le European Union's >reign, Security, and jfence Policies i Maria Fnis and Ana E. Juncos 3ter Contents oduction 282 2 emergence of the EU as a foreign and security actor 282 SP institutions and actors 285 plaining the EU as an international actor 287 SDP operations and missions: policy in action 289 he future of EU foreign and security policy: challenges and opportunities 292 onclusion 293 Reader's Guide EU cooperation in foreign, security, and defence policy has developed rapidly since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s. The first section of this chapter charts the first steps towards a common policy in this area, including the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the gradual militarization of the EU. The chapter then reviews the key theoretical debates on the EU's role as a foreign and security actor. The subsequent section analyses the main actors involved in the CFSP, focusing in particular on the role of the member states and EU institutions in the development of the policy. The next section of the chapter evaluates the range of military and civilian CSDP operations and missions that the EU has undertaken to date, before examining the key challenges that the EU faces in this area. 282 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E, Juncos Introduction The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is one of the most popular European Union (EU) policies with European electorates. Since its inception in 1993, support for the CFSP has ranged from 68 to 79%, and in the last decade it has never fallen below 70% (Eurobarometer, 2004, 2014). Despite this overwhelming public support, the CFSP has also been a controversial and contentious policy area, fraught with tensions. First, there exists a tension between intergovern-mentalist and integrationist states. Traditionally, the former view international relations as a system of independent sovereign states, with foreign, security, and defence policy linked to state sovereignty. Close security and defence cooperation is often seen as undermining state independence and vital national interests. Thus, permanent and institutionalized EU cooperation through the CFSP and CSDP is seen as an anathema to EU member states' national interests. By contrast, the more integrationist states understand the development and institutionalization of the CFSP and CSDP as a natural extension of the EU's function as an international actor, combining its economic soft power with military means in order to shoulder its responsibilities on the international stage. Second, a further source of tension is the split between Atlanticist and Europeanist states. On the one side are EU states committed to a strong NATO and US presence in European security, who fear that the development of the CSDP might undermine NATO. On the other side are states like France that promote an independent European security and defence structure as an alternative to NATO, and as a way of balancing US international influence (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). Finally, there is a tension between more interventionist states, such as France and the UK, and those member states that have a tradition of non-intervention, such as Germany. With the development of the CSDP and the launch of CSDP missions in 2003, this has become a key issue, it has become clear that a minority of member states has shouldered the responsibility and cost for the majority of the operations undertaken under the EU flag. Moreover, the EU member states differ in the importance they attach to the United Nations (UN) mandate for humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions. In particular, the post-neutral states, such as Sweden and together with Germany, have a traditi on of attachment to UN primacy in peacekeeping q states, such as the UK, can conceive of humanit missions being undertaken even in the absence ^ UN mandate (as in the 1998-9 Kosovo war) de°!' these underlying tensions, the EU has rapidly''* velopcd agency in the area of foreign, security defence policy since the early 1990s. The follcrw section will look more closely at this development The emergence of the EU as a foreign and security actor At the end of the Cold War, the EU was well placed to play a leading role in the new world order. The forerunner to the CFSP, European Political Cooperation (EPC), a loose coordinating network of European for eign ministries, was not up to the task of producing a proactive European foreign policy. Moreover, previous attempts at establishing cooperation in security and defence in Europe, including a failed initiative to establish a European Defence Community, had been unsuccessful. The Western European Union (WEU), established in the 1950s outside of Community structures, had also had a very limited impact on European security. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the need for a security 'buffer zone' between Russia and 'the West', which allowed neutral states Sweden, Finland, and Austria to join the EU. With the fall of communism, and the gradual US withdrawal from the European theatre, questions arose over NATO's future role in the European security architecture. In this context, the Maastricht Treaty would provide the basis for developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It stated that the CFSP should cover 'all areas of foreign and security policy' and that, in time, the EU should work towards creating a common defence policy and eventually a common defence, if the member states so wish (Article J.4.1, title V, TEU). The main CFSP objectives, outlined in the Treaty, included: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union, to promote international cooperation and strengthen international security; and, finally, to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule-of-law, and respect for human rights. The Treaty also established the three-pillar structure of the EU in order to accommodate The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 283 r irH rhe intergovernmental character of the j safes11 ' This second intergovernmental pillar placed the ffSp under the control of the Council (and hence the ^"ber states) and involved minimal input from the missl0n and the European Parliament. Moreover, ''""J-pSP's decision-making was based on member ^* unanimity, giving each government the ability S°veto any p°licy initiative or operation, '"nuringits early years, the CFSP seemed to achieve ■jtle Common positions agreed among the member ^tes were often weak, reflecting lowest-common-(jenominator politics. As a consequence, further in-tjruuonal change was deemed necessary to improve oherence and effectiveness. The Amsterdam Treaty • troduced two significant changes to the CFSP. First, it created a new institution, the High Representative (HR) f°r £he CFSP, which was to represent the EU on the international stage and to act as the Secretary-General of the Council. Second, the Treaty incorporated the Western European Union's (WEU)'s 'Petersberg tasks' into the Treaty, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking, raising expectations about an operational role for the EU. These tasks were further expanded in the Lisbon Treaty (LT) (2009) to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilization tasks (see Box 19.1). The activities of the early years of the CFSP did not include a defence dimension. However, against the backdrop of the Yugoslav civil wars in the 1990s and the EU's inability to respond effectively, the need for further policy development became clear. The Yugoslav experience provided the political will necessary to increase the ambitions and capacities of EU foreign policy, leading to a gradual militarization of the Union. In the context of the Kosovo crisis, a window of opportunity opened at a summit between I franco and the UK in St Malo in December 1998. Over the years, disagreements between France and the UK had made progress on a security and defence policy at the EU level impossible. However, in 1998, Tony Blair's Labour government saw EU defence cooperation as a means and symbol of British EU leadership after years of outsider status. Moreover, it represented a possibility to shape military and security policy in line with British interests (Dover, 2007). for the French government andjacques Chirac, Saint Malo was an unexpected opportunity, fitting well *ith its traditional position of support for a European security architecture independent from NATO (How-orth, 2014). The St Malo summit resulted in a joint declaration that stated that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. In subsequent European Council meetings in Cologne (1999) and Helsinki (1999), these proposals were developed and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established. The member states agreed on the establishment of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), which was to be assisted by a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (BUMS) and which were institutionalized in the Nice Treaty (see CFSP institutions and actors'). Of particular significance was the adoption of a 'headline goal' at the Helsinki Council, foreseeing that by 2003, the EU would be able to deploy 60,000 troops, in 60 days, sustainable for up to a year (Merlingen, 2012). This and other capability-development initiatives sought to make the St Malo objectives operational, and not just a 'paper policy'. Moreover, to enable the EU to undertake military operations, it was necessary to ensure that the EU had access to NATO assets, such as planning and surveillance. The 'Berlin Plus' arrangements securing this access were agreed in 2002, allowing the EU to launch certain operations in the Balkans. However, the EU has also undertaken autonomous military missions without recourse to 'Berlin Plus', such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) in Somalia. While St Malo resulted in the emergence of a military dimension, Sweden and Finland were keen to broaden this framework to include non-military security instruments and civilian crisis management missions, including policing, rule of law, civil protection, and civilian administration (the so-called Feira priorities). As with the military headline goals discussed earlier, a civilian capability catalogue was to be assembled to allow civilian personnel to be deployed rapidly. With the Lisbon Treaty (LT), the European Security and Defence Policy was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This change might seem a minor issue of semantics; however, it has great symbolic value as it demonstrates an ambition for closer cooperation and potential integration. Furthermore, the Treaty abolished the EU's pillar system. The 284 Anna Maria Frns and Ana E. Juncos BOX 19.1 A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CFSP 1949 1954 1993 1998 2002 2003 2007 2009 2009-11 2011 2013-15 2016 NATO is founded by the USA. Bnlain, France, Belgium. Netherlands Denmark. Norway. Italy and Lt Rejection of the proposal for a European Defence Community by the French National Assembly. The Western European Union (WEU) is created outside of European Community structures as an attemptto encourage Furopean security cooperation. European political cooperation (EPC) is instituted and membei matters. The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 285 Be to cooperate more fully on foreign policy | The Maastricht Treaty establishes the CFSP as the successor to the EPC and the second pillar of the EU The December St Malo summit between France and Britain sets in motion the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy. The Amscerdam Treaty institutes the posl of High Representative for the CFSP and incorporates the Petersbend tasks. ■ In December, the Helsinki Headline Goal s adopted EU and NATO formalize the Berlin-plus , providing the EU with access to NATO assets In January, the ESDP launches its first civilian police mission to Bosnia Herzegovina In February the Nice Treaty formally establishes the ESDP and its politico-military structures. In December the European Security Strategy is published EU battlegroups become fully operational. These are 1,500 standby rapid-reaction forces rotating every six months between E U framework states. In December, the Treaty of Lisbon takes full effect: the CFSP is no longer a separate pillar. The role of High Representative is extended. The ESDP is renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) The CSDP suffers mission fatigue linked to the institutional focus on the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crisis. ■ In January, the European External Action Service (EEAS) becomes fi illy operational In June, the WEU is formally dissolved The EU renews its engagement in CSDP missions: for example, in the Sane! region of Africa. In June, the EU Global Strategy is presented by the High Representative In November, the Council adopts the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. In December the Council establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with 25 participating member states. CFSP is still formally intergovernmental and Council decisions continue to be taken by unanimity. However, coupled with institutional developments introduced in the Treaty, such as the new position of the Permanent President of the European Council, the extended powers of the High Representative, and the establishment of the European External Action Service (see 'CFSP institutions and actors'), the LT signals further 'Brusselization' of the CFSP. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty incorporates two related and significant clauses guiding the CSDP. It includes the Solidarity clause, which confirms that EU states are obliged to act together when another member state is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster (Article 222 TFEU); and it also includes the Mutual Assistance clause that states that if an EU state is victim of armed aggression, other EU states have an 'obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power'. This clause is binding for all EU states, but does not affect the neutrality of member states where relevant, nor member states' membership of NATO (Article 42.7 TEU). While these clauses seem lo take the EU into a new mutual defence agreement, military capacities remain in the hands of the individual member states, leaving obligations voluntary ana intergovernmental. Despite these institutional improvements, impor tant challenges remain. In particular, EU civilian ana military capabilities are still weak. The financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity policies that followed reduced what were already very small defence budgets (in 2016 only three EU member states met the NATO than 20% are deployable abroad. Other capa-hortfalls relate to intelligence, surveillance, 0f 2% 01 defence expenditure as a percentage p, -fhe problem is not only the level of spend-defence, but also the quality of European & forces. Of a total of around 1.5 million troops, few '"'^reconnaissance (ISR) systems, strategic air-lift * i air-refuelling capabilities, and remotely piloted ■ craft systems (RPAS). Further initiatives, such as implementation p'at1 on Security and Defence .g. and the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (2017), seek to remedy some of these shortfalls. [KEY POINTS K At the end of the Cold War. the Maastricht Treaty established The rteroovcmmental Common Foreign and I Security Policy • Following i epeated failures Lo deal with conflicts in the EU'S neighbourhood, the St Malo summit created momentum towards H European Security a:ic Defence ■ Policy. [• In 2003. the EU undertook its first civilian and military EESDP missions Throughout the 2000s. the EU attempted ■ to increase its military capabilities. M With the Lisbon Treaty the European Security and L Defence Poicy became tne Common Security and Defence Policy. CFSP institutions and actors Since the inception of the CFSR intense institutional development or 'Brusselization' has taken place (Allen, 1998). That said, the CFSP is still formally an intergovernmental policy area where EU member states continue to be the key actors and drivers through their right of initiative, their veto power, and the high profile of security and defence policy. To a large extent, this influence is exerted through the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) The Lisbon Treaty considerably enhanced the European Council's and thus the member states' role in shaping the EU's international agency. The European Council defines the strategic outlook for the EU, adopts common strategies, and provides guidelines for the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on how to translate CFSP treaty provisions and strategies into policies and practice. The FAC is the Council formation concerned with the CFSP/CSDP. The FAC is the principal decisionmaker in this policy area, and the national foreign ministers meet at least monthly. Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), this Council formation was chaired by the rotating Presidency. Since 2009, this has been replaced with a permanent chair held by the High Representative, thus limiting the agenda-setting and implementation powers of member states. The FAC makes formal decisions on external action including on the CFSP/CSDP and the launch of civilian and military operations. So far, the attempted militarization of the EU has not meant the establishment of a Council of defence ministers, though defence ministers do participate in the FAC when needed. The responsibility for the implementation of Council decisions falls mainly on the HR. In recent years, there has been a growth of informal FAC meetings. These tend to facilitate frank discussions and consensus-building between ministers. The Political and Security Committee and its sub-committees The Political and Security Committee (PSC) occupies a central position in the CFSP and the CSDP, and is one of the main channels for the. member states to control the CFSP. The Committee consists of high-ranking national representatives at the ambassador level. It manages and directs a network of committees and working groups. Moreover, the PSC is the main advisor to the Foreign Affairs Council on CFSP The Committee monitors and analyses the security context in which the EU operates, drafting common policies; and, once these have been adopted by the FAC, the Committee also oversees policy implementation (Merlingen, 2012). The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the main military body of the EU and is composed of the national chiefs of staff, supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS). On the civilian side, the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CivCom) provides information and drafts recommendations to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. 286 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E. Juncos The European Union's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies 287 The High Representative and the European External Action Service With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the office of the High Representative (HR) was extended and renamed the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'. The Lisbon Treaty established the HR as both chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and vice-president of the Commission, with responsibility for EU external action. The job was to be 'double-hatted' in order to improve consistency in the EU's external policies between the Council and the Commission. Furthermore, the extended role of the HR was intended to improve the visibility of the CFSP and the EU around the world. The HR has a particularly important role in agenda-setting as he or she has the right to submit joint proposals in all areas of external action. The job of the HR is complex and the different responsibilities difficult to merge. It is a potentially powerful job, with three functions merged into one: the continuing job of the HR; the performance of the duties of the Externa] Affairs Commissioner; and, finally the fulfilling of the CFSP role previously undertaken by the rotating Presidency. This pivotal position brings with it opportunities to influence the future of the CFSP. However, the office also harbours inherent difficulties. There are tensions between the need to exert leadership and the need to mediate between member states. EU states tend to be suspicious about HR leadership and often strive to limit the of the HR (see Box 19.2). Furthermore, there" UeDCe sions between the Council and the Commissi the ownership of the CFSP. The 'Brusselization' of the CFSP is further J ened by the creation under Article 27 TEIJ 0f ^ European External Action Service (EE/VS) assists the HR. The EEAS became fully functional December 2011. It manages the EU's response to ™ ses and contains an intelligence function, much Irk national foreign service. The workforce of the EEAS consists of seconded staff from the member states th Commission, and the Council Secretariat. Moreove the EEAS acts as the diplomatic corps of the EU i| has 141 Union Delegations or embassies around the world. These represent both the EU and its member states in third countries, and in international organiza tions. In the future, it is possible that some smaller EU states might merge their national representations with that of the EU, though the bigger EU states will likely want to keep their own embassies and international presence (Howorth, 2014). The EEAS has a rather challenging mandate; to coordinate the diplomatic and foreign policies of the member states and, at the same time, to produce new and common positions and policies. Moreover, the EEAS needs to do this without infringing on the members' national interests and sensitivities. Against this background, it was initially hard for the newly established EEAS and the HR to live up to expectations, but BOX 19.2 THE POLITICS OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE When -he office of HR was first established in I99y, the European Council appointed a well-connected, experienced, and high-profile figure to the post: the former NATO General-Secretary. Javier Solana Solana and his small office were a driving force in the development and institutionalization of the ESDP m the 2000s The Lisbon Treaty gave the office of the HR extensive powers over the CFSP However, the member states were reluctant to allow the new HR the means to use these powers Considerations such as political affiliation, geographic origin, and lack of foreign policy experience and influence seemed important in appointing a new HR. As a result, the first post-Lisbon HR was a little-known British Labour politician and civil servant, Catherine Ashton. Her most important task was to sort out the European External Action Service (EEAS) mandate and remit, and To get the EEAS fully functional as quickly as possible. This was a huge task, and gave Ashton an introverted focus: resulting in a lack oi visibility, which raised criticism (Howorth, 2014). However, she was widely commended for her role in the negotiations that led to the deal with Iran regarding its nuclear energy programme and a historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 2014, the so-called Brussels Agreement At the end of 2014, when the EEAS was up and running, the European Council appointed a new HR, the former Italian Foreign Minister. Federica Moghermi. Since then, Moghenni has been actively involved in shaping the EU's foreign policy, including the drafting and implementation of the new EU Global Strategy She has raised the profile and visibility of EU 1 foreign, security, and defence policy considerably during her vears in office Ijhe last few yearS b°t:'1 HR anC^ t'le EEAS kave ""er more active, in leading and producing EU fbr- MC0ITiecurjty, and defence policy such as in the case of ''^plefflcntation of the EU Global Strategy ^£ commission and the European parliament f commission lives in the shadow of the Council the CFSP area and has very limited powers and influence over the CFSP / CSDR The implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the Commission in this regard are ^bivalent. The Commission used to have the right to put forward CFSP policy proposals. However, the Commission can now only present proposals jointly •tn tne HR. Moreover, the EEAS has taken over the Union Delegations that used to be under the Commission's responsibility. Furthermore, the Commission has limited influence regarding the military dimension of CSDP. However, when it comes to civilian CSDP missions, the Commission has more input, as these are included in the EU budget over which the Commission has a say. This being said, the Commission has ambitions to be an active player in stabilization and reconstruction (Lavallee, 2012). The engagement of the Commission in conflict prevention and peace-building is important for the EU to be able to deliver its comprehensive or integrated approach to security (see Box 19.3), drawing on the many instruments available to it. I The European Parliament (EP) has even more limited influence on the CFSP than the Commission. However, the Parliament is kept informed and consulted on CFSP issues. Furthermore, through its role in the EU budget process, the EP has a say to the budget allocated to civilian CSDP missions and policies. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has □ BOX 19.3 COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY The EU emb1 rices an integrated or comprehensive security approach to external conflicts and crises- This entails a coherent and strategic use of all the EU's available tools and instruments in order m increase security and stability for the EU and the wider world. The EU's comprehensive or integrated approach is based on a holistic view of peace and security that takes into account itne root causes of insecurity, such as poverty, state failure, and feck of development and good governance, as well as the more ^mediate security issues and crises. The EU is particularly well had indirect influence over the appointment of the High Representative, as the EP must consent to the appointment of the Commission, including its Vice-President (the HR). MEPs have also been very keen to engage in foreign policy issues, continually pushing their case for an enhanced parliamentary role in external relations. KEY POINTS • Over the years, the CFSP has undergone an increasing Brusselization with the establishment of new policy structures in Brussels. • As an intergovernmental policy area, EU member states remain the key drivers in CFSP through their right of initiative, their veto power, and the implementation of EU security and defence policies. • The key institutional actors in CFSP/CSDP are the European Council, which sets the main policy guidelines, and the Foreign Affairs Council, which acts as the mam decision-making body, supported by the Political Security Committee and its working groups. • The Lisbon Treaty extended the remit of the High Representative and established the European External Action Service (EEAS), the foreign and diplomatic service of theEU. Explaining the EU as an international actor The emergence of the EU as an actor with security and defence ambitions on the international arena has presented EU and International Relations (IR) scholars placed to deal with both long-term root causes of insecurity and their immediate effects as it has a wide range of policies, tools, and instruments at its disposal covering diplomatic efforts security, trade policies, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid. The EU's integrated approach also refers to the need to coordinate policy instruments throughout the conflict cycle (from conflict prevention, to crisis management to peace-building) and with other national, regional, and international actors. 288 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E.Juncos alike with a theoretical puzzle and challenge. Traditional IR and EU theories have struggled to both define the EU as an international actor and explain why the EU ventured into the field of security and defence policy. This is particularly so for mainstream rationalist IR theories, such as (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism. Other theoretical approaches, such as social constructivism, have been better placed to embrace the emergence of the CSFP/CSDP. This is because they focus on the development of common foreign, security and defence norms, practices and identity at the European level as a result of increased cooperation and integration. During the early years of the CFSP, (neo)realists tended to ignore the development of this policy area, seeing it as a policy of rhetoric rather than substance, without any major impact on the ground (Hoffmann, 2000). Both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism understand the CSFP as a formally and substantially intergovernmental policy, thus resting firmly in the hands of sovereign member states. The two theories do vary in how much value they attach to EU level cooperation in the realm of security and defence. (Neo)realism privileges the state as the only actor on the anarchical international arena, characterized as a zero-sum self-help system where each state's main obligation, and interest, is to secure its own survival in competition with other states. In such a system, the potential for trust and cooperation between actors is low. In as much as there is a common EU security and defence policy, (neo)realists would see this as a temporary and precarious alliance that will only last as long as the member states' own security benefits from it, and which does not impinge on their own security situation (Mearsheimer, 2010). Neo-realists would expect to see two forms of intergovernmental cooperation in this area: balancing or bandwagoning the USA, the only remaining superpower after the end of the Cold War (Cladi and Locatelli, 2012). On the one hand, CSDP can be seen as balancing; that is, an attempt by EU member states to enhance their military capacities through cooperation in order to balance US hegemony and power. On the other hand, CSDP can be understood in (neo) realist terms as bandwagoning; that is, as an attempt by EU member states to contribute more substantially to European security thus complementing the US and NATO and strengthening the transatlantic link. (Neo)liberals and liberal intergovernmentalists share realist assumptions that EU foreign, security", and defence policy is a fundamentally intergovernmental policy area, where the member states are the key The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 289 actors. However, both nco-liberals and liberal governmentalists see much more potential fo lntCr" cooperation at the EU level (Pohl, 2013) For^""' scholars, the international arena, while anarch/"^ understood as a positive-sum system, where C' "* can better their security and increase their pros^'^ without threatening other actors. Furthermore th posit economic cooperation as key, alongside de'f ^ capacity, to international security. Rather than a fo"* of deeper integration, the liberal intergovernme "l approach understands CFSP as an arena for interstat bargaining where EU member states can upload thei preferences to shape the policy outcome. Coopers tion at this level adds valuer bargaining between states produces better security and prosperity outcomes for all (Moravcsik, 2009). In contrast, constructivism, which focuses on ac tors' social construction of shared and common val ues, norms, practices, and identity (Christiansen etal 2001), does not posit or privilege any particular actor on the international arena. Constructivism instead seeks to identify the values and norms embraced at the EU level, and how processes of socialization impact on member states' norms and identities. Social constructivists have, therefore, been well placed to study the emergent foreign, security, and defence policy of the EU, and the possible birth of a new, and even unique, form of international security agent. For instance, constructivist studies have focused on the concept and development of a potentially shared, common strategic culture across the member states, through, for example, the production of common strategic documents, such as the European Security Strategy (2003) and the deployment of EU missions on the ground (Meyer, 2006). Similarly, constructivists have also made a contribution to the debate about the EU's international identity. According to Ian Manners (2002), the EU can be understood as a Normative Power Europe (NPE) which promotes its core values of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights in its foreign, security, and defence policy, thus presenting itself as a model for other actors to follow. The NPE concept and idea has been very influential in European foreign policy studies. The NPE school of thought not only emphasizes the normative-driven content and practice of the CFSP/CSDP, but also understands the EU as normative and unique in another way It is normative by virtue of its hybrid character, as a new kind of international actor, comprising both common institutions it rhe EU level and as such sets new stand- j nn]lCV a 1 L bow an international actor can and should be ** od (Manners and Whitman, 2003). One often-ressiul example of a promotion of normative cited succ* . EU is the advancement of the abolition flues by the he death p the NPB concept has been criticized from a realist 1 —......;•;.-->' ^icrli^ it i ^npliesitsnorma- they clash with {the death penalty within and beyond Europe. How- ^pective as hypocritical, as the EU appli. ^ wnles selectively if and when the rive pnnclP jher economic or military concerns (Hyde-Price, 0081 TheIiext section moves from theory to practice, h-examining the implementation of this policy and specifically CSDP missions and operations. CSDP operations and missions: policy in action The first ever CSDP missions were launched in 2003, orJy four years after the establishment of the then ESDP (see Box 19.4). The first two missions were deployed in the Western Balkans: a civilian police mission__EUPM- -to Bosnia Herzegovina; and a military CSDP operation —Operation Concordia—in the form of a peacekeeping force deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). When the CSDP became operational it was thought that the focus was going to be on the EU's close neighbourhood, on conflict management and state-bunding in the Western Balkans. However, that same year, the second military operation took place outside Europe, on the African continent: the autonomous Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Moreover, there was an expectation that these overseas deployments would be first and foremost military in character, as the EU quickly demonstrated a willingness and some autonomous capacity to undertake military operations. However, the majority of the to-date 35CSDP missions (by October 2018) have been civilian, with a particular focus on security sector reform (SSR), andpolice and rule of law missions (see Box 19.4). Approximately one-third of the CSDP missions so far have been either military, or have had a military component. Eight of these have seen the deployment °f military troops on the ground in a peacekeeping or fflsis management capacity in the Balkans and on the African continent. A further five missions to Africa have deluded military training and advisory missions to So-mslia, Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR). I e has thus demonstrated that it can deploy a wide range of military missions from low-key operations involving military training in Mali, to high-intensity combat against military insurgents in DR Congo. The size and scope of EU missions and operations vary widely, from very small-scale civilian and training missions employing a dozen personnel, to larger-scale military missions such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina that in 2004 included 7,000 peacekeeping troops. However, by and large, the size and the scope of their mandates have been rather modest. The length of a mission can also vary substantially from missions covering a few months, to decade long missions such as the ongoing border assistance mission—EUBAM to Ukraine and Moldova, which was launched in 2005. Decisions on the scope, length, and size of a mission are provided for in the mission mandate decided by the Foreign Affairs Council, but a mission's mandate can be amended. For example, the mandate of EUNAVFOR has been extended several times between 2008 and July 2018. While the geographical focus of the CSDP missions has been on Europe, including the Caucasus, and on the African continent, the EU has also undertaken missions outside these areas: for example, in the form of a police mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, the EU has sent civilian missions to the Middle East, including to Iraq and the Palestine territories. The early years of the CSDP were surprisingly hectic, with the EU launching more than 20 missions during the period 2003-09. This rather intense activity was followed by a period of 'mission fatigue' especially with regard to military missions and coincided with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Since 2011, however, there has been a re-ignition of the EU's enthusiasm for CSDP operations, in particular with regard to Africa, with several missions and operations being deployed in the Sahel region, in the CAR and in the Horn of Africa (see Box 19.5). The EU's military missions have often acquired the role of a rapid-reaction force that is sent into a crisis, and that will then be relieved by a larger UN or African Union force. This was the case with the CSDP mission to Chad/RAC in 2008, where 3,700 troops were sent to protect refugee camps until a larger UN force took over in 2009. The pattern was repeated in 2014 in the same area when the EU sent a military mission to the CAR to stabilize the crisis until an African Union force could take over. It is worth noting that despite the development of EU battlegroups in 2007, all military CSDP missions have consisted of ad hoc assembled 290 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E. Juncos BOX 19 4 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Nome Location Nature Type duration EUPM Bosnia Civilian Police looTTP" Concordia FYROM Military Military 20O3 1 Artemis RD Coneo Military Military 2003 ] 1 EUPOL Proxima FYROM Civilian Police 2004-05.1 EUIUS Themis Georgia Civilian Rule of law 2004-05 J EUFORAIthea Bosnia Military Military Since 2004 EUPOL Kinshasa RD Congo Civilian Police 2005-07 1 EUSEC RD RD Congo Civil-Military Securrty sector reform 2005-16» EU|UST LEX Iraq/Brussels Civilian Rule of law 2005-13* AMM Aceh/lndonesia Civilian Monitoring 200S-O6 EUBAM Rafah Palestinian Territories Civilian Border Since 2005 EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova Civilian Border Since 2005 EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Gvilian Police Smce 2006, EUPAT FYROM Civilian Police 2006 \ EUPT Kosovo Civilian Planning 2006-08 EUFOR RD Congo Military Military 2006 "i EUPOL RD Congo Civilian Police 2007-141 EUPOL Afghanistan Civilian Police 2007-171 EUFOR Tchad/RCA Military Military 2008-09 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Civil-Military Security sector reform 2008-10 EULEX Kosovo Civilian Rule of law Since 2008 EUMM Georgia Civilian Monitoring Since 2008 EUNAVFOR Somalia Military Maritime Since 2008 EUTM Somalia Military Capacity building Since 2010 EUAVSEC South Sudan Civilian Security sector reform 2012-14 J EUCAP NESTOR/Somalia Horn of Africa Civilian Capacrty-building Since 2012 EUCAP Sahel Niger Niger Gvilian Capacity-building Since 2012 EUBAM Libya Libya Civilian Border Since 2013 EUTM Mali Mali Military Capacrty-building Since 2013 EUCAP Sahel Mali Mali Civilian Capacity-building Since 2014 EUAM Ukraine Civilian Security sector reform Since 2016 EUFOR RCA CAR Military Military 2014-15^ EUMAM RCA CAR Military Security sector reform 2015-1« EUNAVFOR MED Mednerranean Military Maritime Since 2015 EUTM RCA CAR Military Capacity-building Since 2016 EUAM Iraq Iraq Civilian Security Sector reform Since 2017 Source: the EEAS. The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 29 I BOX I?-5 EUNAVFOR: FIGHTING PIRACY Atalanta, or EUNAVFOR Somalia, is an ongoing (as er 2018). aiJtonomous, military, anti-piracy operation fgylf of Aden off the coast of Somalia, ft was launched in 'pecerrbe, 2008 and forms part of a comprehensive EU jifity stratég)' for the Horn of Africa (HoA). The EU's ^ 3tQgy for the HoA duns rn l.ickle berth current symptoms J root cause? o' ihe insecurity, instability nnd piracy in the fggjon Opei^110" Atlanta is one of three CSDP missions in the HoA The othei two arc EUCAP Somalia (formerly known FUCAPNestO' ; mission thai works to suppori maritime opacity building in Somalia, and EUTM Somalia, a military .pairing mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta was The first naval CSDP operation ijjutside of Europe, deploying up lo 2,000 personnel- -the second marníme operation is EUNAVFOR Med. The aim of BJNAV^OF^ vessels is to secure the strategically important OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA trade routes from Europe to the Asia-Pacific area: 20% of the world's trade passes through the area covered by EUNAVFOR. an area one-and-a-half times the size of the European continent It aims in particular to protect the World Food Programme's (WFP) shipments of food aid to Somali refugees, and similar transports for the African Union. The EU has proclaimed its mission a great success and gives it a 100% success rate in the protection of WFP shipments. Moreover, the number of piracy incidents has dropped massively, from 736 hostages and 32 ships being held by pirates in 201 I to no hostages and ships being held by October 2016 (EUNAVFOR. 201 7) Despite being hailed as a success by the EU, there have also been criticisms of EUNAVFOR. including the EU's inability to stabilize Somalia, its failure to end piracy for good, and its lack of CSDP protection for the most vulnerable vessels (Howorth, 2014). troops volunteered by EU member states; so far the battiegroups have not been called into use. There are some important differences between civilian and military CSDP missions with regard to how they are financed and staffed. Civilian missions are covered by the EU budget, rather than by the member states themselves. However, this often means delays in deployment as a mission request passes through the EU's procurement system. By contrast, in military operations, most of the financial burden for military assets and personnel falls on the participating member states on the basis of the principle 'costs lie where they fall'. There is only a small budget for shared costs (Headquarters, IT, and communication). The financial cost of participating in military missions can thus be prohibitive for some member states and influences their decision to make troops available. Furthermore, in civilian missions further delays can be caused by staffing problems. This is because civilian personnel, such as police officers and judges, do not remain on standby to be deployed like their military counterparts. They have to volunteer and get leave from their employers to participate in EU missions. I How can we judge the success or failure of the CSDP missions and operations? The EU works in very complex theatres, often with multiple actors involved, ft is therefore difficult to discern and isolate EU influence and achievement. As all EU operations are by invi-ktion from the host country, and/or with the backing °f a UN mandate, they tend to be uncontroversial. It could also be said that the EU avoids the most difficult conflict situations. However, the demand for EU CSDP missions vastly exceeds the CSDP's capacity and the number of missions launched. This demonstrates that there is a perception that the EU can and should do something to help. According to the EU, and judged on the mission mandates, EU missions have been successful in achieving their goals. However, the EU missions and operations have been criticized for the often narrow mandates and limited ambitions (Menon, 2009). Moreover, they are said to have 'built-in success' in their mandate. By contrast, if we instead look at the need and ambition to deal with the root causes of insecurity and instability, the EU's activities leave something to be desired (Juncos, 2013; Rodt, 2014). KEY POINTS In 2003. the EU undertook its first civilian and miliary CSDP missions. Two-thirds of CSDP missions have been civilian and one-third have been military. The EU has focused geographically on Europe and Africa, but has also undertaken missions in Asia and the Middle East The EU embraces a comprehensive approach to security which involves the use of all available instruments, EU missions have been relatively successful, although they have also been criticized for their modest and limited mandates. 292 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E. Juncos The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 293 The future of EU foreign and security policy: challenges and opportunities The European Security Strategy, the first strategic reflection at the EU level adopted in 2003, opened with the sentence 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free' (European Council, 2003). The optimism contained in this statement contrasts starkly with the opening remarks of the EU Global Strategy adopted in 2016 (see Box 19.6). The new security strategy states: 'We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned' (High Representative, 2016). Nothing reflects this sentiment better than the problems encountered by the EU in its neighbourhood. Externally, the EU's foreign policies have been thwarted by the emergence of an 'arc of instability' from the East to the South (EEAS, 2015). The deterioration of the situation in Libya and Yemen, the civil war in Syria, the refugee crisis, and the rise of the Islamic State all point to the inability of the EU's foreign policy to shape developments on the ground. ^ BOX 19.6 THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY In 2003, the EU under the auspices of Javier Solana. The then High Representative for the CFSP published its first ever European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled A secure Europe m a better world' The ESS was drafted against the backdrop of the events of 9/1 I, the subsequent war on terror and the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The occupation of Iraq diyided the EU member states along the traditional lines of Atlanticists-Europeanists and gave rise to intense speculation over the future of and potential demise of the EU's security and defence policy. However, the European Security Strategy, approved unanimously by the member states in December 2003 was intended to demonstrate that the EU, despite disagreement over Iraq, was an international actor wrth a coherent strategic vision and common ambitions on the world stage fBiscop and Andersson. 2008) The ESS called on the EU to be a more active, more coherent, and more capable international actor and to oevelop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention' Since the adoption of the ESS the EU's international context has changed drastically. In the aftermath of the wars m Meanwhile, the deterioration of the political ' J in Ukraine, ultimately leading to Russia's an of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and th going conflict in the Donbass region, have also i?"" lenged EU foreign policy. In many cases, this undesirable state of affairs fleets the absolute and relative decline in r,„ 1Ai power of Europe. Tn other rases, the problems are self-injl' as a result of a failure to invest in security anci ^ fence capabilities, or of the continuing disagreemen ' among the EU member states, which prevent it fro speaking with one voice. In this regard, the impact of Brexit could exacerbate some of these problems- f instance, by reducing the total resources available for EU foreign policy initiatives. This could be particularly true in matters of security and defence, since the UK' defence budget is the largest among the EU member states. However, we should not overestimate the UK's actual contribution to the CSDR as the country has underperformed in this area relative to its capabilities Moreover, the UK has been traditionally reluctant to participate in and support CSDP initiatives that might undermine NATO. Yet, current challenges can also be seen in a more positive light as providing momentum for further integration in the area of foreign and security policies. Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia is emerging as a security concern i in the East the rise of China has continued the effects of the global economic crisis have been 'ell and the power transition from US unipolanty towards a potentially more unstable multipolar world has been witnessed These new circumstances led to calls for a new EU Gluba' Strategy which was presentee by i I gh Representative hece tea Moghcnmto J the member states in June 201 6 The EU Global Strategy identifies the following key priorities for the EU's external J action to protect the security of the Union to foster state and societal resilience in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood; to implement an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; to promote cooperative regional orders and to advance a rules-based global order By proclaiming The notion of principled 1 pragmatism. the EU Globa Strategy of 201 6 also emphasizes the fact that EU foreign policy should be not only aoout the 1 promotion cf vali jes but also abd it pi oter mg tne security I and the interests to the Umu'1 h i a wui Id where geopolitics ■til matter [ stance the economic crisis has provided a strong l^°rJ • re for deeper cooperation and coordination as p" 0f resources and cuts to defence budgets I ZiAe the efficiency benefits from pooling and . lore attractive. Moreover, renewed concerns among some EU member states about territorial de-e linked to external crises (Ukraine, Syria), a more asserts , Russia, the refugee crises, and mixed signals torn the Trump Presidency have accelerated calls for rjje development of an autonomous defence capability the EU level. Cooperation has also been propelled . growing security challenges in the EU's neighbourhood and tnc outcome of the Brexit referendum. Conclusion Opinions on the impact and importance of the CFSP and CSDP differ, and there are uncertainties over the future development of the policy. In the face of current geopolitical challenges, will it return to lowest common-denomination (intergovernmental-tst) politics or even to European inter-state security competition, as some nco-rcalist observers predict; or will the coordination and integration of the member states' foreign, security, and defence policies continue to deepen as exemplified by recent initiatives such as Hence, with the exit of the UK and the removal of a major veto player in defence, we could witness increasing security integration among the remaining EU member states. In this regard, there are some posi rive signs which support this view, including the implementation of the EU Global Strategy (see Box 19.6) and plans to move forward in the area of defence with a Commission initiative to support a European Defence Fund, the establishment of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the implementation of Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) initiatives, the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, and ways to make better use of the EU battlegroups. the EU Global Strategy? Despite its shortcomings, the CFSP represents an impressive institutional, normative, and identity-building policy, which has turned the EU into a veritable international security actor able to deploy crisis management operations on the ground. However, as this chapter has made clear, the member states continue to be the key actors in this policy area, and as such, future progress will be inextricably linked to the willingness and ability of the member states to sustain this cooperation. QUESTIONS 1. How can we explain the emergence cf the EU as a security and defence actor? 2. Is the EU a fully "ledged "oreign policy ard security actor on the world stage; I" so. why and how? 3. Is the CFSP stili intergovernmental or has 'Brusselizalion' introduced supranational elements' 4. How helpful are mainstream IRtheories in explainingthe development of EU security and defence policies? 5. I low do CSDP missions and operations contribute to international security? 6. How should we measure the success of CSDP missions and operations? 7. Does the EU Global Strategy provide the EU with a comprehensive and up-to-date strategic document? 8. What will be the likely impact of Brexit on the EU's foreign and security policy? GUIDE TO FURTHER READING Hill, C, Smith, M., and Vanhoonacker, S. (2017) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press) A comprehensive and up-to-date collection on the main aspects of the EU as an international actor. 294 Anna Maria Friis and Ana E. Juncos Howorth, J. (2014) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil'an) An inter informative book on the CSDR its development, key actors, and implementation. It provides useful inforroatK>^ political games behind the policies. Keukeleire, S. and Delreux, T. (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan) A introduction to the topic of European foreign policy. Merlingen, M. (2012) EU Security Policy: What it is, How it Works, Why It Matters (I ondon; Lynre Rienner Publishe ) f\ thorough overview of CSDP institutions, actors, and missions. Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds) (201 I) National and European Foreign Policy: Towards f uropenn<7aticn (London; Routlecige)^ strong edited collection that is particularly useful for its comparative perspective. WEBLINKS http://www.consilium.europa.eu The website of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council http://eeas.europa.eu Tne website of the European External Action Service. Good and up-to-date info-C5DP missions. http://www.iss.europa.eu The website of the research institute, European Institute for Security Studies; foe the CSDR http://www.egmontinstitute.be A research institute and think tank on the CFSP http://www.eda.europa.eu/ The website of the European Defence Agency.