

## **BEYOND BIOPOLITICS: THE NOMOS OF AUTOMOBILITY**

*Unpublished manuscript -- do not quote without the express consent of the authors*

### **Robert Braun**

*Institut für Höhere Studien*

Josefstädter Strasse 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria

Email: robert.braun@ihs.ac.at

ORCID: 0000-0002-0579-3532

### **Richard Randell**

*Webster University Geneva*

15, Route de Collex, 1293 Bellevue, Switzerland

E-mail: richardrandell75@webster.edu

ORCID: 0000-0002-5672-0803

August 26, 2019

### **Introduction**

Despite the rapid expansion of automobile-based mobility in the twentieth century, and the reflection offered by a number of scholars on its social impact as well as different constructs of meaning, it was only with the dawn of ‘automobility studies’ around the beginning of the twenty-first century that automobility was constructed as an object of theoretical and empirical inquiry (Featherstone, Thrift, & Urry, 2005; Sheller, 2004; Sheller & Urry, 2000, 2006, 2016; Urry, 2004, 2006). Automobility studies, stemming from what has been described as the ‘mobilities turn’ in the social sciences (Sheller & Urry, 2006), articulated an alternative and largely critical description of automobility to that of the ‘car culture’ captured in popular culture and public discourse. It also offered critical reflection to previous theorizations and describing the ubiquitous manifestations, representations as well as social impacts of automobility as objects of inquiry. This was complemented by the equally relevant ‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences, following up on Foucault’s famous dictum about “[t]he present epoch [...being] above all the epoch of space” (Foucault, 1986, p. 22), with a number of theorists having rediscovered space and using it as a critical and analytical

tool during the second half of the twentieth century (Massey, 1994; Soja, 1989; Thrift, 1996). This paper is at the confluence of these two ‘turns’ as many have been using mobilities to exemplify specific aspects of the spatial (Cresswell, 2010; Merriman, 2009) as well as mobilities scholars addressing automobility issues via geographical lens (Steffen Böhm, Campbell, Land, & Paterson, 2006; Sheller & Urry, 2000; Walks, 2015). However, we take a somewhat different angle. We are looking at the politics of the spatial as exemplified in a special facet of automobility: spatial violence. In order to direct our attention to the everyday experience of mundane automobility, we present a conceptualization of automobility that utilizes non-realist ontology and presents a phenomenological understanding of everyday automobility; then we turn to the politics of automobility and address automobility violence as the constitutive element of the socio-spatial order of automobility. We argue that at the heart of automobility violence lays a special understanding of biopolitics, one that creates the automobility self (Randell, 2017) as ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). The core of our argument is that this is a key political aspect of the socio-spatial order of automobility. We claim that violence points to the original constitutive moment of the sociotechnical appropriation of modern space. It also points to a theorization of violence that differs from traditional understanding of the politics of violence and its relationship to power.

### **The automobility imaginary**

Adding a – partly critical – analysis to this body of scholarship and also taking issue with the Jasanoffian concept of sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, 2015), one of the most used conceptualizations of technology society confluence, we have elsewhere argued that automobility should be conceptualized as a single non-realist imaginary, composed of both the material artefacts of automobility and their representations (Braun & Randell, Forthcoming). It is what Jasanoff and Kim name, in passing as dreamscape: the “collectively

held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order” (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015, p. 4). The crux of our argument is that, the largely constructionist stance of much of the automobility scholarship notwithstanding, a dualist metaphysics informs much of the corpus of the automobility literature. Even in its most Foucauldian conceptualizations (Steffen Böhm et al., 2006; Cass & Manderscheid, 2018) it is argued that the hegemony of automobility is created by the “reality producing power of [the] interplay of different forms of knowledge and their materialization” (Manderscheid, 2014, p. 616).

Rather than articulating alternative imaginaries of automobility, as other critics of automobility as system have done (Steffen Böhm et al., 2006; Featherstone et al., 2005; Manderscheid, 2014), we attempt to disrupt and displace the taken-for-granted, self-evident truths and utopian visions and images of contemporary automobility. While notions of ‘regime,’ ‘dispositif,’ ‘subjectivities,’ ‘discourses,’ ‘technologies of governance’ and so forth provide explanations for how, historically, automobility has become the dominant system of land transportation across the planet, and how that hegemony in the present is reproduced and sustained, our interest lies with everyday automobility. This everyday automobility reality is an ‘imaginary’ (Althusser, 1971; Castoriadis, 2005; Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, 2015; C. Taylor, 2002), composed not only of discourses, visions and images, but also of automobiles and the physical infrastructure of automobility. Our sensory experiences of automobility reality do not occupy some pre-discursive, pre-interpretive moment: they are embodied and habituated as well as produced, reproduced and transformed within the imaginary. All this *is* automobility reality. Automobility reality, conceptualized phenomenologically, is a dreamscape: a place in which we dwell in the present with composite significations of image and vision, of artefacts and materialities as well as those of illusion and fantasy (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). In this dreamscape there is no other automobility reality, some other ontological

realm composed of the physical and material. The real and the imaginary are not separable: there is no space or analytically definable component of automobility that is real, and a separate part that is 'merely' imaginary. Automobility is the ensemble of artifacts that have been co-produced by and within the imaginary (Jasanoff, 2004), of which those artifacts are also components.

This said, we also need to reconceptualize the politics of automobility, the production and distribution of power by and in automobility, in terms of such non-dualist ontology. In our view automobility power is not produced and sustained via the interplay of different 'representations' of the automobile and their materialization as the constituents of a 'system' or 'regime'. Automobility politics is thus not the conflict represented in the antagonisms of the 'system of automobility' becoming unsustainable as the depletion of energy resources conflict with the energy needs to sustain automobility (Urry, 2004), or the 'automobility regime' dispositive finding its limits in urban rush hour material immobility caused by congestion potentially leading to a reversal of the hegemonic order (Steffen Böhm, Jones, Land, & Paterson, 2006). In our version the politics of the dreamscape needs to be confronted in its entirety.

The dreamscape of automobility is the phenomenological space in which we dwell. Space is, of course, political. "The fundamental stuff of geography" (Thrift, 1996) is also the topography of power -- a "complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation" (Massey, 1994, p. 265). The politics of mobility is, traditionally, also discussed in terms of a dualist ontology: references to representations (meanings and experiences) and their materializations (artefacts and technologies) -- the interplay of which produces and distributes power as 'constellations' comprised of the interchange of reasons, speed, route, feelings and the frictions of mobility (Cresswell, 2010). In our conceptualization of the dreamscape the imaginary ordering of space 'is' the distribution of power; domination

and subordination need not be actualized in actual movement or by technologies enabling it. ‘Automobility’ is power, not as representation of the automobile or the embodiment of the self in the automobility dispositif that is then materialized in our everyday experience, but as our everyday existence ordered spatially. The politics of automobility is the spatiality of our social being (Soja, 1989). This politico-spatiality is ontologically constitutive of automobility (Heidegger, 1962). In the next section this is what we turn to.

In the everyday existence of automobility ‘real’ cars kill ‘real’ people: violence is the inherent force by which space and power is arranged and ordered. Our everyday experience of automobility is a violent order in which power is offered to the automobilized body, while ‘non-cared’ docile bodies are repressed and, often, killed. Non-cared bodies, when moving, are confined to the pavement and, if they decide to share the road with others e.g. by crossing it, they are ordered to do so in specific spaces, at specific speeds and by specific rhythms (Sheller & Urry, 2000). Speed and rhythm, as well as dwelling are spatially ordered: action as social existence of any sort is only possible within the spatial confinement constructed both topographically and politically. Should non-cared bodies disobey their confinement, they become ‘just enemies’, who, when meeting automobility violence, die justifiably. Violence, even violence to the cared body or those other bodies sharing the space with them as other mobility-artefact-human hybrids, is ‘bracketed’, made acceptable as part of the ‘just’ order created by automobility.

### **Nomos of automobility**

We are employing here the theoretical apparatus developed by Carl Schmitt, the twentieth century legal theorist of the spatial order of the political (Schmitt, 2006). Thus, another term for the automobility dreamscape would be *nomos* as “the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible” (Schmitt, 2006, p. 70).

As Carl Schmitt writes *nomos* is not

“law (in German, Gesetz), regulation, norm, or any similar expression. *Nomos* comes from *nemein* - a [Greek] word that means both "to divide" and "to pasture." [...] *Nomos* is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity.” (Schmitt, 2006, p. 70)

Carl Schmitt’s develops the concept of the *Nomos of the Earth*, a legal genealogy of the territorial spatial ordering of the earth, to theoretically separate it from the actual norms, regulations and the law as well as to develop a modern concept of international justice.

Schmitt’s *nomos* serves as a foundation of his concept of sovereignty, the founding moment of spatio-political order. He points to the much debated verse of Pindar quoted in Plato’s *Gorgias*: “*the nomos, sovereign of all/Of mortals and immortals/Leads with the strongest hand/Justifying the most violent*” (Pindar, ca. 450 BCE). He then uses the concept to define the underlying principles of a worldwide territorial order and distribution of power that was achieved under the aegis of the *Jus Publicum Europaeum* (JPE), a hegemonic European legal balance mediating relations between sovereign (European) states. Through “bracketing” conflict and violence (the sovereign *nomos* justifying the most violent), the ‘rationalization, humanization, and legalization’ of war, Schmitt claims, the *Nomos of the Earth* emerged. This *nomos* created ‘just enemies’ with similar political character and rights, and fostered a world order in which annihilation of the other was replaced by accepted means of managing conflicts and appropriating land.

At the heart of Schmitt’s concept of the *nomos* as ontonomous and ontological judgement lies land-appropriation as the primeval act in founding law (Schmitt, 2006, p. 46). This ontology of the social and political order is grounded in Schmitt’s view of sovereignty stemming from the act of conflating justice and violence as interpreted from Pindar. Following this train of thought, we argue, sovereignty, justice and violence manifested in spatial ordering also lies at the heart of automobility. The conflation of justice and violence in

automobility is exemplified in Adorno's famous dictum in *Minima Moralia* about the temptation of the driver "merely by the power of his engine, to wipe out the vermin of the street—pedestrians, children and cyclists" (Adorno, 2005, p. 19). The temptation is not the instinct to kill but the possibility and potential justification to do so. In the 'nomos of automobility' violence is part of automobility justice.

The nomos of automobility, as the Schmittian *Jus Publicum Europaeum*, also evolved historically. By the turn of the nineteenth century urban space was shared by several sociotechnical artefacts as well as by humans moving, selling and playing on the streets. This interplay of actors on the streets was delicate and unstable, but not violent. Automobility, however, disrupted the previous order and entered with a deadly force. In the decade between 1920 and 1929 more than 200 000 people were killed on the streets of America, four times more than in the previous one (Norton, 2007). Cities were spaces where children played and adults gathered, "before road traffic became so dominant, hectic and dangerous" (N. Taylor, 2003, p. 1611) that streets have been transformed into thoroughfares where all road and roadside activities become subordinated to automobility (Bonham, 2006; Randell, 2017). Bracketed violence ordered space: creating *justus hostis*, just enemies – those who do not obey the spatially "regulated relations" (Schmitt, 2006, p. 54) of the dreamscape. These relations are spatially constructed in automobility: space is appropriated and relations are ordered in areas covered with asphalt for the automobile, violence against non-cared inhabitants of the dreamscape is justified.

At first, motorists were seen and defined as invaders to the existing social and spatial order. Therefore, limits were imposed on drivers both in terms of speed and in use of space. However, motorists, advocates of the new technology and other agents heralding the new order quickly turned against 'jaywalkers' – a word invented and applied to those who did not follow the rudimentary new spatial order of the streets. The nomos of automobility emerged

by brute force, through monopolizing the right to violence and justice, in appropriating space. In 1924 the word 'jaywalker' entered into a standard American dictionary as "one who crosses a street without observing the traffic regulations for pedestrians" (Norton, 2007, p. 358).

Today automobility violence kills 1.25 million people globally, about 3500 every day (Culver, 2018). This is the result of physical automobility violence, a further four hundred thousand people die every year in the EU only, from respiration diseases caused by automobility induced pollution (EC, 2017). There is no other area of social or political life where such a constant and violent attrition of human life and the destruction of the human body are abided. Traditional statistical analysis attributes automobility violence to human agency coded as 'error': over 90% of road violence is claimed to be 'caused' by human mistake (Singh, 2015). The first death of the war for the street occurred in 1896. Today someone dies in and by automobility every 25<sup>th</sup> second. Automobility is the most violent socio-political order on Earth (Paterson, 2007). The dreamscape of automobility defined as desired socio-spatial order animated by a shared understanding of present forms of social life, artifacts, and modes of governance (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015), is, actually, a 'nightmarescape'.

It is of specific interest how the law, stemming from the nomos of automobility, deals with violence in automobility. Homicide and acts of violence are punished severely in every legal system. Exceptions to criminal homicide are limited, mostly in cases of self-defense, state sanctioned killing, or special circumstances such as euthanasia. Even if homicide is negligent or involuntary, stemming from breach of duty, it is sanctioned rigorously. Rules of duty (driving a safe speed, maintaining control, exercising awareness, observing traffic signals, using blinkers and headlights) regulate road movement and it is assumed that violence occurs when such duty is breached. However, punitive measures of duty breach are more often than not light in automobility, and result in short term ban of participation or



temperate measures such as license suspension, remedial training or fines applied to the violent and in many cases administrated in the context of a demerit-point system (Tapani Mäkinen et al., 2003).

This dreamscape turned nightmarescape *is* the nomos of automobility: a global sociotechnical order made spatially visible. This is the hegemonic automobility reality, the imaginary within which we dwell. Violence is rationalized and made accepted in the imaginary saturated by complex meanings that involve interpretative arguments as to why violence is justified by e.g. efficiency, comfort or safety (of the cared body). The cared body is power-privileged over all other bodies through the embodied and habituated meanings of safety or efficiency within automobility. It is not the artefact that saves the lives of the cared body; it is the nomos 'justifying the most violent'. The cared body in the technosocial spatial order of automobility maybe conceptualized as the dehumanized automobility *cyborg* (Haraway, 2013), as the *driver-car assemblage*, the hybrid in actor-network theory (Latour, 2005), or the car-human entity performing public routines in public space as *autoself* (Randell, 2017). However conceptualized, the nomos of automobility is sociotechnical in as much as it is cared-body centric: shared understandings of social order focus on desirable visions revolving around the driver-car hybrid. In Schmittian terms this cared-body centrality creates a balance between the sociotechnical and the spatial order: the sociotechnical dominance of the car-driver hybrid serves as the 'guarantor' of the spatial order (Schmitt, 2006, p. 352). Space is ordered in the nomos in complex ways: by permitted and forbidden access, speeds and rythms (Cresswell, 2010; Sheller & Urry, 2000), as well as visible and non-visible (often technologically black-boxed) connections and relations created in and by spatial appropriation (Latour, 1990). The rulebooks of automobility originating in the nomos determine 'just conflicts' between cared and non-cared bodies, settle clashes between hybrids; the Schmittian '*occupatio bellica*' (Schmitt, 2006, p. 207) applies: the temporary

reordering of space in which ‘unintended’ violence happens is the state of exception that upholds the original ‘constitutional’ order of the nomos. Put colloquially: ‘unjust killing’ is accepted as collateral damage of the nomos of automobility. The exception, a constitutive force in Schmitt’s nomos, – human error – is rationalized as technosocial necessity.

### **On violence in automobility**

Violence is undertheorized in philosophical literature (Bufacchi, 2013). It is mostly conceptualized by analytic philosophers in terms of intentionality and by moral philosophers in terms of consequentialism. We take a different route here. The word violence originates from the Greek *βία* – force and rush –, that bring the combined meanings of power, mobility and speed to the dreamscape of automobility. Hannah Arendt (1970) in her seminal essay on violence firmly separates violence from power. She argues that while power is absolute, violence is not: it is merely instrumental and is justified by the end it pursues. Power, according to Arendt, needs no justification as it is inherent in the very essence of political communities, while “violence needs justification and it can be justifiable, but its justification loses plausibility the farther away its intended end recedes into future” (Arendt, 1970, p. 52).

In the dreamscape of automobility violence is constitutive of the political and social order made spatially visible. Violence is not a means to any end that may or may not justify it; it’s the constitutive quality of the order created by the nomos and made spatially visible in the dreamscape. It is constitutive in the same way as John Searle differentiates between constitutive rules and regulative rules: constitutive rules are world-making as opposed to regulative rules that order already existing behaviors (Searle, 2018). Following up on Searle’s example, while ‘drive on the right’ is a regulative rule that establishes ways of driving and the activity of driving exists independently of it, violence is constitutive of automobility as it creates the reality in which people experience their being in modern societies. You can not

dwell in the dreamscape of automobility without following the order made spatially visible by the nomos, or else you have a very high and contingent chance of not being able to live in this world altogether (Searle, 2018, pp. 51-52).

Power springs up, argues Arendt, whenever people get together and act in concert (Arendt, 1970, p. 31). This is the realm of the political – people are acting and speaking together (Arendt, 1958, p. 179). In the nomos of automobility power and violence ‘spring up’ together: they are both constitutive of the order that makes acting/moving in concert possible. Violence *is* power and power *is* violence; neither one is a means to some end, nor are they in need of justification: automobility power/violence is the political order made spatially visible and topographically operable. This is why it is ‘bracketed’: both are required as ends in themselves to constitute the nomos. This is the essence of automobility order – it is in this order that all beings today dwell, move and act.

In the nomos of automobility violence ‘does not depend on implements’ (Arendt, 1970, p. 3) as power/violence is also constitutive of the *autoself*. Automobility violence transgresses traditional conceptualizations of violence as in need of implements or being intentional to inflict harm. Automobility involves machine-human hybrids performing public routines ordered by power/violence, made visible by the nomos in a rhizomatic dreamscape (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Power/violence is constitutive of automobility because human agents are neither in need of implements of violence (they are autoselves), nor do they have specific and direct foresight of the consequences of their actions beyond being actors in a complex interconnectedness of human agents and ‘things’ (Latour, 2005). Intentionality (Jacquette, 2013) or foreseeability (Bufacchi, 2007, p. 66) becomes blurred and evaporates in actor-actant sociotechnical setups (Latour, 1990).

## Violence as biopolitics

As opposed to the casualties of wars between nations, there are no commemorative memorials or statues of the unknown or, actually, known driver(s). The violent wars of land appropriation in JPE are bracketed and tragic; death and injury in the nomos of automobility is not even considered to be sacrifice. Automobility deaths are rationalized and dehumanized to the extent that they are purged from memory, only remembered by friends and family, they are reduced to statistical numbers and not humans killed by automobility. The nomos of automobility as sovereign power establishes itself through the production of a technological order based on the exclusion of bare, human life (Agamben, 1998). This it achieves through the enactment of the exception in which the human being is stripped of her human status and is transformed, in relation to sovereign power, into bare life in constant threat of automobility violence. In the rulebooks of the *nomos* automobility autoselves have rights to violence – humans are in a state of exception. Bare life, encompassed in this exception, inhabits the threshold of the juridico-political community of automobility.

This human in automobility is the Agambenian ‘homo sacer’, who

“cannot participate in the rites of his *gens*, nor [...] can he perform any juridically valid act. What is more, his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land.” (Agamben, 1998, p. 150)

The *homo sacer* is exposed unconditionally to the potential for killing; s/he is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as s/he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Those who are banned from the domain of political beings are reduced by the sovereign nomos to life defined only in terms of *zoē*, recognised only as biological beings. *Zoē* is thus separated from *bios*, qualified (political or public) life, and in the ‘nomos of automobility’ *zoē* is repositioned inside the *polis* as the focus of the spatial order. The nomos of automobility, in Agambenian language, has

constituted itself from its beginnings, through bracketing violence, as an extreme form biopolitics (Agamben, 1998). Sovereign automobility power, in this nomos, is biopolitical as it is based on the constitution of bare life as the threshold of the political order. This new *nomos of the earth* serves as the master trope for the morally compelling, politically forceful and legally significant automobility dreamscape, of how automobility subjectivities, autoselves as well as other actors, are formed and their spatial markers inscribed in accordance with the proper symbolic means of apportioning the nature of their lives as well as livelihoods.

### **Beyond biopolitics**

*Nomos* adds another conceptual layer to the dreamscape of automobility. Current conceptualizations of automobility, whether as ‘system’, ‘regime’ or ‘dispositif’, provide historical and theoretical argumentation as to why automobility is hegemonic. Applying the conceptual tool of ‘nomos’ to automobility points to the fact why it is sovereign – that is political. In the dreamscape “politics [is] returned to its ontological position” (Agamben, 1998, p. 31) as this is where modern wo/men dwell. Automobility as nomos points to the constitutive moment of the sociotechnical appropriation of modern space. As argued in this paper, it is the ontology of automobility power/violence, or as Hannah Arendt writes in her marginalia to Schmitt’s work in a different context, the ‘blood and soil’ of the creation of a new world order (Jurkevics, 2017) .

Arendt goes on to say that within making blood and soil the ontological basis of the political, Schmitt actually thought of land as the constitutive moment, while Nazis meant blood. The nomos of automobility is order made visible through the blood spilled on the asphalt and the violent order made just from the early years of automobility in the late nineteenth century ‘till this day. It is a state of exception where power/violence is just and a

political space is created in which politics becomes biopolitics and every wo/man becomes homo sacer.

The concentration camp, the site in which the state of exception is ‘given a permanent spatial arrangement’, is the paradigmatic space of this new political arrangement. It is ‘the space that is opened up when the state of exception begins to become the rule’. The camp, brought into being through the enactment of the state of exception, is distinctly the product of sovereign power. It is the space in which bare life is most clearly seized. ‘Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was [...] the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation’ – Agamben writes (1998, p. 97). The nomos of automobility is reminiscent of the nomos of the Nazi concentration camp in as much as it is

“the structure in which the state of exception [...] is realized *normally*. The sovereign no longer limits himself [...] to deciding on the exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation (danger to public safety): laying bare the inner structure of the ban that characterizes his power, he now de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception. (Agamben, 1998, p. 97)”

The nomos of automobility is the “camp [...] securely lodged within the city’s interior [, as..] the new biopolitical *nomos* of the planet” (Agamben, 1998, p. 99) where cared and non-cared docile bodies dwell permanently. In this context the *autoself* as bare life is not just the cyborg hybrid of the ‘equipment-context and the human self’ (Randell, 2017) but every citizen and, understood phenomenologically, their Being-in-the-world in automobility.

### **Conclusion: the nomos of post-automobility**

The nomos of automobility is, we argue, a more useful analytical tool than other conceptualizations when theorizing disruption and displacement of taken-for-granted, self-evident truths and utopian visions of automobility. The core of our theoretical contribution in

this paper is that, in the phenomenological space of automobility, we re-conceptualize the dreamscape as the modern nomos of the Earth. In this ‘nomos of automobility’ power and violence are both constitutive of the order made visible: this is the violent dreamscape in which we dwell. It is the sociotechnical space in which ‘acting and moving in concert’ is made possible. In the dreamscape of automobility power/violence is constitutive of autoselves as well as the reality in which they dwell. Humans (both as cared and non-cared selves) are reduced to bare life and the state of exception, normalized, is given a permanent spatial arrangement.

While we have some quarrel with Arendt’s conceptualization of violence, her reading of Schmitt and her, never systematically developed, concept of a different version of *nomos* may provide us with clues as to what the nomos of post-automobility would look like. “Nemoin accords each his own – not in relationship to the soil, but in relationship to the people who settle it” (Arendt, 1958, p. 68). In the center of Arendian nomos is plurality, the primary condition of the political. Where Schmittian nomos of automobility legitimates violence through appropriation of (urban) space, Arendtian human centered post-automobility looks for shared space as the precondition for action. Politics for Arendt “requires a nomos because without it the space of action would have no structure, and no world” (Arendt, 2005, p. 267). Nomos is a topographical metaphor for the space of appearance, the precondition for plurality and political freedom.

The nomos of post-automobility must spring from people – from the ontology of intersubjective action, not from the blood filled asphalt of the nomos of automobility. We agree with theorists of the spatial that intersubjective processes are always permeated with power. When disrupting the ‘nomos of automobility’, the triad of power/violence, justice and space need also to be disrupted. Instead of bracketing violence it is to be unveiled for what it is: the sovereign power/violence dehumanizing wo/man as bare life. Inhabitants of the

dreamscape of post-automobility must reacquire their political status to act freely in concert and the space of automobility need be the relational space of the political in which plurality becomes manifest (Arendt, 1958). Reducing wo/men to bare life, as autoselves, is inherently unjust. The nomos of post-automobility is plural and free. Foucauldian automobility scholarship moved in this direction by introducing the concept of automobility focusing on active, collectivized and socialized mobility modalities (Cass & Manderscheid, 2018).

*Nemein* means to dwell. In our version of post-automobility the emphasis is on a phenomenological reordering of the space in which we dwell. This dreamscape, as shared understanding of forms of social life, of artifacts, and modes of governance, has in its focus the Arendtian ‘space of appearance’ as a precondition of plurality and freedom. The ‘place we share’ is a politico-topographical metaphor – it is the entirety of the new imaginary: an embodied, habituated, produced and reproduced technosocial space. A reordered political and social order made visible in a new dreamscape. The measure of reordering is the human condition: the phenomenological (re)construction of human speed, rhythm and spatial distribution in the *polis* as the space of (mobile) action for the *relational postauto-self* (Dewandre, 2018) and not humans as bare life.



## References

- Adorno, T. W. (2005). *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*. London: Verso.
- Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (pp. 121–173). New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Arendt, H. (1970). *On Violence*. New York: Harcourt.
- Arendt, H. (2005). Introduction into politics. In J. Kohn (Ed.), *The Promise of Politics*. New York, NY: Schocken.
- Böhm, S., Campbell, J., Land, C., & Paterson, M. (2006). Conceptualizing Automobility. In S. Böhm, J. Campbell, C. Land, & M. Paterson (Eds.), *Against Automobility* (pp. 3-16). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Böhm, S., Jones, C., Land, C., & Paterson, M. (2006). Introduction: Impossibilities of Automobility. *The Sociological Review*, 54(1\_suppl), 3-16. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00634.x
- Bonham, J. (2006). Transport: disciplining the body that travels. In S. Böhm, C. Jones, C. Land, & M. Paterson (Eds.), *Against Automobility* (pp. 57-74). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bufacchi, V. (2007). *Violence and Social Justice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Bufacchi, V. (2013). Introduction: Philosophy and Violence. [Introduction: Philosophy and Violence]. *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 265(3), 233-235.
- Cass, N., & Manderscheid, K. (2018). The automobility system: mobility justice and freedom under sustainability. In N. Cook & D. Butz (Eds.), *Mobilities, Mobility Justice and Social Justice* (pp. 101-115). London, New York: Routledge.
- Castoriadis, C. (2005). *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Cresswell, T. (2010). Towards a Politics of Mobility. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28(1), 17-31. doi:10.1068/d11407
- Culver, G. (2018). Death and the Car: On (Auto)Mobility, Violence, and Injustice. *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies*, 17(1), 144-170.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (Eds.). (1987) (Vols. Vol. 2. Capitalism and Schizophrenia ). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dewandre, N. (2018). Political Agents as relational Selves: rethinking EU Politics and Policy-Making with Hannah Arendt. *Philosophy Today*, 62(2), 493-519.
- EC. (2017). *EU action to curb air pollution by cars: Questions and Answers*. Retrieved from Brussels:
- Featherstone, M., Thrift, N., & Urry, J. (2005). *Automobilities*. London: Sage.
- Foucault, M. (1986). Space, Knowledge and Power *The Foucault reader* (pp. 239-256.). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Haraway, D. (2013). SF: Science Fiction, Speculative Fabulation, String Figures, So Far. *Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Technology*. Retrieved from <https://adanewmedia.org/2013/11/issue3-haraway/>
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. London: Blackwell.
- Jacquette, D. (2013). Violence as Intentionally Inflicting Forceful Harm. [Violence as Intentionally Inflicting Forceful Harm]. *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 265(3), 293-322.
- Jasanoff, S. (2004). *States of knowledge: the co-production of science and the social order*: Routledge.
- Jasanoff, S., & Kim, S.-H. (2009). Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea. *Minerva*(47), 119-146.

- Jasanoff, S., & Kim, S.-H. (2015). *Dreamscapes of Modernity*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Jurkevics, A. (2017). Hannah Arendt reads Carl Schmitt's The Nomos of the Earth: A dialogue on law and geopolitics from the margins. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 16(3), 345-366. doi:10.1177/1474885115572837
- Latour, B. (1990). Technology is Society Made Durable. *The Sociological Review*, 38(1\_suppl), 103-131. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.1990.tb03350.x
- Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Manderscheid, K. (2014). The Movement Problem, the Car and Future Mobility Regimes: Automobility as Dispositif and Mode of Regulation. *Mobilities*, 9(4), 604-626.
- Massey, D. (1994). *Space, Place and Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Merriman, P. (2009). Automobility and the Geographies of the Car. *Geography Compass*, 3(2), 586-599. doi:10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00219.x
- Norton, P. D. (2007). Street Rivals: Jaywalking and the Invention of the Motor Age Street. *Technology and Culture*, 48(2), 331-359.
- Paterson, M. (2007). *Automobile politics: ecology and cultural political economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pindar. (ca. 450 BCE). Fragment No. 169a (W. H. Race, Trans.) (Vol. 485, pp. 384-386): Loeb Classical Library.
- Randell, R. (2017). The microsociology of automobility: the production of the automobile self. *Mobilities*, 12(5), 663-676. doi:10.1080/17450101.2016.1176776
- Schmitt, C. (2006). *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. London: Telos.
- Searle, J., R. (2018). Constitutive Rules. *Argumenta*, 4(1), 51-54. doi:0.14275/2465-2334/20187.sea
- Sheller, M. (2004). Mobile Publics: beyond the network perspective. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 22(1), 39-52.
- Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2000). The city and the car. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(4), 737-757.
- Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). The New Mobilities Paradigm. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 38(2), 207-226. doi:10.1068/a37268
- Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2016). Mobilizing the new mobilities paradigm. *Applied Mobilities*, 1(1), 10-25. doi:10.1080/23800127.2016.1151216
- Singh, S. W., DC:. (2015). *Critical reasons for crashes investigated in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey*. Retrieved from Washington D.C. :
- Soja, E. W. (1989). *Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. London: Verso.
- Tapani Mäkinen, Zaidel, D. M., Gunnar Andersson, Marie-Berthe Biecheler-Fretel, Rainer Christ, Jean-Pierre Cauzard, . . . Vaa, T. (2003). *Traffic enforcement in Europe: effects, measures, needs and future*. Retrieved from
- Taylor, C. (2002). Modern social imaginaries. *Public culture*, 14(1), 91-124.
- Taylor, N. (2003). The Aesthetic Experience of Traffic in the Modern City. *Urban Studies*, 40 (8), 1609–1625.
- Thrift, N. (1996). *Spatial Formations*. London: Sage.
- Urry, J. (2004). The 'System' of Automobility. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21(4-5), 25-39.
- Urry, J. (2006). Inhabiting the car. *Sociological review*, 54(1), 17-31.
- Walks, A. (2015). Driving cities: automobility, neoliberalism, and urban transformation. In A. Walks (Ed.), *The Urban Political Economy and Ecology of Automobility* (pp. 3-20). New York, N.Y.: Routledge.

Manuscript