The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.© Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express
written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information.
july 1946
Atomic Energy and American Foreign Policy
Caryl P. Haskins
Volume 24 Number 4•
1946
ATOMIC ENERGY AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY
By Caryl P. Haskins
ONE reason the political problem raised by the discovery of
the means to release atomic energy is so vast is that it
contains inherently contradictory elements. Only by
international action can we reap the potential benefits of atomic
energy, which are so great for all mankind; only by international
action can we find any security against the bomb, which has de
structive
possibilities
that are so
appalling. But if the bomb is
thus the sharpest spur to internationalism, it is also the sharpest
reminder that American foreign policy must not
forget that
American security is endangered
as never before. The bomb pro
vides the greatest temptation
to
aggression ever offered an am
bitious people
or an
unscrupulous leader, and against it the tradi
tional modes of national defense are
clearly inadequate. New
strategies
are called for, alike in the military and the political
fields.
An attempt to encompass the problem must
begin with a re
view of the scientific factors conditioning the release of atomic
energy and the technical circumstances in which the bomb was
developed. There is no short-cut to an
understanding of the
political and social problems involved; and no
simple "yes"
or
'no" answer can be
given
to the various
proposals
made for
dealing with them. The present paper aims
merely
to summarize
and place in juxtaposition the facts about atomic
energy
which
have special significance in the formulation of foreign policy, and
to see now
they apply in the case of the United States.
II. FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES
The discovery of uranium is not recent. It was
recognized as a
metallic constituent of pitchblende inGermany at least as
early
as the middle eighteenth century. Until 1789 it was
generally
thought to be tungsten, but in that year W. H. Klaproth proved
it to be a new element and named it after the planet Uranus, then
newly discovered in the heavens. It was rather inert in its chemi
cal properties, and until 1938 was considered to have only minor
commercial importance
as an
alloying metal (for which in general
itwas too
expensive) and in the tinting of glass and ceramics. So
Council on Foreign Relations
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve, and extend access to
Foreign Affairs
www.jstor.org
®
592 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
little interest had it excited that previous
to 1938 its chemical and
physical properties remained imperfectly known.
Uranium had attracted briei world-wide attention on two
occasions, however. The first was in 1896 when Becquerel, notic
ing that uranium ores caused a
blackening of photographic plates
in the dark, discovered the now-famous "Becquerel" rays and
ushered in the study of natural radioactivity. The second was
when the Curies used the uranium pitchblende
ores of Joachims
thal as their principal
raw material in the discovery and separa
tion of radium. The discoveries of Becquerel and the Curies were
dramatic in several respects. Not
only
were uranium and radium
unique in exhibiting
a spontaneous emission of radiations, the
rate of which could not be influenced by any treatment that could
be given them, but they
were the only elements then known which
could undergo transmutation, yielding ultimately, in both cases,
a form of lead. All other elements were
thought
to be so stable
that transmutation was reckoned as remote as the
discovery
of
the Philosopher's Stone. Then, in 1919, Lord Rutherford showed
that such a
change could in sober reality be artificially effected.
By bombarding nitrogen with a stream of charged elemental
particles ("alpha" particles, the nuclei of helium atoms) at
rather high velocities, he succeeded in producing
some oxygen,
with another form of electrically charged particle
as a
by-product.
This by-product
was shown to be equivalent in charge
to the nu
cleus of a
hydrogen atom, and was called the "proton." Ruther
ford found that, as soon as he ceased bombarding his nitrogen,
both the transformation to oxygen and the generation of protons
ceased.
For 20
years after Rutherford's work, bombardment
experi
ments of this kind were pushed forward with great vigor. Many
elements were used as
targets, and many transformations were
found to be possible, with the production of several kinds of ele
mental "particles"
as
by-product. The electron and the proton
were already known, and in 1932 the "positron" and the "deu
teron" were discovered and named. But the most
important
discovery from the standpoint of atomistics was that of the
"neutron," the existence of which was demonstrated, likewise in
1932, by Sir James Chadwick. The neutron is a
particle of neutral
electrical charge, exceedingly hard to detect and with extraor
dinary penetrating power.
One more basic scientific discovery of outstanding importance
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 593
to the development of techniques of large-scale atomic fission
remained to be made. Irene Curie, daughter of Madame Curie,
and her husband Frederic Joliot, showed in 1934 that certain
light elements such as boron, magnesium
or aluminum not
only
underwent transformation when bombarded with alpha particles,
with the emission of energy (in the form of positrons), but that
these positrons continued to be emitted for some time after
the initial bombardment had been cut off. An intermediate
radioactive element had been
produced
which then "decayed"
further, as uranium or radium had
long been known to do natu
rally. Artificial radioactivity had been discovered.
In succeeding years, innumerable experiments of this sort were
carried forward, and by the time of the war some 500 radioactive
"species" of elements had been artificially produced and the
properties of many of them described. Of
particular
interest was
some work of Fermi, who studied the bombardment by neutrons
of heavy elements of high atomic number. Fermi reasoned that
the neutron, because of its neutral charge, should penetrate such
an atomic nucleus much more
readily than a
charged particle. He
found that such bombarding neutrons might in fact be "cap
tured" by the nuclei, and a new, unstable, radioactive form of the
element produced; this then decayed
to a stable form, with the
emission of additional energy. It only required that such energy
be also in the form of neutrons of suitable
velocity,
and that their
number be greater than that of the particles of tne original bom
bardment, for there to be initiated a "chain" reaction which
would make large-scale, self-maintaining atomic fission possible.
The extraordinary potentialities of such a process were long
recognized by nuclear physicists, but realization of them did not
seem to be
practicable.
Such had been the lines of experiment, and such was the
knowledge, which pointed to the techniques used inproducing the
atomic bomb.
III. THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE BOMB
Fermi and his colleagues had studied the bombardment of
uranium by neutrons in 1934. But it was five years later that
O. R. Frisch and L. Meitner, both refugees from Germany work
ing in the laboratory of Niels Bohr inCopenhagen, suggested that
the
absorption
of neutrons
by
uranium caused the uranium atom
to
split into lighter, nearly equal fragments, with an enormous
594 FOREIGNAFFAIRS
emission of energy in the process. This idea was based on an
important finding published in
Germany early in 1939, by O.
Hahn and F. Strassman, that a
species o? barium could be found
among the reaction
products
or uranium under neutron bom
bardment. Bohr visited the United States in January of 1939 and
communicated his idea. Before the end of February, four Ameri
can laboratories and Bohr's laboratory in Copenhagen had con
firmed the reaction.
By the middle of 1940 the fact that three elements, uranium,
thorium and protactinium (the last exceedingly rare), could un
dergo fission under neutron bombardment had been widely pub
lished. It was further known that the bombarding neutrons must
have very high velocities to
accomplish fission in protactinium
or thorium, but that in the case of uranium slow neutrons could
achieve the effect. The fast neutrons were
captured primarily by
the uranium isotope1 238, and might lead to the formation of a
higher isotope, U-239, which could finally decay to a new element,
unknown in nature, which was christened "plutonium." It was
guessed at that time that plutonium might be itself fissionable if
bombarded by slow neutrons, and this later proved
to be both
true and critically important. The slow neutrons could also be
captured by the rarer uranium isotope U-235, with explosive
fission and the production of additional neutrons.
The possibilities of initiating
a "chain
"
reaction, such as would
be required to produce
an atomic bomb, either through the use of
U-235 or through plutonium
or both, were instantly realized in
this country. The sobering danger of the knowledge was foreseen,
first by
a small group of foreign-born physicists, to whom the
concept of harnessing scientific knowledge in the service of na
tional armament was more familiar than to our own
people.
There followed conferences with President Roosevelt, his ap
pointment of an initial Advisory Committee on Uranium late
in 1939, and the transfer of $6,000 from the Army and Navy
to
defray its expenses. The total ultimate expenditure of the ura
nium project
was to be in the neighborhood of two billion dol
lars. The next steps were the reconstitution of the Uranium
Committee as a subcommittee of the newly organized National
Defense Research Committee in 1940; the formal arrangements
for full exchange of information with the British in the same year;
1
Isotopes
are
species of a single element which have the same nuclear charge, bat differ im
atomic weight. They may be virtually indistinguishable in chemical properties.
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 595
and the formation of a
Top Policy Group including the Vice
President, the Secretary ofWar, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development,
and the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.
There followed in 1942 the formation of the Manhattan District
in the Army Corps of Engineers and the transfer of the uranium
work to the District under the directorship of Major-General
Groves. Likewise there followed the initiation of immense research
projects
at Columbia University, the University of Chicago, the
University of California and elsewhere, and the construction of
the gigantic installations at Oak Ridge and Hanford and inNew
Mexico and other places. Finally came the bombs at Los Alamos
and Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
IV. BASIC FACTORS IN THE USE AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY
We can now summarize the basic technical information affect
ing the international aspects of atomic energy.
First of all, it has been established beyond reasonable scientific
doubt that only two elements, uranium and thorium, need to be
reckoned as raw materials for atomic bombs or atomic power
plants. Furthermore, only
one of these, uranium, is capable
of
supporting
a chain reaction.
Thorium is relatively abundant in nature, occurring in large
deposits in India and fairly extensively in Brazil, the Malay
Archipelago, Australia and the United States, largely in the
form of monazite sands. It can be used to
supplement uranium
supplies in the manufacture of fissionable materials, but cannot
be used without uranium.
Uranium is not a rare element. It occurs inminute but detecta
ble amounts in most
granite and sedimentary rocks, and com
prises about eight parts in 100,000 of the earth's crust. It thus
stands next to
copper in abundance, ismore abundant than zinc,
and is about four times as
plentiful
as lead. Deposits from which
it can be obtained in reasonable yield probably
occur in at least
15 nations, in at least 10 of which
?
the United States, Canada,
the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovakia, England, Portugal, Aus
tralia, Norway,
Sweden and Russia
?
commercial amounts are
known to have been recovered. However, the outstanding deposits
are more
narrowly distributed, being confined to the United
States, Canada, the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovakia and possibly
Russia.
596 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Uranium occurs in the form of three isotopes, U-234, U-235,
and U-238. The first is rare and of no immediate practical im
portance. U-235 is the isotope which undergoes explosive fission
with slow neutrons; it composes about one
part in 140 of nat
urally occurring uranium. U-238 is by far the most abundant
isotope. It is not fissionable by slow neutrons, but is the source of
plutonium. Fissionable materials, therefore, can be manufactured
from amixture of the isotopes of uranium, and in this process not
only
are raw materials for atomic bombs produced, but large
quantities of power are
incidentally generated also. Thus the
production of power and the production of fissionable materials
for bombs are
technically inextricably linked; the same
"pile,"
using the same raw materials, might
serve as a
power plant
or as
a source of bomb loadings,
or even in both capacities simultane
ously,
if suitable arrangements
were made. Further, these same
"piles"
can also be used to
produce
the radiations and to manu
facture the artificially radioactive
"
tracer" materials which are of
such immense value for scientific and medical research and ther
apy. However, although the generation of power or the produc
tion of bomb loadings requires
a
large plant,
a very small plant,
one so small, indeed, that it would be of little practical
use in
turning out
explosives, could serve the scientists and medical
men of an entire nation.
These facts suggest several conclusions bearing
on our
foreign
policy:
(1) Since uranium and thorium alone can be used as raw ma
terials for the production of either power or bombs, and since
uranium is indispensable, the problem of controlling atomic
energy, even
though vast and complex, is nevertheless subject
to
delimitation in a way which would be out of the question if
fissionable materials could be made, for example, from clay. The
fact that the richest deposits of uranium ore occur in a
fairly
limited number of places might make international control feasi
ble; but it also foreshadows violent competitive struggles for
ownership of the richest deposits (the struggle for oil greatly
intensified).
A plant producing materials of scientific or medical interest
can be distinguished fairly easily from one
designed
to
produce
power or to turn out
explosives,
on the simple basis of size.
However, without facilities for very thorough inspection it
would be extraordinarily difficult to distinguish between a
plant
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 597
producing power for peaceful purposes and one which was
turning
out fissionable materials for war.
(2) All the scientific information essential to an
understanding
of the processes of fission was well known to the scientists of the
world, either just before the beginning of the war in Europe
or
just before our entry into the war. This knowledge was based
mainly upon original discoveries made inEngland, France, Den
mark and Germany. Only the technology necessary to the actual
fabrication of the bomb was
kept secret in the hands of the
United States, Great Britain and Canada. This technology,
to be
sure, is highly important because it involves intricate processes,
vast installations and, particularly, large
resources of technically
trained manpower. Nevertheless, we may fairly estimate that
Great Britain, if she chose, could in a minimum of two years
achieve the degree of efficiency in bomb manufacture attained by
this country, and that Russia might attain that position in amin
imum of five, after which her rate of progress might well exceed
our own.
We therefore cannot count on
maintaining
our
security through
a
monopoly of fundamental knowledge in the atomic field
?
indeed, we
narrowly escaped having that knowledge
concen
trated in the hands of Germany, where much of it originated.
Further, our
monopoly of technical information and facilities
is limited and is diminishing. At present we do have a
monopoly
of stockpiles of raw materials and finished atomic bombs, and we
are
equipped with gigantic plants for producing these materials.
Within something like ten years, however, our
monopoly in tech
nology may have disappeared completely, whatever the policy
we now adopt with respect to international action.
(3) The bomb is detonated by
an
explosively rapid "chain"
reaction (the explosion of the atoms in any one "generation"
being initiated by the neutrons produced by the previous "gen
eration" of atom
explosions). Hence there is a critical size below
which the bomb will not
explode. It ismade to explode, in fact,
by an almost instantaneous assemblage of parts of subcritical
size to a mass of larger than critical dimensions, whereupon the
reaction starts
immediately. Limitations to the size of the bomb
on the small side, however, are not such that it could not be trans
ported by the larger rocket carriers and by piloted
or
pilotless
bombers. Long-range rockets of the V-i or V-2 type, or
improve
ments on these, carrying atomic explosives, will therefore defi
598 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
nitely have to be reckoned with in another war. These will possess
such speed and manoeuvrability that the possibility of developing
direct technical defenses against them becomes exceedingly
re
mote.
Virtually the only defenses which can be visualized at pres
ent are indirect, such as the concealment of vital installations (at
least 500 feet underground)
or the extensive dispersion of urban
populations and facilities. Neither solution iswholly practical.
We must conclude, then, not
only that we do not possess more
than temporary security based on a scientific or
technological
monopoly in the field of atomic explosives, but that we cannot
count on
security based on direct technical defense.
(4) These considerations may tempt
us to fall back on the sort
of territorial defenses considered userul in the past
? a system of
insular bases around the world and a
"security zone" of loyal
neighboring nations. Territorial defenses will undoubtedly
re
main exceedingly important in our strategy, but their usefulness
must necessarily be reduced. Small islands would almost certainly
be untenable under atomic attack, and the range of future carriers
of atomic bombs would diminish their value in any case. The de
fection of even a small nation within our zone
might have most
serious consequences if that nation could arm itself with atomic
bombs. We thus might be obliged
to
adopt
a much less passive
attitude toward the internal affairs of countries within our se
curity belt. Finally, the range and speed of atomic weapons will
certainly reduce the protective value of such geographic features
as the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the northern Canadian
wilderness.
(5) The bomb is the ideal weapon for an aggressor. It is effec
tive over a wide area and it ismuch cheaper than any existing
instrument of destruction. The Los Alamos explosion blew the
roof off a farmhouse two miles from the site. At Nagasaki, twisted
steel beams were found three miles away. At Hiroshima every
thing within an area of four square miles was
virtually demolished.
It has been conservatively estimated that 10,000 bombs might
eliminate all the urban areas of a
great nation. The cost of that
number of bombs would be about 10 billion dollars
?
and the
figure is likely
to decrease. An atomic bomb's great radius of
destruction will make long-range rockets efficient even when far
less precisely aimed than those sent by the Germans against
London. Conversely, greater ranges could be attained with equal
skill of aim. In short, the atomic bomb offers ameans of destruc
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 599
tion which is from ten to
possibly
one hundred times cheaper for
the aggressor, in proportion
to
damage done, than any weapon
hitherto available. Leaving aside some factors which might
never
theless be of
importance (such as fear of retaliation), we can see
many reasons
why
a nation which had determined on war would
launch its aggression by using atomic weapons.
(6) Two additional facts worth pointing
out refer not to atomic
explosives but to atomic power and follow directly from the con
dition that any plant, whether designed primarily to produce
radiations or power or
supplies of fissionable materials, actually
produces all three. One fact, technical in nature, is of military
significance. A uranium power plant sends out radiations of great
potential danger
to its human operators unless it can be ade
quately shielded; and adequate shielding is so
heavy that the
power plant becomes unsuitable for installation in light carriers,
though itmight well be used in a surface vessel. The second fact
is economic. Recent calculations indicate that while atomic
power cannot at present compete economically with coal in a
country having adequate coal reserves, itmight nevertheless be
of great importance
to a nation lacking such resources. The impli
cations for the "have-not" nations are obvious.
V. STEPS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
Such facts have convinced most people that some sort of in
ternational regulation of atomic energy is absolutely necessary.
The first reaction was that the atomic bomb must be "out
lawed," a
thoroughly unrealistic solution, of course, until war
itself is successfully outlawed. A second proposal
was that the
development
of atomic energy should be renounced altogether,
by prohibiting the mining
or
processing
or
possession of fission
able materials for any purpose. But such a
policy would deny the
world the potential benefits inherent in the peaceful development
of atomic energy, and never in human history has progress been
prevented by fiat. These two courses
having been dismissed, what
alternatives remain ?
The general objectives, evidently, are, first, that there should
be no
production, manufacture or
stockpiling of potentially
explosive fissionable materials except under effective interna
tional supervision and control; and, second, that there should be
full realization of the scientific and industrial potentialities of
atomic fission for peaceful purposes. The double paradox is that
6oo FOREIGNAFFAIRS
no nation will relinquish its private (and secret) activities until
the first condition is fulfilled, while the second cannot be achieved
unless the world's leading minds in the field of atomistics, wher
ever
they may happen
to be, are able to
exchange information
freely in the best scientific tradition. The reconciliation of these
two
apparently contradictory objectives presents a
towering
challenge.
There are two principal difficulties. In the first place, interna
tional supervision of stockpiles and plants and processing meth
ods involves a considerable delegation of national sovereignty;
and an almost
equally deep faith in internationalism is required
if a nation is to share freely the information which it has gathered.
Faith of this sort cannot be engendered to order and at once.
The second difficulty is to devise a workable system of inspec
tion that will reveal whether atomic energy is being developed for
peaceful
or warlike purposes. (The same
plant, remember, can
make both bombs and power.) Inspection of mines, or of raw
materials at or near the source, would
certainly
be easier than in
spection later in the manufacturing process. Prospecting of mines
by
an international authority would be easier than supervision of
factories. However, if a nation were hostile to the international
authority, the technical difficulties in the way of any sort of in
spection would be very great, perhaps insurmountable.
The Anglo-American-Canadian Declaration on Atomic Energy
of November 15, 1945, marked the first step in the development
of an international atomic policy. Its fundamental proposal
was
that international cooperation and coordination in the whole
field should be advanced as adequate safeguards were
developed.
It was
proposed that these developments proceed by stages. The
three nations themselves undertook to initiate the first stage
?
the exchange of basic scientific information. The second was
described as the exchange of knowledge in the field of industrial
use. The third was the "elimination from national armaments of
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adapted to mass
destruction."2 Adequate safeguards (inspection and other means)
were to be devised for preventing evasions and violations of the
spirit of the pact. Finally, the Declaration proposed that an
Atomic Energy Commission be set up within the United Nations.
At the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the
"Big Three," late in 1945, it was
specifically suggested that an
*Note the breadth of this statement.
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 601
Atomic Energy Commission be established by the General As
sembly of the United Nations, to act in an
advisory capacity to
the Security Council. The Commission was to consist of one
representative from each of the states on the Security Council,
plus Canada in the event that she did not become amember. Its
terms of reference were to inquire into all phases of the problems
arising from the discovery of atomic fission, with the specific
responsibility of formulating proposals for extending the exchange
of information between nations so as to attain the four objectives
outlined in the Anglo-American-Canadian Declaration. Its re
ports to the Council would be made public unless security reasons
dictated otherwise. This proposal
was considered by the Political
and Security Committee of the United Nations in London and
was
adopted by the General Assembly
on
January 24, 1946. All
the most difficult portions of the gigantic task, evidently, lie
ahead. Whether they will be dealt with successfully will depend
largely upon the suggestions for concrete action which the United
States Delegate brings
to the Commission's first meeting.
Two recent developments, among others, will influence these
proposals. The first is the unanimous adoption by the Special
Senate Committee on Atomic Energy of the revised McMahon
Bill, officially designated the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The
domestic atomic energy commission of five members created by
this bill would assume control of theManhattan District Project
and would probably continue research and development with a
budget of approximately $500,000,000 a year. There obviously
had to be legislation for the domestic control of atomic energy
before this country could participate in a system of international
control. It remains to be seen how workable the structure it sets
up may be.
A second important development has been the State Depart
ment's issuance of a report prepared by
a
special committee, of
which Under Secretary of State Acheson was chairman, and by
an
advisory panel of
experts
under the chairmanship of David E.
Lilienthal.3 This mucn-discussed report forms perhaps the most
original single contribution so far made to the thinking
on the
problem of international control. While it raises certain difficulties
in its own
right, it indicates possible paths around a number of
major obstructions which had seemed well-nigh insuperable.
8
"A Report
on the International Control of Atomic Energy," Department of State Publica
tion 2498.
602 FOREIGNAFFAIRS
VI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT
The
proposals
in the State Department report are based on
two technical premises of great importance, the first of which we
have already considered, namely that only uranimum and thorium
can serve as raw materials for atomic bombs. The second premise
is novel and extremely interesting. It is that existing stocks of
purified U-235 and plutonium may be "denatured" under cer
tain conditions in such a way as to
impair them at least tempo
rarily for military purposes while not
decreasing their utility
either for scientific or for industrial ends. This result is achieved
by adding
to the potentially explosive
fissionable material a non
explosive isotope of closely similar chemical properties. Repurifi
cation of the denatured material remains a
possibility; but the
process will be cumbersome, calling for installations similar to
those at Oak Ridge (though
not of comparable size), demanding
scientific and engineering skill of a rather high order, and prob
ably requiring
at least a year. The operation, then, could hardly
be undertaken
secretly
on a
large scale.
The revelation that fissionable materials can be denatured
enables us for the first time to drive a
distinguishing wedge be
tween potentially peaceful and potentially destructive uses of
atomic power, thereby opening the way to at least a
partial solu
tion of one of the most
baffling features of the whole problem.
The State Department report proposes to utilize this advantage
to classify all activities concerned with any phase of the handling
of fissionable materials into "dangerous" and "safe" categories.
The "dangerous" category of activities would include any
which offers a solution "either in the actual fact of its
physical
installation, or
by subtle alterations thereof, to one of the three
major problems of making atomic weapons: I. The provision of
raw materials; II. The production in suitable quality and quan
tity of the fissionable materials plutonium and U-235; and III.
The use of these materials for the making of atomic weapons."4
Thus any activities concerned with the prospecting, mining
or
refining of uranium, or to a lesser degree of thorium, the enrich
ment of U-235 by any methods at present known, the operation
of "piles" for the production of plutonium and of separation
plants for its extraction, and all research and development in
atomic explosives, would be counted "dangerous." The "safe"
*Ibid,v. a6.
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 603
category of activities would include the use of radioactive ma
terials as tracers, the use of smallppilesfas radiation sources or
for the manufacture of radioactive materials (especially those
which decay rapidly), and the operation of large reactors for the
production of
power,
in the range of 100,000 to 1,000,000 kilo
watts. The inclusion of this last activity in the "safe" category
constitutes one of the
report's
most
important
contributions.
Such reactors cannot produce fissionable materials (in the ab
sence of further uranium or thorium) and they will actually
"burn up" their initial "fuel;" hence they will require recharg
ing from time to time.
The
report proposes
the establishment of an international
agency, wnich might be organized as a Commission of the United
Nations or in some other way, termed for purposes of discussion
the Atomic Development Authority. This Authority would have
the right to own and lease property anywhere in the world and
to
carry
on
mining, manufacturing and research in the atomic
energy field, and to conduct such transactions as
licensing,
selling and inspection. It is
proposed
that the Authority have
title and access (through ownership
or lease) to all uranium and
thorium deposits, and alone conduct all mining operations
in
this field, taking possession
of all material mined. All denatured
fissionable material would remain in its permanent possession.
Denatured materials and non-explosive by-products of the
mines (such as vanadium or radium) would be made available
to nations or to
private individuals through sale or lease. The
Authority would construct and own, and alone would have the
right to operate, all separation plants for fissionable materials
and all "piles" which use undenatured material. It alone would
conduct all research in the general fields relating to atomic ex
plosives, and one supposes that it would build up powerful and
advanced research staffs for that purpose. One of the major
re
sponsibilities of these research units would be continually
to re
examine the line dividing "dangerous" from "safe" activities,
which might well shift as
knowledge advanced. In short, the Au
thority would have a
monopoly of the operation of all intrinsi
cally "dangerous" activities in the nuclear field. In addition, it
would exercise the right of inspection in all nations, particularly
in the raw materials field, presumably through
a staff recruited
and maintained on a
truly international basis.
"Safe" activities in connection with atomic energy could rest
6o4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in governmental
or
private
hands. Thus individual nations or
their citizens would be free to conduct, under license and with
a minimum of inspection, the generation of power for peaceful
purposes in privately owned piles operating
with denatured
substances, and to
produce materials for scientific and medical
research. Since the "charges" in such piles would be expendable,
they would be renewed from time to time by the Authority from
its stocks of denatured material. Private research and develop
ment would be encouraged in the "safe" fields, and it is antici
pated that close collaboration would be maintained between such
private research groups and the more
widely informed research
and development groups of the Authority.
Finally, it is
emphasized
that the mining facilities and the
processing plants of the Authority should be distributed among
several nations. Such plants would be under the military guard
of the Authority; but in the event that a recalcitrant nation
seized the plants within its territory, the remaining plants
throughout the world would be able to take appropriate
meas
ures for defense. Since any nation seizing such plants would re
quire approximately
a year to produce bombs on a
large scale,
there would be time to take the necessary protective
measures.
Thus no nation could readily achieve a
monopoly of atomic
weapons.
Before the publication of the State Department report, al
most all the thinking about the international control of atomic
energy assumed that ultimate
ownership
and control of all mines
and of all mining, refining and manufacturing processes con
nected with fissionable materials (in both the "dangerous"
and the "safe" categories) would rest with individual nations.
The hope
was to subject these national operations
to international
law and the "policing" of an international inspection force. The
State Department plan
reverses this thesis, placing
all the in
trinsically "dangerous" activities in public hands and under in
ternational ownership and control from the start.
This arrangement makes possible the formulation of an in
ternational code which is clear-cut and enforceable. For if the
mere
possession of undenatured fissionable material, or the op
eration of mines or
plants producing
or
using such material, con
stitutes a violation of the law, evidence of guilt
can be quite
readily established. As already noted, detection of the illegal
use
of facilities which were nevertheless legally owned would be very
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 605
difficult at best. Under the new
plan, only mining operations
might require large-scale and continuous policing by the inter
national authority. A nation which sought
to evade its obliga
tions could produce bombs in appreciable quantity only by
carrying through many illegal steps, from mine to final processing
plant, using undenatured fissionable materials at every step of
the way. To do this undetected on a
large scale would probably
be difficult even with a
fairly limited system of inspection.
If, as
suggested, the Atomic Authority maintained extensive
research facilities in atomic explosives and related fields, the func
tions of research and inspection might be combined, with the
result that the Authority would always remain master of the
world situation by virtue of technological superiority
as well as
by legal right. The proposal
to
keep "safe" activities in private
hands tends in the same direction. Since "safe" materials are
expendable and can be produced and supplied only by the Author
ity, itwill naturally exercise control over such activities while at
the same time encouraging the full development of private initia
tive and giving
to the relations between the public agency and
private individuals the positive character of an aid to research
and
development.
Finally, the plan does not ignore security phases of the problem
in the event that the whole system of world order should suddenly
collapse. Plants and facilities can be distributed among nations
in such a way that in the event of collapse
no one state will have
a
preponderance
of atomic weapons
?
at any rate no
advantage
as great as itmight well have secured by subterfuge under condi
tions of national ownership. During the basically insecure period
of transition, the United States, Great Britain and Canada will
befin the most secure
positions, as
they are today. Their sharing
of information and facilities may somewhat accelerate the im
pairment
of that
security. But, as we have seen, security
based on
monopoly is in any case doomed.
The difficulty of gaining general acceptance of this sytem is
evident. Any practicable system of international control will
require every nation to
delegate
some of its national authority,
and this is sure to be resisted by sections of public opinion. The
area of national sovereignty to be delegated under this plan ad
mittedly would be very considerable. Other objections, both
broad and detailed, can be brought against the plan. They all will
have to be taken into account. In
considering them, however,
6o6 FOREIGNAFFAIRS
we must recognize that they apply
to any plan
of interna
tional control, and we must set off against them the disadvantages
of systems which propose primary national controls, subject
to
international jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Certain conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysis:
(i) International control of atomic energy is the surpassingly
important objective of this nation's foreign policy. It must be,
indeed, the chief present goal of every nation that wants peace.
If the development of atomic energy continues to rest
entirely in
the hands of separate nations, if there isno
provision for the inter
national exchange of information, for international cooperation
and eventually international control, an international atomic
arms race seems inevitable. The dangers of this cannot be exag
gerated. The advantage that the atomic bomb would give
an
aggressor, the localization of the richer deposits of uranium ore
in certain areas, and the inherent differences in technological
capabilities between nations would breed national rivalries, am
bitions and fears. The tension might become unbearable as the
military potentials of rival nations became more and more
unequal.
A further argument for the international approach is found
in the fact that the possibilities for the constructive use of atomic
energy in peacetime
can be adequately developed only through
world-wide cooperation. These potentialities for good, in the
fields of industry, scientific research and medicine, are very great.
Mankind cannot be asked to forego such benefits.
Many in this country will object that the present American
monopoly
of atomic weapons constitutes a
protection
not only
for ourselves but for the world as awhole, since the United States
cannot, as they believe, be suspected of ever
planning
to start a
war. The conclusion of their argument is that our continued
monopoly ought
not to be put in jeopardy by efforts toward
international cooperation. The answer is that our
monopoly will
be short-lived in
any
case. Our
security
cannot be based on a con
tinued monopoly
01 the raw materials, facilities or manpower for
making atomic bombs, or on a
monopoly of the necessary basic
knowledge. There is no adequate direct defense against atomic
weapons. And our former security based on our
geographical
position has greatly diminished. International cooperation and
ATOMICENERGYAND FOREIGNPOLICY 607
eventual international control, then, seem
plainly designated
as
the objectives of a realistic foreign policy.
(2) To be at all effective, any system of international control
requires some delegation of national sovereignty by every par
ticipating nation. This will be hard to achieve, especially it the
actual power of a central authority
were less, at any rate at
the start, than that of individual nations or some cealition of
them. The processes of education, negotiation and then of actually
putting the system agreed upon into operation will take time.
Success can be achieved only if the participating nations realize
that the safety of each one of them, quite apart from the welfare
of the world as a whole, depends upon the efforts they put forth.
Meanwhile, as
things stand, the development of atomic weapons
will inexorably proceed faster and faster. No time must therefore
be lost in setting
out on the long and laborious road toward the
goal of effective international control.
(3) The nations which first produced the bomb and which
still have a
monopoly in the field
?
the United States, Great
Britain and Canada
?
have taken the lead in acting
on the thesis
set forth in the preceding paragraph. The Anglo-American
Canadian Declaration, the Moscow Communiqu? and the estab
lishment of the Atomic Energy Commission show that they
understand the salient features of the problem
?
the need for an
immediate beginning, the need formaintaining
a balance between
national security and international action, the need for a
long
term approach, and the need for enlarging the field of action to
embrace all weapons capable of mass destruction. But these are
generalities. The next
step
will be to present concrete and detailed
suggestions as to how a
beginning may be made in action. Here
again the nations now
possessing
a
monopoly of atomic weapons
have the responsibility for taking the lead. This is especially true
of the United States. The challenge
to our
leadership
?-
moral,
intellectual and political
?
will come
during the first meetings of
the Atomic Energy Commission, scheduled to begin about the
time these lines appear in print.
(4) With the control and ownership of raw materials, process
ing plants
and manufacturing facilities in each nation primarily
in the hands of the individual governments, the determination
of whether a
given atomic energy plant
were
legitimately
en
gaged in producing power or were
nefariously manufacturing
atomic bombs would be a formidable undertaking, particularly
6o8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
since the rules to be enforced would relate to the manner
of use
of facilities legally owned by states rather than to the illegal
possession of materials or the illegal conduct of processes.
A further drawback to a control system based on national
ownership is that if it suddenly fails
?
and this must be counted
a
possibility
?
the first nation defaulting may be in the advan
tageous position of having all its own
plants intact, a
personnel
already expert in the production of bombs (which might have
been made illegally for some time before being detected), and
perhaps
a
stockpile of bombs and raw materials.
(5) The State Department plan for international control is
built on a more
hopeful
set of premises. It assumes that the
ownership and operation of all atomic facilities of military
potentiality shall rest initially with an international Atomic
Energy Authority. Utilizing the fact that fissionable materials
can be denatured, it draws a tentative line of distinction between
"dangerous" and "safe" materials and activities. It proposes
that the former remain within the sole province of the Authority,
but that "safe" activities may be conducted by nations or
by
private individuals, who will obtain the necessary "safe"
materials from the Authority. It further proposes that the
Authority shall conduct all research within the "dangerous"
areas, through
a
corps of the ablest researchers in atomic energy,
whose secondary task will be to act as
inspectors
to ensure the
proper conduct of the "safe" activities by nations and indi
viduals.
Among the advantages of the plan
are the identification of
ownership with responsibility for the conduct of operations in a
way impossible under schemes built on national ownership. This
permits drawing up amuch simpler rule of law, making illegal the
mere
possession
of certain materials or the mere conduct of certain
processes.
It also offers more
security
in the event the system
breaks down, for a
judicious distribution of plants among many
nations at the start can assure that a
monopoly
of
knowledge and
facilities would not be concentrated, even under the very worst
circumstances, in the hands of any one national group. Most im
portant of all, itmakes inspection
a
positive function and ensures
that the inspectors shall be research men of the highest caliber
who will have the knowledge and interest required to detect
evasions and ensure enforcement.
The scheme's principal handicap, perhaps, is that it calls
ATOMIC ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 609
for so
large
a grant of national sovereignty
to the international
authority. We cannot gauge as yet the political obstacles which
this fact may create. But any form of international control will
encounter political objections; and if there is to be international
control of atomic energy in any form these political objections
will have to be squarely met.
At length the country is face to face with the real issue. The
American policy has on the whole been sound. The Anglo-Ameri
can-Canadian Declaration gave statesmanlike evidence that we
recognize the scope of the problem
no less than its critical nature.
But we have been slow to act, and that slowness has been costly.
A great psychological opportunity
to enlist public opinion in
favor of the necessary grant of sovereignty
was lost at the very
beginning; and every step that has been taken, down to the publi
cation of the State Department report, has lost force
by being
delayed. The essential fact of the question of the control or atomic
energy is that a
delegation of sovereignty such as the State De
partment plan proposes will inexorably be a
part of any plan
which promises to be effective, and that the public mind must be
prepared for this through
an
understanding both of the logic of
the situation and of the calamitous nature of the alternative
policy of national control and national competition. The nec
essary faith in international control cannot be called into being
by the touch of a wand. It must be built link by link, and gather
power as it proceeds. But there is not amoment to lose; the chain
reaction that can blow civilization apart is under way also. Once
again
?
and more
truly
than ever before
?
the race is between
education and disaster.