

Populists at elections

POLb1111 Populism and political parties

Main goals

1. Why are populist political parties successful?
2. Who votes for populists?
3. Empirical examples

Main goals

- To show complexity of possible explanations behind the electoral success of/voting for populist parties
- To introduce the most prominent/recently applied theoretical approaches

Supply
side



Demand
side




Electoral
success

External and internal supply side

External supply side

= political opportunity structures: „consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success and failure“ (Tarrow 1988)

- Study of social movements
- „Translation“ into party politics language




Institutional context

- Different political systems, different opportunities and limitations for the rise of populist parties (general applicability)
- Electoral system – plurality/majority systems vs PR
 - Specific effect of two-round majority system on „pariah parties“
 - Lack of a clear evidence about the effects of electoral systems
- Party law
- Federalism – based on the SOE theory
- Corporativism
 - Lack of evidence
- Conclusion: an opportunity rather than a persuasive explanation (e.g van Kessel 2015)

Political context

- Context of party politics – relationship with and among other parties
- Level of volatility – both supply and demand sides
- Neglecting of new political issues (corruption, transparency, host ideology related issues)
- Convergence in political space (e.g. NPD and *Grosscoalition*)
 - Ignazi – a two step process: convergence after polarization



Creation of niches in the political space

- Copying populist issues – legitimization of populist parties + question of issue ownership (Le Pen – „voters prefer original over the copy“), issue salience

Cultural context

- Specific characteristics across nations
- Intellectual background (*nouvelle droit* in France, anti-partyism in the Czech Republic)
- Ideational scheme as a part of the culture
- Issue salience, organizational resources
- An atmosphere hostile to specific ideas (post-Frankist Spain, left-wing ideology in CEE, anti-partyism)
- Ambivalent effect of stigmatization

Media

- Agenda setters
- Language of (some) media – tabloids
- Media attention
- The prominent effects:
- Issue salience
- Framing and cueing (Sheets et al. 2016)

- Populist owners of the media (Italy, Slovakia, the Czech Republic)
- Specifics of populim?

Internal supply side

- Factors related to the party itself
- Ideological choice, organization (leadership, internal disputes), financial resources, international cooperation
- See more in the literature

Demand side – who votes for populists?

- Rich literature dealing with voting behaviour in general (for a review see Pauwels 2015):
- The sociological approach
- Protest voting
- The economic model of voting/ideological proximity
- Issue voting
- Valence voting

The sociological approach

- **The Columbia school** (1940s) – *The People`s Choice*
- Social determinism – how does social environment influence voting behaviour?
- High correlation of social variables and vote choice
- **Cleavage theory** – Rokkan, Lipset
- Transposition of the existing social conflicts into politics (state – church, centre – periphery, urban – rural, class)
- „defreezing“ of the European party systems from the 1960s

Social structural models – modernization thesis

- Support for PRR among so-called losers of modernization
- Based on negative perception of social transformation processes
- Social breakdown and deprivation thesis – from industrial to postindustrial society; individualization + erosion of collective identities
- New skills needed to cope with modern society (flexibility, entrepreneurship)
- Demand for PRR:
 - return to traditional values
 - protest vote against incompetent established parties
 - dealignment and increasing importance of new issues (e.g. immigration)
- Results: less educated, unemployed, less qualified, insecure male workers supporting RRP (Bezt, Luebbers, Ivarsflaten, Kriesi...)

Protest voting

- Based on the anti-establishment part of populist appeals
- Low level of trust and populist voting
- Low trust in institutions, politicians tend to vote populist parties
- Dissatisfaction with democracy explaining voting for all populist parties regardless their host ideology (Pauwels 2015, confirmed also by Hawkins /2010/ - Chavez in Venezuela)
- BUT a more complicated relationship (Hooghe, Dassonville 2018):
 - Low level of trust related to voting for populist parties
 - Decrease of trust related to voting for PP
 - Voting for PP decreases political trust

Economic model of voting, issue voting

- Closely related to rational choice theory
- Maximization of utility as the main theoretical assumption
- Voters seeking as much information as possible – „perfectly informed voter“
- Pure economic voting – pocket book, entropic (mixed results)
- Proximity model – voting the political party with closest policy positions (Kitschelt et al. 1995 – the winning formula, but De Lange 2016)
- Attitudes crucial for the host ideology correlates with support for PP (van der Brug et al. 2010, Pauwels 2015, March 2012 but also Smith 2010 – crime linked to immigration)

Psychological roots of populist voting

- Bakker et al. (2018)
- Congruence of voters` and politicians` personality (populist message)
- Personal traits typical for voters of populist political parties
- The Big Five model
- Case selection
- H: Low level of agreeableness increases the chance to voter for a populist party.
- Effect founds across the researched cases (Tea Party, Die Linke, PVV)


Comparing voters of populist parties

- Rooduijn (2018)
- Little effort dedicated to comparative analysis of populist voters
- Comparison of 15 cases from Western Europe
- Testing the usual theoretical assumptions (economic voting, protest voting, losers of globalization)
- Absence of solid common ground of electoral base across populist parties (political distrust but the size of the effect varies over the time)



Empirical example I.

Support for PRR in Central Europe



Austria



Education effect plot




EUconfidence effect plot





identity effect plot

- Other
- Greens
- FPO
- SPO
- OVP




Immigration effect plot





Strongleader effect plot



- Other
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Polorientation effect plot




Satisfaction effect plot





Czech Republic



Age effect plot





Education effect plot




EUconfidence effect plot





identity effect plot




Strongleader effect plot





Polorientation effect plot



Satisfaction effect plot




Immigration effect plot





Slovakia



Education effect plot





EUconfidence effect plot





identity effect plot





Immigration effect plot



Strongleader effect plot




Polorientation effect plot




Satisfaction effect plot



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- OLaNO
- Most
- KDH
- LSNS
- Smer



Empirical case II.





2013




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
2013



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2013



Valence voting

- Havlík, Voda (2018)
- Case study – hypotheses driven by both general and case driven expectation
- Policy vs politics
- Departure to issue ownership
- Lack of effect in case of class voting, ideological voting, political trust (?) – competence to solve the most important issues
- Similar results across cases (e.g. Dennison, Goodwin 2015)

Effects of populist attitudes

- A new strand of research
- (A) scale(s) of populist attitudes developed (used e.g. by Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018)

LIVEWHAT items	Description
popatt1	The politicians in [country] need to follow the will of the people.
popatt2	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
popatt3	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
popatt4	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician.
popatt5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
popatt6	What people call ‘compromises’ in politics are really just selling out one’s principles.
popatt7	The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.
popatt8	Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges.

Conclusion

- Chameleonic nature of populism
- Number of explanatory factors – a complex explanation
- Demand and supply side
- Host ideology matters