Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100415
Available online 25 October 2019
2211-467X/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
The multi-speed energy transition in Europe: Opportunities and challenges
for EU energy security
María de la Esperanza Mata P�erez a,1
, Daniel Scholten b,2,
*, Karen Smith Stegen c,3
a
Mekelweg 4, 2628CD, Delft, The Netherlands
b
Jaffalaan 5, 2628BX, Delft, The Netherlands
c
Campus Ring 1, 28759, Bremen, Germany
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Multi-speed energy transition
European Union
Energy security
Renewable energy
A B S T R A C T
The transition towards renewable energy is progressing at different speeds among EU member states. This trend
reflects their divergent national energy security interests and leads to different energy (foreign) policy strategies
within the Energy Union context. This policy perspective highlights how a multi-speed energy transition among
EU Member States affects European energy relations and energy security and explores what the European
Commission (EC) can do to safeguard the Energy Union. We argue that divergent energy security perceptions and
priorities among EU Member States essentially create two clusters of countries: those that focus on renewable
energy, considering it an industrial opportunity and a way to lower import dependence, and those that prioritize
reliable supplies and perceive renewables as too volatile and expensive to replace fossil fuels. We then
contemplate the energy security implications of the two emerging Europes and discuss several ways these could
shape their mutual interactions. Finally, we suggest incorporating an industrial component next to the internal
market and common external voice dimensions of the Energy Union, in the form of a package deal, so that the EC
might overcome political tensions between the two clusters.
1. Introduction
The Energy Strategy and Energy Union call for secure, competitive,
and sustainable energy in the European Union (EU) and set ambitious
goals for the deployment of renewables. By 2030, for example, the EU
should rely on renewable sources for 32% of its energy mix [1].
Achieving this target will require all Member States to embrace
renewable energy and lessen dependence on fossil fuels (domestic and
imported).
There are, however, considerable differences in the speed and
motivation with which Member States pursue the energy transition.
Some EU Member States strongly promote renewables (e.g. Germany,
Denmark) while some actively resist (e.g. Poland). Moreover, some have
a geographical head start (e.g. Austria, Sweden), while others lack
favorable conditions, finance, and expertise (e.g. Hungary, Romania).
These differences reflect divergent national energy security interests and
lead to different energy (foreign) policy strategies, particularly with
regard to cooperation and interdependence. Some countries perceive
renewable energy as an industrial opportunity that simultaneously diversifies
their energy portfolio and mitigates greenhouse gas emissions.
For these countries, European cooperation is a means to tackle these
challenges together, which implies greater interconnection of their
transmission networks. Other countries, however, perceive the efforts of
their greener neighbors as a nuisance that challenges security of supply
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: M.D.L.E.MataPerez@student.tudelft.nl (M.E. Mata P�erez), d.j.scholten@tudelft.nl (D. Scholten), K.SmithStegen@jacobs-university.de (K. Smith
Stegen).
1
María de la Esperanza Mata P�erez is a Sustainable Energy Technology master student at Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Electrical Engineering,
Mathematics and Computer Science.
2
Daniel Scholten is Assistant Professor at Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management. He is also a non-resident fellow at the
Payne Institute, Colorado School of Mines and an advisor and guest lecturer at the geopolitics of energy course, University of Stavanger.
3
Karen Smith Stegen is a Professor of Political Science and the Chair of the International Relations: Politics and History program at Jacobs University, located in
Bremen, Germany. Her background in energy includes six years at an international energy company in Chicago, USA, and two years with an energy institute in
Bremen, Germany.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Strategy Reviews
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/esr
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100415
Received 4 December 2018; Received in revised form 16 August 2019; Accepted 8 October 2019
Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100415
2
at affordable prices and brings grid problems and price volatility
without any additional revenue or employment benefits. In recent years,
these divisions have increased rather than lessened.
The divergent energy paths that are emerging threaten to undermine
the Energy Strategy and Energy Union. What makes the matter additionally
politically sensitive is that the divergent paths seem to run along
a West-East axis. While many Western European countries coordinate
for the system integration of renewables, many Eastern European
countries try to block renewables’ negative effects, e.g. phase-shifters
installed at the German-Polish border. The EU’s energy transition
goals may thus exacerbate the strains between West and East.
This policy perspective highlights how a multi-speed energy transition
among EU Member States likely affects European energy security
and energy relations and explores what the European Commission (EC)
can do to safeguard the Energy Union. We proceed as follows. In Section
2 we describe how divergent energy security perceptions and priorities
among EU Member States are leading to a multi-speed energy transition
and the emergence of two clusters of countries in Europe. In the next
section, we discuss the implications of this development for energy relations
among EU Member States, European energy security, and the
Energy Union. This section also utilizes German-Polish relations as an
illustrative case. We conclude in Section 4 with several policy suggestions
the EC could undertake to mitigate the emergence of two clusters.
2. Divergent energy security paths in Europe
In theory, there is one Energy Union but in practice there are 28
national interests. Due to differences in geography, natural resources,
history and political traditions, the energy security4
priorities of EU
Member States vary and influence their positions on common European
initiatives [2]. Leaving the particularities of each country aside, two
rough clusters of EU Member States can be identified (see Fig. 1).
The blue cluster comprises countries that are deeply concerned about
security of supply and the diversification of sources, particularly natural
gas. These countries are located on the periphery of Europe. Security of
supply is an important goal for all EU countries, however, the countries
in this cluster are particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions and to
actions of external suppliers.5
They are characterized by high levels of
import dependence combined with strong market concentration, and
often have a single supplier: Russia [4,5]. In addition, the energy infrastructures
of these countries are less developed or aging and they lack
sufficient and diverse interconnection with other countries to secure
energy supply,6
which makes their markets less resilient and leaves little
auxiliary options for overcoming supply cut-offs. They may also have
limited domestic renewable sources and a large workforce in fossil fuel
industries; hence, switching to renewable energies comes at a high cost.7
These countries also face higher capital costs relative to Western Europe
and their consumers have less disposable income [10]. As living
standards are generally lower, citizens tend to be more sensitive to an
increase in energy prices. In short, the options for diversifying—in terms
of source, origin and route—are highly constrained in the short- or even
medium-term. As a result, their priority within the Energy Union is to
support the development of both trans-European (gas) interconnectors
and the internal market.
Countries that exemplify this cluster include Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia,
Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Luxemburg. Rather than pursuing a
significant build-up of renewable energies, these countries focus on
diversifying their gas supplies in order to avoid politically motivated
disruptions (and the Baltic countries additionally seek synchronization
with the Continental European Network). Four of these countries, the
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, form the Visegrad
Group (V4) and have started to coordinate their negotiations (and opposition)
with regard to EU renewable energy directives and EU electricity
market reforms. While they acknowledge climate issues, they
denounce the most ambitious 2030 climate targets as unfeasible and
unrealistic and demand full respect of national competences [10].
Greece, Cyprus and Malta are also grouped in this cluster as they prioritize
the diversification of their energy sources and routes through
more interconnections. Additionally, they share the ambition of coordinating
with non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region, which
could increase their relevance as energy hubs and transit countries. We
have also tentatively included Ireland and the UK in this cluster. While
Ireland boasts some successes with RES-E, it remains 90% import
dependent and its plans for an Irish-French interconnector pre-date the
UK’s decision to leave the EU. The UK is a challenge to position, because
the effects of leaving the EU are still unclear. The UK strongly promotes
renewables and is well-connected to North-West European energy
markets, but Brexit sentiments and the repercussions of divorcing the EU
may increase the salience of security of supply over other energy issues.
The countries in the green cluster perceive the Energy Union as a tool
to fight climate change and see renewable energy a business opportunity,
while they also diversify the energy mix and improve import
dependence. These Member States are located in the western half of
continental Europe. They generally have a higher GDP and welldeveloped
energy markets and infrastructures. Their consumers are
less price sensitive and can tolerate higher environmental costs.8
They
also have a longer record of accomplishment with regard to renewables
and a notable portion of their labor force is occupied with the installation,
maintenance and operation of renewable energy sites [9]. These
countries also spearhead innovative activity in climate change mitigation
technologies [7]. Renewables hence bring them economic benefits
in terms of jobs and revenues,9
even if they come at the expense of taxes
and levies. Import dependence, which is high for some of this cluster’s
countries as well, is counterbalanced by sufficient diversification options
in terms of sources, origins and routes. In addition, these countries
have more stable political relations with external suppliers, being premium
markets for oil and gas suppliers and having considerable
political-economic power. Most Western European countries hence see
the Energy Union primarily as a means to promote their role as industrial
leaders in renewable generation technologies.
Typical countries of the green cluster include Finland, Sweden,
Denmark, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. These
countries take the lead in promoting higher renewable energy targets
and climate negotiations. They are motivated by environmental concerns
and economic interests, as evidenced by their high share of European
and global sustainable technology patents and clean tech
4
At its narrowest, energy security is generally synonymous with security of
supply at affordable prices [30–33]. Such a definition relates to dimensions
such as geological availability, political accessibility, economic affordability,
and infrastructure resilience. At its broadest, the term also includes dimensions
such as environmental sustainability, social acceptability, and regulatory stability
[32]. To keep it simple, we follow the World Energy Council which
defined energy security in 2008 as an “uninterruptible supply of energy, in
terms of quantities required to meet demand at affordable prices.”
5
The EU imported 55.1% of its consumed energy in 2017 [6]. High energy
dependency rates are spread across Europe [6]; nevertheless, politically motivated
disruptions, like the one between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, have
highlighted the particular vulnerability of Eastern European countries.
6
In 2014 twelve Member States were still below 10% level of interconnection.
It is expected though that only Spain and Cyprus will remain under 10% in
2020, considering current plans [34].
7
These countries, and more significantly Poland, have a high share of coal in
their energy mix which provides cheap power and employment [35,36].
8
Generally speaking, Western European countries have the highest households’
electricity prices of Europe [8] without facing social unrest over them.
9
According to Ref. [9]; the highest economic returns from the renewable
energy industry concentrate in Western Europe. These countries also hold a
large wind energy technology’ market share globally.
M.E. Mata P�erez et al.
Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100415
3
revenues [7,9,11]. In this light, it remains to be seen whether these
countries will remain as enthusiastic now that increasing competition is
eating away their early mover advantage. EU tariffs on Chinese solar
panels might be a good indication of that.10
Needless to say, countries
not included in this cluster also seek to benefit from the technological
innovations ongoing in the Union. Yet they aim to build upon the
expertise of their neighboring countries, rather than bear the costs of
innovating themselves. Several other countries are also in this cluster,
but do not fit as neatly as those mentioned above. France’s nuclear focus
puts it in a somewhat debatable position regarding renewables, but
neither do supply security concerns dominate its energy policy. Spain,
Portugal and Italy clearly have security of supply as one of their main
energy priorities, due to their high import dependence, but are included
in the green cluster because they have diversified supply and certainly
regard renewable energy as an industrial opportunity. Despite these
various differences, all members of the green cluster share two important
characteristics: they are well-connected continental EU countries
and are relatively older EU Member States. Newer EU entrants and Island
states seems to constitute the periphery to this center, raising the
question whether we should not also separate Eastern Europe and Island
countries into two separate clusters.
To sum up, whereas renewable energy represents energy independence
on a political front and industrial opportunities on the economic
side for Western European countries, Eastern European countries realize
its security of supply potential but worry about their workforce in the
fossil industry and electricity prices. In short, renewable energy is
perceived as win-win in the West and win-lose in the East. These
different energy priorities and concerns translate into different energy
strategies vis-�a-vis the Energy Union. As a result, green cluster countries
receive the EC’s ambitious renewable energy goals with open arms while
blue cluster countries prefer better gas interconnection to European
markets and resist shifting from traditional power sources to renewables
in a short timeframe.
Fig. 1. Member States clustered according to their Energy Union ambitions.
Source: [3]. The two clusters of countries have been identified based on data from relevant European agencies and organizations, data collected by the EC,
bibliographical analyses, and from consultations with and observed political discussions at the EC’s Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER). The two clusters have
been defined following two main indicators: first, energy import dependency together with supplier concentration – with special attention to Russia – [4–6] and
second, macroeconomic benefits of increased renewable energy penetration – in terms of electricity prices, low-carbon technology patents, market shares and
turnover [7–9,11].
10
Moreover, countries supporting market leadership may not always support
ambitious renewable energy targets. During the negotiations on overall climate
targets the German Minister of Economy and Energy claimed that a renewable
energy target above 30% would not be technically and financially achievable
for Germany and for Europe.
M.E. Mata P�erez et al.
Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100415
4
3. Opportunities and challenges of a multi-speed energy
transition in Europe
The most profound implication of the multi-speed energy transition
is that the two clusters we identified could develop into two “Europes”.
In this section, we draw insights from the energy security and renewable
energy literature to sketch the implications of different degrees of a
renewable energy buildup. We then review a recent case study contrasting
German and Polish perceptions and approaches to renewable
energy.
The wide scale adoption of renewable energies by a country or region
has both domestic and international (foreign policy) effects. On the
domestic front, countries competitive in renewable energy can expect
certain economic benefits. We would like to note that it is a misperception
that the renewable energy electricity industry offers fewer jobs.
Indeed, it takes between 400 and 410 people to generate a terawatt of
electricity with wind and photovoltaics, but the same amount of energy
from gas or coal only requires 80 to 125 people [13]. Exporting
renewable energy technology or supporting services, moreover, is
already an emerging market that countries compete over, with China,
the EU, the US, Japan and South Korea dominating global patents and
exports [11,15]. Renewable energies also play a critical role in achieving
energy justice, an umbrella term that includes the amelioration of energy
poverty. For example, renewable energies can provide electricity to
remote areas, which has direct economic benefits (reducing fuel costs)
and can indirectly improve welfare (children can study later in the day,
which enhances their later career prospects). Other economic benefits
include lower health care costs, such as for coal-related illnesses and
conditions [16,17].
Renewable energies also have implications for a country’s international
relations [18–21]. A country and/or region that predominantly
relies on renewables is, for example, less vulnerable to manipulation by
foreign suppliers as it faces less asymmetric dependencies and those
states are less likely to enter energy-related conflicts. Moreover, the
volatility associated with renewable sources of energy is best addressed
by both having a greater variety of renewables energies and increasing
the connections between different sources. A large multi-state network is
more stable and efficient than a small local network and ensures availability
at the right time at the lowest possible price. This kind of
multilateral technical cooperation can have knock-on effects. As Smith
Stegen ([21], 92) argues, “the interconnectedness required of renewable
energy communities may bring us closer to a ‘functionalist’ [23,24]
model of collaboration, in which economic and technical collaboration
can potentially lead—via spill-over effects—to political cooperation and
stability.” Thus, energy cooperation could deepen European integration
[25].
In sum, the green cluster could become an interconnected region
with a high degree of cooperation and interdependence. This Europe
would reap the (geo)political and socio-economic benefits of renewable
energies and be able to minimize the negative aspects of fossil fuel
dependence. The countries of the blue cluster would still be bound to
fossil fuels, which provides them with short-term security of supply, but
obstruct the political and socio-economic benefits of renewable energies.
These countries would be more likely to have bilateral rather
than multilateral connections with each other and to be less connected,
in general, to the more prosperous green Europe.
What could be points of contention between the “two Europes”? We
venture that there are at least four potential issue areas. First, the blue
cluster states may feel themselves to be under growing and unfair
pressure to become “greener”. Indeed, many Eastern European states
already resent and resist such pressure. Second, as the formation of the
Visegrad 4 group indicates, the states within each of the two Europes
might start to align with each other according to their mutual interests,
particularly to defend national energy security sovereignty. In the
future, we might see a clear political separation of the eastern and
western states. Third, the differences in quality of life between Western
Europe and Eastern Europe may be perpetuated and even exacerbated.
Among other effects, this might cause greater east to west migration,
which could heighten existing tensions and has implications for European
cohesion. The exit of the UK from the EU, for example, has been
attributed in large part to such migration. Last but not least, the divisions
within Europe may render the EU vulnerable to divide-andconquer
tactics by third-party countries, such as Russia or China. The
controversy and bitterness over the Russian and German North-Stream 2
natural gas pipeline indicates how polarizing energy security issues can
be [12,27]. Tensions have also emerged over China’s activities in
Europe. As part of its Belt-and-Road Initiative, China created the ‘16 þ 1
Cooperation Platform’ with 16 Central and Eastern European countries,
including 11 EU Member States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and
Bulgaria). The 16 þ 1 platform has raised eyebrows within Brussels, as it
seems to exclude the European Union on purpose.
A recent comparison of German and Polish strategies to achieving
energy security—including a focus on renewable energies and interconnectors—reveals
that different transition speeds, energy security
interests and desire for cooperation are already having effects on the two
countries’ relations [28]. Interviews with industry elites, experts and
political decision-makers from both countries demonstrated that,
although they share similar concerns about energy security—at a general
level—their perceptions and opinions are almost diametrically
opposite. For example, whereas Germany has embraced a transition to
renewable energies (and a rejection of nuclear power) as a way to
achieve energy supply security, Poland is highly skeptical of renewable
energies and there are widespread beliefs that they are too expensive
and volatile and, for these reasons, pose a threat to energy supply
security.
German and Polish interviewees also have contrasting views on the
foreign policy and geopolitical implications of renewable energies. In
Germany, renewables are considered the best option for lessening
dependence on foreign energy and attaining energy self-sufficiency, but
in Poland “greater dependence on renewables is perceived as perpetuating
Poland’s energy dependence on foreign countries” [28]; 3).
Because of its long-term dependence on Russia for energy, Polish interviewees
prioritized self-sufficiency, which they believe could be best
achieved with domestic coal, nuclear power and (potentially) shale gas.
In addition, Germany and Poland have different perceptions of the
benefits of renewable energies. Polish interviewees perceive greater
deployment of renewable energies as entailing high social, economic
and political costs. First, the Polish coal industry employs about 100,000
workers. Dislodging those people and their dependents would have
profound political implications. Second, the Polish grid is outdated and
insufficient. Modernizing and expanding it—so that it could accommodate
renewable sources of energy—would be exorbitantly expensive.
These differences have already influenced relations between Poland
and Germany and Poland and the EU. For example, some polish interviewees
expressed wariness about becoming dependent on German
renewable technologies and are suspicious and resentful of Germany’s
push for Poland to adopt more renewables. Poland is also a member of
the Visegrad 4 group and a member of China’s 16 þ 1 Platform—both of
which seem to exclude and/or counter the EU.
In sum, the dynamics between Germany and Poland and the divergent
perceptions of renewable energy exemplify what could happen on a
broader scale between two Europes.
If two distinct Europes indeed emerge, how might their relations
evolve? We sketch three preliminary scenarios based on different configurations
of how the two clusters (1) perceive the best way to achieve
energy security (less import dependence through renewables versus
reliability through fossil fuels and gas interconnectors) and (2) their
appetite for cooperation and integration. The first scenario flows from
what appears to be happening now—divergent perceptions of energy
security and lack of cooperation. Under this scenario, the two Europes
continue to separate and two competing blocs may emerge. Specifically,
M.E. Mata P�erez et al.
Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100415
5
the two Europes would have different energy sources and limited interconnections
between them. However, if energy security interests
diverge but cooperation and grid interconnectedness become more
attractive, then European energy security—in total—could become
more versatile. Under this second scenario, the two Europes could balance
each other out. When renewable input into the grid is low, then
natural gas could come onstream. And, when renewable resources are
abundant, the gas plants—which are more expensive—could be
switched off. A third scenario would envision a Europe in which, after
initial divergence, the two sides move towards each other in terms of
their energy security strategies and desire for network interconnectedness.
The triggers for such a convergence could be renewable energy
technology transfers, environmental protests, or greater incentives from
the EC. This re-unification would lead to a strengthened Energy Union,
which is the EC’s goal.
4. A way forward
Referring to East-West divergences, Jean-Claude Juncker, in his capacity
as the EC’s President, stated that “Europe must breathe with both
lungs. Otherwise our continent will struggle for air” [22]. It is no
different with the Energy Union.
The typical EU solution to the multi-speed energy transition would
be a well-integrated internal energy market supported by interconnected
European networks, and a common voice in external relations
with energy producers. If this vision would be fulfilled, the electricity
and gas interconnections would indeed allow Western Europe to balance
an increasingly intermittent supply, while Eastern Europe could diversify
natural gas imports by including Norwegian and Algerian gas and
accessing Atlantic LNG ports. More internal trade in this fashion would
also bolster a common external stance as external trade deals are likely
to involve more EU members. While essentially a good strategy towards
realizing the Energy Union, the dilemma remains that Member States
have sovereignty over their national energy mix and will make decisions
about renewables based on their economic and political needs. In
addition, such a strategy does not address the difference between winwin
and win-lose perceptions of member states vis-�a-vis renewable
energies.
The sovereignty issue has long hindered efforts at greater integration.
For example, the internal energy market is still far from being integrated
and resilient, despite the 2014 deadline for its completion.
Differences in national energy priorities have slowed progress, a challenge
the EC can only partly overcome. Action by the EC is limited by
Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty, agreed in 2017. It states that measures
established by the European Parliament and Council to achieve energy
market objectives and security of supply “shall not affect a Member
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources,
its choice between different energy sources and the general
structure of its energy supply”. In order to harmonize the European
external voice, the EC has presented an amendment to the Gas Directive
2009/73/EC that would grant the EC exclusive competence in
concluding agreements with third countries [29]. The EC has claimed
that the amendment will enhance the solidarity between Member States
and improve the functioning of the Energy Union. This move, however,
can be seen as a step towards shifting the competence in energy policy
from the Member States to the EU (it also contravenes the spirit of
Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty).
The second issue relates to the differing views of renewable energy.
As long as renewable energy is considered a win-win issue for Western
Europe (greater independence from imports and economic opportunities)
and a win-lose issue for Eastern Europe (potential supply security
but costly), the EC is unlikely to overcome fundamental differences. In
order to protect the Energy Union from a multi-speed energy transition,
the EC might have to resort to more political rather than administrative
means. It might have to broker a grand deal, i.e. a political compromise,
between its Member States in order to ensure that the economic benefits
of renewable energy also reach the periphery. This compromise would
roughly have to entail that Eastern Europe pursues renewable energy as
a policy priority for improving its security of supply as well as climate
commitments, while Western Europe would compensate for this. In
order to reduce the expected burden on Eastern European consumers in
the short-term, Western Europe could offer cheap loans or pay for
infrastructure projects (also to counter China’s ambitions in this regard)
so that the Eastern workforce and industry can adapt to the energy
transition and lower its emissions. Western clean-tech factories could
also be located in Eastern Europe by their home governments on purpose.
Western businesses would benefit from low wages (and hence
global competitiveness) while Eastern citizens benefit from employment.
Eastern Europe would hence both import and produce Western
renewable energy technology, while Western Europe may retain market
shares otherwise lost to global competitors.
While the challenges regarding the internal market and external
voice are well-document, the different perceptions about the benefits of
renewable energy have yet to be incorporated in EU policy. We believe
this industrial component should be added to the standard package if
further divergence between west and east is to be prevented. There is
obviously a price to pay. Such political objectives come with an economic
cost [14], but the real question is whether the EU can afford to
continue down its current path, which would entail a hefty political cost.
Acknowledgements
This policy perspective builds upon a conference paper and internship
report by Mata P�erez, which were proposed and supervised by
Scholten. The internship was carried out at the Directorate-General for
Energy (DG ENER), European Commission. It also builds upon earlier
work done by Heinrich et al. [28]. We would like to express our gratitude
to the people and institutions involved. They have enabled us to
write this perspective. Please note that the views are those of the authors
and need not represent those of the people and institutions we
acknowledge here.
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