

## A Disturbance of Spirits (since 1967)

### ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

The conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq showed how easily enmities between states could be intertwined with those of discordant elements within a state. In this period, some of the internal discords which exist in all states became more significant. In Iraq there was the opposition of Arabs and Kurds. The Kurdish minority in the north-east of the country had for long been neglected in the measures of economic and social change which were carried out mainly in districts nearer to the large cities. As inhabitants of mountain valleys, or members of transhumant tribes, they did not want close control by urban bureaucracies; they were touched too by the idea of Kurdish independence, which had been in the air since the later Ottoman period. From the time of the British mandate there were intermittent Kurdish revolts, and they became more persistent and better organized, and had more support from states which were hostile to Iraq, from the time of the 1958 revolution. For some years the revolt had support from Iran, but this was withdrawn when the two countries reached agreement on various questions in 1975. After that the revolt ended, and the government took some measures to give the Kurdish areas a special administration and a programme of economic development, but the situation remained uneasy, and revolt flared up once again in the late 1980s, during the war between Iraq and Iran.

A similar situation existed, potentially, in Algeria. Part of the population of the mountain areas of the Atlas in Morocco and Kabylia in Algeria were Berbers, speaking dialects of a language different from Arabic and with a long tradition of local organization and leadership. In the period of French rule, the government had tended to maintain the difference between them and the Arabic-speaking inhabitants, partly for political reasons, but also because of a natural tendency of local officials to preserve the special nature

of the communities they ruled. When nationalist governments came to power after independence, their policy was one of extending the control of the central government and also the sway of Arabic culture. In Morocco, this policy was strengthened by two factors, the long and powerful tradition of the sultan's sovereignty, and the prestige of the Arabic culture of the great cities; Berber was not a written language of high culture, and as Berber villagers came within the sphere of radiation of urban life they tended to become Arabic-speaking. In Algeria, however, the situation was different: the tradition of Arabic culture was weaker, for Algeria had had no great cities or schools, and that of French culture was stronger and seemed to offer an alternative vision of the future. The authority of the government, too, was not so firmly rooted; its claim to legitimacy was based upon its leadership in the struggle for independence, and in that struggle Berbers from Kabylia had played a full part.

Ethnic differences, then, could give a new depth to differences of interest, and so too could differences of religion. The example of Lebanon showed how a struggle for power could easily express itself in religious terms. In the Sudan an analogous situation existed. The inhabitants of the southern parts of the country were neither Arabs nor Muslims; some of them were Christians, converted by missionaries during the period of British rule. They had memories of a period when they had been liable to slave raids from the north, and after independence, with power in the hands of a ruling group which was mainly Arab and Muslim, they were apprehensive about the future: the new government might try to extend Islam and Arabic culture southwards and would be more conscious of the interests of regions near the capital than of those further away. Almost as soon as the country became independent a revolt broke out in the south, and it continued until 1972, when it was ended by an agreement which gave the south a considerable degree of autonomy. Mutual tensions and suspicions continued to exist, however, and they came to the surface in the early 1980s when the government began to follow a more explicitly Islamic policy: a revolt against rule from Khartoum continued on a large scale through the 1980s, and the government was unable either to suppress it or to come to terms with it.

A situation of great danger and complexity existed in countries with large Shi'i populations: Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon. The Iranian revolution seemed likely to arouse a stronger sense of Shi'i identity, and this could have political implications in countries where government was firmly in the hands of Sunnis. On the other hand,

however, a sense of common nationality or of common economic interest could work in the opposite direction. In Syria, a different situation existed, at least temporarily. The Ba'athist regime which had held power since the 1960s had been dominated since 1970 by a group of officers and politicians, with Asad at their head, drawn largely from the 'Alawi community, a dissident branch of the Shi'is; opposition to the government therefore tended to take the form of a strong assertion of Sunni Islam by the Muslim Brothers or similar bodies.

## RICH AND POOR

A gap of another kind was growing wider in most Arab countries – that between rich and poor. It had of course always existed, but it took on a different meaning in a time of rapid economic change. It was a period of growth rather than of fundamental structural change. Mainly because of the increase in profits from oil, the rate of growth was high not only in the oil-producing countries but also in others, which profited from loans and grants, investments and remittances from migrant workers. The annual rate in the 1970s was over 10 per cent in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, 9 per cent in Syria, 7 per cent in Iraq and Algeria, 5 per cent in Egypt. Growth did not, however, take place equally in all sectors of the economy. A large part of the increase in government revenues was spent on acquiring armaments (mainly from the USA and western Europe) and on expanding the machinery of administration; the sector of the economy which grew most rapidly was the service sector, particularly government service; by 1976 civil servants formed 13 per cent of the economically active population of Egypt. The other important field of expansion was that of consumer industries: textiles, food-processing, consumer goods and construction. This expansion was encouraged by two developments in the period: the loosening in most countries of restrictions upon private enterprise, which resulted in the proliferation of small companies, and the vast increase in the volume of remittances from migrants. By 1979 the total volume of these was in the region of \$5 billions a year; they were encouraged by governments because they eased the problem of the balance of payments, and they were used largely for real estate and consumer durables.

On the whole, private investors had no reason to put their money in heavy industry, where both capital outlay and risks were high, and foreign investment in it was limited as well. Virtually the only new heavy industries

were those in which governments chose to invest, if they had the necessary resources. A number of the oil-producing countries tried to develop petrochemical industries, and also steel and aluminium; on the whole the developments were on a larger scale than the likely market would justify. The most ambitious industrial plans were those in Saudi Arabia, where two large complexes were built, one on the Red Sea coast and the other on the Gulf coast, and in Algeria. Under Boumediene the policy of the Algerian government was to devote the larger part of its resources to heavy industries like steel, and to industries which involved high technology, with the hope of making the country independent of the powerful industrial countries and then at a later stage using the new technology and the products of heavy industry to develop agriculture and the production of consumer goods. After the death of Boumediene in 1979, however, this policy was changed, and greater emphasis laid on agriculture and social services.

Almost everywhere the most neglected sector was the agricultural. The main exception was Syria, which devoted more than half of its investment to agriculture, and in particular to the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates, begun in 1968 with help from the USSR and by the end of the 1970s producing hydroelectric power as well as permitting the extension of irrigation in the river valley. The result of this general neglect of agriculture was that, although a large part of the population of every country lived in the villages, agricultural production did not increase in most countries, and in some of them it declined. In Saudi Arabia, 58 per cent of the economically active population lived in the countryside, but they produced only 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Circumstances were exceptional here, because of the overriding importance of oil-production, but in Egypt the proportions were not very different: 52 per cent lived in the countryside and produced 28 per cent of the GDP. By the end of the 1970s, a large proportion of the food consumed in the Arab countries was imported.

Economic growth did not raise the standard of living so much as might have been expected, both because the population grew faster than ever, and because the political and social systems of most Arab countries did not provide for a more equal distribution of the proceeds of production. Taking the Arab countries as a whole, the total population, which had been some 55–60 millions in 1930 and had increased to some 90 millions by 1960, had reached some 179 millions by 1979. The rate of natural growth in most countries was between 2 and 3 per cent. The reason for this was not primarily an increase in births; if anything, the birthrate was declining as methods of birth control began to spread and as urban conditions led

young people to marry later. The main reason was an increase in life expectancy and in particular a decline in infant mortality.

As before, the growth of population swelled the cities, both because the natural increase of the urban population was higher than before, as health conditions improved, and because of immigration from the countryside. By the middle of the 1970s more or less half the population of most Arab countries lived in cities: more than 50 per cent in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Algeria, and between 40 and 50 per cent in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. The increase took place in the smaller towns as well as the larger, but it was most remarkable in the capital cities and the main centres of trade and industry. By the mid-1970s there were eight Arab cities with populations of more than a million: Cairo had 6.4 million inhabitants and Baghdad 3.8 million.

The nature of economic growth, and of rapid urbanization, led to a greater and more obvious polarization of society than had previously existed. The beneficiaries of growth were in the first instance members of ruling groups, army officers, government officials of the higher ranks, technicians, businessmen engaged in construction, import and export, or consumer industries, or having some connection with multinational enterprises. Skilled industrial workers also reaped some benefits, particularly where political circumstances allowed them to organize themselves effectively. Other segments of the population benefited less or not at all. In the cities, there was a population of small employees, small traders and those giving services to the rich, and around them was a larger floating population of those employed in the 'informal sector', as itinerant vendors or casual workers, or not employed at all. In the countryside, medium-sized landowners, or large ones in countries which had not had land reform, could cultivate their land profitably because they had access to credit, but the poorer peasants, who owned a little land or none at all, could scarcely hope to improve their position. The migrant workers in the oil-producing countries might earn more than they could hope to in their own countries, but had no security and no possibility of improving their position by concerted action. They could be removed at will and there were others waiting to take their places. By the end of the 1970s they were even more vulnerable, since many of them no longer came from Arab countries but were brought in temporarily and on contract from further east – from South Asia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines or Korea.

Some governments, under the influence of ideas current in the outside world, were now creating social services which did result in some redistri-

bution of income: popular housing, health and education services, and systems of social insurance. Not all the population was able to benefit from them, even in the richest countries. In Kuwait, all Kuwaitis had full advantage of them, but the non-Kuwaiti part of the population much less; in Saudi Arabia large towns had their *bidonvilles* around them, and the villages were not affluent. The situation was most difficult in the large cities which had grown rapidly through immigration and natural increase. If the *bidonvilles* there were being eliminated, the cheap housing which replaced them was not necessarily much better, lacking as it did material facilities and the sense of community which could exist in the *bidonville*. Public transport facilities were almost everywhere defective, and there was a sharp distinction between those who owned private transport and those who did not. In most cities the water and drainage systems had been constructed for smaller communities, and could not cope with the demands of the larger population; in Cairo the drainage system had virtually collapsed. In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia the problem of water-supply was being met by desalinization of seawater, an expensive but effective method.

#### WOMEN IN SOCIETY

This was also a period in which another kind of relationship within society became an explicit problem. The changing role of women, and changes in the structure of the family, raised questions not only for men who wished to build a strong and healthy national community, but for women conscious of their position as women.

Over the previous generations, various changes had taken place which were bound to affect the position of women in society. One of them was the spread of education: in all countries, even in the most conservative societies of the Arabian peninsula, girls were now going to school. At the primary level, in some countries there were almost as many girls as boys at school; at higher levels, the proportion was increasing fast. The degree of literacy among women was also increasing, although it was still lower than among men; in some countries virtually all women of the younger generation were literate. Partly for this reason, but also for others, the range of work available to women had grown wider. In the countryside, when men migrated to the cities or to the oil-producing countries, women often looked after the land and livestock while the men of the family were away. In the city, modern factories employed women, but work here was precarious; they were hired if there was a shortage of men workers, and in



conditions of slump or overemployment they were the first to be dismissed. Unskilled women were more likely to find work as domestic servants; these were mainly young unmarried girls coming from the villages. Educated women worked in increasing numbers in government offices, particularly in clerical positions, and there was a growing number of professional women, lawyers, doctors and social workers. In some countries there was a small but increasing number of women at the higher levels of responsibility in government; this was particularly true of countries such as Tunisia, South Yemen and Iraq, which were making a deliberate effort to break with the past and create a 'modern' society. In spite of these changes, however, only a small proportion of women were employed outside the home, and at almost every level they were handicapped in competition with men.

The conditions of life in the city, and work outside the home, had some effect upon family life and the place of women in it. In the village, the migration of men workers meant that a wife might have greater responsibilities for the family and might have to make a range of decisions which formerly would have been left to the husband. In the town, the extended family could not have the same reality as in the village; the wife might no longer live in a large female community of sisters and cousins, under the domination of her mother-in-law; husbands and wives were thrown more directly into contact with each other; children might no longer be educated for social life within the extended family, and might be formed by the school and the street as much as by the home. The traffic of ideas and the extension of medical services led to the spread of contraception; urban families, out of economic necessity and because of new possibilities, tended to be smaller than rural ones. Because of education and employment, girls married in their late teens or twenties rather than in their middle teens. In the street and the place of work, seclusion was inevitably breaking down. Not only was the veil less common than it had been, but other forms of separation of men and women were disappearing. In Saudi Arabia an attempt was being made to prevent this: the veil was still generally worn in the streets, education was strictly segregated, and a separate sphere of women's work was defined – they could work as teachers or in women's clinics, but not in government offices or other places where they would mix with men.

These changes were taking place, however, within a legal and ethical framework which was still largely unchanged, and which upheld the primacy of the male. Some alterations were indeed being made in the ways

in which Islamic laws of personal status were interpreted. Among Arab countries, only Tunisia had abolished polygamy, but it was becoming rarer elsewhere. In some countries, for example Tunisia and Iraq, it had become easier for women to request the dissolution of marriage, but everywhere the right of a husband to divorce his wife without giving reasons, and without process of law, was maintained; the right of the divorced husband to the custody of the children after a certain age was also untouched. In some countries the minimum age of marriage had been raised. In some, the laws of inheritance also had been reinterpreted, but in none of them was there a secular law of inheritance. Still less had any Arab country introduced secular laws of personal status to replace those derived from the *shari'a*, as had happened in Turkey.

Even when laws changed, social customs did not necessarily change with them. New laws could not always be enforced, particularly when they came up against deeply rooted social customs which asserted and preserved the domination of the male. That girls should marry early, that their marriages should be arranged by the family, and that wives could easily be repudiated were firmly rooted ideas, preserved by women themselves; the mother and the mother-in-law were often pillars of the system. A large number of women still accepted the system in principle, but tried to obtain for themselves a better position within it by more or less subtle manipulation of their menfolk. Their attitude was expressed, for example, in the stories of an Egyptian woman writer, Alifa Rifaat, depicting Muslim women whose lives were still punctuated by the call of the minaret to the five daily prayers:

She . . . raised her hand to her lips, kissing it back and front in thanks for His generosity. She regretted that it was only through such gestures and the uttering of a few simple supplications that she was able to render her thanks to her Maker. During Ahmed's lifetime she would stand behind him as he performed the prayers, following the movements as he bowed down and then prostrated himself, listening reverently to the words he recited and knowing that he who stands behind the man leading prayers and following his movements has himself performed the prayers . . . with his death she had given up performing the regular prayers.<sup>1</sup>

There were, however, an increasing number of women who did not accept the system and were claiming the right to define their own identity and bring about changes in their social status which reflected that new definition. They were not yet in positions of power; women ministers or members of parliament were little more than tokens of change. Their views



were expressed through women's organizations and in the press. Apart from women novelists, there were a number of well-known polemical writers whose work was widely diffused, in the outside world through translations as well as in the Arab countries. The Moroccan Fatima Mernissi, in *Beyond the Veil*, argued that sexual inequality was based upon, or at least justified by, a specifically Islamic view of women as having a dangerous power which must be contained; this, she suggested, was a view which was incompatible with the needs of an independent nation in the modern world.

There was, it is true, a phenomenon of the late 1970s and the early 1980s which might seem to show a contrary tendency. In the streets and places of work, and particularly in schools and universities, an increasing proportion of young women were covering their hair if not their faces and avoiding social and professional mixing with men. By what might seem a paradox, this was more a sign of their assertion of their own identity than of the power of the male. Those who took this path often did not come from families where segregation was the rule, but took it as a deliberate act of choice, springing from a certain view of what an Islamic society should be, and one which was to some extent influenced by the Iranian revolution. Whatever the motives for such an attitude, however, in the long run it would tend to reinforce a traditional view of women's place in society.

#### A HERITAGE AND ITS RENEWAL

The events of 1967, and the processes of change which followed them, made more intense that disturbance of spirits, that sense of a world gone wrong, which had already been expressed in the poetry of the 1950s and 1960s. The defeat of 1967 was widely regarded as being not only a military setback but a kind of moral judgement. If the Arabs had been defeated so quickly, completely and publicly, might it not be a sign that there was something rotten in their societies and in the moral system which they expressed? The heroic age of the struggle for independence was over; that struggle could no longer unite the Arab countries, or the people in any one of them, and failures and deficiencies could no longer be blamed so fully as in the past upon the power and intervention of the foreigner.

Among educated and reflective men and women, there was a growing awareness of the vast and rapid changes in their societies, and of the ways in which their own position was being affected by them. The increase of population, the growth of cities, the spread of popular education and the

mass media were bringing a new voice into discussion of public affairs, a voice expressing its convictions, and its grievances and hopes, in a traditional language. This in its turn was arousing consciousness among the educated of a gap between them and the masses, and giving rise to a problem of communication: how could the educated élite speak to the masses or on their behalf? Behind this there lay another problem, that of identity: what was the moral bond between them, by virtue of which they could claim to be a society and a political community?

To a great extent, the problem of identity was expressed in terms of the relationship between the heritage of the past and the needs of the present. Should the Arab peoples tread a path marked out for them from outside, or could they find in their own inherited beliefs and culture those values which could give them a direction in the modern world? Such a question made clear the close relationship between the problem of identity and that of independence. If the values by which society was to live were brought in from outside, would not that imply a permanent dependence upon the external world, and more specifically western Europe and North America, and might not cultural dependence bring with it economic and political dependence as well? The point was forcefully made by the Egyptian economist Galal Amin (b. 1935) in *Mihnat al-iqtisad wa'l-thaqafa fi Misr* (*The Plight of the Economy and Culture in Egypt*), a book which tried to trace the connections between the *infitah* and a crisis of culture. The Egyptian and other Arab peoples had lost confidence in themselves, he maintained. The *infitah*, and indeed the whole movement of events since the Egyptian revolution of 1952, had rested on an unsound basis: the false values of a consumer society in economic life, the domination of a ruling élite instead of genuine patriotic loyalty. Egyptians were importing whatever foreigners persuaded them that they should want, and this made for a permanent dependence. To be healthy, their political and economic life should be derived from their own moral values, which themselves could have no basis except in religion.

In a rather similar way, another Egyptian writer, Hasan Hanafi, wrote about the relationship between the heritage and the need for renewal. Arabs like other human beings were caught up in an economic revolution, which could not be carried through unless there were a 'human revolution'. This did not involve an abandonment of the heritage of the past, for which the Arabs were no less responsible than they were for 'people and land and wealth', but rather that it should be reinterpreted 'in accordance with the needs of the age', and turned into an ideology which could give rise to a

political movement. Blind adherence to tradition and blind innovation were both inadequate, the former because it had no answer to the problems of the present, and the latter because it could not move the masses, being expressed in a language alien from that which they understood. What was needed was some reformation of religious thought which would give the masses of the people a new definition of themselves, and a revolutionary party which would create a national culture and so change the modes of collective behaviour.

Much of contemporary Arab thought revolved around this dilemma of past and present, and some writers made bold attempts to resolve it. The answer given by the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-'Azm (b. 1934) sprang from a total rejection of religious thought. It was false in itself, he claimed, and incompatible with authentic scientific thought in its view of what knowledge was and its methods of arriving at truth. There was no way of reconciling them; it was impossible to believe in the literal truth of the Qur'an, and if parts of it were discarded then the claim that it was the Word of God would have to be rejected. Religious thought was not only false, it was also dangerous. It supported the existing order of society and those who controlled it, and so prevented a genuine movement of social and political liberation.

Few other writers would have taken this position, but more widespread was a tendency to resolve the body of religious belief into a body of inherited culture, and thus to turn it into a subject of critical treatment. For the Tunisian Hisham Djaït (b. 1935), national identity could not be defined in terms of religious culture. It should indeed be preserved; the vision of human life mediated through the Prophet Muhammad, and the love and loyalty which had gathered around him over the centuries, should be cherished, and both should be protected by the state. Social institutions and laws, however, should be wholly separated from religion and based upon 'humanistic' principles; the individual citizen should be free to abandon his inherited faith if he so wished.

We are for laicism, but a laicism which will not be hostile to Islam, and does not draw its motivation from anti-Islamic feeling. In our anguished journey we have preserved the very essential of faith, a profound and ineradicable tenderness for this religion which has lighted our childhood and been our first guide towards the Good and the discovery of the Absolute . . . Our laicism finds its limits in the recognition of the essential relation between the state, certain elements of moral and social behaviour, the structure of the collective personality and the Islamic faith, and in our being for the maintenance of this faith and for its reform. Reform

should not be made in opposition to religion, it should be made at one and the same time by religion, in religion and independently of it.<sup>2</sup>

For another Maghribi writer, Abdullah Laroui, a redefinition both of past and of present was essential. What was needed was genuine historical understanding, to 'take possession of our past' through an understanding of causality, of the way in which things developed out of one another. Beyond that, a genuine 'historicism' was necessary: that is to say, a willingness to transcend the past, to take what was needed from it by a 'radical criticism of culture, language and tradition', and use it to create a new future. This process of critical understanding could not itself give a direction for the future. It needed to be guided by the living thought of the age, and in particular by Marxism if correctly understood; with its sense that history had a direction and moved in stages towards a goal, it could provide the insights by which the past could be incorporated into a new system of thought and action.<sup>3</sup>

At the other end of the spectrum were those who believed that the Islamic heritage by itself could provide the basis for life in the present, and that it alone could do so, because it was derived from the Word of God. This was the attitude expressed in increasingly sharp terms by some of those associated with the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and elsewhere. In such movements there took place in the 1960s a certain polarization; some of the leaders and members were willing to make a compromise with the holders of power and to accept the existing regimes, at least for the present, in the hope that this would give them influence over policy. Others, however, moved in the opposite direction: a total rejection of all forms of society except the wholly Islamic one. In a work published earlier, in 1964, *Ma'alim fi'l-tariq (Signposts on the Path)*, Sayyid Qutb had defined the true Islamic society in uncompromising terms. It was one which accepted the sovereign authority of God; that is to say, which regarded the Qur'an as the source of all guidance for human life, because it alone could give rise to a system of morality and law which corresponded to the nature of reality. All other societies were societies of *jahiliyya* (ignorance of religious truth), whatever their principles: whether they were communist, capitalist, nationalist, based upon other, false religions, or claimed to be Muslim but did not obey the *shari'a*:

The leadership of western man in the human world is coming to an end, not because western civilization is materially bankrupt or has lost its economic or military strength, but because the western order has played its part, and no longer possesses

that stock of 'values' which gave it its predominance . . . The scientific revolution has finished its role, as have 'nationalism' and the territorially limited communities which grew up in its age . . . The turn of Islam has come.<sup>4</sup>

The path to the creation of a truly Muslim society, Sayyid Qutb had declared, began with individual conviction, transformed into a living image in the heart and embodied in a programme of action. Those who accepted this programme would form a vanguard of dedicated fighters, using every means, including *jihad*, which should not be undertaken until the fighters had achieved inner purity, but should then be pursued, if necessary, not for defence only, but to destroy all worship of false gods and remove all the obstacles which prevented men from accepting Islam. The struggle should aim at creating a universal Muslim society in which there were no distinctions of race, and one which was worldwide. 'The western age is finished': it could not provide the values which were needed to support the new material civilization. Only Islam offered hope to the world.

The implications of such teaching, if taken seriously were far-reaching. It led that part of the Muslim Brothers which supported Sayyid Qutb into opposition to 'Abd al-Nasir's regime; Qutb himself was arrested, tried and executed in 1966. In the following decade, groups emerging from the Brothers followed literally his teaching that the first stage towards creation of an Islamic society was withdrawal from the society of the *jahiliyya*, to live according to the *shari'a*, purify the heart, and form the nucleus of dedicated fighters. Such groups were prepared for violence and martyrdom; this was shown when members of one of them assassinated Sadat in 1981, and when Muslim Brothers in Syria tried to overthrow the regime of Hafiz al-Asad in the following year.

Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum were those who continued to believe that Islam was more than a culture: it was the revealed Word of God, but it must be understood correctly, and the social morality and law derived from it could be adapted to make it the moral basis of a modern society. There were many forms of this reformist attitude. Conservatives of the Wahhabi school, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, believed that the existing code of law could be changed slowly and cautiously into a system adequate to the needs of modern life; some thought that only the Qur'an was sacred, and it could be freely used as the basis of a new law; some believed that the true interpretation of the Qur'an was that of the Sufis, and a private mystical devotion was compatible with the organization of society on more or less secular lines.

A few attempts were made to show how the new moral and legal system could be deduced from Qur'an and Hadith in a way which was responsible but bold. In the Sudan, Sadiq al-Mahdi (b. 1936), the great-grandson of the religious leader of the later nineteenth century, and himself an important political leader, maintained that it was necessary to have a new kind of religious thought which would draw out of the Qur'an and Hadith a *shari'a* which was adapted to the needs of the modern world. Perhaps the most carefully reasoned attempt to state the principles of a new jurisprudence came from beyond the Arab world, from the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (1919-88). In an attempt to provide an antidote to the 'spiritual panic' of Muslims at the present time, he suggested a method of Qur'anic exegesis which would, he claimed, be true to the spirit of Islam but provide for the needs of modern life. The Qur'an was 'a divine response, through the Prophet's mind, to the moral-social situation of the Prophet's Arabia'. In order to apply its teaching to the moral and social situation of a different age, it was necessary to extract from that 'divine response' the general principle inherent in it. This could be done by studying the specific circumstances in which the response had been revealed, and doing so in the light of an understanding of the Qur'an as a unity. Once the general principle had been extracted, it should be used with an equally clear and meticulous understanding of the particular situation in regard to which guidance was needed. Thus the proper interpretation of Islam was a historical one, moving with precision from the present to the past and back again, and this demanded a new kind of religious education.<sup>5</sup>

#### THE STABILITY OF REGIMES

An observer of the Arab countries in the 1980s would have found societies in which the ties of culture, strong and perhaps growing stronger as they were, had not given rise to political unity; where increasing wealth, unevenly spread, had led to some kinds of economic growth but also to a wider gap between those who profited most from it and those who did not, in the swollen cities and the countryside; where some women were becoming more conscious of their subordinate position in the private and public worlds; where the urban masses were calling in question the justice of the social order and the legitimacy of governments out of the depths of their own inherited culture, and the educated élite was showing a deep disturbance of spirit.

The observer would also, however, have noticed something else which,



in all the circumstances, might have surprised him: the apparent stability of political regimes. Although the Arab countries were often thought of as politically unstable, there had in fact been little change in the general nature of regimes or the direction of policy since the end of the 1960s, although there had been changes of personnel. In Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, there had been no substantial change for a generation or more. In Algeria, the real change had taken place in 1965; in Libya, the Sudan, South Yemen and Iraq, the group which was to remain in power until the 1980s had taken over in 1969, and in Syria in 1970; in Egypt too, the change from 'Abd al-Nasir to Sadat in 1970, which might at first have seemed like a change of persons within a continuing ruling group, had soon turned out to signal a change of direction. Only in three countries were the 1970s a decade of disturbance; South Yemen, where there were conflicts within the ruling party; North Yemen, where a certain rather inconclusive change of regime took place in 1974; and Lebanon, which remained in a state of civil war and disturbance from 1975 onwards.

The apparent paradox of stable and enduring regimes in deeply disturbed societies was worth considering, although in the end it might turn out not to be a paradox. To borrow and adapt an idea from Ibn Khaldun, it could be suggested that the stability of a political regime depended upon a combination of three factors. It was stable when a cohesive ruling group was able to link its interests with those of powerful elements in society, and when that alliance of interests was expressed in a political idea which made the power of the rulers legitimate in the eyes of society, or at least of a significant part of it.

The cohesion and persistence of the regimes could partly be explained in obvious ways. Governments now had means of control and repression at their disposal such as had not been available in the past: intelligence and security services, armies, in some places mercenary forces recruited from outside. If they wished, and if the instruments of repression did not break in their hands, they could crush any movement of revolt, at whatever cost; the only check was imposed by the fact that the instruments were not wholly passive and might turn against the rulers or dissolve, as happened in Iran in the face of the massive rising of the people in 1979–80. They had also a direct control over the whole of society such as no government had had in the past. First the Ottoman reformers and then the European colonial rulers had extended the power of government far beyond the cities and their dependent hinterlands, into the remotest parts of the countryside, the mountain valleys and steppes. In the past, authority had been exercised

in these remoter parts by political manipulation of intermediate powers, lords of the valleys, tribal chiefs or saintly lineages; now it was exercised by direct bureaucratic control, which extended the hand of the government into every village and almost every house or tent; and where the government came it was not concerned only, as in the past, with defending the cities, roads and frontiers and raising taxes, but with all the tasks which modern governments perform: conscription, education, health, public utilities and the public sector of the economy.

Beyond these obvious reasons for the strength of governments there were others, however. Ruling groups had been successful in creating and maintaining their own *'asabiyya*, or solidarity directed towards acquiring and keeping power. In some countries – Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq – this was the solidarity of a party. In others it was that of a group of politicians who were held together by links established in early life and strengthened by a common experience, as with the military politicians in Egypt and Syria. In others again it was that of a ruling family and those closely associated with it, held together by ties of blood as well as common interests. These various kinds of group were not so different from each other as might appear. In all of them, ties of interest were reinforced by those of neighbourliness, kinship or intermarriage; the tradition of Middle Eastern and Maghribi society was that other kinds of relationship were stronger if expressed in terms of kinship.

Moreover, the ruling groups now had at their disposal a machinery of government larger and more complex than in the past. A vast number of men and women were connected with or dependent upon it, and therefore willing (at least up to a point) to help it in maintaining its power. In earlier days the structure of government had been simple and limited. The sultan of Morocco until the later nineteenth century had been an itinerant monarch, raising taxes and showing his authority by progresses through his domains, with a personal army and a few dozen secretaries. Even in the Ottoman Empire, perhaps the most highly bureaucratic government the Middle East had known, the number of officials was comparatively small; at the beginning of the nineteenth century there had been approximately 2,000 civil officials in the central administration, but by the end of the century the number had grown to perhaps 35,000. By the early 1980s, there were almost twice as many government officials as workers employed in industry in Egypt, and the proportions were similar in other countries. This vast regiment of officials was distributed among a number of different structures controlling the various sectors of society: the army, the police, intelligence

services, planning organizations, irrigation authorities, departments of finance, industry and agriculture, and the social services.

Personal interests were involved in the maintenance of the regimes; not only those of the rulers, but army officers, senior officials, managers of enterprises in the public sector, and technicians at a higher level without whom a modern government could not be carried on. The policies of most of the regimes favoured other powerful sections of society as well: those who controlled certain private sectors of the economy, industries in private ownership, import and export trade, often in connection with the great multinational corporations, which were of increasing importance in the period of the *infitah*. To these could be added, to a lesser extent, skilled workers in the larger industries, who in some countries had been able to organize themselves effectively in trade unions and could bargain for better working conditions and wages, although they could not use their collective power to exercise influence over the general policy of the government.

In the last decade or two there had emerged a new social group, of those who had prospered by migration to the oil-producing countries. Of the 3 million or more immigrants from Egypt, Jordan, the two Yemens and elsewhere into Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, most went without the intention of settling. Their interest therefore lay in the existence of stable governments which would allow them to move backwards and forwards easily, to bring home what they had saved and invest it, for the most part in land, buildings and durable consumer goods, and to remain in secure possession of what they owned.

Army officers, government officials, international merchants, industrialists and the new rentier class all, therefore, wanted regimes which were reasonably stable and able to maintain order, and on good enough terms with each other (in spite of political quarrels) to permit the free flow of workers and money, and which maintained a mixed economy with the balance shifting in favour of the private sector and permitted the import of consumer goods. By the end of the 1970s most regimes were of this nature; South Yemen with its strictly controlled economy was an exception, and Algeria a partial exception, although there too the emphasis had changed after the death of Boumediene.

There were other segments of society of which the interests were not favoured to the same extent by the policies of government, but which were not in a position to bring effective pressure upon it. Large landowners with a base in the city and with access to credit were able to obtain a profit from agriculture, but smallholders, sharecroppers and landless peasants were in

a weak position. They formed a smaller proportion of the population than before, because of migration to the cities, although still a considerable one; they produced a lesser part of the GDP of every country, and were no longer able to supply the food needed by the urban populations, which were dependent upon the import of foodstuffs; they were neglected in the investment programmes of most regimes. On the whole they were in a depressed condition, but it was difficult to mobilize peasants for effective action.

In the cities there were vast strata of semi-skilled or unskilled workers: lower government employees, unskilled factory workers, those engaged in providing services, those working in the 'informal' section of the economy, as itinerant traders or casual workers, and the unemployed. Their position was fundamentally weak: engaged in the daily struggle for existence, in natural competition with each other, since supply greatly exceeded demand, splintered into small groups – the extended family, those from the same district or the same ethnic or religious community – in order not to be lost in the vast, anonymous and hostile city. They could erupt into effective and united action only in special circumstances: when the government's system of control broke down, or when there was an issue which touched their immediate needs or deeper loyalties, as with the food-riots in Egypt in 1977 or the Iranian revolution of 1979–80.

One of the signs of the new dominant position of governments in Arab societies was that they were able to appropriate to themselves the ideas which could move minds and imaginations, and extract from them a claim of legitimate authority. By this time, any Arab government which wished to survive had to be able to claim legitimacy in terms of three political languages – those of nationalism, social justice and Islam.

The first to emerge as a potent language was that of nationalism. Some of the regimes which existed at the beginning of the 1980s had come to power during the struggle for independence, or could claim to be the successors of those who had; this kind of appeal to legitimacy was particularly strong in the Maghrib, where the struggle had been bitter and memories of it were still fresh. Almost all regimes made use too of a different kind of nationalist language, that of Arab unity; they gave some kind of formal allegiance to it, and spoke of independence as if it were the first step towards closer union, if not complete unity; connected with the idea of unity was that of some concerted action in support of the Palestinians. In recent years there had taken place an extension of the idea of nationalism; regimes claimed to be legitimate in terms of economic develop-

ment, or the full use of national resources, both human and natural, for common ends.

The second language, that of social justice, came into common political use in the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the Algerian revolution and the spread of Nasirism, with its idea of a specifically Arab socialism expressed in the National Charter of 1962. Such terms as socialism and social justice tended to be used with a specific meaning; they referred to reform of the system of land-tenure, extension of social services and universal education, for girls as well as boys, but in few countries was there a systematic attempt to redistribute wealth by means of high taxation of incomes.

The latest of the languages to become powerful was that of Islam. In a way, of course, it was not new. There had always existed a sense of common destiny among those who had inherited the religion of Islam – a belief, enriched by historical memories, that the Qur'an, the Traditions of the Prophet and the *shari'a* could provide the principles according to which a virtuous life in common should be organized. By the 1980s, however, Islamic language had become more prominent in political discourse than it had been a decade or two earlier. This was due to a combination of two kinds of factor. On the one hand, there was the vast and rapid extension of the area of political involvement, because of the growth of population and of cities, and the extension of the mass media. The rural migrants into the cities brought their own political culture and language with them. There had been an urbanization of the migrants, but there was also a 'ruralization' of the cities. Cut off from the ties of kinship and neighbourliness which made life possible in the villages, they were living in a society of which the external signs were strange to them; the sense of alienation could be counterbalanced by that of belonging to a universal community of Islam, in which certain moral values were implicit, and this provided a language in terms of which they could express their grievances and aspirations. Those who wished to arouse them to action had to use the same language. Islam could provide an effective language of opposition: to western power and influence, and those who could be accused of being subservient to them; to governments regarded as corrupt and ineffective, the instruments of private interests, or devoid of morality; and to a society which seemed to have lost its unity with its moral principles and direction.

It was factors of this kind which produced such movements as the Muslim Brothers, of which the leaders were articulate and educated men, but which appealed to those who were shut out of the power and prosperity of the new societies; and it was partly in self-defence against them or in

order to appeal to a wider segment of their nations that most regimes began to use the language of religion more than before. Some regimes, it is true, used the language of Islam spontaneously and continuously, in particular that of Saudi Arabia, which had been created by a movement for the reassertion of the primacy of God's Will in human societies. Others, however, appeared to have been driven into it. Even the most secularist of ruling groups, those for example of Syria, Iraq and Algeria, had taken to using it more or less convincingly, in one way or another. They might evoke historical themes, of the Arabs as the carriers of Islam; the rulers of Iraq, caught in their struggle with Iran, appealed to a memory of the battle of Qadisiyya, when the Arabs had defeated the last Sasanian ruler and brought Islam into Iran. In most countries of mixed population, the constitution laid down that the president should be a Muslim, so linking the religion of Islam with legitimate authority. In legal codes there might be a reference to the Qur'an or the *shari'a* as the basis of legislation. Most governments which took this path tended to interpret the *shari'a* in a more or less modernist way, in order to justify the innovations which were inevitable for societies living in the modern world; even in Saudi Arabia, the principles of Hanbali jurisprudence were invoked in order to justify the new laws and regulations made necessary by the new economic order. Some regimes, however, resorted to certain token applications of the strict letter of the *shari'a*: in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the sale of alcohol was forbidden; in the Sudan, a provision of the *shari'a* that persistent thieves should have their hands cut off was revived in the last years of Numayri's period of rule. In some countries strict observance of the fast of Ramadan, which had been spreading spontaneously, was encouraged by the government; an earlier attempt by the Tunisian government to discourage it, because it interfered with the efforts needed for economic development, had met with widespread opposition.

#### THE FRAGILITY OF REGIMES

Cohesive ruling groups, dominant social classes and powerful ideas: the combination of these factors might help to explain why regimes had been stable throughout the 1970s, but if examined closely all three might also appear to be sources of weakness.

Ruling groups were subject not only to the personal rivalries which arose inevitably from conflicting ambitions or disagreements about policy, but also to the structural divisions which appeared as the machinery of govern-



ment grew in size and complexity. The different branches of government became separate centres of power – the party, the army, the intelligence services – and ambitious members of the ruling group could try to control one or other of them. Such a process tended to occur in all complex systems of government, but in some it was contained within a framework of stable institutions and deeply rooted political habits. When not so contained, it could lead to the formation of political factions, and to a struggle for political power in which the leader of a faction would try to eliminate his rivals and prepare the way for his succession to the highest position. Such a struggle could be kept within limits only by constant exercise of the arts of political manipulation by the head of the government.

The link between the regime and the dominant social groups might also turn out to be fragile. What could be observed was a recurrent pattern in Middle Eastern history. The classes which dominated the structure of wealth and social power in the cities wanted peace, order and freedom of economic activity, and would support a regime so long as it seemed to be giving them what they wanted; but they would not lift a finger to save it, and would accept its successor if it seemed likely to follow a similar policy. By the middle of the 1980s, the situation of some of the regimes seemed to be precarious. Oil prices reached their peak in 1981; after that they declined rapidly, because of an excess of production, more careful use of energy in industrial countries and the failure of OPEC to maintain a united front on prices and volume of production. The decline in revenue from oil, together with the effects of the war between Iran and Iraq, had an impact on all the Arab countries, rich and poor alike.

If the support given by powerful segments of society to governments was passive, it was partly because they did not participate actively in the making of decisions. In most regimes this was done at a high level by a small group, and the results were not communicated widely; there was a tendency for rulers, as they settled into power, to become more secretive and withdrawn – guarded by their security services and surrounded by intimates and officials who controlled access to them – and to emerge only rarely to give a formal explanation and justification of their actions to a docile audience. Beneath this reason for the distance between government and society, however, there lay another one: the weakness of the conviction which bound them to each other.

Once political ideas were appropriated by governments, they were in danger of losing their meaning. They became slogans which grew stale by repetition, and could no longer gather other ideas around them into a

powerful constellation, mobilize social forces for action, or turn power into legitimate authority. The idea of nationalism seemed to have suffered this fate. It would always exist as an immediate and natural reaction to a threat from outside; this was shown during the war between Iraq and Iran, when those parts of the Iraqi population which might have been expected to be hostile to the government gave it support. It was doubtful, however, whether it could serve as a mobilizing force for effective action, or as the centre of a system of ideas by which life in society could be organized. 'Arabism', the idea of a politically united Arab nation, might still be brought into action by a new crisis in the relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours; the quiescence of the Arab states during the Israeli invasion could be partly explained by the complexities of the Lebanese situation, and was not necessarily a foretaste of what would happen were Israel at war with other neighbours. In general, however, the main function of Arabism was as a weapon in conflicts between Arab states and a pretext for the interference of one state in the affairs of others; the example of 'Abd al-Nasir, appealing over the heads of governments to the Arab peoples, had not been forgotten. On the other hand, the strengthening of human ties between the Arab peoples, because of education, migration and the mass media, might in the long run have an effect.

About the other leading ideas, those of social justice and Islam, the contrary might be said: not that they had lost their meaning, but that they had too much meaning, and too great a power as motives for action, to be harnessed for long to the purposes of any regime. Their roots lay too deep in history and conscience for them to be made into the docile instruments of government.

Governments which appealed to such deeply rooted and powerful ideas did so at their own peril. They were caught in the ambiguities and compromises of power, and if they used languages with such a strong appeal their opponents could also do so, in order to show the gap between what the government said and what it did. They could use with deadly force such words as tyranny and hypocrisy which rang through the whole of Islamic history. The assassination of Sadat in 1981, and an episode in Saudi Arabia in 1979 when a group of convinced Muslims occupied the Great Mosque in Mecca, were signs of the strength of such movements of opposition, particularly when they could combine the appeal to social justice with that to Islam.

Even the most stable and the longest-lasting regimes, then, might prove to be fragile. There would certainly be shifts of power within ruling groups,

because of death or palace revolutions; in 1985 Numayri, the ruler of the Sudan, was deposed by a military *coup* combined with widespread civil disturbance; in 1988, Bourguiba's long domination of the political life of Tunisia ended when he was deposed and replaced by an officer of the army, Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali. Such events might lead to changes in the direction of policy, as had happened when Sadat succeeded 'Abd al-Nasir; but were there likely to be more violent and radical changes?

In some countries there was a possibility that more lasting and formal institutions, which broadened the extent of participation in the making of decisions, would be restored. There was a general desire for this among the educated classes, and even some of the regimes themselves might decide that it was in their own interest; without some degree of participation effective social and economic development could not take place, and real stability was impossible without institutions – that is to say, known and accepted conventions about the way in which power should be obtained, used and transmitted.

Whether such a change occurred would depend on the level of education, the size and strength of the middle classes, and the confidence of the regime. It was not likely to occur in most Arab countries, but there were signs that it was taking place in some of them. In Kuwait, the parliament was restored in 1981 after a gap of several years, and showed itself to have independent opinions and the power to persuade government to take notice of them; but it was dissolved in 1986. In Jordan, an attempt was made in 1984 to revive the parliament which had been in abeyance for some time. In Lebanon, in spite of the civil war, the idea of parliament as the place where, in the end, differences could be reconciled, and of constitutional rule as the basis of legitimacy, was still alive.

The country where constitutional rule seemed most likely to be restored was Egypt, where the educated class was large and stood at a level of political understanding above that of most Arab countries. It had a social and cultural unity, and a surviving memory of the constitutional period, which had lasted for thirty years and had been a period when, within certain limits, opinions could be expressed freely; the memory had been revived in recent years by contrast with the relative lack of political freedom in the periods of 'Abd al-Nasir and Sadat. Under Sadat's successor Husni Mubarak, a cautious change began. Elections to the Assembly were held in 1984; the electoral system was devised in such a way as to ensure a large majority for the government, but the election took place in an atmosphere of comparatively free discussion, and some members of an opposition

party, a revival of the Wafd, were elected. This might have been an indication that Egypt was moving into a position like that of Turkey or some Latin American countries, where periods of parliamentary rule and military dictatorship would alternate, and constitutional life would be always restored and always threatened.

If more radical changes took place, it seemed more likely in the 1980s that they would take place in the name of an Islamic idea of the justice of God in the world than in that of a purely secular ideal. There was not one idea of Islam only, but a whole spectrum of them. The word 'Islam' did not have a single, simple meaning, but was what Muslims made of it. For 'traditional' villagers, it might mean everything they thought and did. For more concerned and reflective Muslims, it provided a norm by which they should try to shape their lives, and by which their acts could be judged, but there was more than one norm. The term 'fundamentalism', which had become fashionable, carried a variety of meanings. It could refer to the idea that Muslims should try to return to the teaching and practice of the Prophet and the first generation of his followers, or to the idea that the Qur'an alone provided the norm of human life; this could be a revolutionary idea, if Muslims claimed – as the Libyan leader Qadhafi appeared to do – that they had the right to interpret the Qur'an freely. The word could also be used of an attitude which might better be called 'conservative': the attitude of those who wished to accept and preserve what they had inherited from the past, the whole cumulative tradition of Islam as it had in fact developed, and to change it only in a cautious and responsible way. This was the attitude of the Saudi regime and its supporters, and of the Iranian revolutionary regime, although the cumulative traditions they accepted were very different from each other.

The circumstances of the different Arab countries varied greatly. An Islamic movement in one country could have a different meaning from what might appear to be the same movement in another. For example, the Muslim Brothers in Syria did not have the same role as those in Egypt; to a great extent they served as a medium for the opposition of the Sunni urban population to the domination of a regime identified with the 'Alawi community. Similarly, the fact that the Iranian revolution had taken a certain form did not mean that it would take the same form in other countries. In part at least, the revolution could be explained in terms of factors which were specific to Iran: certain powerful social classes were particularly responsive to appeals expressed in religious language, and there was a religious leadership which was able to act as a rallying point

for all movements of opposition; it was relatively independent of the government, generally respected for its piety and learning, and had always acted as the spokesman of the collective consciousness.

Such a situation did not exist in the Arab countries. In Iraq, where Shi'is formed a majority, their men of learning did not have the same intimate connection with the urban masses or the same influence on the government as in Iran. Sunni *'ulama* had a less independent position. Under Ottoman rule they had become state functionaries, close to the government and compromised by their relations with it; by tradition and interests they were linked with the upper bourgeoisie of the great cities. Leadership of Islamic movements therefore tended to be in the hands of laymen, converted members of the modern educated élite. Such movements did not have the sanctity conferred by leaders of inherited and recognized piety and learning; they were political parties competing with others. On the whole they did not have clear social or economic policies. It seemed likely that they would be important forces of opposition, but would not be in a position to be able to form governments.

An observer of the Arab countries, or of many other Muslim countries, in the mid-1980s might well have come to the conclusion that something similar to the Iranian path would be the path of the future, but this might have been a hasty conclusion, even so far as Iran was concerned. In a sense the rule of men of religion was a reaffirmation of tradition, but in another sense it went against tradition. The inherited wisdom of the *'ulama* was that they should not link themselves too closely with the government of the world; they should keep a moral distance from it, while preserving their access to the rulers and influence upon them: it was dangerous to tie the eternal interests of Islam to the fate of a transient ruler of the world. This attitude was reflected in a certain popular suspicion of men of religion who took too prominent a part in the affairs of the world; they were as susceptible as others to the corruptions of power and wealth, and perhaps they did not make very good rulers.

It might happen too that, at a certain stage of national development, the appeal of religious ideas – at least of ideas sanctified by the cumulative tradition – would cease to have the same force as another system of ideas: a blend of social morality and law which were basically secular, but might have some relationship to general principles of social justice inherent in the Qur'an.

## Afterword 2002

The decade since the late Albert Hourani published the first edition of this book has witnessed many dramatic and significant events: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, followed by Operation Desert Storm; a bitter civil war in Algeria that may have cost as many as 100,000 lives; the unification of the two Yemens; the deaths of three 'grand old men' of Arab politics – King Husayn of Jordan in February 1999, King Hasan of Morocco in July 1999 and President Hafez al-Asad of Syria in June 2000, each of whom was succeeded by his son; the creation of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and parts of the Israeli-occupied West Bank under the path-breaking Oslo Accords signed by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization on the lawn of the White House in Washington, DC; the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist and the unravelling of those same Accords in 2002 following the second Palestinian uprising and Israel's military response.

However, the most dramatic of all recent events, in terms of media coverage, if not by the calculus of human loss and suffering, were the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 which cost just over 3,000 lives, the heaviest losses sustained as the result of a belligerent act on the American mainland since the end of the Civil War. All nineteen of the suspected suicide hijackers who flew three civilian jets loaded with passengers and fuel into the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon building near Washington were Arabs, fifteen of them from Saudi Arabia. All are suspected of having been trained by the al-Qa'ida ('base' or 'foundation') network funded and presided over by the Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden. It would be absurd, of course, to claim that any of the events that have occurred since the sad and unexpected death of Albert Hourani in 1993 could have been predicted by him. But none, I suspect, would have surprised him entirely.



As a historian of ideas as well as events, his knowledge was as deep as it was broad. He had a profound understanding of both the common legacies of religion and shared historical consciousness that hold the Arab peoples together and of the ideological differences and structural forces which continue to tear them apart.

In the Prologue to this book, and in several sections of the text Hourani pays tribute to Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the Arab philosopher of history whose theories of cyclical renewal and concept of *'asabiyya* – ‘a corporate spirit oriented towards obtaining and keeping power’ – still provide a useful frame through which to view contemporary events. In Ibn Khaldun’s theory the earliest form of human society was that of the hardy people of the steppes and mountains, where authority was based on ties of kinship and group cohesion – *'asabiyya*. A ruler with *'asabiyya* was well placed to found a dynasty, since urbanites tended to lack this quality. When dynastic rule was stable and prosperous, city life would flourish. But in Ibn Khaldun’s era every dynasty bore within itself the seeds of decline, as rulers degenerated into tyrants, or became corrupted by luxurious living. In due course power would pass to a new group of hardy rulers from the margins.

In its broader application the Khaldunian approach as interpreted by Hourani may still provide us with significant insights, despite the massive culture shock sustained by the Arab-Muslim world in the aftermath of European domination, beginning with the French conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and culminating in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Hourani points out that in the post-colonial period, since the early 1960s, there has been remarkably little change in the general nature of most Arab regimes or the direction of their policies: in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco there has been no substantial change for more than a generation; in Libya, Syria and Iraq, the groups that were in power by about 1970 retained control throughout the eighties and nineties.

This degree of political continuity seems paradoxical when we consider the extraordinarily rapid changes and the degree of social turbulence beneath the surface – the exploding populations, the rapid pace of urbanization, the extension of motorized transport, the transformation of the countryside, the demographic changes that have tilted the balance towards youth and the continuous eruptions of armed conflict in the region, from the Western Sahara to Palestine and the Gulf. Nevertheless, in the light of the turbulent events of the past decade,

Hourani’s explanation still holds up: ‘To borrow and adapt an idea from Ibn Khaldun,’ he writes:

it could be suggested that the stability of a political regime depended upon a combination of three factors. It was stable when a cohesive ruling group was able to link its interests with those of powerful elements in society, and when that alliance of interests was expressed in a political idea which made the power of the rulers legitimate in the eyes of society, or at least a significant part of it. (page 448)

The cohesion of regimes now depends on such factors as personality cults disseminated through visual media and the ubiquitous presence of the intelligence and security services – tools unavailable to past rulers. Moreover in most states the power of government now extends into those remotest parts of the countryside where its writ was once either weak or practically ignored. But in modern Arab politics the *'asabiyya* of the ruling group is still an important, perhaps crucial factor in the acquisition and maintenance of power.

A *tour d’horizon* of the Arab states in early 2002 provides ample confirmation of Hourani’s thesis. Saddam Husayn remains in power in Iraq despite military failure and national humiliation in the first Gulf war of 1980–88 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when his forces were driven out of Kuwait by the American-led coalition including Arab forces from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, the erosion of his country’s sovereignty by the imposition of ‘no-fly zones’ policed by US and British airforces, and the establishment of the autonomous Kurdish regional government under allied protection in the north-east. And, despite increasingly belligerent threats by the United States and Britain to remove him by force in order to destroy his capacity, in violation of UN sanctions, to manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), there is little sign of an alternative. The Iraqi opposition is fragmented and ineffectual: there is no plausible candidate to replace Saddam, however much Washington and Whitehall would prefer it to be otherwise.

Following a Khaldunian analysis, the source of Saddam’s resilience can be explained by the *'asabiyya* of his al-Bu Nasr clan from the region of Takrit, on the Tigris north of Baghdad which radiates through an extended network of families, clans and tribes originating in this area. It was from this region in the Sunni Arab provinces that a significant part of the officer corps had been recruited prior to the military coup that

brought Saddam Husayn and his former chief Hasan al-Bakri to power in 1968. Though formally adhering to the secular Arab nationalism of the Ba'ath party, the group's *'asabiyya* has proved far more durable than its ideological orientation. By adroit manipulation of clan loyalties and rivalries Saddam built up a formidable system of power based not only on coercion and fear but also on clientism.

The distribution of land (confiscated from old-regime landowners or political opponents) and the disbursement of oil revenues, presided over by Saddam, lies at the centre of this web of patron-client relationships; but a modern state like Iraq has numerous other benefits in its storehouse in addition to oil and land: licences for setting up businesses, import-export enterprises (including arms imports), control of foreign exchange and even control over labour relations. As Charles Tripp observes, a structure has been created 'geared not simply or even primarily to the general concern of improving the economic condition of the country, but rather to the particular preoccupation of creating networks of complicity and dependence which would reinforce the position of those in power.'<sup>1</sup>

The *'asabiyya* of the Takriti-dominated Republican Guard, preserved by Saddam during Operation Desert Storm, acted as his shield during subsequent risings by the Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the southern cities of Basra, 'Amara, Nassiriyya, Najaf and Kerbala in 1991. Though the Kurds were protected by allied air power, the Shi'a rebels were abandoned (despite initial encouragement by America). Within a few weeks the Republican Guard divisions had recaptured all the rebel-held towns, inflicting massive destruction and loss of life. The pariah status and regime of sanctions imposed on Iraq after this second Gulf war, far from undermining the power of Saddam Husayn, probably served to strengthen its *'asabiyya*: reports surfacing in the Western press in 2000 revealed that the regime was earning some \$2,000 million annually from oil smuggling. After the defection and subsequent execution of Saddam Husayn's son-in-law Husain Kamil al-Majid, the president's elder son 'Uday appeared to be the major beneficiary of this lucrative by-product of UN sanctions against Iraq.

Iraq is doubtless an extreme example: but it nevertheless conforms to a pattern of *'asabiyya*, supporting a network of patron-client relationships that prevails in most other parts of the Arab-Muslim world. In contrast to the *'asabiyya* of the ruling clan in Iraq, the Al Sa'ud family in Saudi Arabia makes no attempt to conceal its ownership of the country's principal

natural resource behind the mask of state institutions. Since Saudi Arabia's foundation in the 1920s the Al Sa'ud, a sept of the 'Aniza tribe, have effectively been its owners as well as its rulers. Oil is not just the kingdom's primary national resource: it is first and foremost private, family property. The bulk of the revenue is paid to the king before it is registered as national income. The royal family decides on its needs, and government officials are obliged to act accordingly. The 6,000-odd princes and princesses linked to the Al Sa'ud are entitled to regular stipends in addition to their 'working' salaries as government officials or commissions they may receive on business deals. In 1996 a Saudi economist estimated that the royal family was costing the state at least \$4,000 million a year.

Similar arrangements apply in most of the oil-producing Gulf states where rule is vested in one family, while in Libya, oil royalties and the support of his own networks of clan and tribal allegiances has sustained the eclectic and unpredictable Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi for more than three decades since the military coup that brought him to power as a 28-year-old army captain.

The persistence of patrimonialism – private ownership of the state and its resources – as a political fact of life is doubtless reinforced by the patronage that the control of oil resources confers on dominant groups, but it exists even where the state has much more limited resources at its disposal. In Syria the military-political apparatus of the Ba'ath party was taken over by a predominantly rural group from a minority religious community in much the same manner as in Iraq. However, in contrast to that of the Sunni Takritis in Iraq (who come from the Sunni Arab minority, which constitutes about 20 per cent of the Iraqi population) the *'asabiyya* of the dominant group in Syria is based in the narrower ethno-religious matrix of the 'Alawite or Nusayri community from the mainly rural Latakia region north of Lebanon.

The Alawis, who comprise less than 12 per cent of the Syrian population, are Shi'ites who have a distinctive esoteric theology inaccessible to outsiders: in their case the solidarity of kinship is reinforced by a closed religious tradition. Recruited into the armed forces by the French during the 1930s and 1940s, their military expertise enabled them to rise through the ranks. After the Ba'athist coup of 1963 many officers suspected of disloyalty to the new government were replaced by 'Alawis, a trend that accelerated after Hafez al-Asad, the 'Alawi airforce commander, staged a successful coup against his Ba'athist colleagues in 1970. Thereafter the power of the state was firmly concentrated into 'Alawi hands. Of the

officers commanding the 47th Syrian Tank Brigade, responsible for suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion in the city of Hama in 1982 at a cost of some 20,000 lives, 70 per cent are reported to have been 'Alawis.

When Hafez al-Asad died in 2000, the constitutional niceties were rapidly dispensed with to ensure a smooth succession. Fearful that Hafez's younger brother Rifaat al-Asad (living in exile after attempting to oust Hafez during a previous illness) would attempt to take over, a hastily convened People's Assembly voted unanimously to lower the minimum age for a president from 40 to 34, the exact age of Bashar al-Asad.

As the Arab world grows more distant from the period of direct colonial domination, so the old lines of *'asabiyya* and dynastic rule seem to reassert themselves. As the drama over Bashar al-Asad's succession revealed, the differences between overt and covert dynastic rule were becoming less apparent. Sixteen months earlier the succession in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan following the death of King Husayn in February 1999 bore striking similarity to the events that would unfold in Damascus. During Husayn's absence in America for medical treatment he transferred many of his responsibilities to his brother Crown Prince Hasan, who had been regent since 1965; on his return, however, two weeks before his death, he named his eldest son Abdullah as Crown Prince (a letter he is reported to have sent his brother expressed dissatisfaction with his handling of the kingdom's affairs during his absence, particularly his involvement in military matters). The dying monarch also accused his brother's supporters of slandering his immediate family, prompting speculation of a serious family rift. In the event, the Jordanian succession, like that of Bashar al-Asad, passed quite smoothly. The new king promised fundamental reforms, including strengthening the rule of law and further advances towards democracy. He appointed a new government under a new prime minister. His uncle, Prince Hasan, was effectively excluded from power and several of his political allies were replaced. Queen Rania, a Palestinian, adopted a high public profile as Queen of Jordan. Despite the continuing stresses due to the failure of the Oslo Accords and the second Palestinian *intifada*, the continuity and legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy seem assured.

In Morocco the Alawite monarchy, whose legitimacy, like that of the Hashemites, derives from the monarch's descent from the Prophet Muhammad, also experienced a smooth transition from father to son. Muhammad VI, who succeeded his father in July 1999, immediately

proclaimed himself an advocate of reform and modernization, adopting a high-profile, populist style very different from that of his father. During a ten-day visit to the poor and isolated northern Rif region, virtually ignored by his father, he promised to help the poor and reduce unemployment and spoke about sensitive issues including social justice, human rights and equality for women. In November he abruptly dismissed his father's closest adviser, the interior minister Driss Basri, a move that was widely seen as signalling his desire for reform.

In other Arab states the same patterns of continuity were discernible, if much less clearly. In Egypt and Tunisia the same 'strong men' Husni Mubarak and Zayn al Abidin Ben Ali have remained in place since the first edition of this book appeared: both came to power by legal, constitutional means, Mubarak as Vice-President after Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in October 1981, Ben Ali in November 1987 after seven medical doctors declared the ageing and increasingly erratic founding father of modern Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, unfit to govern. (Bourguiba, kept in confinement by Ben Ali for more than a decade, finally died in April 2000 at the age of 96.)

The great and disastrous exception to this picture of relative continuity and stability has been in Algeria, where the collapse of the ruling FLN party and subsequent military intervention led to a bitter civil war that may have cost more than 100,000 lives, most of them civilian. Here the army's cancellation of the second round of the national elections after the Islamic Salvation Front won the first round in December 1991 led to an increasingly bloody civil war that came to resemble, in its barbarity and lack of regard for the lives of non-combatants, the campaign fought by the French against Algerian nationalists nearly two generations earlier. At this writing a measure of stability has been restored with the presidency of 'Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister considered able to bridge the gap between the moderate Islamist leaders and the army generals who continued to hold the strings of power. The savagery and bitterness of the war in Algeria can be seen as the exception that proves the soundness of the Hourani-Khaldun theorem: in the period before the military take-over the government of President Chadli failed on three vital counts – the ruling FLN ceased to maintain its cohesion owing to internal rivalries, while its corruption and lack of legitimacy discredited it in the eyes of a growing part of society.

In neighbouring Tunisia and beyond, in Egypt, the lesson of the Algerian disaster has not been ignored. In Tunisia a relatively prosperous



economy combined with firmly repressive measures has kept the potential Islamist opposition at bay, while the opposition, for its part, has reneged on its original ambition for an Islamist or 'fundamentalist' alternative by agreeing, in public at least, to embark on the road to democracy, regardless of consequences. In Egypt the cycle of Islamist revolt and state repression continues. But here the state appears to have gained the upper hand. The massacre by Islamist terrorists of seventy people, including sixty foreign tourists, at Luxor in November 1997 not only devastated the economy by leading to a collapse in tourism but was also the cause of a massive populist revulsion against the Islamists, the majority of whom, responding to public pressure, announced a cease-fire in their war against the government.

In Saudi Arabia the cohesion of the ruling Al Sa'ud will face a new challenge when it has to choose a king from the next generation – the grandsons of 'Abd al-'Aziz. With King Fahd in failing health, the real power has been wielded by his younger brother, Crown Prince 'Abdullah, commander of the National Guard. But Fahd's uterine brothers, the sons of Hassa al-Sudairi, and their sons occupy key positions in the state. Given the uncertainties of the international climate, rising social tensions due to falling export revenues and growing unemployment, with powerful princely factions competing for power it is far from certain that the *'asabiyya* which has served the Al Sa'ud so well in the past will extend into the future. If and when 'Abdullah succeeds to his ailing brother's throne, a crucial test for the dynasty's stability will be the choice of his successor as Crown Prince.

In re-reading Hourani's history after a decade one is made newly aware of just how precarious the paradoxical stability he describes in the final part of this book has become. As he explains in Chapter 22, in many respects the modern Arab state that emerged from the colonial era had been strengthened by the processes of modernization introduced under European auspices: to the traditional activities of government including maintaining law and order, the collection of taxes and the provision of some basic public services were added areas that had previously been under foreign control, such as banking, infrastructure, communications and public utilities. The increase in the power of the state, however, has not been matched by a proportional increase in public accountability. The modern state may be much more powerful than its Ottoman predecessor, but in crucial respects it lacks both modern democratic legitimacy and the moral authority of its historical antecedents.

The predicament of the modern Arab state, and the people it governs, is made all the more problematic by the absence of a cultural consensus over what the sources of legitimacy are or ought to be. The Islamist movements are generally united in their demands for the 'restoration' of the Shari'a, the divine law of Islam, which they deem to have been supplanted by illicit, imported foreign codes and modes of governance; but there is little consensus among them over the content of that law, the ways in which it should be administered under modern conditions, or the forms by which it should become institutionalized.

At the same time modern Arab societies, like other societies throughout the world, have been brought into the orbit of electronic media. Events that were formerly filtered through the state-controlled newspapers and broadcasting networks are now beamed via satellite into people's living rooms. Attempts by governments to ban or limit satellite television have been largely unsuccessful. Exposure to outside influences has made people much more generally aware of the world beyond and the shortcomings of their own societies and systems of government. The consequent discontents may flow in apparently different directions, towards the states' Islamist opponents, or towards the advocates of 'civil society' who demand more representation and democratic controls. These streams, however, are as likely as not to become merged. At its broadest the demand for the 'restoration of the Shari'a' is simply the desire to check and limit arbitrariness of personal or dynastic rule and to replace it with rule of law. As Gudrun Kramer, who has examined a large body of recent writings on Islam and democracy, argues, the ideological positions of the Islamists are more ambiguous and less clear than one would hope, but they are not as antagonistic to the values of equality, pluralism and democracy as the statements of the most forceful advocates of radical political Islam such as Sayyid Qutb or the Algerian leader of the FIS Ali Ben Hadj, would suggest.<sup>2</sup>

As well as precariousness of arbitrary rule and ambiguity about the sources of the state's legitimacy there remains a continuing shadow of uncertainty about the legitimacy of the boundaries and jurisdictions separating the Arab states. As Hourani reminds us:

Before the modern age, frontiers were not clearly and precisely delimited, and it would be best to think of the power of a dynasty not as operating uniformly within a fixed and generally recognized area, but rather as radiating from a number of urban centres with a force which tended to grow weaker with distance and with the existence of natural or human obstacles. (page 138)

Despite the vast increase in their military power made possible by modern weaponry, communications and bureaucratic controls, many frontiers remain porous and fragile. Though Arab states may formally recognize each other and co-operate on an inter-state basis through organizations such as the Arab League and other regional bodies, the commonalities of language and affective loyalties of clan or family that cut across boundaries make national allegiances precarious. It is perhaps no surprise that when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Kuwaiti armed forces were unable to offer more than a token resistance: the imbalance in military power was overwhelming. More problematic from the point of view of the existing state system was the fact that a significant number of dissenting voices among the Palestinians and in Yemen, traditionally hostile to Saudi Arabia, actively supported Iraq.

The Saudi response to Yemeni dissent was the expulsion of more than half a million expatriate Yemeni workers and the termination of its annual subsidy of \$660 million. When the danger of Iraqi invasion had passed, at least temporarily, after the American-led coalition (which included most other Arab states, at least in token form) expelled the Iraqis and restored Kuwaiti sovereignty in February 1991, the Saudis underscored their hostility to Yemen by backing a secessionist movement in the South with a view to reversing the precarious political unity achieved by the two halves of the country in 1990. The movement led to a brief civil war in 1994, in which 85 tanks were reported destroyed and more than 400 soldiers killed. The North Yemenis accused the Saudis of backing the secessionist movement (with support from other Gulf states) in order to create a new petroleum emirate in the Hadhramaut area under Saudi influence, with an outlet on the Indian Ocean. (The Nimr company owned by the Bin Mahfouz family, originally from the Hadhramaut and with close links to the Al Sa'ud, holds one of the main oil concessions there.) The victory of the North, however, was assured when the Americans made it clear in the United Nations that they favoured Yemeni unity. Here, as in Kuwait, they took the lead in order to protect their own interests, and those of other oil-dependent Western economies.

Far from consolidating the state system, Operation Desert Storm emphasized its fragility. The United States may have held back from pursuing the Iraqi forces to Baghdad because of the fears of its allies and partners in the Gulf that such a course could lead to the country's disintegration into three mutually hostile territories: a southern Shi'i state vulnerable to Iranian political control or manipulation; a central rump or

core around Baghdad under Saddam Husayn; and the Kurdish areas of the north. In the event America held back from supporting the anticipated Shi'i revolt that followed the defeat of the Iraqi forces and Iraq suffered only a partial disintegration – with a degree of Kurdish autonomy enforced by the no-fly zone imposed by American and British air power. The same considerations apply at this writing, when a new war against Iraq is being actively considered. This time, however, the political dangers are even more pressing, since the Arab states in whose interests such an action might theoretically be contemplated have actively signalled their hostility. An attack on Iraq by Western countries considered by many Arabs and Muslims to be hostile towards the Islamic world as a whole could lead to further instability throughout the region.

For good or ill the Arab experience is now ineradicably bound with that of the rest of the world. Through emigration Arabs and Muslims achieved what conquest ultimately denied them: a substantial physical and cultural presence in the West, a presence that reflects and may perhaps exacerbate the tensions prevailing between identities based around 'traditional' or received assumptions about a world created by God and the need to survive in a modern milieu founded upon what one sociologist happily calls the 'institutionalization of doubt'.<sup>3</sup>

The attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 seemed to epitomize the way in which a conflict originating in a strategically sensitive part of the world – the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf – has acquired a global dimension with unforeseeable global consequences. Fifteen of the alleged perpetrators were Saudis from the Asir region on the Yemeni border, one of the last areas to be incorporated into the Saudi Kingdom during the 1920s, a region where researchers from the *Sunday Times* found that a 'disproportionate number of families' were able to trace their origins to the Yemeni tribes defeated by the Al Sa'ud.

A modified version of the Khaldunian paradigm almost fits the 11 September attacks: tribesmen from a highland region far from the centre of power mount an assault on the 'centre': though in this sophisticated, twenty-first-century version of Ibn Khaldun, it is not Riyadh, the Saudi capital, or even Jeddah, the commercial centre of the Hijaz, that are attacked, but the twin towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon, the outward and visible symbols of the financial and military might of the United States which is seen to support the Saudi dynasty and the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestine. The anathemas on the Saudis and Americans pronounced by al-Qa'ida and its leader Osama

bin Laden (scion of a family from the holy city of Tarim, in the Hadhramaut valley of Yemen, which rose to fortune by building palaces for Saudi princes) are couched in language similar to that of earlier proclamations that resonate down the centuries, from early Shi'i rebels, to Ibn Tumart and the Sudanese Mahdi: the existing rulers are not governing in accordance with what 'God sent down' and must be replaced by men of virtue who will restore the law of God. But the conditions and contexts of this challenge are, of course, vastly different from what came before. The leaders of this Arab assault on America were not themselves uncultivated tribesmen from the highlands or steppes possessing a simple piety at odds with the urban sophistication of the city. They were highly trained operators thoroughly familiar with modern weaponry, communications and structural engineering. They had planned and plotted their actions in the heart of the West's own cities using the facilities of its educational institutions. They knew how to fly the world's most sophisticated passenger aircraft.

None of this, of course, could have been predicted in detail: one would hardly expect the historian to succeed where the intelligence services of the West so spectacularly failed. But the attentive reader will have found in Hourani's account of the modern Arab predicament plenty of 'sign-points on the road' to 11 September – to borrow the title of the famous tract by Sayyid Qutb which inspired the terrorists. The 'vanguard of dedicated fighters' proposed by Qutb which would pursue the jihad 'not for defence only, but to destroy all worship of false gods and remove all the obstacles which prevent men from accepting Islam' (p. 446) found its fulfilment in the Islamist movements which sprouted first in Egypt and later throughout the Muslim world in the aftermath of Qutb's execution in 1966.

The jihad against the Russians (following their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979), supported by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and America, with funds and armaments channelled through Pakistani military intelligence, was the catalyst that fused several thousand volunteers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and North Africa into a formidable fighting force which at this writing is still resisting the American-led 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan. For Qutb's followers the jihad against the new *jahiliyya* (ignorance or paganism) represented by the West was part of a pan-Islamic struggle: at least one of the groups that formed part of the al-Qa'ida network intended that the struggle would lead to a restored universal caliphate.

Although the jihad against the Russians drew volunteers from all parts of the Muslim world, the core of the movement was recruited from the Arab world, and it was Arabs (the so-called 'Afghan-Arabs') who predominated in this new Qutb-style vanguard. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 these battle-hardened mujahidin turned their attention to other regions where, according to their analysis, Muslims were fighting the forces of the new *jahiliyya* represented by anti-Muslim, pro-Western or secular governments. Some of these places, such as Kashmir, Bosnia, the southern Philippines and Somalia, were linguistically and culturally remote from the Arab-Muslim heartlands. But in at least three important regions – Egypt, Algeria and the Arabian peninsula – the return of the Afghan-Arabs led to a significant increase in the level of violence directed towards the government or their perceived foreign protectors. Saudi Arabia and Yemen witnessed sophisticated terrorist attacks against American military personnel and an American naval vessel, the *USS Cole*. In Egypt tourists were attacked with the aim of crippling the economy by stopping the flow of foreign currency. In Algeria the level of violence escalated disastrously after the army intervened to prevent the leading Islamist party – the Islamic Salvation Front – from winning the second round of the elections to the National Assembly scheduled for January 1992.



At this writing the 'war on terrorism' declared by the United States in the wake of the 11 September attacks was unravelling under the pressure of its internal contradictions. The Saudi-sponsored Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had provided al-Qa'ida with protection, had been removed by American military action and replaced with an interim government sympathetic to Western interests. But President George W. Bush's Manichean rhetoric, insisting that the whole world, including the Arab-Muslim part of it, must join his crusade against terrorism, was interpreted by the Israeli coalition government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, as giving Israel the 'green light' to reoccupy Palestinian cities vacated under the Oslo Accords in order to flush out, kill or bring to justice the Palestinian factions responsible for an escalating series of suicide-bomb attacks against Israeli civilians. In the mounting crisis over Palestine, Arab opinion was overwhelmingly ranged against America: the atrocities of 11 September were forgotten in the outrage generated by the images of Israeli tanks moving into Palestinian camps and cities, reducing them to rubble and burying Arab bodies.

At the end of March 2002, before the Israeli tanks had moved into all




the territories controlled by the Palestinian National Authority under the Oslo Accords, the Arab League had taken the historically important step of unanimously agreeing both to recognize and to 'normalize' relations with Israel (including diplomatic exchanges, trade and tourism) in exchange for a return to the Palestinians of the territories (with some minor adjustments) occupied by Israel in the war of 1967. After the renewed Israeli incursions, however, the prospects for a settlement along these lines looked dimmer than ever. The real beneficiary of this new escalation of the Arab-Israel crisis was Iraq: in the newly polarized climate, no Arab government could risk co-operating in a campaign against Iraqi 'terrorism' led by Israel's principal ally and backer, the United States. A resolution of the Palestinian conflict which had lasted for more than half a century would not in itself resolve the problems of legitimacy and authoritarianism still afflicting the Arab peoples and their governments. But a resolution had the potential of transforming into a formidable source of economic and social regeneration a running sore at the heart of the Arab-Muslim world and its consciousness. The opportunity existed, but there seemed little prospect that the ageing leaders of Israel and Palestine, Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat, locked in a personal feud that had lasted for two decades, were capable of seizing it.


## The Maps





1 The area covered by the book, showing main geographical features and names frequently used.



2. The expansion of the Islamic empire.











— Approximate limits of the 'Abbasid caliphate

0 500 Miles  
0 800 Kilometres


3 The 'Abbasid caliphate at the beginning of the ninth century.



4 The Middle East and Maghrib towards the end of the eleventh century.




5 The Middle East and Maghrib towards the end of the fifteenth century.











6 Muslim Spain: i) the Umayyad caliphate; ii) the Christian reconquest.






7 The Ottoman Empire towards the end of the seventeenth century.




8 The expansion of European empires until 1914.








9 The post-war settlement, 1918–1923: i) the Sykes-Picot agreement, 1916





ii) the Mandates.



10 The partition of Palestine: i) the partition plan of the Royal Commission, 1937; ii) the armistice lines, 1949, and the Israeli occupation, 1967.



11 The Middle East and Maghrib in 1988.




12. Pilgrimage routes, shrines and centres of learning.




**Tables**  
**Notes**  
**Bibliography**  
**Index of Terms**  
**Index**

## The Family of the Prophet



Adapted from J. L. Bacharach, *A Middle East Studies Handbook* (Seattle, 1984), p. 17.

## The Shi'i Imams



Arabic numerals indicate the line of succession recognized by the 'Twelver' Shi'is.  
Roman numerals indicate the line recognized by the Isma'ilis.

\*recognized as *imam* by the Zaydis.

Adapted from J. L. Bacharach, *A Middle East Studies Handbook* (Seattle, 1984), p. 21.

## The Caliphs

### THE RASHIDUN

The first four caliphs are known to Sunni Muslims as the *Rashidun* (the 'Rightly Guided' Caliphs):

Abu Bakr, 632-4

'Umar ibn al-Khattab, 634-44

'Uthman ibn 'Affan, 644-56

'Ali ibn Abi Talib, 656-61

### THE UMAYYADS

Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan I, 661-80

Yazid I, 680-3

Mu'awiya II, 683-4

Marwan I, 684-5

'Abd al-Malik, 685-705

al-Walid I, 705-15

Sulayman, 715-17

'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, 717-20

Yazid II, 720-4

Hisham, 724-43

al-Walid II, 743-4

Yazid III, 744

Ibrahim, 744

Marwan II, 744-50



## THE 'ABBASIDS

Abu'l-'Abbas al-Saffah, 749-54  
 al-Mansur, 754-75  
 al-Mahdi, 775-85  
 al-Hadi, 783-6  
 Harun al-Rashid, 786-809  
 al-Amin, 809-13  
 al-Ma'mun, 813-33  
 al-Mu'tasim, 833-42  
 al-Wathiq, 842-7  
 al-Mutawakkil, 847-61  
 al-Muntasir, 861-2  
 al-Musta'in, 862-6  
 al-Mu'tazz, 866-9  
 al-Muhtadi, 869-70  
 al-Mu'tamid, 870-92  
 al-Mu'tadid, 892-902  
 al-Muktafi, 902-8  
 al-Muqtadir, 908-32  
 al-Qahir, 932-4  
 al-Radi, 934-40  
 al-Muttaqi, 940-4  
 al-Mustakfi, 944-6  
 al-Muti', 946-74  
 al-Ta'i', 974-91  
 al-Qadir, 991-1031  
 al-Qa'im, 1031-75  
 al-Muqtadi, 1075-94  
 al-Mustazhir, 1094-1118  
 al-Mustarshid, 1118-35  
 al-Rashid, 1135-6  
 al-Muqtafi, 1136-60  
 al-Mustanjid, 1160-70  
 al-Mustadi, 1170-80  
 al-Nasir, 1180-1225  
 al-Zahir, 1225-6  
 al-Mustansir, 1226-42  
 al-Muzta'sim, 1242-58

Adapted from C. E. Bosworth,  
*The Islamic Dynasties* (Edinburgh, 1967).

## Important Dynasties

'Abbasids, 749-1258. Caliphs, claiming universal authority; main capital Baghdad.  
 Aghlabids, 800-909. Tunisia, eastern Algeria, Sicily.  
 'Alawis, 1631-today. Morocco.  
 Almohads (al-Muwahhidun), 1130-1269. Maghrib, Spain.  
 Almoravids (al-Murabitun), 1056-1147. Maghrib, Spain.  
 Ayyubids, 1169-1260. Egypt, Syria, part of western Arabia.  
 Buyids (Buwayhids), 932-1062. Iran, Iraq.  
 Fatimids, 909-1171. Maghrib, Egypt, Syria. Claimed to be Caliphs.  
 Hafsids, 1228-1574. Tunisia, eastern Algeria.  
 Hashimites of Iraq, 1921-58. Iraq.  
 Hashimites of Jordan, 1923-today. Transjordan, part of Palestine.  
 Idrisids, 789-926. Morocco.  
 Ilkhanids, 1256-1336. Iran, Iraq.  
 Mamluks, 1250-1517. Egypt, Syria.  
 Marinids, 1196-1464. Morocco.  
 Mughals, 1526-1858. India.  
 Muhammad 'Ali and successors, 1805-1953. Egypt.  
 Muluk al-tawa'if ('party kings'), eleventh century. Spain.  
 Nasrids, 1230-1492. Southern Spain.  
 Ottomans, 1281-1922. Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Cyprus, Tunisia, Algeria, western Arabia.  
 Rassids, ninth-thirteenth century, end of sixteenth century-1962. Zaydi Imams of Yemen.  
 Rasulids, 1229-1454. Yemen.  
 Rustamids, 779-909. Western Algeria.  
 Sa'dids, 1511-1628. Morocco.  
 Safavids, 1501-1732. Iran.  
 Saffarids, 867-end of fifteenth century. Eastern Iran.  
 Samanids, 819-1005. North-eastern Iran, central Asia.

## IMPORTANT DYNASTIES

- Sa'udis, 1746–today. Central, then western Arabia.  
Saljuqs, 1038–1194. Iran, Iraq.  
Saljuqs of Rum, 1077–1307. Central and eastern Turkey.  
Timurids, 1370–1506. Central Asia, Iran.  
Tulunids, 868–905. Egypt, Syria.  
Umayyads, 661–750. Caliphs, claiming universal authority; capital Damascus.  
Umayyads of Spain, 756–1031. Claimed to be caliphs.

*Note:* some of the dates are approximate, as it is not always easy to know when a dynasty began or ceased to reign. Names of countries indicate the main centres of power of dynasties; except for modern dynasties, they are used in a loose geographical sense.

Adapted from T. Mostyn (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 59.

## Ruling Families in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

### THE OTTOMAN SULTANS

- Selim III, 1789–1807  
Mustafa IV, 1807–8  
Mahmud II, 1808–39  
Abdülmeçid I, 1839–61  
Abdülaziz, 1861–76  
Murad V, 1876  
Abdülhamid II, 1876–1909  
Mehmed V Reşad, 1909–18  
Mehmed VI Vahideddin, 1918–22  
Abdülmeçid II, recognized as caliph but not sultan, 1922–4

### THE KINGS OF SAUDI ARABIA

- 'Abd al-'Aziz, 1926–53  
Sa'ud, 1953–64  
Faysal, 1964–75  
Khalid, 1975–82  
Fahd, 1982–

### THE DYNASTY OF MUHAMMAD 'ALI IN EGYPT


- Muhammad 'Ali, *Vali* (governor) of Egypt, 1805–48  
Ibrahim, *Vali*, 1848  
'Abbas I, *Vali*, 1848–54  
Sa'id, *Vali*, 1854–63  
Isma'il, Khedive, 1863–79  
Tawfiq, Khedive, 1879–92  
'Abbas II Hilmi, Khedive, 1892–1914  
Husayn Kamil, Sultan, 1914–17

Fu'ad I, Sultan, then King, 1917-36  
 Faruq, King, 1936-52  
 Fu'ad II, King, 1952-3

THE 'ALAWIS OF MOROCCO

Sulayman, Sultan, 1796-1822  
 'Abd al-Rahman, Sultan, 1822-59  
 Muhammad, Sultan, 1859-73  
 Hasan I, Sultan, 1873-94  
 'Abd al-'Aziz, Sultan, 1894-1908  
 'Abd al-Hafiz, Sultan, 1908-12  
 Yusuf, Sultan, 1912-27  
 Muhammad V, Sultan, then King, 1927-61  
 Hasan II, King, 1961-

THE HASHIMITES





## Notes

Notes have been kept to a minimum. For the most part they refer to direct quotations, but a few references are also given to other books where I have followed them closely. Where I know of a reliable English translation of a text, I have either quoted it or else used it as a basis for my translation. References to the Qur'an are to the translation by A. J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (London, 1955); the first figure given refers to the *sura* (chapter) and the second to the *aya* (verse).

### Prologue

1. 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddima* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 33; English trans. F. Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah* (London, 1958), Vol. 1, p. 65.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 163; English trans. Vol. 1, p. 330.
3. Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ta'rif bi Ibn Khaldun*, ed. M. T. al-Tanji (Cairo, 1951), p. 246; French trans. A. Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldun: le voyage d'occident et d'orient* (Paris, 1980), p. 148.

### Chapter 1

1. R. B. Serjeant, 'Haram and *hawta*: the sacred enclave in Arabia' in A. R. Badawi (ed.), *Mélanges Taha Hussein* (Cairo, 1962), pp. 41-58.
2. F. A. al-Bustani and others (eds.), *al-Majani al-haditha*, Vol. 1 (Beirut, 1946), p. 103; English trans. A. J. Arberry, *The Seven Odes* (London, 1957), p. 142.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13; English trans. p. 147.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 88; English trans. p. 118.
5. For these and later quotations from biographies of the Prophet, see A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* (London, 1955), a translation of Ibn Ishaq's *Sira* (life) of the Prophet.
6. Qur'an 96:1-8.

### Chapter 2

1. O. Grabar, *The Formation of Islamic Art* (New Haven, 1973), pp. 45-74.
2. Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, *Tarikh*, ed. M. Ibrahim, Vol. 7 (Cairo, 1966), pp. 421-31; English trans. J. A. Williams, *The History of al-Tabari 27: The Abbasid Revolution* (Albany, New York, 1985), pp. 154-7.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 614-22; English trans. J. A. Williams, *Al-Tabari, the early 'Abbasid Empire 1: The reign of al-Ja'far al-Mansur* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 145.
4. al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, *Tarikh Baghdad*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1931), pp. 100 ff.; English trans. in J. Lassner, *The Topography of Baghdad in the Early Middle Ages* (Detroit, 1970), pp. 86 ff.

### Chapter 3

1. R. W. Bulliet, *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979).
2. Abu'l-Tayy'ib al-Mutanabbi, *Diwan*, ed. A. W. al-'Azzam (Cairo, 1944), pp. 355-6; English trans. A. J. Arberry, *Poems of al-Mutanabbi* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 76.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 322-5; English trans. pp. 70-4.
4. 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz, '*al-nubl wa'l-tannabul wa dhamm al-kibr*' in C. Pellat, 'Une risala de Gahiz sur le "snobisme" et l'orgueil', *Arabica*, Vol. 14 (1967), pp. 259-83; English trans. in C. Pellat, *The Life and Works of Jahiz*, trans. D. Hawke (London, 1969), p. 233.
5. Muhammad Abu Rayhan al-Biruni, *Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind* (Hyderabad, 1958), p. 5; English trans. E. Sachau, *Alberuni's India* (London, 1888), Vol. 1, p. 7.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 85; English trans. pp. 111-12.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 76; English trans. p. 100.
8. Biruni, *Kitab al-saydana fi'l-tibb*, ed. and English trans. H. M. Said (Karachi, 1973), p. 12.
9. U. Haarmann, 'Regional sentiment in medieval Islamic Egypt', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 43 (1980), pp. 55-66; Haarmann, 'Die Sphinx: systematische Volkreligiosität im spätmittelaltischen Ägypten', *Saeculum*, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 367-84.

### Chapter 4

1. P. Crone and M. Hinds, *God's Caliph* (Cambridge, 1986).
2. Qur'an 8:20.
3. Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, *al-Risala*, ed. A. M. Shakir (Cairo, 1940); English trans. M. Khadduri, *Islamic Jurisprudence: Shafi'i's Risala* (Baltimore, 1961).
4. Qur'an 26:192-5, 13:37.
5. Qur'an 7:171.
6. Ahmad ibn 'Ahd Allah al-Isbahani, *Hilyat al-awliya*, Vol. 2 (Cairo, 1933), pp. 132, 140; English trans. J. A. Williams, *Islam* (New York, 1961), p. 124.
7. Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Tirmidhi, *Kitab khatm al-awliya*, ed. U. Yahya (Beirut, 1965), pp. 13-32.
8. al-Isbahani, *Hilyat al-awliya*, Vol. 10 (Cairo, 1938), p. 79; English trans. M. S. Smith, *An Early Mystic of Islam* (London, 1935), p. 243.
9. Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi, 'Fi'l-falsafa al-ula' in M. A. Abu Rida (ed.), *Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyya* (Cairo, 1950), p. 103; English trans. R. Walzer in *Greek into Arabic* (Oxford, 1962), p. 12.
10. Ahmad ibn al-Qasim ibn Abi Usaybi'a, '*Uyun al-anba fi tabaqat al-atibba*' (Beirut, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 43; English trans. in F. Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (London, 1975), p. 183.
11. A. I. Sabra, 'The scientific enterprise' in B. Lewis (ed.), *The World of Islam* (London, 1976), p. 182.

### Chapter 6

1. R. M. Adams, *Land behind Baghdad* (Chicago, 1965).
2. M. Brett, 'Ibn Khaldun and the arabisation of North Africa', *Maghreb Review*, Vol. 4, i (1979), pp. 9-16; and 'The Fatimid revolution (861-973) and its aftermath in North Africa' in J. D. Fage (ed.), *Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 631-6.
3. L. Abu Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments* (Berkeley, 1986), p. 147.

## Chapter 7

1. Ibn al-Hajj, *al-Madkhal* (Cairo, 1929), Vol. 1, pp. 245–6.
2. Qur'an 40:40; 16:97.
3. R. Le Tourneau, *Fès avant le protectorat* (Casablanca, 1949), pp. 565–6.
4. Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Battuta, *Rihla*, ed. T. Harb (Beirut, 1987); English trans. H. A. R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, Vols. 1–3 (Cambridge, 1958–71).

## Chapter 8

1. I. M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), pp. 199–206.
2. M. H. Burgoyne with D. S. Richards, *Mamluk Jerusalem* (London, 1987), p. 69.
3. 'Abd al-Wahhab ibn Ahmad al-Sha'rani, *Lata'if al-manan wa'l-akhlaq* (Cairo, 1972), p. 63.
4. Qur'an 4:59.
5. A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford, 1981), p. 45.
6. Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Nasihah al-muluk* (Tehran, 1972), quoted in Lambton, p. 124.
7. Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, English trans. H. Darke (London, 1978), p. 9.
8. Ibid.

## Chapter 9

1. Qur'an 3:105.
2. Guillaume, *Life of Muhammad*, p. 651.
3. G. E. von Grunebaum, *Muhammadan Festivals* (New York, 1951), p. 28.
4. Ibn Battuta, *Rihla*, p. 153; English trans. Vol. 1, p. 189.
5. Qur'an 3:97.
6. Qur'an 9:125.
7. C. Padwick, *Muslim Devotions* (London, 1961), p. 252.
8. Qur'an 12:101.

## Chapter 10

1. Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani; ed. and French trans. L. Bercher, *La Risala*, 3rd edn (Algiers, 1949), pp. 302–3.
2. A. L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton, 1970).
3. A. Layish and A. Shmueli, 'Custom and shari'a in the Beduin family according to legal documents from the Judaeen desert', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 42 (1979), pp. 29–45.
4. Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, pp. 71–2.
5. Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, 'Uyun, Vol. 3, pp. 342–4; English trans. in G. Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges* (Edinburgh, 1981), pp. 89–91. This section owes much to Makdisi's book.
6. Ghazali, *al-Munqidh min al-dalal*, ed. J. Saliba and K. 'Ayyad, 3rd edn (Damascus, 1939), p. 127; English trans. R. J. McCarthy, *Freedom and Fulfilment* (Boston, 1980), p. 91.
7. Ghazali, *Faysal al-tafriqa bayn al-islam wa'l-zandaqa*, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1961), p. 202; English trans. McCarthy, p. 167.
8. Ghazali, *Ihya' ulum al-din*, Part 3, Book 2 (Cairo, 1334/1916), p. 52.
9. Ghazali, *Munqidh*, p. 132; English trans. McCarthy, p. 94.
10. Ghazali, *Ihya*, Part 3, Book 1, p. 17; English trans. R. J. McCarthy, p. 380.

## Chapter 11

1. al-Husayn ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sina, *The Life of Ibn Sina*, ed. and English trans. W. E. Gohlman (Albany, New York, 1974), pp. 36–9.
2. Qur'an 24:35–9.

3. Qur'an 8:85.
4. Muhammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, *Fasl al-maqal*, ed. G. F. Hourani (Leiden, 1959), p. 7; English trans. G. F. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* (London, 1961), p. 50.
5. Ibid., p. 17; English trans. p. 61.
6. Muhyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi, *Shajarat al-kawn* (Beirut, 1984), p. 45; B. Furuzaufarr, *Ahadith-i Masnavi* (Tehran, 1955), p. 29. I owe these references to the kindness of Dr J. Baldick and Dr T. Gandjei.
7. O. Yahia, *Histoire et classification de l'œuvre d'Ibn 'Arabi* (Damascus, 1964), Vol. 1, pp. 113–35.
8. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmu'at al-rasa'il al-kubra* (Cairo, 1323/1905), Vol. 1, pp. 307–9; French trans. in H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taki-d-Din b. Taimiya* (Cairo, 1939), pp. 256–7.
9. O. Yahia, Vol. 1, p. 19.

## Chapter 12

1. Ahmed ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Zaydun, *Diwan*, ed. K. al-Bustani (Beirut, 1951), pp. 29–33.
2. Ibid., pp. 48–9; English trans. A. J. Arberry, *Arabic Poetry* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 114–17.
3. Abu Bakr ibn Tufayl, *Hayy ibn Yaqdhan*, ed. J. Saliba and K. 'Ayyad, 5th edn (Damascus, 1940), pp. 191–2; English trans. L. E. Goodman, *Hayy ibn Yaqzan* (New York, 1972), pp. 164–5.
4. Abu'l-Faraj al-Isbahani, *Kitab al-aghani* (Beirut, 1955), Vol. 6, pp. 294–8; English trans. in H. G. Farmer, *A History of Arabian Music* (London, 1929), pp. 102–3.
5. Ghazali, *Ihya*, Part 2, Book 8, Vol. 2, p. 237; English trans. D. B. Macdonald, 'Emotional religion in Islam as affected by music and singing', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1901), p. 199.
6. Ibid., p. 244; English trans. p. 223.
7. Ibid., p. 249; English trans. p. 229.
8. Ibn Khaldun, p. 28, English trans. Vol. 1, pp. 55–6.
9. Ibn Khaldun, pp. 493–4; English trans. Vol. 3, p. 150.

## Chapter 13

1. Ibn Khaldun, p. 183; English trans. Vol. 1, p. 372.
2. Ibid., p. 148; English trans. Vol. 1, p. 300.
3. Quoted in T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, new edn (London, 1965), p. 203.
4. C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, new edn (London, 1921), pp. 6–8.

## Chapter 14

1. Ahmad al-Nasiri al-Salawi, *Kitab al-istiqa*, Vol. 7 (Casablanca, 1956), pp. 82–6; French trans. in J. Berque, *Al-Yousi* (Paris, 1958), pp. 91–2.
2. Ibid., Vol. 4 (Casablanca, 1955), pp. 163–4; French trans. I. Hamet, *Archives Marocaines*, Vol. 33 (1934), pp. 570–2.

## Chapter 15

1. English trans. in W. L. Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft* (Princeton, 1935), pp. 117–18.
2. Quoted in 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-athar fi'l-tarajim wa'l-akhbar (Cairo, 1965), Vol. 4, p. 214. I must thank Dr K. Barbir for drawing my attention to this letter.

## Chapter 16

1. Jabarti, Vol. 4, p. 285.
2. Ibid., p. 348.

- English trans. H. Inalcik in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics* (New Haven, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 269–71.

## Chapter 17

- H. H. Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1910), pp. 786–7.
- J. Cambon, quoted in C. R. Ageron, *Les algériens musulmans et la France (1871–1919)* (Paris, 1968), p. 478.

## Chapter 18

- J. W. van Goethe, 'Aus dem Nachlass', *Westöstliche Divan*.
- R. Kipling, 'A Ballad of East and West'.
- Rifa'a Rafi'i al-Tahtawi, *Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz* in M. F. Hijazi (ed.), *Usul al-fikr al-'arabi al-hadith 'ind al-Tahtawi* (Cairo, 1974), pp. 208 ff.
- Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, *Aqwam al-masalik fi ma'rifat ahwal al-mamalik* (Tunis, 1867–8), p. 5; English trans. L. C. Brown, *The Surest Path* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967), p. 74.
- Rashid Rida, *Tarikh al-ustadh al-imam al-shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1931), p. 11.
- Taha Husayn, *al-Ayyam*, Vol. 3, 19th edn (Cairo, 1972), pp. 3–4; English trans. K. Cragg, *A Passage to France* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 1–2.

## Chapter 19

- T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, new edn (London, 1940), p. 56.
- Ibid.*, p. 23.
- J. Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris, 1962), p. 60; English trans. *French North Africa* (London, 1967), p. 63.

## Chapter 20

- Abu'l-Qasim al-Shabbi, quoted in M. M. Badawi, *A Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 159.
- Taha Husayn, reply to Tawfiq al-Hakim, *al-Risala*, 15 June 1933, pp. 8–9; reprinted in *Fusul fi'l-adab wa'l-naqd* (Cairo, 1945), pp. 107–9.
- Ahmad Shawqi, *al-Shawqiyyat*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 153–66.
- 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, *Jawla fi'l-dhikrayat bayn Lubnan wa Filastin* (Beirut, 1978).
- 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm*, 2nd edn (Cairo, 1925), p. 103.
- Quoted in R. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969), p. 30.

## Chapter 21

- G. Tillion, *Les ennemis complémentaires* (Paris, 1960); English trans. *France and Algeria: complementary enemies* (New York, 1961), p. 9.

## Chapter 23

- Abdullah Laroui, *L'histoire du Maghreb: un essai de synthèse* (Paris, 1970), pp. 15, 353–4; English trans. R. Manheim, *The History of the Maghreb: an interpretive essay* (Princeton, 1977), pp. 10, 384–5.
- Adunis ('Ali Ahmad Sa'id), quoted in S. K. Jayyusi, *Trends and Movements in Modern Arabic Poetry* (Leiden, 1977), Vol. 2, p. 572.
- Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, *Unshudat al-matar* (Beirut, 1960), pp. 103–7; English trans. in S. K. Jayyusi (ed.), *Modern Arabic Poetry* (New York, 1987), pp. 432–5.

## Chapter 24

- Department of Information, Cairo, *Mashru' al-mithaq* (Cairo, 1962), pp. 13 ff.; English trans. S. Hanna and G. H. Gardner (eds.), *Arab Socialism* (London, 1969), pp. 344–5.

## Chapter 26

- A. Rifaat, *Distant View of a Minaret*, English trans. D. Johnson-Davies (London, 1983), p. 109.
- Hichem Djait, *La personnalité et le devenir arabo-islamiques* (Paris, 1974), p. 140.
- A. Laroui, *La crise des intellectuels arabes* (Paris, 1974), English trans. *The crisis of the Arab intellectual* (Berkeley, 1976); and *L'idéologie arabe contemporaine*, new edn (Paris, 1977).
- Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi'l-tariq* (Cairo, 1964), pp. 4–5.
- F. Rahman, *Islam and Modernity* (Chicago, 1982).

## Afterword 2002

- Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 207.
- Gudrun Kramer, 'Islamist notions of democracy', in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.) *Political Islam – Essays from Middle East Report* (London, 1997), p. 79.
- Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 176.