German-UK defence cooperation in Brexit times: Between multilateralism and new bilateralism
Urbanovská Jana, Martin Chovančík, Monika Brusenbauch Meislová
MASARYK UNIVERSITY
The paper was written as part of the project “Germany and Out-of-Area Military Operations: Civilian
Power, Trading State or Middle Power?” Registration number 17-12243S, supported by the Czech
Science Foundation.

Research departure



Why search for new bilateralism here



New bilateralism
While not mutually exclusive with mini or multilateralism, its development would serve to undermine
EU defence cooperation effort
New actors
in bilateral defence relations
New agenda
in bilateral defence relations
New instruments
for bilateral defence relations
Increased prominence
of security in bilateral relations

Analysis



Official interaction
•first indications of re-investment prior to 2015 first indications (UK review, increased Germany
status and vice versa)
•Joint Vision Statement under preparation
•momentum building until Brexit referendum
•
•post-Brexit referendum
•Cold-shoulder until 10/2018 JVS signature
•Since JVS all quiet on the Western front
•
•New actors: NO, apart from Scottish rapprochement with Germany economically and defense industries
reaching out for joint ventures (Rhein..)
•New agendas: NO, not even like Aachen treaty, where explicit coordination is extended to new
fields (export coord.)
•New instruments: YES - JVS, committees
•New increased prominence: YES - to the extent of Brexit context (so absolutely yes, but relatively
no)
•
•

Official interactions
•first indications of re-investment prior to 2015
•UK review, increased Germany status and vice versa
•JointVision Statement under preparation
•momentum building until Brexit referendum
•post-Brexit referendum
•Cold-shoulder until 10/2018 JVS signature
•since JVS all quiet on the Western front
•visits less frequent
•New actors: NO
•apart from Scottish rapprochement with Germany economically and defense industries reaching out
for joint ventures (Rheinmetall)
•New agendas: NO
•unlike Aachen treaty, where explicit coordination is extended to new fields (export coordination)
•New instruments: YES
•JVS, committees
•New increased prominence: YES
•to the extent of Brexit context (so absolutely yes, but relatively no)

Military cooperation
•prior - passive long -term and traditional BFG, largest stationed presence abroad
•but still behind military cooperation with FR or other bilateral (US) units
•active lagging behind - strategic culture
•prior to referendum - decision to withdraw by 2020
•Post-Brexit referendum
•Until 2018 same passivity
•Reversal of withdrawal 2018, MoD minister tied it as a result of Brexit - to keep int. presence
•hindered by poor German operability and willingness
•multilateral programs much more viable than bilateral
•New actors: NO
•not in any format, (FNC)
•
•New agendas: NO
•no new joint units or excercises
•
•New instruments: NO
•apart from JVS no active convergence
•
•New increased prominence: NO
•seemingly during 2018, but declaratory only
•
•withdrawal would signal full abandonement of deeper bilateral defence relations
•

Defence industrial cooperation
•revealing field, joint projects tie to joint procurement and integration displays priorities
•private ownership secondary
•prior to Brexit referendum, mostly multilateral projects or with FR (e.g. OCCAR)
•post-referendum UK direct search for bilateral projects and arrangements for EADS, MBDA
•ambitions to "go it alone"
•Rheinmetal (KMW) acquisition of BAE Land Systems key market move
•post-2018 renewed ambition to join EU projects –locked out at the moment (MGCS, FCAS,)
•New actors: YES
•While private entities, still subject to government aproval and clearly enter the debate with
actorness
•New agendas: NO
•unlike Aachen treaty, where explicit coordination on arms exports is bilaterally present with
France (and follow-up)
•New instruments: YES
•JVS does foresee a platform for joint defence projects
•New increased prominence: YES
•Due to the intra-EU debate and UK's crucial role – defence industrial and R&D role gained
bilateral prominence

Conclusion