

The Nature of EU Foreign Policy

World Bank), and the G7/8/20. Although the EU's participation in international organizations is often hindered by both external and internal legal constraints and by the divergences in member states' preferences on the desirability of European unity in international organizations, we also argue that the EU has established close relationships and practical working methods to engage in the global governance architecture. The usefulness of a 'single voice' and strictly coordinated EU positions in multilateral settings is also critically assessed. Furthermore, presenting the example of emerging power coalitions such as the BRICS (including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and expanding multilateral frameworks in the Southern hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific area, the chapter discusses the rise of competing multilateral settings, in which the EU is largely absent and wherein competing conceptions of multilateralism are promoted.

Finally, in Chapter 14, we consider the implications of our findings with regard to theories of international relations, European integration and constructivism and consider the state of the art of these theoretical schools in the light of our empirical findings. We conclude by assessing the use of the 'structural foreign policy versus relational foreign policy' which is used as an overarching framework in the analyses presented in this book.

In the introduction, we presented a short overview of the genesis of EU foreign policy, a series of puzzling observations about the relevance of EU's foreign policy, and an assessment of three episodes in European integration and international relations. All of these elements provide both an illuminating and confusing picture of EU foreign policy. Acknowledging the sometimes contradictory nature of EU foreign policy, this chapter deals with the EU's peculiar foreign policy architecture.

In the first section, we portray EU foreign policy as multifaceted (comprising CFSP, CSDP, external action and the external dimension of internal policies), multi-method (combining an intergovernmental and a Community method) and multilevel (entailing the national, European and international levels). The next section then unveils various areas of tension to which EU foreign policy is subjected, followed by a third section on the EU foreign policy's objectives and principles. The overview of the three episodes in the introduction also exposes features of foreign policy in general. It reveals that foreign policy is not only about reacting to international crises and conflicts in relation to other international actors. It is also about structuring the behaviour and mindset of other actors in international politics. The difference between relational and structural foreign policy, as well as the globalizing context in which EU foreign policy takes place, are subject of the subsequent fourth and fifth sections of this chapter. Taken together, these five sections provide a comprehensive and clear analytical framework to analyse EU foreign policy in the remainder of the book.

Understanding EU Foreign Policy

Multifaceted foreign policy – but not all-encompassing

We understand the foreign policy of the EU as a multifaceted foreign policy. EU foreign policy can indeed not easily be pinned down or summarized. This is evident when looking at the EU treaties, which clearly differentiate between the CFSP and CSDP on the one hand and the EU's 'external action' and 'external dimension of internal policies' on the other.

been mainly developed since the establishment of the EU in the early 1990s, although some of them originate from earlier stages in the European integration process.

'External action' and 'external dimensions of internal policies' belong to the realm of foreign policy in three respects: they include policy fields and instruments that have important foreign policy dimensions; they provide the instruments and leverage (carrots and sticks) necessary for foreign policy action; and they can entail contractual and political frameworks (such as association agreements) that allow the EU to pursue foreign policy goals. However, as explained in Chapters 9 and 10, the relationship between foreign policy, external action, and external dimensions of internal policies is not always clear-cut, as interests and activities stemming from the various policy fields can also compete with each other.

In any case, a one-sided emphasis on CFSP/CSDP in assessments of EU foreign policy should be avoided. Depending on the foreign policy issue at hand and the time period under discussion, the centre of gravity will differ in terms of the site of policy elaboration. On several major issues, initiatives taken within the context of the EU's external action, not within the CFSP, are at the political and operational heart of EU foreign policy. This reflects the fact that it is the EU's trade policy and its ability to conclude international agreements that provide the EU with much of its power and leverage when dealing with third actors.

A closer reading of the Treaties shows another dimension of EU foreign policy: the importance of the *foreign policies of the member states* (see further). It reveals that coordination of and cooperation between national foreign policies is an equally important component of EU foreign policy.

Taken together, EU foreign policy thus includes the foreign policy developed across the CFSP/CSDP, the various dimensions of the EU's external action and external policies of internal dimensions, as well as through interaction with the foreign policies of member states. This also means that, in this book, EU foreign policy is not considered as being the same as:

- *European foreign policy*. The EU does not include all European states and is only one of the various 'European' multilateral frameworks through which foreign policy is developed; thus the EU cannot be equated with 'Europe'.
- *CFSP/CSDP*. As EU foreign policy is also developed through other dimensions of the EU's external action, it is untenable to narrow foreign policy down to the decisions and actions adopted within the CFSP/CSDP framework.
- *The sum of national foreign policies of EU member states*. Member states maintain their own national foreign policies, which may in part

First of all, the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) provides the main platform for developing and implementing the political and diplomatic dimension of EU foreign policy (see Chapter 7). Established in the early 1990s by the Treaty of Maastricht as a relatively weak component of the EU, with none of its own instruments and no EU actors bearing responsibility for it, the CFSP gradually gained strength in the last two decades. CFSP provides the platform to not only position the EU with regard to foreign policy issues, but also to actively pursue the EU's foreign policy interests and contribute to mediation efforts and other international diplomatic initiatives. A High Representative and a diplomatic service (the European External Action Service (EEAS)) are now responsible for putting the CFSP into operation. A major feature of CFSP is that, through the Council and its intergovernmental dynamics, member states retain control over the foreign policy positions and actions developed in the CFSP.

Second, the *Common Security and Defence Policy* (CSDP) includes various civilian and military crisis management instruments which can be used to underpin and implement the EU's foreign policy and to reinforce the potential and credibility of the CFSP (see Chapter 8). Launched in the early 2000s and formalized through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the CSDP provides the platform for launching military operations and civilian missions, which *de facto* take place mainly in the EU's neighbourhood and Africa. Mirroring CFSP, CSDP is fully controlled by the member states, which, particularly in case of more intrusive military actions, generally opt for other multilateral frameworks such as NATO or *ad hoc* coalitions. The EU does not possess its own military or civilian crisis management capacities, but relies on the voluntary contributions from the member states, although diplomatic and military staff in Brussels contribute to the preparation, support and conduct of CSDP initiatives.

Third, the EU's '*external action*' encompasses the EU's external trade policy, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements (see Chapter 9). These policies have been gradually developed since the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late 1950s and have been further strengthened since the early 1990s with the establishment of the EU. The strengths of the various dimensions of the EU's external action lie in the EU's stronger legal competences in these fields, the availability of considerable financial and other resources and of a bureaucratic apparatus to prepare and implement policies.

Finally, there are the '*external dimensions of internal policies*' (see Chapter 10). Some of the internal policies of the EU – such as energy, environmental, and migration and asylum policy – also have an external dimension with important foreign policy relevance. These policies have

Table 1.1 CFSP/CSDP, External Action and external dimension of internal policies in the Treaties

<i>Treaty on European Union (TEU)</i>	
Title I	Common Provisions
Title II	Provision on democratic principles
Title III	Provisions on the institutions [see Chapters 3 & 4]*
Title IV	Provisions on enhanced cooperation
Title V	General provisions on the Unions external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Chapter 1	General provisions on the Union's external action [see Chapter 1]*
Chapter 2	Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy [see Chapter 7]*
Section 1	Common provisions
Section 2	Provisions on the common security and defence policy [see Chapter 8]*
Title VI	Final Provisions
<i>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)</i>	
Part one	Principles
Part two	Non-discrimination and citizenship of the union
Part three	Union policies and internal actions [including the following Titles] [see Chapter 10]*
Title I	The internal market
Title III	Agriculture and fisheries
Title V	Area of freedom, security and justice
Title VIII	Economic and monetary policy
Title XIX	Research and technological development and space

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The *Treaty on European Union* (TEU) includes the main provisions for the CFSP and CSDP, which are organized on the basis of the 'inter-governmental method'. This means that member states retain control over the development of foreign policy through the dominant position of the European Council and the Council of Ministers and through the predominance of unanimity in decision-making.

The *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (TFEU) includes the main provisions on the EU's external action and the external dimensions of internal policies. These are principally organized through the 'Community method', which is based on an institutional equilibrium

be defined and developed with no or minimal involvement from the EU. As a result, the label 'EU foreign policy' only includes national foreign policies in so far as these are developed through a certain interaction with the EU.

It is important for understanding the nature of EU foreign policy that this policy is neither exclusive nor all-encompassing. The EU is equipped with considerable capacities to develop a foreign policy and these capacities are far-reaching with regard to some foreign policy dimensions (such as trade issues, where the EU has exclusive competence). However, EU member states never intended to transfer all national foreign policy competences to the EU and never wanted to see national foreign policies replaced by a common or single EU foreign policy (see also the section on competences in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7 on CFSP). In general, foreign policy is not covered by exclusive EU competences, as member states wanted to retain control of this policy domain that is so closely linked to national sovereignty. The EU's competence and ability to develop a foreign policy thus varies considerably, depending on the foreign policy dimension at stake.

As a result, the EU was not conceived to develop an all-encompassing foreign policy. This also implies that there is a wide variety in the extent to which a comprehensive EU foreign policy is formulated to tackle the many issues on the foreign policy agenda. This ranges from comprehensive policies towards the Western Balkans, for instance, to nearly non-existent policies towards territorial defence or changing security situations like those in East Asia and the Pacific.

This non-exclusive and not all-encompassing nature has important implications for the study of EU foreign policy. Scholars and external observers may, from a normative point of view, expect the EU to have a fully-fledged, all-encompassing and exclusive foreign policy. However, this cannot be the predominant touchstone for analysing EU foreign policy and its effectiveness, as this does not correspond with the nature of EU foreign policy that the member states had in mind.

Multi-method foreign policy

The multi-method character of EU foreign policy is a direct consequence of its multifaceted nature. 'Multi-method foreign policy' denotes that the varying facets of EU foreign policy are organized within two different treaty settings that reflect two different policy-making methods (see Chapter 4). This duality is reminiscent of the two EU treaties that provide the foundations for EU foreign policy: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (see Table 1.1). Although these are two separate treaties from a legal point of view, together they are often called 'the Treaties', or the 'Treaty of Lisbon'.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

Title XX	Environment
Title XXI	Energy
Part four	Association of the overseas countries and territories
Part five	The Union's external action [see Chapter 9]*
Title I	General provisions on the union's external action
Title II	Common commercial policy
Title III	Cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid
Chapter 1	Development cooperation
Chapter 2	Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries
Chapter 3	Humanitarian aid
Title IV	Restrictive measures
Title V	International agreements
Title VI	The Union's relations with international organizations and third countries and Union delegations [see Chapter 13]*
Title VII	Solidarity clause
Part six	Institutional and financial provisions [see Chapter 4]*
Part seven	General and final provisions

Declarations [see Chapter 7]*

13.	Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy
14.	Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy

Note: * This refers to the chapter in this book where this Title, Chapter or Part of the Treaty is analysed.

Source: European Union (2010: 3–10).

between the Council of the EU (the 'Council'), the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Court of Justice, and on the possibility of majority voting for most decisions in the Council.

This dual system, with two methods of policy-making and clear legal boundaries between the related policy fields, has far-reaching consequences for the nature and outcome of EU foreign policy. However, this formal division is also misleading as EU foreign policy is developed through both the interaction and symbiosis between the two methods. Also, the practice of EU foreign policy does not always follow the formal

categorization of the Treaties. As explained in Chapter 4, there is a much larger complexity of – and diversity within – the EU's foreign policy mechanisms than is suggested by the simplistic categorizations 'external action' and 'external dimension of internal policies versus CFSP/CSDP' and 'Community method versus intergovernmental method'. For instance, unanimity is required for some decisions within the EU's external action (such as trade agreements on foreign direct investments), while cooperation between member states' policies is also deemed to be an appropriate method in some of these policy fields (such as development policy).

Multilevel foreign policy

Characteristic of EU foreign policy is the interaction between the national and EU levels, with the centre of gravity and the nature of this interaction varying according to the issue at hand. The national and EU levels are not neatly separated from each other: national actors are part of some important EU institutions, and EU policies are mirrored in national policies. Moreover, EU policy-making also occurs in an international context: the EU and its member states are – partly, jointly or separately – part of regimes, organizations and institutions at the international level (see Chapter 13). To a large extent, therefore, EU foreign policy can be conceptualized as a complex *multilevel foreign policy*, reflecting the interconnectedness of multiple governance levels and policy arenas in the policy process. Depending on the policy issue and policy framework, the actors on the various levels have different competences, levels of legitimacy, obligations and resources.

EU foreign policy can in this sense be understood from a governance perspective (Justaert and Keukeleire 2012). Following the description of governance by Tömmel and Verdun (2009: 1), EU foreign policy may be characterized by 'the highly diversified EU procedures and practices, combining formalized modes of rule-setting with informal practices of negotiation, cooperation and consensus-building; the multilevel and multi-actor structure underlying these procedures and practices; and, not the least, the diverging patterns of implementation under a common umbrella'.

Understanding EU foreign policy as an example of multilevel governance also has wider dimensions. Although we may focus on the EU, we must avoid the trap of EU centrism, giving the false impression that for member states the EU is the only or the main international framework in which to develop foreign policy, promote foreign policy goals or fulfil commitments. EU foreign policy is embedded within a wider set of multilevel foreign policy networks and within the increasingly important context of global governance (see Telò 2009; Van Vooren *et al.* 2013; Wunderlich and Bailey 2011). This also includes other multilateral settings such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation

in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN, the G7/8/20, and more informal settings (see Chapter 13).

Nearly all foreign policy actions undertaken by the EU are developed either in cooperation with other international organizations (sometimes at their request) or in parallel with (and sometimes in competition with) the actions of these organizations. Following Wallace (2005: 78), it may be more accurate to speak of a *multi-location foreign policy* to avoid the notion of hierarchy often implied by the multilevel concept and to indicate that the EU is only one among the various relevant locations for foreign policy-making. Member states perpetually weigh up the pros and cons of developing foreign policy in the EU rather than in another foreign policy forum.

Mirroring national foreign policy?

Another crucial feature of EU foreign policy is that EU member states retain their national foreign policy, despite the existence of a 'common' foreign and security policy. Member states are required under the Treaty to support the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, two declarations added to the Lisbon Treaty (Declarations 13 and 14) underline the fact that the CFSP provisions do not affect the member states' powers in relation to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy (see Chapter 7). The resulting effect is an ambiguous multilevel relationship between EU foreign and security policies and member states' own initiatives in this field.

That the national level has to be taken seriously in analysing EU foreign policy raises the question whether EU foreign policy also mirrors, or should mirror, national foreign policy. Many studies of the EU's external relations or foreign policy focus on the EU's capabilities as an international actor and its capacity 'to mimic the features of a nation-state within the international system' (Rosamond 2002: 175). This becomes obvious in the plethora of publications concerning the famous 'capability-expectations gap' (Hill 1993) and the EU's '(strategic) actorness', 'presence' or 'performance' (see Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Caporaso and Jupille 1998; Jørgensen 2012; Jørgensen *et al.* 2011; Sjøstedt 1977; Toje 2008).

The tendency to evaluate EU foreign policy mainly or exclusively against the yardstick of the foreign policy of individual states can be questioned. It can be useful or even necessary for EU foreign policy to gain some of the capabilities and characteristics of states' foreign policy. However, it is questionable whether EU foreign policy must automatically – and on all levels – be seen as a substitute or as a transposition of individual member states' foreign policies to the European level. The specificity and added value of an EU foreign policy can be precisely that it emphasizes different issues, tackling different sorts of problems,

pursuing different objectives through alternative methods, and ultimately assuming a form and content which differs from the foreign policy of its individual member states. At a time when globalization is demonstrating the limitations of nation states and conventional foreign policies, it seems odd that we would look to the EU to develop a foreign policy equivalent to that of a state.


Equally questionable is the tendency to automatically perceive the relationship between the foreign policy of the EU and that of its member states as a zero-sum game. The point of departure of this book is that the relationship between the foreign policies of the member states and the EU can be a zero-sum game (with a stronger EU foreign policy leading to weaker national foreign policies, or vice-versa), but that in other cases it can be a positive-sum game (with EU foreign policy complementing and even strengthening national foreign policies and foreign policies developed in other international fora). The question of whether, and under what conditions, the relationship between EU and national foreign policies is to be seen as either a zero-sum or positive-sum game is one of the most essential and sensitive aspects of EU foreign policy. The following chapter on the history of EU foreign policy demonstrates that, in general, significant steps forward in EU foreign policy were only possible when the member states perceive the relationship between EU and national foreign policy as complementary and as a positive-sum game, and not as potentially undermining national foreign policy.

Areas of Tension in EU Foreign Policy

Understanding the evolution and nature of EU foreign policy requires insight into a number of areas of tension which loom over discussions on European foreign policy and which are also recurrent themes in the book. These various areas of tension have a major impact not only on the macro-picture of treaty changes and EU foreign policy's evolution, but also on the micro-picture of responses to specific foreign policy dossiers. The areas of tension reflect the differences in the long-standing fundamental choices made by member states with regard to sovereignty, integration, power and interests. Allegiance to these choices and to their application in specific cases often prevails over the willingness to provide an effective foreign policy answer.

Presented schematically in Figure 1.1 and explained in detail below, these areas of tension are major explanatory factors in the analysis of EU foreign policy. The member states' and EU institutions' willingness and ability to overcome these areas of tension (or to at least temporarily avoid or neutralize their undermining effects) are an essential factor for allowing initiatives in EU foreign policy as well as EU foreign policy effectiveness.

Figure 1.1 Areas of tension in EU foreign policy



European integration versus Atlantic solidarity

Tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration have had the most dominant and permanent impact on EU foreign policy, stemming from the pivotal role of NATO and the US as security providers for the majority of EU member states. The Soviet threat, the Cold War, Western European military weakness and American military superiority meant that for most member states in the second half of the twentieth century, the Atlantic Alliance and the American security guarantee were essential security conditions after the Second World War. The logic of such a choice was confirmed in the early 1950s and 1960s by the failure of French proposals to bring defence within the scope of European integration (the European Defence Community and the Fouchet Plans). It also explains why, when the member states cautiously stepped towards developing common foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s through the new European Political Cooperation (EPC), the European Community (EC) was at that time conceived and defined as a civilian actor (see Chapter 2).

Military dependence on the US not only determined defence policy, but also largely defined the parameters of member states' national foreign policies and EPC (which was the predecessor of the CFSP). As has continued to be the case after 1989, depending on an external actor for military security carries a fairly sizeable price tag since the demands of that protector must be taken into account when taking a stand on foreign policy issues. In addition to gratitude for America's security guarantee and the idea that some member states enjoy a 'special relationship' with the US, it explains why elites and public opinion in several European countries consider aligning themselves to American views and positions

as a normal reflex and as being part of their identity. It explains why practically every proposal for a common foreign policy initiative was and is reviewed by several EU member states against what could be called the 'what do the Americans think?' test. The appropriateness of an EU foreign policy initiative became measured not solely, or not in the first place, in terms of the EU's potential impact on the issue at hand, but rather in terms of its impact on transatlantic relations.

The extent to which the 'Atlantic factor' had to be taken into account would prove to be one of the most divisive issues in the development of a common EU foreign policy. The end of the Cold War, which provided the necessary context to launch the CFSP and CSDP, did not make this factor irrelevant (see Chapter 8). Although the US supported the development of the CSDP (at least within certain limits), the Atlantic factor remained a powerful area of tension, particularly because the Central and Eastern European member states considered NATO and the US as their vital security guarantee with regard to Russia. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in the early 2000s and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that territorial security was not to be taken for granted and that a US-led military alliance could still be essential in view of newly emerging threats. This tension of 'Atlantic solidarity versus European integration' thus remains important and is a first recurrent theme in this book.

Civilian power versus military power

The EU's struggle with power is a second major area of tension and another recurrent theme of this book. The EU's struggle with power has two dimensions. The first is related to the question whether the EU should be merely or predominantly a civilian power or whether (and to what extent) it should also become a military power. The second dimension is related to the extent to which the EU should exert power or become a power at all.

The concept of 'civilian power' (Duchêne 1972, 1973) was one of the first and most influential attempts to conceptualize (Western) Europe's status and role in the world. It has since been widely elaborated upon. First, it refers to the transformation of interstate relations within Europe from war and indirect violence to 'civilized' politics. The EU's current (pre)accession talks with countries in the Western Balkans demonstrate this transition, which also provides an interesting formula for troubled interstate relations elsewhere (see Chapters 9 and 11). Second, the concept of civilian power focuses on the possibility of an actor being a 'power' while not possessing military instruments. It is this part of Duchêne's thesis which has received widest attention. From a normative perspective, this enables the EU's endeavours on the international stage to be conceived not in a threatening but a positive light.

The Cold War and the dominance of NATO in the military security arena left the EC/EPC in the 1970s and 1980s with little other option than to maximize its potential impact as a civilian power. However, the end of the East-West order pointed to both the constraints and challenges of civilian power. On the one hand, the EU was pressured to transform itself from a civilian power into a civilian *and* military power, as the limitations of being a civilian power in a distinctly uncivil world became painfully obvious during (and since) the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s. The EU was forced to gradually depart from the familiarity of its status as a non-military power and from 1999 complemented its CFSP with a CSDP, endowing itself with civilian and military crisis management tools (see Chapter 8). The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and even the limited military campaign against the dictatorial regime in Libya in 2011 forced EU countries to face yet another level of military challenge, which clearly surpassed the EU's capacities and ambitions as a modest military power. Moreover, the question emerged whether the EU could still be a civilian power and profit from the advantages and attractiveness of such a role – in the second meaning of Duchêne's conceptualization – if at the same time it transformed to, albeit modest, military power (see Orbie 2006; Telò 2006; Whitman 2010).

On the other hand, confrontation with the new world (dis)order challenged the EU to behave more as a *power*, willing to exert itself purposefully to achieve foreign policy objectives. The need to actively promote and support new political, legal and socio-economic structures in other regions of the world compelled the EU to make more active use of its non-military foreign policy tools, most of which fall under the banner of EU 'external action'. To this end, the EU quite successfully exerted power in Central and Eastern Europe states and later also in the Western Balkans, but proved reluctant to use its instruments to enforce desired changes or attitudes in other parts of the world. The EU's failure to behave as a power was particularly evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (see Chapter 11). The EU did not manage to use its relationship with the Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries as a lever for change, which is one of the explanations for the disappointments about the EU, which were also voiced during Arab uprisings in the early 2010s.

Intergovernmental method versus Community method

The areas of tension previously discussed relate to the questions about whether the EU should be the locus of a foreign and security policy and what kind of power the EU should be. The third question is whether the EU should organize foreign policy through the 'intergovernmental method' or through the 'Community method'. As argued above, the

intergovernmental method implies that member states retain control over decision-making through the dominant position of the European Council and the Council of Ministers in which they are represented and through the predominance of the unanimity rule. The Community method implies that the member states not only accept a transfer of competences to the EU, but also a sharing of power with supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Parliament (EP), an inability to veto decision-making, and judicial oversight by the Court of Justice of the EU (see Chapters 3 and 4).

This area of tension arises from the traditional notion of foreign policy as one of the central tasks, prerogatives and even *raison d'être* of sovereign states. This explains the reluctance of member states to lose their grasp over this major policy field. Intergovernmentalism is one of the defining features of the CFSP/CSDP, as member states want to retain full control over decision-making. The price member states paid for ensuring that the supranational institutions would not meddle in CFSP was that these policies would not be supported by established institutional mechanisms and common instruments.

This weakness of CFSP was made more explicit as its development was paralleled by the growing foreign policy relevance of other facets of EU foreign policy (in particular trade policy, development cooperation, and association and cooperation agreements) and of the Community method applicable there (with a well-elaborated institutional set-up, significant competences and extensive instruments and budgets). This explains why the Council was and is often forced to rely on other EU policy domains to flesh out or implement CFSP decisions. More fundamentally, the European Commission has gradually developed its own unspoken foreign policy dynamic through its various 'external policies'. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the creation of the European External Action Service and the double-hatted function of 'High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission' has only partially been able to overcome the divide between both approaches (see Chapter 3).

Member states also assess the viability of a potential EU foreign policy initiative in terms of whether it fits within their conception of European integration. Accordingly, they differ on where they envisage the appropriate balance between the intergovernmental method and the Community method to lie within the realm of foreign policy. This does not depend in the first place on considerations of efficiency or cost-benefit analysis, but rather on the member states' overarching view of the nature and *finalité* of European integration. Foreign policy debates in the EU are thus likely to focus beyond the issue at hand to broader questions centred on policy competences among the EU institutions and between the national and the EU levels. This 'intergovernmental versus Community method' tension is a third recurrent theme in this book.

External objectives versus internal objectives

The fourth area of tension is related to the nature of the objectives of EU foreign policy. These objectives hide a reality that is often disregarded by external observers. In order to understand EU foreign policy it must be appreciated that decisions on EU foreign policy are often not only steered by *external objectives* aimed at influencing the external environment, but also by various *internal objectives*, which are often not made explicit. Internal objectives can be broken into three categories: interrelational objectives aimed at managing member states' mutual relations; integration objectives aimed at affecting European integration; and identity objectives aimed at asserting the identity of the EU (Keukeleire 2003, 2008). These different kinds of objectives reflect the fact that EU foreign policy has multiple internal functionalities (Bickerton 2010; 2011: 118).

Interrelational objectives are intimately linked to the very origin and purpose of European integration. Following the harrowing experiences of two world wars, the integration process was launched as a radically new method to definitively tackle long-standing enmity between Germany and its Western European neighbours. Member states were offered a new framework to define and manage their mutual relationships and to defend and promote national interests in a less threatening way. This was gradually applied to the foreign policy domain. The EU's foreign policy framework was designed to resolve, or at least contain, the potential tensions and conflicts arising between member states when dealing with foreign policy issues, to enhance the predictability of behaviour, and to promote where feasible both mutual understanding and solidarity. The interrelational dimension of European integration implies that the EU's foreign policy or specific foreign policy actions can target the management of internal EU relations as a principal goal. Conversely, it can also imply that member states agree *not* to handle a foreign policy issue within the EU framework out of fear that doing so would revive mutual tensions and augment internal disagreement and distrust.

In addition to interrelational objectives, foreign policy initiatives can stem from two other types of internal objectives that reach beyond external goals. Member states can promote or adopt new foreign policy initiatives which primarily aim to strengthen European integration, influence the nature of the European project, or create the impression that the process of integration is progressing or regressing (*integration objectives*). The member states' main goal can also be simply to demonstrate that the EU exists, to emphasize the specificity of the European approach to international politics, to differentiate the EU from other actors (particularly the US) or to shape and strengthen European identity (*identity objectives*). The extent to which a member state will give different weight to these various objectives fluctuates over time and according to the issue at hand.

Recognizing the different types of objectives helps to gain a deeper understanding of EU foreign policy. First, it explains divergences between the levels of expectation of political leaders, the general public and the rest of the world. The general public and external actors evaluate EU foreign policy in terms of its external impact whereas political leaders may be operating according to an entirely different agenda. Second, it explains why even those member states who, in principle, may not favour a strong EU foreign policy may in some circumstances accept new initiatives if a given policy serves one or more internal objectives. Third, it explains why member states are in some cases quite uninterested in the external effectiveness of EU foreign policy action. This tension between the external objectives and the various internal objectives of EU foreign policy is a fourth recurrent theme in this book.

Back to the Treaties: Principles and Objectives

Whereas the previous discussion on the field of tension between external and internal objectives relates to the political dynamics behind EU foreign policy, we now examine the formal principles and objectives of the EU's international action that are put forward by the EU in its own treaties. The principles as well as objectives of the EU's action on the international scene are enumerated in Article 21 TEU, which is one of the only articles that cover both CFSP/CSDP and external action, thus also including trade and development policies. Article 21(1) TEU points to the core objectives and principles that guide the EU's international action:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The EU thus takes its own principles-driven history as a point of departure for promoting these virtues to the rest of the world. One of the reasons why the EU has been labelled a 'normative power' is this focus on values as a constitutive feature of the EU and its foreign policy (Manners 2002, 2006; Nicolaidis and Whitman 2013; Whitman 2011). This concept refers to the EU's 'ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations' (Manners 2002: 239). Chapter 6 and particularly Box 6.1 analyse in more detail the EU's promotion of values and offers some critical observations about the EU as a normative power.

The subsequent paragraph – Article 21(2) TEU – includes a list of eight objectives. The first goal – safeguard the Union’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity – can be seen as the overarching general objective for the EU’s foreign policy. However, it provokes more questions than answers. What are the EU’s ‘fundamental interests’, and in practice, what does it mean to safeguard the EU’s security and integrity? The second objective is to pursue the principles which are set out in the first paragraph of that article: democracy, rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law.

The third to seventh objectives refer to the core goals of major components of the EU’s external policy: ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’ (CFSP/CSDP and external action); ‘foster the sustainable development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ (development policy); ‘encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy’ (trade policy); ‘improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources’ (environmental policy); and ‘assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters’ (humanitarian policy). Finally, the eighth objective reflects the overarching objective of promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

How can we assess these objectives? First, rather than providing guidance for concrete foreign policy actions, the Treaty provisions are general principles to which member states could easily subscribe but that leave scope for very different views on the appropriate action to be taken in order to pursue these goals. Two examples illustrate this point. Responses to the 2011 revolt against Colonel Gaddafi in Libya are justified by the second and third objectives of Article 21(2). Member states, however, had different views on the expedience of military intervention. Another example is that the objective on eradicating poverty sounds attractive, but it hides different views on how to achieve this: primarily through development aid or through the promotion of free trade (see Chapters 7 and 9)?

Second, Article 21 TEU does not set priorities, giving the impression that all objectives are equally important to the EU. This is deceptive, though, as the legal competences, budgetary instruments and institutional set-up that the EU has at its disposal are very different for each of these objectives. They determine the importance that can *de facto* be attributed to the various Treaty objectives. The result is that a hierarchy unavoidably imposes itself. For example, the EU’s exclusive competences and well-developed trade policy toolbox explain why the EU will act more firmly in this field. This contrasts to the EU’s external security capacities, where its competences and instruments are much more limited.

Third, self-evident and generally accepted as the objectives may be, they are not always compatible in practice. For instance, initiatives to

promote human rights and democracy in China or Russia may lead to a deterioration of relations with those countries, which can in turn impede cooperation to tackle specific international conflicts or to reach agreements on climate policies. This also explains why the goal of ‘consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies’ (Art. 21(3) TEU) is in practice barely attainable (see Chapter 4).

Relational and Structural Foreign Policy

The conceptual framework used in this book to frame and analyse foreign policy was already pointed to in the introduction to this book. It reflects an understanding that, to pursue the above-mentioned objectives of EU foreign policy, this policy is not only about shaping or managing relations with other actors. On a more ambitious level, foreign policy is also about influencing the *structures* that determine how other actors behave. The following two subsections conceptualize both types of foreign policy using the labels of relational and structural foreign policy.

Relational foreign policy

Relational foreign policy is a foreign policy that seeks to influence the attitude and behaviour of other actors as well as the relations with and between others actors. This policy can take different forms, require different actions and employ different instruments, depending on whether these relations are conducted in a context of peace, conflict or war. In general, a considerable part of relational foreign policy is devoted to crises and conflicts.

On a declaratory level, actors continuously position themselves in relation to other actors and with regard to specific crises and conflicts – one of the main functions of diplomacy. This happens through unilateral declarations, interaction in the context of bilateral relations and the determination of positions within multilateral settings such as the UN.

On an operational level, where positions are underpinned by actions, a foreign policy actor can opt for a variety of foreign policy activities, depending on its interests and capabilities. Diplomatic efforts serve to enter into dialogue, negotiate and mediate in order to support, change or counter the position of other actors and find support for one’s own position (Jönsson 2002). Diplomatic initiatives can be complemented and buttressed through economic and financial instruments (to sanction, reward or provide support) and through civilian and military crisis management instruments. These operational dimensions of relational foreign policy can be conceived and implemented in a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral mode.

Structural foreign policy

Structural foreign policy is a foreign policy which, conducted over the long-term, aims at sustainably influencing or shaping political, legal, economic, social, security or other structures in a given space (Keukeleire 2003, 2008, 2014a; Keukeleire *et al.* 2009, 2014). Structural foreign policy seeks to promote and support structural changes and structural reforms, tackle structural problems and constraints, or support and sustain existing structures. The concept of structural foreign policy resonates with the political and diplomatic usage of 'structural' by practitioners, e.g. when they refer to 'structural reforms' or 'structural change'. Furthermore, it relates to the academic conceptualization of 'structural power' (Guzzini 1993; Holden 2009; Strange 1994), which refers to the capacity to shape the organizing principles and rules of the game and to determine how others will play that game (Holsti 1995).

An example of a successful structural foreign policy is American foreign policy in the decade following the Second World War, which aimed to establish new structures in Western Europe and definitively resolve Franco-German hostility (see Chapter 2). Other examples include the EU's (enlargement) policy with regard to Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and toward the Western Balkans in the 2000s, designed to support the structural transformation of these regions. An example of a (largely) failed structural foreign policy is the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular towards the Mediterranean region (see Chapters 9 and 11).

Structural foreign policy and relational foreign policies are not mutually exclusive and can be complementary and mutually dependent. For example, structural foreign policy towards the Western Balkans became possible only after successful relational foreign policy actions (including military operations and diplomatic initiatives). However, that this success would be enduring was only assured through the creation of a comprehensive set of new structures to make peace sustainable in the long term (see Chapter 11).


Having defined and illustrated structural foreign policy, we turn our attention to two key aspects of the qualification 'structural': structures and sustainability. First, the purpose of a structural foreign policy is to influence or shape *structures*. These structures consist of relatively permanent organizing principles, institutions and norms that shape and order the various interrelated sectors in a society, such as the political, legal, economic, social, or security sector. Organizing principles are made operational through a complex set-up of formal and informal institutions and norms that can vary from region to region, from country to country, and from society to society, depending on the specific context and trajectories of the regions, countries and societies concerned. For

example, 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'free market economy' are organizing principles that shape politics, law and economics in many states. However, the way in which they are made operational differs considerably between, for example, European countries, the US and India.

Structures can be situated on various interrelated levels: individual; societal; state; inter-societal; interstate or regional; and international, transnational or global levels. For example, human rights or the rule of law can be protected through national legislation, but also through regional organizations and international treaties. Figure 1.2 visualizes how structures can be situated in different sectors and on different levels, providing a matrix for analysing structural foreign policy of the EU as well as of other structural powers (see Chapter 12). Generally speaking, and reflecting the approach taken in this book, this matrix can help to determine which levels and sectors get most attention in the structural foreign policy of an actor and, at least as important, which of these are neglected. For example, the analyses in Chapters 11 and 12 will demonstrate that the EU mostly pays attention to the national, regional and international levels, but often neglects the societal level and the impact of policies on the individual level (see also Box 1.1). More specifically, and going beyond the scope of this book, the matrix can also be used to develop more focused, detailed and in-depth research designs, for instance to examine and explain the relationship between different sections of the matrix (see the example in Box 14.1) (Keukeleire 2014a).

Second, the objective of structural foreign policy is to produce *sustainable* effects. The purpose is not simply to shape or influence structures, but to do so in such a way that these structures develop an enduring character and become relatively permanent, including when external pressure

Figure 1.2 Structural foreign policy: sectors, levels and internalization



or support has disappeared. In view of their relatively permanent quality, changing the structures within which actors operate can be harder and take more time than influencing or changing the behaviour of actors. However, if successful, the impact of these efforts can be both more profound and more enduring.

Both material and immaterial factors can contribute to the sustainability of structures and thus to the long-term success of structural foreign policy (see also Box 9.1 on 'external governance' and 'diffusion'). Material factors concern the extent to which the organizing principles can be translated into functional institutions and mechanisms, able to generate the expected results. This points to the potential relevance of the EU, which through its Association and Cooperation Agreements, financial instruments, and technical and legal expertise has a major toolbox to materially support structural reforms. A structural foreign policy can generally only be effective and sustainable if it is comprehensive or at least takes into account the various relevant interrelated or 'interpenetrated' sectors and levels (see Wight 2006: 109–10, 115) (see Box 14.1). Combined with the fact that sustained effort is required over the long term, this explains why a structural foreign policy is beyond the capacity of most individual states, and consequently why the EU is a potentially interesting locus for member states to develop such a policy.

Whether changes to structures are sustainable also depends on immaterial (or ideational) factors: the extent to which the structures are seen as legitimate and are (or are becoming) part of the belief system, culture or identity of the people concerned (population as well as elites). Structures or structural changes have more chance of becoming internalized when they are perceived as desirable and legitimate, not just as the result of external pressure or of a purely rational cost-benefit calculation (acquiring in order to avoid sanctions or gain economic support, for example) (see Wendt 1999: 266–78). The internalization process is facilitated if the structures and structural changes to some degree account for indigenous contexts, processes, preferences and sensitivities in the target country or society (see Goodin and Tilly 2006; Migdal 2001). As becomes clear in Chapters 11 and 12, these immaterial factors pose the greatest challenges to the EU's policy towards other regions in the world, for example when dealing with religious movements in the Arab world or with other 'non-Western' or 'non-modern' actors or groups that are situated on the societal level (see Box 1.1).

The Globalizing Context of EU Foreign Policy

Globalization is a major contextual factor for foreign policy in general. The increasing scope, depth, impact and velocity of globalization processes carries implications that are fundamental yet not always

Box 1.1 Structural foreign policy and the societal level

Most levels included in the conceptualization of structural foreign policy (see Table 1.1) are self-evident and fit within the usual typology of foreign policy (see also Wight 2006: 112). Whereas this holds true for the international or the state level, this may be less the case for the *societal level*, which is one of the often neglected dimensions in the analysis of EU foreign policy and foreign policy in general (for other 'neglected dimensions', see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 19–25). The 'societal level' refers to the various ways in which groups of people are persistently connected on the basis of ethnicity or religion (Waever 1993:23) or on the basis of kinship or other systems to organize groups of people, ranging from extended families and clans (such as in the Western Balkans) to tribes (for example in Libya, Afghanistan or Pakistan) and large religious groups (such as the Shiites or Sunnis). These can be situated within a country, but are often of a transnational nature.

The inclusion of the societal level in the conceptualization of structural foreign policy serves to emphasize the existence of structures that do not fit within 'modern' or Western frameworks. However, these structures can – in terms of identity, legitimacy and effectiveness – be more important to the people concerned than those at the state and interstate level. Analysing the possibility of structural changes in a third country or region can thus require an understanding of the way in which societal structures can substitute or dominate over state structures, and of the way in which societies and states transform and constitute one another (see Gough *et al.* 2004; Migdal 1988, 2001). This is particularly important when analysing the foreign policy of the EU, which mainly focuses on states and regional organizations, and thereby often neglecting the societal level.

Considering the importance of the societal level also points to the lack of societal security in third countries. *Societal security* refers to the ability of a society (largely defined on an ethnic or religious basis) to persist in its essential character. Hence, it is about the sustainability, allowing for an acceptable level of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, values, and religious, ethnic or national identity (Waever 1993: 23). Deteriorating societal security can be the result of the indirect pressure from the international system (for instance through the homogenizing impact of globalization or Westernization) (Buzan 1993; Latouche 1996). As demonstrated in Chapters 11 and 12, particularly in the sections on the southern Mediterranean and on Islamism, the lack of societal security can also have negative consequences for the EU's foreign policy if this leads to a rejection of the Western or European models and if other structural powers are seen as caring more about these societal security concerns.

acknowledged. Globalization refers to the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of patterns of social interaction and interregional flows of people, trade, capital, information,

technological knowledge, ideas, values and norms. Indeed, few areas of social life escape its reach. These increasingly intensive flows are facilitated by different kinds of physical infrastructure (such as transport, communication and banking systems), but also by immaterial, normative and symbolic factors (such as trade rules, the spread of values and customs, and of English as the *lingua franca*) (Held and McGrew 2000: 3–4).

As globalization constrains and empowers actors, its impact is profoundly uneven, reflecting and strengthening existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy while also generating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Held *et al.* 1999: 27). The positive effects of globalization and increasing interdependence are matched by a growing vulnerability in a burgeoning number of interrelated policy areas. This is not only the case in the military field (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and sensitive military technology, threat of 'low-scale' terrorist attacks with large-scale effects) and in the economic field (including energy provision or the vulnerability of information networks). It also extends to policy fields that used to receive less attention: the environment (ecological change, unsafe nuclear plants), public health (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) and societal security (the preservation of a society's essential features). Threats are no longer solely posed by states, but increasingly by a wide range of non-state actors, anonymous and diffuse networks, and incremental developments that cannot be associated with a specific actor (see Held *et al.* 1999; Held and McGrew 2000; Turner 2010).

Exploring what globalization means for foreign policy leads to two key questions. First, has globalization 'rendered foreign policy redundant'? Second, is 'foreign policy [still] a key site of agency in international relations, or [is it] being steadily emptied of content' (Hill 2003: 13, 16)? Linking globalization to foreign policy leads to a duality. On the one hand, globalization reflects a growing predominance of economics over politics and of foreign economic relations over foreign policy. On the other hand, the implications of globalization and the vulnerabilities it causes make foreign policy more essential than ever. Hence, there is a need for more foreign policy and for a different kind of foreign policy. Yet national governments find themselves to be increasingly irrelevant in addressing the challenges of globalization, as their traditional foreign policy is impotent in the face of multiplying vulnerabilities. This not only explains the demand for 'global governance' (Held and McGrew 2002); it also provides a potential impetus for strengthening the EU's role in global governance (see Wunderlich and Bailey 2011) (see Chapter 13).

There is a rather ambiguous relationship between European integration and globalization, with the EU acting both as a shield against and an agent for globalization (Wallace 2000: 48–9; Noustos *et al.* 2012). On the one hand, the EU functions as an instrument to protect its member

states and citizens from the negative consequences of globalization and tries to contain, manage and order this process. Increasingly helpless, member states' governments turn to the EU to respond to questions they are incapable of answering alone. The EU's rich cross-border legal mechanisms and the fact that an increasing number of 'internal' policy issues are now dealt with at the EU level helped member states to control some of the repercussions of globalization and to protect themselves from turbulent global events. Vulnerability in traditionally domestic or internal policy fields, such as health, the environment, energy or migration, explains the current pressure to gradually elaborate an EU foreign policy in these fields (see Chapter 10).

On the other hand, while promoting global governance in an attempt to protect itself from globalization, the EU acts as an agent of globalization. More fundamentally, the EU contributes to globalization through its trade policy and its support for a global free market economy, as well as a neo-liberal international order (including through the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and through its initiatives to conclude free trade agreements with other regions of the world). The EU has not always sufficiently considered the consequences of its policies: it contributes to international structures that, while positive in many ways, also reproduce and reinforce patterns of exclusion, alienation and uncertainty (see Chapter 13).

Initially perceived to not primarily affect the EU, the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 shook the EU and several European countries to their foundations and proved to be an eye-opening event (Della Posta and Talani 2011). The EU was seemingly no more successful in shielding Europe from the perils of globalization. It forcefully demonstrated that Europe could also be situated on the losing side, whereas the newly emerging countries such as the BRICS proved to move gradually to the winning side. This increasingly allows the latter to steer processes of globalization and global governance in directions that are favourable for these (re)emerging powers (see Chapters 12 and 13).

Conclusion

Today's world is a markedly different place to that of a twentieth century defined by two world wars and subsequent bipolarity. Today, the increasing impact of globalization, the rise of emerging powers and the financial crisis throw up new sets of opportunities and challenges. The context in which the EU and its foreign policy are designed and operate has thus changed. We propose a conceptual approach – relational foreign policy versus structural foreign policy – on which we base our analysis of EU foreign policy in the chapters which follow. These concepts are complementary, not contradictory – they help us understand more

dimensions of foreign policy challenges and how these are being, and could be, addressed. Building on this understanding of the context and definition of foreign policy, this chapter has explored the question of what specifically constitutes EU foreign policy. We understand EU foreign policy as multifaceted (including CFSP, CSDP, external action and the external dimension of internal policies), multi-method (combining an intergovernmental and a Community method) and multilevel (embedded in an international context and also comprising the national policies of the member states). Four areas of tension characterize this policy field: between European integration and Atlantic solidarity; between civilian and military power; between the intergovernmental and the Community method; and between external and internal objectives. These ideas form the conceptual backbone on which the rest of this book is based.

Chapter 2

European Integration and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview

The relationship between European integration and the development of a European foreign policy has remained ambiguous from the end of the Second World War to the present day. Nevertheless, European integration has evolved from a primarily economic endeavour to one with a substantive political and foreign policy dimension (see overview with key dates in Table 2.1). Charting this progress, this chapter demonstrates that several obstacles that were highly problematic in the early stages of the process continue to be the stumbling blocks of EU foreign policy today.

European Integration: The Product of a Structural Foreign Policy (1945–52)

The Marshall Plan of 1947 and the Schuman Declaration of 1950 launched a highly successful structural foreign policy towards post-war Western Europe, in which the process of European integration played a crucial role. To use today's terminology, the Marshall Plan and Schuman Declaration proposed to tackle the 'root causes' of the wars and economic and political crises that had characterized Europe in the first half of the twentieth century by creating new structures to govern both the new (West) German state and its relations with its neighbours. This policy towards West Germany was one of the greatest successes of post-war American and French policy, precisely because it deviated from both the conventional concept of a foreign policy and the traditional approach to defeated nations.

The Marshall Plan

In his speech at Harvard University, the then American Secretary of State, General George Marshall, outlined the main features of a long-term American assistance programme for Europe (Hogan 1987; Marshall 1947). The US feared the further spread of communist ideology in the