EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Electrifying Europe : the power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks Citation for published version (APA): Lagendijk, V. C. (2008). Electrifying Europe : the power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks Amsterdam: Aksant DOI: 10.6100/IR638264 DOI: 10.6100/IR638264 Document status and date: Published: 01/01/2008 Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of Record (includes final page, issue and volume numbers) Please check the document version of this publication: • A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement: www.tue.nl/taverne Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at: openaccess@tue.nl providing details and we will investigate your claim. Download date: 11. Sep. 2019 Electrifying Europe Electrifyingeurope.indd 1 Foundation for the History of Technology & Aksant Academic Publishers Technology and European History Series Ruth Oldenziel and Johan Schot (Eindhoven University of Technology) Series Editors The Technology and European History series seeks to present scholarship about the role of technology in European history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The series focuses on how technical communities, nation-states, businesses, social groups, and other actors have contested, projected, performed, and reproduced multiple representations of Europe while constructing and using a range of technologies. The series understands Europe both as an intellectual construct and material practice in relation to spaces inside as well as outside Europe. In particular, the series invites studies focusing on Europe's (former) colonies and on the two new superpowers of the twentieth century: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Interdisciplinary work is welcomed. The series will offer a platform for scholarly works associated with the Tensions of Europe Network to find their way to a broader audience. For more information on the network and the series, see: www.tensionsofeurope.eu Books in series 1. Judith Schueler, Materialising identity. The co-construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss national identity (Amsterdam, June 2008) 2. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks (Amsterdam, August 2008) 3. Frank Schipper, Driving Europe. Building Europe on roads in the twentieth century (Amsterdam, September 2008) 4. Adri Albert de la Bruheze and Ruth Oldenziel (editors), Manufacturing technology: manufacturing consumers. The making of Dutch consumer society (Amsterdam, Autumn 2008) Foundation for the History of Technology The Foundation for the History of Technology (SHT) aims to develop and communicate knowledge that increases our understanding of the critical role of technology in the history of the Western world. Since 1988 the foundation has been supporting scholarly research in the history of technology. This has included large-scale national and international research programs and numerous individual projects, many in collaboration with Eindhoven University of Technology. The SHT also coordinates the international research network Tensions of Europe: Technology and the Making of Europe. For more information see: www.histech.nl Electrifyingeurope.indd 2 7-8-2008 14:27:04 Electrifying Europe The power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, prof.dr.ir. C.J. van Duijn, voor een commissie aangewezen door het College voor Promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 30 September 2008 om 16.00 uur door Vincent Christiaan Lagendijk geboren te Delft Electrifyingeurope.indd 3 Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor: prof.dr. J.W. Schot Copromotor: dr.ir. G.P.J. Verbong The research has been made possible by: Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) This publication is made possible by: Fondation Electricite de France Stichting Unger-Van Brerofonds Foundation for the History of Technology Typesetting and design: Ellen Bouma, Alkmaar, the Netherlands Cover image: Copyright NASA, collection Visible Earth (http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/). Electrifyingeurope.indd 4 7-8-2008 14:27:04 5 Acknowledgements Writing a Ph.D, dissertation is commonly viewed as a long and lonely activity Indeed, I occasionally had troubles explaining to friends and family that spending six to eight hours a day poring over old papers, often several days in succession and away from home, can be interesting and entertaining. Yet on a daily basis I was hardly lonely I had fruitful interactions with colleagues, as my dissertation project was a part of the research program Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe (www.tie-project.nl). Conversations with Irene Anastasiadou, Sorinela Ciobica, and Suzanne Lommers have formed my thinking about my topic and source material. I particularly share many good memories with Frank Schipper; ranging from testing all the different cakes in the UN restaurant, and smelly cheeses in French freezers, to trying to finish our manuscripts in the New York Public Library. In Eindhoven our paths finally crossed, after living and studying in close proximity for quite some time. Alec Badenoch not only deserves credit for his editing work, but also for making me more aware of the importance of media in history. My two supervisors, Johan Schot and Geert Verbong, were influential as well. Geert was in particular important for getting the project on the track in the first year, and has been a critical reader of draft chapters. Johan introduced me to history of technology, and inspired me about the TIE project. He was a great motivator towards the end of the writing process. Both deserve credit for giving me relative liberty in doing research, and for taking that back at the right moment. Erik van der Vleuten has been something of a shadow supervisor, and provided valuable opinions and feedback. My other colleagues of the Eindhoven University of Technology and the Foundation for the History of Technology made up an inspiring working environment. Lidwien Hollanders-Kuipers and Roeslan Leontjevas were indispensable for their practical assistance. I thank Thomas Lindblad and Jeroen Touwen for showing me the job advertisement, which I would otherwise have missed. In 2004 the Fondation Electricite de France awarded me with a research grant, enabling me to expand the scope of my study. I thank them for their generous support, and in particular Yves Bouvier for his assistance on practical matters. I am Electrifyingeurope.indd 5 7-8-2008 14:27:04 Electrifying Europe Image drawn by Alec Badenoch for the TIE project website. grateful to the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT) for their financial support to visit annual meetings, and for naming me International Scholar for 2005-2007. SHOT as well as the Tensions of Europe network have been important places of interaction, where I could - so to speak - meet the people I read. I profited in particular from discussions with Arne Kaijser from practically the beginning of my project. At the Tensions summer school in Bordeaux, the enthusiasm of Christophe Bouneau gave me the indication that the book was progressing along. Tom Misa gave useful advice in a writing masterclass. I also benefited from the Ph.D, course of the Dutch N.W. Posthumus Institute, and my fellow participants. At the ESTER seminar in Brescia I received useful comments by Ben Gales and Peter Scholiers. My research was done in a number of archives and libraries, and I am grateful to the helpful staff I encountered. I in particular wish to thank the following: Joceline Collonval of the Historical Archives of the European Commission, Francoise Peemans of the Belgian Diplomatic Archive, Anne-Marie Smith and Johannes Geurts at NATO Archives, and František Cahyna, Olivier Feix and Marcel Bial at UCTE. Special thanks go out to Bernhardine Pejovic (League of Nations Archives), Electrifyingeurope.indd 6 7-8-2008 14:27:05 Acknowledgements 7 Esther Trippel-Ngai, Sylvie Carlon-Riera, and Maria Sanchez (all United Nations Geneva Archives). They made long stays in Geneva comfortable and entertaining. Several people were helpful in helping me to locate sources, including Waqar Zaidi, Liane Ranieri, Yves Berthelot, Jan-Anno Schuur, E. A. Tyurina, Stellan Andersson, Petr Veselky, and Marian Rose-Heineman. Walter Fremuth filled many voids I could not found answered by other sources. I very much enjoyed his hospitality during a two-day interview on the outskirts of Vienna, in close proximity to former East-West transmission lines. My research has brought me to many places over the last years, but it always brought me home as well. Here, parents, parents-in-law, my brother, and my friends have always been supportive and helpful. But "home" was not only a comfortable place to work. It also was a place where science hardly mattered. Irma, later joined by Sander, are my connection to contemporary life, and brought me love and joy. At home, history did not so much matter; only the future did. And it continues to do so. Oss, June 30, 2008 Electrifyingeurope.indd 7 0 7-8-2008 14:27:05 0 # Electrifyingeurope.indd 8 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:27:05 Table of contents Acknowledgements 5 List of illustrations 11 Abbreviations 13 1 Introduction: In search of European roots 15 Histories of electrification 20 Towards a history of the European system 25 Unpacking the European system 30 Sources and limitations 33 Structure 36 2 "Opening the doors to a revolution" 39 An industry expands 44 Postwar rationalization and regulation 51 International organization in the field of electricity 57 The League of Nations and electricity transmission 61 Conclusions 66 3 Planning a European network, 1927-34 69 European unification and electricity 70 The European project taking shape 76 Imagining Europe electrically 80 The League and a European electricity network 86 Albert Thomas' European public works 90 Responses to the plan 96 The demise of the projects 100 Conclusions 104 Electrifyingeurope.indd 9 10 4 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 107 Wartime and postwar ideas of Europe 109 Prep aring for war 114 Recovery initiatives 119 U.S. internationalization opposed 124 The TECAID mission 131 European ideas on international operation 137 Towards a Western European power pool 143 The UCPTE 146 Further regional grouping 151 Conclusions 154 5 Securing European cooperation, 1951-2001 157 U. S. containment strategy 158 An all-European approach: the ECE 164 Bottlenecks and Battle Act 168 Converging interests: Yugoslavia 174 Interconnecting regions 180 The path of least resistance: Austria and Yugoslavia 190 Uniting Europe 198 Creating a European Market 204 Conclusions 210 6 Conclusion: From cooperation to competition 213 The roots of the European system 214 Building the Europ ean system 217 Epilogue 220 Sources and bibliography 223 Archival sources 223 Interview 224 Newspaper and magazine articles 225 Published documentation 225 Scholarly books, articles and dissertations 230 Summary 245 Biography 247 Electrifyingeurope.indd 10 11 List of illustrations Tables 2.1 Transmission distances and losses per voltage 40 2.2 Electricity imports and exports from and to Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden, 1925-1930, in kWh 45 2.3 Electricity generation (incl, autoproducers) in Europe in GWh, 1932-37 55 3.1 European network proposals in size and costs (including plants) 82 3.2 Unemployment in European countries, 1928-34 (in thousands of men) 91 3.3 Electricity exports relative to national production, indexed (base year = 1925) 99 3.4 Electricity imports relative to national consumption, indexed (base year = 1925) 99 3.5 Electricity exports as percentage of national production 100 4.1 1938 French National Interconnection Program (length of lines in km) 115 4.2 Electricity production in selected European countries, 1939-1945 (in GWh) 119 4.3 Membership of the OEEC, CMEA & UN 123 4.4 Planned ECA support for electricity equipment, 1948-1951 (in millions of US$) 126 4.5 The International Program in figures 128 4.6 Interconnections between TECAID countries, 1949 135 4.7 Imports and exports in TECAID region in 1949, in GWh 136 4.8 The Emergency Program in figures 143 4.9 Electricity production in selected European countries, in GWh (1938-1951) 153 4.10 ECA Industrial projects expenditure for power facilities, 1947-1951 (in millions of US$) 154 4.11 ECA approvals for withdrawals of Counterpart funds, 1948-1951 (in millions of US$) 155 5.1 The Yugoslav Five-Year Plan 1947-1951 (investments in millions of Dinars) 175 5.2 The Yugoslav grid between East and West, 1955-1980 198 Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 11 7-8-2008 14:25:21 12 Electrifying Europe Figures 0.1 Image drawn by Alec Badenoch for the TIE project website. 7 1.1 Lights out at the Colosseum in Rome. 16 2.1 Swiss, French, and German interconnections around in 1926 42 2.2 The RWE system in 1928 48 2.3 Louis Loucheur, 1872-1931 52 2.4 Group portrait of CIGRE's first conference in 1921 57 2.5 The basic structure of the League of Nations 62 3.1 Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa (in black) in the world 73 3.2 Headers in Notre Temps 75 3.3 George Viel's 400 kV network for Europe 81 3.4 Oskar Oliven's scheme for a European super power system 83 3.5 Albert Thomas, 1878-1932 93 4.1 ECAs international power plants 127 4.2 Europe's electrical engineers 137 4.3 Berni's plan for a European network (1949) 138 4.4 Selmo's European interconnections (1949) 139 4.5 Total electricity production and electricity exchange relative to ^ total production in the UCPTE zone, 1953-1965 150 ^ 5.1 U.S. economic and military aid, 1948-1954 (in millions of US$) 163 5.2 Austria's electricity network in 1946 170 5.3 Yougelexport: Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria and Western Germany 176 5.4 Electricity systems in continental Europe in 1969,110 kV and above 182 5.5 SUDEL grid in 1970 183 5.6 Existing and planned cross-border interconnections in Central Europe in 1963 185 5.7 Austrian electricity imports from CMEA, 1968-1982 (in GWh) 193 5.8 Cross-border HVDC connections and 400-750 kV lines in Central and Eastern Europe, existing and proposed in 1985 195 5.9 European power pools and HVDC links in 1985 200 Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 12 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:21 0 Abbreviations AC alternating current AEG Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft BBC Brown Boveri & Cie CDO Central Dispatch Organisation CEEC Committee of European Economic Co-operation CEEU Commission for Enquiry on European Union CEQ Committee on Electric Questions CIGRE Conference Internationale des Grands Reseaux de Transport d'Ener- gie Electriques ä Tres Haute Tension CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls CoEP Committee on Electric Power CPTE Coordination de la Production et du Transport de l'Energie electrique CSCE Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe DC direct current ECA Economic Cooperation Administration ECONAD Committee of Economic Advisers ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EECE Emergency Economic Committee for Europe ERP European Recovery Programme EU European Union EUROPEL Compagnie Europeenne pour Entreprises d'Electricite et d'Utilite Publique FRG Federal Republic of Germany GDR German Democratic Republic GNP gross national product GWh gigawatt per hour HV high voltage HVDC high voltage direct current Hz Hertz IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICC International Chamber of Commerce Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 13 0 14 Electrifying Europe IEC International Electrotechnical Commission ILO International Labour Organisation IMI International Management Institute IPS Interconnected Power Systems kV kilovolt KWh kilowatt per hour LoN League of Nations LTS Large Technical Systems MW megawatt NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OAPEC Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OCT Organisation for Communications and Transit OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation OSR Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe PNJ Pennsylvania-New Jersey Interconnection PUP Public Utilities Panel RWE Rheinisch-Westfälischen Elektrizitätswerks AG SHAEF Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force SOFINA Societe Financiere de Transports et d'Entreprises Industrielles SSR Socialistic Soviet Republic TECAID Technical Assistance TSO transmission network operator UCPTE Union pour la Coordination de la Production et du Transport de i'Electricite UCTE Union for the Coordination of Transportation of Electricity UFIPTE Union Franco-Iberique pour la Coordination de la Production et du Transport d'Electricite UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNIPEDE Union Internationale des Producteurs et Distributeurs d'Energie Electrique UNRRA United Nations Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration WEC World Energy Council WEWA Wasserkraft- und Elektrizitätswirtschafts Amtes WPC World Power Conference Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 14 7-8-2008 14:25:21 Chapter 1 Introduction In search of European roots Gales blazed across the Alpine region as usual during autumn. In the early morning of September 28, 2003 a severe storm forced a tree to sway near the Italian-Swiss border. Unfortunately, the branches tripped a power line. The load of the disturbed line is automatically divided among other cables. These transmission lines were already utilized close to their full capacity. To relieve them from excessive load, the Italian transmission network operator (TSO) decided to cut down electricity imports by 300 MW. Twenty-four minutes later another tree hit a high voltage line. This second incident overloaded remaining transmission lines between Italy and Switzerland. In order to contain the problem, Italy was isolated from the European grid of the Union for Coordination of Transportation of Electricity (UCTE) - encompassing the cooperation between 23 European TSOs. This separation from the UCTE network caused a frequency instability in Italy, which eventually led to the collapse of the domestic system.1 Less than two minutes after Italy's isolation from the European interconnected network the entire Italian peninsula was deprived of electrical power. The largest blackout in Italian history was a fact. All over the country trains came to a halt and traffic lights went off. In Rome, where the annual all-night festival Notte Bianca was taking place, plunged into darkness. The Roman subway system came to halt, trapping thousands of passengers. The Vatican put backup generators into action, enabling the pope to proclaim new cardinals on early Sunday morning. An ongoing liver transplant had to be aborted and postponed in a Trieste hospital. Only after half a day the whole of Italy was once again supplied. The blackout not only disrupted Italian society, but also led to the death of at least four people.2 The UCTE immediately appointed a committee to evaluate the blackout. Not awaiting the report, various actors began to search for the roots of the blackout, and initially pointed fingers at each other across the Alps. An Italian newspaper 1 This account is based upon the UCTE reports concerning the blackout. UCTE, Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the 28 September 2003 Blackout in Italy (Brussels: UCTE, 2004), http://www.ucte. org/_library/otherreports/20040427_UCTE_I C_Final_report.pdf. 2 "Blackout, tre morti in Puglia, Sicilia ancora al buio," La Repubblica, September 28, 2003, http://www. repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/cronaca/blackitalia/citta/citta.html. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 15 16 Electrifying Europe Figure 1.1 - Lights out at the Colosseum in Rome. Source: API Reporters reported how Swiss and French authorities blamed Italy for not handling the crisis properly3 In response, the Italian TSO claimed that their inability to restore control over the system was not the root of the blackout. Italy's TSO argued that the tree starting the chain of events was on Swiss soil.4 The Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung printed the response of the Swiss TSO, which admitted that the blackout indeed originated on Swiss soil.5 Yet it stressed that Italy's domestic handling of the situation was not their area of responsibility. Swiss authorities stressed that national TSOs themselves are "in the last place responsible for the supply within their own boundaries".6 Despite these conflicting opinions on the origins of the incident, a consensus seemed to exist on structural issues at the root of the blackout. These primarily concerned the Italian position within the European interconnected network. The 3 "Blackout, per Parigi e Berna la responsabilitä e italiana," La Repubblica, September 28, 2003, http:// www.repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/cronaca/blackitalia/cause/cause.html. 4 "Black out, Marzano apre inchiesta Troveremo presto i responsabili'," La Repubblica, September 28, 2003, http://www.repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/cronaca/blackitalia/marzano/marzano.html. 5 H. Blattmann, "Zu früh für Schuldzuweisungen," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 28, 2003, 13. 6 Blattmann, "Hochspannung zwischen Schweiz und Italien. Bericht zur Ursache des Blackouts," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 28, 2003, 13. Original German text is "letztlich selber verantwortlich sein für Versorgung innerhalb der eigenen Grenzen". Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 16 7-8-2008 14:25:22 Introduction - In search of European roots director of the French TSO identified Italy's strong dependence on imported electricity as a key problem. In other words, Italian reliance upon electricity imports made it a weak link within the European electricity network.7 The capacity of transmission lines between Italy and its neighboring countries thus urgently needed expansion. This view of a "risky" interdependence was shared by Italy's ministry of economic affairs.8 The leading Italian employers' federation Confindustria not only resented the high electricity prices in Italy due to its external interdependence. It also saw the blackout as an upshot of a long-lacking clear national energy policy.9 Not just national TSOs and policies were subjected to criticism. A commentator in Le Monde regarded the creation of the European electricity market by the European Union (EU) as uneven and lacking sufficient regulation.10 EU Energy Directives resulted in increasing international commercial electricity flows. Yet this was not matched by an increase in cross-border transmission capacity. In addition, Italian and French procedures for handling international flows were not harmonized. Switzerland, a key country for electricity transits in Europe, did not even have to comply with EU-regulation as a EU non-member.11 This negative view upon the formation of a European electricity market formation was not shared by the responsible EU Commissioner, however. In November 2003, Loyola de Palacio - EU Commissioner for Transport and Energy - stated in a speech that "recent blackout events in Europe cannot sensibly be blamed on the market opening process".12 To her, the events in Switzerland and Italy were due to a lack of communication between TSOs which is "unacceptable whether or not the electricity market is open or not".13 In April 2004 UCTE released its final report. According to the report the blackout had both national and European roots. UCTE endorsed the view that Italian and Swiss TSOs responded without sufficient urgency. Similarly, Italy's inability to cope with the isolation from the UCTE-grid was acknowledged by the report. UCTE also placed the blackout within the context of the development 7 Pascal Galinier, "Les risques et faiblesses d'un reseau sature. La panne en Italie souligne la fragilite de l'Europe de lelectricite," Le Monde, September 30, 2003. 8 "Black out, Marzano." 9 "Confindustria: 'Lelettricita e emergenza nazionale'," La Repubblica, September 28, 2003, http://www. repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/cronaca/blackitalia/confind/confind.html. 10 Galinier, "Les risques." 11 Ibid. 12 Loyola de Palacio, "Challenges Towards a Unified European Energy Market" (presented at the Round-table on energy, Nyenrode, The Netherlands, November 13, 2003), 3. She refers to blackouts in the plural as in the same year disruptions occurred in London (August 28) as well as in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark (September 23). Earlier that year, a lengthy blackout disrupted life in north-eastern United States and south-eastern Canada (August 14). 13 Ibid., 13 Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 17 Electrifying Europe of a European electricity market, resulting in an increase of cross-border flows. According to UCTE, these were "out of the scope of the original system design". To them the interconnected system in Europe was built as a "backbone for the security of supply".14 This point of view was endorsed by EURELECTRIC, an organization representing the European electricity industry. It equally recognized the large amounts of commercial flows as one of the main causes of the power failure.15 It is not my intention to make a detailed anatomy of this blackout. Rather, I want to use this example to shed light upon the structure of the electricity system in Europe. The various responses to the blackout suggest that national systems are the main building blocks of the European system. While there are three coordination centers in the UCTE area, there is no centrally controlled European network.16 A EU policy directed towards an internal electricity market did not change this. Following the Italian blackout, Le Monde concluded that the European system remains governed by national regulators and managers, who often act according to national priorities.17 On the other hand, the blackout also indicates that national TSOs do not have total control of the domestic electricity supply. Incidents outside Italy triggered a sequence of events which led to a breakdown of its electricity system. If the Italian network had not been isolated, electricity supply in other European countries could have been affected. This is to say that electricity networks in Europe are to a very large extent interwoven, technologically, institutionally and economically. Countries rely on their neighbors, not only in terms of import and export, but also to meet technical requirements in order not to jeopardize transnational system integrity. With regard to the European electricity system - the subject of this inquiry -, one might be inclined to link its development to the formation of an internal electricity market under the aegis of the EU. This is nevertheless not the case. The real first step towards a common electricity market was a result of the Single European Act signed in 1985. Yet the development of the interconnected European network is the result of a development which already started in the 1920s, and is not directly connected to the history of the EU and its predecessors. In Interwar years the construction of a transnational electricity network was already conceived as a specific European project. European network-building gained further momentum after WWII, and came to include most European countries by 1995. 14 UCTE, Final Report, 3 15 Union of the Electricity Industry-EURELECTRIC, Power Outages in 2003. Task Force Power Outages (Brussels: EURELECTRIC, June 2004), 13. 16 The centers are in Braunweiler (Germany), Laufenburg (Switzerland), and Belgrade (Serbia). See http:// www.ucte.org/aboutus/tsoworld/systemoperation/ (accessed November 1, 2007). 17 Galinier, "Les risques." Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 18 fift) 7-8-2008 14:25:22 Introduction - In search of European roots The process of network integration in Europe has largely escaped the eye of historians of European integration. Studies of European integration have primarily dealt with the development of the European Community since 1951, and more specifically with issues of political and economic cooperation. A few specialized studies of the development of a common energy policy - including electricity - are available, but their results are hardly included in the main textbooks on European integration.18 These studies mainly focus on the role of the European Commission or the interplay between nation-states and Community bodies, and ignore the work of other international actors such as the UCPTE and engineering organizations. This neglect is remarkable because as historians Badenoch and Fickers have argued that technological infrastructures might well be perceived as the "essence of European integration". Not only do they provide the material basis for flows of goods, people, capital and services which the EU and its predecessors sought to create, but they have also been mobilized as symbols and metaphors of European integration.19 European integration history, primarily centering upon the development of the EU and its predecessors, neglects the integrating effects of networks. Van der Vleuten and Kaijser have noted in their literature overview these histories "fail to analyze [the shaping and entanglement of infrastructures] with broader historical developments".20 For the study of the neglected role of infrastructure, and more broadly technology, in the European integration process, Thomas Misa and Johan Schot proposed to use the concept of hidden integration.21 In a more recent paper Schot explains that "hidden" not only refers to the neglect by historians, but also to the explicit strategy of engineers to "technify" discussions on European 18 This is the case in for example N.J.D. Lucas, Energy and the European Communities (London: Europa Publications, 1977); Stephen Padgett, "The Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization," Journal of Common Market Studies 30, no. 1 (1992): 53-75; Janne Haaland Matlary, Energy Policy in the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Susanne K. Schmidt, Liberalisierung in Europa. Die Rolle der Europäischen Kommission (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1998); Padgett, "Between Synthesis and Emulation: EU Policy Transfer in the Power Sector," Journal of European Public Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 227-245; and most recently Julie Cailleau, "Energy: from Synergies to Merger," in The European Commission, 1958-1972. History and Memories, ed. Michel Dumoulin (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 471-490. 19 Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, "Introduction: Untangling Infrastructures and Europe: Mediations, Events, Scales," in Europe Materializing? Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (London: Palgrave, forthcoming). 20 Erik Van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, "Networking Europe," History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 30. They made a similar point in their "Prologue and Introduction: Transnational Networks and the Shaping of Contemporary Europe," in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Van der Vleuten and Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006), 7. 21 Thomas J. Misa and Johan Schot, "Inventing Europe: Technology and the hidden integration of Europe. Introduction," History and technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-22. The notion of hidden integration was first introduced by Johan Schot as a core concept in Johan Schot, "Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe: Project proposal," Transnational Infrastructures of Europe Working Documents Series, no.l (Eindhoven: Eindhoven University of Technology), http://www.tie-project.nl/publications/ pdf/Proposal.pdf. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 19 0 20 Electrifying Europe integration in order to reduce the influence of political and non-experts actors as much as possible.22 This is not to imply that the aims and stakes of engineers were free of political content. In many instances they saw technological solutions as an alternative to a political path, or as a continuation of politics by technical means. This study can thus be perceived as an inquiry into the hidden integration of the European electricity system. In addition to fill a gap in the literature, this book also sheds light on the intentions, ideas and strategies of engineers, various companies and their international organizations. The inquiry pursues the following questions: 1) How, when and why did the notion of a European electricity system take root? 2) How did it develop throughout the decades up to the end of the twentieth century, and how did it affect the actual transnational network construction? 3) Which actors played an influential role? In the remainder of this introduction, I first present an overview of relevant approaches and findings present in the existing historiography on the development of electricity networks. This is followed by a section that discusses available findings specifically on the European electricity system. Subsequently, I discuss the approach I use to answer my main questions, and I elaborate on the sources used. Finally, in the last section I introduce the structure of the book. Histories of electrification In the scholarly field of history of technology there is a substantial literature about processes of electrification and network-building. This section surveys this field, and seeks to identify which insights and concepts are useful for this study. I will depart from Thomas Hughes' ground-breaking work, which inspired other scholars to write mainly national histories of electrification. In Networks of Power, Hughes compared electricity network development in Berlin, Chicago, and London.23 His thoughts inspired a new field preoccupied with the study of so-called Large 22 Johan Schot, "Transnational Infrastructures and European Integration," in Europe Materializing?, ed. Badenoch and Fickers I profited from discussion on the implications of this concept for my thesis with Johan Schot. Also see the recent Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, "Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks," Journal of Modern European History 7, no. 2 (forthcoming 2008), 196-217. 23 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 0 0 Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 20 0 7-8-2008 14:25:22 Introduction - In search of European roots Technical Systems (LTS).24 Hughes defined electricity networks as socio-technical systems including technological components, but also institutional and organizational ones, as well as natural resources, and legislation.25 These systems were constructed by so-called system builders, which could be either people or institutions.26 They were guided by a number of principles. Two important ones that also play a role in the building of international connections were load factor and economic mix. Since electricity cannot easily be stored, network operators sought to use generating capacity to a maximum at all time, and hence create a high load. A high load factor thus reflects high usage of the systems equipment and is a measure of efficiency.27 Economic mix refers to the optimal use of a combination of various energy sources in the system in order to create economic advantages and increase the system reliability. For this reason system builders sought, for example, to use hydroelectric plants or mine-based lignite-fired plants, also when they were located in another country.28 Hughes attributes much importance to these two concepts. He noted in Networks that "[i]f a would-be Darwin of the technological world is looking for laws analogous to the environmental forces that operate in the world of natural selection, the economic principles of load factor and economic mix are likely candidates".29 In American Genesis Hughes takes his argument about the importance of system-builders one step further.30 He argues that large technical systems were central in the creation of the modern technological nation. Hughes articulates a 20th century history for the United States that logically follows the growth of systems. First, he 24 Following Networks more systematic inquiries into the theoretical meanings of LTS have been made, including by Hughes himself, as well as the application of LTS concepts on historical developments other than electrification. Most notable are Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T.J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Renate Mayntz and Thomas P. Hughes, eds., The Development of Large Technological Systems (Frankfurt am Mainz: Campus Verlag, 1988); and Olivier Coutard, ed., The Governance of Large Technical Systems (London: Routledge, 1999). For an overview of two decades of LTS research see Van der Vleuten, "Understanding Network Societies: Two Decades of Large Technical System studies," in Networking Europe, ed. Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, 279-314. 25 Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technical Systems," in The Social Construction, ed. Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch. 26 Ibid., 51-52. System-builders, implementers of technological innovations within an institutional and cultural framework, are not necessarily people. Due to up-scaling and increasing complexity of systems since the First World War, the system-building process gradually shifted from inventor-entrepreneurs to organizations and governments. After WWII, European institutions played a significant role as well. Also see Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects that Changed the Modern World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 27 Hughes, Networks, 218-221. 28 Ibid., 366-367. 29 Ibid., 462. 30 Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (London: Viking, 1989). Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 21 0 22 Electrifying Europe discusses the invention of systems, then the spread of large systems, and finally the emergence of reactions to the systems. Over the last two decades, a wide variety of historical research on electrification has been inspired by the LTS approach. The majority of histories of electrification are from a national perspective.31 Most attention has gone to developments in the United States, and northern and western parts of Europe. To my knowledge, hardly any systematic accounts of Central and Eastern Europe are available - either in English or native languages.32 In both France and Italy large multi-volume historical accounts on electricity have been published.33 The role of the French Association pour l'histoire de lelectricite en France, which has sponsored conferences starting in 1983, has been important. Since that year it also published the Bulletin d'histoire de lelectricite, which appears twice a year.34 Thirteen colloquiums were organized between 1983 and 2002. Many focused primarily on French developments, but several conferences had explicit international perspectives.35 In general, most studies recognize and acknowledge the importance of the work of Hughes. Economic mix and load factor are regularly used to explain the 31 Examples of books based on dissertation research are Timo Myllyntaus, Electrifying Finland: The Transfer of a New Technology into a Late Industrialising Economy (London: ETLA, 1991); Jonathan Coo-persmith, The Electrification of Russia, 1880-1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Van der Vleuten, "Electrifying Denmark: A Symmetrical History of Central and Decentral Electricity Supply until 1970" (PhD diss., University of Aarhus, 1998). A good example of a multi-author is Ana Cardoso de Matos et al., A Electricidade em Portugal: Dosprimórdios ä 2\ia Guerra Mundial (Lisbon: Museu de Electricidade, 2004). For The Netherlands, see the chapters on Energy, edited by G.P.J. Verbong and other in: J.W. Schot, H.W. Lintsen, and A. Rip, eds., Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw, vol. 2, Delfstoffen, Energie, Chemie (Stichting Historie der Techniek, 2000). 32 One example is Ľudovít Hallon, "Systematic Electrification in Germany and in Four Central Europe States in the Interwar Period," ICON7 (2001): 135-147. Hallons article sketches the main outlines of electrification in the region, with a strong emphasis on German developments. His sources on Central Europe concern contemporary sources. More general studies of the region do point to the importance of electrification, but without going into detail or referring to more comprehensive publications. See for example Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 219 and 229. 33 In Italy the Storia dell'industria elettrica in Italia has appeared in five volumes (volume three comprises two books) starting in 1992. In France the Histoire generale de lelectricite en France was published in three volumes between 1991 and 1996. They also published a research guide which gives detailed information about journals, historical studies, and useful archives concerning the history of electricity in France. See Arnaud Berthonnet, Guide du chercheur en histoire de lelectricite, Editions La Mandragore (Paris, 2001). 34 In 2003 the name of the journal has been renamed Annales historiques de lelectricite, now published under the auspices of the Fondation Électricité de France. 35 Thirteen colloquiums were organised between 1983 and 2002. Many primarily focused on French developments, but several explicitly addressed international histories and perspectives. See for example Fa-bienne Cardot, ed., 1880-1980. Un siecle ďélectricité dans le monde: Actes du Premier colloque international d'histoire de lelectricite (Paris: Presses Universitaire s de France, 1987); and Monique Trédé, ed., Électricité et electrification dans le monde: Actes du deuxiéme colloque international d'histoire de lelectricite, organise par I'Association pour l'histoire de lelectricite en France, Paris, 3-6 juillet 1990 (Association pour l'histoire de lelectricite en France, 1992). Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 22 7-8-2008 14:25:22 Introduction - In search of European roots growth of systems. Yet Hughes emphasis on "natural" system growth has been criticized.36 Van der Vleuten has argued convincingly that the presupposed economic logic of an ever increasing scale cannot be upheld for the history of electrification in Denmark.37 Van der Vleuten showed that no Danish consensus existed on the economic superiority of a large scale electricity system. Decentralized systems coexisted with centralized systems for most of the 20th century.38 Complementary to Hughes' systems approach, another seminal work is Electrifying America by David Nye. He introduced the user and cultural perspective in the history of electrification. Although users are not central in this book, this branch of literature has led to useful conclusions that influenced my research. First, because it stressed that electricity network development was not "a 'natural' or 'neutral' process; everywhere it was shaped by complex, political, technical, ideological interaction".39 Second, because it shows the salience of ideological and cultural factors. Similar findings are put forward by various authors in the field of Alltagsgeschichte, which focused on the cultural history of electricity and its symbolism in daily life.40 All point to the importance of ideas and expectations that accompany and guide the construction of electricity systems. As we will see, such ideas also played an important role in building international connections in Europe. Other historians of electricity networks have shown that nationalism provided a stimulus for expanding networks and interconnecting systems. Often technological infrastructures were built to serve specific national socio-economic and political aims. Gabrielle Hecht discussed the notion of technopolitics in her work on French postwar identity in relation to nuclear technology, meaning "the strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody or enact political goals".41 36 See for example Joachim Radkau, "Zum ewiger Wachstum verdammt? Jugend und Alter grosstechnischer Systeme," in Technik ohne Grenzen, ed. Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges (Frankfurt am Mainz: Surhkamp, 1994), 50-106. 37 Van der Vleuten, "Electrifying." 38 Ibid., 327. Also see the recent Erik van der Vleuten and Rob Raven, "Lock-In and Change: Distributed Generation in Denmark in a Long-Term Perspective," Energy Policy 34, no. 18 (2006): 3739-3748. 39 Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 138-139. 40 Notable works include Beate Binder, Elektrifizierung ah Vision: Zur Symbolgeschichte einer Technik im Alltag (Tübingen: Vereinigung für Volkskunde, 1999); and also Coutard, "Imaginaire et developpement des reseaux techniques. Les apport de l'histoire de [electrification rurale en France et aux Etats-Unis," Reseaux 5, no. 109 (2001): 76-94. Also Kline's work on rural electrification in the United States is noteworthy in that respect. See Ronald R. Kline, Consumers in the Country. Technology and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 41 Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity After World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); and Hecht, "Technology, Politics and National Identity in France," in Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes, ed. Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2001), 256-257. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 23 24 Electrifying Europe In an inspiring paper, Mats Fridlund and Helmut Maier introduced the term engineering nationalism as a process whereby network technologies became tools for nation-building and nationalistic objectives in the hands of engineers.42 The authors indicate how electricity projects were pursued to support national industry and autonomy in Sweden and Germany. In the latter country military objectives played a central role in discourses on network-building between 1933 and 1945. The state was often the central actor in promoting electrification, although stronger in some countries than in others. In his history of the electrification of Russia, Coopersmith claims that states do not utilize technologies in a vacuum, but "such actions occur within a pattern including prior state interest in the technology, a politically connected engineering or scientific entrepreneur, a ruling party facing a perceived challenge or crisis, and a political leader who promotes the technology for specific political goals".43 Network development thus mattered to the actors involved in nation-state building. Historians for their part confirmed the integrating impact of infrastructures. Van der Vleuten for example claimed that in The Netherlands "networks increasingly tied together the entire country [...] into a single artificial space", enabling complete utilization, industrialization and cultivation.44 This aspect is recognized by students of nationalism as well. Weber saw the geographical spreading of road and rail infrastructures as crucial agents of change in modernizing the country-side, creating markets, and making its inhabitants "French".45 For reasons related to nation-building, rural electrification was often promoted by national authorities.46 According to Oliver Coutard, it was part of governments' policy of modernization, carried by social modernizers and politicians.47 It also aimed to provide the whole country "the means and symbols of 42 Mats Fridlund and Helmut Maier, "The Second Battle of the Currents" (working paper, Department of History of Science and Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, 1996), 3-4. A recent work on engineering national is S. Waqar H. Zaidi, "The Janus-face of Techno-Nationalism. Barnes Wallis and the 'Strength of England'," Technology and Culture 29, no. 1: 62-88. 43 Coopersmith, The Electrification, 152. 44 Van der Vleuten, "Introduction: Networking Technology, Networking Society, Networking Nature," History and Technology 20, no. 5 (2004): 195. 45 Eugen Joseph Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford University Press, 1976), in particular chap. 12 on roads. 46 These processes have been well-documented for France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. See respectively T. Nadau, "^Electrification rurale," in I'lnterconnexion et le marche, 1919-1946, vol. 2 of His-toiregenerale de I'Electricite en France, ed. Maurice Levy-Leboyer and Henri Morsel (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 1199-1232; Kline, Consumers; and Coopersmith, The Electrification. 47 Coutard, "Imaginaire," 79 Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 24 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:22 Introduction - In search of European roots modern civilization", including economic backward areas.48 Often authorities (on various levels) took on the role of pioneer in an attempt to bring nature and society "to order" by using high-modernist ideology.49 The building of electricity systems was thus presented as a stimulus to economic development, modernization, and national unification. As we will observe later in this book, similar arguments played a role at the international level. Towards a history of the European system The above mentioned examples mainly concerned national developments. Although international developments are by far less well-documented, processes of electrification and network-building are not confined to national borders. Histories dealing with specifically European system-building are even rarer. In this section, I review that which has been written, how it is useful for this book, and which perspectives are missing. Several publications compare various national paths of developments, like the unpublished habilitation of Denis Varaschin.50 He emphasizes the national style of electrification in western European countries, without saying much about cooperation between countries. Robert Millward wrote a national comparison between transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructures, and their respective governance forms.51 As he emphasizes similarities and contrasts between national developments, little to no attention is spent on international network-building. Within business history a substantial amount of work has analyzed the activities 48 Nadau, "^Electrification," 1200 Original French text is "des outils et des symboles de la civilisation moderne". A related chapter about how infrastructures transform rural places is Kaijser, "Nature's Periphery: Rural Transformation by the Advent of Infrasystems," in Taking Place: The Spatial Contexts of Science, Technology and Business (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006), 151-186. 49 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 4. 50 Varaschin, "Etats et electricite en Europe occidentale. Habilitation a diriger des recherches" (Habilitation, Universite Pierre-Mendes-France: Grenoble III, 1997). I have used a copy held by the Fondation Electricite de France in Paris. 51 Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and Transport, 1830-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 25 26 Electrifying Europe of international engineering firms.52 Here again, international network-building is not part of the narrative. Arne Kaijser s work on network-building in Scandinavia mainly consisted of a national comparison between countries. He nevertheless pays attention to international developments. According to Kaijser, interconnections between regional systems were sought to gain economies of substitution (improving economic mix) by combining different hydropower resources in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.53 In addition, collaboration between Denmark and Sweden in the form of a submarine cable had a catalytic effect upon the interconnection process, especially within Denmark. This specific cable, intended to transmit the Swedish summer surplus of hydropower to Denmark, was later also used for flows in the opposite direction.54 Here Kaijser points to the difference between planned and evolving systems, or how linkages built for a particular intention can be used for other purposes as well.55 In a 1997 publication, Kaijser explicitly speaks of transnational connections and argues their construction was strongly influenced by the socioeconomic and political context, and should be placed within the according institutional setting.56 A limited number of studies have shed some light on the development of a European electricity system. Although they lack an adequate empirical basis, they do provide a general outline of the process. One of these is authored by Henri Persoz.57 He uses a framework analogous to Hughes to explain the development of a European system. Before WWI, electricity producers improved their load factor by expanding their clientele, also across borders if these plants happen to be 52 See for example Luciano Segreto, "Financing the Electric Industry Worldwide: Strategy and Structure of the Swiss Electric Holding Companies, 1895-1945," Business and Economic History 23, no. 1 (1994): 162-175; and Peter Hertner, "Les societes financieres suisses et le developpement de l'industrie electrique jusqua la premiere guerre mondiale," in 1880-1980, ed. Cardot, 341-356. A substantial business history of electrification just appeared; William Hausman, Mira Wilkins, and Peter Hertner, Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the History of Light and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). A preview has been published as William J. Hausman, Mira Wilkins, and John L. Neufeld, "Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1880s-1914,"_RevMe economique 58, no. 1 (2007): 175-190. 53 Kaijser, "Controlling the Grids: The Development of High-Tension Power Lines in the Nordic Countries," in Nordic Energy Systems: Historical Perspectives and Current Issues, ed. Arne Kaijser and Marika Hedin (Chicago: Science History Publications, 1995), 33. 54 Ibid., 37-38. 55 Ibid., 52. 56 Kaijser, "Trans-Border Integration of Electricity and Gas in the Nordic Countries, 1915-1992," Polhem 15 (1997): 4-43. A similar point is made in Lars Thue, "Electricity Rules: The Formation and Development of the Nordic Electricity Regimes," in Nordic Energy, ed. Kaijser and Hedin, 11-30. 57 Henri Persoz, "Les grands reseaux modernes," in Une oeuvre nationale: L'Equipement, la croissance de la demande, le nucleaire (1946-1987), vol 3, of Histoire generale de lelectricite en France, ed. Henri Morsel (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 783. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 26 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots located at the border. In addition, engineers tried to create an economic mix by interconnecting hydroelectric and thermal electricity plants, again also across national boundaries. The main rationale was to use waterpower as optimal as possible, and to avoid spilling of hydroelectricity and fuel. Interconnected operation brought more efficiency It enabled the transmission of electricity from one power station to the other in cases of emergencies. Therefore utilities could decrease their additional generation capacity, which they kept in reserve to cover demand in exceptional situations. Persozs explanation for the progress towards a European system is thus located in system dynamics using Hughsian concepts such as economic mix and load factor. A report by Verbong et al confirms the role of "system dynamics" behind the growth of a European network.58 The authors distilled three general phases of European collaboration; accidental cooperation (1915-1950), a European network within national institutional boundaries (1950-1990s), and crossing institutional boundaries (since 1990s).59 Georg Boll showed a similar story for the development from local German systems, to Germany being part of a European Verbundswirtschaft.60 An unpublished French masters thesis by Julian Barrere added more detail to these stages.61 Barrere observed the formation of international non-governmental organizations in the first phase, which represented the interests of the electricity industry. These organizations contributed to the exchange of ideas on network development. After WWII, Barrere underlines the role of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1948), and also the UCPTE (1951) as important platforms for international collaboration.62 He regards the liberalization of energy markets by the EU since the 1990s as a new phase.63 Persoz added that in this period the connection of Eastern and Western 58 G. Verbong, E.van der Vleuten, and M.J.J. Scheepers, Long-Term Electricity Supply Systems Dynamics: A Historical Analysis (Eindhoven: SUSTELNET, 2002). 59 Ibid., 20-24. 60 See Georg Boll, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Verbundbetreibs in der deutschen Elektrizitätswirtschaft bis zum europäischen Verbund. Ein rückblick zum 20-jährgen Besiehen der Deutschen Verbundsgesellschaft e. V, Heidelberg (Frankfurt: Verlags- u. Wirtschaftges, d. Elektrizitätswerke m.b.H., 1969), 126-129. This history of Germany's electricity system from 1969 did spend a mere three pages to describe cooperation within a European framework. Throughout the rest of the text, however, related international events are mentioned. 61 Julien Barrere, "La genese de l'Europe electrique: Les logiques de l'interconnexion transnationale (debut des annees 1920-fin des annees 1950)" (PhD diss., Universite de Bordeaux-Ill, 2002). The thesis was supervised by Christophe Bouneau. It was written on the basis of conference reports and documents published by various international organisations. A solid account by any means- especially for a master's thesis -, Barrere often uses France as a starting point and focuses mainly on technical reasons to create a European system. I have used a copy held by the Fondation Electricite de France in Paris. 62 The Union for the Production and Coordination of Transportation of Electricity (UCPTE) is the same as the current-day UCTE. The 'P' of production was dropped in 1998 as a response to EU policy. 63 This is the case with Verbong, Vleuten, and Scheepers, Long-Term, 23tf. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 27 28 Electrifying Europe European networks was also a crucial new development for Europe's electricity industry64 Several other historians recognize the crucial role of international organizations and networks of people, usually made up of engineers. Christophe Bouneau places the birth of a transnational network of engineers in the Interwar period. He discerns a technical "International" with a technocratic world view, which grew by means of international congresses and associations.65 For the period after WWII, Bouneau recognizes the importance of engineers in organizations like OEEC and UCPTE. Barjot and Kurgan made a comparable argument, while also indicating the involvement of financial institutions and engineering firms for the period up to WWII.66 They suggest a number of general consequences of growth of this expert community. First, this community fostered the growth of interconnections. Second, engineering associations stimulated a scientific spirit and an exchange of knowledge, aimed at rationalizing electricity systems. Third, it stimulated new modes of operation whereby not only entrepreneurs played a crucial role, but also various nation-states.67 These findings provided useful starting points for my research. Still, I consider the explanation for the proliferation of a European system as incomplete, for two main reasons. First of all, these historical accounts all stress technical-economic attributes as determinants of growth, and thus cannot explain why actors tried to built European networks as a "regional" optimum. The technical-economic "logics" of continuous scale increase are never questioned. Hence, Henri Persoz places the history of the European interconnected system in the light of an implacable principle - "a movement without ending" - within the electricity industry, recognizing the need to connect electricity networks with others until the whole planet is interconnected.68 He thereby admits that his interpretation is not a suitable explanation for the question why explicitly a European system came about.69 My second objection is that the peculiarity of the drive towards a European system is not sufficiently taken into account. It is essential to understand why en- 64 Persoz, "Les grands," 812ff. 65 Christophe Bouneau, "Les reseaux de transport delectricite en Europe occidentale depuis a fin du XIXe siecle: De la diversite des modeles nationaux ä la recherche de la convergence europeenne," Annales historiques de lelectricite 2 (2004): 31-33. This edition of Annales historiques is a special issue commemorating the 20th anniversary of the publication of Hughes' Networks of Power. 66 Dominique Barjot and Ginette Kurgan, "Les reseaux humains dans l'industrie electrique," Annales historiques de lelectricite 2, (2004): 69-88. 67 Ibid., 80-81. 68 Persoz, "Les grands," 783. 69 Ibid., 784. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 28 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots gineers speak of a European system, and not any other international or regional system. Whereas historians sought to explain the growth of national networks by pointing at national(istic) discourses and ideological inspiration, these factors are neglected by historians who study the growth of a European system. Yet at the same time, there are indications that such motives played a role. Barrere briefly touches upon two interwar grand schemes for a European grid, and Boll describes one as well.70 Both, however, do not contextualize the plans, nor analyze the underlying ideas other than technical ones. Others have shown in limited cases that ideas about Europe influenced the design of power plants and network. A good example is the work done by Alexander Gall on the so-called Atlantropa project.71 German engineer Herman Sorgel, the architect of the project, proposed to lower the Mediterranean by building a dam between Gibraltar and Tangiers.72 In the 1930s he added a European electricity network, fed by the hydroelectric plant planned at the dam. Sorgel legitimated his bold plan by claiming that a physical bond between nations was a better warranty for peace than paper treaties.73 Persoz, too, hints at engineers' idealistic inspiration for interconnecting countries. He briefly mentions that ideas of solidarity and the hope of avoiding past tragedies inspired discussions on European interconnections in the 1950s. He observed similar notions in the political vision of the EU with regard to international interconnections, in particular in the case of connections between Western, and Central and Eastern Europe.74 It is perhaps Persoz personal background as an electrical engineer, who was deeply engaged in international collaboration, which prevented him from further questioning these assumptions and their meaning for the European integration of electricity networks.75 70 Barrere, "La genese," 134-136; and Boll, Enstehung, 62-64. 71 Gall, Das Atlantropa-Projekt: Die Geschichte einer gescheiterten Vision. Herman Sörgel und die Absenkung des Mittelmeers (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1998); and more recently his "Atlantropa: A Technological Vision of a United Europe," in Networking Europe, ed. Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, 99-128. 72 See Sörgel, Atlantropa (München: Piloty & Loehle , 1932). 73 He wrote that "[d]ie Verkettung Europas durch Kraftleitungen ist eine bessere Friedensgarantie als Pakte auf dem Papier; denn mit der Zerstörung der Leitungen würde sich jedes Volk selbst vernichten." Ibid., 118-119. 74 Persoz, "Les grands," 788-789. 75 Before his retirement, Persoz has worked for Electricite de France as well as being a member of UNI -PEDE and OGRE, and mainly devoted his time to international collaboration and network-building. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 29 30 Electrifying Europe Unpacking the European system Besides providing a general periodization, the existing literature leads to three observations. First, international network-building has a dynamic of its own worth studying. The development should not be taken for grant. Second, ideological convictions played a role in thinking about and planning a European system and the socio-economic and political context clearly affected network-building. And third, international organizations and engineering communities can be perceived as crucial agents for international network-building. These attempts to infrastruc-tural integration were not picked up by historians of European integration, likely since these developments took place outside of the political sphere. This is what I have labeled hidden integration above. This section reviews ways to "unpack" this hidden integration. To analyze processes of hidden integration I use the particular concept of European system-builders as recently developed by Van der Vleuten et al.76 These authors have adapted Hughes' notion of system-builders in order to "study actors in the international arena working simultaneously on transnational infrastructures and taking 'Europe', however defined, as their sphere of activity".77 Thus the objects of focus in this study are international organizations and engineering communities that acted explicitly as European system-builders. I preserve Hughes' emphasis on the socio-technical nature of these systems, enabling me to look beyond technological elements, and to equally take political and economic aspects of system-building into account. It also implies that socio-technical system-building is not seen as a straightforward and rational activity, but an often contested and negotiated process, affected by contextual factors.78 Different from Hughes is the focus on transnational system-builders. To some extent this is a methodological move. Dealing with each European country individually is impossible to research. Looking at transnational system-builders enables to focus on an arena where all these countries met. The word "transnational" has been around for quite a while but gained significance within political science in the 1960s.79 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye used 76 Van der Vleuten et al., "Europe's System Builders: The Contested Shaping of Transnational Road, Electricity and Rail Networks," Contemporary European History 16, no. 3 (2007): 321-348. 77 Ibid., 326. 78 Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, "Networking Europe," 24. 79 Two recent articles delve deeper into the origins of transnational history. See Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Learning by Doing: Notes About the Making of the 'Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History"' Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 159-179; and Van der Vleuten, "Towards a Transnational History of Technology. Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls," Technology and Culture 49, no. 4 (2008, forthcoming)- Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 30 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots "transnational" to depict forms of interaction between non-state actors over national boundaries.80 They pled to study not only intergovernmental organizations, but also non-governmental organizations. This does not imply that the importance of nation-states and borders is underestimated. On the contrary, some have even argued that transnational ties should be conceived as strengthening rather than weakening the power of nation-states.81 While some barriers are dissolved, others are created or reinforced. Applied in historical studies, the transnational turn also represented a break with nation-state centered history. This has resulted in a focus upon actors who lack clear nation-state loyalties or whose agendas supersede national interests. Much emphasis remains on the study of international organizations. They represent a valuable research site to examine ideological and European agendas. Though initially a domain of study of political scientists, the work of international organizations has recently become an object of study for transnational history.82 According to Akira Iriye, international organizations testify to the awareness of people and nations that "they shared certain interests and objectives across national boundaries and they could best solve their problems by pooling their resources and effecting transnational cooperation".83 In addition, examining international organizations enables to look beyond national objectives only. It helps to unveil a specific transnational European agenda, and to show that the history of the European interconnected network is more than the sum of all national histories alone.84 Another element of transnational history is useful to help identify system-builders. According to Patricia Clavin, transnationalism is not only about international organizations, but also about people and "the social space that they inhabit, the networks they form and the ideas they exchange".85 An exemplary study is Evangelistas Unarmed Forces, as he described how a transnational movement of 80 Kiran Klaus Patel, "Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 52, no. 7 (2004): 629. 81 Clavin, "Introduction: Defining Transnationalism," Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 431. 82 The relation between transnational history and international organisations has recently been explored in Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 83 Ibid., 9. 84 A similar point is made in Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnationalism and Early European Integration: The Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circles, 1947-1957," The Historical Journal 44, no. 3 (2001): 773-798. 85 Clavin, "Introduction," 422. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 31 32 Electrifying Europe scientists opposed the nuclear arms race during the Cold War.86 His book clearly shows how international human networks of engineers pursued a common aim. Evangelistas book also highlights the role of a specific group of people, namely communities of experts.87 For this study, a transnational approach thus enables a view on human networks of engineers, and an assessment of their ideas of Europe connected to their system-building. What these system-builders saw as "European" needs further specification. Although nowadays "Europe" almost seems to correspond with the EU, its historical definition is all but clear-cut.88 Most scholars agree that "Europe" is more than a geographical space, but also an idea. The building blocks of this supposed European idea or identity are formed by what some regard as the European legacy or European experience.89 Historian Pirn den Boer divides this European legacy into three notions: one of a Christian Europe, a shared European civilization, and a European notion of freedom.90 Despite this scholarly attention for a supposed common European past, others tried to refute this proposition. Shore and Black for example argued that the view of a single European past makes a too sharp distinction between who is and who is not "European", and may "add to the tide 86 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). 87 Their role is also stressed by Clavin, "Introduction," 427. Clavin's expert communities border on what has been described elsewhere as epistemic communities. See Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35. He defines an epistemic community as "a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area". 88 Historical studies of the idea of Europe are abundant and include Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932 (Chapel Hill/London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, The History of the Idea of Europe (London: Routledge, 1995); Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter Veit, eds., The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity (Providence: Berg, 1992); Elisabeth du Reau, L'Idee d'Europe au XXe siede: Des mythes aux realties (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1996); Anthony Pagden, ed., The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, eds., Ideas of Europe Since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 89 For a discussion see Wintle, "Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience," in Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Presence, ed. Wintle (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 12-14. 90 See amongst others his "Europe to 1914: The Making of an Idea," in The History, ed. Wilson and Van der Dussen, 13-82. For more on a Europe of Christianity see Hay, Europe. Agnes Heller's view on Europe is in some way comparable with Ernest Gelmers loose equalisation of nationalism and modernisation with her insistence that "European culture is modernity". See Heller, "Europe: An Epilogue?," in The Idea of Europe, ed. Nelson, Roberts, and Veit, 22; and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 32 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots of xenophobia and racism".91 Others contend that the historical foundations of Europe as a delineated entity is weak. Anthony Smith sees this as "Europe's true dilemma"; a choice between unacceptable historical myths and memories on the one hand, and on the other hand a patchwork, a memory-less scientific "culture" held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change.92 The latter point of Smith is crucial; the idea of Europe is historically subjected to change. In analogy to Borneman and Fowler, this book will threat Europe not as a "stable, sovereign, autonomous object", but rather as existing only in historical relations.93 According to them, historical actors have related to Europe as a strategy of representing themselves and as a device of power. I too do not work with a fixed and predetermined definition of Europe, neither from a geographical nor a cultural point of view. My actors, the system-builders, determine what is European and what is not. This implies that "Europe" was neither a logical, uncontested or a single grand project. Rather, building an electrical Europe was a layered process, hardly undisputed and natural. Visions of a European system also reflected different geographies of Europe, including some countries while excluding others. These geographies not only varied among engineers and politicians involved, but were also reflected - and caused - by membership of international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental. Sources and limitations In the case of national electrification, the primary system-builders often include the state, along with national utilities and national engineering associations. For the development of a European interconnected network, the system-building process was fragmented over a number of international organizations. The organizations that were involved in European system-building are the primary focus of this study. Different types of organizations have been the object of study. First of all, I looked at a number of intergovernmental organizations, including 91 Cris Shore and Annabel Black, "The European Communities and the Construction of Europe," Anthropology Today 8, no. 3 (1992): 11. Another article making a case for this argument is Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Fictions of Europe," Race and Class 32, no. 3 (1991): 3-10. 92 Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992): 73-74. 93 John Borneman and Nick Fowler, "Europeanization," Annual Review of Anthropology 26 (1997): 489. Others have suggested a similar approach. See for example Hayden White, "The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity," in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, ed. Bo Strath (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 67. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 33 34 Electrifying Europe the League of Nations (LoN, 1920-1946), the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1919), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1948-1961), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 1947) and several institutions of the (now) European Union. Since little to none secondary literature exists on their activities with regard to electricity, I primarily relied on archival sources and official documents. Second of all, another focus was on international non-governmental organizations directly dealing with electricity. This includes associations of electrical engineers, utility managers and network operators, like UNIPEDE and the World Power Conference (now World Energy Council, WEC). In general, these organizations did not receive wide historical attention. Incidentally an academic publication appeared, and in some instances commemorative overviews were commissioned - as was the case for UNIPEDE/EURELECTRIC and WEC.94 These however primarily focus on the more recent period. Unfortunately their voluminous congress reports are not widely available in libraries, and series are often incomplete. I therefore chose to focus mainly on UNIPEDE, the organization most closely related to network-building, and examine all their proceedings starting in 1926. Within the same category is the UCPTE, which comprises a personal union between network operators. Their activities also had to bear historical scrutiny. I made a thorough study of their private archives as well as their official documentation. These two categories contain the most important European system-building organizations with regard to electricity. In addition, several additional archives have been used, either to fill blank spots or to cross-check other archival pieces and perspectives. I made extensive use of the National Archives of the United States to describe the role of the Marshall Plan on electricity network-building in Europe. I further used additional archives, including the national archives of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the archives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949). Furthermore, I incidentally relied on journals and newspapers, and also conducted one interview. Besides qualitative sources I also used quantitative data to illustrate the development of international collaboration in Europe. I am aware that a strong focus on international actors and use of mainly archival research has several limitations. Although archives are regarded a primary re- 94 See respectively Paul K. Lyons, 75 Years of Cooperation in the Electricity Industry (Brussels: Union of the Electricity Industry/EURELECTRIC, 2000); and Ian Fells, World Energy 1923-1998 and Beyond: A Commemoration of the World Energy Council on its 75th Anniversary (London: Atalink Projects / World Energy Council, 1998). Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 34 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots source, their content is always selective. What is eventually kept, and how it is filed, represents a choice of the archivist. For this selection, historians in turn make their own assessments. Despite the fact that I did extensive research in most key archives, I too made a selection of what I found most valuable for this study. One other drawback of archival research could be the lack of recent material. Researchers are often restricted by archival laws, restricting access to material younger than 30 years. In my case, this was not an issue for at least a number of archives. For several key archives, including that of UNECE and UCPTE, I was allowed access to recent documents as well. Restrictions do not apply to the archive of the League of Nations, and the policy with regard to documents of EU institutions is rather liberal. The only two archives which likely hold more relevant material that I did not see are the National Archives in Washington D.C and NATO. In considering secondary literature and archival sources, the main void in this study is a lack of knowledge on Central and Eastern European developments. Not only is there little written on national or regional histories of electrification, archival sources are rare and difficult to access. One obvious source would have been the Central and Eastern European equivalent of the UCPTE, the Central Dispatch Organization. This organization ceased to exist in 2005, and their private archive remained closed to historians.95 The current state and location of the archive is unknown. The archives of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, 1949), located in Moscow, are open to researchers but as of yet highly unorganized.96 With regard to transnational history, there have been complaints that the field is too absorbed with studying international organizations. In defense, Clavin asserted that many of these institutions have seen little study by historians. She notes that "archival research has drawn out their complex relationship to national and supranational power with a subtlety and depth that has eluded the writing of some international political scientists on the subject".971 cannot but agree with her. One pitfall of a transnational approach is less attention for national perspectives. This does not imply that national developments are ignored completely. In various instances I refer to national developments. Yet most of my examples are drawn from countries whose history with regard to electricity has been well documented. Two other countries that I regularly describe, namely Austria and Yugoslavia, played exceptional roles in European network-building. Although I 95 Petr Veselky (Secretary of CDO), letters to author, June 3, 2004 and December 8, 2004. 96 E. A. Tyurina (Director of the Russian State Archive of the Economy), e-mail message to author, January 16, 2006. The archives are open, but not very organised, and lack a decent inventory. At that moment, no funds were available to improve that situation. 97 Clavin, "Introduction," 424. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 35 36 Electrifying Europe believe that a historical survey of international collaboration from a national perspective would almost certainly result in another perspective of the past, I strongly believe that transnational and national histories complement rather than conflict with each other. Another drawback of a focus on transnational actors and organizations is that it excludes ideas and visions that were not brought forward to these international forums. A good example can be taken from existing historiography. The above-mentioned Atlantropa project was not picked up by any of the system-builders I studied, and thus not features in this book. In other words, there may have been other more nationally or locally confined plans for a European system that I did not take into account. One other consequence of the approach is that I did not deal substantially with the Nazi era. That period is relatively short, and already quite well-documented in terms of secondary literature. Although historian Bernhard Stier has argued that the Nazi influence on network-building in Europe is underestimated, he also points to the fact that German archives are not complete on this matter.98 Other related material on Nazi network-building is scattered over various national archives, and often incomplete. My own experiences in the Bundesarchiv in Vienna confirm this, as Nazi period files were very incomplete. I therefore relied on secondary literature to sketch the main developments of that distinct period. Structure The book has a chronological perspective of the development of a European system. Chapter 2 charts the electricity sector in Europe in the beginning of the 20th century. By then the electricity industry already had an international character as transmission lines and entrepreneurs operated across borders. In this period the first international engineering associations related to electricity were founded. At the same time, national governments sought to steer the development of networks and increasingly safeguarded electricity as a national resource. The 1920s and 1930s are the focal point of Chapter 3. It answers my first research question by describing how an agenda for a European electricity system originated, within the context of the emerging European movement. Not only engineering associations, but also intergovernmental organizations like the League 98 Bernhard Stier, "Expansion, reforme de structure et interconnexion europeenne: Developpement et difficultes de lelectricite sous le nazisme, 1939-1945," in Les entreprises du secteur de lenergie sous I'Occupa-tion, ed. Varashin (Arras: Artois Presses Universite, 2006), 289-290. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 36 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Introduction - In search of European roots of Nations and International Labor Organization played an instrumental role. Important actors in this period are electrical engineers, but also include policymakers, entrepreneurs, and economists. Most of them were somehow connected to the European movement. Ideas on Europe were inspired by political stalemate and economic distress. The notion of a European network fed on these problems. The war and subsequent period is covered by Chapter 4. The main topic of this chapter is the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation. This was solidified in the form of regional power pools, starting in Western Europe with UCPTE. That region also experienced profound American influences through the European Recovery Program (ERP), which also sought to stimulate European integration. This was also the case for their activities concerning electricity. The ERP not only aimed to reconstruct electricity systems and expand electricity production. It also stimulated cooperation in the electricity sector. European engineers were also willing to work together more closely, inspired by more ideological reasons. Chapter 5 covers the 1950s until approximately 2001. Its main narrative is the contested nature of interconnections across the Iron Curtain. The chapter focuses on another part of the ERP; the strengthening of Western Europe for a possible new war. At the same time, I show how the NATO alliance actively tried to prevent East-West cooperation, which was mainly propagated by UNECE. East-West cooperation did come about, especially after the process of detente set in. Finally at the very end of the twentieth century the EU begins to play a role in the process of European system-building and thus also enters my narrative. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 37 0 # Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 38 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:23 Chapter 2 "Opening the doors to a revolution" A dry winter following a hot summer in 1921-'22 led to a lack of water, which seriously decreased hydroelectricity production in Italy1 In the Po Valley, in the northern part of the country, this forced local governments to take action. The provinces of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice - Italy's industrial heartland -appointed special commissioners to ration the available electricity to industry. Besides this rationing, Switzerland supplied extra electricity. Technically this was possible, as transmission lines crossed the Italian-Swiss border and Italy already imported electricity from Switzerland. Electricity suppliers in France took part as well. French coal-fired plants in Nancy and Vincey supplied electricity to Zurich, Switzerland. The latter town normally received electricity from the Swiss plants in Brusio and Thusis. Northern Italy now consumed that electricity. According to the commissioner for Lombardy, Milanese engineer Angelo Omedeo, these electricity transmissions avoided "consequent shutting down of factories owing to lack of motive power".2 At this point in time an international solution - electricity exchanges between countries - seemed obvious to a solve a local problem - electricity shortage in northern Italy. Why this was possible, and how this situation was still rather unique needs historical explanation. By 1921 transmission lines traversed national boundaries for over two decades. The earliest cross-border interconnections, mostly 60-70 kV lines, could not play an important role beyond the local level, however.3 Often these connections transmitted electricity produced by power plants situated on border rivers.4 1 Gaetano Salvemini, "Economic Conditions in Italy, 1919-1922," Journal of Modern History 23, no. 1 (1951): 32. 2 League of Nations, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, Proces-Verbal of the Second Session, Held at Geneva, March 29th- 31st, 1922, LoN document series, C.212.M. 116.1922. VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1922), Annex 7, "Report to the President of the Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and Transit on the Requested Action by the League of Nations for Facilitating the Cession by One Country to Another of Electric Power for Operation of Railways of International Concern," 33. 3 Christophe Bouneau, "La genese de l'interconnexion electrique internationale de la France du debut du siecle ä 1946," in Les reseaux Europeens transnationaux XIXe - XXe siecles: quels enjeux?, ed. Michele Merger, Albert Carreras, and Andrea Giuntini (Nantes: Ouest Editons, 1994), 78-79. 4 Varaschin, "Etats," 136, table 8. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 39 40 Electrifying Europe Table 2.1 - Transmission distances and losses per voltage AC current Capacity in kW Transmission Cross-section of cop- Loss of charge inkV Single line Double line distance in km per wiring in mm2 in% 60 19,000 38,000 100 3x95 10 110 40,500 891,000 200 3x 120 10.15 220 110,000 220,000 400 3x 160 10.2 380 550,000 1100,000 600 3x400 10.5 380 500,000 1000,000 1,000 3x400 15.7 Source: Legg ;e, Grundsätzliches, 8. But after the Great War, two major development! s took place. A first major change was the use of higher voltages for transmission lines. This enabled the transfer of electricity over longer distances, without uneconomical losses in charge (see Table 2.1). Since then, higher voltage transmission lines interconnected the border regions between Germany, Switzerland, France, and to a lesser extent Italy.5 According to Lundgreen, the use of "high-voltage electrical technology opened the doors to a revolution in machine building, [...] lighting and transportation, [...] to the production, storage and distribution of current via central power stations".6 Second and related, the average power plant capacity increased with the construction of so-called supercentrales or Uberlandwerke. At the time the rapid increase in capacity resonated in consecutive claims of several new plants to be the largest in Europe.7 As the name Uberlandwerk already implies, these plants served consumers far beyond the local. Networks and plants were not the only aspects of electricity production that operated internationally. The financing - "the nervous system of all construction enterprises for the great technological networks"8 - and construction of electricity networks were also international in character. Holding companies called Unternehmergeschafte played a dominant role in setting up local and regional electricity systems all over Europe and beyond. These were powerful alliances between manufacturers of electrical equipment on the one hand and banks on the other. One such company helped engineering the complex electricity transmissions between the three countries in the 1921-22 events described above, namely the 5 Bouneau, "La genese," 78-79. 6 Peter Lundgreen, "Engineering Education in Europe and the USA, 1750-1930: The Rise to Dominance of School Culture and the Engineering Professions," Annals of Science 47, no. 1 (1990): 58. 7 Millward, Private, 114. 8 Armand Mattelart, The Invention of Communication (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 99. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 40 7-8-2008 14:25:23 "Opening the doors to a revolution" Swiss Unternehmersgescha.fi Motor AG, which had interests in several plants involved in the transmission including Kraftwerke Brusio AG.9 Agostino Nizzola was the technical director of Motor.10 The company also erected the 50 kV interconnection between Beznau and Lontsch in 1908, and built a plant in Gosgen which connected to the network of the Compagnie Lorraine d'Electricite (see Figure 2.1).11 According to Nizzola, the electricity transmission involving France, Switzerland and Italy seemed "a first step towards the solution of wider and more interesting problems".12 He referred in particular to the possibilities of interconnecting different power systems, even across national boundaries. It would allow for a better balancing between thermal and hydroelectricity, and offer avenues for mutual help. But despite the international character of the industry, Milanese engineer Omedeo stressed that these emergency supplies to Italy only came about due to "the international agreements and goodwill".13 The obstacles to cross-border transmissions were no longer technical, but political and legislative.14 Of the three countries involved, Italy had the least restrictive policy. State intervention strengthened in 1919, but mainly to promote further electrification. The 1919 Bill issued uniform measures for public participation in firms, and tariffs and subsidies for building dams.15 Legislation in France was more restrictive. There, a law issued in October 1919 forbade the export of hydroelectric power without permission from the Conseil d'Etat.16 Since 1912 electricity imports had needed consent of the Minister of Public Works.17 Switzerland tried to bring unutilized water-power under state ownership in 1891. The construction of export-oriented power plants in the first two decades of the 20th century, among them the two plants in Brusio, led 9 Brusio AG was established in 1904, and generated electricity in Switzerland. The main beneficiary of the imported power was the Italian Societä Lombardei per la distribuzione di energia elettricä (Lombarda). 10 Agostino Nizzola (1869-1961) was born in Lugano, Switzerland. He was trained as an electrical engineer at the EPF in Zurich. Between 1891 and 1913 he worked as an engineer for BBC, before becoming director of Motor, the financial society of BBC. He was a board member on various financial and electricity bodies, under which the Kraftwerke Brusio. 11 H. Niesz, "L'Echange denergie electrique entre pays, au point de vue economique et technique," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, Basle, Sectional meeting, vol. 1 (Basel: Birkhäuser & Cie, 1926), 1028. 12 LoN doc, ser., C.212.M.116.1922.VIII, Annex 7, "Report to the President," 33-34. 13 Ibid. 14 Varaschin, "Etats," 138-139. 15 Renato Giannetti, "Resources, Firms and Public Policy in the Growth of Italian Electrical Industry from Beginnings to the 30s," in 1880-1980, ed. Cardot, 44 & 47. 16 Varaschin, "Etats," 139. The Conseil d'Etat is the foremost legal advisor of the French national government. 17 Bouneau, "La genese," 77. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 41 42 Electrifying Europe Coldenb«nj _ V Lggende * Uflni .. jr Q Usm« hydrtuliqui a Po*lt janc^en ou IransftHTrurion _ > 80 hV. _ «60 kV. Figure 2.1 - Swiss, French, and German interconnections around in 1926 Source: H. Niesz, 'L'Echange, 1026. Used by permission of the World Energy Council, London, www. worldenergycouncil. org. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 42 "Opening the doors to a revolution" to controversy and fierce debate in Swiss popular press.18 A 1916 ordinance placed electricity sales to other countries under the control of the Federal government.19 Thus despite the existence of international connections, national legislation increasingly restricted their use. Although cross-border electricity transmission was still in its infancy, the use of higher voltage technology in the period between the wars made interconnections beyond national border a serious option.20 The Franco-Swiss-Italian cooperation answered to this potential. Still, as historian Christophe Bouneau has argued, one could see a paradoxical development in the interwar electricity sector: while the sector was highly international, it became increasingly subjected to national regulations.21 Next to international transmission lines, a growing international human network had also emerged. A community of electrical engineers, dominant in research and development, and pioneering in entrepreneurship, came to form a transnational class of people. The activities of the Unternehmergeschafte since the 1890s further promoted an engineering and industrial network with international ramifications.22 This class was developing constantly by holding congresses, conferences, and forming international associations. But at the same electricity production and transmission became increasingly framed within national boundaries - a process described as domestication by Hausmann et al.23 In part, this was because of government efforts to bring about a more rational organization of electricity generation and supply, inspired by engineering philosophy and wartime experiences with central planning. But it was also to counter the "additional costs" of foreign finance and control of electric power facilities; not only to reduce the major role of foreign finance and manufacturers, but to decrease external dependence in general.24 This development, which took place during and after WWI, was mainly of a legislative nature. In many European countries, authorities assumed some form of oversight over in- and outbound flows of electricity, and began to develop transmission networks and production capacity, in particular of hydroelectricity. This not only involved import and ex- 18 David Gugerli, Redeströme: Zur Elektrifizierung der Schweiz, 1880-1914 (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 1996), 287-288. 19 Varaschin, "Etats," 138. 20 Pierre Lanthier, "Logique electrique et logique electrotechnique: la cohabitation des electriciens et des electrotechniciens dans la direction des constructions electriques francais: une comparaison internationale," in Strategies, gestion, management: les compagnies electriques et leurs patrons, 1895-1945: Actes du 12e colloque de lAssociation pour l'histoire de lelectricite en France les 3, 4 et 5 fevrier 1999, ed. Dominique Barjot et al. (Paris: Fondation Electricite de France, 2001), 35. Also see Kaijser, "Controlling," 32. 21 Bouneau, "Les reseaux," 25, 31-32. 22 Barjot and Kurgan, "Les reseaux," 70. 23 Hausman, Wilkins, and Neufeld, "Multinational," 177. 24 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 43 0 44 Electrifying Europe port regulations and concession systems, but also included laws making watercourses "national", and restricting their accessibility to foreign investors. This development was not without opposition. Fostering the international character of the electricity industry was a concern for most international and professional organizations related to electricity. Electricity producers and Unternehmergeschafte alike wanted to keep the industry as international as possible, and keep borders open. In the eyes of many engineers, the geographical spread of networks and interconnection of power plants led to a more rational organization of electricity production. They often argued that transmission lines should not halt at national borders. The League of Nations took a similar stance. That organization tried to install international conventions that, while respecting the national legislations, sought to simplify the expansion and use of international connections. The aim of this chapter is to sketch the main national and international context in which electricity networks were developed. It provides a survey of international network-building activities, and the birth of international organizations related to electricity. It will also show the national framing of electricity production and network-development, which displayed itself in this period in restrictive legislation on cross-border developments and in plans for national networks. A transnational class of people - engineers - did not reject this increasing national organization entirely. Rather, engineers mediated to extend electricity networks across borders, while respecting national sovereignty. International interconnections and electricity exchange were legitimated by business interests, but were also seen as more rational. The chapter also shows that debates on system-building did not yet include ideas of specifically European cooperation. Hope was placed on international conventions - and not European ones - as a way of keeping borders open. An industry expands Electricity generation and distribution was initially geographically limited to local consumers. Often local governments took part in exploiting gasworks, and were thus not eager to bear risks to support electricity - a potential competitor. Local authorities often granted private initiative with a concession to exploit small-scale electricity plants. Typically, the first application of electricity in the late 19th century Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 44 fft) 7-8-2008 14:25:24 "Opening the doors to a revolution" 45 o o o CS Oh co XI o W co on i—i ,_i J—< CS o Imp o Oh XI os W CS on o Imp o Oh XI 00 W CS on o Imp o Oh X w CS on o Imp o Oh X vo w CS on o Imp o Oh X in w CS on 1 o Imp a c S hi a O Q CS CS in o o 00 o vo cs vo * o ts o od ■ in o o on in oo CS >-i CS vo O ro O cs' o o o O o o ts oq vq co O in o o o vd o o on o in co o o on o in o o o o o vd on co on ^ CS O O co co 00 O O O ro 00 O CS vo ^ O O ^' o CS oq in 00 on ro CS O vo ro in vo o o o o on ^ o cs o o o co on 00 00 in ro in o o o m K o." o." cs on 00 vd o o o in o K co o o o o co o cs 00 cs 00 ^ K on cs o CS -a a £ ft J 3 1 X 1-1 -a a > o CO Sh o ? 'B 1> c3 o a a f 00 vo CS on o o 00 CS cs co o cs o vd in in co cs o cs cs o in O 00 CS CS CS o o o vd CS -a a a Q c •2 « c c3 a . o * u Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 45 7-8-2008 14:25:24 46 Electrifying Europe was lighting but other early uses included tramways.25 In many cases, local governments became involved as network service grew.26 These first small-scale systems regularly had foreign influences, mainly from the United States and Germany. Diligent patent politics enabled first movers like American firms Westinghouse and General Electric, and the German counterparts Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft (AEG) and Siemens, to expand their empires.27 Alfred Chandler labeled these the "Big Four". They dominated the industry from the 1880s until the 1940s.28 They had an interest not only in supplying equipment to produce and distribute electricity, but also in providing consumers with traction systems, electromotors, and other appliances.29 Most general histories of electrification regard the 1891 international electrical exhibition in Frankfurt as the emblem of electricity transmission over longer distances. There electricity was transported over 175 kilometers to Frankfurt from its origin, the river Neckar in Lauffen. Only a decade and a half later, the first transmission lines traversed national boundaries.30 River-run hydroelectric plants on the Rhine fed into Germany, France, and Switzerland. Starting in 1906, a 40 kV line to Guebwiller in France transmitted electricity generated at the hydroelectric plant in Rheinfelden, Germany.31 Another 40 kV crossed the Rhine and French-German border between He Napoleon (near Mulhouse) and Fribourg from 1910. International connections also appeared beyond the Rhine. The first large-scale export-oriented plant was erected in Brusio in 1906. Both 23 kV and 55 kV lines exported hydroelectricity from the Swiss Ticino region to northern provinces in Italy.32 Scandinavian countries built cross-border linkages as well. During WWI, a submarine cable between Helsingor in Denmark and Helsingborg in Sweden came into operation.33 Good statistics of international electricity exchanges are available since approximately 1925. By then, countries like Germany. Switzerland and 25 See for example Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Ginette Kurgan rightly argues that this pattern is varied per country, and was dependent on many factors, like economic and social structure, access to primary energy sources, and the relation between civil society and the State. See Alain Beltran, Ginette Kurgan, and Henri Morsel, "Presentation," Bulletin d'histoire de lelectricite 22 (1993): 12. 26 Millward, Private, 77. 27 Henri Morsel, "Panorama de l'histoire de lelectricite en France dans la premiere moitie du XXe siecle," in 1880-1980, ed. Cardot, 88-89. On AEG and Siemens see Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977), 463-473 and 538-549. 28 Ibid., 464. 29 Hausman, Wilkins, and Neufeld, "Multinational," 180. 30 Persoz, "Les grands," 783. 31 Vivian Saminaden, Histoire du developpement des reseaux interconnects d'Europe (Paris: Electricite de France, 1994), 3. 32 Ibid 33 Kaijser, "Trans-Border," 6; and Van der Vleuten, "Electrifying," 120. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 46 7-8-2008 14:25:24 0 "Opening the doors to a revolution" Sweden had multiple interconnections with their neighbors, and made increasingly use of these (see Table 2.2; for totals of electricity generation, see Table 2.3). The use of high voltage transmission lines meant electricity production was no longer restricted to be near consumers. This opened perspectives for harnessing water-power in more distant and isolated mountain areas. Interconnections between thermal and hydroelectric power plants - also over borders - were often built to get a better economic mix.34 This was the rationale behind the interconnection between Gosgen in Switzerland and Nancy in France. In general, it was more economical to use hydroelectricity rather than burn expensive coal. Switzerland transmitted hydroelectric power to Lorraine in times of plentiful water, often during night-time, and during peak demands in France. The flow reversed in times of low water, during the end of winter or frost.35 Low hydraulicity impelled Swiss electricity producers to connect not only to French mine-head thermal power units, but also to German ones: Gosgen was connected to Laufenburg as well.36 Such projects were the outcome of an emerging field of study in engineering. Since the end of the 19th century, engineers studied the technical-economic planning and operation of electricity systems, to guarantee a maximum productivity and profitability37 The emphasis on economic mix and interconnection were two results of this new focus. Another was load management, which aimed at "regularity of load and maximum practical utilization of generating capacity".38 In other words, it tried to avoid periods of very low and high demand, and ensure a load curve that was as "flat" as possible - resulting in lower prices per kWh. This was done by interconnecting areas with different peak loads, and by distributing to industries with large continuous electricity needs.39 The introduction of the steam turbine in thermal plants, which was much more efficient than reciprocating steam engines, propelled a search for demand to fulfill the potential of an economy of scale.40 Another advantage of interconnecting systems or plants was that it allowed mutual assistance in case of incidental shortages. Working along these engineering principles brought unprecedented challenges in organization and finance, in the form of large plants and vast transmission networks.41 34 Hughes, Networks, 346ff. At p. 367 Hughes gives the following definition: "An economic mix is an interconnection of power plants whose energy sources are complementary." 35 Niesz, "L'Echange," 1028. 36 Ibid., 1029-1030. 37 Stier, Staat und Strom: Die politische Steuerung des Elektrizitätssystems in Deutschland 1890-1950 (Mannheim: Verlag Regionalkultur, 1999), 51. Also see Hughes, Networks, 363. 38 Hughes, Networks, 219. 39 Kaijser, "Controlling," 32-33. 40 Hughes, Networks, 363-364. 41 Segreto, "Financing," 163. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 47 0 48 Electrifying Europe HE-W-lfcwelliiliits ED-kY-EinlariUHt»n5 — — — TU Vt, piqtlllicrt 110 kV, jreieMwn \ / ÖSTERREICH y[VDrarlbergl Blmdenz Figure 2.2 - The RWE system in 1928 Source: Boll, Entstehung. 45, image 14. Used with kind permission of BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 48 7-8-2008 14:25:25 "Opening the doors to a revolution" The Unternehmergeschäfte met these challenges.42 Shortly after the Frankfurt exhibition, German manufacturers of electrical equipment formed several electrical enterprises, in which Swiss - and to a lesser extent German and Belgian - banks played an important role as financiers.43 Normally several years passed before electricity plants were in operation, and shares or obligations could not be issued immediately. These holding companies solved the problem this time-lag created by separating the issuing of shares from the long-term finance of new undertaking. This was one reason to incorporate the enterprises in Switzerland, as Swiss legal provisions for issuing bonds were looser than German ones.44 Switzerland's favorable financial institutional setting helped in generating long-term capital.45 In 1895 AEG incorporated the Bank für elektrische Unternehmungen (Elektrobank), with Swiss and German banks Credit Suisse and Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft.46 In the same year Swiss manufacturers of electrical equipment Brown Boveri & Cie (BBC) founded a financial trust named Motor für angewandte Elektrizität, better known as simply Motor - the company Nizzola worked for. German financial institutions provided two-thirds of its capital, and BBC itself most of the remaining third.47 A year later, Siemens created the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für elektrische Industrie, better known as Indelec.iS During their first years of existence, the activities of these holding companies were mainly concerned with financial operations, and were aided by a small staff. This changed around 1904-05 when, generally speaking, more managers and technical sections were added to plan and supervise projects.49 A good example of the new engineering philosophy combined with financing through Unternehmergeschäfte was the system of the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Elektrizitätswerks Aktiengesellschaft (RWE, 1898). In the 1910s and 1920s, RWE 42 Hertner, "Les societes," 342-343. This kind of entrepreneurship was not limited to electricity. Hertner also gives examples of railway undertakings. 43 For Belgium see Ginette Kurgan van Hentenryk, "La patronat de lelectricite en Belgique, 1895-1945," in Strategies,gestion, ed. Barjot et al., 55-69. 44 Albert Broder, "L'Expansion internationale de l'industrie allemande dans le dernier tiers du XIXe siecle: Le cas de l'industrie electrique, 1880-1913," Relations internationales 29 (1982): 78. 45 Hertner, "Les societes," 342-343, and Barbara Bonhage, "Unternehmerische Entscheidungen im Spannungsfeld gesamtwirtschaftlicher Veränderungen: Eine Fallstudie zum organisatorischen Wandel der Bank für elektrische Unternehmungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit und im Zweiten Weltkrieg" (Lizentiatsarbeit, Philosophischen Fakultät I der Universität Zürich, 1998), 49. 46 It was also known under its French name Banque pour entreprises electrique. 47 Patrick Küpper and Tobias Wildi, Motor-Columbus: From 1895 to 2006. Ill Years of Motor-Columbus (Baden: Motor-Columbus, 2006), 3. Also see Luciano Segreto, "Strategie et structure des societes finan-cieres suisses pour l'industrie electrique (1895-1945)," in Allmächtige Zauberin unserer Zeit. Zur Geschichte der elektrischen Energie in der Schweiz, ed. Gugerli (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 1994), 57-72. 48 Hughes, Networks, 164. 49 Ibid., 164-165. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 49 50 Electrifying Europe built relative large plants of different generation types, like the 50 MW brown coal-fired Goldenbergwerke (1914) in the Ruhr area. Later it built the hydroelectric plant of Vermuntwerk (1930) in Austria.50 At the same time, a network of initially 110 kV, and in the 1920s 220 kV, was erected to interconnect them (see Figure 2.2).51 Elektrobank played a fundamental role in connecting the RWE grid to the south to tap into Rhine, Neckar and Alpine regions in Germany and Austria.52 Power plant Goldenberg also connected to Gosgen in Switzerland.53 RWEs system became a Verbundbetrieb, a united operation through cooperation between interconnected power plants, which resulted in a well-balanced economic mix. The cheapest suppliers of electricity, the brown coal plants at the mine heads, made for the year-round base load. River-run hydroelectric plants performed a similar function. Hydroelectric plants with water storage capacities, like the Vermuntenwerk, covered seasonal shortages.54 RWE diversified its load in addition to its energy supply. It supplied electricity to municipalities, but its main clientele was industrial. Chemical works in the Ruhr were persuaded to connect to RWE. Their loads were ideal because they took electricity day and night. In addition, RWE had large steady consumers in iron and steelworks. Hugo Stinnes, the chairman of RWE between 1903 and 1924, saw the policy of mass production and large area supply as rational.55 RWE engineer Arthur Koepchen denned rationalization as "using technology to obtain the economic optimum with a minimum of resources".56 To facilitate such an optimal system, a main switching station became operational in Brauweiler in October 1929, where interconnected plans and load were centrally controlled and monitored.57 RWE s Verbundbetrieb thus was an example of a rational system that crossed national frontiers. 50 On Goldenbergwerke, in 1914 the largest plant in Europe, see Boll, Enstehung, 42-44. For Vermuntwerk, in 1930 by far the largest unit in Austria, see Clemens M. Hutter, "Kriege, Krisen und kein Groschen Startkapital," in Energie für unser Leben, 1947 bis 1997. 50 fahre Verbund (Vienna: Österreichische Elektrizitätswirtschafts-Aktiengesellschaft, 1997), 61. 51 The first 110 kV was built between Lauchammer and Riesa in 1911. Saminaden, Histoire, 3. 52 Hughes, Networks, 424; and Boll, Enstehung, 44. 53 Niesz, "L'Echange," 1030. 54 Ibid., 418. 55 Hughes, Networks, 415. For Hugo Stinnes and his policy of integrating firms backward and forward, see Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 209-212. 56 Ibid., 418. 57 Ibid., 423. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 50 7-8-2008 14:25:25 "Opening the doors to a revolution" Postwar rationalization and regulation The philosophy followed by RWE (minus its international component) was increasingly put into practice within national territories. The experience of wartime economy strengthened notions of optimized organization and rationalization, in a time when the role of the state in most national economies expanded. This included an increasing state influence on the electricity sector. The war and subsequent reconstruction marked a vital turning point in use of electric power. It also saw electrical engineers making a name in wartime organization and postwar recovery.58 As the war and postwar period saw an increase of the importance of electricity, an expansion of regulatory measures affected the production and transmission of electric power. Meanwhile, the role of Unternehmergeschafte dwindled, leaving states the most powerful actors in the electricity sector. In general, the sheer length of warfare during WWI led to a total war economy -an unprecedented feat in modern history. Unaccountable government agencies took care of war mobilization, and led to a corporatist managed society which emerged around the collaboration between state, industry and labor. This went with increased state intervention in production, distribution, and allocating economic resources.59 Engineers played a profound role in those war agencies and administrations. Their emphasis on rationality, efficiency, and scientific methods thus carved a secure place in administrative thinking. These wartime experiences were at least partially carried over into peacetime. As Thomas Hughes writes "[w]artime government had introduced industrial, technological, and scientific planning and control on an unprecedented scale".60 Electricity, which had been introduced in factories to speed up wartime assembly lines, became increasingly associated with rational organization.61 Governments sometimes took over the role of financier of power plants, and stimulated interconnection to make more electricity available without expanding generation capacity.62 Wartime administrators themselves were sometimes directly involved in the electricity industry. This was the case in two belligerent countries, France and Germany. German engineer Walther Rathenau (1867-1922), son of AEG-founder Emil Rathenau, was involved in founding Elektrobank. He is regarded 58 Barjot and Kurgan, "Les reseaux," 72. 59 Philip Morgan, "The First World War and the Challenge to Democracy in Europe," in Ideas of Europe, ed. Spiering and Wintle 69-70. 60 Hughes, "Visions of Electrification and Social Change," in 1880-1980, ed. Cardot, 327-328. 61 Christophe Bouneau, "L'Economie electrique sous l'Occupation: Des contraintes de la production aux enjeux de l'interconnexion," in Les entreprises, ed. Varaschin, 120. 62 Hughes, Networks, 288-289. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 51 52 Electrifying Europe Figure 2.3 - Louis Loucheur, 1872-1931 Source: League of Nations Photo Archive. Used by courtesy of United Nations Office, United Nations Library, Geneva. one of the vital promoters of the principles of rationalization and (state) planning in Germany63 In the service of the Kaiser, Rathenau led the Kriegsrohstoffabteilung of the Prussian War Ministry Already at that time (1915-6), Rathenau proposed to increase state influence in the electricity sector.64After the war he became Minister of Reconstruction in the new Weimar Republic, until his murder in 1922. His French counterpart Louis Loucheur (1872-1931, see Figure 2.3) was an engineer-entrepreneur and co-founder of Societe Giros et Loucheur, an engineering firm specialized in constructing electricity and electric rail networks.65 During the war, he served as under-secretary of state for munitions, and later Minister of Armaments. After the war Loucheur became Minister of Reconstruction. In that role, Loucheur aimed to lay the foundations for a strong, efficient and modern France. He encouraged mass production, and stressed the importance of raw materials and energy, in particular coal and hydroelectric power.66 Most European countries were in the grip of volatile financial climate and high inflation rates in the first years after the war. This also affected the electro-technical industry. The Unternehmergeschafte were able to continue to play a role, but the character of the industry changed considerably. This was because of a wave of 63 W.O. Henderson, "Walther Rathenau: A Pioneer of the Planned Economy," Economic History Review 4, no. 1 (1951): 98-108. 64 Stier, Staat, 367. 65 Stephen D. Carls, Louis Loucheur and the Shaping of Modern France, 1916-1931 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 3-4. 66 Ibid., 129&172ff. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 52 0 7-8-2008 14:25:25 "Opening the doors to a revolution" mergers and cartels, following the process of horizontal concentration (production, transport, distribution, and finance), and territorial concentration and expansion.67 After the war Elektrobank, Indelec and Motor underwent complete reorganizations. Motor merged with Columbus AG fur Elektrische Unternehmungen to Motor-Columbus in 1923.68 These reorganizations were led by the Swiss banks. German firms now only played a minor role in the holding companies. Before WWI the German electro-industry accounted for some 46% of world exports in the sector, this swung between 25 and 28% in the 1920s.69 The Belgian Societe Financiere de Transports et d'Entreprises Industrielles (SOFINA) saw its large share of German capital shrink in favor of Belgian, American, French, and British capital.70 Many German stockholders left Elektrobank. Only one-third of the Aktienkapital remained German; Swiss banks covered the rest.71 For a part this change was because of the new Swiss legislation regarding hydropower, the Wasserrechtgesetz, which stipulated that at least two-thirds of the stock of the concession-taking companies should be Swiss.72 The diminishing role of foreign suppliers of capital and equipment coincided with another development: the encroaching influence of governments on electricity production and transmission. Legislation reinforced the influence of the government on the process. Generally speaking, electricity regulation served a variety of purposes: adjusting prices, replacing coal with hydraulic energy, prioritizing national needs, and making electricity a national public service. The latter involved rationalizing national electricity production by prioritizing interconnections, but also by stimulating electrification, especially of the countryside. In what follows I will discuss these four types of legislation aimed at achieving these four different goals. Although this is not a definitive overview for all European countries, it nevertheless suggests a clear image of the main tendencies in national electricity policy. The first laws concerned electricity prices. The war seriously disrupted international trade flows, and led to different priorities to employ labor and resources. 67 Varaschin, "Etats," 144. 68 Kupper and Wildi, Motor-Columbus, 13. These two companies already were a sort of private union, as Walter Boveri was the initial chairman for both. 69 Peter Hertner, "Financial Strategies and Adaptation to Foreign Markets: The German Electro-Technical Industry and its Multinational Activities: 1890s to 1939," in Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective, ed. Alice Teichova, Maurice Levy-Leboyer, and Helga Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 153-155. In 1931, at the height of the Depression, it would temporarily regain 32.7%. 70 René Brion and Jean-Louis Moreau, Inventaire des archives du groupe SOFINA (Societe Financiere de Transports et d'Entreprises Industrielles) 1881-1988 (Brussels: Archives Generates du Royaume, 2001), XIX. 71 Barjot and Kurgan, "Les réseaux," 75. 72 Bonhage, "Unternehmerische," 50-51. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 53 0 54 Electrifying Europe This led to inflation.73 Coal was scarce immediately after the war, resulting in higher prices. For many former belligerents this created a situation of Kohlenhunger.74 An employee of the new Austrian republic wrote in 1919 that The expansion of water-power is required. The provinces need light and power, the State needs electricity for the railways. The miserable coal situation is widely known.75 This led many governments to interfere with electricity prices. Laws on prices of electricity were for example issued in Belgium (1919), Italy (1919), Spain (1920), Germany (1922), and Poland (1920).76 A second and related form of legislation stimulated the development of hydro-electricity, also as an alternative for thermal power. For Western Europe, Denis Varaschin concludes that between the wars hydroelectricity became seen as the most important form of national energy to develop.77 In countries like Switzerland (1916), France (1919), Portugal (1919), and pre-Mussolini Italy (1919) laws on the exploitation of hydraulic power were issued. Usually, such regulations assigned which level of government within the national frame was responsible for granting concessions for exploitation. Austria set up the Wasserkraft- und Elektrizitatswirtschafts Amtes (WEWA), in 1918 to study rail electrification and to mobilize capital to expand hydroelectric production.78 Further laws in 1921 and 1922 gave tax exemptions on all interest payment for loans raised for new power plants, and on running expenses for a maximum of 20 years.79 A third form of legislation restricted the export of domestically generated electricity, and against foreign (majority) ownership of plants and installations. In 1916 Swiss Cantons got the right to exploit hydroelectric power, or grant concessions 73 Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Golden Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1992), 71. 74 Varaschin, "Etats," 100. 75 "The expansion of water-power is required. The provinces need light and power, the State needs electricity for the railways. The miserable coal situation is widely known." Staatssekretär Dr. Ellenbogen, "Verhandlungen über die Wasserkraft und Elektrizitätswirtschaft mit den Landesvertretungen Salzburg," 1919, file Z.26064 III, box 2184H, folder 425-1, Österreichische Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter: OS). 76 This often concerned price increases or maximum prices. G. Siegel, Die Elektrizitätsgesetzgebung der Kulturländer der Erde, vol. 2, Westeuropa (VDI - Verlag, 1930), 21ff, 566ff & 1015ff. For Germany see his Die Elektrizitätsgesetzgebung der Kulturländer de Erde, vol. 1, Deutschland (VDI - Verlag, 1930), lOlff. For Poland, see Polish National Committee, "Polish Power Resources and their Development," in The Transactions of the First World Power Conference, vol. 1, Power Resources of the World Available and Utilised (London: Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd., 1924), 1129. 77 Varaschin, "Etats," 100-101. 78 Memorandum on the installation of WEWA, December 18, 1918, file Z.674 III, box 2184H, OS. 79 Bundesministerium für Handel und Verkehr, "The Development of and Utilisation of Water Power in Austria," in The Transactions of the First World Power Conference, vol. 1, 698-699. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 54 7-8-2008 14:25:25 "Opening the doors to a revolution" Table 2.3 - Electricity generation (incl, autoproducers) in Europe in GWh, 1932-37 1925 1932 1933 1937 Austria 2,300 2,826 2,969 3,082 Belgium 2,274 4,028 5,672 Bulgaria 132 196.5 Czechoslovakia 1,954.5 2,653 3,016 Denmark 372 657 751 1,104 Estonia 78 89 Finland 1,479 1,692 2,786.2 France 10,222 15,408 17,156 20,218 Germany 20,328 22,129 13,590 Hungary 816 Italy 10,013 11,063 Latvia 115 133 Luxembourg 482 461 662.3 Netherlands 945 2,526 2,614 3,318 Spain 2,795 3,066 Sweden 406 (1926) 4,897 5,334 8,105 Switzerland 2,734 4,867 4,877 6,878 United Kingdom 12,513+ 21,888+ + From April 1st of the year considered until March 31st of the following. Based on: UNIPEDE, Production et de la Distribution d'Energie Electrique, various years; and Kittler, Der internationale. to do so. At the same time, hydroelectricity transmitted across borders needed permission from the Bundesrat.80 The French regulations of October 1919 had a similar tenor. Without a state authorization or concession, no one was allowed to exploit water-power. Export of electricity generated by French water-power concessionaires required state approval, or an international treaty.81 In Italy, a separate law of October 1926 subjected both export and import of electricity to approval by the Minister of Public Works. Authorized electricity imports were subjected to a tariff of 0.025 Lire per KWh.82 Other European countries, too, installed laws governing electricity exports: Czechoslovakia (1919), Finland (1919), Luxemburg (1924), Norway (1917), and Poland (1922).83 Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden were 80 Siegel, Westeuropa, 950-951, in particular articles 1 & 8. 81 Ibid., 165-181, and in particular articles 1 & 27. 82 Ibid., 564-565. In 1928 a two-tier tariff for electricity imports was issued; from November 16 until April 15 the levy remained 0,025 Lire per KWh, but between April 16 and November 15 it was lowered to 0,0015 Lire per KWh. 83 Based on the overview in ECE, Transfers of Electric Power Across European frontiers: Study by the Electric Power Section, UN doc, sen, E/ECE/151 (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), 62-67. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 55 56 Electrifying Europe among the few countries without export restrictions.84 A nationalistic element was sometimes present in these decisions too. The French government wanted to make French industry superior to German industry. Concession-takers were therefore obliged to use equipment from domestic producers and suppliers since 1928.85 If this was impossible or impracticable, the Ministry of Public Works granted special permission for foreign purchases.86 A fourth type concerned the development of electricity as a national public service.87 Such national electricity laws aimed to expand production capacity, to interconnect regional electricity systems, and to encourage a wider distribution of electricity. Germany (1919), Portugal (1926), Luxemburg (1921), France (1928), and Belgium (1922) all adopted such laws.88 Areas still without electricity service often saw the State or subsidiary bodies taking action. Concession-holders were obliged, under certain conditions, to provide electricity to anyone potential customer within their scope, and expand networks of distribution to that. Especially rural areas were electrified in the name of social and economic progress, and sometimes for electoral purposes.89 This electricity-for-all policy eventually led to discussions about creating national networks. In several countries this led to plans for linking regional networks into national interconnections. This was the case in Switzerland, where toward the end of WWI regional producers agreed to build interconnections between their systems.90 In Germany, a 1930 plan by engineer Oskar von Miller aimed to provide a general scheme of a national network, which was to serve as a guideline for further "organic" expansion through interconnection.91 Austrian Staatssekretär Ellenbogen argued in 1918 that in planning large hydroelectricity plants one should think of a transmission network that would integrate newly built power stations with existing ones.92 Portugal issued a law on a national network in December 1927 with a similar aim.93 In Italy a north-south transmission line was seen in the early 1920s as the first step toward a national 84 This point is also made by Barrere, "La genese," 45. 85 Harm Schröter, "A Typical Factor of German International Market Strategy: Agreements Between the U.S. and German Electrotechnical Industries up to 1939," in Multinational Enterprise, ed. Teichova, Levy-Leboyer, and Nussbaum, 160. 86 Siegel, Westeuropa, 139. 87 Christophe Bouneau, Michel Derdevet, and Jacques Percebois, Les reseaux electriques au coeur de la civilisation industrielle (Boulogne: Timee-Editions, 2007), 35. 88 For Germany see Stier, Staat, 379-412; Siegel, Westeuropa, 802-803 (Portugal), 652-653 (Luxemburg), 138-148 (France), and 23-24 (Belgium). 89 Varaschin, "Etats," 90. 90 Ibid., 104-105. 91 Boll, Enstehung, 58-59. 92 "eines Hauptverteilungsnetzes." Memorandum on the installation of WEWA, December 18, 1918, OS. 93 Siegel, Westeuropa, 810-815. Also see Matos et al., A Electricidade, 323. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 56 7-8-2008 14:25:25 "Opening the doors to a revolution" Figure 2.4 - Group portrait of CIGRE's first conference in 1921 Source: CIGRE photos d'archive 1921-1982, collection Fondation Electricite de France, 7 Rue de Percier, Paris. network, which in reality took much longer to realize.94 Planning such networks and interconnections required a standardization of frequency and tension. Over the 1920s, 50 Hz triple phase alternating current became the standard in most of Europe.95 The French Ministry of Public Works recommended the use of 50 Hz as early as April 1918. This was adopted soon after in Portugal, Luxemburg, Belgium, but also in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.96 International organization in the field of electricity While governments took on the issue of electricity supply, electrical engineers were organizing themselves in new international professional societies. In the 1920s, most of these societies discussed national legislation, and how international collaboration could be continued. Generally speaking, membership of these organizations was often arranged through national committees and national professional organizations. Though they were open to all nationalities, the organizations were 94 Giannetti, "Resources," 48-49. 95 Varaschin, "Etats," 142. Varaschin can not pinpoint the exact development that made 50 Hz the standard. 96 Siegel, Westeuropa, 806 (Portugal), 672 (Luxemburg), and 40 (Belgium) L, de Verebélý, "General Survey of Hungary's Power Resources and Their Future Development, with Special Reference to Electrification," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, vol. 1, 924; and Masarykova Akademie Práce, "Review of the Natural Sources of Energy and Their Use in Czechoslovakia," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, vol. 1, 760. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 57 58 Electrifying Europe in effect dominated by countries with an advanced electricity industry The earliest organization, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), was founded in 1906 in London. It essentially made the International Electrotechnical Congress, held since 1881, into a permanent organization. The first discussions in London were between representatives of national (electrical) engineering organizations.97 The aim of the IEC was "to consider the question of standardization of the nomenclature and ratings of electrical apparatus and machinery".98 The 1920s saw the foundation of three more international organizations. One them was the Conference Internationale des Grands Reseaux de Transport d'Energie Electriques a Tres Haute Tension (CIGRE), which gathered for the first time in Paris in 1921. CIGRE brought together engineers interested in electricity-transmission from related national professional organizations. Conferees were not present as national representatives, but as private people, however. Overall, CIGRE s objective was to study technical issues related to the construction and exploitation of large electrical networks at high voltage. But the 1921 conference participants also looked beyond technical subjects. They also devoted their attention to legislation on distribution, and imports and exports of electricity.99 Thus, the first part of the conference was devoted to papers describing national legislation about high voltage transmission lines.100 Four years later another organization was founded. In 1925 the electro-technical industries of Italy, France and Belgium set up the Union Internationale des Producteurs et Distributeurs d'Energie Electrique (UNIPEDE).101 In the following years more members j oined, including Poland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.102 In the first years, UNIPEDE was made up of national professional groups related to electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. The first congress held in Rome in 1926 - with a keynote address by Benito Mussolini - had 220 delegates from 13 countries.103 Within UNIPEDE, too, national regulations were a 97 L. Ruppert, History of the International Electrotechnical Commission - L'histoire de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale (Geneva: Bureau Central de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale, 1956), 1. Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, the United States of America were represented. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were not present but had expressed their interest in joining. Spain and Hungary were represented by their respective ministries of commerce. Canada sent a delegate from the Standardisation Commission. 98 Ibid. 99 Jean Tribot Laspiere, ed., Construction et exploitation des Grands reseaux de transport denergie electrique ä tres haute tension. Compte-rendu des travaux de la Conference Internationale tenue ä Paris du 21 au 26 novembre 1921 (Paris: l'Union des Syndicats de l'Electricite, 1922), 5. "[...] les participants indiquaient qu'ils entendaient ecarter de leur examen et de leurs discussions tous autres sujets, notamment ceux qui concernent la legislation des distributions et l'importation ou l'exportation du courant". 100 Ibid., pp.63-360. 101 UNIPEDE did not see a lot of historical attention. In 2000, the remnant of the organisation commissioned a historical study, providing an overview of its activities. See Lyons, 75 Years. 102 For UNIPEDE, see Henri Persoz, "40 ans d'interconnexion internationale en Europe: Le role de l'UNIPEDE," in Electricite et electrification, ed. Trede, 293-303; and Lyons, 75 Years, 12-13. 103 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 58 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:26 "Opening the doors to a revolution" widely discussed topic. At the UNIPEDE s first meeting in Rome. Italian engineer Domenico Civita presented a report on existing legislation in a wide number of countries.104 Finally, the World Power Conference (WPC) was formed in 1924 to serve as a forum to discuss the worlds emergent energy questions.105 The institutional roots of this organization lay within the British electro-technical industry, while its inspiration lay in the atrocities of 1914-1918. The war, wrote WPC's first chairman Daniel N. Dunlop, "revealed the need for a conference of practical men, scientist, engineers, manufacturers, financiers and politicians, to consider the utilization of the forces of nature, in the light of new internationalism [...]".106 The WPC took their internationalist attitude seriously, and invited Germany to join in order to, in Dunlops words, "seal the spirit of complete goodwill in which the Conference assembled".107 The organization consisted of an International Executive Committee of 23 members, each representing their respective national electricity industries. Geographically, the Committee consisted mainly of European countries, and their (former) colonies.108 In addition, a structure of National Committees existed, populated by leading figures from electricity companies, equipment producers, technical universities, and related state bodies. This was complimented by a permanent secretariat based in London. The first conference saw an attendance of 2,000 delegates from over forty countries.109 Although electricity (mainly hydroelectricity) was only one of many energy-related issues the Conference dealt with, national electricity regulation was widely discussed there. Within these international circles of electrical engineers, producers and entrepreneurs, a consensus emerged: national embedding of electricity regulation was seen as unavoidable, but should it not harm cross-border cooperation and flows of electricity. As an example, I will review a special session at the 1926 World Power Conference in Basel, Switzerland devoted to international exchange of elec- 104 D. Civita, "Sur la situation electrique dans les differents pays. Legislation et statistique," in Comptre rendu des travaux du premier congres international tenu ä Rome en septembre 1926, ed. UNIPEDE (Rome: L'Universale Tipografia Poliglotta, 1926), 489-600. 105 Scarce histories of this organisation are Hans-Joachim Braun, "Die Weltenergiekonferenzen als Beispiel internationaler Kooperation," in Energie in der Geschichte: Zur Aktualität der Technikgeschichte, llth Symposium of ICOHTEC, ed. Braun (Düsseldorf: Verein Deutscher Ingenieure), 10-16; and Fells, World Energy. 106 Cited from Dunlops foreword in The Transactions of the First WPC, vol. I, VII. This idealistic motivation of Dunlop is also acknowledged in Fells, World Energy, 42. 107 Ibid., IX. Germany did form a National Committee, presided by Klingenberg and Von Miller as member. 108 In 1924 countries represented on the Committee were the Australian Commonwealth, Austria, Belgium, the Dominion of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dutch East Indies, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Indian Empire, Italy, Japan, Dominion of New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United States of America, and Yugoslavia. 109 The Transactions of the First WPC, vol. 1, IX. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 59 60 Electrifying Europe tricity. Etienne Genissieu, prominent French engineer and supporter of interconnecting electricity systems, gave an outline of existing interconnections between Switzerland and France.110 To him there was no general solution for the exchange of electricity between nations. Such a solution was not dependent on technical factors, but on sheer diplomacy.111 For one, Genissieu thought that electricity should be free from regular custom and fiscal duties. He argued that it was far more difficult to fix the value of the "cargo" on transmission lines than it was on regular goods. What is the value of a delivery that is variable, mobile, changeable, and that should be immediately be consumed after production?, asked Genissieu.112 Prices were not uniform, but dependent on a multitude of factors; time, place, quantity, use, season etc. He was supported by German engineer Robert Haas, characterized as a supporter of U.S. style laissez-faire in the electricity industry.113 He gave examples of electricity flows between Germany and Switzerland. To Haas it was remarkable that energy-rich countries fenced off their potential with laws and controls. To him, "the European countries today are mentally and economically not yet completely ripe for the alternately exchange of the electricity".114 Both Haas and Genissieu underlined the fact that international exchange was already taking place. But without legislation, larger exchanges would be able to take place resulting in a more rational use of resources.115 Without exception, all papers in the session argued for a laissez-faire regime for international electricity transmission. Swiss Professor Landry underlined this in his General Report on the session. "In spite of all advantages which national interconnection brings with it", he wrote, "there will be in certain countries either a periodical or permanent surplus or shortage of energy".116 Based on the examples named by Haas and Genissieu. Landry valued that international connections "can never have any but a useful and beneficial effect from all points of view".117 Landry added that 110 On Genissieu see Bouneau, Derdevet, and Percebois, Les reseaux, 41-43. 111 E. Genissieu, "Echanges denergie entre pays," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, vol. 1 , 1001 and 1015. 112 Ibid., 1014-1015. 113 The characterisation is made in Stier, Staat, 433. Haas was the director of the Rheinischen Kraftwerke at Rheinfelden. He should not be confused with the French Robert Haas (1891-1935), who was a pivotal figure in the Organisation on Communications and Transit of the League of Nations. 114 "die europäischen Länder sind heute geistig und wirtschaftig noch nicht ganz reif für den wechselweisen Austausch der elektrischen Energie." Robert Haas, "Austausch Elektrischer Energie zwischen verschiedenen Ländern," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, vol. 1, 987. 115 A point also made by Niesz, 'L'Echange', 1049. 116 Professor Landry, "Exchange of Electrical Energy Between Countries: General Report on Section B," in Transactions of the World Power Conference, vol. 1, 1116 117 Ibid., 1117. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 60 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:26 "Opening the doors to a revolution" From an economic and technical point of view [... ] everything speaks in favor of the exchange of energy between countries. Everything possible must be done therefore, to develop this exchange.118 The League of Nations and electricity transmission Efforts were in fact made to regulate international electricity exchange. In their report to the WPC session, both Haas and Genissieu mentioned the work of the League of Nations (LoN) on international electricity transmission. This might seem surprising, as the League is far better known for its - allegedly ailing - political work.119 In general, the three mains tasks for the newly found League were to enforcing the Paris Peace Treaties, promote international security, and to develop international collaboration.120 The League's main bodies were the Assembly, where every country was represented, and the Council, which was the exclusive domain of the "Great Powers".121 The Secretariat, a permanent international administrative service, took care of the overall coordination (see Figure 2.5).122 The LoN engaged in a wide range of so-called "technical activities", in particular through its Health Organization, Economic and Financial Organization, and Organization for Communications and Transit.123 These organizations worked in relative autonomy because both Council and Assembly, staffed with ministers and diplomats, were "ill-suited" to oversee work for which they had "limited knowledge, 118 Ibid., 1124. 119 For histories of the League, see F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); and the more recent Pierre Gerbet, Marie-Renee Mouton, and Victor-Yves Ghebali, Le reve d'un ordre monidale de la SDN a I'ONU (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986). Also the thematic edited volume UN Library Geneva, The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983). 120 Gerbet, Mouton, and Ghebali, Le reve, 42. 121 The Assembly met every September. Each country had one vote. Through history, the Council consisted of three to six permanent members, and between four to eleven elected member states, usually represented by foreign ministers. The original Council members were Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Germany and the Soviet Union later became permanent members, too. 122 Ibid., 36. 123 For an early overview of the Leagues technical work see H.R.G. Greaves, The League Committees and World Order: A Study of the Permanent Expert Committees of the League of Nations as an Instrument of International Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1931). Recently, an excellent study of the work of the Economic and Financial Section has appeared: Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels, "Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organisation," Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 465-492. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 61 62 Electrifying Europe Health Organization Technical organizations Permanent Court of International Justice (International Labor Organisation Associated organizations Figure 2.5 - The basic structure of the League of Nations Adapted from The League of Nations: A Pictorial Survey (1929). The pictures in the background represent (clockwise) the Palais des Nations (used by the LoN between 1936 and 1946, currently the United Nations Office at Geneva), the William Rappard Centre (International Labor Organization 1925-1975, currently World Trade Organization) and the Peace Palace in The Hague (Permanent Court of International Justice, still in use). interest, and time".124 These organizations thus had very little political accountability, and worked mainly with experts. Contemporaries therefore often equated "technical" with "non-political".125 According to one observer, the difference between political and technical was "the distinction between the volitional and the scientific attitude and action upon any given matter".126 124 Martin David Dubin, "Transgovernmental Process in the League of Nations," International Organization 37, no. 3 (1983): 490. A similar point is made in Gerbet, Mouton, and Ghebali, Le reve, 108. According to Pierre Le Marec, the Assembly was "incompetent" for such "technical" work, and needed permanent commissions within the League's structure. See his "L'Organisation des Communications et du Transit" (PhD diss., Universite de Rennes, 1938), 28. 125 Schot and Lagendijk, "Technocratic Internationalism," 198if. 126 Pitman B. Potter, "Note on the Distinction Between Political and Technical Questions," Political Science Quarterly 50, no. 2 (June 1935): 268. A precise definition of the technical approach is hard to establish, as it is not completely limited to the work of engineers. According to Potter "'political' refers to policy or general principle or theory of action, 'technical' to application in detail of previously adopted policy or law". Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 62 7-8-2008 14:25:26 0 "Opening the doors to a revolution" The organization that dealt with electricity was the Organization for Communications and Transit (OCT). A body like the OCT was foreseen during the Paris Peace conference.127 This sentiment was further reinforced by contemporaries' conception that the progress of transport technologies made borders seem obsolete. To South African minister of foreign affairs Jan Smuts, British representative at the Peace Conference in Paris, transport and communications were "bursting through the national bounds and (...) clamoring for international solution".128 At the same time, the League's built on the fruitful inter-Allied cooperation during WWI. During the war, so-called Inter-Allied Councils, in which Italy. Great Britain and France joined forces, had controlled and rationed food, shipping, coal, and munitions. The good experiences with these Inter-Allied Councils inspired the idea to use the LoN for common economic needs.129 In practice the OCT dealt with transport issues (road, rail, maritime, inland waterways, air), aiming to standardize and create international regulatory regimes for them.130 In 1920, the Council agreed to host a conference dealing with such issues. The resulting General Conference on Freedom of Communications and Transit met in Barcelona in 1921 and laid the basis for the OCT. The agenda included ways to restore prewar free trade and unhindered travel, in the form of a General Convention on the Freedom of Communications and Transit. Electricity issues were discussed for the first time as part of talks on an international regime of railways. Most members of the Barcelona Conference were in favor of electrifying international lines. But as these international routes crossed borders, the overhead power lines would, too. Who would be responsible for the necessary electricity became a point of discussion, however. The Italian delegation proposed that countries with large hydroelectricity resources should be responsible for the traction. The suggestion was rejected by 16 votes to 6. But delegates 127 By Covenant article XXIII (e) the League bore responsibility 'to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League'. "Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League will make provisions. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind." 128 J.C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), 43. 129 J.A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration (London: Clarendon Press, 1921). 130 See Frank Schipper, Vincent Lagendijk, and Irene Anastasiadou, "New Connections for an Old Continent: Rail, Road and Electricity in the League of Nations' Organisation for Communications and Transit," in Europe Materializing?, ed. Badenoch and Fickers. Communications at that time was not equated to telecommunications, but to means of transport. Telecommunications was a minor part of League activities, but mostly reserved for other international organisations. For the League's activities concerning radio, see Antoine Fleury, "La Suisse et Radio Nations," in The League of Nations in Retrospect, 196-220. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 63 0 64 Electrifying Europe nevertheless thought the issue interesting enough for further study.131 This provided the first impetus to study the issue of international cession of electricity, for which Paolo Bignami was assigned as expert.132 His primary tasks were to decide whether the issue fell within OCT s competences, and whether it was desirable to devise detailed regulations.133 Judging from Bignami's report, the matter did fall within the mandate of the OCT, as electric traction did make for a great improvement in the means of transport.134 Based on his report, the OCT decided to leave further study of electrifying international railway lines to its Rail Committee. At the same time, however. Bignami saw the need to take up international electricity transmission as a topic of study. According to him, his study only concerned one aspect "of the much wider, and consequently much more complicated, question of the value of international agreements in assisting to bring about a rational exploitation of power [...]".135 He used the 1921-2 electricity transmission from France, via Switzerland, to Italy as an example. International agreements enabled a better regularization of international electricity exchanges. Bignami thought. As state control increased, these agreements should not hamper the principle of sovereignty.136 The OCT approved his suggestion, and therefore appointed a temporary Subcommittee for Hydro-Electric Questions. It presented its first findings in 1923. Whereas rail and waterway transport knew earlier international conventions, the Subcommittee found itself working on a novel issue.137 The Subcommittee therefore refrained from stipulating detailed codes of law, and drew up two Conventions in "very general and elastic terms".138 These Conventions only gave general governing principles. It expected that, in practice, special agreements between states were 131 "Report to the President of the Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and Transit on the Requested Action by the League of Nations for Facilitating the Cession by One Country to Another of Electric Power for the Operation of Railways of International Concern," 1922, registry file 14, box R-1120, League of Nations Archive, Geneva (hereafter: LoN). 132 Bignami, an engineer, was present at the 1921 Barcelona conference, member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and former Under-Secretary of State. 133 "Report to the President of the Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and Transit," 1922, LoN 134 LoN doc, ser. C.212.M.116.1922.VIII, Annex 7, "Report to the President", 31. 135 Ibid., 33. Bignami actually used the French-Italian-Swiss collaboration in 1921-'22, which also opened this Prelude. 136 Ibid., 34. 137 LoN, Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, vol. 3, Electric Questions: Report Concerning the Draft Conventions and Statutes Relating to the Transmission in Transit of Electric Power and the Development of Hydraulic Power on Watercourses Forming Part of a Basin Situated in the Territory of Several States, LoN doc, ser. C.378.M.171.1923.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1923), 3-4 138 LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit: Minutes of the 4th Session: Report of the Sub-Committee for Hydro-Electric Questions, LoN doc, ser, C.486.M.202.1923.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1923), 9. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 64 7-8-2008 14:25:26 0 "Opening the doors to a revolution" needed.139 The first Convention, the Convention on the transmission in transit of electric power, was an attempt to settle matters of international transmission and transit of electricity. In general, all measures and solutions should fit within the "limits of national laws".140 This includes the construction of new lines and installations, either directly by states or concessionary companies. The choices made for new transmission lines should be technical considerations, and not political ones or national frontiers. Transit of electricity should be free of special dues, besides charges for expenses made and services delivered. The second Convention concerned the Convention relating to the development of hydraulic power on watercourses forming part of a basin situated in the territory of several states.111 It aimed to arrange the construction of power plants in rivers or lakes with two or more riparian states. Such plants were already in existence on the Rhine, for example. Here, too, the method of building hydroelectric plants and installations should be a technical consideration, without looking at political borders. Navigable waterways remained subject to the General Convention of the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern. Generally speaking, both Conventions were highly theorectical, and lacked examples from practise. Although fourteen countries initially signed the transit Convention, and thirteen the Convention on hydraulic power, the ratification turnout was low.142 Only a handful of states ratified the Conventions; four for the one on transmission in transit, and five for the one on development of hydraulic power on international watercourses.143 As the group of ratifying countries did not include neighboring states, the Conventions had little practical value. Although the attempt was made to codify the possibilities of continuing and expanding of international electricity flows, it hardly materialized in the form of an international agreement. 139 LoN, doc, ser. C.378.M.171.1923.VIII, 4. 140 Ibid., 5, 141 Ibid. 142 "Conventions adoptees par la Deuxieme Conference generale des Communications et du Transit, Geneve, novembre-decembre 1923. Transmit aux Gouvernements les instruments officiels approuves par la Conference,", 1923, registry file 14, box R-1144, LoN 143 By 1938 this number had increased to respectively eleven (Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt, Great Britain, Iraq, Greece, New Zealand, Panama, Spain, and Western Samoa) and ten (Danzig, Denmark, Great Britain, Iraq, Greece, Hungary, New Zealand, Panama, Siam and Western Samoa). See Sir Osborne Mance, International Road Transport, Postal, Electricity and Miscellaneous Questions (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 148-150. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 65 0 66 Electrifying Europe Conclusions To contemporaries, the emergency electricity delivery to Italy showed the potential of international interconnection of electricity systems. The introduction of larger power plants and especially higher transmission voltages opened new opportunities for collaboration between regional systems. But the first decades of the 20th century saw a double development. On the one hand, the international character of the electricity industry strengthened. The number of transmission lines crossing borders grew. Unternehmergeschäfte financed and built of plants and networks all over Europe and beyond. In addition, a transnational community of electrical engineers emerged through several non-governmental organizations. Yet on the other hand, the Franco-Swiss-Italian collaboration was a rare event. Technically, transmitting electricity between interconnected electricity producers and distributors across borders was possible with relative ease. But politically, international electricity flows became increasingly subjected to the consent of national authorities. Since the end of WWI, most European governments had installed an array of legislation to regulate electricity. On a whole, authorities took an active hand in electrification and provided a framework of rationalization with national borders. One outcome of this development was that in many countries the in- and outflow of electricity needed a form of state approval. Concession systems and other restrictive measures limited the possibilities of international holding companies and previously unchecked international electricity flows. In their first years of existence, international conferences devoted significant attention to such national legislation. To electrical engineers, the national framing became a reality in the first decade after WWI. Their international organizations -CIGRE, UNIPEDE, and WPC - all had national committees or national professional unions as the branches of their organizational tree. But legislation restricting the free flow of electricity across borders was a contested issue, and many pleaded for a more open system. Not only entrepreneurs argued for a laissez-faire regime for international electricity flows. Many engineers thought that international interconnections enabled a better economic mix, improved load factors, and opened perspectives for mutual help. In sum, international cooperation was seen as more rational. International arrangements for easing cross-border electricity flows were tried by LoN. The LoN took up the study of international electricity transmission - and generation - in 1922. It fitted well within the overall work of its OCT, which promoted the freedom of communications and transit. The two Conventions tried to respect national legislation - and sovereignty - as far as possible. They were Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 66 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:26 'Opening the doors to a revolution' 67 hardly a success, however, because only a few states ratified them. Because the first efforts of the LoN had little impact, a different course was taken towards the end of the 1920s, as the subsequent chapter will show. In response to the Leagues failing global attempt, possible solutions became framed within an emerging push for European unity. This was done both in terms of a liberal European exchange regime, but also in the form of a European electrical network. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 67 0 7-8-2008 14:25:26 0 # Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 68 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:26 Chapter 3 Planning a European network, 1927-34 In 1932 the journal L'Europeen featured a front-page article by Marcel Ulrich.1 Ulrich was laureate of the French Ecole de Poly'technique and Ecole des Mines de Paris.2 At the time he also was president of UNIPEDE.3 He earlier served as president with CIGRE. Ulrich thus was distinguished French engineer but also a well-known figure within the international electro-technical community. His article certainly appealed to the latter community, as Ulrich described on-going discussions about a European electricity network. Engineers proposed such schemes starting in 1929, which received supported from the electro-technical community. About at the same time, the International Labor Organization and LoN took similar plans into consideration. Between 1930 and 1937, these Geneva organizations studied its feasibility. To engineers, a European interconnected network enabled a better economic mix by linking thermal and hydroelectric power plants. As the idea of a European network was essentially a technological project, Ulrichs article seemed out of place in L'Europeen. This journal provided a forum for different visions on European values and the future of Europe.4 With other journals like L'Europe, L'Europe nouvelle, Paneuropa, I'Europeen was an outgrowth of the idea of European unity, which gained significant momentum and became a movement in the 1920s. To Europeanists - a loosely grouped elitist alliance of people promoting and believing in European unification - "Europe" seemed a way to overcome economic nationalism and political disagreement, and to restore Europe's pre-war global prestige. Ideas for unifying Europe often included technological projects as a unifying force. The European movement showed fascination with electricity, as well as with rational organization and technological solutions. It 1 Marcel Ulrich, "Un projet de reseau europeen. Le transport de lenergie electrique," L'Europeen 25 (1932). 1 thank Waqar Zaidi of Imperial College for point my attention to this article. 2 Annales des Mines: Biographies relatives ä des ingenieurs des mines decides, s.v. "Jacques Marie Marcel Ulrich", http://www.annales.Org/archives/x/ulrich.html (accessed July 11, 2007). 3 Ulrich ((1880-1933) was UNIPEDE president from September 1930 until July 1932. See Lyons, 75 years, 110. 4 Etienne Deschamps, "L'Europeen (1929-1940): A Cultural Review at the Heart of the Debate on European Identity," European Review of History - Revue europeenne d'histoire 9, no. 1 (2002): 85-95. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 69 0 70 Electrifying Europe is therefore not surprising that Europeanists saw a European electricity network as a tool for forging European unity Many Europeanists believed that such a network could increase material and social progress in Europe. Some even went further: they believed that interconnecting Europe's countries also encompassed a dimension that I would label an ideological mix. In their eyes, the immediate construction of a European high-voltage network could relieve unemployment, spark economic growth, modernize Central and Eastern European economies, and at the same time create a spiritual and unifying European bond. In other words, they regarded the rationalization of Europe's energy economy as a panacea for a multifariousness of interwar issues. Many engineers, however, including Ulrich, did not see immediate prospects for such a network. Rather, they saw it as a long-term and gradual process whereby Europe's electricity structure was rationalized and expanded. This chapter discloses the particular history of the idea of a European electricity network in the 1930s, and traces its origins. This idea originated in the electro-technical community, with support from industry, but it gradually became a regular topic on the international political agenda. A network of engineers, entrepreneurs, and politicians was responsible for spreading this idea. All were infused with European ideas, and convinced that European unification could not only be a political and economic project. "Europe" needed a technological dimension as well. Generally speaking, these actors motivated their ideas by pointing at the economic crisis and deteriorating international relations, but also demonstrated a strong belief in planning, coordination, and rationalization. But the ideal of a European electricity network was not uncontested. A proposal made by Belgium met substantial opposition from national economic interests groups. Many questioned the technological and economic feasibility of such an undertaking. Still, although (national) authorities checked those exchanges of energy flows across borders, in practice electricity exchanges between countries were taking place. Political turmoil eventually brought studies of a possible European network to a halt. European unification and electricity Ideas of European unification gained significant strength after WWI. Such ideas often had roots in much older notions of shared European values, as Europe was seen as a centuries old geographical and cultural concept.5 After WWI, ideas on European unification were more connected to precarious circumstances of the time 5 See for example den Boer, "Europe." Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 70 fift} 7-8-2008 14:25:26 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 and on the options for shaping a better future. During interwar years, "Europe" was envisaged as a possible solution to several lingering political, cultural, and economic issues. WWI itself was interpreted as a low point for Europe's civilization. According to historian Michael Adas "it was clear to virtually all Western thinkers that European civilization had entered a period of profound crisis".6 Historian Jo-Anne Pemberton writes that "visions of despair and warnings that the social and intellectual foundations of Western civilization were disintegrating featured prominently in philosophical and social commentary".7 Politically, the 1919 Paris Peace Treaties restored a balance among European powers. This was however a brittle and precarious one. The dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the re-creation of Poland led to border changes in Central and Eastern Europe. This, in turn, caused problems with minority groups and displaced persons. In Western Europe, fierce hostility still existed between France and Germany, especially over the system of reparations established by the Peace Conference. Economically, these reparations contributed to an unstable conjuncture. Most European countries experienced high inflation during and immediately after the war.8 Fear of inflation and attempts to regain pre-war markets led to inward-looking national economic policies, resulting in a spree of tariff walls and volatile exchange rates. The years after 1929 saw an even further slide into the economic abyss.9 Meanwhile, the United States closed domestic markets to European products, restricted immigration and abdicated from international politics by not joining the League of Nations. The new communist regime in the Soviet Union also turned its back to the international political arena, only to join the League in September 1934. The wish for unifying Europe was a response to these issues.10 Unification -either economically, politically, or both - was a way to restore pre-war European power and prestige.11 A well-defined way towards European unity did not exist. 6 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 381. 7 Pemberton, "Towards a New World Order: A Twentieth Century Story," Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 312. 8 Eichengreen identified a postwar boom to 1919-1921. See Eichengreen, Golden, 107fF. 9 An excellent introduction into the European economic situation after WWI and the Great Depression is Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 10 For an overview of all sorts of European-inspired manifestations during the Interwar, see Pegg, Evolution; and Michel Dumoulin and Yves Stelandre, LTdee europeenne dans I'entre-deux-guerres (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 1992). 11 Analytically speaking, historians often a make distinctions between a political, economical, and cultural path and unity is often made. In practice, these different paths are obviously intertwined. See Sylvian Schirmann, "Introduction," in Organisations internationales et architectures europeennes 1929-1939. Actes du colloque de Metz 31 mai - lerjuin 2001. En hommage ä Raymond Poidevin, ed. Sylvian Schirmann (Metz: Centre de Recherche Histoire et Civilisation de l'Universite de Metz , 2003), 11. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 71 0 72 Electrifying Europe On the whole, economic unification was seen more viable than, and a precondition for, political unification.12 Without economic cooperation, competition was likely to plunge Europe into another major conflict. Economic unification would not only end "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, but would result in a large market as well. The United States with its large domestic market, was observed with a mix of envy and admiration, and often compared to Europe.13 In the 1920s, entrepreneurs and politicians looked across the Atlantic for ideas on how to improve efficiency and rationalization, promoted by the technocracy movement and proponents of scientific management. By applying these ideas, not only in factories and electricity systems but on Europe's economy as a whole, they tried to mimic the economic success of the United States.14 Many argued that to arrive at similar levels of economic prosperity and technical progress, and to be able to resist American economic supremacy, a United States of Europe had to be created as a counterweight. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was one of them. Coudenhove was the founder of the Pan-European movement in 1922 and an important Europeanist thinker in the Interwar period. He thought that only an economic and political organized Europe could compete on an equal footing with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Empire (see Figure 3.1).15 Europe should become the fourth world power. The notion of Pan-America, the association of sovereign states in North and South America, inspired Coudenhove to come up with the term "Pan-Europe".16 Next to Coudenhove, another important ideologue of the European movement was Francis Delaisi (1873-1947). This French left-wing journalist started to publish on international economy and politics after WWI.17 Delaisi identified two contradictions in postwar Europe. Firstly, he condemned the subjection of economic policy to narrow national political interests. To Delaisi, this ran counter 12 Michel Dumoulin, "La reflexion sur les espaces regionaux en Europe ä la aube des annees trente," in Organisations internationales, ed. Schirmann, 24. 13 Contemporary Dannie Heineman explicitly drew potential lessons from the American experience for Europe. See Heineman, Outline of a New Europe (Brussels: Vromant, 1930), 16ff. More recently historian Victoria de Grazia has also written about comparisons being made between the two. See her Irresistible Empire: Americas Advance Through 20th-century Europe (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 2005), 78-95. 14 Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 22ff. Also see Pemberton, "New Worlds for Old: the League of Nations in the Age of Electricity," Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 320. 15 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Vienna: Editions Paneuropeennes, 1928), 4. A recent biography on Coudenhove is Vanessa Conze, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Umstrittener Visionär Europas (Zurich: Muster-Schmidt, 2004). 16 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa ABC (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1931), 3. 17 Michele Pasture, "Francis Delaisi et l'Europe, 1925-1929-1931 (extraits)," in L'Idee europeenne, ed. Dumoulin and Stelandre, 43. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 72 7-8-2008 14:25:26 Planning a European network, 1927-34 Figure 3.1 - Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa (in black) in the world Source: Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa ABC, 32. to existing economic interdependencies between European countries.18 Secondly, Delaisi identified a paradox between what he regarded the "two Europes"; a horsepower-Europe (Europe A) and horse-drawn-Europe (Europe B).19 In "Europe A", Delaisi argued, a mechanized industry came about with the steam engine as key technology. This also led to a new entrepreneurial bourgeoisie that broke the political power of old aristocratic elites. Besides increasing production, these changes triggered democratisation.20 To Delaisi "[h]orse-power [was] the natural supporter of democracy".21 "Europe B" on the other, relied on animal power rather than on steam engines, and knew a latifundia subsistence. A seeming lack of democracy followed the lack of development.22 State intervention could not solve these contradictions, Delaisi argued. Rather, it needed liberal economic principles. For Delaisi, abolishing protectionist policy was the first step towards a peaceful and united Europe. In addition, rationalizing production methods would further strengthen interdependent economic re- 18 This is the main thesis of his Les contradictions du monde moderne (Paris: Payot, 1925). I used the English translation: Political Myths and Economic Realities (London: N. Douglas, 1927). 19 This was the theme of Delaisi's influential Les deux Europes (Paris: Payot, 1929). The dividing line ran across Danzig, Cracow, Budapest, Florence, Barcelona, and Bilbao. 20 Ibid., 47ff. 21 "[l]e cheval-vapeur est le support naturel de la democratic". Ibid, .50. 22 Ibid., 49. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 73 74 Electrifying Europe lations.23 He favored international institutions to guide this process, stressing the triangle of LoN, ILO, and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, 1920).24 Although his ideas were sometimes seen as simple, if not simplistic, they became popular within the international trade union circles and the European movement.25 Delaisis emphasis on planning and rationalization was equally en vogue. This was a notion that would come to infuse European ideas, especially after 1927. While Delaisi saw an important role for technology, the supposed relation between European unification and technology went much further, in particular for network technologies. Many contemporaries regarded these as a unifying force, and fundamental precondition for cultural, economic, and political unity. Starting with railways, argues sociologist Armand Mattelart, the image of the network served as a guide for the first formulation of a redemptive ideology of communication. Networks of communication were envisaged as created of a new universal bond.26 Electricity transmission systems enable certain forms of transport and communication networks.27 While these latter two physically circulate messages and ideas, and potentially bring people together, electricity is not able to do this directly. But figuratively electricity was nonetheless seen as a means of connecting people and carrying ideas. Some saw electrification as an incentive to collaboration. For example American engineer Charles P. Steinmetz claimed that "to get the economy of the electric power, co-ordination of all the industries is necessary, and the electric power is probably today the most powerful force tending towards coordinations, that is cooperation".28 In addition, electricity network also served as a powerful symbol. For example, the French internationalist magazine Notre Temps introduced a weekly column in 1929 named La Jeune Europe, which reported on the progress on European unification.29 The headers used in this of Notre Temps 23 Franck Thery, Construire L'Europe dans les annees vingt: L'action de l'Union paneuropeenne sur la scene franco-allemande, 1924-1932 (Geneva: Institut europeen de l'Universite de Geneve, 1998), 53; and Delaisi, Les deux, 193. 24 Thery, Construire, 56. 25 Dumoulin, "La reflexion," 25; and Patrick Pasture, "The Interwar Origins of International Labour's European Commitment (1919-1934)," Contemporary European History 10, no. 2 (2001): 226-227. 26 Mattelart, The Invention, 85. 27 This is stressed in Nye, Electrifying, 26. 28 Steinmetz is cited in Ibid., 167. 29 The column was written by Pierre Brossolette, who was a well-established French journalist and member of the Section Erancaise de Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO), a socialist party. He also wrote for L'Europe nouvelle. During the German occupation he was active in the Resistence movement. On the role of Notre Temps within the Interwar Europeanist circle, see Klaus-Peter Sick, "A Europe of Pluralist Internationalism: The Development of the French Theory of Interdependence from Emile Dürkheim to the Circle Around Notre Temps (1890-1930)," Journal of European Integration History 8, no. 2 (2002): 45-68. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 74 7-8-2008 14:25:29 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 Figure 3.2 - Headers in Notre Temps Headers from La Jeune Europe, a column printed in the journal Notre Temps, from different years. I am indebted to Waqar Zaidi for providing me with these images. confirm electricity's prominent role in Europe's (see Figure 3.2).30 The first image shows two male figures reaching out to each other, while standing in from of electricity poles. The second shows a birds' view of Europe, with electricity lines in the fore cover the continent. The asymmetric crescendo directions of the power lines also suggest progress. While the first images hints at a European electricity network, the second invokes a form of European cooperation and progress through electricity.31 In particular, electricity networks were regarded bearers and indicators of progress. Rural electrification was often associated with a modernization mission. It brought an "urban" technology into the hinterland, and made its inhabitants equally "modern".32 The halo of progress and cooperation surrounding electricity functioned like a magnet.33 Thus, "Europe" and electricity had symbolic overlap in this period. An explicit combination of such ideas is the foreword to Delaisi's Les deux Europes, written by Dannie Heineman.34 Heineman, a German-trained electrical engineer of American origin, was administrator of SOFINA. This was one of the largest Unternehmergeschafte in the 1920s and 1930s. In the foreword, Heineman argued that the war had deprived Europe of its former grandeur and markets.35 European countries responded by protecting domestic markets, while subsidising export industries. Heineman saw two main problems. First, a market crisis 30 The first image of the two men seems to anticipate the journal's later cooperative stance towards the national-socialistic ideology, especially when paying attention the right arm of the person on the right. 311 thank Dr. Alexander Badenoch for helping me in analyzing this imagery. 32 Coutard, "Imaginaire". 33 Schivelbusch, Disenchanted, 75. Nye makes a similar point in Electrifying, 168. 34 Heineman, "Preface," in Delaisi, Les deux Europe (Paris: Payot, 1929), 7-20. 35 Ibid., 8. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 75 0 76 Electrifying Europe in "Europe A" leading to unemployment, and second, an agricultural crisis in "Europe B".36 Heineman envisaged electricity to restore the "broken economic harmony" between "Europe A" and "B" and to help mend both crises.37 Electrification would help lowering costs of manufactured products in Europe A, thus making its products more competitive on world markets. At the same time, production and purchasing power of agricultural communities in Europe B would be raised. According to Heineman it was electricity that enabled every European region to industrialise.38 "The imbalance caused by horse-power", wrote Heineman, "is abolished by kilowatt".39 An International Clearing House should help finance large works of public interest, like railways but in particular power plants and networks.40 In addition, Europe should rationalise its economy; not only its production, but also its sales and the transport of products. The European project taking shape Despite this wide range of ideas about European unification, no central rallying point existed for the European movement. This changed in 1929. On September 5 of that year, Aristide Briand addressed the Assembly of the LoN, and proposed to seek a way to forge a United States of Europe. The initiative of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in retrospect seems a supreme attempt to forge European security and stability, both politically and economically. His appeal to the Assembly underlined the need for "some sort of federal bond" between the people of Europe to tackle the political and economic issues. Briand aimed to provide a political dimension to on-going "technical and economic initiatives".41 It helped to carve a niche for a regional and European policy in the LoN. That niche would be the Commission for Enquiry on European Union (CEEU).42 Set up by the Assembly in September 1930, this commission was the main vehicle within the League on European collaboration. It worked closely with other League organizations and commissions. But it also radiated outside the Leagues sphere. 36 Ibid., 11-12. 37 Ibid,, p. 17. The disturbance between Europe A and B was, according to Heineman, primarily caused by the introduction of steam power. 38 Ibid. 39 "Le desequilibre que le cheval-vapeur a provoque c'est le kilowatt qui le supprime". Ibid., 17. 40 Ibid., 11-12. 41 LoN, Verbatim Record of the 10th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 6th Plenary Meeting, LoN doc, ser., A. 10.1929 (Geneva: LoN, 1929), 5. 42 One of few studies on the CEEU is Antoine Fleury, "Une evalution des travaux de la Commission d'Etude pour l'Union Europeenne 1930-1937," in Organisations internationales, ed. Schirmann, 35-53. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 76 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:29 Planning a European network, 1927-34 While Briand's proposal placed European unification firmly on the international political agenda, it was preceded by several initiatives in the economic sphere. For one, within the international labor movement "Europe" functioned as "a unifying concept" since the early 1920s.43 For another, support for European economic cooperation gained a foothold, especially in the financial and corporate world.44 The first initiatives came from politician-industrialists, and were inspired by continuing Franco-German antagonisms. In 1921 the French Minister of Liberated Areas, Louis Loucheur, and the German Minister of Reconstruction, Walther Rathenau, struck an agreement in Wiesbaden, on paying German reparations in kind.45 The Wiesbaden agreements were however revoked because of domestic opposition.46 Further rapprochement between France and Germany was reached, however. Many considered 1924-1925 a turning point.47 The 1924 Dawes Plan restructured German reparations payments and led to an influx of capital which ended high inflation in German.48 The next year the Pact of Locarno fixed the Franco-German border, politically rehabilitated Germany's position in Europe, thus solving another major issue haunting the European scene. Germany's reentry in international politics sparked a wave of commercial agreements and 14 international cartels were formed between 1924 and 1926.49 In particular the Entente Internationale de FAcier was regarded as an economic counterpart to Locarno.50 Comprising an iron and steel production cartel of Belgian, French, German, and Luxembourg companies, this entente was signed in 1926 after eight months of negotiation.51 According to one historian, before 1925 the debate on schemes for European unification was disparate, but "[w]hat followed after 1925 was characterized by the fact that the discussion became more concentrated, more purposeful".52 43 Pasture, "The Interwar," 222ff. 44 Eric Bussiere, La France, la Belgique et l'organisation economique de L'Europe, 1918-1935 (Paris: Comite pour l'histoire economique et financiere de la France, 1992), 315. Also see Thery, Construire 63ff. 45 See Ibid., 64-65; Bussiere, La France, 131-135; and Louis Loucheur and Jacques de Launay, Carnets secrets, 1908-1932 (Brussels: Editions Brepols, 1962), 84-95. 46 This opposition was not just domestic. In particular Great Britain was, within the International Reparations Commission, against such a scheme. See Carls, Louis Loucheur, 228-234. 47 For positive changes between Germany and France see Thery, Construire, 9-13. He points to three developments in particular. First, the accession of Gustav Stresemann as Chancellor, who was willing to fulfill Germany's obligations as laid down in the Versailles Treaty. Second, the adoption of the Dawes Plan in August 1924. The third event was Germany's recognition of its western border vis-ä-vis Belgium and France. 48 Patrick O. Cohrs, "The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925," Contemporary European History 12, no. 1 (2003): 1-31. 49 Thery, Construire, 57-58. 50 Maier, Recasting, 542. 51 Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and Hungary later joined. Thery, Construire, 60. 52 Peter Krüger, "European Ideology and European Reality: European Unity and German Foreign Policy in the 1920s," in European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, ed. Peter M.R. Stirk (London: Pinter, 1989), 86. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 77 0 78 Electrifying Europe One such purposeful development was set in motion by Louis Loucheur in that year. Loucheur proposed to host an international economic conference, under the auspices of the LoN.53 The European economy in particular was to be a central topic. Loucheur, active in both politics and industry, envisaged an economically unified Europe, based on industrial cooperation.54 Historian Stephen Carls stressed how Loucheur realized during the Paris Peace negotiations that "the Germans would eventually outstrip the French economically, regardless of the measures taken at the conference".55 From that moment he was a proponent of a European economic system with Germany as a cornerstone. Loucheur envisaged such a European economy existing of private ententes in the industrial sector - like coal, steel, iron, chemicals, and electricity -, and in particular along a German-Franco axis. Such a "Europe des producteurs" had two main advantages, according to Loucheur. First, it enabled processes of rationalization beyond the scope of a single country, encompassing the whole of Europe. Second, international agreements could help transform the existing climate of custom barriers, and restore pre-war purchasing power.56 The International Economic Conference eventually took place in Geneva, in May 1927. During the previous eighteen months, the Leagues Economic Organization and the appointed Preparatory Committee worked to achieve a consensus. They decided that the Conference participants should be experts in economics, trade, industry, and scientific management.57 The subsequent Conference succeeded in passing resolutions on lower trade tariffs. Negotiations on tariff truces were one topic, and another was economic rationalization within a European framework - along the lines of Loucheur. According to a report by ILO on the conference, "[t]he whole work of the Conference was dominated by the idea of rationalization".58 In particular, the Conference discussed the ideal of a rational distribution of work between nations, including relations between agricultural and industrial countries. International industrial agreements were equally seen as a measure of rationalization.59 The closing resolution of the Conference stressed that these measures were of a European nature: 53 The whole international and French context surrounding this proposal is best explored in Chapter II of Bussiere, La France, 257ff. 54 Veronique Pradier, "L'Europe de Louis Loucheur: Le projet dun homme d'affaires en politique," Etudes et documents V (1993): 295. Also see Bussiere, "L'Organisation economique de la SDN et la naissance du regionalisme economique," Relations internationales 75 (1993): 304. 55 Carls, Louis Loucheur, 171. 56 Pradier, "L'Europe", 295; and Thery, Construire, 65-66. 57 Pemberton, "New Worlds", 319. 58 International Labour Office, The Social Aspects of Rationalisation: Introductory Studies (Geneva: P.S. King, 1931), 5. 59 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 78 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:29 Planning a European network, 1927-34 [T]he Conference has fully carried out its task of setting forth the principles and recommendations best fitted to contribute to an improvement of the economic situation of the world and in particular to that of Europe, thus contributing at the same time to the strengthening of peaceful relations among nations.60 From Loucheurs suggestion for an economic conference, inspired by his quest for economic unification, to Briands politically oriented proposal seemed a logical next step. In September 1930 a Japanese delegate to the LoN noted that "the European federation, that is Briand and Loucheur".61 Adding a technological part to these economic and political initiatives for uniting Europe seemed almost equally logical. This technological part also included electricity networks. At the International Economic Conference, electricity was one topic on the table. Among many other cartels under discussion Loucheur himself pleaded for forming an electricity cartel, based on Franco-German cooperation.62 At the same time, the Conference recognised the electricity industry as one where international rationalisation made sense, which should lead to lower prices and increased production. Direct reference was made to the potential role of international connections between various hydroelectric and thermal power plants: From year to year co-operation between hydroelectricity power stations and coal-fired power stations improves as a result of the increasingly high voltages used for transmission. [...] Thus the idea of an international linking-up of water- and steam-produced electrical energy is advancing towards realization, and wholly new vistas are opening for international co-operation in power generation. (...) By this system the question of world power supply might perhaps be more economically solved than ever before.63 Although electricity was part of discussions on international rationalization, it was not directly linked to European cooperation. It was about to happen, however, as within the international electro-technical community ideas of Europe and ideas of rationalization were invoked simultaneously in the form of a common electricity system. 60 LoN, World Economic Conference: Discussion and Declarations on the Report of the Conference at the Council of the League of Nations on June 16th,1927 (Geneva: LoN, 1927), 14. 61 "la Federation européenne, c'est Briand-Loucheur." Cited in: Pradier, "L'Europe", note 39. 62 René Brion, "Le role de la Sofina," in Lefinancement de l'industrie électrique, 1880-1980, ed. Monique Trédé-Boulmer (Paris: Association pour 1'histoire de lelectricité en France, 1994), 226. 63 LoN, International Economic Conference, Geneva, May 1927, vol. 16, Documentation: Electrical Industry (Geneva: LoN, 1927), 17. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 79 0 80 Electrifying Europe Imagining Europe electrically The first idea for a European-wide electricity network was put forward in May 1929.64 This was two years after the International Economic Conference, and several months before Briand's speech. French engineer George Viel presented a paper on the potential of400 kV technology and its application in France, at a conference hosted by Groupe du Sud-Est de la Societe Frangaise des Electriciens. He argued that exploiting distant hydroelectric resources was difficult without transmission voltages higher than 220 kV, regardless of the precise location.65 At 400 kV electricity could be transmitted over 1,000 km without substantial losses. This would enable France to construct connections with neighboring countries like Spain and Italy, but also with the Ruhr and Sarre regions.66 Seasonal exchange with these countries thus resulted in saving large amounts of precious coal. Viel argued that a 400 kV grid could connect centers of hydroelectricity production, and therefore enabled the exchange of seasonal surpluses.67 In the last part of his paper, Viel pondered on the possibilities of 400 kV on the European mainland.68 Here similar results could be achieved: a better economic mix, better connections between generation and consumption, resulting in lower electricity prices. The main difference, however, was the increase of scale of rationalization. This in addition enabled peak load savings because of the longitudinal time differences. He added a map of a possible scheme for such a European network (see Figure 3.3).69 Viel's interest in long-distance transmission predated his 1929 plan. As director of the Compagnie electrique de la Loire et du Centre, he pioneered in erecting interconnections at 52 and 120 kV. He also planned an interconnection between the Massif Centrale and the Alpine regions by higher voltages, which was gradually brought into service under Viel's guidance between 1925 and 1940.70 His ponder-ings on an electricity network beyond French borders were therefore not startling. 64 Several of these plans have been mentioned elsewhere, but mostly to illustrate Interwar thinking or as examples of technocratic Utopias. Never before have its impact been properly assessed. See for example Fridlund and Maier, "The Second."; Maier, "Systems Connected: IG Auschwitz, Kaprun, and the Building of European Power Grids up to 1945," in Networking Europe, ed. Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, 129-158. The earlier mentioned Atlantropa project by Hermann Sörgel will not be dealt with here. This plan never saw serious consideration on the international level. 65 Georges Viel, "Etude dun reseau 400.000 volts," Revue generale de l'electricite, no. 28 (1930): 729. 66 Ibid., 740. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 741-744. 69 Ibid., 742-743. 70 Claire Seyeux, "Gestion du personnel: La reponse de Loire et Centre 1912-1932," in Strategies, gestion, ed. Barjot et al., 382. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 80 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:29 Planning a European network, 1927-34 Figure 3.3 - George Viel's 400 kV network for Europe Source: Viel, "Etude," 743, figure 14. Why Viel thought in terms of a European 400 kV network is more difficult to explain. Viel was the first to think in terms of a European system, but his paper does not explain what inspired him to think in European terms. Still, in retrospect, there appears to be a possible source of inspiration. The Compagnie electrique, Viel's employer, belonged to the Societe Giros et Loucheur, partly owned by Louis Loucheur.71 Taking his ideas on Europe and rationalization into consideration, and his activities in the electricity sector, it seems fair to assume that Louis Loucheur's ideas were of influence on Viel. Viel clearly set a trend. Only one year later, in June 1930, Ernst Schonholzer championed an electricity plan for Europe.72 The scheme of this engineer from Zurich resembled Viel's. Schonholzer agitated against the "waste" of coal, and argued for a better utilization of hydropower in Europe. He envisaged a grid interconnecting major consumption areas, in particular the cities of London, Berlin, 71 Ibid., 378-381. 72 Ernst Schönholzer, "Ein elektrowirtschaftliches Programm für Europa," Schweizerische Technische Zeitschrift 23 (1930): 385-397. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 81 82 Electrifying Europe Table 3.1 - European network proposals in size and costs (including plants) Architect Size Costs (in 1930 Swiss Fr)* Load Saving per year Georges Viel 3,000 kmf 10.4 billion Fr. 79.5 million kWf 7 million kW Ernst Schonholzer 3,800 km 25 billion Fr. 6.4 million kW 24 mil, tons of coal Oskar Oliven 9,750 km 240 billion Fr. 20 million kW - * Converted on basis of League of Nations Statistical Yearbook of 1930. 1 New network necessary in France for national grid and high-capacity transmission lines into neighboring countries. Load represents the hydro-electric potential in Europe as a whole. Viel did not indulge in extensive calculations for his European scheme. Paris, and Vienna.73 While Viel assumed the use of 400 kV, Schonholzer calculated his plan based on a transmission voltage of 660 kV. The Channel would be traversed by use of an overhead transmission line between Calais and Dover. A main difference concerned Schonholzer s invocations of Europeanist ideas. Although Schonholzer cannot be linked to any prominent Europeanist, he listed both the initiatives of Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi as inspiration. He argued that Briand's plan for a United States of Europe needed "an electrical-economic program striving for a uniform and rational use of white and black coal".74 According to Schonholzer, if Europeans could curb their internal political tensions, international HV transmission lines could serve as a symbol of a yet existing European "Kulturgemeinschaft".75 Schonholzer remained a rather anonymous figure and he did not make a lasting impact on the electro-technical community. But a German colleague of him did. In the same month, German engineer Oskar Oliven gave a General Address at the second World Power Conference in Berlin, in which he pleaded for a European electricity system.76 Oliven, the Director-General of the Gesellschaft fur Elektrische Unternehmungen (GESFUREL) in Berlin, was the first to introduce this idea at an international event, which explains why his Address arguably had the biggest impact within the international electro-technical 73 Ibid. 74 "ein elektrowirtschaftliches Programm zum Zwecke der einheitlichen, rationellen Ausnützung der weissen und der schwarzen Kohle". Ibid., 385. "White coal" was an oft-used expression for hydro-electric-ity 75 Ibid. 76 Oskar Oliven, "Europas Großkraftlinien. Vorschlag eines europäischen Höchtspannungsnetzes," Zeitschrift des Vereines Deutscher Ingenieure 74, no. 25 (June 21, 1930): 875-879. Olivens contribution can also be found in the proceedings of the 1930 Berlin WPC. It was also published as a separate booklet, in French, German, and English, being "European Super Power Lines: Proposal for a European Super Power System" (General Address presented at the World Power Conference, Berlin, 1930). Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 82 7-8-2008 14:25:29 Planning a European network, 1927-34 Figure 3.4 - Oskar Oliven's scheme for a European super power system Source: Oliven, "Europas". Used by permission of the World Energy Council, London, www. worldenergycouncil. org. community.77 In later years, any notion of a European network was often referred to as "the Oliven-plan". In his Address, Oliven reminded his fellow engineers how electricity supply grew from a local to regional service. Like Viel and Schonholzer, he too looked at a further scale increase, arguing that it was time to look ahead: [T] o-day we are facing the fact that exchange of energy and compensation of load are taking no heed of political frontiers. Now is the time for us to realize that we have not yet considered that this exchange and compensation is a question of the greatest importance for the whole of Europe and we have not yet done anything in this matter to ensure and organized cooperation of the political and economic factors of our Continent.78 He envisaged a network of approximately 9,750 km, consisting of five main lines (see Figure 3.4). Three lines ran from north to south: from Norway to Rome, from 77 Viel would present his paper only one year later at a CIGRE conference. See Georges Viel, 'Etude dun reseau a 400.000 volts', in Compte rendu des travaux de la sixieme session de la C.I.G.R.E. (Paris: Union des Syndicats de l'Electricite, 1931). 78 Oliven, European, 1. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 83 84 Electrifying Europe Calais to Lisbon, and from Warsaw into Yugoslavia. These were complemented by two east-west lines: from Paris to Katowice, and from Rostov to Lyon. Together they combined a tight coupling between areas with hydro and coal-fired power stations on the one hand, and large centers of consumption on the other. Like the two other proposals, this European system would exploit existing energy sources to a better extent, and help to shave peak loads. It also allowed exploitation of hy-dropower all over Europe, whereby Oliven targeted the Danube and the Dalmatian coast as well.79 Oliven hoped that his "super power lines" would open up these regions economically. Technologically, Oliven did not see insurmountable problems. He pointed out that new 200 kV lines were built to eventually operate at 400 kV.80 In his eyes, 400 kV thus was possible, or at least would soon be possible. Outside technological issues, Oliven expected that in particular "personal and political motives" were potential barriers.81 Such motives earlier had prevented otherwise sound interconnections of plants and systems on smaller scales, and prevailed over economic-technical logic. Oliven, unlike Schönholzer, did not directly legitimate his idea by referring to plans for European unification, but by pointing to the economic advantages and efficiency of such a network. Still, Oliven recognized that the existing old European culture provided the most suitable grounds for an "Elektro-Verbund-Wirtschaft".82 To Oliven, the effectuation of a general electricity plan for all of Europe was 'a self-evident fact for the coming generations'.83 This did however not imply that Oliven expected his "europäischen Großkraftliniennetzes" to be realized in the short term. Crucially, Oliven did not see his grand vision to be completed before the coming generations.84 He recognized a growing number of interconnections between emerging national systems. Oliven regarded these "a very good interim solution for the period until the time when the difficulties standing in the way of a common European high voltage system are removedby international agreements".85 The first practical step towards a rational electricity supply in Europe was to create a European electricity network. Such an undertaking should be studied within the scope "of a very large organization", argued Oliven.86 Although not specifying 79 Ibid., 3-4. 80 Ibid., p.2. From 1929 on, RWE in Germany constructed 220 kV, which were also equipped to carry a voltage of 380 kV. See Boll, Entstehung, 46. 81 Oliven, European, 1-2. 82 Oliven, "Europas," 879. 83 Oliven, European, 1. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 6. 86 Ibid., 10. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 84 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:29 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 particular organizations, he urged scientists, politicians and engineers at the conference to use their influence with their respective governments. This appeal by Oliven resonated with ideas articulated by Dannie Heineman. In his foreword to Les deux Europes in 1929, he too proposed to take up the concept of an electrified Europe as object of a general study.87 During UNIPEDEs third congress in September 1930, he made another point similar to Oliven. There, Heineman proclaimed that "the great revolution of tomorrow" was an international entente or cartel between electricity producers and distributors that could establish a comprehensive economic plan for the electrification of Europe.88 However, Heineman added that such collaboration had to be preceded by national cooperation between electricity companies. Heineman did not only have a message similar to that of Oliven, there was also a personal link. The two studied together and since 1922 Heinemans SOFINA owned a quarter of the shares of Olivens enterprise GESFÜREL.89 Thus, the two men most certainly knew of each others lecture. Like Viel, Heineman also knew Loucheur. Together they set up a consortium for a traction system in Constantinople in 1911.90 In 1927 Heineman, like Loucheur, had argued for an international cartel of electricity producers and distributors. According to him, only international collaboration enabled a technical and economic rational exploitation of natural resources.91 Taken together, their visions about Europe and electricity combined encompassed both an economic mix as well as an ideological mix. While Oliven stressed the rationalizing effects of connecting consumption and production centers, Heineman hoped to raise Europe out its industrial and agricultural depressions. The idea of a European network became known outside engineering circles. By 1929, Heineman was well-entrenched within the European movement, and was a crucial promoter. He was a member of Count Coudenhove-Kalergis Paneuropa Union, which included also Briand and Loucheur, and involved in setting up its Economic Office.92 Towards the end of 1930, Heineman gave several lectures in 87 Heineman, "Preface," 18-19. 88 "la grande revolution de demain". "Discours de D. Heineman," in Congres international de l'UNIPEDE ä Bruxelles, 1930, Compte rendu. Cited in Brion, "Le role," note 31. This event is also mentioned in Liane Ranieri, Dannie Heineman, patron de la SOFINA: Un destin singulier, 1872-1962 (Brussels: Editions Racine, 2005), 181-182. 89 GESFÜREL, "Contrat de collaboration," 1922, file 5663, box 26, collection SOFINA, Belgium State Archives, Brussels (hereafter BSA). Oliven was already involved with SOFINA as representative on the management board since at least 1912. 90 Ranieri, Dannie Heineman, 68-73. 91 Heineman, "Internationale Elektrizitätswirtschaft," Wirtschaftshefte der Frankfurter Zeitung, 1927, 26. 92 The Economic Office would be housed in SOFINAs office in Brussels. Ranieri, Dannie Heineman, 327. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 85 0 86 Electrifying Europe German and French entitled "Sketches of a new Europe", in which he conveyed ideas from Les deux Europes.93 This lecture, eventually published in three languages and two Europeanist journals, made both Heineman and his ideas more widely known - including his emphasis on the potential role of electricity94 Paul Hymans (1865-1941), Belgian minister of foreign affairs, was clearly inspired by Heinemans lecture.95 In early 1931, Hymans sent the text around the Belgian diplomatic service in Europe.96 Likely, Hymans also knew about Heinemans suggestion to start a study into the electrification of Europe, made in the foreword of Delaisi's book. Already in January 1930, Belgian embassies and consulates in Europe started to send information about electricity laws of their respective host countries to Hymans' Brussels ministry.97 Soon, the Belgian foreign ministry took up Olivens suggestion to bring such a study within the scope of a large organization; the League of Nations. The League and a European electricity network The League's OCT studied electricity in an international context starting in 1921. The two 1923 Conventions were however hardly successful. A change of course took place after that. Since 1924 the Subcommittee dealing with electricity became a permanent one, renamed as the Committee on Electric Questions (CEQ). In ad- 93 Heineman, Outline. His lecture shows all elements of the typical European project of the Interbel-lum. Heineman hoped to tackle the economic and financial troubles of his time- heavily inspired by the America experience -, and give "the vision of an engineer", with technological integration reinforces the political authority. According to Heineman three crucial elements were needed for forging a "United States of Europe". Firstly, a financial organism comparable to the U.S. Federal System of Banks. Heineman thought that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 1930) would be a good starting point. Second, an administrative organism was needed, similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Thirdly, means of transport and communications had to expand between the European states, enabling a more optimal mode of trade. 94 It was issued in an English, German and French version. In 1930 it was published as "Esquisse dune nouvelle Europe," L'Europeen 7 (1931): 1-7. One year later it was again printed as "Das Wirtschaftliche Gleichgewicht Europas," Paneuropa 6, no. 2 (1930): 48-56 95 Paul Hymans (1865-1941) studied law in Brussels, and acted as minister of foreign affairs in four In-terwar cabinets (1918-1920, 1924-1925, 1927- 1934, and 1935-1935). He was minister of economic affairs during the last two years of WWI, and represented Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference. He was the first chairman of the General Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920. 96 Letter by Hymans to diplomatic service, 19 January 1931, file 11440: Commission consultative des Communication et transit, Diplomatic Archive of Belgium, Brussels (Diplobel). Hymans introduced Heineman as "a friend from business". 97 Dossier "Documentation sur de la legislation et la reglementation concernant l'importation et Importation et le transit d'energie electrique dans divers pays," 1929-1933, file 4643: Pan-Europa, Diplobel. The dossier includes letters from ambassadors from Sweden, Greece, France, Latvia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Luxembourg. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 86 7-8-2008 14:25:30 Planning a European network, 1927-34 dition, its competence increased as electrical engineers and other specialists now staffed the Committee.98 The CEQ got in touch with the IEC, WPC and CIGRE, and offered them representation on the Committee.99 Still, it did not have the expected result as the Committee was rather inactive. The CEQ gathered in 1927 and 1928, but without taking new issues into consideration. This was about to change in 1930 as ideals of a European electricity network were to gain momentum within the League of Nations. In the slipstream of Briands proposal and setting up the CEEU, the CEQ was about to rejuvenate its work. The Belgian government triggered this by making several proposals to the CEEU in December 1930. One of these related to international electricity exchanges.100 In recent years, according to the Belgian proposal, the main industrial countries in Europe with common frontiers built cross-border electricity lines, and electricity exchange gained importance. Belgium thought that these exchanges were increasingly important, but at the same time ever more controlled - sometimes restricted - by national laws. The Belgian government stressed that "national legislations should not stand in the way of such a program and that a definite statute should be established to enable it to be carried into effect".101 So far, the proposal stayed close to the earlier international Convention on electricity transmission and transit, whose disappointing results were regretted by the Belgian government. But an important deviation from the previous ideas was that Belgium considered the issue - under present technical conditions - essentially a "continental one". Belgium opted for a European solution, which it expected to have immediate effects. The CEEU was therefore requested to study electricity transmission in a European framework. This was to be able to "already look forward to the time when these exchanges can no longer be limited to two neighboring countries, but when they will have to extend the whole continent, which will have to be covered 98 New members were the director of the Elektrobank, J. Chuard, the Swede and Director-General of Hydraulic Power and Canals F.W. Hansen, and the Frenchman G. Arbelot who held the position of Director of Hydraulic Power and Electricity Distribution in the Ministry of Public Works. LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit: Minutes of the 6th session Held at Geneva, March 12th - 14th, 1924, LoN doc, ser., C.196.M.61.1924.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1924), 4 and 6. 99 "Permanent Committee on Electric Questions: Report on the Work of the First Session," 23 November 1926, registry file 14, box R-1144, LoN I could however not find any interferences or interruptions of IEC, WPC, and CIGRE in minutes of the Committee. In other words, although there was a live correspondence between those organisations and Geneva, physical representation cannot be confirmed. 100 LoN, Proposals put Forward by the Belgian Government for the Agenda of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, on December 11th, 1930, LoN doc, ser., C.706.M.298.1930.VII / C.E.U.E.3 (Geneva: LoN, 1930), 1. 101 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 87 Electrifying Europe by an immense network of power distribution".102 Belgium entrusted this task to the CEEU as it saw electricity networks as a part of European unification. The latter process was described in the proposal as "to lay the foundations is to establish a system of constant co-operation among the peoples of Europe", and "to strengthen the links uniting these peoples".103 This thus included physical links as well. The LoN Council and the CEEU accepted the Belgian proposal in May 1931.104 Because of its technical nature, the matter was left to the CEQ, which was not without doubt when discussing the issue in June. In particular, OCT Secretary-General Robert Haas pointed out that not only technical aspects were of importance, but that "economic and legal aspects were far from negligible".105 Chairman Silvain Dreyfus mentioned the two previous Conventions, which had been ratified by only a few members. He asked why a strictly European approach would receive a warmer welcome. The OCT nevertheless accepted to study the question, and proposed two things. First, as the Belgian request was concise and did not contain a plan for action, the OCT asked the Belgian government for more information. Only after receiving Belgium's additional information, a competent committee would be set up to study this question. This decision postponed concrete steps by several months106 Second, the OCT invited the League's Secretariat to prepare documentation on national legislation and international agreements in force in various European countries. The Belgian government sent a note with additional information to the League's Secretariat on November 4, 1931.107 In the note, the Belgian government clearly expressed which steps should be taken to arrive at an ambitious goal: the creation of a European electricity network. According to the Belgian government argued that there were two main advantages to such a project. First, a European electricity network created a "communaute d'interets" between countries, helping to consolidate peace. Second, such a network was the only possible way to an intensive and rational exploitation of Europe's energy resources. According to the note, proper coordination between the electricity policies of the various countries was lacking in the current situation.108 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 LoN, Resolution Adopted by the Commission of Enquiry for European Union Relating to Transport and Transit of Electric Power, LoN doc, sen, C.417.M.173.1931.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1931), 79-80. 105 Ibid., 44. 106 Ibid. 107 "Note. Divers aspects de la question du transport et du transit de lenergie electrique et notamment du probleme de la creation d'un reseau europeen," 4 November 1931, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN The accompanying letter was address to Sir Eric Drummond, the League's Secretary-General at the time. 108 Ibid, The French text read: "L'un des results de la creation d'un reseau electrique europeen serait d'etablir entre les differents pays une communaute d'interets bien propres ä consolider la paix. La creation d'un reseau electrique europeen peut seule rendre possible l'exploitation rationnelle et intensive, de toutes les sources d'energie de l'Europe, exploitation qui, ä l'heure actuelle, este entravee par la manque de coordination des politiques electriques des differents pays." Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 88 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:30 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 The new note identified three distinct elements for study. The first concerned national legislations on production, transport, distribution, and exchange of electricity. The second element was of a technical nature, and entailed technical parameters and security regulations in network and power stations currently in force. This could help to determine standards for operating electricity networks in Europe. A last object of investigation was of an economic nature. The Belgian government wanted an inquiry into possibilities to mobilize international credit for certain countries, as well as a study of possible rates of return on capital investments.109 The OCT Secretariat responded cautious to this additional note. Secretariat members regarded the plan as complicated, and therefore proposed careful incremental steps. Given the technical, political and juridical complexity concerning a European electricity network, work should start by examining issues that could be solved with relative ease.110 The intent to set up a committee of experts that should have representatives from both various governments as well as electricity producers was discussed again.111 The international electro-technical community was quick to express its interest. In February 1932, UNIPEDE president Marcel Ulrich wrote the League Secretariat about the pending study into a European electricity network. In his letter he explained that industrialists within his Union were very interested in creating a European electricity transmission network, since they expected eventually be called upon to realize and operate it.112 In December 1932, then UNIPEDE-president Robert A. Schmidt enquired whether the special committee "for studying the Oliven project" had already been formed, and if so, who its members were.113 The response from Geneva was negative. In addition, the OCT stressed that they planned to study a broader issue than Olivens proposal.114 The OCT meanwhile had become familiar with that latter scheme. While asking the texts of the Belgian proposal made to the CEEU, WPC Chairman Daniel Dunlop sent along a copy of paper by Oskar Oliven. He also offered his services for documenting electricity legislation in Europe.115 109 Ibid., 2-4. 110 The response stated that work should commence with "questions qui pourraient etre resolues plus vite et plus facilement". Emil Hauswirth to Pietro Stoppani, 25 February 1932, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN 111 Ibid. 112 Marcel Ulrich to Pietro Stoppani, 16 February 1932, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN Ulrich wrote that "[l]es industriels groupes au sein de notre Union sont, en effet, des plus directement interesses au projet de creation de reseaux europeens de transport denergie electrique, puisque ce sont eux qui seront eventuellement appeles ä les realiser et ä sen servir". 113 "pour letude du projet Oliven." R.A. Schmidt to Robert Haas, 7 December 1932, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN Schmidt had succeeded Ulrich in July 1932. See Lyons, 75 Years, 110. 114 Robert Haas to president of UNIPEDE, 1 December 1932, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN 115 Daniel Dunlop to Robert Haas, 16 July 1931, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 89 0 0 90 Electrifying Europe The Belgian government announced in June 1932 that "its study of the questions not being at an end".116 In other words, it anticipated to supply more information on the issue. This once more postponed appointing the special committee. Meanwhile the Secretariat found the WPC willing to help collecting information on European electricity statistics and legislation.117 The chairman send Siegels Die Elektrizitätsgesetzgebung der Kulturländer de Erde, and additions to that book from national committees of the WPC.118 But in a return letter Gijsbert van Dissel, the secretary of the CEQ, hinted at the unfavorable perspectives of the project. Van Dissel wrote that the original plan was to send out a questionnaire to acquire statistics, plans, and legislation of concerning countries. This was cancelled because of "the general economic crisis and the fact that most countries are at the present moment suffering from an over-production of energy and a decrease in consumption".119 Albert Thomas' European public works The economic crisis did not go unnoticed in Geneva. Many contemporaries interpreted the October 1929 Wall Street crash as a turning point in Europe's economic fortunes, not in the least because it coincided with a renewed effort to settle reparation issues.120 Although many European countries faced similar and interrelated problems, they nevertheless chose to tackle them nationally.121 1929 witnessed a growth of protectionist measures. Resolutions on relaxing commercial and tariff policy as agreed on at the International Economic Conference of 1927 did not stand.122 The overall tense economic situation led to a drastic increase of unemployment in European countries. The depression inspired Albert Thomas, the director of the International Labour Organization (ILO), to design a comprehensive plan for the construction 116 LoN, Various Communications by the Secretariat: 3. Transmission in Transit of Electric Power, LoN doc, ser., C.531.M.265.1932.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1932), 27. 117 Ibid. 118 C.H. Gray to G, van Dissel, 21 March 1932, registry file 9E, box-R-2572, LoN The concerned book is Siegel, Die Elektrizitatsgesetzgebung. 119 G, van Dissel to C.H. Gray, March 1932, registry file 9E, box-R-2572, LoN 120 Clavin, The Great, 88-89, & 99. 121 Ibid., 5. 122 LoN, Work of the Second Conference with a View to Concerted Economic Action: Statement by M. Colijn, LoN doc, ser., C.144.M.45.1931.VII (Geneva: LoN, 1931), 13. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 90 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:30 Planning a European network, 1927-34 91 Table 3.2 - Unemployment in European countries, 1928-34 (in thousands of men) Country Austria Belgium Czechoslovakia France Germany Poland Italy Sweden 1928 182 5,300 39 16 126 324 10.6 1929 192 5,600 42 10 1,899 129 301 11.2 1930 243 16,500 105 13 3,076 227 425 12.2 1931 300 41,100 291 64 4,520 300 734 17.2 1932 378 71,800 554 301 5,575 256 1,006 22.8 1933 406 62,400 738 305 4,804 250 1,019 23.7 1934 370 72,300 677 368 342 2,718 964 18.9 Source: B. R. Mitchell, European historical statistics, 1750-1920 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 166-172. of a wide range of European public works.123 His public works included a system of railways and highways, as well as an electricity transmission network. For several reasons, Thomas saw these public works as an apt solution to the problems Europe was facing. First, the construction of public works provided much needed jobs in a time of high unemployment. Second, it offered Central and Eastern European countries a prospect for further industrialization. This line of thinking was strongly influenced by Delaisi's Les deux Europes.12i Third, the increase and improvements of infrastructures led to more mobility and market formation in that part of Europe. Thomas also hoped to "induce investors to put out money which at present time they are keeping hidden in their stockings".125 A final reason for Thomas was to create "the elements to construct a New Europe".126 At the same time, the plan fitted well with ILO's - and Thomas' - interest in rational organization and planning. This intended creation of a New Europe resembled an earlier ideal of Thomas, but only on a larger scale. During the early phase of mobilization during WWI, Thomas was entrusted with organizing a productive war economy, working to- 123 Albert Thomas (1878-1932) was born in Champigny-sur-Marne, as son of a baker. An excellent pupil, he went to study history and literature at the Ecole normale superieure in Paris. When Thomas moved into municipal politics in 1904, he already was on his way to become a spokesman for French Socialism and the leading reformist of the socialist party. Several biographical publications on Thomas and his ideas have appeared. Presumably the earliest to appear is B.W. Schaper, 'Albert Thomas: Dertig jaar Sociaal Reform-isme" (PhD diss., Leiden University, 1953). A French edition appeared in 1959. A more recent biography is Denis Guerin, Albert Thomas au BIT, 1920-1932: De I'internationalisme a L'Europe (Geneva: Institut europeen de l'Universite de Geneve, 1996). 124 Schaper, Albert Thomas, 307-308. 125 Albert Thomas to Hon. R.H. Brand, Messrs. Lazard Bros, & Co Ltd, 30 May 1931, fonds Cabinet Albert Thomas (hereafter: CAT), file 6B.7.3, Archives of the International Labour Office, Geneva (hereafter: ILO). 126 Tun des elements de construction dune Europe nouvelle." Note by Banque generate pour l'industrie electrique, "Reseaux internationaux," 14 December 1931, CAT file 11A.2.3, ILO. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 91 7-8-2008 14:25:30 0 92 Electrifying Europe gether with Louis Loucheur. When he became minister of armaments, Thomas closely collaborated with industrialists and directed the French war economy to significant increased production. He wondered how the "spirit of war", which caused a new sense of national belonging, could be transferred into peacetime. Thomas proposed creating "a new France", whereby the close cooperation between state, industry, and labor was continued.127 According to historian Martin Fine, Thomas used the war as vast testing laboratory where he applied new methods on various areas of economic and social activity.128 Albert Thomas brought these experiences to Geneva in 1919 as the first director of the ILO. Thomas made sure that its Secretariat had a relative autonomous position within the Organization.129 His ideas further were shaped by his growing interest for optimization and scientific management. He already had observed the introduction of Taylorist practices in France.130 During a trip to the United States, Thomas came in touch with progressive businessmen Henry Ford and Edward A. Filene. Both exposed the ILO-director to American ideas on scientific management and rationalization.131 With Filenes financial support, he set up the International Management Institute (IMI) in 1926. This organization, headed by Thomas' ILO colleague Paul Devinat, collected and spread knowledge about scientific management.132 Thomas linked rationalization with the economic future of Europe, too. In an introduction to a handbook on scientific management, he wrote that this novel approach was a revelation for many Europeans, who saw the economic progress of the United States as a threat to Europe.133 Thomas, with Devinat, applauded the 1927 resolution of the International Economic Conference that stressed the need of rationalization in Europe. Two years later, Albert Thomas also welcomed Briand's initiative, albeit critically. Thomas appreciated the momentum created by his former prime minister. 127 Martin Fine, "Albert Thomas: A Reformer's Vision of Modernization, 1914-'32," Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 3 (1977): 551. 128 Ibid., 549. 129 Schaper, Albert Thomas, 206ff. The ILB was divided into three parts; a diplomatic division preparing general conferences, a political division communicating with organisations of employers and workers, and a research division taking care of inquiries. Thomas' heart in particular laid with the latter. Emil Walter-Busch, "Albert Thomas and Scientific Management in War and Peace, 1914-1932," Journal of Management History 12, no. 2 (2006): 219. 130 Ibid., 214. 131 Fine, "Albert Thomas," 554. For Filene and his European activities see de Grazia, Irresistible, 130ff. 132 This history is best described in Walter-Busch, "Albert Thomas," 219-222. 133 Scientific management "a ete la revelation pour un grand nombre d'Europeens que ces progres econo-miques de lAmerique menacaient la situation du vieux continent et qu'il n'y avait de salut pour lui, a son tour, que dans une rationalisation de la production". Paul Devinat, ^Organisation scientifique du travail en Europe (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1927), VII. The introduction to this book was written by Thomas. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 92 7-8-2008 14:25:30 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 93 Figure 3.5 - Albert Thomas, 1878-1932 Source: League of Nations Photo Archive. Used by courtesy of United Nations Office, United Nations Library, Geneva. He applauded that European unification gained a political dimension, but he disapproved the adopted method of the LoN. He in particular felt that other Geneva institutions - like ILO - where passed over in the process that led to the establishment of the CEEU.134 He blamed Aristide Briand for not inviting the most prominent international officials to the first discussions in 1929 - probably including him.135 In addition, he was skeptical about concrete results, as Briand's proposal seemed ill-prepared.136 The Briand initiative and the resulting Commission of Enquiry nevertheless became the focal point of Thomas' European efforts, as he tried to provide a more concrete and technical focus to its work. In April 1931 Thomas presented a memorandum about unemployment in Europe to the ILO Secretariat, which he wished to send to the CEEU. He wanted to install two sub commissions; one studying the possibility of creating a European Labor Exchange, and another one to launch a vast program of European public 134 Guerin, Albert Thomas, 65. 135 Schaper, "Albert Thomas," 304. 136 That was characteristic for Briand according to Thomas. He once said of Briand that he did not prepare his speeches by searching in books and notes , but by dreamingly staring at the smoke of his cigarette ("Lui, il prepare ses discours non pas en cherchant dans les livres, non pas en cherchant dans des notes. II regarde la fumee de sa cigarette qui s'envole, et il reve a l'idee nouvelle a laquelle il peut s'attacher"). Cited in Guerin, Albert Thomas, note 31. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 93 0 7-8-2008 14:25:30 94 Electrifying Europe works.137 At that time many national governments issued public works projects to relieve unemployment. These programs not only provided jobs. The newly built railways, roads, drainages and other works should benefit the whole society. Thomas's ambition was to coordinate these national projects into large-scale European schemes. When geared to one another, public works not only benefited the country of construction, but also neighboring countries, Thomas argued. He also hoped that countries would order equipment and material from each other.138 At the same time, wrote Thomas, it "would thus develop that spirit of collaboration, that European spirit which is the object of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union to foster".139 His three prime projects were an extensive international road system140, a system of navigable waterways, and finally an international electricity transmission system. Thomas, like others before him, envisaged this network to work at 400 kV. He also recognized the current work of the OCT and stressed the importance of the Belgian memorandum. But the responses from the ILO Secretariat were rather skeptical.141 Thomas' co-workers challenged the economic viability of his program, and preferred a national framing over his European approach.142 Thomas decided to include these comments in the memorandum which he submitted to the CEEU It was discussed by the CEEU Unemployment Committee in early July 1931. This Committee was created two months before, in close collaboration with ILO.143 Generally speaking, it endorsed the intended positive effects of the proposed scheme of European public works by Thomas. It invited countries to propose plans within this program. In addition, the Committee stressed the need of international collaboration, and the requirement of capital and credits.144 Thomas' vision of European public networks met considerable opposition from Pietro Stoppani, LoN Secretariat member and head of the Economic section. Stoppani told Thomas that his plan encompassed "projets de luxe", and that only 137 LoN, Memorandum from the Director of the International Labour Office on Certain Questions Dealt with by that Office, of Special Interest to European States, LoN doc, sen, C.39.M.19.1931.VII (Geneva: LoN, 1931). 138 LoN, Unemployment: Proposals of the International Labour Organisation, LoN doc, ser, C.275.M.127.1931.VII, Annex 14 (Geneva: LoN, 1931) It is explicitly mentioned that the proposals to combat unemployment were "made on the Directors responsibility", being Thomas. 139 Ibid. 140 The history of Thomas' efforts for the road network has been disclosed in Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008). 141 Thomas wrote about the response to Raoul Richard. Thomas to Richard, 8 May 1931, CAT file 6B-7-3, ILO. 142 Guerin, Albert Thomas, 71. 143 LoN, Memoire du Bureau International du Travail. Geneve, le 29 juin 1931, LoN doc, ser, C.E.U.E./C/l (Geneva: LoN, 1931), 1 . 144 LoN, 'II. Public works, LoN doc, sen, C.395.M.158.1931.VII (Geneva: LoN), 56-57 Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 94 7-8-2008 14:25:31 Planning a European network, 1927-34 public work programs in backward countries should be considered. In addition, Stoppani regarded improving roads a better stimulus for local economies than electricity networks.145 Stoppani left Thomas under the impression that the LoN would thwart his activities. To the ILO director, the LoN was unwilling to take the initiative. It let him to assume the LoN was not the proper route to his European networks. He decided to rely on engineers instead.146 Therefore Thomas assembled a group of experts around him from engineering and finance. He contacted Marcel Ulrich, and other prominent French engineers Ernest Mercier, and Henri Cahen, and also Dannie Heineman. In December 1931 he met Georges Lemaitre, delegated administrator of the Banque Generale pour I'lndustrie Electrique, who offered his services The Banque Generale collaborated with Elektrobank and Motor-Columbus, and was active in Germany, Argentina, France, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia.147 Besides being a financial institute the Banque Generale had an engineering department, which frequently conducted technical studies.148 Lemaitre was however convinced that a "super network" at 400 kV was not an "immediate technical and economic necessity".149 According to Lemaitre, the advantages of 400 kV were only useful for transmitting electricity over very long distances of around 1,000 km.150 He argued that a dense patchwork of networks was developing, but mainly within national boundaries. What was necessary according to Lemaitre was to "weld" together these national networks.151 This was not far from what Oliven had proposed. Although connecting centres of production and consumption made sense from an economic point of view, Lemaitre also saw a political obstacle to Thomas' network. Lemaitre argued that it was politically unacceptable to any state to be dependent on another country for meeting one's energy needs. What he therefore proposed was a reduced programme, limited to bilateral projects between "horse-powered" countries. Such an undertaking could be carried out rapidly and still create employment.152 The French electrical engineers, with whom Thomas was in touch, backed Lemaitre's opinion on 400 kV. Marcel 145 Thomas wrote Richard about his episode. Thomas to Ricard, 18 July 1931, CAT file 6B-7-3, ILO. 146 Ibid. English translation reads: "We will not be able to succeed if it were not on behalf of the technicians and the great groupings of interests of the coherent and effective initiatives". 147 "Electrification de l'Europe. Note sur une conversation avec M. Lemaitre, administrateur-delegue de la Banque Generale pour I'lndustrie Electrique," 10 December 1931, CAT file 11A.2.3.1, ILO. 148 Georges Rabinovitch, "Electrification de l'Europe. Note sur une conversation avec M. Lemaitre, administrateur-delegue de la Banque Generale pour I'lndustrie Electrique," 10 December 1931, CAT file 11A.2.3.1.ILO. 149 Ibid., 2-3. 150 Ibid, .3. 151 "Ce qu'il faut, par consequent, c'est provoquer la soudure des reseaux nationaux.". Ibid. 152 Ibid., 4. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 95 96 Electrifying Europe Ulrich was one of them.153 At a small conference on December 12, Thomas again discussed options with Lemaitre. Thomas underlined what he regarded the two prime aims of his plan: to reduce unemployment, and to create a "New Europe". Lemaitre, on the other hand, reiterated his thoughts on using 400 kV.154 Thomas was clearly disappointed seeing his original 400 kV plan amended. Describing this episode to Henri Cahen, Albert Thomas wrote that "our electrician friends have thrown me a small disillusionment".155 Responses to the plan Until now, I have only highlighted those directly involved in plans for a European electricity system. But how did engineers, industrialists and politicians not directly involved in these initiatives look at the notion of a European electricity network? Although it is hard to provide a definitive overview of opinions, this section reviews two rather insightful sources. The first is a report by the LoN on the WPC in 1933. A LoN official attended this meeting and actively documented the response by engineers to the plan. Second, the Diplomatic Archive of Belgium harbors a collection of responses from domestic actors. Together, they provide more insight in arguments used by both proponents and opponents, both internationally and domestically. Domestically, the Belgian proposal to CEEU met significant opposition.156 Politically, the Minister of Public Works reprimanded Hymans for launching such an initiative without consulting the Minister of Defense, and industrial circles. Especially that latter group made its grievances heard. In general, industry protested against possible dependency on foreign-generated electricity and the potential harm to Belgian economic interests. The Comite Central Industriel, an employers association, contended that electricity imports were far from desirable from the viewpoint of both national economy and defense. These arguments were in line with Lemaitre s expectations. The Comite contended that if the "Oliven project" was 153 Thomas to Dannie Heineman, 29 December 1931, CAT file 6B.7.3, ILO. 154 Report of a conference on "Reseaux internationaux, " 12 December 1931, CAT file 11A.2.3, ILO. 155 "nos amis électriciens m'avait jeté une petite douche ."Thomas to Henri Cahen, 29 December 1931, CAT file 6B.7.3, ILO. 156 Besides the groups and associations named in this section, others wrote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This included the Compagnie Generale d'Entreprises Electriques et Industrielles, Union Beige des Producteurs d'Electricite, Union des Villes et Communes Beiges. The same archival material has been used in Ranieri, Dannie Heineman, and I kindly thank Miss Ranieri for pointing my attention to these files. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 96 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:31 Planning a European network, 1927-34 carried out, "Belgian interests" should at least play a role in its building.157 More straightforward was the opinion of the Association des Constructeurs de Materiel Electrique de Belgique. It wrote that the effect of a European electricity network was nothing less than the "the death of our extensive electrical industry".158 Arguably the most interesting comments on the proposal came from the Union des Exploitations Electriques en Belgique. This Union represented the interests of private concession-holding undertakings that exploited power stations, distribution networks, tramways and electrified railways.159 It argued that high voltage technology did not allow establishing a European network according to plans put forward by engineers. In other words, the Union regarded 400 kV as technologically unfeasible. From a financial point of view, the Union regarded the calculated returns on investments as very optimistic, especially considering the general economic situation in 1932. The Union thus concluded that creating a European electricity network was not feasible from both a technical and financial point of view, and therefore not interesting for Belgium.160 The influential engineer colonel Emil Weyl, administrator of Electrobel and board member of SOFINA, also deemed the prevailing economic situation unsuitable to begin such an undertaking. He nevertheless expressed his full support for the LoN study into the political and administrative organization of such a network.161 The stress placed on unfavorable economic circumstances can be illustrated by fate of an attempt to float a new company, the Compagnie Europeenne pour Entreprises d'Electricite et d'Utilite Publique (EUROPEL). This j oint venture between SOFINA, Elektrobank, and the Compagnie Italo-Belge pour Entreprises d'Electricite et d'Utilite Publique (Italo-Belge), three of the large Unternehmergeschafte in Europe, was signed in June 1929.162 EUROPEL would finance and setup electricity systems in for example Silesia and Hungary.163 But this never materialized. In 1933 the partners decided to liquidate EUROPEL, as SOFINA was unable to place the 157 "Si done Ton juge opportun de ne pas pousser le projet Oliven, il est non moins essentiel de veiller ä ce qu'il ne soit pas realise par d'autres en dehors des interets beiges." Note by the Comite Central Industriel, 13 January 1931, File 4643 II, Diplobel. 158 "la mort de notre grosse industrie electrique [...]." Note by the Association des Constructeurs de Materiel Electrique de Belgique, 4 March 1932, File 4643 II, Diplobel. 159 Ginette Kurgan van Hentenryk, "Le regime economique de l'industrie electrique beige depuis la fin du XIXe siecle," in 1880-1980, ed. Cardot, 120. 160 Director-General and President of the Union des Exploitations Electriques en Belgique to Mr. Van Caenegem, 24 November 1931, File 4643 II, Diplobel. 161 Weyl to Van Caenegem, 16 March 1932, File 4643 II, Diplobel. 162 Draft statutes of "Cie Europeenne pour Entreprises d'Electricite et d'Utilite Publique ~ 'Europel',", 2 June 1929, Box 12, File 5890, collection SOFINA, BSA. 163 Brion, "Le role," 231. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 97 98 Electrifying Europe company on the Brussels Stock Exchange and raise the necessary capital.164 Similar arguments were expressed by engineers at the 1933 sectional meeting of the WPC, held in Stockholm, but they also added new arguments and visions on how to organize electricity supply in Europe.165 Despite its apparent pessimism, League Secretariat members had taken up the invitation to visit the meeting. The report of the conference provides an interesting insight into the different prevailing visions on how to organize electricity supply in Europe. The best-known proposal was the one presented by Oliven. Generally speaking, engineers agreed that such a network enabled a better economic mix and load factor.166 But a great divergence between countries with well-developed electricity infrastructure, and those still building one, also had to be taken into account. According to the report, several engineers therefore expressed doubts about the possibility to immediately create a European electricity network. Not only would it need a vast amount of capital, lesser developed countries were not ready for such a "rational development".167 But to many engineers Olivens plan was a theoretical one. Some remarked that transmission lines in Olivens plans hardly matched with existing ones. Several engineers regarded developing a European system through gradual growth a more practical alternative; from local and provincial networks to national ones, before arriving at a "supranational network".168 There seemed to have been a consensus on the argument that international connections should be built first between regional and national networks. Cross-border electricity exchange could cover immediate needs before a European system was in place.169 According to the report this was the most probable development. This was in line with Lemaitres vision, but also corresponded with Olivens own expectations. Based on these sources, it seems as if a "super" European network was seen as undesirable by some, and by many others as impossible in the short term. In Belgium, national economic interests clearly were an important issue. But elsewhere the notion of international collaboration was not refused, nor was the planning on a European scale. Rather, it was technological and economic arguments that led many engineers to believe the scheme was not yet do-able. The more grad- 164 Newspaper clipping from unknown paper, "Compagnie Europeenne pour Entreprises d'Electricite et d'Utilite Publique - EUROPEL. Assemblee extraordinaire du 31 mai 1932," 1 June 1932, Box 12, File 5890, collection SOFINA, BSA. 165 "Session speciale de la Conference Mondiale de l'Energie, Stockholm 1933," n.d., registry file 9E box R-4286, LoN The report is without an author's name, but likely written by Gijsbert van Dissel, then the responsible Secretariat member for the CEQ. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 98 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:31 0 Planning a European network, 1927-34 Table 3.3 - Electricity exports relative to national production, indexed (base year = 1925) 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1932 1933 1934 1937 Germany 100.3 100.6 100.5 100.3 100.5 104.9 100.7 99.0 France 99.9 100.2 100.2 100.4 100.3 99.7 99.5 99.6 99.7 Netherlands 100.5 100.1 99.9 99.9 99.8 99.0 Austria 100.1 101.2 102.9 105.1 104.2 109.0 110.2 112.6 Switzerland 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9 Czechoslovakia 105.0 101.8 99.0 99.0 99.0 Calculated from: UNIPEDE, Production et de la Distribution, various years; and Kittler, Der internationale. Table 3.4 - Electricity imports relative to national consumption, indexed (base year = 1925) 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1932 1933 1934 1937 Denmark 99.9 101.7 101.0 100.2 101.1 102.7 100.4 100.0 Germany 99.6 99.7 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.4 101.6 99.0 France 100.2 100.3 100.3 100.3 100.3 100.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 Netherlands 100.0 100.0 100.5 104.2 103.6 101.7 Norway 100.1 109.8 100.1 100.3 99.0 Austria 99.5 99.7 100.4 104.7 100.6 100.5 155.0 Switzerland 101.2 100.6 101.0 104.0 106.2 99.2 99.1 99.1 99.2 Czechoslovakia 99.9 99.8 99.7 99.7 99.0 99.0 99.6 99.6 Calculated from: UNIPEDE, Production et de la Distribution, various years; and Kittler, Der internationale. ual approach, by building interconnections between regional and national networks was seen as the way forward, towards a European system. These opinions matched those expressed by the engineers consulted by Albert Thomas. They did not see the immediate need and possibility of a 400 kV network, and therefore proposed to use the emerging national networks as a backbone for a future and gradually emerging system. The available statistics of international electricity flows for this period show that this vision made sense. Stronger even, international exchange expanded alongside national production. Since 1925 electricity exports represented only a few per cent of total national production - except for Switzerland, and gradually Austria. In the period 1925-1937, the relative amount of electricity flowing either in or out European countries hardly altered. Considering the growth of domestic production between 1925 and 1937 (see Table 2.3), electricity production more than doubled in many countries despite a severe economic crisis. But Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the relative importance of import and export did not change sub- Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 99 0 0 100 Electrifying Europe stantially. In other words, whereas production increased, electricity exports rose accordingly - with Austria as the sole exception (see Table 3.5). This seems to suggest a status quo of national versus international developments; both national networks and international exchange grew gradually and hand-in-hand. Table 3.5 - Electricity exports as percentage of national production 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1932 1933 1934 1937 Belgium - - 0.24 0.62 0.64 - 0.37 0.29 - Germany 0.58 0.71 0.66 0.55 0.66 2.61 0.74 - - France 0.75 0.97 1.00 1.15 1.12 0.62 0.41 0.48 0.62 Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 - Austria 1.00 1.98 3.57 5.58 4.74 9.09 10.17 - 12.33 Switzerland 27.16 25.15 25.05 23.86 23.33 19.03 20.03 21.54 22.62 Calculated from: UNIPEDE, Production et de la Distribution, various years; and Kittler, Der internationale. The demise of the projects In August 1932 the Belgium government sent a third and complementary note to Geneva.170 The contrast with its previous memorandum was remarkable. Gone were projections of a European network and invocations of its potential contributions to stability in Europe. The aspect of system-building seemed to be replaced by a more regulatory approach. Now, the main focus was on the study of two issues; one, problems relative to the political and administrative regime of electricity, and second, issues related to technologies of production and transmission, and economic aspects of their exploitation.171 The Belgian government nevertheless suspected that these issues could be addressed best in the European framework of the CEEU.172 The primary object was to draw up European conventions. Studying both issues should lead to a road map which allowed for a gradual development of an international electricity system.173 In that light, the CEEU sent a letter to all participating European governments in May 1933, asking to supply the Secretariat with information on existing power stations, existing systems, and planned expan- 170 "Suggestions preliminaires et informations complementaires relatives a la question du transport et du transit de lenergie electrique," 13 August 1932, registry file 9E, box R-2572, LoN 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 100 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:31 Planning a European network, 1927-34 sion.174 The original Belgian proposal and the two additional notes were included with the letter. With the emphasis on a European network downplayed, the final aim of the study became how to establish a European liberal exchange regime for electricity. At the 1933 OCT meeting it became clear that the present circumstances were unfavorable. This was directly related to the economic depression, which according to the CEQ caused an overproduction of electricity.175 The CEQ therefore decided that "the present situation [does] not render it possible to anticipate in the near future either the institution of a more liberal regime for the exchange of electric power or the constitution of a European electric system".176 But political tensions in Europe were also rising. This was underlined by resignation of all German OCT members in 1933. However, the CEQ decided that the documentation should be updated until a more favorable moment presented itself. The Secretariat reported in 1935 that a detailed study was being prepared, despite the unfavorable conditions.177 The study reviewed the structure of each country's electricity sector. In addition, it included an abstract of existing laws on the import and export of electricity. In 1937 the Secretariat expressed that despite the deteriorating political situation in Europe the study would be finished and presented to the CEQ in "the near future".178 This optimism was shattered the year after. Because of political changes in Europe, and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe, peaceful perspectives of international electricity exchanges in Europe had become very uncertain - to say the least.179 Therefore the study was abandoned. In August 1939, three weeks before Germany's invasion of Poland, it was registered into the LoN's archive and never to be consulted for its intended purpose.180 Albert Thomas' idea of a European electricity network had already suffered 174 "Transmission and Transit of Electric Energy. Circular letter no.81," 4 March 1933, registry file 9E, box R-4286, LoN Responses were received from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, Romania, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. For an overview see LoN, Transport and Transit of Electric Power and Regime of the International Exchange of Electric Power in Europe, LoN doc, ser., C.98.M.33.1934.VIII (Geneva: LoN), 97ff. 175 LoN, Memorandum of the Secretary-General of the Committee on Transport and Transit of Electric Power and the Regime of International Exchange of Electric Power in Europe, LoN doc, ser., C.C.T.566 (Geneva: LoN), 97. 176 LoN doc, ser., C.98.M.33.1934.VIII, 22. 177 Ibid. 38. 178 LoN, Transport and Transit of Electric Power, and Regime of the International Exchange of Electric Power in Europe, LoN doc, ser., C.380.M.256.1937.VIII (Geneva: LoN), Annex 23. 179 LoN, Transport and Transit of Electric Power, and Regime of the International Exchange of Electric Power in Europe, LoN doc, ser., C.266.M.159.1938.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1938), 13. 180 v.B. (unknown initials) to Mr. Lukac, 8 August 1939, registry file 9E, box R-4286, LoN Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 101 0 102 Electrifying Europe a major setback in December 1931, after his expert-advisors denounced the use of 400 kV. Thomas wrote Heineman that he had not given up on his "European electricity union". He asked Heinemans advice on whether to follow Lemaitres suggestion to forge collaboration between Western European electricity producers and interconnect national systems.181 But Thomas also moved on to a new venture. Since early 1932, he took significant interest in Francis Delaisi's Plan quinquennal europeen, a European five-year plan. Thomas took part in a meeting on this plan in January 1932, organized by the Comite Federale de Cooperation Europeenne.li2 Like before, Delaisi stressed the need to bridge the divide between Europe A and Europe B, but now his main focus was on constructing roads in Eastern Europe.183 This would help lowering transport costs, which in turn made agricultural products more competitive on the world market.184 A report on the electrification of Central Europe was written by a French engineer, but it stressed that it was primarily to help developing transport infrastructures, most notably rail.185 What was left of ILO's efforts on European public works, including its electricity part, died with its inspirer Albert Thomas on May 8, 1932. In September 1932, the reports of CEEU's Unemployment Committee were handed over to a commission preparing the Monetary and Economic Conference, to be held in London one year later.186 National governments filed proposals that hardly resembled Thomas' initial schemes. In addition, only Central and Eastern European countries' plans were proposed. They included plans for new roads and railway connections towards adjacent countries, but the overall European character was lost.187 The International Conference on Monetary and Economic Questions in 1933 eventually rejected the international public works program as a whole. Without ambiguity the United States - the most important creditor at the time - stressed that every 181 Thomas to Heineman, 29 December 1931, CAT file 6B.7.3, ILO. 182 "Comite Federale de Cooperation Europeenne, Commission agricole et des travaux publics," 30 January 1932, CAT file 11C.7.3, ILO. The Comite Federale was created in 1928 by French mathematician Emile Borel. See Jean-Michel Guieu, "Le Comite federale de Cooperation europeenne: L'action meconnue d'une organisation internationale privee en faveur de l'union de l'Europe dans les annees trente (1928-1940)," in Organisations internationales, ed. Schirmann, 73-91. 183 Delaisi, "Un plan quinquennal europeen," in Bulletin du Groupement francais pour la paixpar la SDN, 4, (May 1931), 6. Found in CAT file 11C.7.3, ILO. 184 "Comite Federale de Cooperation Europeenne, Commission agricole et des travaux publics," 30 January 1932, CAT file 11C.7.3, ILO. 185 No mention was made to previous ideas for a European network. A. Guiselin, "Rapport pour 'Union Douaniere Europeenne. Complementaire au Plan Quinquennal de Francis Delaisi. Electrification de l'Europe Centrale," 8 January 1932, CAT file 1 l.C.7.5, ILO. 186 LoN, Monetary and Economic Conference: International Questions Relating to Public Works, LoN doc, ser., C.377.M.186.1933.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1931), 1. 187 The list of proposals presented to the London Conference can be found in LoN, Report on the Fourth Session of the Committee, LoN doc, ser., C.379.M.188.1933.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1933); and LoN, doc, ser., C.377.M.186.1933.VIII. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 102 7-8-2008 14:25:31 Planning a European network, 1927-34 country should raise its own funds. U.S. representative Paul Warberg stated that the United States opposed any idea of financing "somebody else's program".188 The CEEU, once the focal point of the European movement, was barely in existence in 1932. The main items on the 1932 agenda were electing a new chairman, as the CEEU lost its chair and spiritual father Aristide Briand.189 Five years passed before the CEEU met again. At the final meeting in 1937, only a handful of persistent believers were left, who thought the CEEU "ought to meet even if it had nothing on its agenda".190 This was literally the case at the meeting. The only resolution adopted was one that asked the Secretariat to draw up an agenda for the CEEU's next meeting, one that was never scheduled. The CEEU never really lived up to its expectations. According to historian Antoine Fleury, this was primarily due to the failure of the political activities of the League, aggravated by the political and economic crisis, and not so much to the underlying idea of European union as such.191 The European movement lost much of its momentum due to the death of two prominent proponents of European unity. Loucheur had already died in 1931. Added to that was the rise of Hitler Germany after 1933. Following Austria's Anschluss to the Third Reich, Coudenhove-Kalergi traded Vienna for Bern, and later New York.192 This also had consequences for the promoters of a European system. Nation states turned to strategic network-building, anticipating a possible new war. Two important proponents of a European system left the scene. Oskar Oliven, of Jewish descent, fled from Germany to Zurich following the aryanisa-tion of GESFUREL in 1934.193 He died in 1937. Dannie Heineman, also of Jewish origins, equally left Europe and eventually settled in New York. The start of WWII in 1939 sealed the fate of the Interwar projects. But as we shall see, the idea of a European electricity system had taken root. 188 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 210. 189 LoN, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, LoNdoc, sen, C.724.M.324.1932.VII (Geneva: LoN, 1932). 190 The quote is from Mr. Paul-Boncour, representing France. LoN, Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Commission, LoN doc, ser., C.532.M370.1937.VII (Geneva: LoN, 1937). 191 Fleury, "Avant-propos," in Le Plan Briand d'Union fédérale européenne: Perspectives nationales et transnationales, avec documents, ed. Antoine Fleury and Lubor Jílek (Bern: Peter Lang, 1998), XV. 192 Conze, Richard Coudenhove, 51-53. 193 Joseph Walk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden, 1918-1945 (Munich: Saur, 1988), 286. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 103 104 Electrifying Europe Conclusions Around 1927-1930 an intriguing convergence took place between engineers aiming to keep the electricity sector international, and ideas on the economic and political unification of Europe. Intellectually underpinned by men like Coudenhove and Delaisi, "Europe" became part of the policy of both the LoN and ILO. In the slipstream of these initiatives, a number of plans for a European electricity network were presented. While previously cross-border electricity transmissions were discussed as "international" and "bilateral", engineers now increasingly spoke of a European network. "Europe" represented a unit of optimization, where energy resources and electricity demand could be rationalized to a maximum extent. In addition, the network maps of engineer like Oliven and Viel not only represent a future electricity system. They also are a vision of what Europe should be, showing which countries are "European", and which are not. Initially these schemes circulated only within engineering circles. However, through the close relations between the worlds of engineering, industry, and politics - exemplified by men like Heineman, Loucheur, Thomas -, these plans for a European network gained wider knowledge. It was carried by a network of people who sympathized with Delaisi and Coudenhove, and believed in both rationalization and European unification. In particular the role of the Belgium government - in the person of Paul Hymans - was instrumental. Hymans was connected both to the European movement and Heineman. Eventually the idea of a European network transformed into an agenda item of the CEEU. In parallel, Albert Thomas and the ILO took up a similar study, related to both battling economic depression and securing a European peace. The notion of a European network found an easy entrance into ongoing processes aiming at unification, for two reasons. First, it fitted well with ideas of international rationalization and cartelization, resonating since the International Economic Conference of 1927. Such notions were equally popular within engineering circles. Second, it served what I call an ideological mix of expectations. Electrifying Europe would create employment, and increase the productivity of Eastern European ("Europe B") agriculture and Western European industry ("Europe A"). To some, a European electricity network would symbolize European unity, and provide a foundation for a New Europe. Although they both wished a European system, there were important differences between engineers and Europeanists.194 Several Europeanists, in particular Thomas, hoped to construct a European grid in the short term. They saw the con- 194 The distinction between the two is analytical. In practice, one could be an engineer and Europeanist at the same time. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 104 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:31 Planning a European network, 1927-34 struction of such a vast grid contributing to unemployment relief and improving the economic structure all over Europe. Electrical engineers, however, stressed that European interconnected system was a project for the coming generations. An immediate construction of such a network was in their eyes unattainable. It needed to use a transmission voltage of 400 kV or higher, which was neither technically feasible nor economically justified. In addition, the international financial climate was hardly favorable. In looking at available responses to the plans, I found many critical remarks by engineers on the economic, financial, political, and technical feasibility of building a European network. But this opposition was primarily directed at a particular reading of Viel's and Olivens proposals: the need to build a "super" network, in the form of new-to-built European arteries. These plans seemed to suggest a planned system. For many engineers, this planned European network did not sufficiently take into account the ongoing processes of network planning and building on the national level. Thomas' adviser Lemaitre saw a political obstacle as well. Recognizing the protective legislation of national governments, he argued that no country would be willing to accept to be dependent on a third country for covering energy needs. Most commentators therefore proposed to interconnect national networks. This would also improve economic mix, and open possibilities for mutual assistance. Oliven himself already mentioned that constructing interconnections between emerging national systems was a good "interim solution for the period until the time when the difficulties standing in the way of a common European high voltage system are removed by international agreements".195 By this approach a European system would gradually grow. This approach also was close to ongoing processes. Statistical evidence shows how national production and consumption, as well as import and export of electric power together grew. Although cross-border electricity transmission remained rather modest, national and international electricity flows experienced a balanced growth. As an alternative to European network plans, this process was to be continued, alongside the possible removal of restrictive policies. This new consensus did however have some consequences. Interconnecting national systems at that point was possible in only the most industrialized part of Europe. This can perhaps be best explained by looking at the presupposed dichotomy between Europe A and B. Men like Thomas and Delaisi wanted to develop economies in the eastern and southern part of Europe with electrification. But with national systems forming the backbone of an organically growing European 195 Oliven, European, 6. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 105 106 Electrifying Europe system, "Europe B" fell out of scope as it was hardly as electrically advanced as Western European countries. This dichotomy would be strengthened in following decades, because of economic and political causes. This chapter showed how and when the movement to keep the electro-technical industry "international" transformed into a movement in favor of organizing electricity supply on a European level. Although plans for a European electricity network were subjected to criticism, crucially, their European dimension was never really in doubt. At the same time, the development of national systems was not questioned either. Engineers did not plead for building a planned European network in the short term. Rather, they foresaw a future European system as the outcome of gradual growth. "The European electricity economies together, not as a single unit", argued one German engineer, "constitutes the European electricity economy".196 196 "Die europäischen Elektrizitätswirtschaften in ihrer Gesamtheit, nicht als Einheit, sind die Europäische Elektrizitätswirtschaft." Joseph Legge, Grundsätzliches und Tatsächliches zu den Elektrizitätswirtschaften in Europa (Dortmund: Gebrüder Lensing, 1931), 4. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 106 0 7-8-2008 14:25:31 0 107 Chapter 4 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 In April, 1949, a group of European engineers was welcomed by their American hosts, and presented to the press at a location not far from the White House in Washington D.C. The conference they attended there kicked off a five-week tour of power plants and control centers around the United States. The visitors from Europe, most of them system operators in their respective countries, flew across the Atlantic to see firsthand the American state-of-the-art in the electricity industry. This Technical Assistance (TECAID) Mission was an integral element of the electricity programs set up within the framework of the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. The overall intention of the ERP with regard to electricity was to expand generation capacity, by building national and international power plants on the one hand, and making better use of new and existing capacity by creating European power pools on the other. These power pools, should be brought about by building both physical and institutional interconnections between countries. To Paul G. Hoffman, administrator of the ERP, the mission was about more than increasing the amount of electricity available in Europe. In his address to the European engineers, Hoffman named two other important aspects of the TECAID Mission, which also applied to the ERP general. First, increasing the availability of electricity should help increase productivity in industry. Hoffman linked productivity to welfare, stating that it was "impossible for any people to enjoy a better standard of living unless within the confines of that country the people produce more".1 At the same time, expanding generation capacity was directly related to economic recovery. The ERP's most prominent advisor on electric power, Walker Cisler, considered electricity to be "one of the greatest resources for the revival of Western Europe".2 The adjective "Western" reflected the absence of Central and Eastern European countries in the ERP. What is less obvious in Cisler's mention of "Western Europe" 1 "Address of Welcome to European Electric Systems Operators Group and Press Conference," 22 April 1949, Speech and article file 1949, Paul. G. Hoffman Papers, Truman Library, Independence (Missouri), Paul. G. Hoffman papers. I thank Frank Schipper who providing me a copy of the press conference transcript. 2 Ibid. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 107 7-8-2008 14:25:31 0 108 Electrifying Europe is that, Scandinavian engineers also did not come to Washington as part of the TECAID mission. In this, the meeting was a harbinger of how Europe would eventually be organized electrically. By 1964, within each of these three "regions", Western Europe, Scandinavia, and Central and Eastern Europe, international electricity flows were institutionalized as a permanent power pools. This division in regions reflected historical continuity, as well as the technical-economic possibilities for network connection. As we saw in the previous chapters, Western Europe had a history of international electricity exchanges before 1940. In Scandinavia initiatives towards regional cooperation were undertaken in that same period. On the other hand, overland connections between Scandinavia and the European mainland were only possible between Finland and Soviet Union, and Denmark and Germany. In all other cases submarine cable technology was necessary, which required new technological solutions and vast investments. Central and Eastern European countries generally had lower levels of electrification than their Western and Nordic counterparts. Linking to Northern or Western Europe was thus hardly possible without substantial technological progress and, again, major investment. Yet technology and geography were far from the only reasons for this division in regions. It also reflected political and socio-economic differences. Within the emerging Cold War world, the division between East and West reflected different ideological points of view. This was to a lesser extent also true for the status aparte of Scandinavian countries.3 As an outcome of these efforts, organizations representing regional power pools eventually became the face of European cooperation. Inherent in these pools were American ideals of productivity and integration, as well as specific European views on collaboration. Not only the power pools themselves, but also the UN and ERP institutions were guided and steered by a cohort of - mainly Western - European electrical engineers, who had their own beliefs regarding the future shape of a European system and what "Europe' should be about. UNIPEDE's Study Group on International Connections was a crucial forum for these engineers, as many of its members held positions on postwar Committees and Commissions. European engineers clearly had differing opinions from American ERP officials, who argued for international - and even supranational - ownership and operation of power plants and networks. The ideas of Western European engineers showed remnants of interwar plan, in stressing the solidarity effects of a European network. At the 3 Spain also - largely involuntarily - held an exceptional position in international relations. Franco's Spain was absent or denied from nearly all postwar international organisations and other forms of collaboration. See for example Edward Johnson, "Early Indications of a Freeze: Greece, Spain and the United Nations, 1946-47," Cold War History 6, no. 1 (2006): 43-61. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 108 7-8-2008 14:25:31 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 same time, their proposed way of creating such a network was rather similar to the consensus that emerged in the course of the 1930s that national and international interconnections should develop side-by-side. To them, a European system should consist of nationally operated networks, working in close coordination. In this chapter, I will review how collaboration within regions came about and what the underlying assumptions behind it were. I will start by reviewing ideas of Europe during WWII and immediately afterwards and show how they related to network-building plans and activities shortly before and during WWII. Here I emphasize the increased priority given to network control and national interconnections, not only for reasons of rationalization but for strategic and sometimes military motives as well. After that, I will provide an extensive account of reconstruction efforts with an emphasis on the ERR I will reconstruct the discussions related to plans for the European electricity sector within the framework of the ERP, and how European ideas fused with American beliefs on interconnected systems. Most attention will be dedicated to cooperation in Western Europe. The chapter shows how U.S. visions for Europe's electricity structure, which entailed international ownership of electric plants and pooling of resources, were neither rejected nor accepted uncritically. Instead, U.S. ideas were adjusted to fit the prevailing notions of European engineers. These engineers shared the idea that European cooperation was useful, but should be of an informal character, and the importance of European electricity exchanges was to meet national electricity needs. The outcome was a lasting form of international collaboration, which was successful in liberalizing regulations for international electricity transfers. At the same time, as interdependencies between countries grew, this was done without giving up national control over the electricity sector. This chapter touches only briefly upon the question why collaboration between regions did not come about in this period. The strategic intentions of American policy are examined more closely in the subsequent chapter on electricity connections between East and West. Because these factors still need to be taken into consideration, this chapter will conclude with a review of the reconstruction period, rather than true conclusions. These will be drawn at the end of chapter 4 for the postwar period as a whole. Wartime and postwar ideas of Europe Ideas on Europe unification remained alive, even as economic problems and political tensions between nations persisted in the course of the 1930s. Another ideology presented itself in the form of Hitlerite fascism. The debate whether Hitler's Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 109 0 110 Electrifying Europe Nazi ideology contained a specific European element is still open. According to Pierre Gerbet, Hitler sought a grand Germany rather than a grand Europe.4 Peter Bugge supports this by stating that National Socialism "was a program for Germany and not for Europe".5 By contrast, John Laughland has attempted to prove that "Europe" was more than propaganda to the Nazis.6 It is however fair to say that on the surface Nazi ideology had elements in common with ideas of Europe. Hitlers intentions to create a unified and efficient European economy, a Großraumwirtschaft, were hardly far from the ideals of interwar Europeanists. Yet the goal of this Nazi New Europe, a "social and racial reconstruction of European society", was different, as was the means to establish it: war.7 Another similarity between Europeanists and National Socialists was their intended use of network technologies. To forge the union and create a European space, Nazis envisaged using Großraumtechnik. They argued that construction of vast networks of motorways (Autobahnen), railways, and airlines would facilitate European economic integration.8 Still, this integration was not intended to share resources, enable free trade, and create dependencies. Rather it was meant to create a self-sufficient autarkic German (war) economy and improve the means to wage war.9 Both Hitler and Mussolini appealed to a "technocratic impulse" and drew on people "with economic and technological expertise".10 Some fervent Europeanists, who shared some of these values, eventually chose to support this German Europe. One of them was Francis Delaisi. In his 1942 La revolution eu-ropeenne, the darling economist of the interwar European movement interpreted German dominance as a means to rationalization, stability, and the creation of a unified European economy.11 4 Pierre Gerbet, La construction de L'Europe (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1983), 43. 5 Bugge, "The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914-1945," in The History, ed. Wilson and Van der Dussen, 107. 6 Laughland's motivation to prove this point seems not to come from historical interest alone, but also serves his skeptical outlook on the current state of European integration. See his The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997). When juxtaposed, Bugge and Laughland have total opposite views. Bugge states that "Hitler rarely used the concept of'Europe' and the little he said, other than in propagandistic connections, is fully in accordance with his racial philosophy and the 'Drang nach Osten'". Laughland, on the other hand, claims that "Hitler made regular references to Europe throughout his entire time in office, including before the war". 7 Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 10-11 and 14. 8 Helmut Maier, "Systems connected: IG Auschwitz, Kaprun, and the building of European power grids up to 1945," in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000 (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006), 138-139; and Laughland, The tainted, 28 and 31. 9 Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 86-87. 10 Ibid., 76-78. 11 Laughland, The Tainted, 41. Also see de Grazia, Irresistible, 127. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 110 7-8-2008 14:25:32 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 Despite German hegemony, these New Order ideas of Europe were contested. Since 1941, writes historian Walter Lipgens, "leading personalities and elite of the resistance groups in all countries had [... ] expressed in almost identical terms their realization that 'from the English Channel to the Aegean Sea' the same battle was being fought against the same enemy, on the basis of the same faith in human dignity and the rule of law, and in the conviction that the resistance was a single unity which would overcome past discords and in due time bring about a federation of Europe".12 Historian Peter Bugge notes that as an exception Scandinavian resistance movements seemed to favor an Atlantic order.13 Many Western European governments found themselves in exile in London, offering possibilities to discuss a post-Hitler Europe. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed in September 1944 to form an economic and customs union, the Benelux. Around the same time, a French official named Jean Monnet proposed to place coal and steel from the Ruhr under the supervision of a European supranational authority, and to create a large common market.14 As after WWI, the ending of WWII witnessed a growing number of initiatives in favor of European unity. In general, the initiative for European cooperation moved from private movements to the international governmental stage. During the interwar period the only intergovernmental body aiming to stimulate European collaboration was the CEEU, which had little tangible results. In 1947-1948, European cooperation became a policy objective of many countries, which consequently entered into a patchwork of new organizations.15 These organizations all generated more results than the CEEU. These new nationally-based organizations did not end private initiatives, however. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi remained a tireless promoter of European unity, and was, for example, the driving force in setting up the European Parliamentary Union.16 A notable difference from the interwar period was the role of both the United States and Soviet Union.17 Both had deliberately played a minor role on the international stage in the 1920s and 1930s. The two emerged out of WWII as superpowers, and to a large extent dominated international politics, but hardly in harmony with each other. At the Yalta Conference in 1944 they claimed separate spheres of 12 Walter Lipgens, Documents in the History ofEuropean Integration, vol. 1, Continental Plans for European Union, 1939-1945 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 662. 13 Bugge, "The Nation," 111. 14 Gerbet, La construction, 46. 15 Ibid., 59. 16 Elisabeth du Reau, L'idee d'Europe au XXe siede: Des mythes aux realties (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1996), 130. 17 Maier, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," The American Historical Review 86, no. 2 (1981): 161. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 111 112 Electrifying Europe influence and consequently divided postwar Europe.18 The United States' vision of European cooperation was "more in accordance with the will of the local populations" than Stalin's conception of the future of Europe.19 His vision more closely resembled Hitler's imperialistic ambitions, as he tried to remake Central and Eastern Europe in the image of the Soviet Union. The very thought of European cooperation including Western Europe was repressed, leaving "'Europe' [...] mainly a term and idea employed by dissidents signifying western, democratic, humanist or other similar orientations".20 Between some Eastern European and West German intellectuals, the idea of reviving Central Europe, or Mitteleuropa, was very much alive in the early 1980s.21 The revitalization of the term was, on a whole, to resurrect the "center" of Europe from the destructive effects of Yalta, but also to reassert nationalistic aspirations of the Soviet satellites.22 While Central and Eastern Europe were coerced into withholding participation European cooperation, another region chose voluntarily to stay at arms' length. The choice to create a separate Nordic organization reflected the overall Scandinavian attitude towards European cooperation, which embraced postwar European integration with "mixed feelings".23 During the Cold War, the Nordic international political position was centered on the so-called Nordic balance; "a political balance [...] whereby Nordic countries could enjoy a lower level of tension than Central Europe and yet keep both [...] superpowers at a distance".24 The foundation of the Nordic Balance consisted of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, Sweden's policy of non-alignment, and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union (April 1948).25 18 The role of "Yalta" is particularly stressed in Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993). Great Britain was also part of the Yalta discussions. 19 Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263. 20 Ole Weever, "Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal," in The History, ed. Wilson and Van der Dussen, 164 and 161. 21 Thomas Masaryk coined the term as a political concept in the 1920s, believing that there were strong opportunities for a New Europe consisting of small nations between Germany and Russia. Josette Baer, "Imagining Membership: The Conception of Europe in the Political Thought of T.G. Masaryk and Vaclav Havel," Studies in East European Thought 52 (2000): 203-226. For the historical and topographical roots of the term see Hans-Dietrich Schultz and Wolfgang Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa: Conceptualisations of 'its' Space in and Outside German Geography," European Review of History - Revue europeenne d'histoire 10, no. 2 (2003): 273-292. 22 Hans-Georg Betz, "Mitteleuropa and Post-Modern European Identity," New German Critique 50 (1990): 173. 23 Thorsten B. Olesen, "Choosing or Refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration, 1945-2000," Scandinavian Journal of History 25 (2000): 147. 24 Weever, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992): 78-79. 25 Mikael af Malmborg, "Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument and the Enlargement of "Little Europe"," Journal of European Integration History 1 (1997): 65. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 112 7-8-2008 14:25:32 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 Instead of joining the Western European developments, the Scandinavian countries often went ahead with their own integration process. One example was the Nordic Council, set up to promote political integration in Scandinavian countries. Beyond these regional alliances, generally speaking, Scandinavian countries either favored cooperation through an Atlantic alliance, as well as within new global organizations over any sort of pan-European cooperation. In Western Europe cooperation and integration was not only on the agenda of countries themselves, but was also heavily stimulated by the United States. After WWII, the U.S. officially committed itself to assist Europe by providing substantial aid through the ERR Recovery and integration were part and parcel of the ERP agenda. According to the first report to the U.S. Congress, the attainment of the ultimate recovery goals depends largely on raising industrial efficiency and output in Europe. It is in planning this part of the program that the participating countries have perhaps the greatest opportunity to make the fundamental adjustments required to redirect the use of European resources along the lines of economic cooperation.26 Alan Milward adds that the ERP was placed in the framework of a sort of customs union theory, which posits that if "all restrictions on the movement of factors of productivity were removed from a particular area this would maximize the efficiency with which those factors were used and thus maximize output [...]".27 The Foreign Aid Act proposed to the U.S. Congress by President Truman spoke of the intention to create a larger common market without internal borders like the U.S. itself, and the Congress insisted on a common reconstruction program and organization.28 According to diplomatic historian Michael Hogan, the United States envisaged two steps towards an integrated Europe; first, at least some merger of economic sovereignty, and second, the rationalizing power of the market together with a modern belief in economic planning and bureaucratic management.29 26 ECA, First Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 4. 27 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 56-58. The quote is on page 58. Also see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), 5. 28 Gerbet, La construction, 69. 29 Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 293. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 113 114 Electrifying Europe Preparing for war In the years before the war, national dispatch stations were installed in several - mostly Western - European countries. This was the case in Belgium, for example, where the foremost private electricity producers founded the Coordination de la Production et du Transport de I'Energie electrique (CPTE) in 1937, headed by Louis de Heem. CPTEs main task was coordinating the various existing systems through interconnected operation.30 Although the rationalization of existing networks was the main impetus for coordinating networks on a national basis, it was also connected to preparations for an anticipated war. This was the case in several Western European countries. One of the nations most concerned with potential war preparation was France. In June 1938 the French government announced its national interconnection program.31 The program included setting up a central dispatching bureau under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Public Works. Its core activities included coordinating information exchange between existing regional dispatch offices and creating an economic mix between thermal and hydroelectric power.32 Both the French government and a large labor union argued that the new measures could immediately contribute to national defense as well. Several prominent electrical engineers, including Pierre Ailleret,33 had voiced similar opinions, arguing that it would provide an instrument to allocate electricity to key sectors and areas in case of a war economy.34 Network-building activities envisaged in the program struck a similar balance between issues of economy and defense. Of a planned network expansion of some 4,85 km costing 1.5 billion French Francs (see Table 4.1), some 541 million of the funds were earmarked for lines in the interest of national defense. This involved strengthening networks in the north-east of France, where power plants were vulnerable in case of a German attack.35 In this region the state built a 150 kV network, supplying electricity to the Maginot Line to provide elec- 30 CAPAS, "Evolution du systéme électrique européen. Nouveaux défis pour la recherche" (Academie royale des Sciences, 2006), 52. 31 Bouneau, "Transporter," in Histoire generale, vol. 2, ed. Lévy-Leboyer and Morsel, 792-793. 32 Ibid., 796. 33 Pierre Ailleret was born on March 10, 1900, graduated from the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées and the Ecole superieure d'Electricite. Early on in his career, he worked in the French Ministry of Public Works. In 1929 he became professor at the National Institute of Agronomy, and since 1938 he taught at the Ecole de Ponts. He was one of the founders of Electricité de France (EDF). During the first postwar years he was the French representative on the Public Utilities Committee of the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin. He was appointed vice-general-director, until 1967. He died in 1996. His son, Francois Ailleret, also held a high positions within EDF. 34 Ibid., 793. 35 Ibid., 794-795. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 114 7-8-2008 14:25:32 0 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 Table 4.1 - 1938 French National Interconnection Program (length of lines in km) 220 kV 150 kV 90 kV Total Lines of first urgency 540 376 153 1,069 Urgent lines 592 916 33 1,541 Other lines 733 596 246 1,575 Total 1,865 1,888 432 4,185 Source: Bouneau, "Transporter," 794. trie traction for provisioning trains, enable ventilation systems, and electrify gun turrets.36 The French interconnection program long outlasted the Maginot Line, and was aborted by the Vichy government in 1943, mainly because of shortages of equipment. Measures to safeguard existing lines and plants were taken in the same year. The Ministry of Industrial Production even set up a special police force to guard electrical installations. Later in 1943, German troops performed similar tasks, with two regiments assigned to protect the crucial interconnection between Paris and the Massif Centrale.37 In Italy strategic and military considerations played a key role in network building and administration as well, both before and during the war. Since 1922 the Mussolini administration increased efforts to prepare for warfare and a war economy. The electricity sector was a key part of these efforts. Especially the north of Italy was crucial, as it harbored 71.8 per cent of all installed capacity, and also was the expected theatre of war.38 Measures included making hydroelectric dams less sensitive to aerial attacks through camouflage techniques, standardizing frequencies, and increasing the interconnectedness of regional systems.39 The stress placed upon the latter aspect was not new and already discussed during WWI, and the years immediately after.40 Now, a T-shaped grid was planned: an east-west line traversing the Po Valley from Turin to Venice, and the north-south line from Verona to Terni (80 km north from Rome).41 In 1941 the project of the 230 kV North-South line was finally planned, connecting Florence and Verona. Although the line was completed during the war, it was taken out of service in 1944. Contrary to earlier expectations, the North remained relatively free of military action.42 36 Morsel, "Industrie electrique et defense, en France, lors des deux conflits mondiaux," Bulletin d'histoire de lelectricite 23 (1994): 7-18; and Herve Bongrain, "L'Electricite au service de la Defense nationale," in Histoiregenerale, vol. 3, ed. Morsel, 560. 37 Bouneau, "Transporter," 848-851. 38 Segreto, "Strategies militaires et interets economique dans l'industrie electrique italienne: Protection ou interconnexion des installations electriques, 1915-1945," Bulletin d'histoire de lelectricite 23 (1994): 68-71. 39 Ibid. The proposed means of camouflage was artificial fog. 40 Ibid., 65, and Giannetti, "Resources." 41 Segreto, "Strategies militaires," 73. 42 Ibid., 75-78. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 115 0 0 116 Electrifying Europe Germany, the other fascist regime, also prepared itself for a new war. The 1936 Four-Year-Plan aimed at economic self-sufficiency and rearmament, whereby electricity was a basic element of the war economy.43 Due to the Depression, the electricity sector had an overcapacity. But with the armaments productions at full steam and economic recovery on its way, this surplus quickly turned into deficit.44 In the fall of 1939 reserve capacity in Germany was practically non-existent.45 Therefore a Reichslastverteiler - load dispatcher - was assigned to directly intervene in the operation of power plants and networks in September 1939, shortly following the invasion of Poland. Historian Bernhard Stier argues that an autarkic electricity policy for the Reich was impossible. Not only was Germany a net importer since the 1920s, but the war economy required even more electricity in order to become self-sufficient in other sectors.46 The production of aluminum, and in particular Buna, a type of synthetic substitute for natural rubber, required substantial kWh per ton.47 It was therefore not surprising that new sources of electricity were sought in recently absorbed and occupied countries. This was done within the second Four-Year-Plan of November 1940, which aimed to develop Germany into a European Großwirtschaftsraum.i% The Plan identified the expansion of hydroelectric production as well as the full technical interconnection of the German system as its essential elements. In addition, new interconnections to adjacent countries should help to increase reserve capacity. This included the exploitation of resources in countries under German occupation, and countries collaborating with the Nazi regime. Also in Austria, already interconnected to Germany before the Anschluß of 1938, many hydroelectric plants were planned. These included hydroelectricity plants on the rivers Inn, Enns, and Danube. Alpine storage plants, like the Tauern-Großkraftwerk at Kaprun, were planned in particular to cover peak loads.49 In 1941 the Nazis discussed building 43 "Grundlage der Kriegswirtschaft." Stier, Staat, 475. 44 Stier, "Expansion," 271. 45 Stier, Staat, 478. 46 Ibid., .479 and 483. 47 Whereas the production of ton of aluminium - a known energy-intensive process - required 20.000 kWh, a ton of Buna required 40.000. See Maier, Erwin Marx (1893-1980), Ingenieurwissenschaftler in Braunschweig und die Forschung und Entwicklung auf dem Gebiet der elektrischen Energieübertragung auf weite Entfernungen zwischen 1918 und 1950 (Verlag für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik, 1993), 259-261. Stier calculated a ton of aluminium at 25.000 kWh. See "Expansion," 272. 48 Maier, Erwin Marx, 285. 49 Ibid., 270-271. A recent and impressive study of the Nazi electricity programme in Austria is Oliver Rathkolb and Florian Freund, eds., NS-Zwangsarbeit in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft der 'Ostmark' 1938-1945: Ennskraftwerke - Kaprun - Draukraftwerke - Ybbs-Persenbeug - Ernsthofen (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2002). Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 116 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:32 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 117 new connections from Austria to Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia.50 The occupation of Norway in April 1940 revived ideas of importing Norwegian hydroelectricity.51 Also in Germany the vulnerability of electrical installations was recognized. Already in 1934 the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Ministry of Aviation) tested the potential damage of air raids by tying explosive charges to transmission lines. Similar analyses were made for possible Belgian and French artillery attacks.52 Sections of the German Wehrmacht, particularly the air force, favored developing underground transmission lines.53 The current standard of AC was not fit for that, which stimulated research into the feasibility of DC cables. This even resulted in a scheme quite similar to Olivens interwar plan, but for HVDC.54 Towards the end of the war, a first part of the HVDC system was completed between the Elbe and Berlin.55 In the Netherlands, military considerations were an argument to interconnect local systems within the western and most urbanized part of the country.56 Shortly after that work had started, however, the German occupation in 1940 changed priorities. Besides interconnecting local and provincial systems within the Netherlands, the Nazis also wanted to construct linkages with Germany.57 The new German authorities left matters as much as possible to Dutch actors, including G.J.Th. Bakker of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and J.C, van Staveren of the union of Dutch electricity producers (Vereeniging van Directeuren van Electriciteitsbedrijven in Nederland). They supervised the building of interconnecting lines which had mostly already been discussed during the 1930s.58 Representatives of the Dutch provincial electricity company and the German RWE 50 "Niederschrift über die Sitzunf des Fachausschusses I (Wasserkraftplannung) am 27, und 28.1.1942 in Berlin, Pariser Platz 5a," Collection Wasserwirtschaftsstelle für das untere Donau-gebiet 1940-1942, Box 134, OS. 51 Such plans were first presented at the 1930 WPC in Berlin. See Maier, Erwin Marx, 94-100. 52 Maier, '"Nationalwirtschaftlicher Musterknabe' ohne Fortune. Entwicklungen der Elektrizitätspolitik un des RWE im 'Dritten Reich'," in Elektrizitswirtschaft zwischen Umwelt, Technik und Politik. Aspekte aus 100 Jahren RWE-Geschichte, 1898-1998, ed. Helmut Maier (Freiberg: TUB, 1998), 143-144. 53 Maier, '"Lauchhammer', 'Döbern und 'Ragow': Imaginäre und reale Verknotungen der Niederlausitzer Landschaft in die Elektrizitätswirtschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts," in Die Niederlausitz vom 18. Jahrhundert bis heute: Eine gestörte Kulturlandschaft?, Band 19 der Cottbuser Studien zur Geschichte von Technik, Arbeit und Umwelt, ed. Günter Bayerl and Dirk Maier (Münster: Waxmann, 2002), 149-195. 54 Maier, Erwin Marx, 286-292. 55 Maier, "Systems Connected," 145. 56 G.P.J. Verbong, L.van Empelen, and A.N. Hesselmans, "De ontwikkeling van het Nederlandse koppel-net tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog," NEHA-Jaarboek 12 (1998): 277-278. 57 Ibid., 284 & 287. 58 For the continuity between 1930s discussions and wartime building, see G.P.J. Verbong, A.N. Hesselmans, and J.L. Schippers, "Crisis, oorlog en wederopbouw," in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw, vol. 2, Delfstoffen, energie, chemie, ed. J.W. Schot et al. (Zutphen: Stichting Historie der Techniek/Walberg p, 2000), 190-201. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 117 7-8-2008 14:25:32 118 Electrifying Europe reached an agreement in 1941 on an international connection between Nijmegen and Kleef. Each party would be responsible for building the line on its own side of the border. This line was completed in April 1944 but only taken into service for a short while.59 Another line, which involved Belgium as well, was projected for the most southern province Limburg. This 220 kV line between Lutterade (Netherlands), Zukunft/Brauweiler (Germany), and Jupille (Belgium) was completed in 1944, but only gained importance after WWII.60 Transmission lines with France were also planned, but never built.61 Worries over the vulnerability of electricity systems and the according precautionary measures were certainly justified. Electricity was no longer merely the object of fascination, but had become essential to modern economies. According to a 1945 U.S. bombing survey, electricity was "an essential of all modern industry". During WWII, this was certainly the case for Germany. The U.S. survey claimed that the German electricity system was in a precarious state. It stated that "any loss of production would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results".62 While recognizing electricity's strategic importance, the Allies never explicitly targeted German electrical installations; the British Royal Airforce only dropped 0.04 per cent of its bombs on electric utilities, and the U.S. Airforce 0.05 per cent.63 Albert Speer ironically remarked at the Nuremberg Trails that the Allies prolonged the war by not launching a coordinated attack on the German electricity system.64 The Allied forces had a similar policy for Italy, as they decided not to bomb the industrial North. That, in combination with the unexpected southern front left many electrical installations relatively unharmed. Most damage was inflicted in central Italy, by both Allied actions as well as retreating German troops.65 In France, the electricity system was seriously damaged, in particular in the summer of 1943, when an upsurge of Resistance actions targeting electrical installations coincided with massive aerial bombardments by the Allies. The situation worsened with the Allied invasion of Normandy. By August 1944 the French high-voltage network was nearly paralyzed. Shifting priorities in favor of war-related in- 59 Verbong, Empelen, and Hesselmans, "De ontwikkeling," 301-302. 60 See Louis De Heem, "Experience acquise dans le fonctionnement interconnects du reseau beige avec les reseaux des pays voisins," in Report to UNIPEDE Congres: Comite detudes des interconnexions internationales, IV.l (Rome: UNIPEDE, 1952), 2-3. 61 Stier, "Expansion," 286. 62 United States, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all report (European War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), 83 and 85. 63 Ibid., 83. 64 Speer cited in Maier, "Systems Connected," 144-145. 65 Segreto, "Strategies militaires," 81-82. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 118 7-8-2008 14:25:32 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 Table 4.2 - Electricity production in selected European countries, 1939-1945 (in GWh) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Austria 3,580 3,990 4,429 4,731 5,640 5,877 3,628 Belgium 5,577 4,138 4,773 4,941 5,030 3,647 4,366 Bulgaria 266 295 302 316 342 307 401 Czechoslovakia - - - - - 6,805 4,457 Denmark 1,065 873 1,001 1,091 1,133 1,147 1,017 France 20,228 18,833 18,588 17,857 18,228 14,213 18,074 Germany 34,053 39,800 45,200 11,277* Italy 18,417 19,431 20,761 20,233 18,247 13,545 12,648 Netherlands 3,903 3,624 3,493 3,447 3,414 2,823 1,740 Norway 5,056 4,794 5,520 6,045 7,045 7,387 6,936 Portugal 382 397 416 407 425 447 488 Romania 582 543 606 - - 647 - Spain 3,111 3,617 3,890 4,438 4,776 4,720 4,236 Sweden 9,054 8,624 9,117 9,795 11,035 12,427 13,526 Switzerland 5,506 6,267 6,498 6,269 6,960 6,917 7,971 * Only Western Germany. Source: UNIPEDE annual statistics. For Germany: Stier, Staat,l5. dustries led to French laws restricting electricity consumption as early as December 1940. In later war years, many French areas became used to blackouts, not only due to rationing but also to sabotage and bombardments.66 In general, most European countries experienced a modest growth of their electricity production from 1939 onwards (see Table 4.2). In most occupied countries - Belgium, France, and the Netherlands - this growth turned into a decline in 1943-1944. Exceptions to this trend are Norway and Austria, which were in particular targeted by the National-Socialist regime to supply more hydroelectricity. Still, both countries experienced a decline in 1945, mainly due to destruction related to warfare and damage done by retreating German forces, and scarce energy sources. Recovery initiatives Considering their bombing policy, the wartime Allies preferred to keep electricity systems intact. Where they did target them, like in France, the Allies gave restoring electricity supply high priority. There, the repair of damaged plants and lines was a 66 Bouneau, "L'Economie," 128-131. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 119 120 Electrifying Europe task for U.S. Army engineers. Almost immediately after the landing at Normandy, the engineering division of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) surveyed existing needs and started repair work.67 These actions resulted in quite a substantial increase in electricity production in France in 1945 (see Table 4.2). Once SHAEF ceased to exist in mid-1945, the so-called Public Utilities Panel (PUP) took over its role.68 PUP was set up in June 1945 on the initiative of British and American Control Authorities in Germany, and reported to the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE, established May 1945).69 While SHAEF was only active behind the frontline following the Normandy invasion, the PUP was more of an interim European organization, and thus had a wider range of activities. Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States were represented at the PUP meetings. Great Britain, France, and the United States also represented Austria and Germany.70 The PUP was initially concerned with reconstructing and repairing of installations and transmission lines between Germany and its neighboring countries71. Thereafter PUP tried to coordinate electricity exports from Germany to Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Another task was the exchange of information, which in practice consisted of preparing statistical returns on production and consumption, and export and import of electricity and gas.72 Both SHAEF and PUP tried to cover acute needs. They were inadequate to supervise a structured reconstruction and modernization of war-torn Europe. In 1947 the EECE, of which the PUP was part, was absorbed by a new organization: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 1947). The UNECE 67 One of the first inventories I found concerned the region around Cherbourg, which saw three weeks of battle after the invasion on June 6, 1944. The purpose of the report was to determine the condition of the electric power (as well as the water supply) facilities in the area. "Report of Inspection. Location: Cherbourg Area," 10-14 July 1944, Record Group 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, file 4.1: Records of the Engineer Division, box 3, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, United States (hereafter: NACP). 68 "Absorption of EECE by the Economic Commission for Europe, 'Emergency Economic Committee for Europe. Paper Submitted by the Acting Secretary-General for the Information of the Economic Commission for Europe'", 26 April 1947, registry fonds GX: Economics, file 12/1, United Nations Organisation in Geneva Archives (hereafter: UNOG). 69 The EECE was one of several European wartime organisations, referred to as the E-organisations. These also included he European Coal Organisation (ECO: officially established in January 1946, but in function since June 1945) and the European Central Inland Transport Organisation (ECITO: September 1945). Their work has not received wide historical attention. 70 "The Work of the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe," n.d., registry fonds GX, file 12/1, UNOG. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 120 7-8-2008 14:25:32 0 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 was set up to accelerate reconstruction, "to modernise the structure of industry and to modify the character of the economic system" in Europe.73 The UNECE was part of the United Nations (UN, 1945), an organization that took over the role of the LoN in 1946. The groundwork for the UN was laid during and shortly after WWII. On the whole, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China decided upon the structure of the new world organization in 1944, as the basis of a effective system of collective security.74 The Americans insisted that UN dealt with economic and social affairs as well. This became the task of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).75 In order to accelerate reconstruction ECOSOC set up regional working groups, the ECE being one of them.76 ECE was not alone in aiding an ailing Europe. In fact it was outshone by the European Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP was the result of an invitation by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who in June 1947 spoke of an extensive aid program enabling "the Europeans to help themselves". The foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met that same month. They decided to convene a special conference to discuss the coordination of American aid in July 1947.77 That conference led to a Committee of European Economic Co-operation (CEEC), along with technical committees on Food and Agriculture, Energy, Iron and Steel, and Transport. At a later stage, Timber and Manpower committees were created, as well as a Balance of Payments Committee, and a Committee of Financial Experts. The CEECs task was to submit a plan for allocating ERP funds for the period 1948-1951. All participating countries were asked to hand in the necessary information to the technical committees. Most information was already submitted in August of the same year.78 On April 26,1948 sixteen western European countries signed a convention establishing the organization to handle the ERP, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). 73 Yves Berthelot and Paul Rayment, "The ECE: A Bridge Between East and West," in Unity and Diversity in Development Ideas: Perspectives from the UN Regional Commissions, ed. Yves Berthelot (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 57. Also see Václav Kostelecky, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: The Beginning of a History (Stockholm: Arbetarrorelsens arkiv och biblioték, 1989), 16-18. 74 First, in meeting between August and October 1944 at the estate of Dumbarton Oaks near Washington D.C., the Great Powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China) ironed out the main structure of the new world organisation. It should guarantee the basis of a effective system of collective security. The main decisions taken at Dumbarton included a General Assembly composed of all member states with an equal vote, and a Security Council composed of the great (armed) powers, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. Gerbet, Mouton, and Ghébali, Le réve, 139-141. 75 Ibid. 76 Berthelot and Rayment, "The ECE," 56-57. 77 Milward, The Reconstruction, 64. 78 OEEC, The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation: Two Years of Economic Co-Operation (Paris: OEEC, 1950), 9-10. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 121 0 0 122 Electrifying Europe This need for new organization was contested by some. At the 1947 Conference, Norway and Sweden pleaded to organize the ERP within the United Nations' framework, and to use the UNECE to administer ERP funds. This Scandinavian initiative did not prevail for several reasons. First of all, not every European country had UN membership.79 Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and Romania did not join the UN until 1955. The Federal Republic of Germany as well as the German Democratic Republic followed only in 1973 (see Table 4.3). This situation would potentially trouble UN-based decisions on how to allocate and spend the aid. Second of all, with regard to UNECE, the United States was afraid that Soviet political obstruction would stymie its effectiveness.80 Lastly, the United States wanted more control over the distribution of funds. In particular, it wished to avoid a repetition of the political struggles experienced in an earlier assistance program, the United Nations Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA, 1943).81 The U.S. Congress was impressed with UNRRA's results82 but it also resented the exploitation of its funds, of which 74 per cent came from the United States, by Eastern European communists.83 The OEEC thus went ahead and, despite their reservations, Sweden and Norway participated. Matters were different for Central and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union. They abstained from becoming OEEC members, despite the fact that Secretary Marshall himself had pointed out that assistance was open to everyone. To Marshall, aid was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos".84 Initially, the Soviet Union seemed to embrace that idea and sent a mission to Paris, despite having some reservations. Moscow was critical toward aid for Germany and former allies of Hitler, while preferring a "no-strings-attached assistance to the anti-Nazi Allies".85 The Kremlin was also suspicious of U.S. intentions. On the one hand the Soviets 79 Milward hints at it in The Reconstruction, note 29. Most of the eastern European countries would join in December 1955. 80 The Soviet Union at least tried to do this at UNECE's first session in May 1947. WW. Rostow, The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 73-74. 81 Robert H. Johnson, "International Politics and the Structure of International Organization: The Case of UNRRA," World Politics 3, no. 4 (2006): 520-538. It should be noted that "United Nations" in its title referred to the group of countries providing aid, and not to the "United Nations" as an organization. 82 Milward, The Reconstruction, 46; and David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London: Longman, 1992), 35-36. 83 This resentment is mentioned in Maier, "Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years," in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 277. 84 Excerpt from Marshall's speech, recited in Ellwood, Rebuilding, 85. From a geographic point of view one could argue whether Turkey and Greece are really "western". 85 Gerbet, La construction, 69; and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 104. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 122 7-8-2008 14:25:32 0 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 123 Table 4.3 - Membership of the OEEC, CMEA & UN Country OEEC/CMEA member UN-member Albania CMEA 1955 Austria OEEC 1955 Belgium OEEC Yes Bulgaria CMEA 1955 Czechoslovakia CMEA Yes Denmark OEEC Yes Federal Republic Germany OEEC 1973 Finland None 1955 France OEEC Yes Greece OEEC Yes German Democratic Republic CMEA (1950) 1973 Hungary CMEA 1955 Iceland OEEC Yes Ireland OEEC Yes Italy OEEC 1955 Luxembourg OEEC Yes Netherlands OEEC Yes Norway OEEC Yes Poland CMEA Yes Portugal OEEC 1955 Romania CMEA 1955 Spain OEEC (1958; associate) 1955 Sweden OEEC Yes Switzerland OEEC 2002 Turkey OEEC Yes USSR CMEA Yes United Kingdom OEEC Yes United States None1 Yes Yugoslavia None Yes *They joined as part of the USSR, t The U.S. did participate as part the Bizone of Germany and the Anglo-American zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, consultative members did not have the right to vote in the Commission. Adapted from: Kostelecky, The United Nations, 15, figure 1; and Gerbet, Mouton, and Ghebali, Le reve, 426. desired U.S. credits, but on the other they feared economic blackmail.86 In 1947 the Soviet ambassador in Washington warned his minister of foreign affairs that "the Marshall Plan [...] is directed toward the establishment of a West European 86 This was fed by earlier experiences. A 1945 request for U.S. aid was supposedly "lost". Only six months later the United States spoke of a loan of one billion dollar, but linked to a settlement of various controversial issues. Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 123 0 7-8-2008 14:25:32 124 Electrifying Europe bloc as an instrument of American policy".87 In addition, Stalin saw the Marshall Plan as a watershed, interpreting it as an attempt to revive German industrial and military potential which threatened Soviet security. It hampered Stalin's vision of a future Europe, and endangered German-Soviet relations.88 But not only the Soviet Union had reservations about their taking part in the ERP According to Alan Milward, the U.S. State Department purposely made the ERP incompatible with Soviet wishes.89 Others have confirmed that view.90 It was, however, Stalin who decided not to participate, and coerced countries within his sphere of influence to do the same. Thus when the Soviet delegation walked out of the Paris Conference in July 1947, they took the Central and Eastern European states in their wake.91 The Soviet Union then set up the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949 as a rival organization for regional economic cooperation and development. This division in Europe between "East" and "West", with a hesitant "North", contributed to a corresponding regional division in the field of electricity. The ERP gave strong incentives to forge a close collaboration between OEEC countries. Over the course of the 1950s, Western European countries strengthened interconnections between their respective systems, and created a power pool. The CMEA over time created its own system, as did Scandinavian countries. In the following section, I will trace these interconnections, focusing mainly on Western European development within the framework of American aid. U.S. internationalization opposed The ERP, as described by the European Cooperation Act of 1948 (the U.S. law that called it into being), was based on four main points: 1) the creation of internal financial stability, 2) development of economic co-operation between the countries, and 3) solution of the trade deficit with the U.S. economy. The fourth point was "a strong production efforthj each of the participating countries, especially in agricul- 87 Recited in Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, "New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports" (Cold War International History Project working paper, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1994), 43. 88 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside, 50-51. 89 Milward, The Reconstruction, 64. 90 British and French ministers of foreign affairs Bevin and Bidault sought to strengthen the improbability of Soviet participation, telling the U.S. Ambassador in Paris that "they hoped that the Soviet will refuse to cooperate". Recited in Parrish and Narinsky, "New Evidence," note 105. 91 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside, 51. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 124 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:33 0 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 ture, fuel and power, transport, and the modernization of equipment".92 Between 1947 and 1951 the ERP transferred 11.8 billion US$ to Europe.93 To administer the ERP, the United States set up the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). ECA had national missions in each participating country to oversee domestic allocation of ERP funds. On the European side, the OEEC coordinated and allocated ERP funds. It was made up of a Council, an Executive Committee, and Technical Committees. In Paris, where the OEEC had its headquarters, was also the Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (OSR). The Special Representative was the highest ranking officer responsible for the ERP in Europe. The OSR coordinated the activities of the ECA national missions and worked directly with the OEEC in Paris.94 The United States stayed in close proximity to the decision-making process concerning the spending of ERP funds. The ECA tried to exert some leverage on national economic policy in Western Europe through the so-called counterpart funds. The equivalent in national currency of all ERP-financed imports had to be deposited in a special account with the national bank. Five per cent of the funds in each account were allocated for the U.S. use for administrative expenditures associated with the ERP, and for the procurements of materials needed by the United States.95 The remaining counterpart funds had either to be used to retire debt or for investments. To put these funds to use, ECA authorization was required.96 A stable financial and monetary climate was a first prerequisite for obtaining permission.97 The ERPs electricity program was negotiated between the OEEC, ECA and OSR.98 The overall electricity program, covering the period 1948-1951, had three main aims. First, it should recuperate wartime damage. This included completing 92 CEEC, Committee of European Economic Co-Operation, vol. 1, General Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1947), 6. 93 Gerard Bossaut, L'Europe occidentale a I'heure americaine: Le Plan Marshall et I'unite europeenne (1945-1952) (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1992), 138-139. 94 Hogan, "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism," The American Historical Review 90, no. 1 (1985): 47 and 54-56. Also see Chiarella Esposito, Americas Feeble weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 7. 95 ECA, Second Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 55. 96 For more on counterpart funds, see Esposito, Americas, 6-7; Milward, The Reconstruction, 107ff; and Bossaut, L'Europe, chap. 7. 97 Esposito's study of ERP fund spending in France and Italy elaborately threats the actual implementation of counterpart funds. Often, in the case of these two countries, ECA could not extort absolute control over counterpart spending. National politics and specific economic problems forced ECA to release funds, whereas Paris and Washington not always were eager to do so. 98 The OEEC did also discuss the distribution of available (heavy) electrical equipment. Although related, I will however focus on their activities concerning the construction of international power plants and networks, and international coordination efforts. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 125 0 0 126 Electrifying Europe Table 4.4 - Planned ECA support for electricity equipment, 1948-1951 (in millions of US$) 1948 1949 1950 1951 Total Main national programs 125 100 50 25 300 Supplementary International 25 75 75 25 200 Program Total 150 175 125 50 500 Calculated on basis of: CEEC, General Report, 51, table 16. plants under construction, and overdue maintenance of equipment. A second goal was "to increase [supplies of energy] progressively and thus raise the whole standard of productivity of European workers", which resonated with one of the overall objectives of the ERR" OEEC countries planned to increase electricity by nearly 70,000 million kWh by 1951. This would bring total production to 40 per cent above the 1947 level. In addition, generating capacity would increase by at least 25 GW, approximately two-thirds above the pre-war level. In total, ECA estimated it would need to allocate around 500 million US$ to reconstruct and modernize Western Europe's electricity system, (see Table 4.4 for a breakdown). Each country identified its national priorities, and presented these to the OEEC. ECA's Industry Division subsequently considered these national plans, and approved them accordingly. Taken together, these plans were known as the National Program. But the Electricity Program had a third aim: stimulating European cooperation. This fitted well with the US's overarching aim of these to have countries pool resources and work together in a close fashion. The CEEC had drafted a number of projects for what became known as the International Power Program. CEEC selected nine projects: six hydro plants in Italy, France, and on the frontier separating Austria, Italy and Switzerland, as well as two lignite thermal plants in Western Germany and a geothermal plant in Italy (see Figure 4.1). The CEEC report emphasized that "these projects have been selected without regard to national frontiers".100 These projects were labeled "international" not only because they supplemented the national plans mentioned above. The idea behind the International Program was to exploit international resources (border rivers, streams of water from mountain ranges on borders) through internationally financed and owned plants and the electricity generated in those plants would be shared among participating countries (see Table 4.5).101 Economically speaking, the aim of this International Program was to cover electricity shortages during wintertime.102 At least according to G.W Perkins, the International Power Program was 99 CEEC, General Report, 10. 100 Ibid., 11. 101 CEEC, Committee of European Economic Co-Operation, vol. 2, Technical Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132. 102 Ibid, 131. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 126 7-8-2008 14:25:33 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 127 LEGEND 5« porsffopd IW of ttit fuel flfltf Pawer Report * iv. v- ) —Goldenberg i-J-,;' ^Fr »Senheim I— J i / V / " «Sarca Molveno Figure 4.1 - ECA's international power plants Source: CEEC, Technical Reports, 164. "maybe the most important part of the whole Electricity Program".103 Perkins worked for the Industry Division of ECA, which oversaw the Electricity Program. Its importance in relation to the National Program was reflected in ECAs allocated budget. While ECA reserved 300 million US$ for the National Program, the International Program had a budget of 200 million. While national projects were co-financed by ECA funds, the countries themselves, and counterpart funds, ECA bore the bulk of the costs with regard to the International Program.104 In spite of the high hopes, the International Program from the start did not live up to ECAs expectations. In contrast to ECA, the Western European nations gave priority to the National Program. They were not as enthusiastic about the International Program as ECA was. This was reflected in discussions of the 103 Arthur S. Griswold (consultant on electricity, Industry Division) to Mr. Perkins (Director, Industry Division), 7 September 1948, RG 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, file 2.2: Records of the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe, subject and country files of the Industry Division, box 1, NACP. 104 Ibid. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 127 7-8-2008 14:25:33 128 Electrifying Europe Table 4.5 - The International Program in figures 2 &0 ^ .2 .2 & ^ o | J 3 ^ 1 a Sir Off o Adige Noce Italy Italy 140 552 4 22 Bouthier Italy 972 771 4 46 Fessenheim France (Rhine) France 120 850 4 67 Goldenberg Germany France 190 1,150 2 18 Benelux Germany Larderello Italy Italy 75 500 5 6 Piave Italy Italy 130 275 5 16 Sarca Molveno Italy Italy 180 500 4 30 Upper Inn Austria Italy 349* 1,407* 4-6* 80* Switzerland Austria Italy Weisweiler Germany France 150 1,000 3 30 Benelux Total 2,306 6,645 315 * Austrian part only. Source: CEEC, Technical Reports, 132, table 23. Electricity Committee of the OEEC. That Committee was composed of national experts on electricity, mostly engineers working for national utilities. According to an internal ECA report, the September 1948 meeting of the Committee saw "inconclusive and at times very heated" discussions on the International Program.105 Judging by the minutes of the meeting that seems an understatement. The Italian delegate opened the sessions by remarking that none of the five planned power stations in Italy would export electricity. He therefore wanted exclude these plants from the International Program.106 Subsequently, U.S. officials representing the Bizone in Germany made a similar announcement; the two planned brown coal 105 Arthur S. Griswold to Perkins, "Report of O.E.E.C. Electricity Committee Meetings, September 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1948," 15 October 1948, RG 469, file 2.2, NACP. Griswold had been presented at this meeting as ECA observer. 106 "Minutes of the 10th Meeting," 10 September 1948, fonds OEEC, file 1157.3, document EL/M(48) 10, Historical archives of the European Union, Florence (hereafter HAEU). While originally doing my research on-site in Florence, I found several files barely readable from microfilm. I owe many thanks to Jan-Anno Schuur of the OECD Archives in Paris for supplying me several better copies. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 128 7-8-2008 14:25:33 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 plants would supply to German consumers only.107 This was backed by General Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of the U.S. zone in Germany. He "emphatically opposed" the idea of exploiting Ruhr brown coal fields to the benefit of contiguous countries.108 He was responsible for making Western Germany self-supporting, a task requiring sufficient energy sources. At the same time Clay felt as if neighboring countries were trying to obtain electricity from Germany as a form of reparations.109 The technical and economic soundness of the intentions of the International Program was evidently not in doubt. The British representative stated that it was in the interest of each country to "work a favorable site outside its frontier rather than to work a less favorable site".110 But implementing the program led to difficulties primarily due to "political and diplomatically uncertainty".111 According to the United Kingdom the International Program therefore "seriously failed to materialize".112 Either the definition had to be changed, or a program more thoroughly studied than the 1947 report should be drawn up. Eventually a related suggestion by the chairman, Franz Hintermayer from Austria, was adopted; each country should make a list of "installations which might be of international interest". The definition employed by Hintermayer already reflected an important deviation from the initial American idea, in two ways. First of all, Hintermayer spoke of international installations, which included both power stations and transmission lines, which differed from the original emphasis on power plants. Second of all, the definition of "international" seemed to have changed. For ECA, international projects should involve more than one country in terms of resource, finance and electricity supply. By redefining this to installations that "might be of international interest", it came to include power plants and transmission lines that in the first place contributed to the national electricity economy, and only in the second place contributed to other countries. The Committee eventually decided to study obstacles to implementing the International Program, and to submit installations of international interest. Although the work of the UNECE is reviewed more thoroughly in the next chapter, it is important to note here that they too faced opposition to plans for international ownership of electrical installations. In December 1947 the UNECE discussed the future of Europe with regard to electricity. The meeting had a high profile, considering the presence of the Executive Secretary Gunnar Myrdal, his 107 Ibid. "Bizone" was the commonly used name for the merged British and U.S. zones in Germany since 1946. 108 DeForest to Perkins, 13 November 1948, RG 469, file 2.2, box 1, NACP. 109 Ibid. 110 "Minutes of the 10,h Meeting", 10 September 1948, fonds OEEC, file 1157.3, document EL/M(48) 10, HAEU. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. Electrifyingeuropehandels2.indd 129 0 130 Electrifying Europe special assistant Walt Rostow, and UNECE's chief economist Nicholas Kaldor. At the heart of the discussion was a paper by the Director of the Electric Power section, James Houston Angus.113 Angus proposed a formal resolution, a "European Power Charter", in which each member state would promise to develop its indigenous power resources to the maximum economic benefit of all signatories. Furthermore, he wanted to compile an overall program according to jointly determined priorities. But his most ambitious suggestion was the European Power Board, that would "[market] surplus national power production" as well as own and operate HV-interconnections. The Board would also act as a finance corporation, and consider international questions of system operation and load control.114 Kaldor was very open to the suggestion, and in addition he recognized the need to think about the relation between this project and the ERR115 In an earlier response Walt Rostow116 expressed mixed feelings. On the one hand he strongly agreed with the timing for implementing a long-term scheme for Europe's electricity supply. On the other, he doubted whether nations desired such a charter.117 French expert Pierre Ailleret, also present at the meeting, immediately renounced the idea of the Board. He considered bilateral agreements a better option, and the ownership of transmission lines "was out of the question".118 The only possible option for such a board was to attract finance for developing new projects. After some discussion it was agreed that no specific project of such a board would be laid before the Committee on Electric Power at this stage. The withdrawal of Angus' proposal was also the end of the European Power Board, and similar suggestions. No consensus could be found within the ECE for a formal body for international, or supranational, cooperation and ownership. This 113 The director was part of the ECE's Secretariat. 114 Draft note by James Angus Houston, "Electric Power. European Power Board," 13 December 1947, registry fonds GX, file 12/1/1, UNOG. 115 Note of meeting held in the Executive Secretary's office to discuss the proposal that the Power Committee be asked to consider the formation of a European Power Board, 19 December 1947, registry fonds GX, file 12/1/1, UNOG. 116 Walt Whitman Rostow was born as a son of Russian-Jewish parents on October 7, 1916 in New York City. Rostow received a PhD in economics from Yale in 1940, and spend his wartime service in the Office of Strategic Services. After the war he worked in the German-Austrian Affairs Unit, under Charles P. Kindleberger, in the economic section of the State Department, which was headed at that time by Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William L. Clayton. After his two-year employment in Geneva as special assistant to Myrdal, he became professor of economic history at MIT, although still being active in Washington. He became a policy advisor to Kennedy in 1958. Shortly after publishing his acclaimed The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto he was promoted to Kennedy's deputy special assistant for national security affairs. Under president Johnson he was national security advisor and a relentless supporter of military intervention. He died on February 13, 2003. 117 W.W. Rostow to Angus Houston, 16 December 1947, registry fonds GX, file 19/13/1, UNOG. 118 Note of meeting, 19 December 1947, UNOG. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 130 7-8-2008 14:25:33 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 did not imply that other forms of collaboration were undesired. Hintermayer, also active in the UNECE Committee on Electric Power, proposed "an informal international group to exchange ideas with a view to closer co-operation [and providing] valuable data for any European grid system which might be established in the future".119 He saw his suggestion supported. Clearly Western European engineers were in favor of international cooperation, but both within the OEEC and UNECE, they opposed plans for international or European ownership of power plants and transmission lines. The TECAID mission ECA was not happy with the lack of progress of the International Program after the September 1948 meeting of the OEEC Electricity Committee. One month later, Perkins wrote Special Representative Harriman that [t]he international program could and should be one of the important elements in the general European recovery and in European economic cooperation. As matters stand, it is not.120 The Electricity Committee did not take up the International Program again before the end of 1949. ECA, however, did. Its December 1948 report reckoned that the International Program was "a controversial matter" from the start, which had "continued to remain unsettled".121 ECA underlined its definition of international projects as "those plants requiring an international agreement for their financing, construction, or for the utilization of the power they produce".122 According to the report, many of the plants included in the initial program had no international aspect whatsoever, and the Bizone authorities had not been consulted about the two German plants. But this was not the only problem for ECA. Whereas the Paris Report assumed an expansion of generation capacity by 21,203 MW through the National Program, recalculations in 1949 indicated that an increase of only 14,867 MW would be 119 UNECE, Committee on Electric Power, First Session, Fifth Meeting, October 14, 1947, UN doc, ser., E/ ECE/EP/SR.1/5 (Geneva: UNECE, 1947), 7. 120 G.W Perkins to A.W. Harriman, 7 October 1948, RG 469, file 2.2, box 1, NACP. 121 C.W. DeForest, A.S. Griswold and S.F. Neville, "The Electricity Programs, Long-Term and 1949/50," Annual Report prepared for Electric Power Branch, Industry Division, Office of Special Representative (Paris: ECA, 1948), 14. Found in RG 469, file 2.2, box 1, NACP. 122 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 131 0 132 Electrifying Europe possible.123 This considerable gap was due in part to inaccurate estimates in 1947, but mostly to the unavailability of materials and financial means. ECA wanted to make up for this deficit, as the planned growth of industrial activities of Western European countries was based on the initial calculation.124 It also wanted to tackle the lack of reserve capacity. It therefore suggested initiating a Complementary Program, which would aim to meet the deficit. The report provided an extensive list of 74 plants, both thermal and hydroelectric, representing a capacity of 7,865 MW.125 The list contained national plants not part of the National Program, as well as most of the plants of the original International Program. In addition, ECA indicated that surplus capacity was not always and sometimes could not be offered to contiguous countries during peak times. To a large extent this was caused by a lack of interconnections, ECA argued, which prevented a more effective pooling of resources.126 This was in contrast to the United States, where interconnected systems often formed voluntary operating committees. Such forms of collaboration enabled more economic operation and made more effective use of available equipment, assuring "the greatest benefit to all concerned".127 This apparent lack of international coordination was earlier pointed out by ECAs most important consultant concerning electricity, Walker Cisler (see Figure 4.2). Cisler was a prominent American engineer who had already worked on electricity systems in Europe through SHAEF and PUP.128 In October 1948 he pointed out to Perkins that little coordination of operation of electricity systems existed between countries in North-Western Europe.129 More coordination had several advantages, argued Cisler. First, participating countries would be able to schedule 123 Ibid., 10. 124 Ibid., 8. 125 Ibid., 16-19. 126 Samuel F. Neville (Assistent Chief, Electric Power Section) to Huntington Gilchrist (Director, Industry Division), 11 September 1950, RG 469, 2.2, box 5, NACP. 127 C.W. DeForest, A.S. Griswold and S.F. Neville, " The Electricity Programs, Long-Term and 1949/50," Annual Report prepared for Electric Power Branch, Industry Division, Office of Special Representative (Paris: ECA, 1948), 22-23. Found in RG 469, file 2.2, box 1, NACP. 128 Walker Lee Cisler (1897-1994) graduated from Cornell University with a degree in mechanical engineering, after serving in WWI. He began to work for the Public Serve and Electric Gas in New Jersey. He would be employed by the Office of Production Management (later named War Production Board) in 1941. In mid-1943 he shortly joined Detroit Edison Company, but was asked by Eisenhower to become chief of the public utilities headquarter of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force). Cisler's main task was to restore power plants across war-torn Europe. He was for example part of the restoring power and gas service in Paris in 1945. After WWII he would join the board of Detroit Edison, and Walker Cisler was also asked by Paul G. Hoffman to become the head of ECAs Power Branch. Cisler became the first U.S. chairman of the World Energy Conference in 1968. He further dedicated his efforts to promote peaceful use of nuclear power, and was a frequently consulted advisor for many national and international organisations. 129 Walter Cisler and C.W. DeForest to George Perkins (Director Industry Division), 26 October 1948, RG 469, file 2.2, box 1, NACP. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 132 7-8-2008 14:25:33 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 power plant outages for maintenance and help cover each other s electricity shortages during such periods. Second, since it would enable mutual assistance, each country could reduce the margin of reserve requirements. Third, because closer coordination enables better use of existing capacity, the total amount of available electricity would increase.130 According to Cisler, collaboration between utilities had proven to be very effective in the United States.131 He therefore recommended having Western European network operators exchange experiences with their American counterparts, under the sponsorship of ECA Such a visit would also "be very helpful in furthering the aims and purposes of ECA from the standpoint of electric power".132 Cisler preferred that this visit take place as soon as possible. Perkins took over Cisler s suggestion and subsequently informed Robert Majorlin, the Secretary-General (1948-1954) of the OEEC.133 Between April and May 1949, a group of twenty-five electrical engineers from Western Europe visited the United States for a period of six weeks. Several of these men were Electricity Committee members, and in general all were involved with load dispatching in their respective countries. A number of people on the mission had already worked together. For example Louis de Heem (Belgium) was acquainted with Walker Cisler through PUP. Through the first ECE Electricity Committee meeting in 1947, De Heem also knew Dutchman G. J. Th. Bakker, Frenchman Crescent, and Swiss René Hochreutiner as well as the chairman of the group, Franz Hintermayer. OEEC Technical Assistance Project No. 1, or the TECAID mission as it became known, had an extensive program. Steam and water power stations - including plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority and Niagara Hudson Power Co. - plant manufacturing works of Westinghouse, research installations, and central control rooms were all part of the tour across the United States.134 In particular, much attention was devoted to a number of large interconnected groups, or power pools. This was reflected in the TECAID report, which consisted of two parts. The first dealt with American practices, the second reviewed existing interconnections in Western Europe. In the first part, the report focused upon the South Atlantic & Central Areas Group (SA & CA Group) and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 William Foster to Robert Marjolin, 26 November 1948, RG 469, file 2.2, NACP. The letter was send under the name of Foster, at the time Deputy Special Representative in Europe, but was drafted by Perkins. 134 A complete list is printed as Appendix B of the official report. See OEEC, Interconnected Power Systems in the USA and Western Europe: The Report of the Tecaid Mission, the Report of the Electricity Committee (Paris, 1950), 29ff. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 133 0 134 Electrifying Europe Interconnection (PNJ) as examples of a loosely-knit system and a closely-knit system, respectively135 The PNJ was planned from the start to be an interconnection between companies. Founded by three utilities in 1927, they decided to construct a 220 kV ring between the utilities to their mutual benefit.136 Utilizing this ring structure, a central control organization in Philadelphia allocated the total load to the most economical plant available in the whole interconnected system. The PNJ did not see the need for automated control of frequencies. The overall transmission capacity was large and the frequency was centrally monitored by control staff in Philadelphia. The SA & CA Group represented a loosely-knit system. At the time it was the largest interconnected system in the world, stretching from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. As to geographical size, according to the Report, it was quite comparable to the surface of Western Europe including Italy. The Group was established in 1928 as a voluntary association and gradually came to include over eighty public utilities, both private and public. These were connected through tie-lines, which are denned as interconnections between different control areas or utilities.137 As the interconnected system grew, manual control of frequency and exchanges between utilities became insufficient. The Group therefore changed to automated control of frequency and tie-line loading.138 Crucially, however, the Group did not have a centralized system of control. Each participating utility took responsibility for their own system conditions. Once a year, representatives of all utilities met, mainly to coordinate maintenance programs. Regional committees met twice a year. The most frequent contact between utilities was telephone calls between load dispatchers of neighboring utilities. Contact with load dispatchers other than from neighboring areas was rare. According to the TECAID report, a closer organization was not economically justified. American engineers argued that allocating load to the cheapest available units in the Group resulted in between 80 to 90 per cent of total possible savings.139 Relatively little attention was devoted to allocation of load to utilities further than the adjacent areas. The resultant report, presented to the OEEC in June 1949, also reflected on the applications of American practices in Western European countries. The European engineers were particularly fond of the loosely-knit system of the SA & CA Group, 135 Ibid., US. 136 The history of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey Interconnection is by Hughes as an example of a planned system. See his Networks, 325-332. 137 See Steven L. Rueckert, "Transferring Electrical Power between Utilities: Economics and Reliability Tie Energy Suppliers Together," IEEE Potentials 7, no. 4 (1988): 13-14. 138 OEEC, Interconnected, 15. 139 Ibid., 16. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 134 {ft} 7-8-2008 14:25:33 0 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 135 Table 4.6 - Interconnections between TECAID countries, 1949 From/to Austria Belgium Denmark France Netherlands Norway Switzerland France 2 x 60 kV 1 x 65 kV 1 x 70 kV 1 x 70 kV 1 x 125 kV 4x 150 kV 1 x 130 kV 1 x 140 kV 1 x 150 kV 1 x 70 kV Italy lxl30kV 1 x 140 kV ' lxl50kv Netherlands 1 x 220 kV Sweden 1 x 50 kV 1 x 80 kV -i-i-i-i 2 x 220 . „-,.-.itt . , _ „ i T t . ^ ^i -v t 3x110 FRG „ lx220kV lxl50kV lx220kV , 9xll0kV .„,,, lx220kV 2 x 220 kV Source: OEEC, Interconnected, 52-55. which showed that interconnecting relatively small systems was economically advantageous. Recognizing that interconnected operation was already in place in some Western European countries, the TECAID mission nevertheless thought that further efficiency could be attained by expanding this interconnection. The report stated that at this point that "the major advantages are to be gained within national frontiers".140 But the report also stressed the possible advantages of interconnected operation between countries in Western Europe. There, however, the lessons to be drawn from the TECAID mission were less clear. Contrary to power pools in the United States, interconnections between Western European countries often involved "national interests" and sometimes currency exchange issues.141 But even with that being the case, a considerable number of international interconnections did already exist between the FRG and France, Switzerland and France, and Switzerland and the FRG (see Table 4.6), and were used for electricity imports and exports (see Table 4.7). The report stressed that these cross-border connections were the result of negotiations between individual parties, without substantial interference of authorities or international organizations. According to the report, organizations like UNIPEDE, OEEC or UNECE could play a role in preparing surveys of economic possibilities of electricity exchanges, but the Mission nevertheless recommended that "discussions of possible interchanges be left to the free negotiation of the utilities concerned [... ] ".142 140 Ibid., 24. My emphasis. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 135 fffi) 7-8-2008 14:25:33 136 Electrifying Europe Table 4.7 - Imports and exports in TECAID region in 1949, in GWh Import by -> Export by -l FRG Austria Belgium Luxembourg Netherlands Denmark France 13 Switzerland Total imports FRG 565 40 0 14,7 0.06 2.5 0 66 707.26 Austria 141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141 Belgium 40 0 0 21 0 22.8 0 0 83.8 Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 Netherlands 0.8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.8 Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 France 520 0 13.6 4.9 0 0 8.1 241.5 1,023.6* Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 80.4 0 182.4 Switzerland 35 0 0 0 0 0 91.3 45 171.3 Total exports 776.8 610 54.6 4.9 35.7 150.06 220 53.1 409.5 2,569.16 ^Including 235,5 GWh from the Saar. Totals in general may vary from the figures given due to the exclusion of Sweden, Yugoslavia, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, Saar, and Czechoslovakia. Source: OEEC, Interconnected, 61. In addition, the report gave several recommendations. First, it advised setting up international regional committees to enable regular electricity exchange with or without formal contracts.143 The utilities themselves should elect the committee members. This was quite similar to Hintermayer's proposal within the ECE, which also spoke of forming an informal group. In addition, the report stated, these regional committees could only work effectively within "a spirit of mutual trust'.144 It was thus desired that committee members would be appointed as private persons, and would be people who would get along well. Second, the Mission named obstacles to interconnected operation in Europe. Of particular concern were foreign currencies, which at the time were not convertible. Another obstacle was posed by difficulties of a political and administrative nature, which restricted the increase of cross-border transmission - an issue already recognised during the interwar period. These difficulties were reported to OEEC's Electricity Committee, and became the object of study. 143 Ibid., 49. 144 Ibid. Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 136 7-8-2008 14:25:33 (Re)Constructing regions, 1934-51 137 Figure 4.2 - Europe's electrical engineers From left to right: P. Smits (Belgium), S. Tuonioja (ECE Executive Secretary), René Hochreutiner, Pierre Sevette (ECE director of Energy Sections), Walker Cisler (USA), and Pierre Ailleret (France). Source: UN Photo archive, Geneva, UN no. 13113, "ECE's Committee on Electric Power celebrates 10th anniversary", Geneva, October 10, 1957. Used by courtesy of United Nations Office, United Nations Library Geneva. European ideas on international operation But outside of intergovernmental organisations plans were also being made for electricity systems in Europe. Only a few months after the TECAID mission, UNIPEDE held its first postwar meeting in Brussels. For the first time a Study Committee on International Interconnections held a session and presented ideas for international network operation in Europe. Although this Committee was new, most of the members already knew each other. They included G.R. Peterson, the vice-chairman of the TECAID mission, Louis de Heem, J, van Dam van Isselt (Netherlands) and Jan Latour (Poland) who knew each other through the UNECE's work on electricity. Although they were not members of the UNIPEDE Committee Electrifying_europe_handels2.indd 137 7-8-2008 14:25:34 0 138 Electrifying Europe S3 Figure 4.3 - Berni's plan for a European network (1949) Source: Berni, "La construction," 10. Used with kind permission of Union of the Electricity Industry/EURELECTRIC. he I'ttllLtV!