Khrushchev’s Secret Speech And Its Consequences in Eastern Europe Housekeeping •Last quiz •New Quiz •Paper at the end: Topic by October 31 •Review some of the existing scholarship •Use 4-5 original documents REVIEW: •Stalin’s Death and the Impulse for Change • The new leadership is fearful of foreign threats and internal • stability • Agree for the need to change • Stalin had become inflexible, and the policies he used to industrialize Soviet Union were no longer working • People expected better life • Domestic political change • No more terror: amnesty • More money for food, consumer goods, housing • 1953: Enter the Eisenhower Administration •Review of US foreign policy: • The balance of power: US strategic advantage • Capacity to deliver nuclear weapons to USSR • USSR does not have that capacity •NSC-68: Global ideological conflict • Security and defense top budgetary priority • Massive increase in spending •The Korean War: US bogged down in a stalemate Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric •Eisenhower and Republicans Run Against Containment Policy • Appropriate vision of global ideological struggle • John Foster Dulles (and Allen Dulles) • Containment is a policy of reaction, not action • US must take offensive: “Roll Back” •Eisenhower very cautious on military spending • High budget deficits endanger stability • “Military-Industrial Complex” Eisenhower’s Strategic Policy: The New Look •Not Containment, which is reactive •Wants to save money •Massive Retaliation •Willingness to strike where most strategic •Willingness to use whatever weapons make sense • Korea? An Unfortunate Miscommunication •Germany and NATO The Use of Undercover Operations: An Aside •Iran, 1953: Mohammad Mossadegh: Wants to gain control over Iran’s oil, which earlier had been owned by British • Sanctions against Iran, but Truman did not approve of coup • Eisenhower Administration approves, Mossadegh replaced by • Shah Reza Pahlavi • Eisenhower administration maintains Mossadegh at risk of communist takeover • US companies now gain access to Iranian Oil • Shah Reza Pahlavi installs harsh dictatorship Guatemala, 1954 •Jacobo Arbenz elected to presidency in 1951 •Arbenz institutes fairly radical reforms • Appropriates land from United Fruit Company for landless • peasants (John Foster Dulles is on the board of UFC) • Legalizes communist party in Guatemala •Dulles portrays Arbenz as Communist •Organizes CIA operation and overthrows Arbenz, installs dictator •Guatemala has been unstable repressive regime ever since • Soviet New Leadership and Foreign Policy •Domestic pressures to improve people’s lives •Poor economic performance in countries of Eastern Europe • The New Course •The threat of nuclear annihilation •Belligerent US rhetoric that seems to approve nuclear war •Considerable concerns about German rearmament in NATO •Little influence beyond communist world • •MALENKOV: For greater reform, war will end civilization: Weak •MOLOTOV: Little reform; war is inevitable, sharp divide between socialist and capitalist camps: Inflexible Germany rearms in 1954 Khrushchev’s Strategy •Socialism and Capitalism must clash •Capitalist camp wants to destroy socialism •But socialist camp has grown stronger • Nuclear weapons • More economic growth • Allies not only in Eastern Europe, but China, elsewhere •As a result, capitalists won’t attack socialism • Meanwhile, continuing economic and political progress of • socialist camp will lead to victory Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy: 1955 •Investment on nuclear capabilities: Bombers, Missiles •Creation of the Warsaw Pact as answer to NATO •Loosen Stalin-Molotov vision of either friend or enemy • Austrian State Treaty • Repairs relationship with Yugoslavia •Expand alliances to newly independent, nationalist states that don’t like Britain, France, US: Egypt, India, Indonesia •Peaceful Coexistence with West • Proposals to reduce conventional forces • Geneva Conference • Normalizes relations with West Germany • • • The 20th Congress of the CPSU: 1956 •The Public Section • War is no longer inevitable: Peaceful Coexistence • Different Roads to Communism • Socialism doesn’t need a violent revolution, can come to power peacefully • Global clash between camp of imperialism/war and camp of peace • The 20th Congress: The Private Section •Khrushchev attacks Stalin • Why? Understands contradiction in Soviet Union • Has to explain • Also sees it as a way to weaken opponents to his policies • What? Stalin betrayed Leninism and the Party • Lenin recommended Stalin’s removal • Stalin murdered Old Bolsheviks: over 50% of 1934 “Congress of Victors”; over 78% of Central Committee • Stalin tried to remove Tito •BUT: Stalin’s decision to suppress enemies of party, collectivize agriculture and rapid industrialize were good Impact in Soviet Union •Distributed to Party • Raised many questions • Resulted in Crackdown • Unpopular within many party elites Impact in Eastern Europe: Poland. 1956 •Post-WWII: “Home” and “Moscow” Communists •Wladyslaw Gomulka, Home Communist, Sent to Prison in • 1951, Released in 1954 •Khrushchev’s speech in February, 1956 •Polish communist leader, Boleslaw Bierut, dies in March •Struggle within communist party •Uprisings begin in Poznan in June, around 70 killed, but • unrest continues •In October, Party appoints Gomulka as leader, who calls for reform •Soviets concerned, but Khrushchev believes won’t go to far, allows it to happen • • Hungary, 1956 •As in Poland, Struggles within Party • Stalinist Rákosi and Reformist Nagy • 1953: Nagy made Prime Minister to oversee New Course • 1955: Nagy deposed as Prime Minister, Rákosi returns • Rákosi deeply unpopular, Economy doing badly • Secret Speech undermines Rákosi • Students, intellectuals encouraged by events in Poland • The Soviet Decision on Hungary •THE CASE FOR WITHDRAWAL (Mikoyan, Shepilov, Zhukov) • It will make matters worse in Soviet-dominated countries in Central Europe • It will strengthen NATO • It will damage peace offensive in nationalist newly independent countries • •THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION (Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov) • It will make USSR look weak and encourage imperialists • It will encourage other Eastern European countries to revolt • It will encourage nationalist dissent in USSR (esp. Ukraine, Moldova, Baltics) • It will hurt standing with other Communist Parties (China, Tito) • •KHRUSHCHEV WAVERS, THEN SUPPORTS • Key Issue: Nagy says he wants out of Warsaw Pact • Khrushchev needs to keep his own authority, can’t look weak The Crisis in Suez: Background •The Suez Canal: Finished in 1869 by British • Key waterway connecting Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea •Gamel Abdel Nasser heads Egypt as Arab Nationalist • Looks to Soviet model for industrial development • Confrontation towards former imperialist countries • Stalin/Molotov ignores him • Khrushchev begins to court him in 1955 with arms sales, help with Aswan Dam The Crisis Unfolds •July, 1956: Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal •October 26-28: Israel, Britain and France attack Egypt •October 30: US and USSR join in criticizing attack at UN •Eisenhower threatens economic sanctions, in particular selling British pounds, resulting in devaluation •Soviets threaten military action: Soviet volunteers, nuclear retaliation •Israel, Britain and France stop the attack •Khrushchev’s lesson: Nuclear threats work The Role of Memory: •The Lessons We (Mis)Learn • Two misinterpretations of brinksmanship: Korea, Suez •Creates a narrative by which we understand ourselves • But different people have different narratives • Want to persuade others • History becomes political Memory of 1956 in Hungary • • Write three things • Big in 1989: Reburial of Nagy a key event • By 1990s, less important • Seems to be more important now • • •