| online lessons and media content | 26 hours (6 weeks) | 1 ECTS |
| assigned readings | 75 hours | 3 ECTS |
| test preparation | 26 hours | 1 ECTS |
| total workload | 125 hours | 5 ECTS |
You are currently viewing the whole syllabus; go back to default view.
The speed of loading and viewing the syllabus may be slower when showing a large amount of content.
Chapter contains:
1
Discussion Forum
1
Study text
Chapter contains:
5
ROPOT
1
Study text
Chapter contains:
1
Discussion Forum
6
PDF
2
Video
1
Study text
7
Web
Teacher recommends to study from 11/10/2021 to 18/10/2021.
Chapter contains:
1
Discussion Forum
1
ROPOT
6
PDF
1
Video
1
Study text
Teacher recommends to study from 18/10/2021 to 25/10/2021.
Chapter contains:
5
PDF
1
Video
1
Study text
Teacher recommends to study from 25/10/2021 to 1/11/2021.
Chapter contains:
7
PDF
2
Video
1
Study text
Teacher recommends to study from 1/11/2021 to 8/11/2021.
Chapter contains:
5
PDF
1
Video
1
Study text
Teacher recommends to study from 8/11/2021 to 15/11/2021.
Chapter contains:
3
PDF
1
Video
1
Study text
Teacher recommends to study from 15/11/2021 to 22/11/2021.
Course information
Course description
The course will guide students to an
understanding of the context, design, and decision-making process behind the
key economic instrument utilized in modern diplomacy and especially crisis and
coercive diplomacy - international sanctions. The course is
dedicated explicitly to sanctions (with a key focus on EU restrictive measures) and examines the impact in the
innovation, design, and execution of sanction regimes at the forefront of
global developments.
ECTS Credits: 5
Max no. of students: 30
Level: graduate
Language: English
Lecturer: Mgr.
Martin Chovančík, Ph.D.
Learning outcomes
By
the end of the course students should be able to:
- identify appropriate contexts of
sanctions use and articulate the
interplay with other economic and diplomatic instruments
- compare the toolkit utilized by actors to
address diplomatic challenges, crisis, or conflict
- competently
analyze/appraise the
weaknesses and compromises made in particular sanctions regimes
- assess and criticize the sanctions imposed from the
point of view of the targeted and designing country
- assess and criticize the EU restrictive measures design and limitations in a typology of cases
Time allocation
Course requirements
1) Readings
2) Lectures
3) 2 Online open-book examinations
a) 1 test will be shorter knowledge-based
b) 1 test will be a conceptual examination, where you will be asked to assess the design of a real-world sanctions regime and identify gaps or feasible improvements
1) Readings
2) Lectures
3) 2 Online open-book examinations
a) 1 test will be shorter knowledge-based
b) 1 test will be a conceptual examination, where you will be asked to assess the design of a real-world sanctions regime and identify gaps or feasible improvements
- You may successfully pass the course only by having written and passed both tests.
- Grading is determined on a standard scale where 60% is required for passing.
Links to first test:
Final test
Second (final) test
This is an open book test with 4 open questions asking you to explain the studied phenomena in an inter-related way.
There are a 100minutes for the test and you may take it within a 7-hour window during the published exam dates.
The test application only becomes active during the designated time. (10:00-17:00 on the day)
Pick one
If you were to fail, you may enroll in a subsequent term as a resit. But only after your evaluation had been entered and only if that evaluation is F.
14. 1. 2022 10:00
19. 1. 2022 10:00
22. 1. 2022 10:00
Final date for final test - 100minutes on 28 01 2022 10 00 - 28 01 2022 18 00
1 Crises, int. engagement, bargaining theory, and sanctions in diplomacy and negotiation 18/10/2021
The crucial question to start with in our understanding of international sanctions (and by the time we progress to design, even more specifically EU sanctions) is the comprehension of bargaining theory, strategic interaction, and the coercive spectrum.
The literature assigned below points your attention to the first two of these approaches, while the accompanying lecture focuses on the coercive spectrum and the space within which sanctions may be utilized and effectively implemented.
Robert
Art and Patrick Cronin, Coercive
Diplomacy, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall
(eds.), 2007, Leashing the Dogs of War, US Institute of Peace, Washington., pp.
299-319
(2015) Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence, International Interactions, 41:4, 744-754, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710
Furthermore, the following texts help us understand where sanctions fall within "complex approaches" in terms of coercion or support for policy. We tend to view sanctions as negative punishment of behavior that is to be altered, yet sanctions often form a support structure to progress negotiation or bargaining - or very importantly - create the space for dialogue.
The two following texts talk about incentivization and UN experiences with utilizing sanctions (noting of course also the downsides).
Thomas Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker, and David Lanz, “UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice”, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 18 February 2019.
EMMANUEL NG. Third-Party Incentive Strategies and Conflict Management in Africa. Air & Space Power Journal: Afrique et Francophonie. 2016;7(1):14-29
Repositories
Here you may find links to relevant data portals for the major sanctions actors.
Repositories
Here you may find links to relevant data portals for the major sanctions actors.
EU
UN
USA
Lecture
The lecture comes in two parts and connects the above-mentioned texts providing context for the milieu of international sanctions among many other tools. The second part of the lecture looks at the specific example of Myanmar and proceeds to discuss the strategic interaction with the use of sanctions in negotiation.
2 Sanctions history, key actors, and institutional limitations 25/10/2021
As you've heard from the previous lecture, and no doubt seen mentioned in the literature - international sanctions carry a stigma from the blanket approaches of the 1990s - namely in the case of Iraq, Haiti, or BiH and others.
The 1990s are however not the departure point for sanctions practice, merely a hugely impactful period of activity. This weeks material is intended to provide a broader picture of the:
- history of sanctions development
- institutional development based on sanctions use
- key limitations of the main actors utilizing sanctions
- the multilateral dilemma and commitment issue in sanctions design
- and lastly, the main avenues of sanctions smartening of the past decades
Farrall, J. M. (2009). United Nations sanctions and the rule of law. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 45-78.
(2007) The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory, Survival, 49:4, 99-110, DOI: 10.1080/00396330701733902
Special focus on institutional limitations
UN Angola Sanctions – A Committee Success Revisited By Anders Möllander March 2009
Sanctions On Iraq - Talk by Denis Halliday & Phyllis Bennis
I recommend watching at least the first half of this panel contribution on the impact of Iraq sanctions. See if you can draw any parallels to current events.
Lecture
The lecture focuses a lot more on sanctions actors and the genesis of their approach to sanction than general sanctions history. Not only are the two intertwined, but the literature above does a great service in covering the main threads of the historical development of sanctions.
First knowledge-based test is upcoming Nov. 12th.
The test will be held in the IS ROPOT (contains closer instructions). Consists of 10 multiple-choice questions and is self-evaluated.
There are 20 minutes to complete the test (this time period starts when you first open the test and doesn't stop running if you close it), you may start the test on November 12th anytime between 9AM and 17PM CET.
The link to the test is here:
3 Sanctions logic and their targeting, packaging, and impact 1/11/2021
This week builds on the previous ones in developing our understanding of various design options for international sanctions. Based on the historical evidence from past weeks and the commentary and lecture on developing smart sanctions - the readings herein provide very good guidance for understanding what "SMART" sanctions actually entail.
The lecture introduces several concepts not introduced in great detail in the texts to illustrate the practical "LOGICS" of what sanctions aim to achieve and how SMART sanctions are applicable within any one of those logics. The goal is to understand the fine line between combining smart sanctions and using more blanket conventional sanctions toward the same goal.
Eriksson, M. (2016). Targeting peace: Understanding UN and EU targeted sanctions. pp. 233-247.
Woo, B., Verdier, D. (2020). A unifying theory of positive and negative incentives in international relations: sanctions, rewards, regime types, and compliance. Econ Gov 21, 215–236.
Lucena Carneiro, C., & Apolinário, L. (2016). Targeted Versus Conventional Economic Sanctions: What Is at Stake for Human Rights? International Interactions, 42(4), 565–589.
Pandeyu, S. (2018). Sanctions on Pakistan and their Failure as Strategic Deterrent. ORF Issue Brief no. 251
Lecture
4 Sanctions effectiveness and circumvention, EU challenges 8/11/2021
Effectiveness
Effectiveness is by far the most frequently discussed facet of sanctions and also stands for the broadest body of literature on sanctions. The reason is quite simple, criticism draws attention, and we do not agree on what makes a sanction regime effective?
Is it complete capitulation of the target? Is it partial acquiescence? Is it no side effects? Is it fair to judge sanctions by their applied goals, their actual goals, or the actual goals while taking into account the limited number of alternative options? What are the relevant metrics?
Importantly, we aim to improve the effectiveness of all sanction regimes. If that is true, should we not make them more robust and hard-hitting instead of targeting and tailoring? After reading the texts on these facets the lecture also discusses the plethora of variables that impact the effectiveness of a sanction regime and debates the relative weight and normative impact of event hose sanctions regimes we might deem ineffective.
Pape. R.A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, Vol. 22. Issue 2. 90-136.
Dizaji, S. F., & van Bergeijk, P. A. G. (2013). Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of economic sanctions: A VAR approach with an application to Iran. Journal of Peace Research, 50(6), 721–736. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313485487
Rosenberg, E., Z. K. Goldman, D. Drezner, and J. Solomon-Strauss. 2016. The New Tools of Economic Warfare: Effects and Effectiveness of Contemporary US Financial Sanctions. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security
Circumvention
The chain is only as strong as the weakest link, right? An effective sanction regime must be bulletproof, right?
The assigned readings point to who the most typical sanction busters are, and what the effects of even a unilateral sanction regime you would not expect to work may be. And yes, the many circumvention, organized crime, grey market, point diversion, and illicit routes and methods a sanction regime is able to inspire.
The presentation offers practical examples with illustrations of the typical manners of sanction circumvention with key terminology and descriptions of daily practice of sanction due diligence officers from banking institutions to the state apparatus.
And because circumvention is quite undesirable, and every innovation to block it is likely to breed more innovative ways of circumvention, the lecture builds up to explaining what secondary sanctions are and why they are a very potent tool despite their problematic extraterritorial forms adopted currently.
Early, B. R. (2015). Busted sanctions: Explaining why economic sanctions fail. 142-158 and 207-219.
Hastings, J. V. (2018). The complex relationship between sanctions and north korea's illicit trade. Asia Policy, 13(3), 28-34.
Lecture
5 Sanctions in arms trade, EU practice, and specifics of arms embargoes 15/11/2021
Arms embargoes
Why dedicate a separate category to the sanctions of arms embargoes? What makes them special in the context of other sanction measures available to the international community and the EU?
They are called for in crises situations as possibly the least-objectionable restrictive measure to clearly communicate that one does not support a violent escalation between the target parties. They are used often, in fact, the most often out of any other sanction type by the UN and frequently by the EU and many state actors.
Their prolific and unobjectionable use bears investigation into the type of effects to be expected of an effective arms embargo but also brings the question of whether an effective arms embargo (e.g. one being complied with by the senders, monitored, and enforced) is actually the right and proper tool to be implemented.
The lecture further illustrates the main trafficking routes relevant to conflicts with impact on the EU and the EU reaction to the deficiencies of this tool, culminating in the debate over the Common position on arms exports and the Arms Trade Treaty.
Erickson, J. (2020). Punishing the violators? Arms embargoes and economic sanctions as tools of norm enforcement. Review of International Studies, 46(1), 96-120. doi:10.1017/S0260210519000329
Michael Brzoska, & George A. Lopez. (2009). Putting Teeth in the Tiger : Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 205-254
(2015) Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya, European Security, 24:2, 264-286, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2014.967763
Erickson, J. L. (2013). Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004. Journal of Peace Research, 50(2), 159–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312470472
Lecture
6 EU sanctions, non-CFSP economic instruments, aid membership, and MFC status 22/11/2021
non-CFSP sanctions
International sanctions need not only come in the form of coercive punishment (managed by the EEAS under the EU or OFAC under the US). Regional organizations and individual states also have access to sanctions in the form of interruption/alteration of existing incentives extended to the target.
This takes on the form of interrupting, or canceling aid, increasing tariffs, introducing capital controls, tightening banking regulations, and much more. You can easily see how these measures would overlap into the competencies beyond the EEAS or OFAC. Not all aid is however equally subject to conditionality.
Particularly in the case of the EU, this creates a dual-track approach to sanctions which requires coordination, but if coordinated properly allows for packaging with CFSP sanctions in a more effective and versatile regime.
To illustrate, the lecture goes through humanitarian and development aid patterns and possible coercion via their alteration and illustrates on the case of Myanmar the possible dual-track combination of measures imposed by EU bodies with vastly different mandates.
(2014) Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign policy: coherence by accident?, Contemporary Politics, 20:1, 63-76, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2014.881605