynasty was to dominate the region for more than six hundred years to come.

At the time the Habsburgs arrived from the Swabian southwest of the empire, the area comprised by twentieth-century Austria consisted of a multitude of small and medium-sized German border territories. As a first step, the new rulers tried to solidify their scattered possessions by acquiring the territories that separated them. This policy brought much of Carinthia and Tyrol under Austrian domination by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and created a territorial configuration that showed early similarities with the shape of the twentieth-century republic.⁸

The eastern Alps had been drawn into the powerful expansionism of a dynasty that began to express itself in two seemingly contradictory, but nonetheless interrelated forms. On the one hand, the Roman-German empire transformed into a quasi-hereditary monarchy under Habsburg leadership. Although the emperor was elected and not determined by hereditary succession, the Habsburgs ruled the empire all but continuously between 1438 and 1806.⁹ Austria changed from periphery to core; Vienna turned into the imperial residence and a preeminent center of German cultural and political life. The intellectual and administrative elite from many German territories flocked to Vienna in the service of the emperor and his court: Austria had become the leading German state.

At the same time, dynastic acquisitions led the country toward the east. In 1526, the Habsburgs inherited the lands of the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns. The conquest of Hungary from the Turks represented the dominant aspect of Austrian foreign and military policy during the subsequent centuries and turned the Habsburg Monarchy into the prevalent force of the European southeast and a great power in its own right. Thus, the population of the eastern Alps had transformed from inhabitants of the German periphery into inhabitants of both the imperial German crown lands and a multinational empire. This dichotomy, rooted in dynastic politics, was to remain a central feature of Austrian political reality.

In spite of their apparent opposition, the two developments were intimately related. To a considerable extent, the eastward expansion of the Habsburg realm resulted from the dynasty's standing within German Central Europe. As Roman-German emperors, they fought the Ottoman Turks in the name of the empire and could draw on support from other imperial territories—one need only think of famous military

leaders such as Louis of Baden and Charles of Lorraine. In turn, their international power basis cemented the predominance of the Habsburgs among German princes and contributed to their nearly unchallenged role as the Roman-German imperial family. The Habsburgs drew much domestic strength from their status within the Holy Roman Empire, and the special position of the Austro-Germans in the Habsburg Monarchy depended in no small measure on their interconnectedness with the rest of German Central Europe.

Religious developments impacted early modern Austria as deeply as the military and political expansion. The Protestant Reformation that swept across the German lands did not stop at the Habsburg borders. In the course of the sixteenth century, much of the population became Protestant. Lutherans were most numerous, but Anabaptism and Calvinism attracted followers as well—until the Habsburgs, together with the Bavarian Wittelsbachs, became the driving force behind the German Counterreformation.

Through stern policy measures, the Habsburgs accomplished the re-Catholicization of their German hereditary lands. The losses in population and economic strength and the devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War that erupted over Habsburg religious pressure in Bohemia constituted a heavy price, though. Furthermore, the weakening of imperial authority and the deep religious chasm that followed the war lay the groundwork for the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia as a Protestant counterforce to the Habsburg emperor. The Prussian conquest of Silesia, which was defended in part with the plight of that territory's large Protestant population, demonstrated that the Habsburg state could no longer unilaterally dominate German Central Europe. The transfer of Silesia also exacerbated a process in which Prussia, historically a border territory like Austria, acquired regions that lay closer to the German heartland, whereas Austria's center of gravity began to move outside its traditional German base.

The French Revolution of 1789 and its Napoleonic aftermath dealt a deathblow to the historic Holy Roman Empire. Subsequent to the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War, the empire had diminished in political relevance; the individual territories rarely cooperated in the service of the whole. When Napoleon Bonaparte induced Francis II to lay down the imperial crown in 1806—to be prepared, Francis had created an Austrian emperorship two years prior—the framework that had held the German cultural realm together, at least in tradition and sentiment, had collapsed.

At the same time, the ideas of the French Revolution, which stressed the importance of the nation versus the formerly prevailing interests of rulers and dynasties, began to influence the German intellectual climate. The overthrow of French domination heightened expectations that the end of the war would bring about a more closely integrated German political structure. But the Congress of Vienna was a gathering of princes and resulted in the restitution of a conventional dynastic system that left the popular movements disenchanted. Instead of an actual German state, the monarchs established the loosely connected German Confederation under Austrian leadership. For a few decades more, the German Question remained dormant.

The revolutionary outbursts of 1848 put a dramatic end to the *Biedermeier* tranquillity that had outwardly marked post-Napoleonic Europe. In German Central Europe, the revolution opened the final chapter in the drive toward unification that ultimately resulted in the establishment of a Prussian-led German polity in 1871. In 1848 the outcome was still open. The territorial princes had to permit elections for an all-German democratic parliament, which took its seat in Frankfurt. Delegates from Austria's German provinces participated fully in the proceedings. The selection of the Austrian archduke John as the erstwhile regent underlined the parliamentarians' desire for a political arrangement that included all historically German provinces. Yet, the Habsburgs could not be interested in dividing their lands into a German and a non-German section and insisted on solutions suitable to the multiethnic character of their realm. Most parliamentarians, by contrast, did not want merely to recreate a loose federation and regarded the inclusion of the numerous non-German nationalities under Habsburg rule as incompatible with the intended national state. The position taken by the Habsburg government tipped the balance in the Frankfurt assembly, and a majority of the delegates voted to offer the German crown to Frederick William of Prussia. In spite of the king's rejection of the parliamentary overture and the ultimate failure of the revolution, many intellectual leaders had concluded that only Prussia would be able to unify the German states.

During the short period between 1859 and 1866, the Habsburgs were effectively expelled from the emerging nation-states in Italy and Germany. They lost their Italian provinces in the wars of 1859 and 1866. In the latter year, Austria's defeat by Prussia led to the discontinuation of the German Confederation and ultimately the emergence of a German federal state without Austria. Once the inhabitants of

the imperial German crown lands, the Austrians now remained on the outside.

As a consequence of 1866, the Austro-Germans visibly became only one nationality among many within the Habsburg realm, and other nationalities began to question their privileged position to an even greater extent than before. The German Austrians responded to their new internal and external environment with intensified German nationalism. A radical minority came to demand the immediate dissolution of the Habsburg empire and the incorporation of its German provinces into the Hohenzollern monarchy, whereas the larger part of the population accepted the political separation from Germany while stressing the ethnocultural links. When the Habsburg realm disintegrated at the end of World War I, however, most German Austrians regarded accession to Germany as a logical completion of the German unification movement. The rivalry between the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties had kept them outside the German state; the abdication of these dynasties and the dissolution of the multinational monarchy seemed to have removed the *raison d'être* of Austrian political separateness. In November 1918, the (German-) Austrian national assembly declared the Republic of German-Austria a constituent part of the German Republic. But dynastic obstacles had been replaced by geopolitical ones, since the victorious Allies of World War I rejected any territorial enlargement of their defeated German enemy and insisted on the continuation of Austrian political independence.

A new republican Austria had come into being against the original intentions of its founders. Accession to Germany initially remained a political goal. In 1938, however, the National Socialists brought about Austro-German union under circumstances quite different from those envisioned by the democratic revolutionaries of 1848 and 1918 and left lasting marks on its public image. The defeat of National Socialist Germany in World War II thoroughly transformed the political landscape of Central Europe and marked a new beginning in Austrian political life.

The National Imagery

In 1945, historical tradition did not inherently favor the development of a distinctly Austrian national consciousness. This would not preclude the gradual formation of such a consciousness, which could be based on other, more contemporary constituents. To the proponents of Austrian nationalism, however, historical legitimation seemed indis-

pensable. Convinced it was not sufficient to promote a distinctly Austrian national present, they advanced a complementary historical conception that began to dominate public discourse and became of central importance for the collective self-image of the Austrian public.

This emerging Austrian national ideology centered on demarcation from Germany. Austria and the Austrians had never been part of Germany or the German nation.¹⁰ Some authors traced Austrian separate-ness back to the *privilegium minus* in 1156; others chose the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.¹¹ Austrians were of different descent than Germans and spoke a language that was clearly demarcated from the one used in Germany.¹² Austrian identity was formed by the Counterreformation and the baroque period and represented a Catholic antipode to Protestant Germany.¹³ The Austrians felt much closer to their East Central European neighbors than to the Germans.¹⁴ And finally: the Austrians had been incorporated into Germany against their will in 1938; they had been betrayed by the international community and had resisted as much as they could; they had been a mere victim of National Socialist Germany.¹⁵

Originally, this Austrianist worldview was found among the most conservative segments of the political right and on the communist left, whereas liberal and social democratic voices were noticeably rare.¹⁶ In the course of the postwar decades, however, its major conceptions spread to initially resistant sectors of society. The historical discourse was directed at the general populace. Although a number of academic historians participated in it, its main focus was on popular history, and many of its foremost promoters were non-academic researchers and publicists, often with ties to the educational bureaucracy.¹⁷ The analysis of central elements of this national imagery provides important information about the role of historical interpretation in the Austrian nation-building process.

Portrayal and Assessment:

Variances of National Imagery

There are different ways national imagery can be created. A historical myth may misrepresent historical events to support national goals. In other cases, undisputed historical events are merely reinterpreted or given new relevance. Sometimes reinterpretations and value judgments lead to the mythicization of events that in and of themselves are undisputed, and even the refutation of legendary historical concepts can result in the forming of new legends.

Frequently, historical events achieve their mythological status through their subsequent appraisal. One example of this type of national imagery centers on Austria's religious history. An important element of Austrianist ideology, with deep roots in Habsburg tradition, juxtaposes Catholic Austria and Protestant Prussia as well as, by extrapolation, Germany as a whole.¹⁸ The interwar president Wilhelm Miklas explained that "Catholic faith in the hearts and souls of the Viennese is inseparably intertwined with true Austrianness; with a love for the fatherland that cannot be separated from Catholic belief and truly Catholic convictions."¹⁹ The Christian Social politician and historian Ernst Karl Winter wrote of an *Austria Sancta*, which, as the representation of Austria's Catholic saints, should guide the country and its people.²⁰ The German-born Austrianist Oscar Schmitz argued that in "almost every Austrian, something of the binding powers of the Catholic Church, of the baroque urge to sensualize the sublime and to sublime the sensual, of the harmony of Haydn, Mozart, and Schubert, became flesh and blood, whereas in almost every German there is something of Luther's negation of form."²¹ And in his *Österreichische Staats- und Kulturgeschichte*, Ludwig Reiter concluded simply that "the Austrians formed their national culture in resistance to Luther's reformation."²²

A careful examination of the religious and political conditions in early modern Austria renders the conceptualization of Austrian identity as a baroque and counterreformational opposition to Protestant Germany somewhat problematic, though. The territories of today's Republic of Austria had become predominantly Protestant in the course of the sixteenth century. The Counterreformation subsequently represented a fundamental disruption of Austrian intellectual and economic life. More than one hundred thousand Protestants were driven into exile.²³ Protestant German territories, in particular the city states of southern Germany, witnessed a sizable influx of Austrian religious refugees. The Free Imperial City of Regensburg alone provided a new home for 750 Austrian Protestants; among them were members of such notable families as the Jörgers and the Herbersteins, but predominantly common residents of such cities as Vienna and Graz, Villach and Steyr.²⁴ The remaining Protestants had to return to the Catholic Church; only small Protestant communities secretly preserved their faith in remote Alpine regions until Emperor Joseph II issued his Edict of Toleration in 1781.

The image of Austrian identity as the embodiment of the Counterreformation and the baroque cannot easily be proved or disproved. The

questions it raises are not so much based upon events, but upon values or judgments. It is conceivable that Austrian culture was transformed by the Counterreformation, although the similarities with Bavarian religious history challenge the assumption that the Austrians truly became different from “Germans” in general.²⁵ Such factual assessments are not the only complication, however. One will also have to ponder the implications of turning a historical period during which large sectors of the Austrian population suffered protracted persecution at the hands of their government into a symbol of national identity. Finally, it might be difficult to integrate Austria’s current Protestant population of almost four hundred thousand into this image of Austrianness.²⁶

While national mythology can thus be rooted in a divergence of value systems, its more typical origins lie in explicit reinterpretations of historical developments. Like many earlier national movements, the emergent Austrian nationalism insisted on its embeddedness in a long historical tradition. Commonly, the origins of Austrian political sovereignty were traced back to the *privilegium minus* of 1156; the privileges granted to the Babenberg dukes of Austria in that charter became important elements of national discourse. During the emotional Austro-German debate about Austria’s role in the projected German Historical Museum in Berlin, Austrian officials cited the *privilegium minus* as evidence for Austria’s prolonged separation from Germany.²⁷ The “Austrian Encyclopedia,” published by the governmental Bundesverlag, stated succinctly:

Privilegium Minus, the basic document of Austria’s sovereignty. . . . These freedoms surpassed the rights of all other territorial rulers in the empire and constituted the basis for Austria’s departure from the imperial frame.²⁸

The substantive historical significance of that document, however, cannot measure up to such assessments. In its central stipulations, the *privilegium minus* granted the new dukes of Austria special rights of inheritance and jurisdiction and limited their obligation to participate in royal diets and military expeditions. In order to get a full understanding of this event, one has to examine its genesis.

The Babenbergs had supported the Hohenstaufen dynasty in their protracted conflict with the powerful Guelphs. In order to weaken his opponents, King Conrad III of Hohenstaufen entrusted the Babenbergs with the Guelph Duchy of Bavaria. Before long, however, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, also of the Hohenstaufen family, considered it politic

to restore Bavaria to its traditional dynasty. In order to diminish the insult to his Babenberg supporters, he elevated their Austrian possessions to the rank of a duchy and granted the *privilegium minus*. The political process was not intended to express a particularly independent role of the Austrian territory—its original intent would, on the contrary, have resubjected Austria to direct Bavarian rule—but grew out of dynastic rivalries and their subsequent pacification.

No less relevant than the genesis of the charter is its actual significance for subsequent political developments. The Austrian privileges did not remain an isolated phenomenon. The Guelphs were granted more extensive freedoms soon thereafter, and by the fourteenth century many German princes took such rights for granted. Not even the *privilegium maius*—a fanciful falsification commissioned by Austria's Duke Rudolf IV that was subsequently accepted in part by the emperor—surpassed *in toto* the special rights of the imperial electors.²⁹ The Austrian dukes sought compensation for the fact that they had not been elevated to the ranks of those electors; incidentally, the privileges focused on the established domains and did not extend to all the regions of the twentieth-century Republic of Austria. Finally, it should not be overlooked that the representative of the central imperial authority, against whom such charters could be employed, soon came to be the archduke of Austria himself in his role as Roman emperor. Only if the Austrian territorial rulers had come into opposition to a powerful imperial authority subsequent to the recognition of the *privilegium maius* might their privileges have attained historical relevance. Since the Habsburgs never encountered this situation, these privileges did not come to play a significant role: the unique feature of Austria's political position within the empire was not its peripheral, but its central status as the power base of the emperor.

Austrian Identity between Germany and Mitteleuropa

The affinities between Austria and its neighbors play a large role in Austrianist historical interpretation. The principal line of argument centers on Austria's relationship to other German-speaking territories. In its most explicit form, it contends that the Austrians have never been part of Germany or German history because Germany was first created in 1871 and distinctly excluded Austria. The historian Wilhelm Böhm expounded:

One has to recall that we never formed a state together with

today's Germany. The Holy Empire was neither German nor a state; the German Confederation was German, but not a state either, and the German national state of 1871 was consciously put into place in opposition to us.³⁰

According to a popular extension of this argumentation, which rejects any historical inclusion of Austria in a larger German context, it was not Austria that had formed a part of Germany, but Germany that had formed a part of Austria.³¹ The basis for this interpretation lies in the federalist structure of the Roman-German empire, which differed in fundamental aspects from the conditions found in Western Europe. The relationship between the German ethnocultural tradition and the universalist imperial tradition undoubtedly represented a critical point of tension throughout much of German history. The Holy Roman Empire was larger than its German nucleus. Yet throughout the duration of the empire, it was understood by Germans and non-Germans alike where *Germania* or *Alemania* lay, and the undisputed German character of their Austrian hereditary lands formed an important precondition for the continuity of Habsburg emperorship. The more obviously the Holy Roman Empire had lost its preeminence in Christendom and had turned into (merely) a German Empire, the more improbable the election of a non-German emperor had become. Hartmann Schedel's world chronicle of 1493 refers to Germany as matter-of-factly as does Johann Hübner's famed encyclopedia of 1709, where one can read under the heading Germany (Deutschland):

Germany is a large country in Europe. It is situated in the temperate zone and is approximately 200 German miles long and 150 German miles wide. To the west, it borders on France and the Low Countries, to the south, on Italy and Switzerland, to the east, on Hungary and Poland, and to the north, on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.³²

The encyclopedia considers the existence of an entity called Germany a given that requires no further explanation. When it points out the country's borders with Italy and Hungary, it directly subsumes the Austrian territories under the concept of Germany. The separate reference to Switzerland, which is not regarded as part of Germany, provides that this understanding was not based on linguistic criteria alone. Foreign sources also refer to Germany long before the founding of the Prussian-led German state of 1871. Nicolas Sanson d'Abbeville's celebrated world atlas

of 1665 contains maps of Upper and Lower Germany; the territories depicted in the map for Upper Germany (Haute Allemagne) include the Austrian provinces.³³ In 1856, *Magnus's Commercial Atlas of the New World* elaborates under the heading Germany:

Germany is divided into thirty-eight independent states, which have been politically united under the name of the Germanic Confederation, the object of which is to maintain internally and externally the independence and integrity of each state. Austria is the principal state, Prussia is the second, and then follow Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hanover, Saxony.³⁴

It would be anachronistic to project modern German national identity back in time and to equate the Germany of the 1500s with the twentieth-century polity of that name. The outright negation of German history and identity prior to 1871, however, premises distinctly unitarian and centralist criteria. If German history begins in 1871, Finnish history begins in 1918, Icelandic history during World War II, and Slovenian history with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The proposition that ethnic and historic identity can only be acquired through a fully independent and centralized nation-state echoes the widely faded conception of nations without history and cannot do justice to the historical experience of most European, not to mention non-European populations. A Polish people (some would argue also a Polish nation) was able to exist at a time when the Polish state had been dismembered, and it experienced history during this period. The German development distinguished itself from this and similar cases insofar as Germany actually enjoyed an autonomous political environment, expressed in political polycentricity within a loose German-dominated federalist structure. At least until 1866, the Austrian provinces fully participated in this German framework of identity, which was tighter than the contemporary Romanian and Croatian structures, while not as tight as the French and Portuguese.

Even the more cautious line of argument, which focuses on the time period subsequent to 1866–1871 and proposes that the Austrians ceased to be Germans during those years (or, alternatively, did not join the then-forming German nation), does not lead to thoroughly convincing conclusions.³⁵ It cannot account for the national development of the German-speaking Austrians in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia—one third of the Austro-German population. Just like other Austrians, the German speakers in the lands of the Bohemian crown did not

become part of the German Empire in 1871, were not permitted to unite with Germany in 1918, and were incorporated into that country in 1938.³⁶ *Their* German character, however, remained undisputed. It is difficult to see why the equivalent historical experience during the time period after 1866 should not have impacted the German identity of the Austro-Germans in Southern Moravia if it had transformed the collective sense-of-self among the neighboring Lower Austrians. This analytical weakness becomes all the more pronounced if one takes into account that prior to 1918 the Lower Austrians had been in more intimate human interaction with the Southern Moravians than with the inhabitants of Western Austrian provinces such as Salzburg or Vorarlberg.³⁷

Austrianist interpretation does not base the country's distinctiveness exclusively on the political structures of Austrian history, but describes a more encompassing Austrian ethnic or national identity. This Austrian identity is strictly demarcated from German traditions:

With regard to culture, and mentality in general, the difference, in part even opposition, between Germans and Austrians is so obvious that only sheer obstinacy refuses to acknowledge it. We Austrians have not simply left the German nation; we were never part of it.³⁸

Some Austrianists propose an Austrian national identity that dates back for centuries, as expressed by the Graz historian Alexander Novotny:

For millions of years the earth was circling the sun—and no one knew! For centuries an Austrian nation has existed; first [it was] dormant and finally—particularly after 1945—the Austrians realized that they are a nation.³⁹

Albert Massiczek's much-quoted study of Austrian national identity shares the long-range conceptualization of Austrian nationhood:

Incidentally, it should be observed that the concept of an "Austrian nation" is no mere invention of the Second Republic, but can be documented as early as 1368 at the University of Vienna for students from the Habsburg domains.⁴⁰

But while the most appropriate political framework for the German-speaking Austrians had been debated earlier, the notion of an Austro-German ethnic or national dichotomy is of fairly recent origin. The university nations of fourteenth-century Europe do not shed much light on

twentieth-century national questions, because they resemble modern nations in name only. The contemporary University of Vienna harbored—in addition to the Austrian nation, which included students from Italy as well—a Rhenish nation, which included Southern and Western Germans as well as Frenchmen and other Western Europeans; a Hungarian nation, which comprised Magyars and Eastern Slavs; and a Saxon nation representing students from all over Northern Europe.⁴¹ At the University of Prague, on the other hand, contemporaneous Austrians along with Bavarians, Western Germans, and Dutchmen formed the Bavarian nation, whereas Eastern Germans joined Poles and Lithuanians in the Polish nation and Sudeten Germans were united with Czechs and Southeast Europeans in the Bohemian nation.⁴²

In traditional Austrian discourse, the inclusion of “Austrian” in a wider “German” was so ubiquitous that it must suffice here to point to a few examples through time.⁴³ The ethnic sense-of-self of a sixteenth-century aristocratic family is visible in the writings and reminiscences of the Khevenhüller clan.⁴⁴ These Carinthian noblemen not only socialized with Germans wherever they went—as students in Pavia, as travelers in France and Spain—but consistently referred to themselves as Germans.⁴⁵ In a Spanish place of pilgrimage, Bartholomew Khevenhüller explained to suspicious officials that he and his companions had traveled there because the place was “well-known among us Germans,” and in his last admonishments to his son he lamented that there was “such presumptuousness with regard to customs and dress among us Germans.”⁴⁶

More than two centuries later, in July of 1811, Austria’s oldest continually published periodical, the *Carinthia*, first appeared in the Alpine city of Klagenfurt. The cover page was dominated by a poem titled “A German Greeting to Germans” and saturated with patriotic appeals to German unity. And if one browses through newspapers from the final years of the Habsburg empire yet another hundred years later, one cannot but notice how unquestioningly the Alpine Austrians still saw themselves as Germans; the conversations recorded by the liberal historian Heinrich Friedjung during the same time period underscore that such notions of identity were just as characteristic for private as they were for public discourse.⁴⁷

Faced with a multitude of sources documenting their distinctly German self-image, Austrianist authors could only redefine the identity of previous generations of Austrians:

Slowly there occurred the realization, against the conservatism

of a deeply-rooted custom and against the misleading or mistaken diction of the pre-1938 literature, that it is wrong to speak of “Germans” in Austria, even if the Austrians themselves, erring about the historical facts, called themselves Germans.⁴⁸

The perceived need to amend the self-identification of earlier Austrians and to ascribe contemporary theoretical relevance to a categorization of medieval student bodies that essentially followed the four points of the compass illuminates the difficulties faced by the proponents of historical nation-building.⁴⁹ Prior to World War I, the concept of Austria comprised a much wider set of meanings, within which today’s German-speaking Austrians formed the core group of the Austrian or Austro-Hungarian empire’s German nationality. The Austro-Germans shared Austria with a multitude of other nationalities; their own German ties were seen as a given. Dating back long before the development of modern nationalism, the Alpine provinces had experienced a loose cultural and political commonality with other German-speaking regions under the federalist roof of the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, the Roman-German emperor resided in Austrian cities from 1438 to 1806, with the exception of the brief rule of a Bavarian Wittelsbach in the 1740s. German artists and intellectuals from many parts of the empire—including Leibniz, Mozart, and Beethoven—took up residence in Vienna. Since it was the domicile of the emperor and the court, the city was seen as the cultural capital of the politically polycephalic German world; as late as 1859, a manifesto published in a leading Austrian newspaper refers to Vienna as “Germany’s largest city, in which the genius of Schiller, conveyed by our Burgtheater’s interpretation, reigns as in possibly no other place.”⁵⁰

The French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath led to the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the beginning of modern nationalism in Central Europe. During the decades of Metternich’s chancellorship, the liberal and national ideas that began to take root within most of the cultural groups under Habsburg rule could long be kept under control, but the revolutionary outbursts of 1848 visibly brought them to the fore. Habsburg Austria experienced both an internal liberal revolution and several national revolutions, whose success would have fundamentally transformed the national landscape of Central Europe.

Delegates from Austria’s German-speaking population attended the constitutional assembly in the Frankfurt *Paulskirche*, which attempted to implement national and democratic conceptions in the German lands,

and the Austrian archduke John was elected Germany's chief administrator. In an important analysis of the western Habsburg territories of the revolutionary days, the Czech historian Jiří Kořalka described the triangular juxtaposition of a conservative dynastic Austrianism, a liberal Germanism, and, as a national alternative particularly in the Bohemian lands, an emergent Austro-Slavic conception.⁵¹ The Habsburg Monarchy survived this first major challenge by the rising popular movements because its military forces were able to overcome the internally divided revolutionaries—if not completely without foreign support.⁵²

The German unification envisioned by the liberal revolutionaries of 1848 did not materialize, and in 1866 Austria had to secede from German politics after its military defeat by Bismarck's Prussia. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia made Austria's withdrawal from Germany the central condition for peace.⁵³ But the exclusion from the emerging German national state was not accepted with relief or resignation by the Austro-Germans. Instead, it led to the intensification of their until-then largely self-evident but not necessarily urgent sense of German identity.⁵⁴ In recent years, several North American scholars have described the deepening of German national consciousness in late nineteenth-century Austria. Looking at the Bohemian capital of Prague, Gary Cohen analyzed the evolution of a more consciously German identity among urban German-speaking elites in Cisleithania.⁵⁵ Karl Bahm described the dissimilation of German and Czech identities in linguistic border regions within the Habsburg realm.⁵⁶ Jill Mayer followed the growth of German nationalist discourse in the late nineteenth-century Austrian press.⁵⁷ And Pieter Judson explained this German nationalism by means of the nationality conflict, putting it into the context of national ownership and the defense of both individual and collective property.⁵⁸

It could not come as a surprise, then, that the parliamentary representatives of the German-speaking Austrians responded to the abdication of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties and the disintegration of the Danube Monarchy in the final days of World War I with demands for accession to the newly established German republic. On November 12, 1918, the Provisional National Assembly proclaimed the Republic of German-Austria and resolved:

Article 1

German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authority is derived from the people.

Article 2

German-Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic. Particular statutes determine the participation of German-Austria with the legislature and the administration of the German Republic as well as the extension of German laws and institutions into German-Austria.⁵⁹

The Peace Treaty of Saint Germain obligated the Austrians to forego unification with Germany and to drop the modifier German from their country's territorial designation. Austria's relationship to Germany was put under the supervision of the League of Nations:

Article 88

The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.⁶⁰

The Austrians were in no position to reject these terms. Nonetheless, the country's national assembly resolved to "protest solemnly before the world against the fact that the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, under the pretext of protecting Austrian independence, deprives the people of German-Austria of their right to self-determination and refuses them the fulfillment of their heartfelt desire, which also represents a vital economic, cultural, and political necessity: the union of German-Austria with the German mother country.

"The National Assembly expresses its hope that as soon as peace has overcome the spirit of national hatred and animosity caused by the war, the League of Nations will not lastingly deny the German people the right to national unity and liberty, which it grants all other nations."⁶¹

At times, the desire for union with Germany that expressed itself so strongly in the aftermath of World War I is ascribed exclusively to doubts about the economic viability of the Austrian republic.⁶² It remains doubtful whether such an explanation goes to the heart of the matter. Economic uncertainty in interwar Austria was high, to be sure, but Germany's political and economic situation seemed equally bleak. Union

with Germany did not promise an escape from reparation payments, either. Beyond such factual counterpoints, purely economic interpretations face a more fundamental challenge. The exclusive search for secondary explanations premises that the Austrian republic represented the natural development, which was only questioned because of extraordinary political and economic circumstances. Such a premise approaches the interwar years with a postwar mind-set, however. In 1918, the concept of a small Alpine republic was more novel than the concept of union with Germany. The prevalent intellectual alternatives had been a large multinational empire and an encompassing German nation-state; hardly anyone had conceived of a small German-speaking republic. Thus, in the eyes of contemporary Austrians, there occurred no seminatural transition from “old Austria” to “new Austria,” but a collapse of the established order that required a new beginning. In the course of this beginning, all available options had to assert themselves not only by the absence of negative implications, but also by positive appeal. There are sound reasons to conclude that the most immediate doubts that contemporary Austrians harbored about their new state did not concern its *viability* but its *desirability*. The conclusions the German-speaking Austrians drew, in turn, corresponded to the conclusions drawn by all the nationalities of the disintegrating empire that possessed linguistic ties across the former imperial borders. Thus, the Romanians of Transylvania and the Poles of Galicia did not form their own Habsburg successor states but joined larger Romanian and Polish political entities.

The peace treaties of St. Germain and Versailles had ruled out Austro-German union at least for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding these geopolitical realities, the union question continued to stir interwar Austrians. Many Austrian associations joined wider German bodies, and large-scale pan-German festivals and meetings brought together choir members as well as Catholic activists, gymnasts as well as university teachers from different German-speaking regions.⁶³ The Austro-German Popular League, the mass organization established to promote union with Germany, included leading members from all the major parties, among them the chancellors Karl Renner, Rudolf Ramek, and Ernst Streeruwitz.⁶⁴ Fueled by corporate memberships, the Popular League peaked at more than a million members in 1930.⁶⁵

Austrian and German public institutions tried to prepare the path for future union. While various Austrian adjustments to German uniform traditions were primarily of symbolic significance, the conscious attempts at aligning the two legal systems reflected a more concrete political agenda. This policy of gradual convergence culminated in the

projected Austro-German customs union, which was negotiated by the foreign secretaries Johannes Schober and Julius Curtius in 1931. The customs union project tested the limits of international willingness to permit Austro-German cooperation short of political union; it ultimately failed largely due to French opposition.⁶⁶

The programs of the four principal political parties (their combined share of the parliamentary vote was 95 percent in 1919 and 1920, 97 percent in 1923 and 1927) contained similar objectives.⁶⁷ The Social Democratic Program of Linz of 1926 stated: “The Social Democrats regard the accession of German-Austria to Germany as the necessary completion of the national revolution of 1918. They desire, by peaceful means, the accession to the German republic.”⁶⁸ The Greater German People’s Party, whose position on Austro-German relations is visible in its name, emphasized in 1920: “The guiding light of our foreign policy is the union of Austria and Germany.”⁶⁹ In its 1922 program, the Agrarian League echoed the words of its National-Liberal sister party: “The unification of all German regions in the contiguous German language area in a united Germany is its unalterable foreign policy goal.”⁷⁰ Even the Christian Social Party—the only significant political party that contained relevant anti-union elements, who eventually formulated early concepts of Austro-nationalism—supported union, albeit less explicitly than its political competitors. The 1926 party program affirmed: “In particular, [the Christian Social Party] demands equal rights for the German people within the European family of nations and the organization of the relationship between Austria and Germany on the basis of the right to self-determination.”⁷¹

After Hitler had come to power in Germany, the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats suspended their demands for union; they did not want to be part of a National Socialist state. The Social Democrats, for their part, emphasized that they did not base this decision on national grounds. In May 1933, the official representatives of the Austrian Social Democratic party proclaimed:

If we want Austria to preserve its independence from a fascist Germany, we do not desire this for the purpose of turning Austria lastingly from or against Germany, but for the purpose of letting Austria fulfill its mission for the whole German people.

We want German-Austria to be a haven of refuge for German liberty, for German democracy, for the free development of German culture and literature, and especially for the German labor movement and German socialism, until the whole of Germany will be free again.⁷²

Political separation notwithstanding, the national ties (in the contemporary Central European understanding) were meant to be preserved. Such national unity regardless of official borders had persistently been invoked by Austria's political leaders. Allied interdiction or German internal politics might prevent political union, they insisted, but the Austrians would always form an integral part of the German nation. Ranging from the first state chancellor Karl Renner, a Social Democrat ("We are a great branch of the great German nation, no more, but no less. We are not a nation; we have never been one and can never become one"), via the liberal chancellor Johannes Schober ("May the suffering of the German people in Germany and in Austria come to an end, so that both German brothers can henceforth walk hand in hand toward a brighter tomorrow") to the Christian Social chancellor Ignaz Seipel ("One cannot understand us Germans, if one wants to interpret the term nation, used by us, the same way the Western peoples do. . . . For us, the nation represents the great cultural community, regardless of citizenship; it means more to us than the state"), a cross-party consensus existed in the national question.⁷³ The idea of a separate Austrian nation found little echo in the mainstream population. It was in two more peripheral political movements that a change in consciousness began to take shape.

Union with Germany did not hold much promise for the supporters of the former imperial family, because it would have precluded the desired return of the Habsburgs to the Austrian throne. Although they traditionally displayed only limited interest in questions of nationalism—their loyalties were attached to a very different concept of allegiance—the monarchists recognized the necessity to widen their popular appeal and developed the conception of *homo austriacus*, Austrian Man. This *homo austriacus* was described as a supranational mediator between nationalities, as polylingual, adaptable, art-loving, and deeply immersed in the traditions of the Habsburg empire.⁷⁴ It is fair to say that this conception more accurately reflected the image of its aristocratic and haute-bourgeois creators than of Tyrolean mountain farmers or Styrian factory workers. The *homo austriacus* represented the ideal of the courtly nobleman or top-level bureaucrat who administered a multinational empire in the service of his prince. This human type existed, and honorable people sprang from it, but it was never representative of the empire's general population—of any nationality. The Austrianist right was living a nostalgic memory of its own past.

The final step toward an Austro-national conception that reflected

the realities created by World War I rather than a longing for the bygone imperial era was taken by the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ). The series of articles on this topic published by Alfred Klahr in the Communist journal *Weg und Ziel* in 1937 can be seen as the theoretical founding charter of an Austrian nation. Klahr's analysis culminated in a programmatic call:

Can we, the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers' movement, publicly recognize and support the development of the Austrian nation? We not only can, we must do this today.⁷⁵

This aspect of the political development is fairly well-known. Conservative German nationalists in Austria have been inclined to think that the concept of an Austrian nation can be dismissed out of hand by referring to its Communist founding father; such simplifications cannot adequately reflect the complexities of the topic. Admittedly, an awareness of the significant Communist contribution to early Austrian nationalism undermines the claim to democratic superiority advanced by many adherents of a separate Austrian nation and ethnic.⁷⁶ The existence of such a community, however, cannot be disproved that way; why should an Austrian journalist be incapable of illuminating the Austrian national debate just because he is a Communist? The persuasiveness of this early Austrianist model is diminished less by its internal Austrian ideological origins than by the international environment that generated it. Until its national reorientation in the mid 1930s, the Austrian Communist Party, too, adhered to *großdeutsch* concepts.⁷⁷ At the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935, the Austrian delegate emphasized that the independence of the Austrian republic was "in no way connected with the ideology of Austrian patriotism. The Austrian people are a part of the great German people."⁷⁸

The national turnabout of the KPÖ was not primarily a consequence of internal Austrian considerations. The historian Radomir Luža determined that "the promoter of the new KP policy of Austrian independence, Georgi Dimitrov, the Comintern secretary, apparently forced the issue after the conclusion of the July 12, 1936 Agreement between Hitler and Schuschnigg. As late as July 11, the KPÖ Politbureau still maintained the old thesis that the 'Austrian people consider themselves to be a part of the German nation, with which they would merge.'"⁷⁹ The propagation of Austrian separateness by Klahr and the Austrian Communist Party expressed the policy of the Communist International, which had a clear

interest in preventing the increase in power that its National Socialist German nemesis would have received from the incorporation of Austria. The acknowledgment of ethnic and national ties between Austrians and Germans would have supported the claim for unification; as a consequence, such ties had to be repudiated.

The importance of the Moscow-based executive committee of the Communist International—and, in turn, of the Soviet leadership—for the decision making of individual national parties cannot be overestimated, because the Comintern defined itself as one communist world party divided into national sections. Its organizational statutes made it clear that the national parties were subordinate to the executive committee, whose instructions were binding on all member parties.⁸⁰ This international structure allowed the central leadership of the Comintern to adapt the national imageries promoted by individual member parties to larger strategic needs, as Walker Connor documented exhaustively in his study of Marxist-Leninist approaches to the national question.⁸¹ Connor drew particular attention to the repeated policy reversals that characterized the Comintern's stance in national questions during the 1930s.⁸² This was, as indicated above, also the period of Communist national reorientation in Austria, and Alfred Klahr's efforts can only be understood in the context of contemporary geopolitics and Marxist-Leninist analysis. If the concept of a distinct Austrian nationality could be of value to the Soviet Union—and it undoubtedly could—abstract scholarly criteria were extraneous. The desire to examine the Austrian national question according to an apolitically defined standard of objectivity would have been classified as the reflection of a “bourgeois mind-set.”

Within the Austrian party, the new concept encountered considerable resistance. The KP theorist Franz Marek, who experienced the reaction of the party base firsthand, noted that the national question tended to be raised frequently in party meetings and that “a vote in those early days would undoubtedly have shown that most party workers rejected the new thesis. Not by chance, Alfred Klahr, who had published his articles in *Weg und Ziel* under the pseudonym Rudolf, came to be called Rudolf the Founder.”⁸³ Only after considerable insistence from the central leadership, which was entrusted with implementing the Comintern's new guidelines, did the party members ultimately adjust to the new way of thinking. The initial doubts among the communist cadres about their new national identity are still evident in the underground paper *Das Signal*, which was distributed in Vienna in 1939. Its subtitle “The paper for thinking Germans” contradicted the

official party line in what—for so disciplined an organization as the Austrian Communists—was quite a noteworthy fashion.⁸⁴

To the monarchists, the concept of Austrian nationhood represented the sole hope for a restoration of Habsburg rule; the Communists viewed it as a contribution to the external security of the Soviet Union. The population of Austria itself did not play a dominant role in the considerations of early Austrian nation-builders. The subsequent association of German unity with war and dictatorship created initial preconditions for a mental reorientation that went beyond political outsiders. The year 1943, in particular, brought not only an indication of international policy planning through the Moscow Declaration, in which the Allies announced the restoration of Austrian independence after a victory against Germany, but increasing signs that such concepts gained support among Austrians.⁸⁵ How characteristic such developments were of the overall climate of opinion, however, remains open to debate.⁸⁶ Many Social Democrats received the Moscow Declaration with more pragmatic appreciation of geopolitical realities than enthusiasm, and some remained unconvinced.⁸⁷ During its preparations for the overthrow of the National Socialist government in 1944, the German resistance movement still expected the former Austrian chancellor, the Catholic-Conservative Kurt Schuschnigg, to accept a German ministerial position.⁸⁸ In many respects, it appears most realistic to view the arrival of the Allies in 1945 as the moment at which a more encompassing transformation of public opinion took shape.

The scholarly debate is demarcated as clearly by the turning point of 1945 as is the political, whose internal discontinuity it faithfully reflects. Austrian historians had long stressed their country's German mission more than virtually any other segment of the population. In the late Habsburg period, Heinrich Friedjung's melancholy tribute to Bismarck and the Prusso-German unification *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland* developed an encompassing Germanist perspective of the future.⁸⁹ Their own political exclusion from the new Germany was interpreted as the ultimate sacrifice that the Austrians had made for the German unity they so deeply desired. And throughout the interwar years, culminating in the writings of Heinrich von Srbik, Austrian historiography accentuated the specifically Austrian contribution to the welfare and prosperity of the wider German nation.

Friedrich Kaindl and Harold Steinacker, who had personal roots in the eastern provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy, stressed the role of Austria as the link between the German nation-state and the numerous

German minorities in eastern and southeastern Europe.⁹⁰ They accused the *kleindeutsch* historians of having excluded German territories outside the Prusso-German empire from the focus of German historiography and having devalued the contribution of those territories to German history.⁹¹ Hugo Hantsch even anchored his opposition to National Socialism in his belief in the specifically German mission of Austria and its Catholic and imperial Habsburg traditions. In *Österreich: Eine Deutung seiner Geschichte und Kultur*, Hantsch concluded:

We would have to turn the whole history of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs on its head if we were to deny the community that unites us with the whole German people. Austria is, even in the narrow and diminished state in which it was preserved by the Treaty of St. Germain, “shield and core of the *Reich*,” if we think about cultural riches and tasks in Central Europe.⁹²

This Austro-Germanist conception found its preeminent representative in Heinrich von Srbik, professor of history at the University of Vienna. In his extensive scholarly work, including his four-volume *Deutsche Einheit*, Srbik tried to merge and transcend Prussocentric and Austrocentric approaches to German history.⁹³ In a speech held at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 1936, he delineated his scholarly approach and underscored his insistence on the Austrian contribution to German history:

I have directed you toward the goal that I had staked out for myself. “Austria in German history”; this was not meant to be mere self-praise of the Austro-Germans, albeit my words may at times involuntarily have sounded that way. A wider and more rewarding concept stood before my eyes, however incomplete its realization might have been: a presentation of the Austrian share in universal German history and an attempt to promote the historic affiliation between the southeastern Germans and the Germans in Germany in this historiographical manner.⁹⁴

In 1945, this long scholarly legacy came to an end. The German-oriented historians that were able to retain their positions found it advisable not to insist on their traditional viewpoint.⁹⁵ Since few expressly Austrianist historians were available in the early postwar

years, Austrian academic historiography largely fell silent, whereas the concept of Austrian nationhood was disseminated above all through primary- and secondary-level education and the media. Some academic historians managed to develop a wider viewpoint of scholarly detachment, but increasingly, a passionately Austrianist generation of historians—and political scientists—rose to prominence.⁹⁶ Their deeply engaged publications in support of a separate Austrianness are represented most vividly by the oeuvre of Erika Weinzierl, Georg Wagner, and Felix Kreissler.⁹⁷

The German-oriented position, now largely excluded from academic influence, still surfaced occasionally in nonacademic publications. In spite of its methodological limitations, this alternative version of politically-engaged historiography was able to make its own contribution to general historical knowledge by documenting aspects of Austrian life that found little attention among mainstream historians.⁹⁸ During the debate started by the theses of the well-known West German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann, who included the Austrian experience in a broader concept of German history even subsequently to World War II, individual Austrian academics, most prominently Fritz Fellner, professor of modern history at the University of Salzburg, expressed moderately Germanist positions as well.⁹⁹

The heated discussions in the late 1980s surrounding the presidency of the former secretary general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, led to a partial rethinking of postwar ideology at least in segments of Austrianist historiography. Postwar historical interpretations, most of all the proposition that Austrians had been mere victims of German aggression during World War II, came to be considered harmful for Austrian public consciousness; interestingly, the sociopsychological consequences of these theories and not so much their fragile evidential basis called them into question.¹⁰⁰ There are even occasional signs of a more comprehensive critical examination of national core tenets.¹⁰¹ The ultimate scholarly and political implications of this fairly recent and tentative historiographical trend can not yet be fully assessed.

Whether it was seen in a positive or in a negative light, the relationship with Germany stood at the center of most analyses of Austria's external integration. This basic fact challenged Austrianist scholars and publicists to place this relationship into a broader context and stress competing

affiliations. German ties were compared with ties to the other successor states of the Habsburg empire, leading to the conclusion that the Austrians feel more connected to East Central Europe than to Germany. The Graz historian Moritz Csáky averred:

Of course, not only modern linguistics and sociology, but also the daily consciousness of a predominant portion of the population, whose representatives surely feel more at home in Trieste, Prague, or Zagreb than in Hamburg or Kiel, where German is spoken, have taught us that language need by no means be constitutive for a people and a nation.¹⁰²

In the words of the journalist Hans-Henning Scharsach, the argument is sharpened further:

Austrians who are experienced vacationers know that they feel nowhere less at home than in Hamburg or Kiel.¹⁰³

This viewpoint, often called the Austrian *Mittleuropa* conception, spread in influential intellectual and political circles during the 1980s. The leading role of a prominent politician like the later Conservative party chairman and vice-chancellor Erhard Busek in this discussion created a link to practical politics and resulted in the foundation of a transnational body initially referred to as *Pentagonale*.¹⁰⁴ Eventually, this forum for Central European cooperation extended from the Baltic to the Balkans. Germany, however, was not included; Munich and Dresden were not seen as part of *Mittleuropa*. Indeed, the argumentation of many *Mittleuropa* theorists suggests that their interest in southeastern Europe rested less on that region itself than on internally Austrian considerations: it was seen as a geopolitical alternative to an Austria too closely tied in with its German neighbor. Ernst Karl Winter, an early proponent of the southeastern orientation, founded his argument in this manner:

Austria will only remain independent, autonomous, and neutral if it belongs to southeastern Europe. The government, the parties of the state, and the people must recognize that the Austrian nation must be in a partnership with the nations of the southeast. Otherwise, Austria will not remain, in the long run, an independent state that is distinguishable from Germany.¹⁰⁵

The popular appeal of this *Mittleuropa* concept proved limited, however. Even the polls that indicated the success of Austrian nation-building consistently documented that the Austrians remained more

closely attached to Germany than to any other neighboring country. In surveys that span the time period from 1970 to 1990, between sixty and seventy percent of Austrians polled named Germany as the country most similar to their own, while the second-place country (Switzerland or Hungary; the latter also profits from the history-class memory of an entity called Austria-Hungary) received between 10 and 23 percent.¹⁰⁶ The former Czechoslovakia, which *Mitteleuropa* theory places particularly close to Austria, reached only between 2 and 7 percent, and the former Yugoslavia barely 1 percent.

Albert Reiterer’s Austrian identity survey of 1984 (Table 10) asked the interviewees to rank the similarity of Austrians and select other groups according to a scale of one to five (with 1 as “very similar” and 5 as “not similar at all” as the extremes and 3 as “undecided” in the middle).

Table 10: Degree of Similarity Question, 1984
(On a scale of 1 to 5, how similar to Austrians are the following groups?)

Group	Mean Answer
Germans	1.73
Swiss	2.31
Hungarians	3.32
Czechs	3.63
Yugoslavs	3.77
Italians	3.89
Americans	3.89
Russians	4.51

Source: Albert Reiterer, ed., *Nation und Nationalbewußtsein in Österreich* (Vienna, 1988), 121-122.

With the Germans as the sole group located at the similar-to-very-similar level and the Swiss as predominantly German-speaking as the only other group above the midpoint, this poll weakens the Austrianist *Mitteleuropa* conception. When put into a framework of comparative sympathies, the different attitudes toward Austria’s German neighbors

as compared to its eastern ones were even more visible.¹⁰⁷ As part of an international survey about national stereotypes in 1963, two thousand Austrians were asked about their national preferences (Table 11).

Table 11: Austrian National Preferences, 1963
(*Question: Which of these nations do you like best?
More than one answer was permitted.*)

Nation	Percentage
Germans	44
Swiss	22
Scandinavians	11
Dutch	10
British	6
French	5
Hungarians	3
Czechs	2
Italians	2
All the same	4
Don't know	7
Total	118

Source: Manfred Koch-Hillebrecht, *Das Deutschenbild* (Munich, 1977), 35.

The survey not only indicates a strong preference for German speakers over everyone else, but also a general preference for geographically remote Northern Europeans over the immediate neighbors in East Central Europe. At least as far as relative sympathy levels for West Germans and East Central Europeans are concerned, little seems to have changed during the subsequent decades. In response to a 1994 question exploring to which regions they felt closely drawn, Austrians put Bavaria in first place with 46 percent and ahead of South Tyrol, which had been an integral part of the Austrian province of Tyrol until the Peace Treaty of St. Germain awarded it to Italy in 1919 (41 per-

cent). Following Switzerland with 30 percent, Hungary, as the first non-German-speaking region, received only 13 percent; few Austrians—five percent of the respondents—felt closely drawn to the Czech Republic.¹⁰⁸ Whatever the extent of Austrian withdrawal from things German, it was not accompanied by a corresponding opening toward the country's neighbors to the east.¹⁰⁹

Austrian Identity and World War II

Austrian attitudes during World War II represent a particularly important aspect of Austrian national ideology and thus warrant a more extensive examination. After all, the conclusion that Austrians had never felt any affiliation with Germany or had separated from any remaining German connections in 1156, 1806, or 1866 would be less persuasive if they could be fully integrated into German political and military structures as late as the 1940s. As it immediately precedes the Second Republic, the time period of Austria's incorporation into Germany, and particularly Austrian popular response to it, also affects the assessment of earlier eras.

In the initial postwar years, national ideology relied primarily on long-term images. References to Austrian resistance against German domination during World War II were commonplace, but they were rooted in an *a priori* standpoint: since the Austrians had never been Germans, or had ceased to be Germans long ago, they naturally rejected incorporation into Germany and resisted this foreign rule to the best of their ability.

With the passage of time, the interpretation of World War II shifted, and the Austrian wartime experience was tied more directly to the genesis of Austro-nationalism. Several prominent historians designated Austria's resistance to German occupation as *the* crucial element of Austrian nation formation. Felix Kreissler developed a theory of Austrian national self-realization out of an analysis of Austrian behavior during World War II.¹¹⁰ Karl Stadler introduced his study of wartime internal security reports with the assessment that the war years brought growing hostility against the "German foreigners" and concluded:

In that sense, the struggle of the Austrian worker against the exploiter, of the Austrian farmer against the enemies of religion, and of the bourgeoisie against the usurpers from the Reich also represented a *national war of liberation*.¹¹¹

Yet the historical image presented in these studies has come under

increasing scrutiny. Following the election of Kurt Waldheim to the Austrian presidency, in particular, international observers began to suggest that Austrian interpretations of the country's wartime history had not always backed up their firm conclusions with equally persuasive empirical evidence.¹¹²

The thesis that the conduct of the Austrian population during World War II demonstrates its national separation from Germany will be put to the test. As its principal measure, the analysis relies on the largest quantifiable population sample available—the approximately 1.2 million Austrians who served in the German armed forces. To assess the relative commitment to the German national state and its war effort, the study then contrasts the conduct of German military personnel from Germany proper, from Austria, and from select regions outside Germany that had come under German control during the war, such as Alsace and Luxembourg.

When German troops moved into Austria in March 1938, the concept of separate Austrian statehood seemed destined to become little more than a historic memory. In the eyes of much of the world, 1938 only appeared to fulfill what the Austrians had demanded in 1918. It took the international desire to weaken Germany following its expected defeat in World War II to return the Austrian question to the forum of international policy making. Having largely accepted Austria's incorporation into Germany at the time it occurred, the Western powers subsequently struggled to develop a program for Austria's postwar future. Initially, reestablishing the interwar republic held only limited appeal for Allied policy planners. The continued integration with a democratized Germany bereft of its Prussian eastern provinces, or, alternatively, an association with southern German states in a South German confederation or with select regions of the former Habsburg empire in a Southeast European confederation remained serious policy options in Allied strategic planning. As Robert H. Keyserlingk has shown, the Moscow Declaration, which in 1943 proposed recreating an independent Austrian republic, was conceived by its authors primarily as an element of psychological warfare aimed at creating dissent within the German war effort by offering special incentives to the Austrians who participated in it.¹¹³ The declaration failed to achieve its military goals, and it was not intended as an actual policy statement. In the context of the Cold War, however, it could subsequently strengthen Austrian demands for a withdrawal of the Allied forces of occupation.¹¹⁴

The Austrian perception of the country's World War II experience, particularly among postwar generations, was informed by personal memoirs and wartime police reports that pointed to the growth of discontent with the existing situation in the Austrian population.¹¹⁵ Austrian wartime frustration was seen as a sign of national distinction from Germany. Basing his observations on the very same presuppositions about the mood in the Austrian populace, the Austro-British scholar Fred Parkinson drew the opposite conclusion:

The allegedly sinking morale of the Austrian civilian population during the last couple of years of the war has been interpreted as evidence of disillusionment with Nazi Germany. However, this argument lacks logic and ought to be turned on its head. If the Austrians were really getting disillusioned in that way, their morale should have been soaring at the prospect of an Allied victory. If, on the other hand, they were getting depressed at the prospect of a German military defeat, it must have been because, as before, they were still craving for a German victory but despairing of such hope ever materializing.¹¹⁶

In working toward their diametrically opposed interpretations, both postwar Austrianist historiography and Parkinson may depend too heavily on assumptions, because so far there has been no compelling evidence that allows a clear distinction between the popular mood in Austria and in Germany proper. Neither select personal recollections nor the generally impressionistic observation of popular dissatisfaction in the course of a prolonged and costly war provide a full substitute for quantifiable data that permit comparison with other regions and states.¹¹⁷ The basic weakness of most studies that tie the origin of Austrian national identity to the struggle against National Socialist Germany lies in their linear presentation of individual acts of resistance without a comprehensive German and European comparison; too often, they also lack quantitative data that establish the relative significance of these activities within Austria. This form of presentation does not devalue such studies as documentations of individual resistance efforts, but it does limit their relevance for the debate surrounding prevalent wartime behavior and national identity.

The more cautious assessment of the Austrian resistance by many scholars outside the Austrianist historiographical tradition should not be used to deny the existence of such a resistance movement or to downplay the personal dedication of its members. It does, however, preclude characterizing this resistance as a national movement of liberation comparable

to such movements in non-German countries. Parkinson quotes the dissatisfied assessment in the Soviet journal *Voyna i Rabochy Klass*, which would be inclined to exaggerate the successes of Soviet allies in order to strengthen domestic morale, that as late as November 1943, “the real underground, nationwide sabotage against the enslavers, which the Austrian Freedom Front proclaimed, is still lacking . . . the freedom movement in Austria lags far behind that of other European countries.”¹¹⁸

The fact that popular frustration in some Austrian provinces took on anti-Prussian overtones finds parallels in other regions, whereas such sentiments remained considerably rarer in many parts of western and southern Austria.¹¹⁹ Personal rivalries and misunderstandings commonly develop between local populations and political and bureaucratic officials from different regions assuming authority in their new environment; developments of this kind can be observed in the provinces of the former German Democratic Republic in the 1990s as well as in post-Anschluss Austria. As evidenced by the current East German situation, these resentments need not be based on ethnic or national sentiments. Even the description of a 1943 conversation with the German trade union leader and resistance envoy Wilhelm Leuschner in the memoirs of the postwar Austrian president Adolf Schärf, which has a prominent place in many studies of Austrian national identity, leaves a number of questions if quoted in its full context:

I interrupted my visitor unheralded and said: “The Anschluss is dead. The Austrians have been cured of their love of Germany. . . .”

Leuschner was surprised and shaken. He told me that he had talked to other men in Vienna, and no one had presented him with such an impression of the mood in Austria. I regained control of myself, so to speak, and initially could not understand how I had arrived at such an answer. I stuck to it, however, and declared that my political friends could only participate in the overthrow of the Hitler government, not in the preservation of the Anschluss. Leuschner was disappointed.¹²⁰

The significance of this report as evidence of Austrian nation formation is somewhat diminished by the fact that it was formulated in 1955, when the concept of an independent Austrian nation already dominated the Austrian debate. The report is, moreover, more complex than it is frequently portrayed.¹²¹ Considering the late stage of the war, Schärf’s thoughts display a fair degree of ambivalence, and Leuschner’s response indicates that not all the dissidents with whom he had met as the emis-

sary of the German resistance movement shared Schärf's assessment of future Austro-German relations. If Leuschner encountered diverse viewpoints concerning Austria's role in a democratic postwar Germany, Schärf's memoirs suggest that even members of the Austrian opposition must have held *großdeutsch* sentiments as late as 1943. The German resistance historian Erich Kosthorst consequently warned against underestimating the contribution of joint Austro-German resistance efforts to a continuous sense of national community and pointed to his own interviews with German resistance members, which did not confirm that the Austrians had definitely "bid farewell to Germany" by 1943/44.¹²²

But personal recollections are too subjective to constitute sufficiently authoritative evidence on their own. There exists a more conclusive measurement for the mood among the Austrian populace: the behavior of Austrian soldiers in the German armed forces.

In 1938, the Austrian federal army was integrated into the German military. The German general staff to some extent merged previously Austrian and German units in the course of logistic homogenization, but the two military commands created for the Austrian regions essentially followed the pre-Anschluss borders. The military district *Wehrkreis XVII* comprised Vienna, Upper and Lower Austria with the northern segment of the Burgenland, and subsequently the German-speaking areas of southern Bohemia and Moravia. The headquarters of military district XVII was located in Vienna. *Wehrkreis XVIII* consisted of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Styria and southern Burgenland, and Carinthia and was supplemented with parts of northern Slovenia after the defeat of Yugoslavia. Its headquarters was in the city of Salzburg.

Since Austrians were treated as ordinary German citizens, they were drafted according to the same standards as Germans from within the borders of 1937. Out of the approximately 18 million men that were inducted into the German military (including noncitizens), a proportionate share of 1.2 million were Austrians.¹²³ These 1.2 million inductees can be contrasted with an overall number of not quite 25 million male citizens between the ages of 15 and 65 who lived in Germany at the outbreak of World War II.¹²⁴ Conscription was the norm for healthy adult males and strictly enforced during World War II. The largest segment of the noninducted males worked in occupations considered essential for the wartime economy. Within this group, there were noticeable differences among the age groups; among 18–21-year-olds, nonmilitary employment was negligible.¹²⁵ Due to the sizable fluctuation between military and civilian employment, a considerable percentage of the male civilian employees had also seen front-line service. Thus, wartime

inductees were, in both social and regional terms, a fairly representative sample of the general (male) population, and the analysis of their conduct can shed much light on attitudes in the population at large.¹²⁶

The Austrian units formed an integral part of the German military. Austrians were represented in all branches of the armed forces and followed the same rules for front-line and support employment as troops from other regions. Seven mountain and infantry divisions, two tank divisions, and three garrison divisions relied most heavily on soldiers of Austrian background; on the Arctic front and in the Balkans, a particularly high percentage of the German forces was composed of Austrians.¹²⁷ Two hundred and seven Austrians held the rank of general in the German armed forces, and 326 Austrians were awarded the Knight's Cross, among them the first soldier to receive this high military decoration.¹²⁸

Austrian troops did not have a reputation for unreliability; on the contrary, units from the Alpine provinces were frequently viewed as elite units. The Finnish scholar Tuomo Polvinen concurs with Hitler's assessment of the troops that the latter put under the command of the Austrian general Lothar Rendulic in 1944:

In the Mountain Army you are taking charge of the best army which I have at my disposition. . . . You will find a lot of your countrymen there.¹²⁹

A key indicator of national identification can be found in desertion ratios. This does not mean that desertion numbers provide a full picture of the overall mood within the military. They cannot reliably express government acceptance, because many political opponents of National Socialism still felt obligated to contribute to what they subjectively viewed as the military defense of the German nation-state.¹³⁰ For individual soldiers, the decision whether or not to desert can also reflect a rational calculation regarding comparative survival chances.¹³¹ The large-scale destruction of records on desertion in the final phases of World War II has in all likelihood made it impossible to account fully for the extent and, above all, the overall social and regional distribution of desertion in the German armed forces of that war.¹³² If one examines the German military history of World War II, however, the connection between regional background and desertion numbers becomes unmistakable, which allows a *relative* comparison of different subgroups. Ethnic German draftees from Poland and western borderlands such as Alsace-Lorraine displayed disproportionately high desertion rates; as a consequence, German military commanders resorted to distributing these soldiers among more reliable units and to

setting upper limits for the percentage of select groups of ethnic Germans per unit. In January 1944, the Supreme Commander Southwest (Army Group C) summarizes the most significant previous orders regarding the employment of ethnic German troops from Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Belgium as follows:

- a. The percentage of ethnic Germans must not exceed 8 percent in any unit.
- b. It is prohibited to unite these 8 percent into a closed detachment or to put them into action as a compact group.
- c. The ethnic Germans who belong to class III of the ethnic roster [Volksliste III] can only be put into front-line action after extensive observation and examination. As a rule, they will initially be used with baggage and supply units.¹³³

Since there is no reason to assume that Austrians or Hessians were less interested in personal survival than Luxembourgers, the conspicuous deviation in the pattern of desertion among conscripts from select ethnic German groups as compared to their counterparts from Austria and pre-Anschluss Germany points to the presence of broader political considerations.¹³⁴ The experience of ethnic German draftees from eastern and western borderlands establishes that the psychological attitude toward military service in the German armed forces had a tangible impact on the military value of draftees. The German military command had to take special precautionary measures against unreliable populations. Austrian draftees were not treated in such a manner. Striking evidence of the contrast between the assessment of Austrians and the ethnic Germans in question by German military planners can be found in the correspondence of the 117th *Jäger* Division. In 1943, its newly appointed commanding general expressed alarm at one specific aspect of the unit's regional composition: it contained almost five percent Alsatians. The fact that the bulk of his division consisted of Austrians, on the other hand, did not cause the general any concern.¹³⁵

Due to the possible influence of numerous outside variables, casualty rates constitute a more elusive indicator of military behavior.¹³⁶ The multifarious casualty computations of World War II converge on the estimate that between three and a half and four million soldiers from Germany proper and approximately 250,000 soldiers from Austria did not survive their service in the German military.¹³⁷ Although most estimates put the percentage of Austrians among the German military war dead close to

the population ratio, the issue has not been fully explored.¹³⁸ Regional differences in German casualties can be found, because the special conditions on the Eastern Front put soldiers from the Prussian northeast at increased risk, particularly toward the end of the war.¹³⁹ At the very least, however, the Austrian casualty figures further reinforce the impression of a substantial participation of Austrians in the German military effort. The high price paid by Austrian soldiers in the German armed forces during World War II can be understood most clearly from the fact that the absolute number of Austrian military casualties came close to that of Great Britain and lay at more than half that of the United States, although the former's population (without colonies) was seven times and the latter's almost twenty times that of Austria.¹⁴⁰

The data on the general draft-age male population can be supplemented with the numbers for particularly committed subgroups. It could be seen as a coincidence that two Austrians were among the twelve fighter pilots who received the second highest military decoration available to active air force members, the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds. (The highest decoration was only awarded to one pilot.) Yet the apparent overrepresentation of Austrians vis-à-vis pre-Anschluss Germans in the largely volunteer Waffen SS, generally considered the most committed branch of the German military during World War II, cannot but reflect on the level of Austrian involvement in the German war effort.¹⁴¹

A judicious analysis of Austrian military conduct during World War II does not reveal a general pattern of idiosyncrasy. Rather, the large sample of quantifiable behavior from the period of World War II provided by the members of the German armed forces indicates that the dominant feature of any comparison between Austrians and their contemporaries from Germany proper is similarity, not difference. These findings do not support the argument that the bulk of the Austrian population had developed a separate national identity prior to 1945.

For many centuries, the Austrian lands had shared in the decentralized political structure of German Central Europe. When Prussia succeeded in unifying Germany on *its* terms in 1871, however, the Austrians remained on the outside. The preconditions for a separate Austrian development had been created. Yet for several generations to come, political separation did not generate a distinctly Austrian national identity.¹⁴²

If one wants to understand the state of Austrian nationhood by the early 1940s, few indicators are as valuable as the simultaneous conduct

of German speakers who lacked a distinctly German sense-of-self. As culturally German populations who had gradually departed from their historical German context, Alsatians and Luxembourgers provide excellent comparisons. These groups had reached a level of detachment from Germany equivalent to separate nationhood; their conduct projects how the members of a distinctly Austrian nation might have responded to World War II.¹⁴³ Considering this point of reference, one should expect several hundred thousand Austrian men to have eluded German military service by evading conscription or deserting to the Allies. In wartime Austria, there was no such response.

The study of World War II reveals an interconnection between national consciousness and military conduct. The more tenuous identification with the German nation among select German-descended populations outside Germany resulted in markedly higher desertion rates and limited the operational usefulness of draftees from those regions for German military planners. From the lack of a comparable development among Austrians, one cannot conclude that the Austrians uniformly supported the political system that governed them; nor can one conclude that there did not exist Austrians who considered the German army a foreign institution. The Austrian conditions do not disallow the supposition that resistance elites began to envision their opposition to the National Socialist government in national terms.¹⁴⁴ They do show, however, that most Austrians had not yet developed a separate national identity and that the tension between national and political considerations resulted in patterns of behavior that resembled those in Germany proper and differed fundamentally from those in Alsace or in Luxembourg, not to mention those in Serbia or Norway. The Austrians became increasingly disillusioned with a union experience that brought so many hardships, and this disillusionment could express itself in regional animosities. Ultimately, however, Austrians still identified with the German nation to an extent unthinkable among the inhabitants of the Franco-German zone of transition. Notwithstanding specific regional variations, Austrian wartime conduct can be reconciled with a wider German pattern.¹⁴⁵

Looking at the broad picture of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Central European history, one may even argue that the political separation that followed Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 had given rise to a more pronounced German nationalism among the Germans of the Habsburg Monarchy than was prevalent among their contemporaries in the German empire.¹⁴⁶ This makes it all the more intriguing that historical images played so important a role in the national reorientation

among postwar Austrians. The analysis of Austrianist historiography supplies valuable insights into the functioning of national imagery and its strong position vis-à-vis abstract concepts of historical authenticity. Austrianist identity images can be problematic in a conceptual sense; all the same, their impact on the public imagination undoubtedly provided them a reality of their own. Their categorization goes to the heart of the question as to the true nature of history. Is history defined by actual events, which, thus, are capable of functioning on their own? Or is history only what is reported about the past, and thus exclusively a reflection of past events as seen in subsequent interpretation? If the latter is the case, what is the point at which such interpretation leaves the realm of history and becomes just another form of national imagery?

On a less metahistorical level, one has to investigate the actual relationship between historical imagery and public identity. Historians can provide valuable identity images, but they are rarely able to transform public consciousness on their own. The instruments of public policy employed by the Austrian postwar leadership will be examined in the subsequent chapter: they illuminate the societal environment of conscious identity building.

Notes

1. Austrian historians are not unique in this specific respect, as can be seen, for example, in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds., *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South-East Europe* (London, 1988).

2. Lévi-Strauss explores the nature of history most provocatively in his study *The Savage Mind* (London, 1966). In a similar vein, the French historian Michel de Certeau describes the practice of history in these words: "It is not content with a hidden 'truth' that needs to be discovered; it *produces* a symbol through the very relation between a space newly designed within time and a *modus operandi* that fabricates 'scenarios' capable of organizing practices into a currently intelligible discourse—namely, the task of 'the making of history.'" [Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History* (New York, 1988), 6.]

3. The viability of the social sciences' central purpose—to subsume social phenomena under systematic laws—has not been enhanced by the increased understanding of the relativity present even in the hard sciences. One does not have to subscribe to Thomas Kuhn's argument [Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962)] that even the natural sciences only function within their own paradigmatic structure to appreciate that it might be difficult for the social sciences to predict the outcome of the much more volatile phenomena they are describing.

4. Some of White's foremost contributions to this topic are collected in Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore, 1978).

5. Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation* (Vienna, 1984), 13. See also Erika Weinzierl, "Österreichische Nation und österreichisches Nationalbewußtsein," *Zeitgeschichte* 17 (1989): 59-60. In a recent essay on the more general role of contemporary history (*Zeitgeschichte*) in Austria, the young Viennese historian Thomas Angerer noted: "In its social function, the discipline became a particularly important element in 'civic' or 'political education.' This was exactly the reason for institutionalizing the discipline in Austria, a fact to which we will return. What concerns us here, however, is that the discipline always adhered to the principle of active intervention in the present."

Angerer continues that in spite of increasing skepticism about this disciplinary approach, "the discipline as a whole still eschews the ivory tower and promulgates itself, if not as an 'applied' science, at least as one profoundly committed to its heuristic value on the social and thus political plane." [Thomas Angerer, "An Incomplete Discipline: Austrian *Zeitgeschichte* and Recent History," in *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 3, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, N.J., 1995), 211 and 212.]

6. The foremost broader contemporary study of Austrian history in this sense is Erich Zöllner, *Geschichte Österreichs*, 8th ed. (Vienna, 1990). For more specific terminological and constitutional developments, see Erich Zöllner, *Volk, Land und Staat: Landesbewußtsein, Staatsidee und nationale Fragen in der Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 1984), and Wilhelm Brauneder and Friedrich Lachmayer, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 6th ed. (Vienna, 1992).

Judging by the volumes published so far and the authors of the forthcoming issues, the ten-volume Ueberreuter History of Austria under the editorship of Herwig Wolfram is bound to become a major contribution to Austrian history in the aforementioned sense. The literature in English tends to focus on the Habsburg Monarchy in its totality. In spite of this divergent focus, which is at the same time wider in space and narrower in time than this introduction, classic works such as Robert Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918* (Berkeley, 1974); R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation* (New York, 1979); Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815* (Cambridge, 1994); C. A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (London, 1968); and A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918* (London, 1948), are important additional readings. A brief English-language introduction to recent Alpine Austrian history is Barbara Jelavich's textbook *Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815-1986* (Cambridge, England, 1987).

7. Even earlier, when Austria was not a territorial but merely a geographical designation, it referred to a small strip of land along the river Danube.

8. It should be clarified, however, that historic territories such as Carinthia or Tyrol did not become part of the Duchy of Austria when acquired by the Habsburgs, but remained separate political entities.

9. After the Habsburg Charles VI had died without leaving a male heir in 1740, a Bavarian Wittelsbach was elected emperor. The brief rule of Charles VII represented the only interruption of Habsburg imperial rule between 1438 and 1806.

10. See, *inter alia*, Wilhelm Böhm in Bundesministerium für Unterricht, ed., *Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht* (Vienna, 1961), 151; Ernst Fischer, *Der österreichische Volks-Charakter* (London, 1944).

11. See, *inter alia*, Ernst Görlich, *Das Handbuch des Österreichers* (Vienna, 1949), advancing the *privilegium minus*; Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation* (Vienna, 1984), stressing 1806.

12. Ernst Missong's "25 Thesen zur österreichischen Nation," *Österreichische Monatshefte* 11 (August 1948) represents one example of the descent theory; the language theory is advanced, *inter alia*, in C. F. Hrauda, *Die Sprache des Österreichers* (Salzburg, 1948).

13. Almost all conservative Austrianists supported this proposition, among them Ludwig Reiter in his *Österreichische Staats- und Kulturgeschichte* (Klagenfurt, Austria, 1947).

14. This assessment became the central tenet of the Austrian *Mitteleuropa* discussion of the 1980s. Among historians, Moritz Csáky argued most engagedly for this view; see "Wie deutsch ist Österreich—eine ewiggestrige Frage?" *Die Presse*, December 21/22, 1985, 11.

15. This view was official public policy from the very beginning of the Second Republic; it had a prominent place in the country's Declaration of Independence. [*Proklamation über die Selbständigkeit Österreichs, Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich 1945*, Stück 1, Nr. 1.] It was presented in detailed scholarly form in Karl Stadler, *Österreich 1938–1945* (Vienna, 1966), and in Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation* (Vienna, 1984).

16. In a highly informative essay, the Austrian political scientist Albert Reiterer demonstrated the similarity of Communist and Conservative interpretations in the national question. Conservatives such as Leopold Figl, Felix Hurd, Alfred Missong, Wilhelm Böhm, and Ernst Joseph Görlich and Communists such as Ernst Fischer largely shared the notion of a baroque, transnational, Habsburgian Austria that is developed as a counterimage to Prussian aggressiveness. See Albert Reiterer, "Österreichbewußtsein im bürgerlichen Lager nach 1945," *Zeitgeschichte* 14 (1986/87): 379–397, especially the table on pages 380f.

17. Ernst Joseph Görlich, Ernst Hoor, and Felix Romanik are representatives of the nonacademic segment of Austrianist activism; Erika Weinzierl, Friedrich Heer, and Felix Kreissler could be listed among the academics.

18. These interpretations have to pass over the predominantly Catholic character of many German regions.

19. "Würdevolle Feier in Mariazell," *Wiener Zeitung*, July 8, 1935, 2.

20. Ernst Karl Winter, "Austria Sancta," in *Ernst Karl Winter: Bahnbrecher des Dialogs*, ed. Ernst Florian Winter (Vienna, 1969), 95.

21. Oscar Schmitz, *Der österreichische Mensch* (Vienna, 1924), 8. The Austrianist historian Georg Wagner commented on the Hessian background of

Schmitz in a manner that draws attention to the ideological undercurrent of Austrian nationalism:

This fact [Schmitz's background] alerts to the interesting phenomenon that, in addition to elective Austrians [Wahlösterreicher] from other language areas. . . , there have always been elective Austrians from Germany who recognized and appreciated the nature of Austria better than a good many Austrians and encouraged us to proudly preserve our identity. In politics, one could mention Stadion and Metternich. But in the fields of culture, art, and literature, too, Austrian patriotism has frequently received support from Germany, just like there are many renegade Austrians, who have done much harm to their fatherland. [Georg Wagner, *Österreich Zweite Republik* (Thaur/Tirol, Austria, 1983), 1:497.]

Although Wagner in his writings generally proposed a separate Austrian ethnocultural identity with roots dating back for centuries, he indicated in these passages that the relationship between Austrian and German identity might be more complex.

22. Ludwig Reiter, *Österreichische Staats- und Kulturgeschichte* (Klagenfurt, Austria, 1947), 122. For a similar interpretation, see also Wilhelm Böhm, "Oesterreich," *Wiener Zeitung*, Beilage der Wiener Zeitung, October 30, 1946, 3.

23. Grete Mecenseffy, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich* (Graz, Austria, 1956), 173, 197–198, 211.

24. *Ibid.*, 173.

25. Indeed, the Bavarian court formed a vanguard of the Counterreformation that promoted increasingly stronger antiprotestant measures in Austrian territories, as Johann Loserth documented in *Die Reformation und Gegenreformation in den innerösterreichischen Ländern im XVI. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1898).

26. Protestants make up approximately 5 percent of the Austrian population today. Within Austria, the share of Protestants varies and ranges from negligible in Tyrol and Vorarlberg to more than 10 percent in Carinthia and Burgenland.

27. See Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte* (Zürich, 1989), 48. This debate took place in the 1980s. Even Albert Reiterer's valuable study of Austrian identity, which takes great pride in its theoretical refinement, traces the prehistory of the Austrian nation in some sense to the *privilegium minus*. [Albert Reiterer, ed., *Nation und Nationalbewußtsein in Österreich* (Vienna, 1988), 55.]

28. Richard Bamberger and Franz Maier Bruck, eds., *Österreich Lexikon* (Vienna, 1967), 2:919.

29. The German electors were a select group of territorial princes entrusted with electing the Roman-German emperor. The status of elector was highly coveted among German princes.

30. Bundesministerium für Unterricht, ed., *Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht* (Vienna, 1961), 151.

31. In the words of secretary of education Hurdes: "When Rudolf of

Habsburg enfeoffed his sons with the Austrian lands in 1282, Austria ceased to be a part of German history. In reality, German history until 1806, when Francis II renounced the Roman-German crown, was merely a part of Habsburg-Austrian history." [Felix Hurdes, *Österreich als Realität und Idee* (Vienna, 1946), 2.]

Although this argumentation rejects any association of matters Austrian and German, it provides its own interpretation of German history and identity by insisting that there was no Germany prior to 1871.

32. Johann Hübner, *Reales Staats-, Zeitungs- und Conversations-Lexicon* (Leipzig, 1709), 464-465.

33. Nicolas Sanson d'Abbeville, *Atlas Du Monde 1665*, republished by Mireille Pastorreau (Paris, 1988), 161.

34. Charles Magnus, ed., *Magnus's Commercial Atlas of the World* (New York, 1856), 19.

35. The prominent Viennese historian Erika Weinzierl, for example, argued that "the time when Austrian history also was German history ended, at the latest, with the defeat at Königgrätz and Austria's departure from the German Confederation." [Erika Weinzierl, "Österreichische Nation und österreichisches Nationalbewußtsein," *Zeitgeschichte* 17 (October 1989): 46.]

36. In the twentieth century, they came to be known as Sudeten Germans.

37. It might be an interesting illustration of this point that two of Austria's postwar presidents—Karl Renner and Adolf Schärf—had moved to Vienna from their birthplaces in Southern Moravia. Also noteworthy is that the (essentially Vienna-based) top bureaucracy of the First Republic had its roots more frequently in the lands of the Bohemian crown than in the Alpine provinces. Of 304 ministerial department heads, 123 were born in Vienna and Lower Austria, 79 in the Bohemian lands, and a mere 53 in the remaining provinces of republican Austria; Salzburg and Vorarlberg each contributed three. [Gertrude Enderle-Burcel and Michaela Follner, *Diener vieler Herren: Biographisches Handbuch der Sektionschefs der Ersten Republik und des Jahres 1945* (Vienna, 1997), 510.]

The issue at hand here is the impact of Austro-German political separation on national identity between 1866 and 1918 and, to a certain extent, 1938. After 1945, of course, Alpine Austrians and Sudeten Germans stood in a very different relationship to Germany because most Sudeten Germans were deported there.

38. Ernst Fischer, *Das Jahr der Befreiung* (Vienna, 1946), 40. It is intriguing, however, that such differentiations were not unique to Austria but could be found in parts of postwar Germany as well. (See also the relevant references in chapters 2 and 4.) Indeed, the French administration that temporarily occupied the Palatinate after World War I had already appealed to regional traditions in terms that foreshadowed later arguments:

French cultural propaganda in the Pfalz itself . . . appealed to the peculiarities of Pfälzer character that had already been established by several generations of regional writers. It often relied on the folklorist and Heimat novelist August Becker, for instance, for descriptions of the allegedly Gallic character traits of the Pfälzers—their wit, argu-

mentative liveliness, egalitarianism, devotion to Napoleon, and preference for wine over beer. Dredging up all evidence of Prussian and Bavarian suspicion of the region in the nineteenth century, French propagandists easily established the artificiality of the Pfalz's bonds with Germany east of the Rhine." [Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, Calif., 1990), 123.]

39. Alexander Novotny, "Bewährung des österreichischen Nationalcharakters in den Wirren, Siegen und Niederlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," *Die österreichische Nation* 27:9/10 (1975): 101.

40. Albert Massiczek, "Unsere Zukunft—Nation mit Weltverantwortung," in *Die österreichische Nation: Zwischen zwei Nationalismen*, ed. Albert Massiczek (Vienna, 1967), 192.

41. The regional background of these university nations is taken from Ernst Joseph Görlich and Felix Romanik, *Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 1970), 106.

42. Friedrich Heer, *Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität* (Vienna, 1981), 42.

43. Readers with the necessary interest, however, can consult Walter Wiltschegg's *Österreich—Der "Zweite deutsche Staat"?* (Graz, Austria, 1992), which, while focusing on the twentieth century, provides relevant material from earlier epochs as well. For a more narrowly circumscribed time period, see also Walter Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria* (New York, 1930).

44. These writings were collected and published by Bernhard Czerwenka in his chronicle *Die Khevenhüller* (Vienna, 1867).

45. Bernhard Czerwenka, *Die Khevenhüller* (Vienna, 1867), 119–122, 143, 145.

46. *Ibid.*, 149, 133.

47. Heinrich Friedjung, *Geschichte in Gesprächen: Aufzeichnungen 1898–1919*, edited by Franz Adlgasser and Margret Friedrich, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1997). It should not be forgotten, however, that this Germanness was understood primarily in an ethnocultural sense and could lead to divergent conclusions as to its political consequences.

48. Richard Bamberger and Franz Maier-Bruck, eds., *Österreich Lexikon* (Vienna, 1967), 2:861.

The notion of Austrians who were mistaken about their own identity recurs in somewhat different form with Felix Kreissler, who established for the year 1934: "The Austrian nation existed already, but it did not know it yet." [Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation* (Vienna, 1984), 538.]

49. The political nature of national tradition building is exemplified in the 1955 contribution of the historian Wilhelm Böhm to a journal discussion about the Austrian nation. Böhm first summed up his historical overview in this manner: "Our retrospective has shown that the concept of an Austrian nation is neither new nor an invention of narrow-minded German-haters, but something that has been in existence for centuries and now finds a new expression in the regained independence of our country."

Although he had thus projected the origins of the Austrian nation far back

in time, Böhm concluded his essay with the following appeal: “Let us hope, then, that Austria, which has had a national theater since 1776, a national bank since 1816, and a national council since 1921, will soon have a nation as well.” [Both quotes from Wilhelm Böhm, “Die österreichische Nation,” *Forum* 2:24 (December 1955): 429.]

50. *Die Presse*, October 14, 1859, 1.

51. Jiří Kořalka, “Österreich zwischen Großdeutschtum und Austroslawismus,” in *Österreich und die deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Heinrich Lutz and Helmut Rumpler (Vienna, 1982), 117–139.

52. The suppression of the Hungarian revolutionaries was accomplished with Russian help. Even more important than outside assistance was the ability of the Habsburgs to pit various nationalities against each other, so that, for example, Croatian troops helped defeat the Hungarians and Czech troops were instrumental in suppressing the revolution in Vienna. The Austrianist historian Erika Weinzierl concedes that the Habsburg Monarchy could only be held together by military means:

The revolution of 1848 brings the monarchy to the brink of collapse, the extent of which is characterized most aptly in Hasner’s admonition in the *Wiener Zeitung*: ‘A kingdom for an Austrian!’ Its disintegration, however, is prevented by the ‘miracle of the House of Austria’—in this case, the army. With full justification Grillparzer greets the victorious military commander Radetzky with the exclamation: “In your camp is Austria.” [Erika Weinzierl, “Das österreichische Staatsbewußtsein,” in *Der Österreicher und sein Staat*, ed. Erika Weinzierl (Vienna, 1965), 20.]

53. Article IV of the Treaty of Prague stated:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria acknowledges the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation as hitherto constituted, and gives his consent to a new organization of Germany without the participation of the Imperial Austrian State. His Majesty likewise promises to recognize the more restricted Federal relations which His Majesty the King of Prussia will establish to the north of the line of the Main; and he declares his concurrence in the formation of an Association of the German States situated to the south of that line, whose national connection with the North German Confederation is reserved for further arrangement between the parties, and which will have an independent international existence. [Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties in Modern History 1648–1967* (New York, 1967), 1:630.]

54. In times of crisis, however, this German identity could express itself more forcefully in earlier periods too, as Walter Langsam documented for the era of the Napoleonic Wars: Walter Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria* (New York, 1930).

55. Gary Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914* (Princeton, N.J., 1981). The term Cisleithania illustrates the difficulty of schematically transposing the history and tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy onto the Republic of Austria. After the Compromise of 1867, the Habsburg

Monarchy in many ways consisted of the Kingdom of Hungary—and the rest. The non-Hungarian lands were not officially addressed as a collective entity called Austria prior to World War I. Thus terms such as Cisleithania and Transleithania emerged. (The river Leitha separated the two entities in one region.)

56. Karl F. Bahm, “Beyond the Bourgeoisie: Rethinking Nation, Culture, and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Central Europe,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 29 (1998): 1:19–35.

57. Jill Mayer, *The Evolution of German-National Discourse in the Press of Fin-de-Siècle Austria*, Working Papers in Austrian Studies 94-4 (Minneapolis, 1994).

58. Pieter Judson, “‘Not Another Square Foot!’ German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Austria,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 26 (1995): 83–97. See also his article, “‘Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard’: National Identity and Liberal Politics in Nineteenth-Century Austria,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 22 (1991): 76–95.

59. *Gesetz vom 12. November 1918 über die Staats- und Regierungsform von Deutschösterreich*, *Staatsgesetzblatt für den Staat Deutschösterreich* 1918, Stück 1, Nr. 5.

60. Fred Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648–1967* (New York, 1967), 3:1567. The development of Allied opinion on the Anschluss question is an interesting story in itself. It was mainly French insistence that ultimately decided the matter. In 1918, the British Political Intelligence Department still assessed the situation created for the German Austrians by the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy in these terms:

We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we cannot make them cease to feel Germans [*sic*]. They are bound to be somewhere. Nothing would be gained by compelling them to lead an existence separate from that of Germany. Such enforced separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but could not prevent cooperation between the two branches nor their final reunion. Lastly, the inclusion of German Austria in Germany is not altogether disadvantageous from our point of view; it would restore the balance between the Catholic south and the Protestant north, and help to check Prussianism in Germany. The idea of preventing the Austrian Germans from joining Germany, even if both parties concerned wish it, has therefore to be dismissed both on grounds of principle and of expediency. [F. L. Carsten, *The First Austrian Republic, 1918–1938* (Aldershot, England, 1986), 6.]

61. Resolution of the National Assembly of September 6, 1919, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik, Neues Politisches Archiv, Karton 4, Deutschösterreich 15-2.

62. One can recognize this reasoning in the scholarly interpretations analyzed in chapter 2 and in the textbooks examined in chapter 4.

63. The 1928 meeting of the German Singers’ Association, which included a prounion rally in its program, brought approximately 140,000 choir members from different German-speaking backgrounds to Vienna.

64. Walter Wiltschegg, *Österreich—der “Zweite deutsche Staat”?* (Graz, 1992), 201.

65. Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners* (Berkeley, 1976), 147; Walter Wiltschegg, *Österreich—der “Zweite deutsche Staat”?* (Graz, Austria, 1992), 202. See also Wolfgang Rosar, *Deutsche Gemeinschaft: Seyss-Inquart und der Anschluß* (Vienna, 1971), 46. In view of the availability of corporate membership, the membership numbers should be seen less as a reflection of mass activism than as an indication of the prevailing climate of opinion.

66. For the customs union project, see Anne Orde, “The Origins of the Austro-German Customs Union Affair of 1931,” *Central European History* 13 (1980): 34–59.

67. The election results are taken from Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), 127.

68. Klaus Berchtold, ed., *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868–1966* (Munich, 1967), 264.

69. *Ibid.*, 446.

70. *Ibid.*, 483.

71. *Ibid.*, 376.

72. “Oesterreichs staatliche Zukunft und die Sozialdemokratie,” *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, May 13, 1933, 1.

73. Karl Renner expressed these sentiments in 1930 in the Social Democratic periodical *Der Kampf*. [Karl Renner, “Was soll aus Österreich werden,” *Der Kampf* 23:2 (February 1930): 52.] Schober made his declaration on German radio on February 22, 1930, during an official state visit. [“Noch zwei Staaten—aber ein Volk!” *Deutschösterreichische Tages-Zeitung*, February 24, 1930, 1.] For Seipel’s words, see Ignaz Seipel, “Das wahre Antlitz Österreichs,” in *Seipels Reden in Österreich und anderwärts*, ed. Josef Geßl (Vienna, 1926), 295.

Numerous similar statements are preserved; Ernst Panzenböck, *Ein deutscher Traum: Die Anschlußidee und Anschlußpolitik bei Karl Renner und Otto Bauer* (Vienna, 1985), and Walter Wiltschegg, *Österreich —der “Zweite deutsche Staat”?* (Graz, Austria, 1992) supply abundant source material.

How alien the concept of an Austro-nationalism in the form propagated in the Second Republic was even for a Catholic-Conservative politician like Seipel can be seen in a private letter he wrote in 1928. Seipel was not a political German nationalist and at heart probably envisioned a more rewarding role for the Austro-Germans within a Habsburgian context than within a Greater Germany. After soberly discussing the Danubian and the German options, however, Seipel expounded:

The seemingly possible third option, namely, that the Austrians consciously focus on being a kind of Belgium or Switzerland and artificially create their own “national consciousness” for that purpose, would in my opinion represent a mistake. This is not a German or Austrian conception but a far-fetched French or Czech conception. Today’s Austria has never lived by and for itself—by their whole history and nature, the Austrians belong to a large country. . . . To cultivate our own little garden and show it to visitors for a cover charge is not a mission that befits the inhabitants of the Carolingian Eastern March and the heirs of the conquerors of the Turks. [Ignaz Seipel to

Dr. W. Bauer, 30 July 1928, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik, Neues Politisches Archiv, Karton 403.]

74. Descriptions of this Austrian Man can be found in Oscar Schmitz, *Der österreichische Mensch* (Vienna, 1924), and, retrospectively, in Alphons Lhotsky, “Das Problem des österreichischen Menschen,” in *Aufsätze und Vorträge*, vol. 4 (Munich, 1976), 308–331. Another early Austrianist publication was *Die österreichische Aktion* (Vienna, 1927), which contained writings by Christian-Social conservatives and monarchists such as Alfred Missong, Ernst Karl Winter, August Knoll, and Wilhelm Schmid, some of whom contributed to the postwar promotion of Austrianist concepts as well.

75. Rudolf [Alfred Klahr], “Zur nationalen Frage in Österreich,” *Weg und Ziel* 2:4 (1937): 176.

76. See the discussion of this issue in chapter 4.

77. English has not yet provided a satisfactory equivalent of the term *großdeutsch*. It uses the term pan-German for a number of different ideological concepts. There existed *allddeutsch* concepts, which like Pan-Slavism contained chauvinist and imperialist elements; the German word *allddeutsch* directly corresponds to English pan-German. *Großdeutsch* or *gesamtdeutsch* ideas, on the other hand, have been held by many eminent democrats—not least among them the leaders of the ultimately unsuccessful democratic revolution of 1848. Problematically, English usage combines these distinct concepts under the designation pan-German.

78. Wolfgang Neugebauer, “Die nationale Frage im Widerstand,” in *Sozialdemokratie und “Anschluß”*, ed. Helmut Konrad (Vienna, 1978), 88.

79. Radomir Luža, *The Resistance in Austria, 1938–1945* (Minneapolis, 1984), 23.

80. As established in § 9 of the statutes:

The Executive Committee . . . issues instructions which are binding on all parties belonging to the Communist International. The Executive Committee of the Communist International has the right to demand that parties belonging to the International shall expel groups or persons who offend against international discipline, and it also has the right to expel from the Communist International those parties which violate decisions of the world congress. [Julius Braunthal, *History of the International, Volume II: 1914–1943* (New York, 1967), 536.]

81. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J., 1984).

82. Connor’s examination of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s (YCP) shifting positions in the 1930s reflects this flexibility particularly well:

The high tide of YCP support for secession was destined not to recede but to undergo instantaneous evaporation. As late as April 20, 1935, the Comintern would goad the YCP to increase its agitation for secession, complaining that the work of the party “within the national liberation movements must be far, far better.” But in August of the same year, and with no advance warning, the Executive Committee of the

YCP would inform its membership that “the Congress of the Communist International has given a new tactical orientation,” a most disarmingly innocent-sounding signal for a radical volte-face in basic strategy. The Seventh Comintern Congress (July 25–August 20, 1935) had just called for a united front of all anti-Fascist forces. Recast in the new scenario as potentially useful ramparts against a Fascist *Drang nach Osten*, the states of Eastern Europe were henceforth to be nurtured rather than dismembered. [Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 142–143.]

Interesting insights into the inner workings of Comintern decision making in national questions can also be found in the memoirs of the Macedonian Communist Dimitar Vlahov, cited in Ivo Banac’s fascinating study of the national question in Yugoslavia. Vlahov reported that the resolution that first proclaimed the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation in 1934 was drafted by a Polish Communist who had no prior knowledge of the Macedonian question. [Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), 328.]

83. Franz Marek, “Diskussionen über die nationale Frage,” in *Aus der Vergangenheit der KPÖ*, ed. Historische Kommission beim ZK der KPÖ (Vienna, 1961), 25f. Rudolf the Founder was a medieval Austrian duke. The Austrian historian Ernst Hanisch relates a contemporary joke that expresses this skepticism in an earthier manner: “Two Communist inmates of the ‘Austro-Fascist’ concentration camp Wöllersdorf meet in the latrine. Says the one to the other: ‘Have you heard yet, as of yesterday we are a nation of our own: not Germans, but Austrians!’” [Ernst Hanisch, “Gab es einen spezifisch österreichischen Widerstand?” *Zeitgeschichte* 12 (1984): 342.] One might want to note that the government that had set up the camp had become increasingly Austrianist itself.

84. See Karl Stadler, *Österreich 1938–1945* (Vienna, 1966), 85.

85. Among these signs, one can list Adolf Schärf’s often cited conversion, which is debated later in this chapter, and the proindependence resolution of the Club of Austrian Socialists in Stockholm. For the latter, see Bruno Kreisky, *Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten* (Berlin, 1986), 390–392.

86. This question is explored in greater detail in the final segment of this chapter, which focuses specifically on Austrian attitudes during World War II.

87. See Helene Maimann, “Der März 1938 als Wendepunkt im sozialdemokratischen Anschlußdenken,” in *Sozialdemokratie und “Anschluß”*, ed. Helmut Konrad (Vienna, 1978), 67; Peter Dusek, “Nachkriegskonzeptionen für Österreich: Der Exilwiderstand und die nationale Frage,” in *Österreicher im Exil 1934 bis 1945*, ed. Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (Vienna, 1977), 241f; Julius Deutsch, “Echte und falsche Unabhaengigkeit,” *Austrian Labor Information* 20–21 (November–December 1943): 10–11.

In a 1975 interview, the long-time party activist Manfred Ackermann described the lasting appeal of Germanist conceptions in segments of wartime Social Democracy:

I myself was a member of the Revolutionary Socialists, who considered [Otto] Bauer’s concept of the all-German revolutionary solution

the correct perspective to the end, in other words, until 1945; we considered it the truly socialist and truly revolutionary perspective. Therefore, I never much participated in this ado about Austrianness [Österreicherei], as I may have called it somewhat disparagingly, but was more convinced of Bauer's perspective: If it should be possible to defeat Hitler, and this enormous pressure is removed from the German masses—if the revolution really breaks out then, it will be a revolution that will not and cannot restrict itself to the territory of old Germany, of the old empire. In the course of such a revolution, the German-speaking Austrians, or the Austrians, the German-Austrians, will not separate themselves from the overall nation, but will, on the contrary, be a solidary component of the all-German revolution. [Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, ed., *Österreich im Exil 1934 bis 1945* (Vienna, 1977), 237.]

See also Friedrich Adler, "Die Legende vom glücklichen Oesterreich," *Austrian Labor Information* 20–21 (November–December 1943): 12–15, and Friedrich Adler, "Wirkliche und fiktive Differenzen in der oesterreichischen Frage," TMs [1945], Archiv des Vereins für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Adler Archiv, Mappe 231.

88. Wolfgang Venohr, *Patrioten gegen Hitler: Der Weg zum 20. Juli 1944* (Bergisch-Gladbach, Germany, 1994), 272.

89. Heinrich Friedjung, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859–1866*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1897–98).

90. Friedrich Kaindl began his academic career as professor of Austrian history at the University of Czernowitz—the easternmost German-language university of the Habsburg Monarchy. During World War I, he transferred to the University of Graz. Czernowitz became Romanian in 1918; it is now Chernivtsi in the Ukraine. Harold Steinacker, too, had his roots in the eastern provinces of the monarchy; his father Edmund was a prominent leader of the Germans in the Hungarian half of the empire. Harold grew up in Vienna and was called to the University of Innsbruck in 1909, but, like Kaindl, he always preserved a keen interest in the German populations in the non-German successor states of the monarchy.

91. See, for example, R. F. Kaindl, *Österreich, Preußen und Deutschland: Deutsche Geschichte in großdeutscher Beleuchtung* (Munich, 1925); R. F. Kaindl, "Zur Kritik der kleindeutschen Geschichtsschreibung," *Österreichische Rundschau* 18 (1922): 483–498; and Harold Steinacker, "Österreich und die deutsche Geschichte: Vortrag auf dem deutschen Historikertag zu Graz 1927," in *Volk und Geschichte: Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze* (Brno, Moravia, 1943), 1–41.

Kleindeutsch constituted the historical counter-model to *großdeutsch* and commonly referred to those in favor of a Prussian-led German polity, in which the German speakers under Habsburg rule would not be represented.

92. Hugo Hantsch, *Österreich: Eine Deutung seiner Geschichte und Kultur* (Innsbruck, 1934), 101. Hantsch was a Benedictine monk deeply steeped in Conservative-Catholic and Habsburg traditions. He was called to replace Heinrich von Srbik at the University of Vienna in 1945.

93. Heinrich von Srbik, *Deutsche Einheit*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1935–42).

94. Heinrich von Srbik, *Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte* (Munich, 1936), 77f. After World War II, Srbik was considered insufficiently Austrian to teach at Austrian universities. See also the subsequent note.

95. For some insight into the contemporary atmosphere, see Gernot Heiß, “Pan-Germans, Better Germans, Austrians: Austrian Historians on National Identity from the First to the Second Republic,” *German Studies Review* 16 (October 1993): 421, 422, and 431. A more detailed discussion of this subject follows in chapter 4.

96. Among the former, one might want to mention Erich Zöllner, whose magisterial works on Austria’s historical development (see the bibliography) continue to be indispensable for any student of Austrian history.

97. Some of their foremost contributions to this debate are represented in the bibliography. Felix Kreissler spent his academic career in France, but he participated energetically in the Austrian political and historical debate.

98. Walter Wiltschegg’s *Österreich—der “Zweite deutsche Staat”?* (Graz, Austria, 1992) might be an appropriate example. While hardly on the cutting edge of modern methodology, it provides a plethora of often neglected source material that illustrates the Germanist flavor of interwar Austrian public opinion, such as election posters, party programs, newspaper articles, etc.

99. See Fellner’s article “The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945,” *Journal of Modern History* 60 (June 1988): 264–289, for which the author, in turn, faced much criticism in Austria. Erdmann summed up his standpoint prior to his death in *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte* (Zurich, 1989).

100. Some of the central contributions to this debate are represented in the essay collection *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte*, ed. Gerhard Botz and Gerald Sprengnagel (Frankfurt, 1994). For an analysis of the victim theory, see also Heidemarie Uhl, *Zwischen Versöhnung und Verstörung: Eine Kontroverse um Österreichs historische Identität fünfzig Jahre nach dem “Anschluß”* (Vienna, 1992).

101. See the references to Gerhard Botz and Ernst Hanisch in chapter 1.

102. Moritz Csáky, “Wie deutsch ist Österreich—eine ewiggestrige Frage?” *Die Presse*, December 21/22, 1985, 11.

103. Hans-Henning Scharsach, *Haiders Kampf*, 8th ed. (Vienna, 1992), 87.

104. Busek wrote extensively on this subject; among his foremost contributions was the programmatic study *Projekt Mitteleuropa* (Vienna, 1986), which he copublished with Emil Brix.

105. Ernst Karl Winter, “Österreich in Südosteuropa,” in *Ernst Karl Winter: Bahnbrecher des Dialogs*, ed. Ernst Florian Winter (Vienna, 1969), 213.

106. All the numbers referring to these polls are from Ernst Bruckmüller, “Das Österreichbewußtsein,” in *Politik in Österreich*, ed. Wolfgang Mantl (Vienna, 1992), 264.

107. Although they have a regular place in studies of Austrian identity, such data measure a fairly ambiguous and fluid phenomenon. In general, positive sentiments towards specific other countries cannot be correlated directly with national sentiments, as can be seen in the relatively high ratings recently

received by popular vacation destinations such as Greece, which are presumably to a larger extent based on positive personal experiences than on a sense of cultural closeness. Comparative national preferences for larger entities that have been proposed as alternative poles of Austrian external integration (Germany and a Habsburgian *Mitteleuropa*), however, might be one fairly instructive aspect of an otherwise somewhat elusive subject matter and have, therefore, been included here.

108. Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft (SWS), FB 297, April 1994. The question was: "To which regions in the vicinity of Austria do you feel drawn?" The percentages listed are the combined answers of strongly and very strongly.

109. In an interesting recent essay, the Harvard historian Charles S. Maier consequently dismissed the viability of the Austro-Mitteleuropa conception and advised the Austrians to bid it farewell. [Charles S. Maier, "Whose Mitteleuropa? Central Europe between Memory and Obsolescence," in *Austria in the New Europe*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 1, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, N.J., 1993), 8-17.]

Decades earlier, president Adolf Schärf, whose words are often invoked to attest to Austria's dissociation from Germany, had rejected the concept of Austria's East Central European orientation in a much less publicized humorous but unequivocal declaration:

We must finally surrender this illusion. When people speak of the Danube Basin, I must always think of a different economic region, which once was just as powerful—the Burgundian empire, the Rhine-Rhone region. It lasted for centuries, and when it collapsed, people believed that the world would not exist much longer. What now remains from this economic region? Only sauerkraut as a national dish; much less appreciated in other countries. In the same way, little but the goulash remained from the Danube Basin. Not even the *Powidltascherl* [plum pockets] survived everywhere. [Hellmut Andics, *Der Fall Otto Habsburg* (Vienna, 1965), 36.]

And in Karl Renner's 1930 rejection of the Danubian Confederation, which in many ways constituted the interwar intellectual link between the postwar *Mitteleuropa* conception and the prewar Danube Monarchy, one finds historical assessments that might have relevance for late- and post-Soviet conditions as well. With reference to the proponents of such conceptions, Renner argued:

The very thing that in the eyes of those who understand history was decided by 1917, however, they have not understood. As soon as Russian czarism had collapsed and the east had become free, Austria had lost her mission in the east, which had been important for centuries. Nothing brings back an opportunity missed: even a democratic Danubian Confederation would come too late now that there is no czar in St. Petersburg and no sultan in Constantinople. The smaller nations in Central and Eastern Europe no longer need it. [Karl Renner, "Was soll aus Österreich werden," *Der Kampf* 23:2 (February 1930): 50f.]

110. Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation* (Vienna, 1984). The

study first appeared in French as *La prise de conscience de la nation autrichienne 1938-1945-1978* (Paris, 1980).

111. Karl Stadler, *Österreich 1938-1945* (Vienna, 1966), 14.

112. See, among others, Evan Burr Bukey, "Nazi Rule in Germany," *Austrian History Yearbook* 23 (1992): 207; and Harry Ritter "Austria and the Struggle for German Identity," *Working Papers in Austrian Studies* 92-8 (October 1992), 2.

113. Robert H. Keyserlingk, *Austria in World War II* (Kingston-Montreal, 1988).

114. This postwar role of the Moscow Declaration is explored in Günter Bischof, "Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklärung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg," *Zeitgeschichte* 20 (1993): 345-366.

115. The memoirs of the later Austrian president Adolf Schärf play a central role; they are examined below. For the police reports, see Karl Stadler, *Österreich 1938-1945* (Vienna, 1966), 14-19.

116. F. Parkinson, ed., "Epilogue," in *Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today*, ed. F. Parkinson (Detroit, 1989), 320.

117. This caveat has become particularly pertinent after the publication of more detailed regional resistance studies from individual German regions, which uncovered many parallels to the Viennese situation.

118. F. Parkinson, ed., *Conquering the Past* (Detroit, 1989), 321.

119. A differentiating assessment of anti-German sentiments in wartime Austria can be found in Tim Kirk's *Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the 'National Community'* (Cambridge, England, 1996). Kirk documents the existence of these sentiments (see particularly pages 121-134), but concludes nonetheless that the "national element in the resistance to Nazism, widespread also in the attitudes of foreign workers in Austria, was not generally to be found among the native Austrian population." [Ibid., 140.]

For the use of anti-Prussian arguments in various South and West German regions in the immediate aftermath of World War II, see Hans-Jürgen Wünschel, "Der Neoseparatismus in der Pfalz nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Landesgeschichte und Zeitgeschichte: Kriegsende 1945 und demokratischer Neubeginn am Oberrhein*, ed. Hansmartin Schwarzmaier (Karlsruhe, Germany, 1980), 283-299, and also Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, "Neugliederungsbestrebungen im deutschen Südwesten und die politischen Parteien (1945-1951)," in *ibid.*, 333-334 and 337-338.

120. Adolf Schärf, *Österreichs Erneuerung 1945-1955* (Vienna, 1955), 20f.

121. In many Austrianist works, the reference to Schärf's memoirs is restricted to his statement that "the Anschluss is dead," whereas Leuschner's reference to the views of other resistance members attracts little attention. See, for example, page 33 of the important *Das neue Österreich: Geschichte der Zweiten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, Austria, 1975).

122. Josef Becker and Andreas Hillgruber, eds., *Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1983), 272.

Further insight into the temporal and motivational background of Austrian national reorientation might be gained from Karl Renner's private letters. In

November 1941, three-and-a-half years after the Anschluss, Renner continued to use the designation “we Germans” even in his frequently highly critical correspondence with a fellow opponent of the current regime. [Karl Renner to Hans Löwenfeld-Ruß, November 15, 1941, printed in *Karl Renner in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen*, ed. Siegfried Nasko (Vienna, 1982), 142.] In the case of Renner, at any rate, it does not seem to have been the mere abstract experience of Austro-German union or of National Socialism that triggered his reorientation.

123. Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1960* (Stuttgart, 1960), 78; Karl Stuhlpfarrer, “Nazism, Austrians and the Military,” in *Conquering the Past*, ed. F. Parkinson (Detroit, 1989), 200.

124. Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand, *Das Heer 1933-1945* (Frankfurt, 1969), 3:249.

125. See the table in Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand, *Das Heer 1933-1945* (Frankfurt, 1969), 3:252.

126. This view is widely shared by military historians. See also Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power*, Contributions in Military History, vol. 52 (Westport, Conn., 1982), 65. To the knowledge of this author, it has not been argued/documented that male Austrians differed in their national sentiments from females.

127. Lothar Höbelt, “Österreicher in der Deutschen Wehrmacht, 1938-1945,” *Truppendienst* 5 (1989): 431.

128. Johann Allmeyer-Beck, “Die Österreicher im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *Unser Heer* (Vienna, 1963), 359. If one includes the police forces, the number of Austrian generals rises to 220.

129. Tuomo Polvinen, *Between East and West: Finland in International Politics, 1944-1947*, ed. and translated by D. G. Kirby and Peter Herring (Minneapolis, 1986), 37.

For a more impressionistic rendition of similar sentiments among former enemy soldiers, see James Lucas’s programatically titled *Alpine Elite: German Mountain Troops of World War II* (London, 1980), particularly the introduction on pages seven to nine.

130. The personal dilemma involved is still visible in the discussions among the German officers who tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944.

131. The German Military Code (*Militärstrafgesetzbuch*) contained the following regulations for desertion:

§ 69

(1) Whoever leaves or stays away from his unit or agency with the intention of permanently evading service in the armed forces or discontinuing his service status will be punished for desertion.

(2) It is to be treated as desertion if the delinquent leaves or stays away from his unit or agency with the intention of evading service in the armed forces in general or the mobilized units of the armed forces for the duration of a war, a military expedition, or internal disturbances.

§ 70 (as modified by the *Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung* (KSSVO) of August 17, 1938)

Desertion is punishable by death or by sentences of lifelong or temporal penal servitude.

[Fritz Wüllner, *Die NS-Militärjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung* (Baden-Baden, Germany, 1991), 482.]

132. In particular, the destruction of the Heeresarchiv in Potsdam during an Allied air raid in April 1945 severely reduced the relevant documentary material. For further discussion, see Fritz Wüllner, *Die NS-Militärjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung* (Baden-Baden, Germany, 1991), 129–152.

The data that have been examined, however, give no indication that soldiers from Austria proved less reliable than other German citizens. [See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners* (Berkeley, 1976), 172.] Due to their lack of completeness, these findings do not constitute absolute proof by themselves, but their basic indications are substantiated by other observations, such as casualty numbers and the internal assessment by the German military leadership.

133. Order by the Oberbefehlshaber Südwest (Oberkommando Heeresgruppe C) from January 21, 1944.

134. According to the Luxembourg historian Gilbert Trausch, no fewer than 3,510 of the 10,211 Luxembourgers inducted into the German armed forces deserted or managed to avoid military service by other means. [Gilbert Trausch, “Deutschland und Luxemburg vom Wiener Kongreß bis zum heutigen Tage: Die Geschichte einer Entfremdung,” in *Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Josef Becker and Andreas Hillgruber (Munich, 1983), 219.] See also Gilbert Trausch, *Histoire du Luxembourg* (Paris, 1992), 172.

Relying on French projections, the German historian Lothar Kettenacker maintained that approximately 20 percent of conscripts in Alsace-Lorraine evaded German military service by desertion or flight. [Lothar Kettenacker, *Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsaß* (Stuttgart, Germany, 1973), 223.] See also Marie-Joseph Bopp, “L’enrôlement de force des Alsaciens dans la Wehrmacht et la SS,” *Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* 5:20 (1955): 40. Even if one treats these calculations cautiously, they demarcate themselves strikingly from Austrian equivalents.

135. Walter Manoschek and Hans Safrian, “Österreicher in der Wehrmacht,” in *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich, 1938–1945*, ed. Emmerich Talos et al. (Vienna, 1988), 350.

136. To name just a few of the variables that impact the number of casualties per male citizen in a regional comparison: different age distribution based on regional differences in birth rate and on occupational mobility; different occupational structure—industrial areas had more health problems and more exemptions from conscription due to production necessities; different skills and proclivities—mountain units were more popular in Alpine regions; navy recruitment was higher in coastal areas.

137. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Hans Dollinger, eds., *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Bildern und Dokumenten*, vol. 3, *Sieg ohne Frieden* (Munich, 1963), 445, and many earlier publications report three million German casualties, but the numbers have slowly been moving upward. For Austria, see Martin K.

Sorge, *The Other Price of Hitler's War* (New York, 1986), 23, and Lothar Höbelt, "Österreicher in der Deutschen Wehrmacht, 1938-1945," *Truppen-dienst* 5 (1989): 432. See also the subsequent notes.

138. For estimates, see, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners* (Berkeley, 1976), 173, and "Die Bevölkerungsverluste Österreichs während des Zweiten Weltkrieges," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 3 (1974): 219-220. Useful for western Germany and Austria, but without factoring in the issues debated below, Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1960* (Wiesbaden, 1960) 78.

In a recent research note, the German military researcher Rüdiger Overmans projected a lower percentage of casualties for Austria than for Germany. [Rüdiger Overmans, "German and Austrian Losses in World War II," in *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 5, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, N.J., 1997), 293-301.] The brief research note contains some problem areas, however. Most fundamental is the problem that Overmans's basic conclusions premise an Austrian share of eligible males of ten percent of the German numbers. Overmans arrives at this ratio by looking at 1939 German census figures that include Southern Bohemia and Moravia in the Austrian numbers. The noticeably higher percentage of people living within but born outside of the borders of the Republic of Austria as compared to the equivalent numbers for Weimar Germany further alters the results of statistics that measure eligible population by residence, but casualties by birthplace. Finally, the larger share of residents of Jewish background, who were excluded from military service, in Austria in 1938/39 also has to be factored in to arrive at the relevant casualty rates per male resident actually subject to conscription.

Measured by these standards, the Austrian casualty rate corresponds largely to that of western Germany, whereas Germany's eastern regions suffered higher losses than western Germany and Austria. [For the reasons for these differences, see also the subsequent footnote.]

139. Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand, *Das Heer 1933-1945* (Frankfurt, 1969), 3:263; Karl Schwarz, "Gesamtüberblick der Bevölkerungsentwicklung 1939-1946-1955," *Wirtschaft und Statistik* 8 (1956): 495.

140. For a comparison of World War II casualties, see Martin K. Sorge, *The Other Price of Hitler's War* (New York, 1986), xvii, and John Ellis, *World War II: A Statistical Survey* (New York, 1993), 253f.

141. Of the approximately 950,000 soldiers that served in the Waffen SS, slightly more than 500,000 were recruited from outside Germany; that number includes members of German minorities abroad and foreign volunteers. This limits the number of German citizens (including Austrians) in the Waffen SS to somewhat below 450,000; proportionally, about 35,000 of these should have been Austrians. But according to the available estimates, approximately 67,000 Austrians served in the Waffen SS, which would result in an Austrian share of almost twice their proportional representation. For the numbers involved, see Lothar Höbelt, "Österreicher in der Deutschen Wehrmacht, 1938-1945," *Truppen-dienst* 5 (1989): 429; George Stein, *The Waffen SS* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), 138 and 281; Ermenhild Neusüss-Hunkel, *Die SS* (Hanover, Germany, 1956), 104.

Heinz Höhne reports a lower total of 910,000 overall members and 400,000 German citizens including Austrians until the end of 1944. [Heinz Höhne, *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf* (Gütersloh, Germany, 1967), 427.] It should be stressed again, however, that a field dominated by estimates cannot provide final answers. The quantitative evaluation of the German and Austrian World War II experience in general and of the conditions in the Waffen SS in particular is still in a state of flux. Therefore, one should focus more on the general outline than on the specific numbers with regard to all German military data of World War II.

142. As explained in more detail below, this assessment refers to mass identity. It does not preclude a different national sense-of-self among select individuals.

143. The exact nature of this national identity falls outside the scope of the current study and will not be answered the same way for Alsatians and Luxembourgers.

144. Indeed, the literature on the Austrian resistance has provided substantial documentation of the existence of such notions.

145. An indication of the prevalent attitude among Austrian soldiers themselves might be found in an officious military history of Austria, in which Austrian World War II participants are described as “fully equal to the best of their other comrades in [German] uniform.” See Johann Allmeyer-Beck, “Die Österreicher im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *Unser Heer* (Vienna, 1963), 365.

146. This more pronounced ethnonational sentiment among Germans in the Habsburg lands has been noted by a number of observers. The Social Democratic leaders of Austrian foreign policy in 1919/20 repeatedly deplored that the union question was not nearly as central to their German counterparts as to themselves. Julius Braunthal described this experience in his memoirs. [Julius Braunthal, *Auf der Suche nach dem Millenium* (Vienna, 1964), 233f.] Gerhard Botz diagnosed more generally that it was “one of the more conspicuous characteristics of the interwar union movement that the Austrian side initially appears as the more insistent and initiating and the German side as the more cautious and restrained partner.” [Gerhard Botz, “Eine deutsche Geschichte 1938 bis 1945? Österreichische Geschichte zwischen Exil, Widerstand und Verstrickung,” *Zeitgeschichte* 14 (1986/1987): 21.]

Such perceptions are reflected pointedly in the observations of the Germanist activist Hans Steinacher. Steinacher, a native Carinthian, was the president of the support organization for German minorities abroad, the VDA. In 1934, he contemplated how he could acquaint a fellow activist from a different Habsburg successor state with the political realities:

I would have had to tell him much more about that. For example, that we Germans in Habsburg Austria had wrongly assumed that the dreams of our youth about the whole historic Germany guided all Germans, whereas they had, with a few exceptions, found no adequate echo in Germany itself. What a chasm between here and there! How strange it was: this German population in Austrian Silesia—in Bielitz, Teschen, Troppau and Jägerndorf—less than two hundred years it had been separated from Prussian Silesia. It was an unnatural border, which cut through fields and pastures and parishes. Yet, on this side,

the Germans had become pan-Germans, the Church had little influence on politics, only German nationalists were sent as the delegates of these territories to Vienna and Prague. And on the other side, in the Silesia of Prussia and the *Reich*: firm, unshakable political dominion of the Center Party [the party of political Catholicism]. [Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., *Hans Steinacher, Bundesleiter des VDA 1933-1937: Erinnerungen und Dokumente* (Boppard am Rhein, Germany, 1970), 528.]