Renewable energy and money

Transition optimists, calm down



However, vRES are the success story of the decade



Recent and future worldwide LCOE estimates

Worldwide energy prices over the last decade



Generation costs in cents (US\$)



Source: <u>FSR</u> using data from: IEA (2020), BloombergNEF (2020), IRENA (2020), Lazard (2020)

How did we get here?

- Demand pull
- Low barriers to entry
- Homogenous products
- Mature silicon industry (PV)



Cumulative global solar installed capacity by country (2006-12)

Future in the making

Renewable share of annual power capacity expansion



Source: IRENA

Transition pessimist, calm down

THE S-CURVES OF TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS



Source: Sovacool, 2016 from Grübler, 1991

Where next? The transition feedback loops

GW 180 WEO 2020 RE Update 160 140 WEO 2019 120 Actual deployment 100 WEO 2017 80 WEO 2017 60 VEO 2016 40 WEO 2015 20 WEO 2009 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035

Source: Carbon Brief; Notes: projections represent the IEA's Stated Policies Scenarios (STEPS) taken from the World Energy Outlook (WEO); RE Update from the IEA's Renewable Energy Market Update³⁰

3.1 IEA FORECASTS OF SOLAR DEPLOYMENT



Source: US EIA Annual Energy Outlook series, 1995-2020.14

Figure 6. Disruption of Coal Power in the United States

Sources: <u>Carbon Brief</u>, <u>RethinkX</u>

The volume-cost loop



The technology loop



The expectations loop



The finance loop





The politics loop



Getting there: support policies

- Feed-in tariffs and quotas
- Feed-in premium
- Auctions
 - RES in
 - Fossil fuels out

Additional info on auctions:

https://auresproject.eu/sites/auresproject.eu/files/media/documents/design_elements_october2015.pdf

4.1. AUCTION-SPECIFIC DESIGN ELEMENTS

- 4.1.1. Price-only/multi criteria auctions
- 4.1.2. Type of auction: auction formats and pricing rules
- 4.1.3. Price ceilings and minimum prices

4.1.4. Other

- 4.1.4.1. Seller concentration rules
- 4.1.4.2. Information provision
- 4.1.4.3. Web-based vs. in-person auctions
- 4.1.4.4. Secondary market

4.2. ADDITIONAL RES AUCTION-SPECIFIC DESIGN ELEMENTS

- 4,2.1. Targets/Scope/Volume auctioned 4.2.1.1 How to set the volume auctioned? 4.2.1.2. Energy or capacity-related remuneration 4.2.1.3. Volumes auctioned 4.2.1.4. Number and frequency of rounds 4.2.1.5. Volume auctioned in each round 4.2.1.6. What to do with the amounts not awarded and not built 4.2.2. Diversity: Technological, size, actors, geographical 4.2.2.1. Technological diversity 4.2.2.2. Size diversity 4.2.2.3. Geographical diversity 4.2.2.4. Actor diversity 4.2.2.5. Other diversity types 4.2.3. Prequalification criteria 4.2.4. Duration of contract 4.2.5. Penalties for non-compliance/delays 4.2.6. Updating of remuneration over time 4.2.7. Other design elements 4.2.7.1. Local content rules
 - 4.2.7.2.. Deadlines and grace periods.

Country-specific conditions

- Potential of renewable energy resources
- Financing costs
- Installation and building costs (land, labour, energy, etc.)
- Ease of access to equipment
- Foreign exchange rates
- General fiscal legislation

Investor confidence and learning curve

Credibility of the off-taker and additional guarantees Presence of a stable and enabling environment that is conducive to market growth Past experience with auctions for both auctioneer and developers

Policies supporting renewables

- Renewable energy targets and national plans that provide a trajectory for the sector
- Fiscal and financial incentives for RE projects
- · Grid access rules
- Risk mitigation
 instruments
- Policies to promote broader development objectives (incl. socioeconomic benefits and industrial development)

Auction design

Trade-off between lowest price and other objectives:

- Auction demand (auctioned volume, off-taker, regularity of auctions)
- Qualification
 requirements
- Winner selection method and criteria
- Sellers' liabilities
 (compliance rules
 distribution of financial
 and production risks)

Price resulting from an auction

Market design matters: LCOE sensitivity to a +/- 10% change in input parameters (onshore wind, PEF)



PEF: At, Be, Fr, De, Lux, NI, Sui

Costs of capital (WACC)

Solar PV





GR Greece, GT Guatemala, IN India, MX Mexico, MY Malaysia, PE Peru, JO Jordan, SA Saudi Arabia, SV El Salvador, TH Thailand, ZA South Africa

Note: Only countries with at least 50 MW installed capacity end of 2017 are shown.

Onshore wind

$\mathrm{WACC}_{\mathrm{after-tax}}$



Financing year

Elicitation of project finance data

- 🔶 Egli et al 2018
- Lorenzoni/Bano 2009
- Shrimali et al 2013

Survey of expert estimates

Angelopoulos et al 2016

Angelopoulos et al 2017

- Wood/Ross 2012
- Wood/10080 2012

Analysis of financial market data

- Estache/Steichen 2015
- Partridge 2018
- Werner/Scholtens 2016

Abbreviations:

AT Austria, BG Bulgaria, BR Brazil, BE Belgium, DE Germany, DK Denmark, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, HR Croatia, IE Ireland, IN India, IT Italy, LT Lithuania, NL Netherlands, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, SE Sweden, US United States

Note: Only countries with at least 50 MW installed capacity end of 2017 are shown.

LCOE breakdown (onshore wind, PEF)



PEF: At, Be, Fr, De, Lux, NI, Sui

Source: Agora EW

=> regulatory environment effects can be larger than cost effects from differences in resource availability

Towards a new market design



Integrating RES: re-imagining the market

A few examples from FSR's design ideas overview

- Power-only market
- National + local energy markets
- Capacity + flexibility markets

Future market inputs



Where next? Solar, wind, battery systems



Source: <u>RethinkX</u>

Towards extreme abundance?



Source: <u>RethinkX</u>