The Theory of Hegemonic War
Author(s): Robert Gilpin
Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History , Spring, 1988, Vol. 18, No. 4, The
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988), pp. 591-613
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/204816
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Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xvIII:4 (Spring 1988), 591-613.
Robert Gilpin
The Theory of Hegemonic War In the introduction
to his history of the great war between the Spartans and the
Athenians, Thucydides wrote that he was addressing "those inquirers
who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to
the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human
things must resemble if it does not reflect it. ... In fine, I have
written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause
of the moment, but as a possession for all time."' Thucydides,
assuming that the behavior and phenomena that he observed
would repeat themselves throughout human history, intended to
reveal the underlying and unalterable nature of what is today
called international relations.
In the language of contemporary social science, Thucydides
believed that he had uncovered the general law of the dynamics
of international relations. Although differences exist between
Thucydides' conceptions of scientific law and methodology and
those of present-day students of international relations, it is significant
that Thucydides was the first to set forth the idea that the
dynamic of international relations is provided by the differential
growth of power among states. This fundamental idea-that the
uneven growth of power among states is the driving force of
international relations-can be identified as the theory of hegemonic
war.
This essay argues that Thucydides' theory of hegemonic war
constitutes one of the central organizing ideas for the study of
international relations. The following pages examine and evaluate
Thucydides' theory of hegemonic war and contemporary variations
of that theory. To carry out this task, it is necessary to make
Thucydides' ideas more systematic, expose his basic assumptions,
and understand his analytical method. Subsequently, this article
Robert Gilpin is Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University.
He is the author of The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, 1987).
? I988 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History.
I Thucydides (trans. John H. Finley, Jr.), The Peloponnesian War (New York, 1951), 14-
15.
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592 ROBERT GILPIN
discusses whether or not Thucydides' conception o
relations has proved to be a "possession for all
help explain wars in the modern era? How, if at
modified by more modern scholarship? What is it
the contemporary nuclear age?
THUCYDIDES' THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR The essential idea
embodied in Thucydides' theory of hegemonic war is that fu
damental changes in the international system are the basic det
minants of such wars. The structure of the system or distribution
of power among the states in the system can be stable or unstable
A stable system is one in which changes can take place if they
not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereb
cause a war among them. In his view, such a stable system ha
an unequivocal hierarchy of power and an unchallenged domin
or hegemonic power. An unstable system is one in which eco
nomic, technological, and other changes are eroding the intern
tional hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemo
state. In this latter situation, untoward events and diplomati
crises can precipitate a hegemonic war among the states in th
system. The outcome of such a war is a new international stru
ture.
Three propositions are embedded in this brief summary o
the theory. The first is that a hegemonic war is distinct from oth
categories of war; it is caused by broad changes in politica
strategic, and economic affairs. The second is that the relatio
among individual states can be conceived as a system; the behav
of states is determined in large part by their strategic interaction
The third is that a hegemonic war threatens and transforms t
structure of the international system; whether or not the parti
pants in the conflict are initially aware of it, at stake is the hie
archy of power and relations among states in the system. Th
cydides' conception and all subsequent formulations of the theo
of hegemonic war emerge from these three propositions.
Such a structural theory of war can be contrasted with an
escalation theory of war. According to this latter theory, as Waltz
has argued in Man, the State, and War, war occurs because of t
simple fact that there is nothing to stop it.2 In the anarchy of the
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, I95
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 593
international system, statesmen make decisions and r
the decisions of others. This action-reaction process i
lead to situations in which statesmen deliberately prov
or lose control over events and eventually find thems
pelled into a war. In effect, one thing leads to another
is the consequence of the interplay of foreign policies.
Most wars are the consequence of such an escalatory
They are not causally related to structural features of
national system, but rather are due to the distrust and un
that characterizes relations among states in what Walt
a self-help system.3 Thus, the history of ancient tim
introduces Thucydides' history, is a tale of constan
However, the Peloponnesian War, he tells us, is diff
worthy of special attention because of the massive acc
of power in Hellas and its implications for the struct
system. This great war and its underlying causes were
of his history.
Obviously, these two theories do not necessarily c
one another; each can be used to explain different wars
interested Thucydides was a particular type of war, wh
a great war and what this article calls a hegemonic war
which the overall structure of an international system
The structure of the international system at the outbre
a war is a necessary, but not a sufficient cause of the
theory of hegemonic war and international change tha
ined below refers to those wars that arise from the specif
ture of an international system and in turn transform th
ture.
Assumptions of the Theory Underlying Thucydides' view
that he had discovered the basic mechanism of a great or hege
monic war was his conception of human nature. He believed tha
human nature was unchanging and therefore the events recounte
in his history would be repeated in the future. Since human beings
are driven by three fundamental passions-interest, pride, and,
above all else, fear-they always seek to increase their wealth an
power until other humans, driven by like passions, try to stop
them. Although advances in political knowledge could contribut
to an understanding of this process, they could not control or
3 Idem, Theory of International Relations (Reading, Mass., 1979).
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594 ROBERT GILPIN
arrest it. Even advances in knowledge, technology,
development would not change the fundamental natu
behavior or of international relations. On the contra
in human power, wealth, and technology would s
intensify conflict among social groups and enhance th
of war. Thucydides the realist, in contrast to Plato
believed that reason would not transform human
would always remain the slave of human passions. T
trollable passions would again and again generate gr
like the one witnessed in his history.
Methodology One can understand Thucydides'
and his belief that he had uncovered the underlying
international relations and the role of hegemonic wa
tional change only if one comprehends his conceptio
and his view of what constituted explanation. Mode
of international relations and of social science tend t
theoretical physics as their model of analysis and e
they analyze phenomena in terms of causation an
linking independent and dependent variables. In mod
meaningful propositions must, at least in principle, b
that is, they must give rise to predictions that can
be false.
Thucydides, by contrast, took as his model of analysis and
explanation the method of Hippocrates, the great Greek physician.4
Disease, the Hippocratic school argued, had to be understood
as a consequence of the operation of natural forces and not
as a manifestation of some supernatural influence. Through dispassionate
observation of the symptoms and the course of a disease,
one could understand its nature. Thus, one explained a
disease by recognizing its characteristics and charting its development
from its genesis through inevitable periods of crisis to its
final resolution in recovery or death. What was central to this
mode of explanation was the evolution of the symptoms and the
manifestations of the disease rather than the search for the underlying
causes sought by modern medicine.
Thucydides wrote his history to fulfill the same prognostic
purpose, namely, to recognize that great wars were recurrent
phenomena with characteristic manifestations. A great or hege-
4 W. Robert Connor, Thucydides (Princeton, I984), 27.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR | 595
monic war, like a disease, displays discernible symptoms and
follows an inevitable course. The initial phase is a relatively stable
international system characterized by a hierarchical ordering of
the states in the system. Over time the power of a subordinate
state begins to grow disproportionately, and that rising state
comes into conflict with the dominant or hegemonic state in the
system. The ensuing struggle between these two states and their
respective allies leads to a bipolarization of the system, to an
inevitable crisis, and eventually to a hegemonic war. Finally, there
is the resolution of the war in favor of one side and the establishment
of a new international system that reflects the emergent
distribution of power in the system.
The dialectical conception of political change implicit in his
model was borrowed from contemporary Sophist thinkers. This
method of analysis postulated a thesis, its contradiction or antithesis,
and a resolution in the form of a synthesis. In his history
this dialectic approach can be discerned as follows:
(I) The thesis is the hegemonic state, in this case, Sparta,
which organizes the international system in terms of its political,
economic, and strategic interests.
(2) The antithesis or contradiction in the system is the growing
power of the challenging state, Athens, whose expansion
and efforts to transform the international system bring it into
conflict with the hegemonic state.
(3) The synthesis is the new international system that results
from the inevitable clash between the dominant state and the
rising challenger.
Similarly, Thucydides foresaw that throughout history new states
like Sparta and challenging states like Athens would arise and the
hegemonic cycle would repeat itself.
Conception of Systemic Change Underlying this analysis and
the originality of Thucydides' thought was his novel conception
of classical Greece as constituting a system, the basic components
of which were the great powers-Sparta and Athens. Foreshadowing
later realist formulations of international relations, he believed
that the structure of the system was provided by the distribution
of power among states; the hierarchy of power among
these states defined and maintained the system and determined
the relative prestige of states, their spheres of influence, and their
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596 | ROBERT GILPIN
political relations. The hierarchy of power and related elements
thus gave order and stability to the system.
Accordingly, international political change involved a transformation
of the hierarchy of the states in the system and the
patterns of relations dependent upon that hierarchy. Although
minor changes could occur and lesser states could move up and
down this hierarchy without necessarily disturbing the stability
of the system, the positioning of the great powers was crucial.
Thus, as he tells us, it was the increasing power of the second
most powerful state in the system, Athens, that precipitated the
conflict and brought about what I have elsewhere called systemic
change, that is, a change in the hierarchy or control of the international
political system.5
Searching behind appearances for the reality of international
relations, Thucydides believed that he had found the true causes
of the Peloponnesian War, and by implication of systemic change,
in the phenomenon of the uneven growth of power among the
dominant states in the system. "The real cause," he concluded in
the first chapter, "I consider to be the one which was formally
most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war
inevitable."6 In a like fashion and in future ages, he reasoned, the
differential growth of power in a state system would undermine
the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and
rising powers.
In summary, according to Thucydides, a great or hegemonic
war, like a disease, follows a discernible and recurrent course.
The initial phase is a relatively stable international system characterized
by a hierarchical ordering of states with a dominant or
hegemonic power. Over time, the power of one subordinate state
begins to grow disproportionately; as this development occurs, it
comes into conflict with the hegemonic state. The struggle between
these contenders for preeminence and their accumulating
alliances leads to a bipolarization of the system. In the parlance
of game theory, the system becomes a zero-sum situation in which
one side's gain is by necessity the other side's loss. As this bipolarization
occurs the system becomes increasingly unstable, and a
5 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York, I98I), 40.
6 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, I5.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 597
small event can trigger a crisis and precipitate a majo
the resolution of that conflict will determine the new
and the hierarchy of power in the system.
The Causes of Hegemonic War Following this mode
cydides began his history of the war between the Spa
the Athenians by stating why, at its very inception, h
that the war would be a great war and thus worthy o
attention. Contrasting the beginnings of the Pelopon
to the constant warring of the Greeks, he began in the
tion to analyze the unprecedented growth of powe
from ancient times to the outbreak of the war. Althou
have already noted, Thucydides did not think of caus
modern or scientific sense of the term, his analysis of th
that altered the distribution of power in ancient Gree
timately accounted for the war, is remarkably modern
The first set of factors to explain the rise of power in
and the expansion of the Athenian empire contained ge
and demographic elements. Because of the poverty of
Attica (the region surrounding Athens) was not envie
other peoples; it enjoyed freedom from conflict. A
quence, "the most powerful victims of war or faction
rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe
became naturalized, and swelled the population.7 With a
in population Attica became too small to sustain it
numbers, and Athens began to send out colonies to ot
of Greece. Athens itself turned to commerce to feed her
population and became the "workshop of ancient G
porting manufactured products and commodities in ex
grain. Thus, Athens began its imperial career from dem
pressure and economic necessity.
The second set of influences was economic and tech
the Greek, and especially the Athenian, mastery of na
which had facilitated the expansion of commerce a
Greek states and the establishment of the hegemony o
the Eastern Mediterranean. After the defeat of Troy, T
tells us, Hellas attained "the quiet which must preced
as the Greeks turned to commerce and the acquisition
Although Athens and other seafaring cities grew "in r
7 Ibid., 4.
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598 ROBERT GILPIN
in dominion," there was no great concentration of power in
prior to the war with Persia: "There was no union of su
cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of e
for confederate expeditions; what fighting there was cons
merely of local warfare between rival neighbours."8 The tec
innovation of naval power, the introduction into Greece of
tification techniques, and the rise of financial power assoc
with commerce, however, made possible an unprecedented
centration of military and economic power. These developm
by transforming the basis of military power, created the c
tions for the forging of substantial alliances, a profound sh
the power balance, and the creation of large seaborne empir
this novel environment, states interacted more intimately, a
interdependent international economic and political system
shape. These military, technological, and economic changes
to favor the growth of Athenian power.
The final factor leading to the war was political: the ri
the Athenian empire at the conclusion of the war with Per
That war and its aftermath stimulated the growth of Ath
power at the same time that the war and its aftermath encoura
Sparta, the reigning hegemon and the leader of the Greeks in t
war against the Persians, to retreat into isolation. With the r
a wealthy commercial class in Athens, the traditional form
government-a hereditary monarchy-was overthrown, a
new governing elite representing the rising and enterprising co
mercial class was established; its interest lay with commerc
imperial expansion. While the Athenians grew in power thr
commerce and empire, the Spartans fell behind and found t
selves increasingly encircled by the expanding power of the
enians.
As a consequence of these developments, the Greeks anticipated
the approach of a great war and began to choose sides. In
time, the international system divided into two great blocs. "At
the head of the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedaemon,
one the first naval, the other the first military power in
Hellas."9 The former-commercial, democratic, and expansionist-began
to evoke alarm in the more conservative Spartans. In
8 Ibid., 9, ii.
9 Ibid., I2.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 599
this increasingly bipolar and unstable world a series o
encounters, beginning at Epidamnus and culminating
gara Decree and the Spartan ultimatum, were to plun
alliances into war. In order to prevent the dynamic an
Athenians from overturning the international balan
and displacing them as the hegemonic state, the Spa
tually delivered an ultimatum that forced Athens to
In brief, it was the combination of significant env
changes and the contrasting natures of the Athenian
societies that precipitated the war. Although the underl
of the war can be traced to geographical, economic, a
logical factors, the major determinant of the foreign
the two protagonists was the differing character of the
regimes. Athens was a democracy; its people wer
daring, and commercially disposed; its naval powe
resources, and empire were expanding. Sparta, the
hegemon of the Hellenes, was a slavocracy; its foreig
conservative and attentive merely to the narrow- intere
serving its domestic status quo. Having little interest in
or overseas empire, it gradually declined relative to
future ages, in Thucydides' judgment, situations sim
of Athens and Sparta would arise, and this fateful pr
repeat itself eternally.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THUCYDIDES' MODEL Thucyd
and the pattern that it reveals have fascinated stude
national relations in all eras. Individuals of every poli
sion from realist to idealist to Marxist have claimed
him. At critical moments scholars and statesmen have seen their
own times reflected in his account of the conflict between democratic
Athens and undemocratic Sparta. The American Civil
War, World War I, and the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union have been cast in its light. In a similar vein,
Mackinder and other political geographers have interpreted world
history as the recurrent struggle between landpower (Sparta,
Rome, and Great Britain) and seapower (Athens, Carthage, and
Germany) and have observed that a great or hegemonic war has
taken place and transformed world affairs approximately every
Ioo years. The writings of Wright and Toynbee on general war
are cast in a similar vein. The Marxist theory of intra-capitalist
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600 | ROBERT GILPIN
wars can be viewed as a subcategory of Thucydides' more gener
theory. More recently, a number of social scientists have revive
the concept of hegemonic war. The "power transition theory" o
Organski, Modelski's theory of long cycles and global war, and
the present writer's book on international change are examples
elaborations of Thucydides' fundamental insights into the dynam
ics of international relations.10 Although these variations and ex
tensions of Thucydides' basic model raise many interesting issue
they are too numerous and complex to be discussed here. Instead
the emphasis will be on the contribution of Thucydides' theory
its applicability to modern history, and its continuing relevanc
for international relations.
The theory's fundamental contribution is the conception of
hegemonic war itself and the importance of hegemonic wars for
the dynamics of international relations. The expression hegemonic
war may have been coined by Aron; certainly he has provided an
excellent definition of what Thucydides called a great war. Describing
World War I as a hegemonic war, Aron writes that such
a war "is characterized less by its immediate causes or its explicit
purposes than by its extent and the stakes involved. It affect[s] all
the political units inside one system of relations between sovereign
states. Let us call it, for want of a better term, a war of hegemony,
hegemony being, if not the conscious motive, at any rate the
inevitable consequence of the victory of at least one of the states
or groups." Thus, the outcome of a hegemonic war, according
to Aron, is the transformation of the structure of the system of
interstate relations.11
In more precise terms, one can distinguish a hegemonic war
in terms of its scale, the objectives at stake, and the means employed
to achieve those objectives. A hegemonic war generally
involves all of the states in the system; it is a world war. Whatever
Io Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," in Anthony J. Pearce
(ed.), Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York, 1962), I-2; Quincy Wright, A Study of War
(Chicago, I942); Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, I96I), III, IV; Vladimer
Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, I939). See, for
example, A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York, 1968; 2nd ed.); Organski and
Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago, 1980); George Modelski (ed.), Exploring Long
Cycles (Boulder, I987); Gilpin, War and Change.
II Raymond Aron, "War and Industrial Society," in Leon Bramson and George W.
Goethals (eds.), War-Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology (New York, I964),
359.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 60I
the immediate and conscious motives of the combat
points out, the fundamental issues to be decided are
and structure of the international system. Its outc
foundly affects the internal composition of societi
the behavior of Athens and Sparta revealed, the v
the vanquished in its image. Such wars are at on
economic, and ideological struggles. Because of the
war and the importance of the issues to be decided
employed are usually unlimited. In Clausewitzian
become pure conflicts or clashes of society rather than
of limited policy objectives.
Thus, in the Peloponnesian War the whole of H
engaged in an internecine struggle to determine the
political future of the Greek world. Although the init
of the two alliances were limited, the basic issue in
became the structure and leadership of the emerging i
system and not merely the fate of particular city-stat
disputes, that is, conflicting views over the organ
mestic societies, were also at the heart of the strugg
Athens and aristocratic Sparta sought to reorder oth
terms of their own political values and socioecono
As Thucydides tells us in his description of the
decimation of Melos, there were no constraints on the means
employed to reach their goals. The war released forces of which
the protagonists had previously been unaware; it took a totally
unanticipated course. As the Athenians had warned the Spartans
in counseling them against war, "consider the vast influence of
accident in war, before you are engaged in it."12 Furthermore,
neither rival anticipated that the war would leave both sides exhausted
and thereby open the way to Macedonian imperialism.
The central idea embodied in the hegemonic theory is that
there is incompatibility between crucial elements of the existing
international system and the changing distribution of power
among the states within the system. The elements of the systemthe
hierarchy of prestige, the division of territory, and the international
economy-became less and less compatible with the
shifting distribution of power among the major states in the
system. The resolution of the disequilibrium between the super-
12 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 45.
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602 I ROBERT GILPIN
structure of the system and the underlying distribution of power
is found in the outbreak and intensification of what becomes a
hegemonic war.
The theory does not necessarily concern itself with whethe
the declining or rising state is responsible for the war. In fac
identification of the initiator of a particular war is frequently
impossible to ascertain and authorities seldom agree. When did
the war actually begin? What actions precipitated it? Who com
mitted the first hostile act? In the case of the Peloponnesian War,
for example, historians differ over whether Athens or Sparta
initiated the war. Whereas most regard the Megara decree issue
by Athens as the precipitating cause of the war, one can just a
easily argue that the decree was the first act of a war already
begun by Sparta and its allies.
Nor does the theory address the question of the explici
consequences of the war. Both the declining and rising protag
nists may suffer and a third party may be the ultimate victo
Frequently, the chief beneficiary is, in fact, a rising periphera
power not directly engaged in the conflict. In the case of the
Peloponnesian War, the war paved the way for Macedonian im
perialism to triumph over the Greeks. In brief, the theory mak
no prediction regarding the consequences of the war. What th
theory postulates instead is that the system is ripe for a funda
mental transformation because of profound ongoing changes i
the international distribution of power and the larger economic
and technological environment. This is not to suggest that the
historic change produced by the war must be in some sens
progressive; it may, as happened in the Peloponnesian War
weaken and eventually bring an end to one of mankind's most
glorious civilizations.
Underlying the outbreak of a hegemonic war is the idea tha
the basis of power and social order is undergoing a fundamenta
transformation. Halevy must have had something like this con
ception of political change in mind when, in analyzing the caus
of World War I, he wrote that "it is thus apparent why all grea
convulsions in the history of the world, and more particularly
modern Europe, have been at the same time wars and revolution
The Thirty Years' War was at once a revolutionary crisis, a con
flict, within Germany, between the rival parties of Protestants and
Catholics, and an international war between the Holy Roman
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 603
Empire, Sweden, and France. "13 Similarly, Halevy continues, th
wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon as well as Wor
War I must be seen as upheavals of the whole European soci
and political order.
The profound changes in political relations, economic orga
nization, and military technology behind hegemonic war and th
associated domestic upheavals undermine both the internationa
and domestic status quo. These underlying transformations in
power and social relations result in shifts in the nature and locu
of power. They give rise to a search for a new basis of politica
and social order at both the domestic and international levels.
This conception of a hegemonic war as associated with a
historic turning point in world history is exemplified by the
Peloponnesian War. A basic change in the nature and hence in the
location of economic and military power was taking place in
Greece during the fifth century B.C. This changing economic and
technological environment had differing implications for the fortunes
of the two major protagonists. The Peloponnesian War
would be the midwife for the birth of the new world. This great
war, like other transforming wars, would embody significant
long-term changes in Greece's economy, military affairs, and political
organization.
Prior to and during the Persian wars, power and wealth in
the Greek world were based on agriculture and land armies; Sparta
was ascendant among the Greek city-states. Its political position
had a secure economic foundation, and its military power was
unchallenged. The growth in the importance of naval power and
the accompanying rise of commerce following the wars transformed
the basis of power. Moreover, the introduction into
Greece of fortification technology and the erection of walls around
Athens canceled much of the Spartan military advantage. In this
new environment, naval power, commerce, and finance became
increasingly important components of state power. Thus, whereas
in the past the nature of power had favored the Spartans, the
transformed environment favored Athens and other rising commercial
and naval powers.
Athens rather than Sparta benefited from this new military
and economic environment. Domestically, Athens had experi-
13 Eli Halevy (trans. R. G. Webb), The Era of Tyrannies (Garden City, N.Y., I965),
212.
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604 ROBERT GILPIN
enced political and social changes that enabled it to take advan
of the increased importance of seapower and commerce. Its
trenched landed aristocracy, which had been associated with
former dominance of agriculture and land armies, had been o
thrown and replaced by a commercial elite whose interests
with the development of naval power and imperial expansion
an increasingly monetarized international economy, the Athen
had the financial resources to outfit a powerful navy and exp
its dominion at the expense of the Spartans.
By contrast, the Spartans, largely for domestic economic
political reasons, were unable or unwilling to make the neces
adjustment to the new economic and technological environme
It was not merely because Sparta was land-locked, but also b
cause the dominant interests of the society were committed to t
maintenance of an agricultural system based on slave labor. T
foremost concern was to forestall a slave revolt, and they fe
external influences that would stimulate the Helots to rebel. Such
a rebellion had forced them to revert into isolation at the end of
the Persian wars. It appears to have been the fear of another revolt
that caused them eventually to challenge the Athenians. The Megara
decree aroused the Spartans because the potential return of
Megara to Athenian control would have opened up the Peloponnesus
to Athenian influence and thereby enabled the Athenians to
assist a Helot revolt. Thus, when Athenian expansionism threatened
a vital interest of the Spartans, the latter decided that war
was inevitable, and delivered an ultimatum to the Athenians.l4
The differing abilities of the Athenians and the Spartans to
adjust to the new economic and technological environment and
the changed nature of power ultimately led to the war. The
development of naval power and acquisition of the financial resources
to purchase ships and hire sailors necessitated a profound
reordering of domestic society. Whereas the Athenians had reformed
themselves in order to take advantage of new opportunities
for wealth and power, the Spartans would or could not
liberalize due to a constellation of domestic interests and their fear
of unleashing a rebellion of the Helots. The result was the uneven
growth of power among these rivals that Thucydides viewed as
the real cause of the war.
14 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London, I972).
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 605
The critical point arrived when the Spartans began to b
that time was moving against them and in favor of the Athe
A tipping-point or fundamental change in the Spartan per
of the balance of power had taken place. As certain contem
historians assert, Athenian power may have reached its zen
the outbreak of the war and had already begun to wane, b
reality of the situation is not particularly relevant, since the
tans believed that Athens was growing stronger. The d
facing them had become when to commence the war rath
whether to commence it. Was it better to fight while the
tage still lay with them or at some future date when the adv
might have turned? As Howard has written, similar perce
and fears of eroding power have preceded history's othe
monic wars.l5
The stability of the Greek international system following the
Persian wars was based on an economic and technological environment
favoring Spartan hegemony. When agriculture and land
armies became less vital to state power and commerce and navies
became more important, the Spartans were unable to adjust.
Therefore, the locus of wealth and power shifted to the Athenians.
Although the Athenians lost the war when they failed to heed the
prudent strategy laid down by Pericles, the basic point is not
altered; the war for hegemony in Greece emerged from a profound
social, economic, and technological revolution. Wars like
this one are not merely contests between rival states but political
watersheds that mark transitions from one historical epoch to the
next.
Despite the insight that it provides in understanding and
explaining the great wars of history, the theory of hegemonic war
is a limited and incomplete theory. It cannot easily handle per
ceptions that affect behavior and predict who will initiate a hegemonic
war. Nor can it forecast when a hegemonic war wi
occur and what the consequences will be. As in the case of the
theory of biological evolution, it helps one understand and explai
what has happened; but neither theory can make predictions tha
can be tested and thereby meet rigorous scientific standard of
falsifiability. The theory of hegemonic war at best is a comple
ment to other theories such as those of cognitive psychology an
IS Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Cambridge, Mass., I983), I6.
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606 | ROBERT GILPIN
expected utility and must be integrated with them. It has, ho
ever, withstood the test of time better than any other general
tion in the field of international relations and remains an import
conceptual tool for understanding the dynamics of world polit
HEGEMONIC WAR IN THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM In the
modern world, three hegemonic wars have successively transformed
the international system. Each of these great struggles not
only involved a contest for supremacy of two or more great
powers, but also represented significant changes in economic relations,
technological capacities, and political organization. The
war arose from profound historical changes and the basic incongruity
between new environmental forces and existing structures.
Each was a world war involving almost all of the states in the
system and, at least in retrospect, can be considered as having
constituted a major turning point in human history. These long
and intense conflicts altered the fundamental contours of both
domestic societies and international relations.16
The first of the modern hegemonic wars was the Thirty
Years' War (I619 to 1648). Although this war may be regarded
as a series of separate wars that at various times involved Sweden,
France, Spain, Poland, and other powers, in sum it involved all
the major states of Europe. As Gutmann points out in his contribution
to this volume, the origins of the war were deeply
embedded in the history of the previous century.17 At issue was
the organization of the European state system as well as the
internal economic and religious organization of domestic societies.
Was Europe to be dominated and organized by Habsburg imperial
power or autonomous nation-states? Was feudalism or commercial
capitalism to be the dominant mode of organizing economic
activities? Was Protestantism or Catholicism to be the prevalent
religion? The clash over these political, economic, and ideological
issues caused physical devastation and loss of life not seen in
Western Europe since the Mongol invasions of earlier centuries.
I6 Summary accounts of the wars and their backgrounds are contained in R. Ernest
Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the
Present (New York, I984; 2nd rev. ed.), 522-546, 730-769, 915-990.
17 Myron P. Gutmann, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, XVIII (I988), 749-770.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 607
Underlying the intensity and duration of the war was a pro
found change in the nature of power. Although the power of
state continued to be based primarily on the control of territor
technology and organization were becoming more important i
military and political affairs. From classical times to the seve
teenth century, military technology, tactics, and organization h
hardly changed; the pike, the Greek phalanx, and heavy cavalr
continued to characterize warfare. By the close of that century
however, mobile artillery, professional infantry in linear form
tions, and naval innovations had come to dominate the tactics o
war. In conjunction with what has been called the Military Re
olution, the modern bureaucratic state also came into existence
This development greatly enhanced the ability of rulers to m
bilize and increase the efficient use of national resources. With
these military and political innovations, the exercise of military
power became an instrument of foreign policy; war was no longer
"the [unrestrained] clash of societies" that was characteristic of
warfare in the ancient and medieval worlds.18
The Thirty Years' War transformed the domestic and international
political scene. The Habsburg bid for universal empire
was defeated, and the nation-state became the dominant form of
political organization in the modern world. In the Treaty of Westphalia
(I648), the principle of national sovereignty and non-intervention
was established as the governing norm of international
relations; this political innovation ended the ideological conflict
over the religious ordering of domestic societies. For the next
century and a half, foreign policy was based on the concepts of
national interest and the balance of power; as a result, the scale
of European wars tended to be limited. The commercial revolution
triumphed over feudalism, and the pluralistic European state
system provided the necessary framework for the expansion of
the global market system.19 With their superior armaments and
organization, the several states of Western Europe created overseas
empires and subdued the other civilizations of the globe.
In the closing decade of the eighteenth century, a second
great war or series of wars once again transformed international
I8 Howard, Causes, I6; Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast,
I956); George Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1958).
I9 Jean Baechler (trans. Barry Cooper), The Origins of Capitalism (Oxford, I975), 73-
86.
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608 ROBERT GILPIN
affairs and ushered in a new historical epoch. For near
France and Great Britain, operating within the fram
classical balance of power system, had been fighti
limited conflicts both in Europe and overseas to
primacy of one or the other. This "hundred years
Seeley's expression, culminated in the great or he
of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonapa
I815).20 As in other hegemonic conflicts, profound
nomic, and ideological issues were joined: French o
gemony of the European political system, mercantilist
principles as the organizing basis of the world
revolutionary republicanism or more conservative p
as the basis of domestic society. The ensuing conf
gulfed the entire international political system, re
precedented violence and the opening of a new ag
and political affairs.
During the second half of the eighteenth and th
of the nineteenth century, economic, technologic
developments had transformed the nature of pow
mined the relative stability of the previous syste
warfare. At sea the British had gained mastery of t
and technology of naval power. On land the milit
Napoleon brought to a culmination the revolution
gunpowder as the new weaponry, tactics, and doc
tegrated. The most significant innovations, howev
ganizational, political, and sociological. The conc
levee en masse and the nation at arms made it pos
French to field mass armies and overwhelm their enemies. Under
the banner of nationalism the era of peoples' wars had arrived.
The new means of military organization had transformed the
nature of European warfare.21
After twenty years of global warfare extending to the New
World and the Middle East, the British and their allies defeated
the French, and a new international order was established by the
Treaty of Vienna (I815). On the continent of Europe, an equilib-
20 John R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (Boston, I905), 28-
29.
2I See Gunther G. Rothenberg, "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of
the French Revolution and Napoleon," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XVIII (1988),
771-793.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 609
rium was created that was to last until the unification of German
power in the middle of the century. British interests and naval
power guaranteed that the principles of the market and laissez
faire would govern global economic affairs. Underneath the surface
of this Pax Britannica, new forces began to stir and gather
strength as the decades passed. Following a century of relative
peace, these changes in the economic, political, and technological
environment would break forth in the modern world's third hegemonic
war.
Like many other great wars, World War I commenced as a
seemingly minor affair, even though its eventual scale and consequences
were beyond the comprehension of contemporary
statesmen. In a matter of a few weeks, the several bilateral conflicts
of the European states and the cross-cutting alliances joined
the Europeans in a global struggle of horrendous dimensions. The
British-German naval race, the French-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine,
and the German/Austrian-Russian rivalry in the
Balkans drew almost all of the European states into the struggle
that would determine the structure and leadership of the European
and eventually of the global political system.
The scope, intensity, and duration of the war reflected the
culmination of strengthening forces and novel forms of national
power. The French under Napoleon had first unleashed the new
religion of nationalism. During the ensuing decades of relative
peace, the spread of nationalistic ideas tore at the traditional fabric
of European society, undermined stable political structures, and
set one people against another. The Industrial Revolution also had
diffused from Great Britain to the Continent. War had become
industrialized and fused with the passion of nationalism. An era
of rapid economic change and social upheaval had also given rise
to radical movements threatening revolution and challenging the
domestic status quo of many states.22 In this new environment of
industrialized and nationalistic warfare, the political leaders lost
control over the masses, and war reverted to what it had been in
the premodern era: an unrestrained clash of societies. Nations
threw men and machinery at one another causing massive carnage
and social dislocations from which Europe found it difficult to
22 Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore, 1967),
3-I92; Halevy, Era, 209-247.
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6Io ROBERT GILPIN
recover. Only mutual exhaustion and the interve
European power-the United States-ended the
total war.
The terrible devastation of the war brought to a close the
European domination of world politics and resulted in a new
attitude toward war. The democratization and industrialization of
war had undermined the legitimacy of military force as a normal
and legitimate instrument of foreign policy. In the Treaty of
Versailles (I919), statesmen outlawed war, and the revolutionary
concept of collective security was embodied in the charter of the
League of Nations. States for the first time were legally forbidden
to engage in war except in self-defense and were required to join
together in the punishment of any aggressor. In contrast to the
other great peace conferences and treaties of European diplomacy
the settlement failed to reflect the new realities of the balance of
power and thereby was unable to establish a new and stable
European political order.23 This failure laid the foundation for
World War II, which should be seen as the continuation of the
hegemonic struggle begun in I914 with the breakdown of the
European political order.
The postwar international order has been based on AmericanSoviet
bipolarity and the concept of mutual deterrence. Peace has
been maintained and war as a means of settling conflicts between
the superpowers has been stayed by the nuclear threat and the
possibility of mutual annihilation. Whether or not this sytem will
also one day be undermined by historical developments and utterly
destroyed by a hegemonic war fought with weapons of mass
destruction is the fundamental question of our time.
THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND HEGEMONIC WAR Although the
theory of hegemonic war may be helpful in understanding the
past, one must ask whether it is relevant to the contemporary
world. Has it been superseded or somehow transcended by the
nuclear revolution in warfare? Since no nation that enters a nuclear
war can avoid its own destruction, does it make any sense to
think in terms of great or hegemonic wars? Morgenthau was
referring to this profound change in the nature of warfare and its
political significance when he wrote that the "rational relationship
23 Howard, Causes, I63.
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR 6II
between violence as a means of foreign policy and
foreign policy has been destroyed by the possibilit
nuclear war. "24
That a revolution in the nature of warfare has occurred cannot
be denied. Nuclear weapons have indeed profoundly transformed
the destructiveness and consequences of a great war. It is highly
doubtful that a war between two nuclear powers could be limited
and escalation into a full-scale war prevented. Nor is it likely that
either protagonist could escape the terrible devastation of such a
great war or find the consequences in any sense acceptable.25 In
the nuclear age, the primary purpose of nuclear forces should be
to deter the use of nuclear weapons by one's opponent and thereby
prevent the outbreak of hegemonic warfare.
It does not necessarily follow that this change in the nature
of warfare, as important as it surely is, has also changed the nature
of international relations. The fundamental characteristics of international
affairs unfortunately have not been altered and, if
anything, have been intensified by the nuclear revolution. Inter
national politics continues to be a self-help system. In the contemporary
anarchy of international relations, distrust, uncertainty,
and insecurity have caused states to arm themselves and to prepare
for war as never before.
To be able to say that nuclear weapons have changed the
nature of international relations and thus made impossible the
outbreak of hegemonic war, a transformation of human consciousness
itself would have to take place. Humankind would
have to be willing to subordinate all other values and goals to the
preservation of peace. To insure mutual survival, it would need
to reject the anarchy of international relations and submit itself to
the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes. Little evidence exists to suggest
that any nation is close to making this choice. Certainly in this
world of unprecedented armaments of all types, no state is behaving
as if nuclear weapons had changed its overall set of national
priorities.
One cannot even rule out the possibility of a great or hegemonic
war in the nuclear age. The theory of hegemonic war does
24 Hans J. Morgenthau in idem, Sidney Hook, H. Stuart Hughes, and Charles P. Snow,
"Western Values and Total War," Commentary, XXXII (I96I), 280.
25 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 1984), 19-46.
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612 ROBERT GILPIN
not argue that statesmen "will" a great war; the g
history were seldom predicted, and their course h
foreseen. As Thucydides argued in his discussion o
accident in war, once it has begun, war unleashes f
totally unanticipated by the protagonists. In the nu
is no guarantee that a minor conflict between the s
their allies will not set in motion untoward develo
which they would soon lose control. In brief, the fact
war would wreak unprecedented devastation on ma
prevented the world's nuclear powers from prepar
war, perhaps thereby making it more likely.
What nuclear weapons have accomplished is t
avoidance of a total war to the highest level of fore
the central concern of statesmen. Yet this goal, as i
surely is, has joined, not supplanted, other values
for which societies in the past have been willing to
the nuclear states seek to avoid nuclear war at the same time that
they are attempting to safeguard more traditional interests. The
result has been, for the superpowers at least, the creation of a
new basis of international order. In contrast to the balance-ofpower
system of early modern Europe, the Pax Britannica of t
nineteenth century, or the ill-fated collective security system a
sociated with the League of Nations, order in the nuclear age h
been built on the foundation of mutual deterrence.
The long-term stability of this nuclear order is of crucial
importance, and the threat to its existence over time certainly
cannot be disregarded. Each superpower fears that the other might
achieve a significant technological breakthrough and seek to exploit
it. How else can one explain the hopes and anxieties raised
by the Strategic Defense Initiative? In addition, with the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to more and more states, there is a
growing danger that these weapons might fall into the hands of
desperate states or terrorist groups. The nuclear order is a function
of deliberate policies and not, as some argue, an existential con-
dition.
Historically, nations have consciously decided to go to war,
but they have seldom, if ever, knowingly begun hegemonic wars.
Statesmen try to make rational or cost/benefit calculations concerning
their efforts to achieve national objectives, and it seems
unlikely that any statesman would view the eventual gains from
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THEORY OF HEGEMONIC WAR | 613
the great wars of history as commensurate with the eventual costs
of those wars. It cannot be overstressed that, once a war, however
limited, begins, it can release powerful forces unforeseen by the
instigators of the war. The results of the Peloponnesian War,
which was to devastate classical Greece, were not anticipated by
the great powers of the day. Nor were the effects of World War
I, which ended the primacy of Europe over other civilizations,
anticipated by European statesmen. In both cases, the war was
triggered by the belief of each protagonist that it had no alternative
but to fight while the advantage was still on its side. In neither
case did the protagonists fight the war that they had wanted or
expected.
The advent of nuclear weapons has not altered this fundamental
condition. A nation still might start a war for fear that its
relative strength will diminish with time, and an accident still
might precipitate unprecedented devastation. It is not inconceivable
that some state, perhaps an overpowered Israel, a frightened
South Africa, or a declining superpower, might one day become
so desperate that it resorts to nuclear blackmail in order to forestall
its enemies. As in war itself, an accident during such a confrontation
could unleash powerful and uncontrollable forces totally
unanticipated by the protagonists. Although the potential violence
and destructiveness of war have been changed by the advent of
nuclear arms, there is unfortunately little to suggest that human
nature has also been transformed.
CONCLUSION One can hope that the fear of nuclear holocaust
has chastened statesmen. Perhaps they have come to appreciate
that a nuclear order based on mutual deterrence should be their
highest priority. But against this expectation one must set the
long history of human foibles and mankind's seeming inability t
sustain peace for very long. Only time will tell whether the theory
of hegemonic war holds true in the nuclear age. In the meanwhile,
avoidance of a nuclear war has become imperative.
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