Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Local opposition and acceptance of a deep geological repository of
radioactive waste in the Czech Republic: A frame analysis
Petr Ocelíka,b,c,⁎
, Jan Osičkaa,b,c
, Veronika Zapletalováa,c
, Filip Černocha,c
, Břetislav Dančáka,c
a
Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia
b
International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia
c
Center for Energy Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Local opposition
Deep geological repository
Frame analysis
The Czech Republic
Local governance
Nuclear energy
A B S T R A C T
The article explores framing of the siting process of a deep geological repository of nuclear waste in the Czech
Republic by the municipalities’ representatives in the pre-selected localities. Three distinguished frames have
been reconstructed. The risk frame, which connects the project with a number of predominantly environmental
threats, is counter-balanced by the responsibility frame that uses the ‘Not-In-My-Back-Yard’ label to
delegitimize the local opposition. The third frame then portrays the siting process as a display of general
distrust towards political elites and state institutions. It is argued that the distinguished frames stem from a
deeper ideological conflict about the nature of democratic governance and the value attributed to environment,
further stressing the importance of a siting process’ institutional arrangement that goes beyond technocratic
solutions.
1. Introduction
The management of radioactive waste is a critical challenge to
nuclear industry all-around the world (Ferreira et al., 2009; Greenberg,
2013; Herring, 2010). Although geological disposal has been accepted
as a solution of the problem by most countries with nuclear energy as
well as scientific community (Lidskog and Andersson, 2002; Rempe,
2007), a single definitive siting decision has been reached so far
(Posiva, 2015). The challenge, as Lidskog and Andersson (2002: p. 9)
point out, is to create a system of radioactive waste management that is
“scientifically, politically and publicly acceptable.” Generally, the siting
of hazardous waste facilities is not just a technological process, but it is
firmly embedded within a socio-cultural context (Futrell, 2003; Graaff,
2016; Kojo et al., 2012; Lidskog, 1993; Litmanen, 1996; Ramana,
2013), and thus can be interpreted from radically different perspectives.
As Weinberg (1972) argues, such complex (socio)technological
systems give rise to questions that cannot be answered only by mere
scientific reasoning since they are deeply rooted in value-judgments.
This directly impacts the issue of public acceptance/opposition
(Greenberg, 2013; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2013),
articulated especially at the local level (Fan, 2006; Kang and Jang,
2013; Litmanen, 1996), which is considered to be of a crucial
importance for implementation of a siting plan in any democratic
society (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Lidskog and Andersson, 2002;
Webler et al., 2001).
In contrast to Finland and Sweden, consolidated democracies with
well-developed public participation (Hendriks et al., 2015), the Czech
Republic represents a case of democratic transition (Dufek and Holzer,
2016; Mansfeldová, 2013), only marginally covered by literature so far
(Ďurďovič et al., 2014; Frantál and Malý, 2017), where institutions of
local democracy have been gradually negotiated and adopted (Čermák
and Stachová, 2010; Vajdová et al., 2006). Notably, these institutions
emerge the slowest in issues that are prone to path dependency, among
which the energy industry certainly belongs (Sivek et al., 2012; Jirušek
et al., 2015; Vlček and Jirušek, 2015; Vlček, 2016). As a legacy of the
command, centrally-planned economy, where economic, social and
environmental costs of energy conversions were outweighed by political
and security-related concerns, the Czech energy industry has been
governed predominantly by technicians. A long tradition in uranium
mining and advanced technological know-how then contributed to a
development of nuclear energy as an additional source to coal-based
power generation portfolio. Since technicians have been recruited from
energy industry directly into the decision-making bodies, Czech energy
policy, and even more so nuclear energy policy, has habitually been
decided upon by a closed, technically-oriented community. As a result,
there has been only limited public discussion about the energy issues
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.025
Received 5 November 2016; Received in revised form 7 March 2017; Accepted 9 March 2017
⁎
Corresponding author at: Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Joštova 10, Brno 60200, Czechia.
E-mail addresses: petr.ocelik@gmail.com (P. Ocelík), osicka@mail.muni.cz (J. Osička), zapletal@fss.muni.cz (V. Zapletalová), cernoch@mail.muni.cz (F. Černoch),
dancak@fss.muni.cz (B. Dančák).
Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
Available online 16 March 2017
0301-4215/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
MARK
whatsoever (Osička and Černoch, 2017).
Although the Czech Republic belongs among countries with the
highest support of nuclear energy (Eurobarometer, 2010), the question
of the spent nuclear fuel permanent disposal remains to be a contested
issue (Čermák et al., 2015; Černoch and Zapletalová, 2015; comp. with
CVVM, 2015). Even though the siting process has now been running
for more than 20 years, no substantial progress has been achieved. On
the contrary, the mobilization against the project have intensified after
the list of pre-selected localities1
was published in 2003, and then again
in 2014, after the geological exploration licenses were awarded (see
Ďurďovič et al. (2014)). The closing deadline for the identification of
the two pre-final destinations set on 2020 is further polarizing the
debate between the investor (i.e. the state) and the local communities.
The article uncovers and explores ideological underpinnings of this
conflict which have been obstructed largely by “Not-In-My-Backyard”
labeling (Gibson, 2005; Schively, 2007; comp. with Badera and Kocoń,
2015) adopted by most of the supporters of the project. More
specifically, we are interested in how different interpretations of the
project are socially constructed and promoted at the local level (Kousis,
1999; della Porta and Rucht, 2002; della Porta and Piazza, 2007; Kang
and Jang, 2013; Usher, 2013). In line with Futrell (2003: p. 360), we
argue that the emergence of local opposition or of acceptance cannot be
reduced to the activation of latent individually-held attitudes and
beliefs, but is rather “an outcome of potentially complex, collective
framing processes.” These frames can be seen as particular understandings
of reality that promote collective action. We aim to explore
the framing of the contested issue from the perspective of the mayors of
the respective municipalities. This includes frames which either oppose
or support the project. The focus on mayors was motivated by their
critical position in the decision-making process where they have a
mediating position between local communities and authorized state
institutions (see Botetzagias and Karamichas (2009), Özen (2009)).
Moreover, they have very close and informal ties to local communities,
often represent the “voice of the community”, and are frequently
directly involved in local opposition (and potentially also acceptance)
activities.
In this context, we deal with the following question: How is the
issue of deep geological repository of radioactive waste (henceforth
the issue or the project) framed from the perspective of mayors in preselected
localities? Since data was collected during 2014, the identified
frames should be seen as snapshots of the prevailing discursive
structuration of the issue.
2. Theory
Most of the literature on local opposition distances itself from the
“Not-In-My-Back-Yard” (NIMBY) concept (see e.g. Burningham et al.,
2006; Devine-Wright, 2005; Wolsink, 2006). The NIMBY explanation
of local opposition is based on a “paradox” that while a certain project
or technology is in principle supported by the majority of the population,
its proposed realization is often strongly opposed by local
residents (Van Der Horst, 2007). This “social gap” is explained as a
result of individually rational actions where individual costs substantially
overweight individual benefits which leads to a collective suboptimal
outcome (Bell et al., 2005; Wolsink, 2000). Besides the NIMBY
explanation there is a number of approaches that take into account a
wide variety of factors that extend beyond the rationalist perspective
(for review see Devine-Wright (2007)). These “post-NIMBY” approaches
explain local opposition as a result of a complex interplay
of various context-dependent factors (Devine-Wright, 2007; Wolsink,
2000) and tend to stress non-individual levels of explanation
(Burningham et al., 2006; Futrell, 2003; Tindall, 2002).
This includes discursive construction of a contested issue which
illuminates how the understanding and experiencing of environmental
issues is being formed (see della Porta and Piazza (2007), Futrell
(2003), Hajer (2005), Schlosberg (2013), Taylor (2000), Usher (2013)).
Fan (2006) documents how the local opposition to nuclear waste
repository (NWR) at Orchid Islands has been reinforced through
different framings of environmental justice. Litmanen (1996: pp.
529, 533) argues that disputes over NWR in Finland were fueled by
struggles over “scientific-technical, economic, and political definitions”
of the radioactive waste which are “linked with different value and
belief systems.” Similarly, Kang and Jang (2013) in their study of the
local opposition to NWR at Kyungju, South Korea, show how different
framing strategies are used and embedded in a wider political discourse
and value systems of stakeholders. Futrell (2003) explores frame
building processes of the local opposition towards chemical-weapons
disposal program and shows that it has been established as a
negotiated and reasoned reaction to information uncertainty, not as a
consequence of selfish or irrational claims. We build on this research
(also see della Porta and Piazza (2007), Kousis (1999), Rucht (2002),
Usher (2013)) by identifying the prevailing framings of the issue.
The research is meta-theoretically grounded in the constructivist
tradition (see Berger and Luckmann (1991), Goffman (1974)) which
assumes that reality is created, maintained and transformed chiefly
through the complex processes of social construction. The social
construction of meanings can be reconstructed by using frame analysis.
According to Snow and Benford (1992: p. 137), frames can be understood
as “interpretive schemata” which are used to “simplify and
condense the ‘world out there’.” Frame analysis thus provides us with
an understanding of meaning constructions through which “people
come to embrace a particular version of reality” (Futrell, 2003: p. 364).
This understanding is determined by the content of the given frame
and by what is left out or suppressed. Entman (2004: p. 5) thus
understands framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of
events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote
a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” In this view,
framing is understood as an intentional and strategic process in which
a plurality of contesting actors promotes particular interpretations
rather than others (Oliver and Johnston, 2000: p. 8; Van Gorp, 2007).
In this context, it is common to recognize different effects conveyed
by framing processes as “frame functions” (Benford and Snow, 2000;
Entman, 1993). Entman (1993) distinguishes four frame functions.
First, frames define problems: they determine what the causal agent is
doing and what the costs and benefits (usually measured in terms of
common cultural values) of these actions are. Second, frames diagnose
causes, determining the origins of a given problem and designating the
potential culprit. It is typical to portray the antagonists as specific
people or social groups rather than impersonal forces (see Polletta and
Ho (2006)). The third function is moral judgement of the causal agents;
this then creates the possibility to differentiate between “good” (us) and
“bad” (the others). The last function of frames is to suggest remedies
which offer a solution to the given problem. They legitimize and predict
the likely effect of these solutions and at the same time delegitimize the
measures of other groups (Entman, 1993). Suggesting a specific
measure thus limits the number of “reasonable” solutions to a problem
(Benford and Snow, 2000). In our research, the functions of moral
evaluation and problem solution are kept separate while the functions
of diagnosing causes and defining problems are merged together.
3. Methodology
Since our research aims to uncover the shared interpretative
schemes through which actors embrace particular understandings of
reality, we build on frame analysis methodology (see Lindekilde (2014),
Ocelík and Osička (2014)). This approach assumes that meaning of
words and other lexical units is dependent on their use (Wittgenstein,
1
Seven locations have been selected as potential repository sites: Čertovka, Březový
potok, Magdaléna, Čihadlo, Hrádek, Horka and Kraví Hora. For the map, see RAWRA
(2015).
P. Ocelík et al. Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
459
1958). In line with our previous work (Ocelík and Osička, 2014), we
understand frames as ideational devices that emphasize or marginalize
certain parts of discursive space.
The frames were reconstructed through the following coding
procedure. First, we – based on theoretical reflection as well as
repeated readings and re-coding of data – identified a set of codes
which were then organized and used as a coding scheme (see Appendix
B). The coding logic is instrumental, i.e. the coding does not focus on
the description and quantitative processing of the text data, but it
identifies more abstract concepts that attempt to capture (also tacit)
meanings of the speaker's utterances (Roberts, 2000). Each code then
labels a segment of text that carries a specific meaning (coding unit)
and interprets it. Second, two independent coders were trained to use
the coding scheme with required inter-rater reliability of Krippendorff's
alpha > 0.7 (Krippendorff, 2004) and intra-rater reliability level
correlation coefficient r > 0.7. These levels were achieved after 7
training sessions that were carried out during two months. Third, the
coders coded the entire data corpus. The data was reduced and sorted
out into code observations. Fourth, the relations between codes are
identified which lead us to the reconstruction of a frame. According to
the character of identified relations we further develop the meaning of
the codes and specify their role in the construction of a given frame
(Ocelík and Osička, 2014). Lastly, we show how the issue is framed
through the definition, evaluation and solution functions. The affiliation
of the respondent to the frame(s) is given by the number of
observed codes that belong to particular frame(s). Thus, whereas each
code belongs just to one frame,2
each respondent can be affiliated to
one or more frames. The frame is a unit of analysis; the interview
responses are then units of observation.
4. Data and methods
The data collection was done using semi-standardized interviews
which are commonly used for reconstruction of subjective understandings
and “personal theories” of the interviewees on a particular
issue (Seidman, 2013). The first part of the interview is common to all
interviewees and consists of a fixed set of general and open questions
aimed at personal reflection of the issue. In the second part, supplemental
and probe questions are asked in order to explore interesting or
unclear parts of the interview (for interview guide see Appendix G). The
selection of the interviewees was based on preliminary research and
expert consultations. In total, 32 interviews were conducted between
February and September 2014 with all mayors who are actively
involved in the issue.3
Informed consent was received at the beginning
of each interview (see Appendix F). Each interview was transcribed and
imported to via R software RQDA package (Huang, 2014). The whole
corpus consists of 284 standard pages; the length of an average
interview is app. 8.9 standard pages. Two independent coders then
coded the corpus with inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff's alfa) of
0.81 and intra-rater reliability (test-retest correlation) of 0.79, resp.
0.80 (see Appendix E). In total, 36 codes were used with 411
observations where the coders agreed (see Appendix C).
The research has not been carried out with a particular social
objective, nevertheless, we do not claim a “neutral” or an “objective”
position. We gather, process and interpret the data in accordance with
the (meta)theoretical assumptions and procedures described in the
previous Section.
5. Results
In this Section, we reconstruct and interpret the frames through
which the involved actors understand the issue of deep geological
repository. The frame is understood as an emerging pattern of relations
among a particular set of codes that establishes a relatively consistent
interpretation of the issue. This Section presents three reconstructed
frames, i.e. responsibility, risk, and dysfunctional state frames.
5.1. The Responsibility Frame: We all want light, we all wanna use
power, so we gotta find a way
The responsibility frame, used mainly by supporters, defines the
issue through a moral and legal obligation that arises from the mere
existence of nuclear waste and ultimately from the fact that we – as a
society – consume electric energy produced in nuclear power plants
(cost acknowledgment; see Appendices A and B). The existence of this
burden is then the starting point which leads to a number of
“inevitable” conclusions. The repository is seen as the only economically
and technologically viable way to deal with the issue safely. The
project is furthermore linked to the development of the energy industry
and of the economy as such. Since there are no realistic alternatives,
what might be questioned are the parameters of the project (such as its
location or its institutional and technological design), but not the
project itself. This combination of urgency and inevitability makes the
project the only moral option.
… [T]his civilization always does some wrongs to nature and so on
and you always have to find this middle ground so that it doesn’t
damage that much and that there’re also the results. We all want
light, we all wanna use power, so we gotta find a way because coal is
running out, so nuclear is gonna be the only option which could
provide electricity, so we have to figure out where to put that waste,
sensibly, where to put it and under what circumstances … (022:
168–171; cost acknowledgment)4
The actions of local opposition thus only transfer this responsibility
and the burden of the project to the following generations. Local
opposition is then evaluated as irresponsible, irrational, emotional,
ignorant or manipulative (irresponsible citizen; see Appendices A and
B). In other words, the opposition towards the project is seen as
motivated by narrow self-interest, incomplete knowledge, misinformation
and/or emotional ties to the locality (see Schively (2007)). This is
consistent with the findings of Özen (2009: p. 418) who identified a
contra-frame in which protesters are portrayed as “‘traitors’ who would
block economic development…” The project is rendered here as a
public, nation-wide, interest that contrasts with particular, selfish
interests of the opponents. The responsibility frame here utilizes the
NIMBY concept (proximity; see Appendices A and B) as expert
knowledge that further delegitimizes local opposition as a detrimental
social institution. This is supported by a common anti-progress and
anti-scientific labeling of local opposition (see e.g. della Porta and
Piazza, 2007; Özen, 2009; Schively, 2007). This irresponsibility of the
opponents is further emphasized and documented by their use of “nonstandard”
extra-institutional political methods such as protest marches
and demonstrations that disrupt established decision-making processes
and the principles of representation.
Nowadays, people chain themselves to a drill, the state and the
others should put their heads together and they should all treat each
other well and it shouldn’t be that one will push the other around,
this isn’t what democracy is about. (003: 103–105; irresponsible
citizen)
2
The two exceptions are codes community pressure and waste import that do not
belong to any of the frames. The community pressure is consistently used by actors who
otherwise have very different views of the issue. Thus it is not included in neither of the
identified frames. The waste import is – by different respondents – seen either as a
potential benefit, or as a potential cost.
3
Two interviews were conducted with mayors of municipalities which were not
selected as sites for a deep geological repository; however, they were actively involved in
the discussion about the depository. All the other interviews were conducted in person.
4
A code citation includes respondent's ID, location of the citation in an interview
transcript specified using line numbers, and name of the code (see Appendices B and H
for more information).
P. Ocelík et al. Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
460
In this context, local opposition is conceived as an anti-modernist
social force that threatens to destabilize not only economic prosperity
but also the democratic foundations of society. Seen as binary
opposites, local opposition is a mirror image of the supporters of the
project who are seen as responsible, rational, progressive, and wellinformed
people able to understand the project in a wider context. This
is in line with the elite democracy approach (Schumpeter, 2010) where
social and political elites elected in free elections enjoy a high degree of
autonomy in relation to the voters and to civil society. Expert knowledge
and powerful bureaucratic apparatus enable and entitle the elites
to deal with complex problems faced by modern societies. The people
then should “rule” just in the sense that they “have the opportunity of
accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter,
2010: p. 285). Thus, political participation that goes beyond active and
passive right to vote lacks legitimacy in this view.
… [I]f I was in the position of the state, I would do everything that
the law allows me to do, you know. … I would normally carry out all
those surveys without asking anyone. I would only inform them.
And then I would take that data from all this, ‘cause a lot of
questions and some of these … like … myths and things which can
be attacked from all sides and for what, they are here because we
simply don’t have the information. (011: 107–111; duty)
Providing this understanding of democratic governance, the responsibility
frame does not leave much room for questions of procedural
justice. It assumes that the decision-making process should take
place within the institutional framework described above. In other
words, “if everything goes according to the laws,” no discussion about
decision-making is needed (duty; see Appendices A and B). Thus the
legality of the decision is equated with its legitimacy. On the other
hand, the distributive dimension of justice is much more articulated
and emphasized. It is argued that the resulting distribution of costs and
benefits of the project for the locality should not be negative. The
financial compensations are considered to be the main instrument
through which a distributively just arrangement can be achieved as well
as an opportunity for local development.
We would definitely not be opposed to financial compensations. If a
location is set which will be surveyed, we’re not going to be heroes
that we don’t want that money. We would be pretty dumb to do that.
(008: 195–196; compensation payment)
This interpretation is underlined by utilitarian calculations which
make it possible to quantify and compare eventual costs and benefits of
different kinds, such as new employment opportunities, environmental
harm, decreased property value, or community costs, as well as an
anthropocentric approach to nature which attributes intrinsic value
only to people and their interests (see McShane (2009)). The proposed
solution is then based on promoting higher awareness about the
repository project among the local communities, adequate financial
compensations, and a decisive stance of the state and Radioactive
Waste Repository Authority (RAWRA).
5.2. The Risk Frame: Here you have a virgin landscape, that's what we
are here for
The risk frame, used mainly by opponents, is constructed through a
variety of risks associated with the repository project. The securityrelated
appeals are then based both on utilitarian, cost-benefit arguments
as well as on value-based arguments. The former arguments
refer mainly to decreased property value due to the stigmatization of
the locality and construction-related impacts such as increased traffic,
noise, air pollution and others (see Appendices A and B). The framing
based on the protection of the environment or quality of life has been
widely documented (e.g. della Porta and Andretta, 2002; Kaufman and
Smith, 1999; Özen, 2009). Environmental harms, most importantly
water loss, are mentioned both in utilitarian and value-based fashion.
In other words, it is not only the well-being of the local community that
is at stake, but also the intrinsic value of nature itself. The most
important value-based argument then relates to place attachment (see
Devine-Wright, 2009; for the Czech Republic see Frantál (2016),
Svobodová et al. (2011), Svobodová and Hájek (2016), described by
Devine-Wright (2007: p. 7) as “positive emotional bonds between
people and valued environments.”
Well, the people were counting on the fact that when we’re poor, at
least we have clean air and beautiful countryside here, clean water.
And now there's the risk that the people’ll lose the beautiful
countryside, the clean air, and they are even threating that clean
water. In this sense, I would say, it's a kind of patriotism, it's deeply
rooted in the people here … (006: 273–275; water loss)
—
… [H]ere you have a virgin landscape, that's what we are here for,
and this is one of the last places like it. And we, instead of protecting
it, we stick this monstrosity here. (024: 242–243; place attach-
ment)
These arguments are further supported by the knowledge of
“independent” experts that supports the critical claims of the opponents.
The risk frame thus rejects the dichotomy where superior expert
knowledge is at the disposal of the investor, i.e. the state and political
elites, whereas non-specialist (“lay”) or incomplete knowledge is
attributed to the opponents and local public in general (see Boswell
(2009); comp. with Litmanen, 1996). On the other hand, state officials
and supporters are portrayed as unprepared, disinterested and incompetent.
Della Porta and Piazza (2007: p. 880) found a similar
evaluation where “…‘good’ politics is presented as coming from bellow
… and based on local knowledge rather than the ‘bureaucratic expertise’
of representative institutions.” This schematization is further elaborated
on in the dysfunctional state frame (see next subsection).
I’m convinced that it's business, it's about money. I don’t think it
has to be stored. We had a security inspector from Dukovany [a
Czech nuclear power plant] here, we listen to the opinions of
experts; a geologist comes here and tells us his opinion. This whole
thing should be approached in a totally different way. (005: 82–84;
useless repository)
Rather surprisingly, the frame does not provide a complex ideological
alternative such as sustainable development aimed at decarbonized
economy and decentralized energy industry (see della Porta and
Piazza (2007), Rootes (1999), Usher (2013)). This might be partly due
to the fact that nation-level, professional, ideologically embedded
environmental organizations such as DUHA Movement (2016) or
Calla (2010) are involved mainly in terms of support, whereas protest
activities are carried out mostly by non-professional, grass-root
organizations without explicit ideological or political agenda (comp.
with Rootes, 2009; for classification see della Porta and Andretta
(2002)). As in the case of the responsibility frame, the “other camp” of
local acceptance is constructed through binary oppositions. The
supporters are considered to be selfish, profit-seeking, irresponsible
individuals who disregard concerns and interests of the local community
(see Čapek (1993)). The opposition is then legitimized typically via
referendums, petitions or extra-institutional collective actions such as
protest marches or demonstrations. In contrast to the responsibility
frame, political action that exceeds election participation is seen as a
sign of mature civil society and as an integral part of democratic
governance. This is in line with the participatory democracy approach
that combines aspects of representative and direct democracy such as
public assemblies and referendums (Sánchéz-Pagés and Aragonés,
2009). In contrast with the elite model, the concept of citizenship
rejects the image of “the man in the street” – an uninformed and
incompetent individual – and constantly stresses the ideal of selfdetermination
(The Port Huron Statement cited in Floridia (2013)).
Since the above-mentioned risks cannot be completely avoided, the
P. Ocelík et al. Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
461
proposed solution is that the project should be cancelled (determination;
see Appendices A and B) or at least postponed until a safer and
more efficient technological solution is available (useless repository;
see Appendices A and B). The responsibility to preserve the localities
for further generations then makes the opposition the only moral
choice. This argument marginalizes the role of financial compensations
which cannot outweigh the harms such as the stigmatization of the
locality and the environmental damage.
5.3. The Dysfunctional State Frame: In that process, we’re the least
important
The dysfunctional state frame is built around a group of codes
which are critical towards the role of the state, or rather its institutions
and political elites which are involved in the siting process (state
mistrust; see Appendices A and B). As with the previous frame, the
framing based on distrust of the political system is well-supported as
well (della Porta and Andretta, 2002; della Porta and Piazza, 2007;
Fan, 2006; Kaufman and Smith, 1999; Özen, 2009; Rootes, 1999). In
contrast to the previous two frames, the significant Other is represented
by the state, not by an antagonistic opinion group. The frame
draws a distinction between the disempowered local communities on
the one hand and the powerful state apparatus and political elites on
the other. The following quote illustrates this by describing the
peripheral position of municipalities and the unilateral actions taken
by the state.
I would say that the state and RAWRA approach it in such a way
that we as a municipality are the lowest on the totem pole in what
they’re doing, at least as I see it. That they absolutely don’t take into
account any of our decisions or something that they promised and
never keep their word. … So in the end, they still do what they want,
if you want to say that. (001: 22–26; overriding state)
The political elites are, again in binary oppositions, defined as
egoistic, distrustful, corrupt, and detached from the people. As
Botetzagias and Karamichas (2009: p. 941) state: “… citizens come to
assume that they are dragged into an ‘unfair’ deal, or that they are
being ‘victimized’, presumably due either to their community characteristics
or to the lack of powerful allies who could shield them
against the undesirable development.” The state institutions are then
seen as arenas controlled by political and economic interest groups and
as barriers that impede local communities and prevent participation in
civil society (see Özen (2009)). This is further amplified by the
instability of the political environment which goes hand in hand with
personal discontinuities and sudden policy changes.
Well that's the difference between them developed countries and
here, that there you’ve got the law and there's no way around it.
Here, they come up with a law and in a year they totally change it,
you see. So people have no certainty that something like this will be
in that law that … if the government suddenly changes, if there's a
new government which’ll have different priorities and it’ll say to hell
with the municipalities, and we just have to put it somewhere,
period. (022: 108–111; state mistrust)
Elements of conspiracy theories, for example that the repository is a
project covertly orchestrated by a “concrete lobby”, are present as well.
In contrast to the responsibility frame, the dysfunctional state frame
thus depicts the failure of representative governance and harshly
criticizes the actions of elites (see Rootes (1999)). This brings us back
to the distinction between elite and participatory models of democracy
(see Fan (2006)). Therefore, as della Porta and Piazza (2007: p. 877)
put it: “It is the very conception of democracy that is put under
scrutiny. The demand for democracy is the demand for another type of
democracy – more participatory and ‘from below’.” This framing
resonates with a broader discourse which has been labeled as a “crisis
of governance” (see e.g. Havlík and Kopeček, 2008; comp. with della
Porta and Andretta, 2002). Likewise, Linek (2010) shows that trust in
politics and political parties is gradually decreasing. The survey on
attitudes of local communities towards the repository issue conducted
in 2012 and 2014 showed similar results (Ďurďovič et al., 2014). In
2012, the state institutions were perceived as institutions that limit or
even oppose the engagement of local communities, whereas municipalities
were seen as organizations that promote this engagement
(Ďurďovič et al., 2014). This is consistent with the findings of
Kunštát (2015) where trust towards local representatives is higher
than trust towards any other institution. The “Nagygate” scandal which
led to the resignation of the Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas in 2013
then linked issues of clientelism and corruption with the core of the
political system (see Kupka and Mochťák (2015)). In this context,
actions of RAWRA are often described as manipulative and corrupting.
… [T]hey organize or arrange a trip to Sweden, pay for it with the
RAWRA taxpayer's money, of course, or whose money that is really
… and they take people, who never got further than ==, that's here,
20 clicks away … so that these so-called village nuclear experts can
conclude that it looks nice. And now consider that they got lunch
there, they got to go on a trip to a place where they’d never get
otherwise, and when they come back, people’ll ask them: What do
you think, what's it gonna look like? (018: 64–68; public corrup-
tion)
RAWRA is described as a “buffer” which shields local people from
the real decision-maker, the state, and as a “puppet” that is connected
with questionable practices. The demands of the local communities,
which are in an asymmetrical position, then “hit the wall of legality.”
The dysfunctional state frame thus emphasizes procedural justice over
the questions of cost-benefit distribution. This general lack of trust is
connected not only with state institutions and the project investor
(RAWRA), but also with the Working Group that was established as a
forum for stakeholder negotiations in 2010 (RAWRA, 2010).
Interestingly, this applies both to the opponents and the supporters
of the project. Whereas the supporters are dissatisfied with the
unproductiveness and indecisiveness of the negotiation process, opponents
mainly criticize the insufficient powers of the Working Group.
The Working Group thus provides only a pro forma engagement of the
representatives of localities and civil society and is seen as a mere
façade used to legitimize state actions.
It [the Working Group] was created so the mayors or those
municipalities had a chance, so that we’d think that we can decide
about it, but it's not like that … And we have no chance to influence
anything there. (016: 204–205; vain negotiation)
This growing mistrust towards and discontent with the existing
institutional arrangements then deepens the frustration of the opposition
actors and pushes them towards extra-institutional forms of action
(della Porta and Rucht, 2002; Özen, 2009; for overview see Hooghe and
Marien (2013)). The proposed solution is based on strengthening the
participation in the whole process of negotiating and selecting the site
for the project; especially through the inclusion of veto power according
to the Swedish model (see Andersson et al. (2006)). The legitimacy
of the decision-making process is not derived from the central political
authority of the state, but from the political will of the local community
which is going to be affected by the project. More generally, the
reconciliation of the relations between the local communities and the
investor (i.e. RAWRA and the state) and subsequent building of trust is
being mentioned.
In the entire process, we are the last to have a say. This cannot be
true, can it? To be the last when that project directly concerns us?
They are going to outvote us. So the will of the state or of RAWRA –
there's no will to listen on their part … In that process, we’re the
least important, we’re the ones to be affected by it, and we’ll be the
last to have a say in it, we’ll have a referendum here, and the people
P. Ocelík et al. Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
462
will express their opinions. And? This is a joke! (005: 140–148;
participation)
6. Conclusions and policy implications
The research objective was to reconstruct how the repository issue
is framed from the perspective of the mayors in the pre-selected
localities. It has been shown that three distinctive frames are used (for
summary, see Table 1). These three frames are not mutually exclusive
which means that actors can be embedded in more than one of these
frame. The embeddedness of the actors in the identified frames is given
by the number of codes from the respective frames that actors use. The
codes listed under the risk frame appear to be the most frequent (see
Appendix C). Overall, however, the three frames tend to be represented
evenly, with each frame constituting approximately one third of the
codes observed (see Table 2). The issue is seen as a complex one and
the mayors typically acknowledge the arguments related to all three
frames (see Appendix A).
The supplemental analysis based on chi-square tests of independence
showed that the main difference is, rather unsurprisingly,
between mayors who do not oppose the project and those who oppose
it (for details see Appendix D). The “non-opponents” are more likely
affiliated with the responsibility frame, whereas the opponents are
more likely affiliated with the risk and dysfunctional state frames.
According to our interpretation, the responsibility and risk frames are
to a large extent based on contradictory notions about the value of the
environment and about the nature of democratic governance. In this
manner, the frames are structured along deeper ideological distinctions
(comp. with Fan, 2006; Kang and Jang, 2013; Litmanen, 1996;
Sovacool and Dworking, 2015). These distinctions then affect how
likely is a given actor to accept or to reject a given frame.
In the responsibility frame, the repository project is seen as a
“problem-solving” activity (Cox, 1981). A clearly defined politico-legal
framework is taken for granted, in which an essentially technological
problem must be solved efficiently and safely. This framework, which
constitutes the procedural basis for decision-making, is given by the
elite democracy model which emphasizes expert knowledge and the
majoritarian principle. Since nuclear energy technology is considered
one of the most complex expert systems (Giddens, 1991), the decisions
about the project should be, at the substantial level, based, if possible,
solely on expert knowledge. In the case of the repository, expert
knowledge is held by the investor, (i.e. RAWRA) and specialized state
agencies (such as the State Office for Nuclear Safety and the State
Mining Administration). The status of nuclear energy is further
strengthened by its comparatively high public support (see CVVM
(2015)). The responsibility here is a consumer's responsibility who
ought to pay for his consumption. Thus the public good is viewed in a
utilitarian manner as a policy or a project that on average benefits the
entire society. On the other hand, the risk frame is based on the
possibility of an alternative solution (della Porta and Piazza, 2007); it
challenges the status quo. The politico-legal framework is questioned,
the contested issue is not seen technically as a problem to be solved,
but rather in ethical terms. The key question is: How is it possible to
address the issue without unnecessary damage to the environment and
while respecting the concerns of local communities? Here, the responsibility
is the responsibility of an (engaged) citizen who ought to
question authority. Nuclear energy is then seen as a Beckian “inconceivable
risk” which cannot be adequately evaluated and controlled (see
Beck (1992)) rather than as a trusted “expert system” (see Botetzagias
and Karamichas (2009)). These concerns are reinforced by the
unprecedented time horizon of the project and by the potentially
disastrous consequences, which additionally increase the sense of risk
(Slovic et al., 1979). The latter effect is further strengthened by impacts
of nuclear accidents, such as Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, that
significantly decrease public acceptance (Eiser et al., 1989; Siegrist and
Visschers, 2013), especially among communities that live in proximity
of nuclear facilities (Huang et al., 2013).
The inability of the current institutional framework to accommodate
this conflict is captured by the dysfunctional state frame. The
frame emphasizes institutional deficiencies, mainly in the context of
the inextricable connection between the political regime and abusive
practices such as clientelism and corruption (Kupka and Mochťák,
2015). This fundamental distrust then scales down to the level of
individual projects which are perceived as part of the “big game” of
politico-economic interest groups. The dysfunctionality of participatory
mechanisms such as the Working Group further deepens the frustration
of local communities’ representatives and strengthens their
detachment from the institutional framework. This dispute over the
engagement of local communities is embedded within the spirited
debate about the role of civil society and citizenship that has been going
Table 1
Reconstructed frames: summary. Source: Authorsa
.
Functions
Definition Evaluation Solution
Frame I By consuming electricity we produce a burden of
spent nuclear fuel
The repository is the only feasible solution
We have a moral obligation to deal with this
burden
The opposition is irresponsible, selfish, and
emotional
The opposition just passes the responsibility to
next generations
The state should take responsibility, make a decision and
compensate the selected locality
Frame II The siting process is linked with a number of
risks
There are alternative solutions of the problem
We have a moral obligation to protect the localities
for next generations
The local communities are in a disadvantaged
position
The siting process must be stopped or at least slowed down
Frame III The state is not able to deal with the problem
competently and legitimately
Localities are not effectively engaged in the siting
process
The Working Group is just a facade that legitimize
the actions of the state
There is a lack of trust among stakeholders
The participation of local communities and civil society
should be strengthened
a
Frames I, II, III correspond to the responsibility frame, the risk frame, and the dysfunctional state frame.
Table 2
Frame affiliations according to code observations. Source: Authors.
Frame Code observations Code observations (%)
Responsibility 137 33.33
Risk 158 38.44
Dysfunctional state 116 28.22
Total 411 99.99
P. Ocelík et al. Energy Policy 105 (2017) 458–466
463
on since the 1990s, a debate that reflects the distinction between the
elite and participatory models of democracy mentioned above (see
Navrátil (2013), Pontuso (2002)). The gradual strengthening of the
non-electoral political participation in the Czech Republic confronts the
closed opportunity structure of the political system (Mička et al., 2015;
for comparative perspective see Vráblíková, 2014) also at the local level
(see Navrátil and Císař (2013)). The presence of the dysfunctional state
frame then clearly points to the importance of an institutional
arrangement of such projects (comp. with Čermák et al., 2015;
Badera and Kocoń, 2014) as well as to the inadequateness of the
technocratic problem-solving approach.
Based on this, we do not expect that standard institutions and
practices – such as information campaigns, propagation of scientific
and technocratic expertise, public hearings, or moral appeals – are
going to be efficient in consensus building (see Kang and Jang (2013)).
The decision-making process should be rather more attentive to
“contestation of discourses in the public sphere” (Dryzek, 2000: p.
162). To paraphrase Hajer (2005), the point is to show how frames
construct a particular problem. This includes explication of normative
positions and resulting recognition that all stakeholders act upon
certain ideological orientations, not only on “purely technical” or
“expert” knowledge. Thus, the decision-making should move away
from political or technocratic authority-based policy implementation to
more participative and deliberative procedures where “policy is constructed
through exchanges of ideas and values among participants”
(Kang and Jang, 2013: p. 57). In general, it is argued that institutional
trust, a key condition of effective policy making, is rooted in a complex
web of interpersonal interactions that generate social capital and thus
facilitate civic engagement and political participation (Putnam, 1993;
Almond and Verba, 1963). In this context, institutions such as civic
panels or community assemblies providing informed and dialoguebased
platforms that supplement the work of local authorities on
important long-term issues (see Ďurďovič (2016)) might be considered
for implementation. This should go hand-in-hand with empowering
local communities through shared decision-making. Since democracy
can be seen as “both an open-ended project and an essentially
contested concept” (Dryzek, 2000: p. 160), there is a room – especially
in the mentioned context of the “crisis of governance” – for such
inclusive institutional innovation and experimentation. The concept of
participative decision-making as sketched above seems to be a reasonable
starting point for such an endeavor.
Funding
The research for this article was supported by the Masaryk
University under research projects “Energetická infrastruktura a její
vliv na energetickou bezpečnost” [MUNI/M/0081/2013] and “Europe
in a Changing International Environment III” [MUNI/A/1067/2016].
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interests is reported by the authors.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Tomáš Charouz, Pavel Svoreň,
Michal Šiffner and Jiří Vlček for assistance with data collection and
coding as well as to the interviewees for kindly participating in the
study. The authors also thank Dagmar Rychnovská, Pavel Dufek, Petr
Voda, and Jan Daniel as well as to the anonymous reviewers for
valuable comments on draft versions of the manuscript.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.025.
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