Pierre Bourdieu

PUBLIC OPINION DOES NOT EXIST

(France, 1972)

"I say that to speak is to express an opinion, and that an opinion consists of an explicitly pronounced discourse."  Plato

First of all, I should make clear that my purpose is not to mechanically and simplistically denounce public opinion polls. Even if there is no doubt that opinion polls are not what they would have been, there is not what would be demystifiers who have claimed either. The polls can make a useful contribution to social science if they are treated rigorously with certain precautions. Neither am I attacking the people who carry out opinion polls; they are doing a certain job which, if not reducible to the pure and simple sale of products, cannot be completely identified with legitimate scientific research either.

THREE IMPLIED POSTULATES

Having thus prefaced my remarks, I would like to enumerate three implied assumptions which must be challenged in order to arrive at a rigorous and solid analysis of opinion polls:

1. Every opinion poll supposes that everyone can have an opinion; or, stated otherwise, that the production of an opinion is within everyone's range of possibility. At the risk of offending a naïve democratic sentiment, I contest this;—second, it is taken for granted that all opinions have the same value. I believe that it can be proven that this is far from the truth, and that by gathering a plurality of opinions which do not have the same real importance, the results are very severely distorted; and third, the fact of asking everyone the same question implies the hypothesis that there is a consensus about the problem, that is, an agreement about which questions are worth asking.

These three postulates imply, it seems to me, a whole series of difficulties which can be found even when all the conditions for methodological rigor are fulfilled in the gathering and analysis of the data.

Opinion polls are often criticized on technical grounds, by challenging the representativeness of the samples, for instance. Given the methods presently used by the polling institutes these objections hardly seem valid to me. They are also accused of biasing the questions, or more accurately, of providing a bias in the formulation of the questions. This is closer to the truth, and often the power is inferred by the way in which the question is posed. Thus, in spite of the elementary precept behind the composition of a questionnaire, which requires that one give all possible answers "a chance", omissions are frequently made either in the questions themselves or in the proposed answers, or else, the very same question is proposed several times in different forms; unless one is working on a survey, one is never sure of having foreseen the whole range of possible responses. One can thus anticipate a repetition of certain answers giving a greater chance to the answer which has been proposed more than another; the answers anticipated, one can omit a particularly important possible question, thus taking away the likelihood of a certain answer appearing.

THE INEVITABLE PROBLEMATICS

I therefore think that there are biases of this kind and it would be interesting to investigate the social conditions underlying their appearance. The sociologist supposes that nothing happens just by chance and that these biases can be explained. Most of the time they are the result of the non-consideration of the people who produce the questionnaires. However, there are other factors as well. The fact that the problems devised by the polling institutes are subordinated to a specific kind of desired result, the ideas they wish to enforce, the reasoning principles behind these problems must ask who can afford to pay for an opinion poll.

Recently, we undertook an analysis of a large national survey on the French people's opinion of the education system, which was based on a random sample of answers given in reply to a questionnaire published and distributed in the French newspapers. To control the validity of our sample, we looked through the files of a number of research institutes, notably IFOP (Institut Français d'Opinion Publique) and SOFRES (Société Française des Études par Sondage), for all the questions dealing with education. We found that more than two hundred questions on the education system were posed since May 1968, compared with less than twenty before. This indicates that the problems which are imposed by this kind of organization are closely linked to the socio-political conjuncture and are dominated by a specific kind of social demand. In other words, the polls, beyond any problem of their own, ask a question of education, for instance, cannot be posed by a public opinion institute until it becomes a political problem. The difference can be immediately noted between such institutes and those which generate their own problematics, if not out of a clear blue sky, at least with a much greater distance from a direct and immediate social demand.

A summary statistical analysis of the questions asked in this survey showed us that the great majority of them were directly linked to the political preoccupations of the "ruling power." If we were to amuse ourselves right now by making a list, and if I were to ask you to write the five questions which you believe that the parties will be able to campaign on during the next election, we would surely receive a very different list from those actually asked by the opinion polls. The question "Should politics be introduced into the schools?" was devised in the last "campaign" (the theme) was asked very often, whereas the question "Should the curricula be modified?" or "Should there be a change in the way classes are taught?" was very rarely posed. Questions of a major importance, at least from another perspective.

THE FUNCTION OF THE POLLS

The problematics proposed by the opinion polls correspond to specific interests. Any problematic can be said to correspond to specific interests, but in this particular case the interests which support these problematics are political interests, and this fact governs both the meaning of the responses and the significance which is given to their publication. The opinion poll is, at the present time, an instrument of political action; its most important function is perhaps to impose the illusion that a public opinion exists, and that it is simple the sum of a number of individual opinions. It imposes the idea for instance that in a group of ethical people there can be found a public opinion, which would be something like the average of all the opinions or the average opinion. The "public opinion" which is stated on the polls is a summary of opinions. It presents the percentages (60% of the French are in favor of...): is a pure and simple artefact whose function is to conceal the fact that the state of opinion at any given moment is a system of forces, of tensions, and that there is nothing more inadequate than a percentage to represent the state of opinion.

We know that relations of force can never be reduced to relations of force: any exercise of power is accompanied by a discourse aimed at legitimating the power of those who exercise it. One could even say that there is a tendency in the exercise of power towards its self-concealment as such, and that concealment is better concealed when it is not concealed. Stated simply, the politician who yesterday said "God is on our side" today says "Public Opinion is on our side" and the supposed effect of the opinion poll: it creates the idea that a unanimous public opinion exists in order to legitimate a policy, and strengthen the relations of force upon which it is based or make it possible.

THE "NO REPLIES"

Having stated my purpose at the beginning, I shall try to quickly indicate the operations which produce this consensus effect. The first operation, which begins with the assumption that everyone must have an opinion, consists in ignoring the "no replies." For some time now, instead of saying "50% of the French are in favor of the discontinuation of the railroads," the newspapers say "50% of the French are for, 40% are against, and 10% have no opinion." But that isn't enough information; for instance, you ask people "Are you favorable to the Pompidou government?" You register 50% "no replies"? 20% yes, 50% no. You can say the number of people unfavorable is greater than the number of people favorable and there is a remainder of 30%; or you can re-calculate those favorable and those unfavorable, excluding "no replies". This simple choice is a theoretical operation of great importance about which I would like to reflect a moment. A survey without "no replies" is the same as what is done in an election when there are blank or null ballots; the implicit philosophy of electoral surveys is thus imposed on opinion polls. On close examination—here is how people feel that the rate of "no replies" is generally higher in women than in men, and that the margin between men and women increases as the problems posed become more specifically political. This is true to such an extent that we were able to determine, out of a list of different questions, which ones could best be considered political, just by examining the margin between the "no replies" by women and men. Another factor: the more a question concerns problems of knowledge, the greater is the margin of "no replies" between more-educated and less-educated people. Another observation: the question "Who is the best wrestler?" (for example: "Should children be punished?") the margin of "no replies" between social classes is slight. Another observation: the more a question poses a situation of conflict and contradiction (such as a question on the situation in Czechoslovakia for persons who vote Communist) or generates tensions for a particular category, the more "no replies" will be received from that category. Thus opinions on the origin of the "no replies" offers information about the meaning of the question, as well as the category of people questioned, the category being defined as much by the probability of having an opinion as at all by the conditional probability of having a favorable or unfavorable one.

THE IMPOSITION OF THE PROBLEMATIC

The scientific analysis of opinion polls shows that there exists practically no such problem as a question which is not reinterpreted in function of the interests or non-interests of the people to whom the question is posed. Thus the first imperative in evaluating the polls is to ask what questions are asked in different categories of people thought they were answering. One of the most pernicious effects of the opinion surveys is to put people in a position where they must answer a question they never thought about, or mistakenly answer a different question from that which was asked, the interpretation only being a record of the misunderstanding.

I stated earlier that the opinion polls could be re-used scientifically; however, this supposes certain precautions which are excluded because of the social conditions under which the research
organizations operate. Journalists who want things to be simple, further simplify the already simplified data which they have been given, and when it reaches the public, it is likely to read as follows: “20% of the French are for this and 80% are for that.” A rigorous interpretation of the opinion polls would require an epistemological examination of each of the questions asked, plus, concerning the system of those questions and the order of the questions, of answers, which together would be the only way to know what were the questions the people really thought they were answering.

Questions having to do with moral issues, for example, the punishment of children, relations between teachers and students, and so on, are problems which are perceived as ethical problems but which are dependent on the social hierarchy, but which can be political problems for the individual having to deal with the distorting effects of surveys is the transformation of ethical responses into political responses by the simple imposition of a particular problematic.

THE TWO PRINCIPLES IN THE PRODUCTION OF OPINIONS

In fact, there are several principles which can be used to generate a response. First of all, there is the one called “political community” which corresponds to a definition of politics which is both arbitrary and legitimate, both dominant and concealed as such. This “political community” is not necessarily in proportion with the level of education. In other words, the probability of having an opinion on all the questions which presuppose a certain political knowledge can be compared to that of going into a museum; it is a function of a person’s level of education. Some astounding variations can be observed: whereas a student involved in a far-left movement perceives the difference of the political categories to the left of the Parti Socialiste Unifié, a middle-level executive sees none at all. In an election, one thinks in terms of the political gradations far left, left, center left, center, center right, right, far right, etc. One of the important problems in a class ethos and can be given a totally different meaning when they are interpreted on political grounds. I shall illustrate this and you will see that what I have said is far from abstract and theoretical. I shall have to refer to a specific sociological tradition, prevalent especially among political sociologists in the United States, who commonly speak of the conservation and authoritarianism of the middle class. Their ideas are based on a comparison of the international results of surveys or elections which tend to show that each time the popular classes are asked, in any country, the answers which are the highest in terms of the production of opinions: an authentically political principle and an ethical one, and the problem of the conservation of the middle classes, which were produced because this difference is ignored. Thus, what I have called the effect of the impression of the problematic, the effect utilized by all opinion polls and political investigations, begins to appear. The selection of respondents from the fact that questions asked in an opinion survey are not the questions which are a real concern for the people questioned, and the responses are not interpreted in function of the problematic under consideration, or at least different categories of respondents in their actual reply. Thus the dominant problematic, whose image is provided by the list of questions posed during the last two years by the polling institutes, is the problematic which essentially interests the people who hold power and who consider themselves to be well informed about the means of organizing their political action. This problematic is very unevenly overcome by the different social classes, and it is striking that the different social classes are more or less apt to produce a counter-problematic. Concerning the reaction to a television debate between Svern-Schreier and the Catholic Church, we can observe that the list of questions for “is success a function of talent, intelligence, work, personal worth?” The answers received revealed nothing about objective truth, but did, in fact, reply to the question “To what extent are you participating in the popular objective laws governing the transmission of cultural capital?” It could be said generally that the lack of consciousness of these laws increases as one descends the social hierarchy, and in the poorest state of society, the popular classes are particularly mystified by the school system. One can understand why the attachment to the myth of talent, of rising through the school system, of the impartiality of the school system, of the opportunity of the distribution of jobs according to skills, etc., is very strong in the popular classes. There is no counter-problematic; it can exist for a small number of people who have been socialized even though it has been taken up by a few parties and groups. The popular classes are thus not conscious of the truth of the mechanisms and they cannot produce a counter-problematic: the whole conceptual framework is not set up, the terms are not defined, and the reference points of all the questions are not sufficiently diffused. We might add that it is not enough for a party to put into its program the struggle against the hereditary transmission of cultural capital; “social capital” is a term that is not further clearly defined, and the diffusion as ideology. A scientific proposition such as “cultural capital is transmitted by the school and by the family” is like a papal bull on birth control: one is only preaching to the converted. It is diffused according to certain laws; the probability that it will be accepted by some and rejected by others can be determined sociologically.

MOBILIZED OPINION

The idea of objectivity enters into an opinion survey in a very different way. One asks the people who hold power and who consider themselves to be well informed about the means of organizing their political action. This problematic is very unevenly overcome by the different social classes, and it is striking that the different social classes are more or less apt to produce a counter-problematic. Concerning the reaction to a television debate between Svern-Schreier and the Catholic Church, we can observe that the list of questions for “is success a function of talent, intelligence, work, personal worth?” The answers received revealed nothing about objective truth, but did, in fact, reply to the question “To what extent are you participating in the popular objective laws governing the transmission of cultural capital?” It could be said generally that the lack of consciousness of these laws increases as one descends the social hierarchy, and in the poorest state of society, the popular classes are particularly mystified by the school system. One can understand why the attachment to the myth of talent, of rising through the school system, of the impartiality of the school system, of the opportunity of the distribution of jobs according to skills, etc., is very strong in the popular classes. There is no counter-problematic; it can exist for a small number of people who have been socialized even though it has been taken up by a few parties and groups. The popular classes are thus not conscious of the truth of the mechanisms and they cannot produce a counter-problematic: the whole conceptual framework is not set up, the terms are not defined, and the reference points of all the questions are not sufficiently diffused. We might add that it is not enough for a party to put into its program the struggle against the hereditary transmission of cultural capital; “social capital” is a term that is not further clearly defined, and the diffusion as ideology. A scientific proposition such as “cultural capital is transmitted by the school and by the family” is like a papal bull on birth control: one is only preaching to the converted. It is diffused according to certain laws; the probability that it will be accepted by some and rejected by others can be determined sociologically.
situate themselves as they really do in real practice, in relation to already formulated opinions. As a hypothesis, imagine at a given moment a problem like teaching where all the courses are known in advance. At the time of the press, the trade union press, the political press, etc., would be the basis for a sort of map which would contain all the known positions. Anyone who proposes a position which is not on the map could be considered ridiculous. Every opinion is objectivity situated in relation to a series of known positions. One commonly speaks of “taking a position”; the expression must be understood in its strongest sense: there is no such thing as an opinion without a position or we do not take them. But we do not take them haphazardly. We take the positions which we are predisposed to take in function of our position in a certain domain. Formally, in the intellectual domain, at a given moment, we can say that an individual, given the particular circumstances, has a certain probability of taking one position rather than another. Obviously there is a small margin of freedom, but there are positions which are posed with greater immediacy and force. A rigorous analysis of ideologies should seek to explain the relation between the structure of positions to be taken and the structure of the range of positions already objectively occupied.

- I arrive now at the problem of the forecast value of opinion surveys. We know that opinion surveys, in the long term, are not a high forecast rate regarding elections, but they seem to fail when one compares an early result with a later one, whenever there has been an intervening crisis. In other words, the surveys capture quite well the structure of opinions at a given moment, in a stable situation, but they do not capture the potential state of opinion, and more exactly, the movement of opinion. If I ask a question in a situation which is not the real situation in which opinions are formed, and because they perceive the opinions themselves and not the ongoing conditions which produce them. There is a considerable difference between the question which people produce in an artificial situation such as a survey and the opinion they produce in a situation closer to the daily-life situation in which opinions are formed. It is this difference among people of the same milieu, etc. Thus, in a psychological experiment, we asked ten people to state their opinion on the length of two pieces of metal, which were of equal length. Afterwards, we took nine of the people aside and asked them to say that the two pieces of metal were not the same length. Then we asked the ten people the question for the second time and the tenth person now says that at first he thought that the two pieces were the same length, but now it seems to him that they’re not exactly the same length, etc. The situation in which opinions are formed, in particular in times of crisis, is of this type; people are faced with already formed opinions, opinions upheld by certain groups and they must choose between opinions because they must choose between groups. This is the principle behind the polishing effect produced by a crisis: one must choose between groups who define themselves politically and who increasingly define their position in function of obvious principles. The political force that is the thing that the opinion survey tells us opinion like the simple sum of individual opinions, gathered in an isolated situation where the individual fortuitously expresses an isolated opinion. In other situations, opinions between which forces and relations of opinions are conflicts of forces. Taking a position on any particular problem means choosing between real groups, which leads us to see that the second position, the assumption that all opinions are equal, is totally unfounded.

Another law can be deducted from our analysis: the more one is involved in a certain problem, the more opinion will seem to be more opinions one will have about it. Going back to the example of the education system, we find that the rate of response is very closely related to one’s personal position in the education system: whether you are an employee, professor, parent or former student, and the probability of one’s having power over the issue in question. Mobilized opinion is the opinion of influential people. If the Minister of Education acted in function of an opinion poll (or even a superficial reading of a poll), he would not do what he acts as a politician, in response to the telephone calls, the visit from the director of the school Normal Academy?... In reality he acts much more in function of forces of actually formed opinion, which enter his field of vision only to the extent that they have power, because they have already been mobilized.

INCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS

In order to forecast, for example, what will happen to the university system in the next ten years, I think that the understanding of mobilized opinion is crucial. In fact, all inferences in a coherent discourse. Do those people who do not answer or who say they have no opinion really have no opinion? I think that taking “he replies” seriously means that the inclusions of certain categories of people cannot attain the status of opinion, that is, the status of a formulated discourse which aims at coherence, and intends to be heard, read, etc. In crisis situations, where formulated opinions are expressed, people who had no opinion will not choose one haphazardly. If they perceive the problem as being political (for workers, questions of salary or of work cadres, they will choose in terms of what can be classed; if the problem is one which they do not perceive as being political for them (repressive relationships within the company) or if the problem is not clearly perceived, they will choose in terms of what can be classed. In other words, the function of both the electoral system and the opinion surveys, whose properties are so similar. To put things in very gross terms, I believe that the electoral system is an instrument whose very logic tends to eliminate suppress differences, and thus naturally tends to be conservative. We can ask ourselves what we are really doing when we use this instrument. One could draw the conclusion, perhaps, that we think and should continue to use it. A revolutionary party which wants to increase its strength in the existing relations of force, based on this analysis, can develop counter-problems as its main strategy, systematically using the procedure, methodically used for generations (the counter-strategy of “its the same difference” as a refusal of the problematic). The problem of a party which has defined its objectives tends to provide tools that can bridge people with the means of being the producers, not of their answers, but of their questions, and in doing so produce their means of defense against questions which are imposed upon them simply because they do not yet have any other means.

In another perspective, it could be concluded that just as people must be taught certain things in school before they can go to a museum, if electoral confrontations are to provide a different balance between the implicit postulates of the electoral system and reality must be as small as possible. In other words, people must have the means of producing opinions; they must therefore have the means to appropriate them. What this means is that from primary school on, people must have a real political education.

One might also be led to say: I do not want to play the electoral game because the structure of society, with the present distribution of cultural capital being one of the factors which defines the capacity for producing opinions, it is an illusion to believe that equality can be achieved in the voting booth. One could concluded that only active minorities are capable of mobilizing opinion. These very different conclusions could be drawn, among others. What is sure is that by studying the operation of opinion, we can have an idea of what a particular type of poll, the electoral survey, functions, and the effect it produces.

In brief, in saying that public opinion does not exist, I mean it does not exist in the form which some people, whose existence depends on this illusion, would have us believe. At present, there is, on the one hand, mobilized opinion, formulated opinion, pressure groups mobilized around a system of interests; and on the other, certain inclinations,
opinions in an implicit state which, by definition are not really opinions, if by opinion we mean a formulated discourse with a pretention to coherence. What I have been considering here is the definition of opinion which is implicitly used in the public opinion survey, it is not my opinion on opinion itself. It is only an explicit definition of opinion as it is employed by the people who produce the opinion polls when they ask people to formulate opinions or to take positions on already formulated opinions. This is what I mean when I say that opinion, the sense of the social definition implicitly accepted by those who prepare or analyze or use opinion polls, simply does not exist.

**Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR)**

**ON JOURNALISM AND OBJECTIVITY**

(Chile, 1971)

In capitalist society, the mass communication media serve the dominant classes. This is generally accomplished by an attempt to impose the supposedly eternal universality and validity of the bourgeois ideological worldview. The techniques developed by each of these media have been conditioned by mechanisms which assure the fulfillment of this ideological function. Furthermore, the communication media—especially in urban areas—have acquired a decisive importance in the coercive action of the dominant classes.

These observations have all become platitudes; nevertheless, any mass media discussion today must take them into consideration. As precarious and undeveloped as they may be, these considerations are important, since they not only challenge a particular form of action of the dominant ideology and the bourgeois media, but also directly concern the action and ideology of the media workers themselves. Furthermore, such a discussion poses the general problem of ideology, its nature and development, and the techniques by which it is transmitted. The discussion is important, therefore, since it not only concerns the specific field of the newspaper worker, but because, in order to be adequately posed, presented and developed, it must also incorporate a more general problem, one which transcends the area of journalism and confronts the framework of society as a whole, understood as the manifestation of human practices conditioned by and conditioning to this.

Although this discussion of the media, the role of its workers and the sense of their possible transformation is in its first stages, certain basic concepts can be noted. To the extent that these concepts are introduced into the discussion in a concrete and creative way, a critical self-consciousness in journalistic practice may be furthered. Moreover, they hold the keys to an active and fruitful incorporation of the media and their workers into the political tasks which are advancing the struggle waged by the oppressed sectors of society for the achievement of economic, political and cultural liberation.

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**B. Bourgeois Ideology: Journalism**

Every social practice in bourgeois society has been invested with an ideological framework which justifies it, gives it meaning and tends to maintain its status in function of its position in the ensemble of social activities. Just as the concrete action of a psychiatrist, a writer or a politician have their natural and mediated roles assigned to them in bourgeois society, the practice of the workers in the communication media has been given its ideological basis, its particular social role and its general significance and direction.

One of the pillars of the bourgeois conception of journalism is what is has been called "objectivity", a notion which has practical as well as moral implications. Throughout the history of journalism, the requisite of objectivity has been elaborated and proposed as a way of approaching reality, as a mechanism for transmitting this approach, and as a desideratum, the ultimate moral goal of the profession. Thus objectivity is not only a formal requisite for the isolated journalist: the journalist himself has come to accept his activity as a synonym for so-called objectivity.

Now, what is the nature of this objectivity?

First of all, it supposes the existence of an exterior reality which must be described "such as it is" by someone possessing the adequate skill.

Second, it implies that the viewpoint of the person responsible for the description is capable of selectively penetrating reality, discerning between what is important and what is in contingent, what is worthy of being described and what is not.

Third, it demands that the description be self-contained, in other words, that judgements be good and bad, for instance, not enter explicitly into the description. Any judgement would thus belong to the world of effects, the result of the reader's interaction with the description; journalism, therefore would be a practice of effects, and the objective description, rather than being responsible for the judgement would simply be the source of the individual reader's reflection and interpretation to this.

Although the technical aspects themselves, objectivity presupposes the elimination of the journalist's subjectivity, reserved exclusively for the process of selecting material and for his "intelligence" in discerning between what is important, what is "news", and what isn't. "Objectivity" also influences the practice of news production, and the news as news, because how news is to be transmuted: a news item must be clearly written, detailed, stating the "how, where and why" of the event. The "how" and "where" imply the description of a particular event and a particular place. The "why", according to the demands of objectivity, must be presented only in terms of the opinions given by the event's protagonists and witnesses.

Fifth and lastly, objectivity responds to a notion of the reader which is peculiar to a society in which the roles of individuals and groups are strictly assigned, and in which the division between manual and intellectual implies that only a select few are capable of generating ideas and communicating them while the majority can only receive the communication, even if these communications are alien to the events in which the receivers were actually the protagonists. In sum, it is a conception of passive readers, who are suited only to take in the news each few day so as to better forget the news of yesterday.

Why must we criticize this so-called objectivity? Because by analyzing this notion point by point, it will lead us to some very concrete conclusions.

1. Does there exist an exterior reality which can be described "such as it is"? The only reality which men know is one which is modified by their consciousness, since the act of knowing corresponds to the arrangement of observable data by means of a highly complex, but thoroughly human and historical mechanism, present in every individual and corresponding to the society in which this individual lives and to his particular place in that society. The idea that there exists an exterior reality whose facade can be perceived without any distortion is a conceptual error, but one which is a part of the ideology of class society, the ideology of the dominant class. What exists is not an exterior reality, but a certain knowledge, a humanization of reality, produced by individual action and conditioned by the totality of society. Therefore no description, even the most strictly scientific and seemingly free from subjectivity can escape an ideological connotation. Since the ideology of the bourgeoisie, the dominant ideology in capitalist society, is a false consciousness, the bourgeoisie believes that it knows reality when it actually knows only the apparent reality of and for capitalist society. Likewise, the concepts of freedom, or nationality, or labor and capital are rationalized, idealized by the bourgeoisie's need for domination: freedom means freedom of property, which is at the same time slavery for those who are not property-owners; nationality is the nationality of the economic and political interests of the national bourgeoisie, which simultaneously implies a negation of nationality whenever those interests transcend the national arena and become international; labor is what capital makes possible, what the owners of the means of production allow the workers, even though, paradoxically, it is the labor of the worker which actually creates the existence of capital. Thus, as we said, the concept of objectivity is part of the ideological framework of the bourgeoisie. In opposition to this exterior reality, described "such as it is", there is a different reality, one in which the oppressed classes are the protagonists, a society in which they are excluded from power. In their search for their rightful hegemony, in the search to bring together their fundamental adjustments and their mastery over society, they generate a new ideology, a new conception of the world, which is not objective, and does not want to be. It is the ideology of a world in transformation, in which the