6 Introduction
developed Germany established a more extensive and invasive
presence but it, too, often failed to have much effect upon the
`hearts and minds' of its ordinary citizens . Local Nazi leaders
could compel their fellow townspeople `to attend meetings and
pretend enthusiasm, but that was largely a mutually agreed
charade' (Allen, 1984 : 104) . Later, when the country was facing
the prospect of military defeat, some elderly workers provided
an ordinary citizen's view of such dramatic political changes as
the onset of Nazi rule . They commented `that they had little
concern for the future : that they had had to work hard under
the [monarchical] Kaiser, in the [democratic] Weimar Republic,
and in the [Nazi] Third Reich, and had probably no more
and no less to expect from [communist] Bolshevism than hard
work and low wages' (Kershaw, 1983: 314) .
On the other hand, many of their fellow citizens had more
reason to fear the coming of communist dictatorship . Peasant
farmers and small-businessmen, as well as wealthy landowners
and industrialists, were likely to lose their land or businesses
through communist collectivisation of agriculture and expropriation
of the private sector. More importantly, the small Jewish
minority of their fellow citizens had already suffered greatly
from the Nazi dictatorship, with many having lost their lives as
well as their livelihood . And this intent of some dictatorships
to take away or reshape human life is perhaps the most important
reason for studying the emergence of modern non-democratic
regimes and the possibility of their resurgence in the next
century.
Theories of NonDemocratic
Government
Although there are no widely recognised general theories of
non-democratic government, there are many theories of such
particular forms of non-democratic government as totalitarianism,
-authoritarianism, communism and fascism . Being concerned
with forms of government, these theories are less interested in
the traditional regime-defining question of `who rules?' than
in the wider question of `how do they rule?', which involves
such issues as the regime's methods and degree of control over
society, its ideological or other claims to legitimacy, its political
and administrative structure, and the goals that it seeks to
attain.
Therefore, although such terms as `totalitarian', `authoritarian',
`communist' and `fascist' are used to describe regimes as
well as forms of government, these labels say much more about
a regime than whether it is a military or a party dictatorship
(and in fact the term `authoritarian' can be applied to both
types of dictatorship) . Inn contrast, to label a dictatorship as a
military' or `party' regime is to describe only the type of reg
me, in the sense of military or party rule, not the form of
government - which in the case of party rule could be either
totalitarian or authoritarian, communist or fascist.
Only theories of totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government
will be examined in this chapter . The notions of
`totalitarianism' and `authoritarianism' are general enough to
have been applied (not necessarily very successfully) to a relatively
7
8 Non-Democratic Regimes
wide range of regimes, including those labelled communist and
fascist. Moreover, the distinctive features of communist and fascist
forms of government will be described in later chapters, especially
those on legitimacy and control (Chapter 5) and on policy
and performance (Chapter 6) .
Totalitarianism
The theories of totalitarianism are the most distinctive and
imaginative of those developed by theorists of non-democratic
government (see Table 1 .1) . The term `totalitarianism' emerged
in the 1920s-30s as part -of the ideology of Fascist Italy : the
Fascist `totalitarian' state was pithily described by Mussolini as
`everything in the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing
against the State' . But in the 1950s totalitarianism reemerged
as__a
prominent concept in Western political science and was
used to describe communist as well as fascist regimes . The classic
works of Arendť and of Friedrich and Brzezinski provided descriptive
theories of totalitarianism (in the sense of offering a
mi čh broader as well as a deeper understanding of the concept)
which c_ laimed that it was a quite new and `total' form of
dictatorship . In fact theories or concepts of totalitarianism were
for years the leading or most dynamic approach to the study
of non-democratic regimes ; but from as early as the 1960s onwards
there was a growing body of opinion that the notion of
totalitarianism had outlived its usefulness . And, despite the work
of such second-generation theorists as Schapiro, the notion of
totalitarianism has never recovered the prominence that it
enjóyéd- in the 1950s 60s.
Arendt's Classic Theory
Arendt's 1951 pioneering work,_ The Origins of Totalitarianism,
depicted totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship.
In her view there had been only two examples o
totalitarian dictatorship - Hitler's Nazi regime and Stalin's
communist regime . More precisely, totalitarianism had existed
in the 1938-45 years of Hitler's Nazi dictatorship in Germany,
in the post-1929 years of the communist dictatorship in the
Soviet Union, and in post-Second World War Eastern Europe,
Theories of Non Democratic Government 9
whose newly established communist regimes were viewed by
Arendt as only extensions of the Soviet-based communist movement
(1962 [1951] : 419, 308 n . 10) .
She downplayed. the ideological/ policy differences between
the rightist Nazis and leftist communists, declaring that in practice
it made little difference whether totalitarians organised the masses
in the name of race or of class (ibid. : 313) . In contrast, only a
year later Talmon emphasised the distinction between Left and
Right totalitarianism in his famous work on what he termed
the `totalitarian democracy' associated with the French Revolution
(1952 : 1-2, 6-7) . He argued that only totalitarianism of
the Left was a form of totalitarian democracy, for_ the Right
totalitarians were concerned with such collective/ historic entities
as state, nation or race and viewed force as permanently
required for maintaining order and social training . The
significance of the differences between left-wing (communist)
and right-wing (fascist) variants of totalitarianism has remained
an awkward issue for theorists and users of the concept of
totalitarianism .
Although Arendt did not view totalitarian regimes' ideological
differences (or even ideological content) as very significant,
she noted that ideology plays an important role in such regimes
(1962: 325, 458, 363) . Totalitarian ideology's desire to transform
human nature provides the regime with a reason as well
as a road map for the all-pervading totalitarian organisation of
human life, as only under a totalitarian system can all aspects
of life be organised in accordance with an ideology . Furthermore,
ideology in turn provides a means of internally,
psychologically dominating human beings and therefore plays
an important role not only in the totalitarian organisation of
all aspects of human life, but also in attaining the ultimate
totalitarian goal of total domination .
One of the features of Arendt's theory of totalitarianism is
the extreme and total goal that she ascribed to this form of
dictatorship . For totalitarianism seeks `the permanent domination
of each single individual in each and every sphere of life'
and `the total domination of the total population of the earth'
(ibid.: 326, 392) . A totalitarian movement's seizure of power in
a particular country therefore only secures a base for the movement's
further global expansion . But taking control of a country
also
offers the opportunity to experiment with organising and
10 Non-Democratic Regimes
dominating human beings more intensively as well as extensively,
and thereby subjecting society to `total terror' (ibid.: 392,
421-2, 430-5, 440) . After the secret police have liquidated all
open or hidden resistance, they begin to liquidate ideologically
defined `objective enemies', such as Jews or supposed class
enemies . This uniquely totalitarian level of terror is in turn
replaced by a third, fully totalitarian stage . Now everyone seems
- ----- -to be a police informer and the secret police not only seek to
remove all trace of their victims, as if these people had never
existed, but also randomly select their victims . However, the
ultimate `laboratories' for experimenting with total domination
are the regime's concentration, extermination or labour camps,
where terror and torture are used to liquidate spontaneity and
reduce human beings to only animal-like reactions and functions
(ibid. : 436-8, 441, 451-6) .
Unlike most later theorists of totalitarianism, Arendt was willing
to take on the difficult task of explaining the origins of totalitarian
regimes (though her explanations have never found favour
with historians) . She argued that these regimes arise from totalitarian
movements' organisation of `masses', in the sense of people
who are experiencing social atomisation and extreme individualisation
- the main characteristic of `mass man' is social isolation
created by the lack of normal social relationships (ibid. : 308-17) .
Such people are more easily attracted by totalitarian movements
than are the sociable, less individualistic people who support
normal political parties . If socially atomised masses also constitute
(or are joined by) masses in the sense of sheer numbers,
they can produce such a powerful totalitarian movement that
a totalitarian regime can be established .
Socially atomised masses were created in a very different fashion
in the Soviet Union than in Germany (ibid.: 313-24, 378-80) .
The Nazi movement came to power by winning the support of
socially atomised masses that were created by the economic,
social and political crises afflicting democratic Germany in the
early 1930s . But in the Soviet Union the socially atomised masses
were created tcfťer the communist movement, had established a
oq party dictatorship. Under its new leader, Stalin, the communist
dictatorship created such masses by the destruction of
the semi-capitalist class structure and by extensive political purges .
Paradoxically, the victims sought relief from their social atomisation
by offering total loyalty to the Communist Party, even
Theories of Non Democratic Government 11
though it was dominated by the perpetrators of the purges Stalin
and the political police .
The prominent role played by the political/ secret police (as
elite formations and super-party) is a unique structural feature
of totalitarian regimes, but the key and most distinctive structural
feature is the functionally indispensable leader figure - the Stalin
or Hitler (ibid.: 380, 413, 420, 374-5, 387) . A totalitarian regime
and movement is so closely identified with the leader and his
infallibility (as interpreter of the infallible ideology) that any
move to restrain or replace him would prove disastrous for the
regime and movement. His subordinates are not only aware of
his indispensability, but have also been trained for the sole
purpose of communicating and implementing his commands .
Therefore the leader can count on their loyalty to the death,
moáopolise the right to explain ideology and policy, and behave
as if he were above the movement.
Friedrich and Brzezinski s Classic Theory
Friedrich and Brzezinski's 1956 Totalitarian Dictatorship and
Autocracy provided a more detailed and widely applicable descrip
tivetheory than Arendt's (see Table 1 .1) . The newer theory's
examples included post-1936 Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and
communist Soviet Union plus the newly established communist
regimes in Eastern Europe and China (though it was acknowledged
that Fascist Italy was a borderline case) . But the most
distinctive and important aspect of the theory was its claim that
the `character' of totalitarian dictatorship was to be found in a
syndrome of six interrelated and mutually supporting features
or traits (1961 [1956] : 9) :
1 . an ideology ;
2. a single party, typically (that is, not always) led by one person ;
3. a terroristic police;
4. a communications monopoly ;
5 . a weapons monopoly ; and
6. a centrally-directed economy .
However, it was acknowledged that the six-point syndrome had
shown `many significant variations', such as the striking variation
in economic structure arising from the fascist regimes' retention
Theories
	
Examples
Arendt (1951)
	
Only Nazi Germany
and Stalin's
Communist Soviet
.Union (plus
subsidiary East
European
communist
regimes)
Friedrich and
	
Nazi Germany,
Brzezinski
	
Communist Soviet
(1956)
	
Union and Eastern
Europe plus Fascist
Italy and
Communist China
Schapiro (1972) Nazi Germany,
Communist Soviet
Union, Eastern
Europe, China and
Cuba - also Fascist
Italy and Nkrumah's
Ghana as weak cases
TABLE 1.1
Theories of totalitarianism
Origins
Political
exploitation of the
masses (of socially
`atomised' isolated
individuals) created
by preceding
democracy's
economic/social
crisis or by
preceding one-party
dictatorship's
political purges and
destruction of
social classes
Era of mass
democracy and
modern technology
Goals
Ideology-directed
goal of dominating
every individual in
every sphere of life
(use of terror)
Ideology-directed
political, social,
cultural and
economic
revolution with
`violent passion
for unanimity'
(use of terror
and propaganda)
Ideology-
accompanied
domination of state,
society and
individual mobilisation
for
1 . outward mass
enthusiasm/
support and
2. either preparation
for war or
building
Communism
Structure
1 . Leader
(functionally
indispensable)
2. Secret police
3 . Party/movement
Party typically led by
an individual leader
1 . leader (absolutist)
2. party (of leader's
followers)
3 . terroristic police
4. politicisation of
military by
totalitarian
movement
1 . Party leader
(personalised
rule)
2. Party
3. State's
administrative
machinery
4. Police and army
Evolution
Long-term,
1 . decline in need
for terror and
2. possibility of
post-leader
collective
leadership (small
group) by party
bureaucrats
Long-term possible
post-leader
transitional era
with some
pluralism of
institutions ; e.g.
incipient pressuregroup
activity by
military or
industrial managers
1 4 Non Democratic Regimes
of a form of private-ownership economy instead of shifting to
a state-owned/collectivised economy as the communists had done
in the Soviet Union (ibid. : 10) .
In fact Friedrich and Brzezinski, unlike Arendt, went on to
address the awkward issue of whether the differences between
communist and fascist regimes outweigh the totalitarian similarities
(ibid. : 7-8, 10-11, 68, 57, 77) . They argued that communist
and fascist totalitarian regimes are basically alike but by no
means wholly alike, and they pointed to differences in origins,
political institutions and proclaimed goals . In a later discussion
of totalitarian ideology's link to international revolutionary
appeals (and to the leader's ambitions for world rule), they
again pointed to the difference between communism's supposedly-global,
class-based appeal and fascism's appeal to a particular
people. Yet despite these significant differences, Friedrich and
Brzézinski maintained that communist_ and fascist regimes were
sufficiently similar to be classed together as totalitarian dictatorshi
s and to be distinguished from older types of autocracy,
none of which had displayed the totalitarian six-feature syndrome .
Like Arendt, these two later theorists viewed totalitarianism
as an extreme, ideologically driven and terror-ridden form of
dictatorship (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1961 : 130-2, 150, 137) .
The regime's ideology is the ultimate source of the goals that
the totalitarians seek to attain through a political, social, cultural
and economic revolution . Totalitarianism is in fact an actual
system of revolution, requiring a state of `permanent revolution'
that will extend for generations and applies to even such
prosaic matters as fulfilling economic Five-Year Plans .
The use of terror is stimulated not only by the ideology's
extensive revolutionary goals, but also by its supposed infallibility.
The totalitarians' commitment to their ideology's infallibility
produces a `violent passion for unanimity' ; after the destruction
of the regime's obvious enemies, the terroristic police turn their
attention to the rest of society and even to the totalitarian party
itself - `searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants
from the totalitarian unity' (ibid.: 132, 137, 150) .
But Friedrich and Brzezinski took a less extreme view than
Arendt of totalitarian terror. They pointed to `islands of sepařaťeness',
such as the churches and universities, where a person
could remain aloof from the terror-accompanied `total demand
for total identification' (ibid. : 231, 239) . And they argued that
the level of police-inflicted terror may eventually decline as
terror is internalised into a habitual conformity-and new generations
of society are raised as fully indoctrinated supporters
of-the regime (ibid. 138).
In fact the regime relies on its `highly effective' propaganda/
indoctrination system as well as terror to instill a totalitarian
atmosphere in society (ibid.: 107, 116-17) . The propaganda/
indoctrination system uses not only mass communications, notably
radio and newspapers, but also face-to-face communication
by thousands of speakers and agitators deployed by the party
and such mass-member organisations as the regime's youth and
labour movements .
Like most other post-Arendt theorists of totalitarianism,
Friedrich and Brzezinski did not examine the - origin of- tótalitarian
regimes . However, they identified mass democracy as
among the `antecedent and concomitant conditions' for totalitarianism;
argued that totalitarian movements and ideologies
are `perverted descendants' of democratic parties and their party
platforms, and emphasised the significance of modern technology
for totalitarianism -- pointing out that four of the syndrome's
six traits have a technological dimension (ibid.: 6-7, 11, 13) .
Their description of the structure of totalitarian regimes was
wide-ranging and showed some obvious similarities with Arendt's
analysis. In particular, Friedrich and Brzezinski considered the
totalitarian absolutist leader to be a unique feature of the regime's
structure
1 . possessing `more nearly absolute power than any previous
type of political leader' ;
2. embodying a unique form of leadership that involves a pseudoreligious
or 'pseudo-charismatic' emotionalism and a mythical/
mystical identification of leader and led ;
subordinating the regime's political party to a wholly dependent
status so that it is more the leader's following than
an organisation in its own right (ibid.: 25-6, 29) .
However, they also acknowledged that the extensive role allotted
to the party in a communist regime was a significant
structurál difference between communist and fascist totalitariaňiim-(ibid.:
273-4, 279-81, 32, 34-6) . They described how the
cómmunist movements carried out a markedly more extensive
3.
Theories of Non-Democratic Government 15
1 6 Non Democratic Regimes
politicisation of the military than the fascist movements sought
to do, and pointed to a similar contrast between fascist and
communist parties' relationships with their regime's (civilian)
state apparatus . In fascist regimes the party was allotted a relatively
limited administrative role and was no more than equal in
power to the state . In contrast, in communist regimes the party
bureaucracy plays a vital role in the state-owned/controlled
economic system, and in the post-Stalin Soviet Union it had
become a super-bureaucracy, penetrating and controlling the
state's administrative apparatus.
Friedrich and Brzezinski had more to say than Arendt on
thé issue of whether a totalitarian regime continues to evolve
after it has established totalitarianism (ibid. : 6, 151, 50-7) .
(However, they had the benefit of observing the changes that
had occurred in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953,
too late for Arendt to consider in her book .) They contended
th-a_t-the communist Soviet Union had passed through phases
of totalitarian development which had never had time to emerge
in the short-lived Nazi and Fascist totalitarian regimes .
These later evolutionary phases or stages had seemed to
produce a more moderate version of totalitarianism, with a decline
in terror and an end to absolutist individual rule . As was mentioned
earlier, Friedrich and Brzezinski argued that the level of
police-inflicted terror might eventually decline (as it had in the
Soviet Union after Stalin's death), and in their discussion of
the post-leader succession problem they acknowledged that after
Stalin's death the highest-ranking officials of the Communist
Party had established a collective form of leadership . They argued
that it was likely such collective leadership would eventually be
replaced by a return to rule by an individual, personal leader .
But, as the years passed without the rise of a new Stalin (and as
the Stalinist terror became a distant memory), the next generation
of theorists of totalitarianism had to take a more flexible approach
to the issue of regime evolution and made some significant
modifications to the classical conception of totalitarianism .
Second-Generation Theories of Totalitarianism
The differences between the two classic theories of totalitarianism
were only a foretaste of the different interpretations and
definitions that the term `totalitarian' soon acquired . With nearly
Theories of Non Democratic Government 17
a dozen theorists_having, -coined their own definitions, with
research ers having__applied it to more than a dozen pre-ťwěntieth
century regimes, and with politicians employing it in anticommunist
polemics it is not surprising that some scholars
believed that such a loosely used term should be avoided or
abandoned (Barber, 1969• Rigby, 1972) . However, others sought
instead to build upon the. contribution made by the two classic
works of Arendt and Friedrich and Brzezinski . They offered
second-generation theories of totalitarianism that could
accommodate the criticisms and changing circumstances that
were undermining the standing of the classic conception of
totalitarianism.
Schapiro's (1972) book Totalitarianism is an accomplished
example of- such second-generation theorising (see Table 1 .1) .
He espoused an Arendt-like view of totalitarianism as being a
form of personalised rule by a leader, aided by a subordinate
elite and ideology, who
seeks
to dominate - in fact to totally
control - state, society and individual (1972 : 102, 119) . But
Schapiro also adopted a similar approach to Friedrich and
Brzezinski's six-point syndrome by identifying totalitarianism's
five characteristic features or `contours', and three distinctive
instruments of rule or pillars (see Table 1 .2) . Together his
two lists covered similar territory to the six-point syndrome but
with the significant addition of mobilisation (see Exhibit l.7)
as a characteristic
feature, and- the significant omission of the
terroristic police as a distinctive instrument of rule (abad.: 20,
45~ 1-19, - 38) .
Like other second-generation theorists of totalitarianism,
Schapiro had to take into account the criticisms that had been
directed at the concept. He tackled a key criticism head-on by
presenting and responding to Curtis's argument that the concept
of totalitarianism was no longer applicable to the Soviet
Union, nor automatically applicable to the now diverse range
ofregimes to be found among the other communist countries
(Schapiro, 1972 : 107; Curtis, 1969) . In fact political scientists
dissatisfied with theories of totalitarianism had developed a host
of new concepts or models of contemporary communist systems :
the
, administered society, the command society, the organisestional
or mono-organisational society the ideological system,
the monist system, the mobilisation -system,and, most fruitfully,
the bureaucratic system; they had also begun to apply to
1 8 Non Democratic Regimes
TABLE 1 .2
Characteristic features of totalitarianism and authoritarianism
Totalitarianism :
classic theorists, Friedrich
and Brzezinski
Six-point syndrome
1 . Ideology
2. Single party typically
led by an individual
3. Terroristic police
4. Communications
monopoly
5. Weapons monopoly
6. Centrally-directed
economy
Totalitarianism :
second generation
theorist, Schapiro
'Contours'
1 . The Leader
2. Subjugation of the
legal order
3 . Control over
private morality
4. Continuous
mobilisation
5. Legitimacy based
on mass support
`Pillars'
1 . Ideology
2. Party
3. Administrative
machinery of the
state
Authoritarianism:
classic theorist,
Linz
1 . Limited political
pluralism
2. Distinctive
mentalities instead
of elaborate and
guiding ideology
3. Absence of
intensive/ extensive
mobilisation
4. Leader or
(occasionally) small
group of leaders
exercise power
within predictable
limits
communist systems the factional-conflict and interest-group
approaches originally developed as models of Western or democratic
politics (Hough and Fainsod, 1979 : 523-4; Hough, 1977:
49-51
In response, Schapiro argued that while there had been
changes in the Soviet Union and other communist regimes,
these developments did not mean that the concept of totalitarianism
was outmoded. He acknowledged that the Soviet Union
nó Iorigěř šúffered from a totalitarian leader and terror, and
had seen a decline in ideological commitment, the emergence
of dissenters, and some signs of pluralism in the form of such
interests as the military establishment and the industrial managers
emerging as `incipient' pressure groups (1972 : 109, 112-13,
115) . But he contended that the essence of totalitarian rule
still persisted, namely an ever-present total control over the
individual (ibid. : p . 117) .
As for the diversity to be seen among communist regimes,
he argued that so long as these regimes shared certain fundamental
and distinctive features they can be classed together as
Theories of Non Democratic Government 19
Exhibit 1 .1 Mobilising the Masses
Although no longer much used, the term (political) 'mobilisation'
was quite commonly used by political scientists in the 1960s-70s
and was included in some theories of totalitarianism and authoritarianism.
The concept was originally a military term meaning the
preparation of an army for war by calling up the reserves and
moving forces to the front line . As later recast into a political
term it would mean dictatorships' attempts 'to activate their peoples
in support of official norms and goals', and it was used in this
sense by fascist and communist regimes themselves long before
the notion of mobilisation entered the theoretical vocabulary of
political science (Unger, 1974 : 5) .
In the Soviet Union the emphasis was on economic attitudes
and behaviour, especially the labour productivity and discipline
needed to meet the production targets of the economic Five-Year
Plans (ibid. : 266, 126). As will be seen in Chapter 7 mobilisation
of the public in support of economic goals was taken even further
by some other communist regimes, notably North Korea, and
it was experimented with by a few African one-party states of the
1960s. In fact, the one-party states in Guinea, Mali and Ghana
were included along with communist regimes as examples of
'mobilisation systems' in a leading 1960s work on the politics of
modernisation, and the concept was briefly adopted by some analysts
of communist politics (Apter, 1965; Rigby, 1972) . Mobilising
regimes also employed their official parties and mass-member
organisations to mobilise the public in support of non-economic
goals, such as community health and/or birth-control programmes,
self-proclaimed cultural revolutions, or instilling the official ideology
in the hearts and minds of the public .
The minimal and most common form of political mobilisation,
though, is simply the activation of the public to express support
for the regime itself . For example, the Cuban communist regime's
ability to draw a crowd of over a million people to political gatherings
in Revolution Square has been based on a highly organised
mobilisation of the public at neighbourhood and workplace level
by the local Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and by
the official trade union movement (Aguirre, 1989: 389-90). To what
extent this support-expressing behaviour reflects a positive attitude
to the regime is always difficult to judge against the coercive/
repressive background of a non-democratic regime (as research
into the defunct Nazi case has confirmed) (Unger, 1974 : 102-3;
Allen, 1984, chs 17, 19). Such political 'participation' is very different
from that 'mobilised' by parties and interest groups in a
democratic system .
20 Non Democratic Regimes
totalitarian despite their diversity in other respects (ibid.: 112) .
Moreover, in typical second-generation fashion he gave the concept
more flexibility by suggesting that totalitarianism actually
varies in intensity and totality, and that even when one or more
characteristic features is weak or absent, the totalitarian nature
of a regime is still clearly-discernible- (ibid. : 124) .
Outmoded or Unfashionable?
Despite the efforts of the second-generation theorists, the notion
of totalitarianism never regained its earlier prominence .
In the 1970s most analysts of their contemporary commu nist
regimes continued to prefer one of the newer models or approaches,
notably the bureaucratic politics model, or to develop
new approaches focused on the policy-making issue, such as
Hough's notion of institutional (or institutionalised) pluralism
(Hough, 1977, ch . 2; Hough and Fainsod, 1979 : 547-8) . By
the 1980s it was also becoming increasingly clear that even such
classic examples of totalitarianism as Nazi Germany - had- in reality
fallen well short of the totalitarian `ideal' . Historical research
into Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union was revealing
that (a) control over society and individual, especially over `hearts
and minds', had been far from total, and (b) the leader had
exercised far from total political control over his subordinates
and-theřégime'š institutions/ organisations (Allen, 1984 ; Kershaw,
1953; Břošzat, 1981; -Getty, 1985) . In fact, decades earlier some
historical research had already suggested that there had been
surprisingly weak `totalitarian' control over behaviour, let alone
attitudes, particularly in the rural areas of Hitler's Germany
and Stalin's Soviet Union (Peterson, 1969 ; Fainsod, 1958) . And
this dawning awareness in the 1960s that even -such horrific
regimes as Hitler's and Stalin's had fallen short of the classic
conception of totalitarianism may explain why there was so little
enthusiasm for applying the concept to some of the new Third
World dictatorships, particularly the rash of African one-party
states that had emerged in the 1960s.
Schapiro did classify the short-lived African one-party state
developed bý Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana as a case of weak/
failed totalitarianism (1972 : - 124) . He argued that before its
fall to military coup in 1966, Nkrumah's regime had been moving
down the road to totalitarianism but that Nkrumah had failed
Theories of Non Democratic Government 21
to establish party control over the state or to arouse a more
than play-acting public enthusiasm for the official ideology and
leader cult (ibid. : 122) . By categorising Nkrumah's regime as a
form of totalitarian dictatorship - however weak and short-lived
- Schapi -o was reaffirming that the concept-was _not outmoded
ancTwa also implicitly offering - a- solution to the problem __of
how to categorise those African one-party states, notably Touré's
mass-mobilising regime in Guinea, which seemed to display
characteristic featuřes of ťotalitarianism (Riviére, 1977) . Yet he
did not develop this approach in any depth or with much
enthusiasm. Nor would many other theorists, or many writers
on Africa, show any interest in applying the concept of totalitarianism
to African or other Third World, non-communist
dictatorships .
Even political biases or expediency did not lead to the concept
being extended to Third World regimes. In her controversial
article calling for US foreign policy to take into account the
distinction between traditional/ authoritarian and revolutionary/
totalitarian autocracies, Kirkpatrick (1979) did mention the (selfproclaimed
Marxist-Leninist) regime in Angola and` the
revolutionary regime in Nicaragua among her examples of actual
or potential rev_ olutionary/totalitarian regimes . But her other
examples were the typically communist cases of Cuba, China,
North Korea and Vietnam, and the controversy aroused by the
article revealed the lack of enthusiasm for applying the conceps
of totalitarianism to contemporary regimes . Furthermore,
neither Qadhafi's regime in the 1980s nor Saddam Hussein's
regime in the 1990s were denounced as `totalitarian' by their
Western critics, even though some US politicians and officials
were prepared to go to extreme lengths to express their disapproval.
Saddam Hussein may have been compared to Hitler,
but his regime was not labelled as totalitarian despite its showing
such characteristic features as an absolutist party leader
and the extensive use of terror .
Authoritarianism
While theories of totalitarianism may seem to cover too rare a
form of modern non-democratic government, theories of
authoritarianism face quite the opposite problem . The term