Washington University
British MPs in Their Constituencies
Author(s): J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 127-143
Published by: Washington University
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/440006
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Legislative Studies Quarterly
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J. VINCENT BUCK
California State University, Fullerton
BRUCE E. CAIN
University of California, Berkeley
British MPs in Their Constituencies
This paper examines the relationships between British MPs and local officials
and councillors for evidence of accommodation or resistance to the representational activities
and styles of MPs. It is based on structured interviews in eight constituencies, including
interviews with the MPs, local councillors, CEOs, and other officials. The
activities of MPs in their constituencies can be categorized into four nonexclusive groupings:
casework, projects, gaining visibility, and party maintenance. Each of these activities
may create tensions in a constituency, with casework (mostly housing cases) and
gaining visibility the most frequently mentioned sources of tension. Divided partisan
representation and electoral competitiveness at both the council and parliamentary levels
resulted in a great deal of tension. Where the same party controlled both the local council
and the parliamentary seat, tensions were largely kept within the party.
Introduction
In recent years, political scientists have called attention to the
wide range of constituency activities undertaken by MPs (Dowse 1963;
Barker and Rush 1967; King and Sloman 1973; Munroe 1977; Cain and
Ritchie 1982; Searing 1985; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). If there
was previously a preoccupation with the legislators' policy-making role,
there is now a greater awareness of their nonpolicy functions. Some of
these functions are symbolic in nature, intended to demonstrate the
representatives' solidarity with and concern for those they represent.
Other activities, such as casework and the defense of community
causes, provide tangible benefits to constituents.
Fenno's study (1978) of congressional homestyles emphasized
the interaction between the personality of the representative and the
make-up of the district. Other studies have shown that electoral and
strategic considerations also affect how representatives decide to allocate
their time and resources, even in the United Kingdom (Cain et al.
1987). What has not been discussed in any detail is how the involvement
of the member of Congress or the MP in constituency affairs may
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XV, 1, February 1990 127
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
affect their relations with other elected and nonelected officials in their
districts.
The way that representatives allocate their time and resources
is prescribed only to a very small extent by laws or by informal expectations
and sanctions that party leaders, activists, and fellow legislators
control. Hence, while there is formally a substantial degree of freedom
in how they decide to represent their districts-for example, the personal
component that Fenno emphasizes-there is in reality a significant
amount of constraint. Given the overlap of jurisdictions, governmental
actors cannot define their roles without affecting and even
coming into conflict with other governmental actors. If, for example,
MPs have increased their ombudsmen interventions in district affairs
over time, then it is likely that local officials and bureaucrats are affected,
and these changes may create tensions.
This paper looks at the ways that national legislators and local
officials work together in Great Britain, to see whether there is any evidence
of resistance or accommodation to the representational styles of
MPs. To examine these tensions and the situations in which they occur,
we interviewed 87 individuals in eight constituencies in Great Britain.
The interviews sought to ascertain the types of activities that occupied
MPs in their constituencies, the interactions they had with local officials
and councillors as a result of these activities, the feelings and attitudes
that resulted from these interactions, and the evidence of
resistance or accommodation to the MPs' representational roles. The
constituencies studied were chosen from the sample used by Cain,
Ferejohn, and Fiorina in their crossnational study (1987) and were selected
to emphasize diversity. Four MPs were Conservative, three
Labour, and one from a minor party. In the Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina
study, four of these MPs were found to be very active in casework and
four less active. Four MPs represented constituencies in which the district
councils were controlled by their party, and two represented constituencies
in which the district councils were controlled by the
opposition. Of the remaining two, one represented a constituency in
which the district council considered itself independent and the other a
constituency with two district councils, one controlled by his party and
the other controlled by the other major party. Six constituencies were in
England, one in Scotland, and one in Wales. One MP was a minister and
three were, or had been, private parliamentary secretaries (PPS).
The interviews, conducted during the fall of 1982 and the summer
of 1983, were structured to last an average of 75 minutes. The MP
was interviewed in all cases, generally before we talked to anyone else in
the constituency. The MP's party agent was also interviewed in all con-
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British MPs
stituencies. Our sample also covers a number of local bureaucrats, including
district CEOs, county CEOs, aides to local CEOs, housing officers,
a finance officer, and the head of a local Department of Health and
Social Services (DHSS) office. The bulk of the respondents, however,
were local councillors, most often chairs or shadow spokesmen on the
most important committees. Members of parties other than the MP's
party were interviewed in all constituencies.
Activities in the District
The activities of MPs in their constituencies fall into four nonexclusive
categories: casework, projects, gaining visibility, and party
maintenance. Each of these activities brings members of Parliament
into contact with officials, party activists, and other locally elected representatives,
but in varying ways, because each leads to a different kind
of constituency interaction. At the heart of much of the conflict we observed
between elected and unelected officials at the local level is credit
claiming. Political actors with overlapping jurisdictions may compete
for or share the credit for activities. Whether they do the former or the
latter is at least partly determined by the type of activity in question.
In theory, for example, we can imagine constituency-related actions
which members undertake on their own and for which they claim
primary responsibility in the expectation of electoral gain. These we
can call indivisible credit-claiming actions. In such instances, a member
often competes with other elected and unelected officials to perform
an action; once the action is taken, however, the electoral credit is
attributed to the member alone. Whether any activity is ever purely indivisible
in this sense is a question we shall come to shortly. By contrast,
activities that require cooperative action by a number of elected and
unelected officials are what we call potentially divisible credit-claiming
actions. We say "potentially" because it is possible, and common, for
one individual to claim credit for actions that were collectively produced.
Finally, we should take note that many actions that are part of an
MP's job have little or no credit-claiming value. Of course, the enterprising
elected official attempts to reduce this number to a minimum.
From this very simple threefold distinction, we can make a couple
of observations. Some activities will have greater potential for conflict
than others (although human nature is such that conflict is
theoretically possible over any action). Thus, we would expect constituency
actions that have little or no credit-claiming value to provoke less
conflict than those that do. In divisible and indivisible credit-claiming
activities, different kinds of conflict can arise. In the divisible case, a
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
member who claims credit for actions that were cooperatively produced
runs the serious risk of annoying the other officials. To use an
analogy from game theory, a member who claims inappropriate credit
may not suffer any adverse consequences if the game is only played
once, but he or she can run into serious difficulties with other elected
and unelected officials if the play is repeated. The short-term gain of
electoral credit must be weighed against the long-term problem of fu
ture cooperation.
In the indivisible case, tensions can arise over the "right" to undertake
an action rather than (as in the divisible credit-claiming case
the responsibility for the action once it has been taken. The right to take
an action can derive from custom, expectations, law, or the logic of ter
ritorial jurisdiction. The right may change with time, and the incentiv
to compete for this right may vary with circumstances. The MP, for instance,
may have a marginal district in which every constituency act
matters electorally, whereas the local councillors for the various parts of
the MP's district may have much safer seats and thus be less motivated
to work for their constituents' favor.
Casework
Returning to the four activities we identified at the beginning,
we can try to locate them within the scheme we have developed. Casework
involves helping individuals with specific governmental problems
(Fenno 1978, 101; Cain et al. 1987, 57). While MPs usually help
their own constituents, they may occasionally take on the problems of
individuals outside their constituencies. For instance, one MP we spoke
with had close ties to a local mosque and helped Asians from far outside
his constituency with their immigration problems. Then too, there are
some MPs who will help individuals with nongovernmental problems,
such as getting an insurance claim settled.' However, the vast majority
of cases which an MP deals with are constituent's problems with the
central government.
Members of Parliament are asked to intervene with the national
government on behalf of their constituents in numerous circumstances
concerning such diverse matters as immigration, health care,
armed services, and pensions. The normal procedure in national casework
is to make a direct inquiry to the appropriate central government
department or civil servant or, in matters of particular urgency, to approach
the relevant minister. There is a broad consensus in Great Britain
that the MP, as the constituency's representative in London, is the
natural conduit for cases involving the national bureaucracy.
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British MPs
However, MPs also deal with cases concerning the local government.
The most common example is the allocation of council housing,
which is handled by the local housing authorities. Even though these
matters are strictly regulated by well-specified formulas, grievances
nonetheless arise between constituents and local bureaucrats, and constituents
take a large number of these kinds of complaints to their members.
Since local housing officers have their own appeal procedures, and
since local councillors may themselves choose to intervene on behalf of
their constituents, the MP who inquires into local cases provides a third
and potentially competitive route of appeal for the citizen.
The approach an MP takes in handling local cases varies with
the MP's personal style, knowledge of local government, and commitment
to resolving problems, as well as the partisan situation in the
constituency and district. Most often in local casework, the MP approaches
the chief executive officer (CEO), lower level administrators,
political leaders, or a local party councillor. The politically astute
MP who is concerned with solving the constituent's problem and who
knows local government well begins his or her work inquiry with lower
level administrators and then proceeds to higher levels (such as the
CEO) if the matter cannot be resolved initially. As one political leader
of a district council observed, "T ... tends to deal with officers. He
knows the procedures. He will come to me with a serious case. He
brought one to me about a woman with a medical disability who was
turned down for priority housing. I can win cases like that." In a similar
vein, an MP commented that, "If it is strictly administrative I send
it to administrators. If not, I send it to the council. If a shoe has a hole
in it you take it to a shoe repairman. If it is falling apart you send it
back to the manufacturer."
Some MPs, however, go directly to the CEO, feeling either that
this is the appropriate level on which to work or that they do not have
the time to give detailed attention to a problem. One CEO who had two
ministers and a backbencher representing parts of his district commented
that he got "more requests from the ministers than from W...
who has more time." An MP is most likely to deal directly with local officials
and bypass local councillors when the local council is controlled
by the other party, but in all cases respondents agreed that local bureaucrats,
in the spirit of neutral competency, were generally fair to MPs regardless
of party. As one CEO noted, requests from an MP usually
receive more attention: "A request from an MP would get special attention
in that I would know about it and would probably personally deal
with it. Inevitably it would get special attention. I would never say that
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
publicly, but you are bound to react to a member of Parliament. It does
not affect the outcome, but things happen more quickly."
Not all MPs compete with councillors to handle local cases.
Some MPs let the councillor from the relevant ward handle the issue
alone, referring the case by letter or phone or just sending the complainant
to the appropriate councillor. Others hold joint surgeries with local
councillors in order to make sure that local problems go directly to local
councillors, while still getting some credit for listening.
Casework on matters involving the central government is unlikely
to create tension between MPs and local authorities. It is part of
the MPs' job, and they are expected to do it. In any case, it is more difficult
for local persons to judge whether the MP is actively and competently
pursuing a case or merely going through the motions. However,
local casework is another matter. Local problems bring MPs into close
contact with local officials and councillors in an arena where it is obvious
to many constituents what sort of person the MP is: passive, aggressive,
publicity seeking, cooperative, or disruptive. There are those who
feel that an MP should not be involved with local council matters. A
Conservative MP made the following comment about his approach:
"Labour MPs try to do council work and councillors hate them. I do not
attempt to do a councillor's job." And a Conservative councillor made
this comment about a Conservative MP' "Labour does not like B ...
since he brings so many problems to the council. They call him councillor
B ..." Still others are cynical about the MPs' real level of interest in
local problems, suggesting that much casework is just a matter of going
through the motions. A housing officer put it bluntly: "I have the feeling
with all MPs that they are trying to seem active. They are asking for information
but they are not taking up the cudgels."
Another problem that MPs have in any council, regardless of
the majority, is maintaining liaison with councillors concerning cases
in their individual wards or under their committees' jurisdictions. All
politicians like to take credit for favorable results or to be viewed as effective.
MPs who try to take credit for themselves risk stepping on several
sets of toes. This problem can be lessened by keeping interested
councillors informed of the progress of the case and by spreading credit
around. Some MPs avoid this problem altogether by referring local
cases to ward councillors or to committee chairs. Of course, the MP can
also avoid a lot of work by referring cases, but the trade-off is that nothing
much may get done to resolve a particular case. The surest way for
an MP to avoid controversy over local casework is to put in the minimal
amount of effort on local cases, but no respondent complained that an
MP did too little on local cases.
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British MPs
Interestingly, the conflict that often is present with district
councils rarely occurs with county councils. We can only speculate as to
why this may be the case. Perhaps the county councils do not deal with
as many matters that affect individuals directly, or perhaps the counties
are a less visible level of government, or that they are less often governed
in a partisan manner.
In sum, casework is primarily an example of indivisible credit
claiming, especially with regard to MPs and local councillors. MPs
who aggressively pursue matters of local government compete with
local councillors, and tensions can result. A particularly insensitive
MP who embarrasses local bureaucrats can run into some problems
normally associated with divisible credit claiming. On the whole,
however, we found generally good working relationships between MPs
and local bureaucrats.
Projects
Unlike casework, which deals with problems of individuals,
projects involve the concerns of groups and the broader interests of the
constituency (Cain et al. 1987, 71). Most requests for aid on projects are
filtered through local councils. Typically, the MP is first approached by
the council or by a coalition of councillors and affected groups. The
type of projects that MPs were involved in ranged from keeping a postal
substation open to trying to bring new industry into an area. A number
were economic in nature, such as gaining development area status for a
district, getting a military contract for a local plant, delaying the closure
of a steel mill, and changing laws or regulations so that manufacture of
certain products were more feasible in the district.
Rarely did MPs take the initiative with respect to projects, as
their counterparts in the U.S. Congress so often do. Generally members
were reactive, responding to requests.2 Some MPs were more active in
responding than others. At one extreme, there was an MP who did just
what he was told. A'leading political figure in his constituency commented
that "he has no [electoral] problems. He does not need to do a
lot of work. We will tell him what to do." At the other extreme, some
MPs would, without prodding, handle all of the London work: setting
up meetings with ministers, leading delegations, asking questions in
parliament, introducing bills, and keeping the local councillors and officials
informed of the project's status and what needs to be done. In addition,
two MPs reported that they used their own contacts, quite apart
from their governmental role, to bring outside industry into a district.
Few local officials or councillors were willing to give any MP much
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
credit for helping the economic situation in their district (none of the
MPs in our sample got rave reviews for successful work in this area), but
they were quite willing to point out those who did little or nothing. Typical
of the comments about the effectiveness of MPs in project work is
one by a leader of the majority Labour party about a Conservative MP:
"He did support conversion of the rail crossing gates. He did support it
and he used it as part of his reelection campaign, but his impact was
small. Local councillors did more in organizing the campaign. He did
speak to the minister, but I have doubts about his impact." Another
councillor was even less generous. "He says that he got [an industrial facility],
but he did nothing. It was certain to go through if the council approved
it, and we did." Those MPs who were obviously less active in
promoting local projects were roundly criticized for not doing more,
and on the rare occasions they choose not to get involved (such as in the
closing of a post office substation), they were extensively criticized by
everyone, including members of their own party. It seems that it is at
least necessary for an MP to go through the motions of project work and
to be on the right side.
The presence of several MPs representing the same town or
county can complicate the picture. In the first place, they all must be
contacted, or they may feel slighted and oppose this or future projects.
(In one of the counties in our sample, eight MPs were involved.) Then it
must be determined who is to take the lead: the senior MP, the most effective
MP, one in the majority party in Parliament, one representing
the majority party in the district, etc. Members of the government (majority
party leaders) are often thought to be ineffective here, since their
need to support the government ultimately outweighs their desire to get
something for the local constituency.
Local government officials in our sample seemed to value MPs
more for their assistance on projects than for their individual casework.
As one respondent said, "The job of the MP is to intervene with government.
It is not to initiate, but if there is a problem with Whitehall, the
man with the key is the MP. I do not expect the MP to be involved with
local council matters." In another constituency a respondent said, "The
MP should represent local authorities' view against central government...,
should be the window through which he sees the constituency."
It would seem that, if local officials and councillors had their
way, MPs would primarily be lobbyists for locally determined policy,
not advocates for citizens against the local authorities.
Projects are the clearest examples of divisible credit claiming.
By definition, they involve benefits that are more collective and less
particularized than casework, and they usually require the cooperation
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British MPs
of a number of elected officials in the same geographic area. As we
might expect, tensions associated with projects had less to do with the
right to undertake project-related actions (quite the contrary, the expectations
of assistance from the MP were quite high) and more to do with
claiming undue credit for what was thought to be a collective effort.
Maintaining Visibility
Maintaining visibility, the third constituency action we identified,
involves those activities that make local constituents aware of
MPs' existence. Members must not only be seen in the constituency but
must also keep themselves in the minds of their constituents when they
are not there. Ideally these activities will convey the MP's concern for
and effectiveness in looking after the interests of constituents. The most
common methods for maintaining visibility with the entire constituency
are of four types: establishing one's presence, attending functions
and meetings, taking positions on local issues, and building relations
with the press. Establishing a presence means first and foremost living
in the constituency, since it has become important in recent years to
convince local activists that a member has a feel for the constituency
and its problems. In addition to returning to the constituency often, establishing
presence usually requires traveling widely within the constituency
and touring schools, factories, pensioners' homes, etc., especially
during the recess.
A second component of visibility is attending constituency
meetings. Some of these are governmental in nature, including council
meetings or hearings, strategy sessions on projects, and ceremonial
functions. Members of Parliament rarely attend council meetings unless
invited, and they are more likely to be invited when their party is in
control of the local council than when it is not. A third source of local
visibility comes from involvement in local issues. In fact, local issues
may well be more important than national issues to an MP's standing in
the constituency.3 A common practice, for instance, is to make an issue
out of the management-or mismanagement-of the oppositioncontrolled
council. Since local government most directly affects people's
lives, the potential for local causes to champion abounds. Most of
these involve the safety and maintenance of housing, but others include
roads, transportation, parking, trash, and sewage.
The MP who would be visible must manage his/her relations
with the press well. A member's relationship with the local press can
range from incestuous to oblivious. Some MPs have a virtual pipeline
to the local press. A reporter in a Labour constituency stated that he had
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
a "special relationship" with the MP and his agent and that he "would
not write anything detrimental, since they are friends and it is a useful
relationship." He went on to say that he would not want to see the MP
lose his seat because he, as a reporter, would "lose a good contact."
Other MPs, usually in safe seats, did not actively seek additional press
coverage. For instance, one CEO commented that the local constituency
"is a safe Labour seat so publicity is not played up.... The MP
does not need to do more. He was the union man. This is a moderate
Labour area and that is reflected by the MP." Most members are selective
in how they use the media to publicize themselves, although it does
not always seem that way to local officials. One housing officer complained
that "W... has a good publicity machine. It is in the paper before
I get it. We must work in the full glare of publicity. When I write
something to him I expect the public to see it." But in the same city, the
national Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) officer said
that nothing involving his department ever was put in the press by the
MP. Apparently, the MP had more to gain by attacking the local government,
which was controlled by his principal opponents, than he did by
attacking the DHSS and undermining his good working relationship
with that office.
Generally speaking, visibility-enhancing activities can fall into
the no credit-claiming category; that is to say, most of these actions do
not result in a particular outcome per se, but simply cause the MP to be
noticed. They are, in effect, symbolic gestures. However, a few-such as
handling local issues-can result in either divisible or indivisible credit
claiming, depending on the circumstances.
Party Maintenance
Finally, what we have called maintenance activity involves bolstering
the membership, funds, and activity in local party clubs. Maintaining
support within the local party is crucial for all MPs, and they
devote a good deal of their constituency activity toward this end. Members
can, of course, get into trouble with their party supporters over
their national policy stands on such issues as abortion, capital punishment,
EEC membership, or defense, but they can also encounter resistance
if they seem to be uninterested or ineffective in supporting the
constituency party. MPs are in real danger if they are weak in both dimensions.
On the other hand, MPs can bolster their reselection prospects
by being regularly available to the local party.4 Consequently, the
prudent MP is careful to attend to party ties by keeping in constant contact
with the party agent and the party leaders and making regular ap-
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British MPs
pearances at party meetings and functions. Party maintenance work is
not an electoral credit-claiming activity, and we found no instances of
tension between the member and the constituency in this area except
when it was felt the member did not do enough.
Looking over all the constituency activities, we find that the
main sources of tension are individual casework involving local government
matters. The credit-claiming benefits of casework are indivisible;
hence, enterprising MPs sometimes compete with local
councillors for the right to this electoral benefit. In most other instances,
tensions are easily avoided by sharing the divisible credit of
collectively produced actions.
Variations in MP-Constituency Relations
The relations between members and local officials vary greatly,
from amicable and cooperative to hostile and competitive. Believing
that constituency activity can have an impact on electoral results, members
generally take an active role in local issues and problems. In recent
years, there has been much research into why MPs have adopted an active
constituency orientation (Cain et al. 1987, chap. 3; Searing 1985,
376-77), but this study reflects a different emphasis. It does not focus
on the MPs' orientation nor ask whether they are more interested in
Westminster or in the constituency. Rather, it examines constituency
service from the viewpoints of both the MP and local actors, asking
what factors determine the nature of their interactions. Our analysis is
necessarily qualitative and speculative, but some plausible factors include
the partisan control of the councils in the constituencies, territorial
heterogeneity, the number of MPs that represent the district(s) in
which the constituency lies and their parliamentary position, and electoral
competition in the district.
Partisan Control of Council
A critical factor influencing the MPs' interactions with local officials
in the constituency is whether or not the member's party controls
the local council. If it does, then the MP can count on more assistance
and cooperation in helping to resolve local problems that are brought to
his or her attention. If the local council is instead dominated by the opposition,
then cooperation is likely to give way to competition. As an example
of a cooperative arrangement, one Labour MP described his
relationship with a Labour district as follows: "On the level that I work
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
there is close identity and shared ideology. All have a vested interest in
each other's survival. There is a close identity of views."
When an MP of an opposition party raises questions about a
local council or tries to resolve local cases, there are unavoidable tensions.
It is not possible to carry out these activities without at least implicit
criticism of the local council, and local councillors are not
inclined to quietly accept such criticism from an influential member o
the opposite party, especially if this member seems to be motivated by
the desire for publicity. A Labour councillor described an activist MP o
another party as follows: "He is a total opportunist. He claims responsibility
for things over which he could not have any influence." This MP
reported that the local council prohibited the housing officer from tak
ing cases referred by parliamentary candidates during an election pe
riod, but that his opponent, who was a councillor, had colleagues to help
him with his cases. Several of the local councillors we spoke to said tha
if the MP were of another party they would try to put him on the spot.
One councillor indicated that if the MP were of another party he would
"try to trip him up" and would "write letters to cause him embarrassment"
and that when he got replies he would "release part of it to the
press." Another said that he would "try and bypass him unless I had a
real stinko of a case and could embarrass him."
To resolve cases under an opposition council, an MP must work
through local bureaucrats primarily. While the bureaucracy will treat
his requests fairly, the MP will tend to be less effective for not having
assistance from local councillors. Since his party is in the minority,
more constituents may turn to him rather than to his party councillors,
because he is more visible and he may be thought to be more effective.
He may in fact still be effective in getting things resolved by the local
council since, as one party worker noted, the other party "will go out of
the way to solve problems to keep our party from picking up votes based
on those problems."5 The issue of local partisanship is particularly
acute in seats in which there is a great deal of electoral competition.
MPs in competitive areas are expected to help discredit the council majority
when it is controlled by the opposition.
Territorial Heterogeneity
Where there are different interests within a constituency, an MP
may have to focus his activities on one group or one part of the constituency
more than another. There is always the danger that some part of the
district will then feel slighted. Sometimes, territorial concerns coincide
with partisanship. For instance, a Labour MP in our sample represented
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British MPs
an area with two local councils, one dominated by his party and the other
by the Conservatives. His attention and activity was directed almost entirely
toward the Labour area. He openly told the Conservative council
that a Conservative MP would be of more help to them.
In a constituency where there were major town-gown cleavages,
the Conservative MP, who appreciated the prestige that association
with the university brought, favored-and was seen to favoruniversity
interests over those of the rest of the city. This favoritism did
not increase his popularity with his party but seemed to provide him
with enough Liberal votes to continue winning his marginal seat. In yet
another constituency, the smaller of two districts felt slighted. Finally,
in a variation on the territorial theme, a minor party MP represented a
working-class city. His party had four councillors on the county council,
but they all represented areas that were more rural and conservative. In
spite of belonging to the same party, they were unable to work together
smoothly, because they represented different types of constituencies.
Number of MPs in a District
Where there are territorial differences, one MP formally represents
several distinct areas or interests within a constituency. In the
cases now to be considered, two or more MPs represent the same area.
Several of the local councils and all of the counties in our sample were
represented by more than one MP. One local council was represented by
four MPs and one county by eight. When these MPs were from different
parties, members of the dominant party developed a favored relationship
with the district. One influential councillor commented on the difference
between an MP in his city who belonged to his party and
another who did not: "W ... is not a truthful person. He tells individuals
that these are district council problems and that they should go see
the district councillors. He lays problems at my door... With R... it is
a close relationship. He phones me for information and I can tell him
the answer from the top of my head and he can get right back to his client.
He has fortnightly surgeries and I often attend." Nonetheless, MPs
from different parties will tend to collaborate on constituency-wide
projects, since no one can afford to be viewed as opposing the broader
interests of the constituency.
Electoral Competitiveness
The marginality of a seat was a major factor in increasing the
member activity in the constituency and hence the potential for tension
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
with local officials. While scholars may debate how large an effect constituency
service has on elections (Cain et al. 1987, 80-84, chap. 7;
Searing 1985, 372-77), all of the MPs in our sample felt that constituency
activity did make a difference, with estimates in our sample ranging
from 500 to 3,000 votes. A Conservative MP credited his reelection,
in spite of an unfavorable redistricting, to his constituency activities.
The three most active members in our sample occupied seats that either
had been recently occupied by another party or demographically
should have been. The fourth most active MP was being redistricted out
of his seat; a new district had absorbed much of his constituency, and he
had to compete for selection with another MP for the new seat. In spite
of his opponent's more favorably perceived ideological stance, the
more active MP won the selection largely because of his constituency
work. A CEO commented on one of the least active MPs: "There is a
joint development committee that determines the industrial future of
this town. It spends ?20 million. H... belongs there, but he never show
up. It is a major focal point. In a marginal seat, this could never tak
place." Constituency work, then, is seen as important for both selectio
and election. In addition, members of minor parties see it as an impor
tant tool for establishing and differentiating their parties from Conservative
and Labour. The electoral incentive is the engine that drives th
local concerns of MPs and local competition with county and district
councillors.
However, electoral competitiveness is important in a second
sense; namely, the competition below the parliamentary level for control
of the local council also has an important impact on MPconstituency
relations. A highly competitive electoral situation at the
district level can lead to greater interparty hostility. In that case, the MP
may be drawn into the fray-especially, as we observed earlier, if the opposite
party controls the council. Even if the constituency seat is safe,
the MP may be expected to help party colleagues discredit the opposition
party's council. The politically astute MP cannot afford to alienate
fellow party members (including councillors) by trying to stay above the
fray, especially when many party members feel that control of the local
council is more important than control of the constituency seat. In
short, there may be more than one electoral incentive governing MPconstituency
relations.
Summary and Conclusion
MPs have a rich and varied schedule of activities in their constituencies.
Many of these activities bring them into contact with local
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British MPs
authorities and, for that reason, can create tensions as well. For the
most active MPs in this study, local casework made up a large part of
their constituency activity. Casework, we argued, is an indivisible
credit-claiming activity over which members and local councillors
sometimes fight. Other kinds of constituency service-projects,
especially-are potentially divisible credit-claiming activities and less
frequently cause conflicts. Still other activities ensure the member's
visibility in the district or maintain the member's party ties and have
nothing to do with credit claiming at all. While a number of factors affect
variations in member-constituency relations, the most notable
were the electoral competitiveness of both the local council and the parliamentary
seat and partisan control of the local council.
MPs' local contacts are more likely to be with councillors and
officials than are those of their counterparts in the U.S. Congress. The
local councils provide many services that affect the MPs' constituents,
and MPs are looked to as ombudsmen when problems in the provisions
of these services arise. Moreover, in Great Britain, elected officials at
both the local and the parliamentary level are more closely tied to the
local party and therefore to each other. These party ties, more than anything
else, mean that MPs' relations with local authorities are not likely
to be neutral: they will be either accommodating or acrimonious. Interparty
cooperation is less common than in the United States.
Tensions between an MP and local councillors and officials
most often surfaced on the issue of local casework and were most
likely to occur in constituencies where the MP was highly active and
where at least one local council was controlled by the opposition
party. These were also the districts and constituencies that were
electorally most competitive. Other factors may contribute to tensions
as well. The MP who is not active or who does not live in the
constituency will generate some ill feeling, as will an MP who concentrates
his activity on one part of the constituency to the detriment
of another. Claiming credit that rightfully belongs to some other
local politician can also create animosity, as will failing to maintain
adequate liaison on cases with councillors.
Tensions with local bureaucrats were never as great as with
local councillors and rarely were they played out in public. Officials
paid at least lip service to the concept of neutral competence and tried
to appear to be fair to all MPs. There was no doubt, however, that they
well knew where political power lay. MPs for their part recognized the
limits to bureaucratic power. While they were not above taking cheap
shots, their targets were the political, not the bureaucratic, powers.
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J. Vincent Buck and Bruce E. Cain
Consequently, animosities between MPs and local bureaucrats were
restrained.
The presence of tension did not rule out cooperation. When it
came to supporting local councils' request for aid on projects, there
were few instances reported of MPs refusing to cooperate. And MPs of
different parties seemed to be able to work together on projects. Tensions
will inevitably exist in competitive situations, where there is likely
to be electoral payoff in challenging the opposition, but tension of this
sort may nonetheless cause a higher level of responsiveness to the concerns
and problems of constituents.
J. Vincent Buck is Professor of Political Science, California
State University-Fullerton, Fullerton, California 92634. Bruce E. Cain
is Professor of Political Science, University of California-Berkeley,
Berkeley, California 94720.
NOTES
We would like to thank Gordon Hands and Gillian Peele for comments that
they made on earlier versions of this paper. This research was partially supported by a California
State University, Fullerton President's Research Grant.
1. Cain and his colleagues found one MP who had apparently assisted a constituent
with getting a toaster fixed (1987, 57).
2. While Cain et al. (1987, 38) found that MPs were more likely to say that protecting
the district was a more important role than helping people, in fact they were far
more restricted in that role than their American counterparts. Cain et al. feel that the traditional
pork barrel function of congressmen is virtually nonexistent for MPs (1987, 39)
and that MPs are far less likely to be involved in helping local interests and governments
find out about available grants and services (1987, 72ff). Searing (1985, 355) finds that
only 15% of his constituency-oriented backbenchers are predominately "local promoters"
in contrast with 75% who are oriented toward solving individuals' problems.
3. Searing (1985, 370) argues that MPs are not expected to reflect the national
policy views of their constituents. While this may to some extent be true there is more
pressure to be in line on issues of local significance and there is also pressure to reflect the
dominant views of the local party.
4. On re-selection see Cain et al. (1987, 86-88); Criddle (1984,219-26); Bochel
and Denver (1983).
5. Cain and Ritchie (1982, 75-76) found a similar situation with the Conservative
council in Hemel Hempstead.
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