Germany and the Visegrad countries within the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy:
promising partners after Brexit?
Jana Urbanovská, Martin Chovančík, Stanislava Brajerčíková
Masaryk University, Czech Republic
The paper was written as part of the project “Germany and Out-of-Area Military Operations: Civilian
Power, Trading State or Middle Power?” Registration number 17-12243S, supported by the Czech
Science Foundation.

INTRODUCTION
•Brexit is expected to have large implications for European security
•
•The significance of German leadership will rise X a lot of reluctance à importance of
international institutions, int. cooperation and partnerships
•
•Partnership between Germany and V4 countries within CSDP
•Is it viable vis-à-vis Brexit?
•Has the defence cooperation between Germany and V4 countries intensified?
•
•V4 countries as supportive partners for Germany?
•Role of path-dependency
•A way to balance France
•Central Europe’s pivot to Germany (interrupted by the migration crisis)
•
•Defence as the area where V4 countries most visible as a united group
•Rise of bilateral defence relations
•

MINILATERALISM AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
•Minilateralism as a “trendy” mode of international cooperation
•
•Aims to “bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest
possible impact on solving a particular problem” (Naim 2009)
•A “process of a small group of interested parties working together … in tackling subjects deemed
too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level” (Moret 2016)
•Based on “purpose-built partnerships” (Patrick 2015)
•“Functional multilateralism” where “coalitions of the willing and relevant” aim to address a
certain part of governance as a first step in solving a larger problem (Haass 2010)
•
•CSDP offering space for minilateral initiatives (EU battlegroups, “pooling and sharing”, PESCO, …)
•
•Can recent strengthening of bilateral defence relations between Germany and some V4 countries go
beyond bilateralism?
•
•

GERMANY AND V4 COUNTRIES WITHIN THE CSDP:
1) EU BATTLEGROUPS
•Examples of minilateral formations in CSDP – cooperation within established groups of states under
the leadership of a “framework nation”
•
•Fruitful ground for a concurrent engagement of Germany and V4 countries
•
•BG I-2010 (Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia)
•German-Czech-Austrian BG II-2012 (Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, North Macedonia,
Ireland)
•Weimar BG I-2013 (Germany, Poland, France)
•German-Czech-Austrian BG II-2016 (Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands)
•German-Czech-Austrian BG II-2020 (Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Finland, Ireland,
Latvia, Netherlands, Sweden)
•
•+ German operational headquarters for the Czech-Slovak BG II-2009
•+ Appreciation of the V4 BG (I-2016, II-2019) by Germany
•
•
•
•

2) PESCO
•PESCO projects led by Germany with a participation of V4 countries
PESCO projects
CR
Hu
Po
Sl
European Union Training Mission Competence Centre
X
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core
European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
X
European Medical Command
X
X
Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations
X
X
X
Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic Support Coordination Element
•Typical purpose-built, output-oriented partnerships
•
•Established by “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding
missions” (Lisbon Treaty, 42(6))
•
•Germany and France – main drivers X differing visions
•

3) DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
•German-V4 Group defence industrial cooperation – little viable
•
•POLAND: major obstacle of a Germany-V4 cooperation; resisting EU strategic autonomy, close ties to
the US à unintegrated into European defence industry; disputes over national policies
•HUNGARY: increasingly linked to Germany; a way to overcome German reservations over internal
policy matters?
•CZECH REPUBLIC: interconnected economies suggesting high feasibility in defence projects X not
materialized so far, though some promising departures
•SLOVAKIA: engagement with Germany non-existent despite all rhetoric; partnership with the CR as
the most viable link in minilateral cooperation
•
•Ongoing bilateral cooperation
•Nascent minilateral cooperation as an upgrade of existing bilateral ties (but only very specific
and underdeveloped)
•
•
•

IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR GERMANY-V4 DEFENCE COOPERATION
•Brexit is expected to shift the balance of power in the EU à strengthening of German leadership
•For V4 countries, Brexit means both…
•… new challenges
•… new opportunities
•The position of V4 countries will depend on a proper rearrangement of their relationships with
Germany and on strengthening their pro-European attitudes
•The potential for cooperation far greater than in the economic field
•Security and defence policy offer a lot of opportunities to strengthen mutual relations
•V4 countries extend the area of EU’s security to the East – much appreciated by Germany
•
•

CONCLUSION
•The record of utilizing the minilateral form of cooperation among Germany and V4 countries in CSDP
is mixed
•
•1) EU battlegroups – cooperation on several occasions X no sign of an intensification since the
in/out referendum
•2) PESCO – V4 countries present in 4 German-led projects à a viable platform for minilateral
cooperation
•3) Defence industrial cooperation – yes, but bilateral approaches perceived to be more effective
than minilateral cooperation
•
•Generally, Brexit accelerated European defence cooperation in many ways, BUT
•
•CSDP has not turned out to be the primary platform for V4 countries to cultivate minilateral
cooperation – when compared to NATO (FNC)
•Other competing minilateral formats of cooperation (e.g. CEDC)
•
•Prevailing preference of bilateral ties
•Minilateral cooperation in a nascent phase
•
•

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