The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies

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I N THIS article I want to discuss three questions: (1) What is a cosmo-
politan sociology? (2) What is a cosmopolitan society? (3) Who are the
enemies of cosmopolitan societies?

What is a Cosmopolitan Sociology?

Let me start by attempting to nail a pudding to the wall, that is, defining
the key terms 'globalization' and 'cosmopolitanization'. At the beginning of
the 21st century the *conditio humana* cannot be understood nationally or
locally but only globally. 'Globalization' is a non-linear, dialectic process in
which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as
combined and mutually implicating principles. These processes involve not
only interconnections across boundaries, but transform the quality of the
social and the political *inside* nation-state societies. This is what I define
as 'cosmopolitanization': cosmopolitanization means *internal* globalization,
globalization *from within* the national societies. This transforms everyday
consciousness and identities significantly. Issues of global concern are
becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the 'moral life-worlds'
of the people. They introduce significant conflicts all over the world. To treat
these profound ontological changes simply as myth relies on a superficial
and unhistorical understanding of 'globalization', the misunderstandings of
neoliberal globalism. The study of globalization and globality, cosmopoli-
tanization and cosmopolitanism constitutes a revolution in the social
sciences (Beck, 2000a, 2002a; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Gilroy, 1993;
Shaw, 2000; Therborn, 2000; Urry, 2000).

    Of course, the new interest in cosmopolitanism has been critically
associated with those elite Western individuals who were the fullest expres-
sion of European bourgeois capitalism and colonial empires. But we need

to identify, as Paul Rabinow argues, a *(self-)critical cosmopolitanism*, which combines 'an ethos of macro-independencies with an acute consciousness . . . of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories and fate' (1996: 56) The study of cosmopolitanization must not be confused with wishful thinking primarily concerned with projecting the cosmopolitan intentions of the scholar. There is no necessary connection between the study of the hidden cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies and the rise of the 'cosmopolitan subject', even if some cultural theorists appear to believe there is.

   To me the 'cosmopolitanization thesis' is a methodological concept which helps to overcome methodological nationalism and to build a frame of reference to analyse the new social conflicts, dynamics and structures of Second Modernity (Beck, 2002c; Beck et al., 2002; Lash, 2002; Latour, 2002). The central defining characteristic of a cosmopolitan perspective is the '*dialogic* imagination'. By this I mean the clash of cultures and rationalities within one's own life, the '*internalized* other'. The dialogic imagination corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual experience, which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize, understand, combine contradictory certainties. It was Friedrich Nietzsche who spoke in this sense of 'the Age of Comparison'. He meant not only that the individual was free to pick and choose among competing traditions and heritages. Even more significant was that the various cultures of the world were beginning to interpenetrate each other. And he foresaw this process continuing, until ideas of every culture would be side by side, in combination, comparison, contradiction and competition in every place and all the time.

   The national perspective is a monologic imagination, which excludes the otherness of the other. The cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative imagination, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which include the otherness of the other. It puts the negotiation of contradictory cultural experiences into the centre of activities: in the political, the economic, the scientific and the social.

   'Cosmopolitanism' means – as Immanuel Kant argued 200 years ago – being a citizen of two worlds – '*cosmos*' and '*polis*'. There are five different dimensions to this, distinguishing between external and internal otherness. Externally it means:

(a) including the otherness of *nature*;
(b) including the otherness of *other civilizations and modernities*; and
(c) including the otherness of the *future*;

internally it means:

(d) including the otherness of the *object*; and
(e) overcoming the (state) mastery of (scientific, linear) rationalization.

While radical social change has always been part of modernity and the social sciences, the transition to a methodological cosmopolitanism revolutionizes the very coordinates, categories and conceptions of change itself. A cosmopolitan sociology (or cosmopolitan social sciences – this is an important difference!) has to answer the questions: how to include nature? How to include other modernities and civilizations? How to include the object into subjectivity and intersubjectivity? How to include the otherness of the future? And how to overcome the state-scientific mastery of rationality – within the framework, methods and conceptions of the social sciences? Methodological cosmopolitanism rejects the either-or principle and assembles the this-as-well-as-that principle – like 'cosmopolitan patriots', patriots of two worlds. What the 'cosmo-logic' signifies is its thinking and living in terms of *inclusive oppositions* (including nature into society etc.) and rejecting the logic of exclusive oppositions, which characterizes methodological nationalism and first modernity sociology.

In relation to the concept of 'globality' (Albrow, 1996; Robertson, 1992) cosmopolitanism means: *rooted* cosmopolitanism, having 'roots' and 'wings' at the same time. So it rejects the dominant opposition between cosmopolitans and locals as well: there is no cosmopolitanism without localism.

Let me exemplify what 'cosmopolitan' means in relation to social theory by referring to the theory of reflexive modernization. One central operational thesis, a basic indicator of reflexive modernization, is the *pluralization of borders*. This is supposed to be true for such fundamental dualisms as the border between nature and society, subject and object, life and death, We and the Others, war and peace. If one focuses on globalization from within (as I do in this article) the pluralization of borders means the pluralization of *nation-state* borders or the implosion of the *dualism between the national and the international*: how far is there a multitude of non-identical borders emerging, within which themes and dimensions and with what effects (strategic opportunities of action for whom); for example: economically, culturally, politically, legally, technologically, etc.? In terms of methodological nationalism these borders coincide; in terms of a methodological cosmopolitanism these borders diverge. 'Globalization from within' thus stands for dissonance in drawing of borderlines – the *axiom of the incongruity of borders*. In other words: borders are no longer predeterminate, they can be chosen (and interpreted), but simultaneously also have to be redrawn and legitimated anew. There is both an increase in plausible ways of drawing new borders and a growing tendency to question existing borders in all different fields (e.g. climate crisis, BSE crisis, biopolitics, genetically modified food, terrorist threat).

When cultural, political, economic and legal borders are no longer congruent, contradictions open up between the various principles of exclusion. Inner globalization, understood as pluralization of borders, produces, in other words, a legitimation crisis of the national morality of exclusion: on which principles are the internal hierarchies of unities or states based? And it produces questions as to the distribution of global

responsibilities: why do we have to recognize a special moral responsibility towards other people just because, by accident, they have the same nationality? Why should they be free of any moral sensibility towards other people for the sole reason that they happened to be born on the other side of the national fence? What loses any legitimacy is the fundamentally dubious assumption that such responsibilities are absolute within a border, while their absence is equally absolute outside this border.

This exclusion crisis sets off an avalanche of cosmopolitan questions: can the reasons which a society gives for the exclusion of strangers be questioned by members of this society and strangers alike? Who questions, who decides, who justifies and who defines who 'who' is? For example, may 'foreigners' participate in the process of discussion, definition and decision-making when it comes to the issue of civil rights? Or does this decision ultimately lie solely with the members? May members claim a right to homogeneity in order to exclude others? The right of 'ethnic self-determination'? The right of 'religious homogeneity', of 'racial homogeneity'? Of 'ethnic cleansing'? So the cosmopolitan constellation evidently created in demands for legitimation, which are asserted both internally and externally, opens up discussions to include groups which have previously been excluded, redistributes the burden of proof and excludes some principles as illegitimate, or questions their legitimacy (Beck-Gernsheim, 2000).

This calls for a 'world citizenry' (Kant), despite the lack of governance in the world at large; and with time, there must be invented a 'cosmopolitan state', founded upon the otherness of the other (Beck, 2002c). Without the rule of law there is only the rule of force and ruse – not the cosmopolitan societies we are looking for. But the rule of law is not static, especially in today's world of reflexive modernization. There has to be a fundamental sense of the principles, the cosmopolitan memory and norms to be expressed through the law – and observed even without law – so there can be shared confidence, an ethos against which global norms are being institutionalized (one example of a cosmopolitan memory: the transnationalization of the Holocaust; Levy and Sznaider, 2001).

I doubt that cosmopolitan societies are any less ethical and historical than national societies. But cosmopolitanism lacks orientation, perhaps because it is so much bigger and includes so many different kinds of people with conflicting customs, assorted hopes and shames, so many sheer technological and scientific possibilities and risks, posing issues people never faced before. There is, in any case, a greater felt need for an evident ethical dimension in the decisions, both private and public, that intervene in all aspects of life and add up to the texture of cosmopolitan societies.

Political decisions in a world where the distinctions that make up our standard picture of the modern state – the border that divides domestic from foreign policy and security – are part of this, including how to fight the war on terrorism, how to monitor the stock market, how to audit the auditors. All of this has to be done, but no-one is sure how to go about it. So, after communism and neoliberalism, the next big idea is needed – and this could

be cosmopolitanism. There is a need to rethink the essential concepts and values of cosmopolitan societies, why so many people don't seem to consider them as self-evident and are fighting them and why there are new dilemmas. It is not a matter of post-modernity or non-modernity, but of a new rule of globalized entangled modernities (Randeria, 1999) that highlight the urgency of demands of this world risk society.

Thus a cosmopolitan sociology imposes fundamental questions of redefinition, reinvention and reorganization. The challenges are related to two fundamental processes: globalization and individualization. The globalization debate took up the territorial bias; the individualization debate has probed and criticized the collective bias of the social sciences (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). First, of course, conceptual problems: by those I mean, for example, the declining effectiveness of sociological classics to make sense of the dramatically changing economy and society; second, methodological problems: most of the social sciences are based on a '*methodological constructivism*' which excludes the otherness of nature and the otherness of the object (Latour, 2001, 2002), and on a '*methodological nationalism*'. This term can be defined by the explicit or implicit assumptions about the nation-state being the power container of social processes and the national being the key-order for studying major social, economic and political processes. Third, organizational problems: what transnational structure of cooperation do the social sciences need in order to explore and understand the emerging worlds of transnational flows, networks, socioscapes, life forms, identities, classes and power structure? A sociology that remains happily glued to its own society and times will not have much to contribute.

What do cosmopolitan social sciences mean in the space of empirical investigation, if the space of sociological imagination is *not* the nation-state society? Göran Therborn (1995, 2000) distinguishes very interestingly between the *universal* and the *global*. He argues that, to classical sociology, space was the social space of humankind. But now we are entering into a new space of sociological imagination, that is, into *globality*. Globality means reflexive globalization, a global everyday experience and consciousness of the global. For Therborn a 'global sociology' treats the globe as a set of divergent cultures and modernities and not only as a territory of humankind in evolution of modernity.

For him:

> globality entails a turn away both from provincial gaze and from the exotic gaze of the colonizer (and of the colonized). There is no longer any legitimate centre point, from which to look out and to communicate with the rest of the world. Vistas, experiences, conceptualizations from all parts of the globe will be brought into networks of global inter-communication. Extra-European cultural experiences and language skills will be important assets here, and new links to comparative linguistics will be opened up. A global sociology amounts to a fundamental turn of imagination as well as of investigation, from

the nation in the North Atlantic space of reference to a global social cosmos
with no naturally given privileged observation post and no absolute time.
(Therborn, 2000: 51)

So '*methodological cosmopolitanism*' implies a new politics of com-
parison in relation to the internal otherness of nature, future, other civiliz-
ations, etc. The monologic national imagination of the social sciences
assumed that Western modernity is a universal formation and that the
modernities of the non-Western others can be understood only in relation
to the idealized Western model. The hegemonic North American notion of
modernity – as spelled out in old modernization theory and theories of
development – locates the non-West at the far end of an escalator rising
toward the West, which is at the pinnacle of modernity in terms of capital-
istic development, secularization, culture and democratic state formations.
In a cosmopolitan perspective we need to attend to how places in the non-
West differently plan and envision the particular combinations of culture,
capital and nation-state, rather than assume that they are immature versions
of some Western prototype. So a cosmopolitan sociology is opposed to a uni-
versalizing armchair theory.

It's quite interesting to relate this debate on 'divergent or entangled
modernities' (Randeria, 1999) to the debate on 'postcolonialism'. Loose use
of the term 'postcolonialism' has the bizarre effect of contributing to a
Western tradition of othering the Rest (Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1996). It suggests
a post-war scheme whereby 'the Third World' was followed by 'the develop-
ing countries', which are now being succeeded by 'the postcolonial'. As
quite a few authors argue, 'we must move beyond an analysis based on
colonial nostalgia' (Ong, 1999: 12ff.). It appears that unitary models of the
postcolonial *and* of modernity are ascendant at a time when, for example,
many Asian countries are not interested in colonialism or in postcolonial-
ism, but are in the process of constructing *alternative modernities* based on
new relations with their populations, with capital and with the West. In many
corners of the globe, in a departure from the norm in post-Second World
War 'developmental states', intellectuals, politicians and scientists are pro-
ducing alternative visions of Asian, Chinese, Latin American modernities.
In other words, the 'alternative' in alternative modernities does not necess-
arily suggest a critique of, or opposition to, modernity and capitalism. It
suggests the kind of entangled modernity that is constituted by different sets
of relations between the post-developmental state, its population, moderniz-
ation and global capital. This is being constructed by political and social
elites who appropriate Western knowledges and *represent* them as truth
claims about their own country. So the debate on entangled modernity or
modernities belongs to a post-postcolonial era.

For a cosmopolitan sociology a tiny question remains to be answered:
how to research the global? Isn't the total global, let's say, a bit too global?
And would a sociology of the global not necessarily transform sociology into
philosophy and metaphysics *without* any systematic empirical reference for

falsification? So the question has to be positioned and answered: how is an empirical sociology of the global becoming possible?

Believe it or not, to me there is a simple answer to this question, but this answer is blocked by common images and misunderstandings of globalization. They are paradoxes of globalization.

The first is that globalization is about globalization. This isn't true. Globalization is about localization as well. You cannot even think about globalization without referring to specific locations and places. One of the important consequences of the globalization thesis is the recovering of the concept of place. It is global–local dialectics which Robert Robertson has in mind when he talks about 'glocalization'. The implication for empirical sociology is that glocalization happens not out there, but in here. Therefore sociology can investigate the global locally. As Saskia Sassen's (2000) work shows, this has significant implications for the analysis and theorization of cities: not the city as a bounded territorialized unit, but the city as a node in a grid of cross-boundary processes. Further, this type of globalized city cannot be located simply in a hierarchical scale that places it beneath the national, regional and global. It is one of the spaces of the global, and it engages the global *directly*, often by-passing the national.

This works becomes clearer if we pick up a second misunderstanding of globalization, which sees it as an additive and not substitutive aspect of nation-state society and sociological imagination. In the globalization discourse you often find the assumption that globalization only changes the relation between and beyond national states and societies ('interconnectedness'), but not the inner quality of the social and political itself ('cosmopolitanization'). But globalization includes globalization *from within*, globalization *internalized*, or, as I prefer to say, 'cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies'. So, this misunderstanding can be solved: under conditions of globalization the national is no longer the national. The national has to be rediscovered as the *internalized global*.

As Saskia Sassen puts it: 'Of particular interest here is the implied correspondence of national territory to the national, and the associated implication that the national and the non-national are two mutually exclusive conditions. We are now seeing their partial unbundling.' Sassen argues:

> that one of the features of the current face of globalization is the fact that a process, which happens within a territory of sovereign state, does not necessarily mean that it is a national process. Conversely, the national (such as firms, capital, culture) may increasingly be located outside the national territory, for instance, in a foreign country or digital spaces. This localization of the global, or of the non-national, *in* national territories, and of the national outside national territories, undermined a key duality running through many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in social sciences, that the national and the non-national are mutually exclusive. (Sassen, 2000: 145ff.)

From this can be drawn the most important implication. There is no need to investigate the global totally globally. We can organize a new purposeful historically sensitive empiricism on the ambivalent consequences of globalization in cross-national and multi-local research networks. But what kind of concepts and categories can we use for this purpose? Or do we have to invent and coin new ones?

It was Kant who argued '*Anschauung ohne Begriff ist blind; Begriff ohne Anschauung ist leer*' (Observations without concepts are blind; concepts without observations are empty). If it is true that the meaning of the national and the local is changing through internalized globalization, then the most important methodological implication for all social sciences is that normal social sciences categories are becoming *zombie* categories, empty terms in the Kantian meaning. Zombie categories are living dead categories, which blind the social sciences to the rapidly changing realities inside the nation-state containers, and outside as well.

The purpose of my distinction between a first and a second age of modernity is *not* to introduce a new problematic evolutionary form of periodization based on either-or epochal 'stages', when everything is reversed at the same moment, all the old relations disappear forever and entirely new ones come up to replace them. The main purpose of the distinction of a first age and a second age of modernity is a twofold one: first, to position the question of new concepts and frame of references and, second, to criticize conventional sociology as an empty-term sociology, a zombie sociology. In a research study at Munich University on 'reflexive modernization' (Beck et al., 2002), which I am in charge of, we are conducting long-term research on subjects like these: how does the meaning of 'class' change under the conditions of individualization and globalization? How does the perception of global risk transform the concept of 'rationality' in science and law? How are the concepts of 'employment' and 'labour' being dissolved and redefined in the global information economy? Has the concept of the state already been converted into a super-, supra-, inter-, post-, neo-, trans-, nation-state?

Let me give you an example. Until now sociologists have written textbooks and done research on the class structure of Britain, France, the United States, Germany and so on. But if you look at how a class-based sociology defines class categories, you find that it depends upon what is going on in families, in households. Empirical definitions of class identity are founded on categories of household, defined by either a male (head) of the household, or, at least, the leading person of a household. But what is a 'household' nowadays, economically, socially, geographically, under conditions of living-apart-together, normal divorce, remarriage and transnational life forms? High mobility means more and more people are living a kind of *place-polygamy*. They are married to many places in different worlds and cultures. Transnational place-polygamy, belonging in different worlds: this is the gateway to globality in one's own life. Class sociology not only proposes that one knows what the category 'household' nowadays means; it also proposes: that households – and classes! – are territorially

based in one and only one national container society. So we have to address the question: what does a de-territorialized, post-national (or bi-national) concept of household mean and what are its implications for class analysis?

In our project on 'reflexive modernization' (Beck et al., 2002), we are researching, for example, the question: if there is no clear relationship between household and family, how do we start, then? If we don't know what a 'family' is, maybe we could start with a 'couple'. But what is a 'couple'? The French sociologist Jean-Claude Kaufmann (1994) has a very sophisticated answer: a couple is not formed when two people start living together, or when they start having sex. Something else must be added: a couple begins when two persons buy one washing machine – not two! Why? Because then the quarrels about 'Dirty Laundry' (the title of his marvellous book) start. Who washes for whom? What counts as dirty? What as clean? What happens in each case, if he says yes and she says no? (Of course those are, as we all know, Western questions.)

If we want to distinguish between a methodological nationalism and a methodological cosmopolitanism we not only have to solve the new problem of beginning – there is also the problem of redefining the sociological frame of reference. If we want to do this for the purpose of empirical research, there are two concepts in the making:

- *Interconnectedness*: beautifully explained and empirically rich, as expressed in the work of David Held and his colleagues, especially their latest book, *Global Transformations* (1999). But this idea of interconnectedness somehow still presupposes the territorial unit of states and state societies, that are becoming more and more interconnected and networked. And, keeping in mind global inequalities, 'interconnectedness' is a semantic euphemism.
- The new metaphor of the *fluid* that flows: neither boundaries nor relations mark the difference between one place and another. Instead, sometimes boundaries come and go, while relations transform themselves without fracture. Then social space behaves like a fluid (Mol and Law, 1994: 643). But the very suggestiveness of the powerful metaphor of the 'fluid' begs the question of whether 'networks' and 'flows' as social processes can be so independent of national, transnational and political-economic structures that enable, channel and control the flows of people, things and ideas. In other words: there is a lack of institutional (power)-structures, sometimes even an anti-institutionalism involved in the powerful cultural research and theory about 'fluids' and 'mobility' (Urry, 2000).
- *Cosmopolitanization from within* (this is what I am working on): cosmopolitanization has to be clearly distinguished from cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism (as I will discuss later) is a large, ancient, rich and controversial set of political ideas, philosophies and ideologies. It remains in part an ideological construct, and as such it has the abstract, even artificial atmosphere that Heinrich Heine described as the 'kingdom of the air'. Cosmopolitanization, on the other hand, is a frame of reference

for empirical exploration for globalization *from within*, globalization *internalized*. It is a kind of class analysis after class analysis, which takes on board globalization. Like class analysis, as Marx proposed it, it combines a descriptive analysis of social structure with the assumption that this analysis gives us a key to understand the political dynamics and conflicts of globalized social worlds.

But cosmopolitan sociology does imply more than a new transnational sensitivity for empirical research (Therborn, 2000): Western sociology, the sociological equivalent of NATO, has most of the money and intercontinental firepower. What does the rest of the world have? It is not without significance that it contains about seven-eighths of the world's population, and that these seven-eighths are no longer subjects of colonization and have their own centres of higher education and research, however short of financial resources many of them may be. Second, transnational immigration and education are creating a quite significant stratum of educated transnationals. They have personal knowledge, both of East-Asia and of California, of Latin America and of Anglo-America, of South-Asia and England, of the Arab world, Africa and France, of Turkey and Germany and the USA, to mention only a few of the largest combinations. These people are raising the standards of the cosmopolitan redefinition of social sciences, which we have to work on. The basic idea is: a cosmopolitan social theory and social science ask about the complicated accommodations, alliances and creative contradictions between the nation-state and mobile capital, between the hidden cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies and national identities and institutions, between cosmopolitanism and nationalism.

What is a Cosmopolitan Society?

As often in history, cosmopolitanization is being experienced and reflected upon as *crisis* – a threefold crisis: crisis of *cosmos* (nature), crisis of *polis* (paradigm of nature-state politics) and crisis of *rationality and control*. To illustrate this, I pick up on the latter one.

We now have to recognize and act upon a new global market risk, which is highlighted by the Asian crisis in 1998 and which demonstrates the social and political dynamics of the *economic* world risk society. The global market risk is a new form of 'organized irresponsibility', because it is an institutional form so impersonal as to have no responsibilities, even to itself. Enabled by the information revolution, global market risk allows the near-instant flow of funds to determine who will prosper and who will suffer. Today, you can illustrate the components of global market risk by the experience of the Asian crisis as you could, in 1986, illustrate the basic aspects of global technological risk with the experience of Chernobyl. Somehow, the Asian crisis is the *economic Chernobyl*. So cosmopolitanization comes into being by recognizing oneself as being involved and victimized by global risk regimes.

Let's look at this in a bit more detail. In the social sciences and cultural theory globalization is often defined in terms of 'time-space compression', 'de-territorialization', 'de-nationalization', etc. Those concepts mostly refer to the *spatial* dimension. But what do globalization and cosmopolitan society mean in the dimension of *time* and (*collective*) *memory*? The experience of a cosmopolitical crisis – as I explained before – implies: people all over the world are reflecting on a *shared collective future*, *which contradicts a nation-based memory of the past*.[1]

There is no memory of the global past. But there is an imagination of a globally shared collective future, which characterizes the cosmopolitan society and its experience of crisis. Of course, both the national and the cosmopolitan imagination are past- and future-oriented. But to oversimplify this distinction: methodological nationalism is about the future implications of a nationally shared past, an imagined past; while methodological cosmopolitanism is about the present implications of a globally shared future, an imagined future. If it is true, as, for example, Koselleck argues, that modernity as such is dominated by the future, this future regime of modernity is being realized *not* in the national but in the cosmopolitan age of modernity. To repeat myself: the definition and construction of collectivity in cosmopolitan societies are about the definition and construction of a globally shared collective future crisis. It is the future, not the past, which 'integrates' the cosmopolitan age.

But a significant difference should be noted, that between *consciousness* and *action*. It is the same in all dimensions of the social and the political – transnational identities and life forms, globalizing economy, global risks, etc.: global consciousness of a shared collective future is a consciousness which does not incorporate forms of action. Forms of action – in the spheres of politics, science, law, etc. – are *past*-based. So far, there are very few transnational forms of action designed for a shared collective future.

From this it follows that the cosmopolitan crisis is not only about a crisis of cosmos and nature, a crisis of polis, and a crisis of rationality and control; it is also to a great degree about profound contradiction between a time-based consciousness of a globally shared future *without* adequate forms of institutionalized action and a past-based national memory *without* a globally shared collective future (or, to be more precise, with a past-based shared *hostility* towards the future).

To sum up this first part of my argument: in the dimension of space we talk and reflect upon the de-territorialization of the social, the political and the economic; in the dimension of time we have to reflect upon the '*re-traditionalization*' of the social, political and cultural through a globally shared collective future. Re-traditionalization means the collective future consciousness takes over the position of tradition and memory in the past-orientated national imagination and paradigm: the tradition of cosmopolitan societies is *the tradition of future*. It is, of course, a *fragile* future, a future crisis, a future of de-futurization.

Just like pre-modern feudal societies and nationally based industrial societies, so, too, do cosmopolitan societies develop their own imagination of time and space, their own concepts of 'class' and 'power', their own notion of democratization and justice, their own hysterias and dilemmas, and their own questions: how to organize politics, that is, reach collectively binding decisions. Breaking free of 'methodological nationalism' and exploring 'methodological cosmopolitanism' will probably only succeed if excursions into social theory are combined with excursions into concealed worlds of experience. So what does 'cosmopolitanization' mean? Let me begin with an example.

The British sociologist Michael Billig talks about '*banal nationalism*' (1995). By this he means that, almost unconsciously, we repeatedly 'show our colours', renewing our national identity and demarcating it from others through a host of everyday routines. Both in this sense – and also in contradiction to it – we must now, I believe, talk about a *banal cosmopolitanism*, in which everyday nationalism is circumvented and undermined and we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena. It certainly starts with pop and rave (youth cultures will be brilliant examples), goes on with television and the Internet, but includes also very definitely food (as John Tomlinson [1999] has shown). Who today can still feed himself locally or nationally? The product labels may still try to make us believe it, but from yoghurt, to meat and fruit, to say nothing of the globalized hotchpotch of sausage meat, as consumers we are irredeemably locked into globalized cycles of production and consumption. Food and drink of all countries unite – that has long ago become trite reality.

Take the supermarket around the corner. Today one finds on the shelves every possible kind of food that used to be eaten on other continents and in other cultures, albeit as industrially mass-produced articles. The result, nevertheless, is a banal cosmopolitan culinary eclecticism, which is meanwhile promoted and celebrated in cook books and TV food programmes as the new normality. So world society has taken possession of our kitchens and is boiling and sizzling in our pans. Anyone who still wants to raise the national flag, when it comes to food, founders on the ever more hollow myths of national dishes, which at best are no more than islands in the broad stream of the dominant and by now banal culinary cosmopolitanism.

As I said, banal cosmopolitanism appears to be displacing banal nationalism – involuntarily and invisibly, and throughout the world. In Birmingham recently, there was a national demonstration against the 'German' company BMW because its plan to sell the 'British' company Rover threatened to bring calamity to the whole region. On such an occasion, for sure, banal nationalism briefly flares up again, but afterwards, in the pub around the corner, tempers are cooled with so-called 'Dutch' or 'German' beer and 'our' football team is cheered on in competitions in which players of every skin colour and culture play against one another.

Which is to say that the experiential frame of national societies, shut

off from one another by a unified language, identity and politics, is increasingly nothing more than a scam. What appears as and is proclaimed as national is, in essence, increasingly transnational or cosmopolitan. What is at issue is the relation of our knowledge of the world and social structure. Social structure is becoming transnational or cosmopolitan; an epistemological shift is required in concurrence with this ontological change. Of course, there are limits to cosmopolitanization as well. On the one hand a new transnational space is eroding and superseding national space as the locus of social life. On the hand this social life is, in many ways, still filtered through nation-state institutions. This situation underscores the *highly contradictory* nature of national–transnational relations as well as the indeterminacy of the emergent cosmopolitan social structures.

For the purposes of social analysis, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish systematically between the *national manifestation* on the one hand and the *cosmopolitan reality* of 'global flows', currents of information, symbols, money, education, risks and people, on the other. This *internal*, involuntary and often unseen cosmopolitanization of the national sphere of experience is occurring, however, as a concealed 'side-effect' of economic globalization, that is, with the power and autonomy of digital capitalism. It has to be said: it is not socialism that is establishing this beneficent disorder in the world, but nationally unbounded capitalism. This does not mean confusing 'world citizenship' with the rise of a global managerial class. A clear distinction must be drawn between 'global capitalism' and 'global citizenship'. Yet a plural world citizenship is to some extent soaring with the wind of global capital at its back (I will come to this later).

At this point, at the latest, it is necessary to warn against a possible *cosmopolitan fallacy.* The fundamental fact that the experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space, but is being subtly altered by the opening to cosmopolitanization should not deceive anyone into believing that we are all going to become cosmopolitans. Even the most positive development imaginable, an opening of cultural horizons and a growing sensitivity to other unfamiliar, legitimate geographies of living and coexistence, need not necessarily stimulate a feeling of cosmopolitan responsibility. The question of how this might at all be possible has hardly been properly put so far, never mind investigated. Actually cosmopolitanization is about a dialectics of conflict: cosmopolitanization *and its enemies.*

But the consequent 'cosmopolitanization' *from the inside* of societies organized and thought in nation-state terms actually increases the probability of *national fallacy* as well. This is the belief that what takes place within the container of this or that national state can also be pinned down, understood and explained nationally. This 'national or territorial fallacy' applies, not least, to a large proportion of the statistics assembled by nation-state oriented economic and social sciences.

So, once again, what does inner 'cosmopolitanization' mean? Cosmopolitanization means that the key questions of a way of life, such as

nourishment, production, identity, fear, memory, pleasure, fate, can no longer be located nationally or locally, but only globally or glocally – whether in the shape of globally shared collective futures, capital flows, impending ecological or economic catastrophes, global foodstuff chains or the international 'Esperanto' of pop music. And the key question now will be to what extent the transnational sphere of experience, which is opening up, will dissolve or overlap the national sphere of experience – whether the former will swallow up the latter or vice versa. To what extent, therefore, the transnational sphere of experience will be overlaid, filtered off and broken down by nation-state institutions and identities – and with what resulting explosions – or, indeed, as such, increasingly the subject of conscious and public reflection.

If one generalizes this phenomenology of the ongoing transnationalization, then the claim I am staking with the concept of 'cosmopolitan society' becomes clear. This concept aims to describe a historically new quality and form of societal differentiation. By which I mean, that a new way of doing business and of working, a new kind of identity and politics as well as a new kind of everyday space-time experience and of human sociability, is emerging. There is no historical precedent for this, hence we are forced to re-think the concept of 'society'. It is impossible even to outline this claim here. I must limit myself to a few aspects, which could make my thesis at least intuitively comprehensible. To this end I would like to look in turn at changes in the understanding of *space-time*, of *identity*, of the *production paradigm* as well as at the resulting consequences for key sociological concepts like *class* and *power* and, within this frame, point to certain *dilemmas of cosmopolitanism*.

Space-Time

One could, of course, object: first, transnational ways of life and the dialogic imagination express, once again, a *middle-class* bias; second, the notion of mobile culture as restless nomadic movement does not apply to those *who stay at home*. But both arguments can easily be rejected.

Let me remind you how Robert E. Park in the 1920s defined the '*marginal man*': '[a] cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples' (1928: 892). In the struggles over belonging, the actions of migrants and minorities are major examples of dialogic imaginative ways of life and everyday cosmopolitanism. We normally only look at the transnationalizaton of capital and not at the much more restricted transnationalization of cheap labour. As Saskia Sassen (2000) has shown, there are combined strategies of relocation to the periphery and the use of immigrant, ethnic and female labour pools in highly segmented labour markets in the core. So, to discover a kind of transnational anomie as a source of social action and capital might, indeed, be a paradoxical discovery to be made by the salutary experience of migrants and their dramatically disadvantaged situation.

Not mobility but the transformation of localities itself is the key impact

of cultural globalization. As John Tomlinson, myself and many others have pointed out, the idea of de-territorialization is of major importance. It means: loosening and transforming the ties of culture to place. 'Our roots are our antennae.' That's the kind of sentence which gets to the heart of the paradigm shift in the role of location in the context of global networks. The more television, but also the mobile phone and the Internet, become part of the fittings of homes, the more the sociological categories of time, space, place, proximity and distance change their meaning. Because this domestic information technology interior potentially makes those who are absent present, always and everywhere. Sociability is no longer dependent on geographical proximity. It thus becomes possible – as recent studies have already shown – for people who live isolated from their neighbours in one place simultaneously to be tied into dense networks stretching across continents. In other words: the sphere of experience, in which we inhabit globally networked life-worlds, is *glocal*, has become a synthesis of home and non-place, a nowhere place.

So the other side of de-territorialization (which actually does have only a negative meaning – 'post-ism' and 'de-ism' are all over!) is cosmopolitanization: the digital cosmopolitan architecture of the most local and private centres of everyday life. A cosmopolitan sociology should investigate not only presence and absence, but also '*imagined presence*' (Urry, 2000). Dialogic imaginations presuppose, among others, imagined presence of geographically distant others and worlds.

Identity

This has important consequences for identity: not all, but an increasing number of people nowadays trade internationally, work internationally, love internationally, marry internationally, do research internationally, and their children are growing up and are being educated internationally. These children are not only bi-lingual; they move through the non-place of television and the Internet like fish through water. So why do we expect that political loyalties and identities will continue to be tied exclusively to a nation? Two consequences of crucial importance: community life will no longer be determined solely or even primarily by location; and collective memory is losing its unity and integrity. And then there are the tricky little questions: how do Turkish Germans deal with the Holocaust? Or non-Jewish Palestinian Israelis? There has been a great deal of thought about the globalization of space and location, but much less about the globalization of time and of memory (Levy and Sznaider, 2001).

At this point of my argument a systematic remark regarding the relationship between transnational cultural theory and studies and the new political economy is necessary: the very suggestiveness of transnational socioscapes, networks and identities, to some extent, pushes aside the political economy of time-space compression and gives the misleading impression that everyone can take equal advantage of mobility and modern communications, and that transnationality has been liberatory for all people.

Instead, a cosmopolitan sociology has to ask: what are the mechanisms of power that enable the mobility as well as the relocation of diverse populations within these emerging cosmopolitan social structures? How are cultural flows and the dialogic imagination conditioned and shaped within the new forms of production and global inequalities?

Production Paradigm

Methodological nationalism corresponds to the specific interrelationship between production, social classes, political power and territoriality. The 'third wave' technology – communications, computerization, etc. – undermines this historic territoriality: territoriality and production are no longer bound together. The new possibilities offered to business by the Internet, inter alia, add up to a qualitative break with a world which thought in terms of the national/international dichotomy, but precisely not in transnational terms. The decisive consequence is this: in the internal space of national and local ways of doing business there is a fundamental transformation of options and decision-making situations. Decisions – in particular those of local and national enterprises – come under the influence of global possibilities and competition. What is involved here is a paradigm shift from territorial production, which was oriented towards a local or national market, to de-territorialized forms of production, which are oriented towards several national markets or the world market. The market has become transnational and not (only) the companies. Consequently this globalization of trade is not restricted to flows of goods and capital, but includes the *globalization of decision-making frames*. And this shift is also taking place within businesses. The result is that a whole statistical view of the world, based on national economies and the international exchange between them, is becoming meaningless or at least losing its value as information. 'International' trade, as recorded by economic research, is being transformed into '*intra*-firm trade', in which nothing is bought or sold, but, rather, products are pushed back and forth within a 'firm' operating transnationally. According to estimates, between 40 and 60 percent of so-called 'international trade' is now 'intra-firm non-trade'. There are as yet no precise statistics. Thus the economists, and not only the social scientists, are counting the wrong peas with great institutional enthusiasm.

Class and Power

This epochal break between first and second modernity also changes the frame of meaning of key social scientific and everyday concepts such as class and power. 'Class' or 'social strata' are still located, researched, organized within the nation-state paradigm – and that frame remains almost unquestioned. This is becoming ever more unreal for a number of reasons, not least because, *within* all sections and sectors of nation-state institutions and political and corporate organizations, new kinds of splits are emerging between active globalizers, who act transnationally and nationally at the same time, and those taking up a national position against transnationality,

who act only in the national frame. So de-territorialized 'class struggle' is – at least – a *two-frames-of-reference game*. The globalizers are located in a different world – frame of meaning – than their counterparts. Who and where are the workers whom the globalizing managerial class has to refer to and feel responsible for as 'their' workers? De-territorialized capital and territorialized labour don't have a common frame of reference to be positioned in. In fact, which frame of reference – the national or the transnational – has to be adopted in the conflict is becoming a central issue of the conflict itself!

The Marxist argument, that workers have no nation, must today be turned on its head: the activists of capital, who have made globalization their profession, have no nation, while the workers and workers' movements, such as the trade unions, call on 'their' state for help, to protect them from the adventures of globalization.

But this in turn means that the continued use of the concept of class in a cosmopolitan sociology obscures the collapse of the nation-state class ontology. Because a *single* nation-state frame of reference for *all* social inequalities and *all* 'classes' can no longer be assumed. The question of which categorical frame of meaning of 'class' conflicts is defining the reality of classes is becoming part of this transnational 'class' conflict. Thus there emerge conditions of *really lived incomparability* between national and non-national, territorialized and de-territorialized 'classes', which the class concept of methodological nationalism does not address. It presupposes an ontology of classes in which all classes position themselves and the opposed other in a common (national) frame of reference. In cosmopolitan perspectives there arises a space of overlapping but incompatible frames of reference and meanings in which radicalized world-scale inequalities become fragmented.

Let me explain this idea from below, from the perspective of the underclass. Transnationality characterizes not only the globalization elites, but the poor exploited immigrants as well. They are treated as 'excluded others' in the United States, but Haitians, Filipino or Indian immigrants are at the same time active in sustaining 'their' households overseas *and* engaging in political struggles against corrupt regimes. So, poor immigrants are living the two-frames-of-reference life and game as well. They are at the same time here and there, located in and in between different incompatible framings of social inequalities and political conflicts. To draw a sociological implication, for example, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of different forms of capital has to be re-thought within the transnational frame: how is the migrant's ability to convert economic capital into social capital being blocked by institutionalized racism of the host society?

So, it is not only the global players who are learning the de-territorialized game of power and putting it to the test, but also some *ethnic minorities*. German, French, Swedish, Kurds organize simultaneous ad hoc demonstrations in Berlin, Frankfurt, Stockholm, Paris, London. But that raises an interesting question: to what extent can coalitions be forged

between the transnationals at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, coalitions which effectively counteract the national reflexes and resentments of the middle of society?

But, at the same time, something else becomes evident: the power of the nation state is by no means broken. The treatment of immigrants can be considered something of a litmus test for how *narrowly* the limits of trans-nationality continue to be drawn within national spaces.

Consequently the theory and sociology of inequality still have to take the step from Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian relativity theory. Put in classical terms: Hegel's master–slave dialectic was conceived territorially. It must be re-thought in de-territorialized transnational terms. The same holds true for the semantics of justice, solidarity, etc., including the social philosophy of justice. What then remains of them is an open question.

Globalization is a narrative about *power*, not about digital space and financial markets. As Susan Strange (1996) argues, states are now engaged in a different competitive power game: they are competing for world market shares and foreign capital in order to realize their 'national' interest. But what really constitutes the 'power' of de-territorialized business? Networked production transforms the relationship of economic power and state power into a game of cat and mouse. The cat nature of business derives from the fact that the latter's investments can create or eliminate the lifelines of national politics and society – jobs and taxes. The mouse nature of state power derives from what once constituted the strength of the state, its territorial bond.

However, the metaphor of the game of cat and mouse is wrong in one central respect: this cat doesn't want to eat the mouse at all! In other words: the power of the state is not undermined through conquest, but de-territorially, through the weightlessness and invisibility of *withdrawal*. That turns the concept of power on its head. Not imperialism, but non-imperialism, not invasion, but retreat of investors constitutes the core of global economic power. The nation-state, nation-state society is threatened not by conquest but by non-conquest. The supply-side states long for nothing more than invasion by the investors; they fear nothing more than their retreat. There is only one thing worse than being overrun by big multinationals: *not* being overrun by multinationals.

The de-territorialization of economic power, therefore, is based precisely on the opposite of what the territorial state's power derives from. It has no army, no means to exercise physical force, in fact, not even any legitimation. Neither governments nor parliaments have to approve the withdrawal or invasion of investors. Does that mean that global business is acting illegitimately? By no means: premeditated *non-conquest,* the power of withdrawal, neither requires approval nor can it be approved. Premeditated non-conquest – this formula also contains the answer to the question of tomorrow: from what does the different kind of politics of global business derive its power? Globalized investment decisions achieve binding force in the most effective way possible – through a policy of fait accompli. In the

end the so-called 'competition state' (Philip Cerny) is itself obligated to expand transnationalization.[2]

Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism

Living in an age of side-effects, we have to ask very early: what are the unseen and unwanted consequences of the new rhetoric of 'global community', 'global governance' and 'cosmopolitan democracy'? What are the risks if the cosmopolitan mission succeeds?

No one can unproblematically transfer some historical concept of cosmopolitanism, irrespective of which cultural continent it derives from, to the present. Rather, we must subject, for example, the European Enlightenment's distinction between *cosmopolitanism* and *nationalism* to a 'critique of recovery' (Walter Benjamin) and deploy it intellectually and politically in the completely changed political landscape of the beginning of the 21st century. The best way of doing this, it seems to me, is to lay bare the dilemmas of cosmopolitanism.

First, one might consider the *universalist–pluralist* dilemma of cosmopolitanism. This is the crunch question: is there a *single* cosmopolitanism or *several* cosmopolitanisms? Universalist cosmopolitanism, that dream of 'a worldwide community of humankind', as Immanuel Kant, but also Karl Popper and many others, dreamed it, is open – like all other universalisms – to the accusation of imperialism (Hacohen, 1999). There is not one language of cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, grammars. The emerging significance of cosmopolitanism is about a plurality of antagonisms and differences. Cosmopolitanism, indeed, is another word for disputing about cosmopolitanisms. This is true for the old Greek philosophy, the controversies during the 18th and 19th century in Europe, and this, I am sure, is true for contemporary debates. But where there are many cosmopolitanisms, perhaps none is left, because there are no generalizable characteristics which allow it to be clearly distinguished, for example, from multiculturalism.

My attempt at a definition may strike many as a dubious compromise, but it could turn out to be a ruse, which allows us to enquire as to the variety of historical cultural cosmopolitan traditions and ideas, *without* at the same time losing sight of the defining characteristics. My central defining characteristic – dialogic imagination – explores and exploits the creative contradictions of cultures within and between the imagined communities of nations (so I am only speaking here in the transnational dimensions of including other civilizations and modernities, *not* the otherness of nature, etc. – see above). This includes:

- the clash of cultures within one's own life;
- globally shared collective futures (as opposed to past-based forms of action);
- a sense of global responsibility in a world risk society, in which there are '*no others*';

- a commitment to dialogue and against violence; and
- a commitment to destroy faith in the supposedly natural *artifice* of 'society' and stimulate the self-reflexivity of divergent entangled cosmopolitan modernities.

To sum up, I suggest three characteristics – *globality*, *plurality* and *civility*, that is, the awareness of a global sphere of responsibility, the acknowledgement of the otherness of others and non-violence – as defining features of a 'de-territorialized' concept of cosmopolitanism.

   The vagueness and equivocalness of this proposed definition are a decisive advantage. The concept stands for openness to the world and for plurality. And this to such a degree that it breaks with philosophical pedantry: there is no substantial founding principle for cosmopolitanisms such as a God-given order or natural law, or the common good, or reason. The basic values of these cosmopolitanisms appeal to a *higher amorality*. This denies a belief in the superiority of (one's own) morality and provides an encouragement no longer to damn those with other beliefs and opinions (while not forcing anyone to love mankind).

   Then there is the *ethnic* dilemma: all attempts to open up the ethnic ghetto, to play down or extinguish ethnicity and racism, only appear to reinforce them. Indeed, to feel oneself as part of a cosmopolitan community and to declare one's position publicly can be turned into its opposite by others' violent ethnic definitions of what is alien. Popper writes in his diary: 'I do not see myself as an assimilated German Jew. That is precisely how "the Führer" would have labelled me.'

   The *global–local* dilemma: cosmopolitanisms throw up the diaspora question – how will being-at-home far away, being-at-home without being-at-home, be possible? This question has often been misunderstood in such a way that social tension and division arise between *cosmopolitans* and *locals*. The former are rooted in *no* place, the latter in *one* place. But as John Tomlinson (1999) argues, the cosmopolitan cannot be opposed to the local in terms of ideal types. Cosmopolitan forms of life and identities are ones that are ethically and culturally *simultaneously* global and local. They symbolize an 'ethical glocalism' or, as I call it, a rooted cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2002b). The difference between purely local and cosmopolitan forms of life is that cosmopolitans experience and – if necessary – defend their place as one open to the world.

   The *multicultural* dilemma: what distinguishes the world of ideas of cosmopolitanism from that of 'multiculturalism'? Multiculturalism attempts – as Mario Vargas Llosa writes – to make permanent that miracle in which dog, cat and mouse eat from the same plate. Multiculturalism, for all its assertion of a world of variety and of the principle of plurality, fosters a collective image of humanity in which the individual remains dependent on his cultural sphere. He (or she) is the product of the language, the traditions, the convictions, the customs and landscapes in which he came into the world and in which he grew up, so that this 'home-land' is regarded as a

closed, self-sufficient and sacrosanct unity, which must be protected against every possible threat.. Naturally against imperialism and also against those forces, such as miscegenation, internationalization and cosmopolitanism, undermining the national spirit. In this sense, multiculturalism is at logger-heads with individualization. According to the multicultural premise, the individual does not exist. He is a mere epiphenomenon of his culture. Cosmopolitanism argues the reverse and *presuppose*s individualization. The idea that this process could continue to the point where, under the banner of political democracy and of the recognition of human rights and of indi-vidual freedom, national particularisms dissolve into a comprehensive and varied world civilization, has perhaps become a little more tangible since the end of the Cold War.

The *constructivism–realism dilemma*: the 'cosmopolitan perspective' is an anti-essentialist perspective. The conception of cultures as homo-geneous unities of language, origin and political identity, as maintained by methodological nationalism, is the exact opposite of the cosmopolitan self-conception. Characteristic of the latter are concepts like *transnational*, *transcultural*, *hybrid*, *diaspora*, etc. In other words: the fundamental con-viction of constructivism – the idea, that collective identities are histori-cally invented and constructed *imagined communities* – is central. This compels a rigorous anti-essentialism without a privileged link to ethnicity, gender, class or cultural tradition. However – whether intended or not – by simply talking about 'Blacks', 'Jews', etc. a residual essentialism or 'as-if essentialism' inevitably slips in. In the current climate of prescriptive anti-essentialism this dilemma cannot be easily resolved. Paul Gilroy, James Clifford and others, however, propose an 'anti-anti-essentialism', a double denial, which should not be equated with an affirmation. They justify this by arguing that, only under the conditions of such a methodical as-if, can 'the changing same' be preserved in discourse about a 'black culture' of resistance or the Jewish diaspora.

International law–human rights dilemma: human rights, which are also asserted in international law, that is, against the sovereignty of indi-vidual states, are a kind of civil religion of modern cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, this transnational humanism can easily turn into a *military humanism*, which – as in the Kosovo War – also provides the Western nations and Allied states with a kind of 'cosmopolitan mission', but also with legitimation for military crusades under the banner of human rights. This dilemma can ultimately only be resolved in the spirit of Kant by a transnational legal order, which, among other things, excludes the possi-bility of interventions being decided and carried out unilaterally by the hegemonic military power and its allies.

Who are the Enemies of Cosmopolitan Societies?

While the image of the world is being revolutionized, intellectual life has largely come to a standstill, defending its myths, conventions and conflicts. Among these are the incantations of the end of politics. An elective affinity

between schools of thought which otherwise have little to do with one another, that is, postmodernism, Luhmann's system theory and neoliberalism, has deleted the question of the 'invention of the political' for a cosmopolitan era from the catalogue of issues to be taken seriously. To that extent, it's not surprising that, intellectually and politically, the *enemies* of cosmopolitan societies dominate the scene. I should like to examine, at least briefly, three hostile positions: first of all *nationalism*, second, *globalism* and third, *democratic authoritarianism*.

Nationalism

Now that the totalitarian encumbrance of Communism has been overcome, nationalism has taken shape as the remaining real danger to the culture of political freedom at the beginning of the 21st century. It is a revived anti-cosmopolitan nationalism which could give the sectarian acts of violence and eccentricities of extremists a terrible legitimation. Although nationalism is absolutely discredited by a history of endless suffering and bloodshed, it has undergone a remarkable resurrection since the end of the East–West conflict.

If the nation-state paradigm of societies is breaking up from the inside, then that leaves a space for the renaissance and renewal of all kinds of cultural, political and religious movements. What has to be understood, above all, is the *ethnic globalization paradox*. At a time when the world is growing closer together and becoming more cosmopolitan, in which, therefore, the borders and barriers between nations and ethnic groups are being lifted, ethnic identities and divisions are becoming stronger once again. In every corner of the world ethnic groups are fighting for recognition of the 'right to self-determination'. It must also be added that globophobia, whatever the specific motivation, is ultimately grist to the mill of ethnic reaction. And, although there are undoubtedly very diverse manifestations of nationalism, of varying significance, in different parts of the world, there are, nevertheless, common basic features, in particular that *metaphysical essentialism of the 'nation'*. These features inevitably give rise to those consequences which made the 20th century one of modernized barbarism. Thus, someone who affirms and elevates 'his own' will almost inevitably, rejects and despises the foreign.

Beyond the revived 'old' nationalism there can also be observed worldwide, but especially in Europe, something approaching a *postmodern romance in the treatment of nationalist and ethnic ideas and ideologies.* This has its origin in the identity politics espoused by various minorities in the United States – blacks, women, gays, Hispanics, etc. After the end of Marxism, which turned the individual into a subjective factor of the conditions of production and of class, a new collectivism is coming into being which attempts to reduce the individual to his existence as a member of a minority culture. Noteworthy is the postmodernity of this identity construction: relativism and fundamentalism – which would appear to be mutually exclusive – are combined. It is assumed, for example, that *only* the members

of a minority group can know the 'truth' about the group, that is, know about the oppression suffered. Only those who belong have, thanks to their origin, privileged access to what constitutes the cultural and political identity of this group. In this way, on the one hand, a postmodern relativism is asserted, namely, that a specific history of oppression is the property of those who 'belong' by virtue of skin colour, gender, etc. On the other, this truth, inaccessible to outsiders, is fundamental and determines the cultural and political existence of every individual.

This *paradoxical combination of postmodernity and fundamentalism* has, meanwhile, detached itself from its American origins and is being applied throughout the world in the revival of ethnic and national identities. It is quite possible that Britain will undergo a kind of ethnic Balkanization. What until recently was a manifestation of folklore, that is Scottish and Welsh National Parties, is now being given a new shine and deployed against the internal imperialism of 'Englishness'. This return of a postmodern ethnicity sees itself, as far as its leading protagonists are concerned, as being 'beyond Right or Left'. But in this respect Adorno was right when he said: Anyone who thinks he stands beyond Right or Left stands on the Right.

Globalism

The end of Communism and the triumphal march of the world market have given rise to a new myth: the *myth of freedom indivisible*. According to this myth, economic freedom, that is the liberalization of markets, and political freedom, that is forms of democratic self-determination and the cultural acknowledgement of the otherness of others, are a species of Siamese twins. The establishment of the world market will inevitably bring in its train, as a matter of inherent logic, the establishment of democracy, plurality and civility. This belief is symbolized by the 'American dream', which often looks more like a nightmare to other countries and cultures. At any rate, at the beginning of the 21st century history is on the side of freedom. Not least, a technological and an economic belief in progress go hand in hand. More succinctly, one might say: whoever has access to the Internet is automatically transformed into a citizen of the world.

If one wants to spell out this argument in a somewhat more sophisticated form, it goes as follows: in order for markets to function, now and in the future, computers and all kinds of communications and information technologies must reshape the economic landscape. An unintended side-effect of this development is the erosion of state control of information and the empowerment of citizens. This in turn forces governments, which want economic growth and affluence, to tolerate, sooner or later, political freedoms.

This evolutionary optimism flies in the face of the facts: first of all, another reminder of the continuing importance – indeed return – of nationalism and of ethnic movements of self-determination. But historical experience also speaks against it. To assess this Internet optimism, it is helpful to bear in mind that something quite similar happened five centuries

ago, after Johannes Gutenberg introduced the printing press to Europe. It is true: the invention of book printing and the beginning of the book trade challenged the old powers of Europe. Luther's Reformation, which shook the authority of the Catholic Church, would not have been possible without book printing and the book trade. But that should not make us lose sight of the counter-effects: absolutist powers established themselves in the centuries after Gutenberg's invention.

There is a noteworthy difference between the ideologies of the 20th century – socialism, Fascism, Communism – and the ideology of globalism, which is dominant today. The former possessed an inspirational force, which globalism lacks. This is an ideology which does not motivate and mobilize the masses. The new neoliberal crusaders preach: 'You must become streamlined, downsize, flexibilize and get on the Internet.' But that precisely does not produce a new feeling of belonging, solidarity or identity. The opposite is true: the free market ideology undermines democratic politics and democratic identities.

The German conservatives once had a controversial election slogan: 'Socialism or Freedom'. One could now turn it around for future use: the conflict '*Freedom or Capitalism*' (Beck and Willms, 2000) is already making itself felt today under the surface of many political arguments. Global capitalism *threatens* the culture of democratic freedom in that it radicalizes social inequalities and revokes the principles of fundamental social justice and security. In this sense, globalism is a powerful opponent of cosmopolitan societies.

Thanks to his own family history, Max Weber became aware of the challenges presented by the world market and the world economy quite early in his career. And yet his conceptual and political strategies got him entangled in an insoluble contradiction. While Weber clearly recognized the multi-ethnic basis of the world economy, he believed it necessary to demand ethnic exclusion in the German labour market. On the territory of the ethnically distinctly unhomogeneous German Empire, the young Weber wanted to restrict or eliminate the cheap wage competition of seasonal workers, mainly Italians and Russian Poles. His theory of the rationality of industrial capitalism was thus combined with an irrational policy of Germanization. Today we are once again threatened by this kind of contradictory combination of nationalism and (neo) liberalism. The following scenario is far from improbable: governments come to power, which are externally adaptable – with respect to world markets – but internally authoritarian. Neoliberalism takes care of the winners of globalization; for the losers, fears of foreigners are stirred up and doses of the toxin of re-ethnicization are administered. Put unkindly: the Blair model and the Haider model as a kind of European division of labour.

Democratic Authoritarianism

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the degree to which the modern state has been weakened with respect to its material room for

manoeuvre and its democratic qualities, but at the same time has been newly empowered with respect to authoritarian possibilities of action. The potential for achieving consensus in a democratic manner is diminishing. However, the state's capacity to enforce decisions – the combined operation of force, law and information technological control *internally* – is being modernized and increased. In other words, it has become possible to compensate for the loss of democratic power by authoritarian means – while preserving the democratic facade. That is what is meant by democratic authoritarianism.

In fact, why not risk capitalism without democracy? Why not just knock off the edges of the anyway outdated institutions of nation-state democracy, that is, 'reform' them, so that the big problems of the future – unemployment, pensions, environment – can at last be solved with technical efficiency? If young people's tendency to violence continues to increase, then why not prioritize order and punish the perpetrators with public beatings? There would still be room for liberals in such a world. They would no doubt boast that they had insisted on a limit of 15 strokes and a free choice of doctor.

The political seductiveness of this democratic authoritarianism is due to its compatibility with modernization. Globalization transforms politics and democracy into zombies – why keep on whining about cosmopolitan democracy? Morality is determined by the technologically possible. Not the other way round. This kind of realism eases the pangs of conscience. In the wake of the gold rush mood, stimulated, for example, by developments in human genetics, the burden of proof is reversed as if it were the most natural thing in the world: remaining moral scruples have to justify themselves and not the loss of moral inhibitions.

The combination of ethnic nationalism and democratic authoritarianism adds up to a severe attack on liberty. But at the same time, in a dialectical turn, it encourages and enforces cosmopolitical movements as well: it makes it most important to begin a new political project with the insistence on liberty, which redefines open societies as cosmopolitan societies. A politics must be invented for the Global Age, which is a challenge for political theory and, in pragmatic terms, for political organization as well.

The Communist Manifesto was published 150 years ago. Today, at the beginning of a new millennium, it is time for a *Cosmopolitan Manifesto* (Beck, 1998) The key idea for a *Cosmopolitan Manifesto* is: we live in an age that is at once global, individualistic and more moral than we suppose. Now we must unite to create an effective cosmopolitan world politics. There is a new dialectic of global and local questions, which do not fit in to national politics. These questions are already part of the political agenda – in the localities and regions, in governments and public spheres both national and international. But only in a transnational framework can they be properly posed, debated and resolved. For this there has to be reinvention of politics, a founding and grounding of the new political subject: that is – *cosmopolitan parties*. These represent transnational interests transnationally, but also

work within the arenas of national politics. They thus become possible, both pragmatically and organizationally, only as national-global movements *and* cosmopolitan parties.

How can cosmopolitan parties become possible and powerful? In the end this question can be answered only where people ask and listen to it – in the space of political experimentation.

Notes

1. This idea I developed in a discussion with Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2001) and Barbara Adam (2002) – I do thank Barbara for staying at the Munich University and spending some *time* with me.

2. Of course, in relation to the concept of state, there have to be some distinctions as well – on the one hand, between *national* unilateralism and '*global* unilateralism', for example of the American empire, and, on the other hand, between two forms of 'transnational states' (Beck, 1999) or multilateralism: transnational *surveillance* states and *cosmopolitan* states (Beck, 2002c).

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