

# Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space\*

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## Abstract

What is the content of Europeanization? Which causal relationships should be explained? Which theory should be used? In answering these questions, the article forwards a conceptualization of Europeanization based on Historical Sociology and Social Constructivism, which implies a departure from the practice in the current Europeanization literature to concentrate on the contemporary with a narrow focus (EU-ization) at the expense of the historical with a broad focus (Europeanization). It is suggested that the causal relationships to be explained are the transfer of European ideas across time and space using a ‘present-as-reality’ definition of the European idea set. In doing so, it becomes apparent that Europeanization cannot be accepted as either static or something that is solely connected to the EU, and that Europeanization has been characterized by diffusion patterns going both into and out of Europe and sociological processes involving subtle shifts in process, structure, agents and conceptions of ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’.

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## Introduction

Johan Olsen once asked what is meant by Europeanization and whether the concept is at all useful (Olsen, 2002). Although almost a decade has passed since this pertinent question was first asked, the precise meaning and scope of

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the term remain unclear, and its usefulness as an analytical tool remains debatable. The view here is that Europeanization can be characterized as different forms of diffusion processes of European ideas and practices across time and space. It is argued that the lack of clarity about the concept is related to a narrow and bracketed historical and geographical scope, a limited empirical focus, and uncertainty about which causal relationships Europeanization should explain and which theory it should use.<sup>1</sup> The article starts out with a brief outline of the problems in the current Europeanization literature, followed by a reconceptualized understanding of the content and scope of Europeanization based on a Historical Sociological perspective, and a suggestion for which causal relationships should be explained based on Social Constructivism. From that follows an analytical framework, which suggests that by utilizing Historical Sociology and Social Constructivism as the theoretical perspective, the scope and content of Europeanization can be expanded without undermining the concept through conceptual overstretch. The article ends by applying the theoretical framework in a historical sociological analysis where five different stages of Europeanization are identified that are each characterized by different ideational structures, agents, processes, diffusion patterns and 'Self' and 'Other' constructions.

Historical Sociology and Social Constructivism share the assumption that agent identities are highly malleable and change as normative structures change (Hobson, 2002, p. 25). Where Historical Sociology is concerned with charting changes in actor behaviour and changes in norms through historical time and how such changes impact on social relations, Social Constructivism provides a framework for understanding structure/agency relations in continuously ongoing identity construction processes. Both are needed for understanding the complex and constantly changing processes of Europeanization. The approach presented here utilizes a view of history as a reflexive process of narrative constructions that always seek to make sense of the present. History is therefore not simply a storehouse of fixed data of past events, but is a product of memory that in turn is deeply involved in our constructions of identity and narratives (Kratochwil, 2006, p. 1). Every historical account is a construction of a narrative of past reality rather than simply a translation of facts into contemporary language (Koselleck, 2002, p. xiii). In such a view of history, the present conception of Europeanization is inextricably tied to past conceptions of Europeanization through a reconstitution of the past, which involves redefining the meaning of past events in such a way that they have meaning and utility for the political project of the present (Maines *et al.*, 1983, p. 163). As a result what we understand Europeanization to be is in a

<sup>1</sup> These questions are raised by Simon Bulmer (2007, p. 47) and in Graziano and Vink (2007).

permanent state of reconstruction and reconstitution, implying that ‘reality is always that of the present’ (Mead, 1929, p. 235). History therefore is made up of former presents, which themselves were constituted through experience from the past and expectations for the future (Koselleck, 1979, p. 258), which in turn were the product of ongoing identity construction processes.

### I. A Concept with no Genesis?

A critique of the current concept of Europeanization must start by looking at how the literature defines the concept and its content. This is a challenging task because, although the field is rich on definitions of Europeanization, a single and precise meaning of the term remains elusive (Kassim, 2000, p. 38). Definitions are often specific to individual pieces of work with no clear overall agreement in which direction the Europeanization concept should be taken, nor on how far back the concept should reach (Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007, p. 38). Yet, current Europeanization thinking contains a significant portion of sociological and historical theorizing, albeit not formulated explicitly and comprehensively. Johan Olsen (2002), for example, identifies five different phenomena that are all referred to as constituting Europeanization and which at least implicitly take note of the concerns of both historical and sociological processes. According to Simon Bulmer (2007, p. 47) these can be divided into understandings of Europeanization described as a transfer from Europe to other jurisdictions either of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms, and secondly as capacity building in Europe, which also involves a transfer of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms. In both understandings, what needs to be explained therefore, is the transfer of ideas leading to behavioural and institutional change through sociological processes.

Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization also includes processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, appropriate behaviour and shared beliefs and norms (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4). However, Radaelli’s Europeanization is EU-centric as he specifies that the rules, procedures and policy paradigms are defined in the making of EU decisions and only afterwards incorporated into domestic discourses, identities and political structures. Therefore, although the definition appears broad and certainly includes sociological processes, it is narrow through its focus on the EU.

Broadly speaking the Europeanization literature has tended to focus on political processes which relate almost exclusively to change brought about by the EU, thereby *de facto* excluding other processes which may also

logically be regarded as Europeanization. The result is a research agenda that is narrow in focus, and apparently unconcerned with its own ideational foundations with a correspondingly limited field of theorizing. Like Ernest Gellner's 'Nations without Navels' (Gellner, 1983), Europeanization has become a phenomenon with no genesis (Gellner and Smith, 1996), facilitating a narrative that has implicitly accepted a euro-centric construction of history in which Europe is portrayed as technically ingenious, morally progressive and innately and permanently superior. Such a representation is not only a myth, but fails to acknowledge the sources of Europe's own identity construction and the heritage of its technological development.

By accepting a Eurocentric interpretation of history, the Europeanization research agenda has also tended to concentrate on a limited number of questions mainly focusing on explaining domestic adaptation to European integration through the EU. Most scholars *de facto* favour a definition of Europeanization either as the domestic impact of the EU, and/or the domestic impact on the EU, increasingly differentiated as 'uploading' and 'downloading' (Börzel, 2002) to and from the EU. Emphasis has been on the process and extent to which Member States and prospective Member States adopt EU rules and implement EU policy-making. A newer branch of the Europeanization literature concentrates on processes of social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing as the mechanisms involved in the process of Europeanization (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig, 2005). As a result Europeanization scholarship has become the study of the impact on and of the EU, analysed through a number of policy specific case studies.<sup>2</sup> Yet, despite the considerable and growing volume of the literature on Europeanization, no common research agenda grounded in an agreed understanding of the social processes involved in Europeanization or on its relationship with the past has been reached. This is a shame because although a narrow conception of Europeanization may provide a useful analytical tool for questions relating specifically to the EU, it lacks historical depth, thereby preventing a thorough and cumulative understanding of the origins and shifting sociological, normative and ideational contents of Europeanization across time and space.

To avoid an overtly narrow and ahistorical conceptualization of Europeanization, I suggest using the concept introduced by Helen Wallace (2000), 'EU-ization', for describing the current narrow focus. 'EU-ization' is different from 'Europeanization' because of its focus on the EU and because it is predominantly concerned with 'political encounters', where specific political entities such as the EU and Member State representatives engage in the

<sup>2</sup> If Europeanization is narrow in geographical and historical scope, it is characterized by a very broad approach to different policy areas such as environmental policy, telecommunication policy, agricultural policy, foreign policy, gender mainstreaming and many more.

transfer of institutional and organizational practices and policies. EU-ization is a small, but important part of the much broader and longer term process of Europeanization, which is predominantly concerned with ‘cultural encounters’.<sup>3</sup> In ‘cultural encounters’ the ideational transfer includes more than institutional and organizational practices and specific policies. The ideational content of ‘cultural encounters’ includes all norms and behavioural practices that make up the identity of the community in question. In the case of Europeanization everything that is, or has been, widely regarded as ‘European’ in a former present. ‘Cultural encounters’ and ‘political encounters’ are both ideational processes, which diffuse sets of ideas from one geographical, cultural or political setting to another. The former does not exclude the latter, and there is a degree of overlap in content, structures, agents and processes, and in the perceived cultural and political expectations, or *finalité*, of the process. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between the two in the kind of ideas that are transferred as Europeanization is mainly concerned with constitutive rules – that is rules which ‘constitute’ a community, whereas EU-ization is mainly concerned with regulative rules – that is rules which regulate behaviour within a society (Searle, 1995). By adopting the constitutive rules contained in Europeanization, membership of the European cultural community may be achieved, whereas EU-ization does not imply membership of a cultural community, but merely indicates fulfilment of the conditions for political encounters with the EU. Both processes exist in ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ variants. A ‘thin’ form of Europeanization/EU-ization is limited to changes in behaviour and rhetoric (Schimmelfennig, 2001), whereas ‘thick’ forms of Europeanization/EU-ization involve changes in the structures of consciousness through internalization of the rules and norms in question.

The two forms of ideational transfers are intricately connected. It is inconceivable to imagine EU-ization without prior processes of Europeanization, just as it is increasingly difficult to imagine contemporary processes of Europeanization without some degree of EU-ization. Yet understanding the subtle differences is important for theorizing and conceptualizing Europeanization/EU-ization. The empirical focus of EU-ization is clearly more limited than the empirical focus of Europeanization, although in both instances the causal relationships to be explained focus on how a number of European ideas are transferred through social processes from one cultural or

<sup>3</sup> The distinction is based on Nelson (1973). The distinction could also be applied to processes of westernization and west-ization, where the latter is a much more limited process of specific policy transfer, such as the Washington Consensus, which of course is a process that does not imply that states with a non-western cultural identity somehow become ‘westernized’ simply because they adapt to certain political and organizational practices in the international system.

political entity to another. Both can therefore be analysed within the same theoretical framework – without succumbing to conceptual overstretch.

The conceptualization of Europeanization forwarded here asks what is the sociological and historical content of Europeanization/EU-ization; how has the content changed over time; and how may the social processes of ideational transfer be explained? By drawing on Historical Sociology, the article implies a departure from the practice in the current Europeanization (EU-ization) literature to concentrate on the contemporary with a narrow focus, at the expense of the historical with a broad focus. It also challenges implicit assumptions and a selective memory, which reinforce a narrative of Europe as a culture based on endogenously derived ideas of freedom, democracy and tolerance with a linear and progressive development since ancient Greece. It is argued that the lack of explicit engagement with history as a reflexive process has resulted in an implicit reproduction of a representation of history that has constructed the present as a natural and linear development from the past, elegantly papering over ruptures and inconsistencies that do not fit with the current understanding of what constitutes a European idea set.

## II. The Historical Content of Europeanization

The European idea set as it is currently conceptualized can be found in key contemporary statements such as the 1990 *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* and the 1993 *Copenhagen Criteria*.<sup>4</sup> Both documents emphasize liberal democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, and the principles of the market economy. Added to these are a number of further secondary European/EU norms<sup>5</sup> contained in the *acquis communautaire* of the EU, which are all part of the overall norm set. Moreover these norms are seen as a product of Europe's historical development. However, what is often overlooked is that the current understanding of what constitutes the European idea set is as much a product of contemporary social identity as it is a product of any real history, where social identity and representational forms of history are combined to present social and historical knowledge that can impose order in current lived experience (Somers and Gibson, 1994, p. 39). The history is therefore a constructed narrative based on a reflexive and careful construction of the past to fit the conception of the 'European Self' in the present.

<sup>4</sup> The documents can be found at «[http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf)» and «[http://ec.europa.eu/information\\_society/activities/atwork/\\_documents/dgenlargementbrochure/sld005.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/atwork/_documents/dgenlargementbrochure/sld005.htm)».

<sup>5</sup> Manners (2002) identifies at least nine primary and secondary norms that are under continuous development and refinement, which may all be said to be defining what constitutes a European norm set. The secondary and more specific norms that are continuously under construction are also part of a process of differentiation of European norms from American norms, as for example social equality and the rejection of the use of capital punishment.

Historical Sociology has an understanding of present structures and processes as being neither natural nor permanent, but to be likely to be succeeded by different arrangements in the future (Linklater, 1998). Therefore, the contemporary *de facto* narrow historical scope of Europeanization is not only time and content specific, but is uncritical in regards to questioning its own underlying normative structures and implicitly assuming that the present can be adequately explained by only examining the present (Hobson, 2002). The inevitable outcome is that a thorough understanding of the origins and shifting normative and ideational content of the concept, related processes and agent behaviour is precluded, and that the present appears as effectively sealed off from the past, thereby cementing it as a static, self-constituting, autonomous and reified entity.

The present version of Europeanization research with its heavy reliance on policy specific empirical case studies overlooks that current EU-ization is the result of past structures of social power, identity constructions, norms and processes of social exclusion. This is a problem because it endows Europeanization with a policy and normative content that is assumed stable across time, even though the normative content of Europeanization clearly has changed dramatically on several occasions. From a Historical Sociological perspective it is clear that Europeanization is *not* a new phenomenon that can be bracketed in the present. Rather, Europeanization is an ongoing process across time and space, which has changed over time in response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities. Europeanization therefore is a continuously reconstituted phenomenon, which is constructed in the relationship between the European 'Self' and the non-European 'Other'.

By analysing Europeanization from a Historical Sociological perspective, I join a growing chorus of revisionist historians, who challenge the conventional Eurocentric perspective that accepts a narrative which has constructed European culture and ideas as superior and endogenous to Europe.<sup>6</sup> When employing a revisionist non Eurocentric perspective, an altogether different narrative emerges, where Europeanization is seen as a process of ideational diffusion and identity constructions based on ideas of different origins. Ironically many of these ideas and extensive technological know-how, which arguably facilitated Europe's tremendous leap forward and self-perception as superior, actually originated in the Middle East and the Orient, despite both having been constituted as Europe's 'Other' (Hobson, 2004).

The underlying assumption of the Eurocentric perspective is that European development was an endogenous process, where Europe in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 'pulled itself up by its bootstraps' to recapture the

<sup>6</sup> See for example Hobson (2004), Frank (1998) and Saliba (1999).

lost grandeur and technological sophistication of the Roman and Greek past. This view can however only be sustained through the ahistoricism of the Europeanization literature, which extrapolates the present backwards through time so that any discontinuous ruptures and differences between historical epochs are smoothed over and consequently obscured. The result is that the past appears to have the same structure as the present, where for example 'democracy' is frequently presented as a European idea with roots in Ancient Greece and the Enlightenment. This is however a view of the past which has been successfully constructed to fit present conceptions of social identity, and which conveniently overlooks that democracy as a practised and universal European norm is a recent phenomenon.

This undiagnosed, yet widespread ahistoricism means that Europeanization can be presented as at once a contemporary and natural phenomenon with no apparent links to the past, and at the same time, as a natural extension of Europe's long history. In so doing scholars and practitioners alike can present the contemporary Europeanization and integration processes as a natural development along a form for 'inverted path dependency' (Hobden, 1998), which obscures the important structural ruptures that have shaped contemporary Europeanization. Such an extrapolation of the past into the present is clearly visible in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which suggests that the Europe of today draws inspiration from:

'the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilizations of Greece and Rome [. . .] and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, has embedded [. . .] the central role of the human person and his inviolable and inalienable rights'.<sup>7</sup>

By applying a reflexive and critical interpretation of history, it is clear that Europeanization has not been linear as suggested in the quote above, but that it has been characterized by serious ruptures in the ideational structure and normative content, and that the flow of ideas has changed direction on several occasions. By focusing on the ideational structural changes over a long-term historical perspective it is possible to divide the process of Europeanization into five periods within which different complex social processes have taken place. Granted, such a periodization is as much a product of the present, and certainly reflects a specific set of priorities, values and a specific understanding of the forces of continuity and change (Green, 1995, p. 99). Nevertheless, it problematizes the uncritical and unreflexive view of history, which characterizes current forms of Europeanization and is rooted in an understanding of the past as shaped by continuity and change between different historical epochs (Green, 1995, p. 101).

<sup>7</sup> European Council (2003).



In the periodization proposed here, each historical epoch follows Mead's understanding that 'reality is always that of the present' (Mead, 1929, p. 235), even though what was previously the present is now the past. In practice this means that the European idea set of a historical epoch is whatever was seen as such at the time it was formulated. As such, there is no right or wrong European idea set, but many different, and sometimes contradicting idea sets, which each were the reality of their present. It is therefore necessary to use a 'present-as-reality' definition of Europeanization, with the understanding that such a definition will be in a permanent process of reconstitution and reconstruction. Each stage in the periodization below is therefore characterized by a different ideational structure, which defines the understanding of Europeaness as it was at the time. Changes in the ideational structure appear either following a critical juncture that may have caused a sudden and violent change in the ideational structure or following a more subtle process of gradual ideational change at the agent level. As both agent and structural changes are at work in Europeanization, the 'cutting points' between the different stages are therefore likely to be more fluid than indicated below.

### *Stages of Europeanization*

1. > – 1450: The Period of European Self-Realization
2. 1450–1700: The Period of Proto-Europeanization.<sup>8</sup>
3. 1700–1919: The period of Incipit Europeanization.
4. 1919 > The period of Contemporary (inward) Europeanization
5. 1945 > The period of Contemporary (outward) Europeanization and EU-ization.<sup>9</sup>

Although 'presents of the past' can never be completely recaptured, and always will be influenced by the understandings of the current present, each historical epoch is characterized by different patterns in the relations between agents and their environment (Maines *et al.*, 1983, p. 162). In the next section this is what is referred to as the sociological content of Europeanization, which consists of different agents, different identity construction processes characterized by different conceptions of 'Other' and 'Significant We', as well as different directions of norm diffusion. By adding a Social

<sup>8</sup> I borrow the term 'proto' from Hobson's periodization of globalization (Hobson, 2004). Incipit Europeanization is taken from Jan Aart Scholte's (2000) concept of Incipit globalization. Although there are many similarities between Europeanization and globalization, Europeanization is always an ideational process carrying a specific norm set, whereas in my view globalization is an empty vessel – that facilitates speedy and global diffusion of many different ideas.

<sup>9</sup> EU-ization is included as part of the post 1945 period because the ideational structure of outward Europeanization and EU-ization are identical. EU-ization is a process that is linked to the European integration process after 1957.

Constructivist theoretical framework, it is revealed that all the historical epochs can be conceptualized as part of the same overall process of Europeanization with similar social processes and causal relationships to be explained, but with important subtle differences between each epoch. What follows is the outline of such a framework utilizing Social Constructivism and Social Identity Theory (SIT).

### III. The Sociological Content of Europeanization

Existing Europeanization scholarship is more grounded in a sociological approach than in a historical approach, although the sociological content of Europeanization is rarely specified. It seems that there is considerable agreement in the current understanding of Europeanization that it is a process involving the transfer of a specific idea set from one group of agents to another, usually followed by behavioural change through different forms of internalization, social learning, adaptation and institutionalization, leading to norm change. The sociological content of the current understanding of Europeanization can therefore be considered to be reasonably well established, although it is not developed into an actual framework for analysis. What is needed therefore is a sociological framework for analysis to explain the essential questions of ideational transfer and change across time and space.

The question of interest here is how ideational change of European ideas and policies take place, and why such ideational change is only successful in some instances, but not in other, seemingly similar instances. These questions are already addressed in Social Constructivist literature and the literature on socialization, particularly SIT.<sup>10</sup> It is widely recognized that ideational change follows two different avenues; one where the source of change originates at the structural level, and the other where change originates at the agent level. At the structural level, the triggering event is likely to be a critical juncture which will have destabilized the existing norm set, leading to an urgent need for change in agent behaviour to avoid policy failure (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). At the agent level, change is likely to take place through changed agent practices and social interaction giving rise to a more gradual form of norm change usually through persuasion, reflexion and reason (Crawford, 2002; Risse, 2000).

The identity constructions in the case of Europeanization take place in many different forums and within several analytically distinct spaces of interaction (Mann, 1997), involving identity constructions at both the elite and mass levels. Moreover, all identity constructions are relational, where

<sup>10</sup> See for example Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Cortell and Davis (1996); Flockhart (2005, 2006).

‘the Self’ is constructed in the space between an ‘Other’ and a ‘Significant We’ through self- and other categorization processes (Flockhart, 2006). The ‘Other’ defines what the ‘Self’ is seeking to distance itself from – ‘what we are not’, whilst the ‘Significant We’ defines what the ‘Self’ is striving towards – ‘what we would like to become’. SIT suggests that adoption of particular norm sets is only likely to take place when the norm diffuser is seen as a ‘Significant We’, or if the origin of the diffused identity or resource portfolio is downplayed or hidden (as has been the case with several Oriental and Islamic resource portfolios). A further complication is that elite and mass levels may not necessarily share the same prerequisites for norm change, as they may not have the same conception of ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’ leading to differences in the speed and extent of Europeanization/EU-ization at the two levels (Flockhart, 2005). These are complicated issues, which cannot adequately be addressed here, but which nevertheless raise important questions about causal relationships for the Europeanization literature to engage with.

By introducing Social Constructivist theory and SIT into theorizing Europeanization<sup>11</sup> a broad and long term perspective emerges, which is able to chart changes in the ideational structures and changes at the agent level – without the disadvantages of conceptual overstretch. Just as the introduction of a long term historical perspective revealed that the ‘historical content’ of Europeanization had changed fundamentally on different occasions, the use of SIT clearly reveals that Europe’s ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’ have also changed on several occasions. These are changes that can only be revealed by combining reflexive history in the analysis of Europeanization with SIT. However, as both theoretical perspectives are complex, parsimony is not a defining feature of the theoretical framework. On the other hand, a focus limited to EU-ization processes would be comparable to Democratization Studies<sup>12</sup> focusing only on contemporary politics, without regard for the important social processes that produced the democratic system in the first place, and without inclusion of earlier more limited forms of democracy.

The sociological content of Europeanization/EU-ization can be summarized as:

- *Ideational structure*: what are the ideas that are being promoted under the heading of Europeanization – what is the ‘reality as present’ definition of ‘the European idea’?

<sup>11</sup> See for example Tajfel (1978, 1982), Hogg and Abrams (1988), Hogg *et al.* (1995) and Flockhart (2006).

<sup>12</sup> In many ways Democratization and Europeanization are similar processes albeit with a different ideational content.

- *Ideational agents*: who are the agents that are promoting/diffusing the ideas in question?
- *Ideational processes*: what processes are being utilized for promoting the European idea set, i.e. adaptation, assimilation, social learning, socialization, force etc.?
- *Norm diffusion direction*: are the ideas flowing into, out of or within Europe?
- *'Other'*: what is the construction of 'Other' and which identity constructions take place in the 'present-as-reality'?
- *'Significant We'*: what/who is perceived within the 'present-as-reality' to be the 'Significant We' – those with the most attractive and desirable European identity?

The actual substantial content of each of the sociological factors is likely to be different in different historical epochs and within different institutional settings. Yet, as long as the ideational structure can be perceived to be 'European' using the 'present-as-reality' definition, the processes are essentially instances of Europeanization/EU-ization.

#### IV. Stages of Europeanization

By using the 'present-as-reality' definition of what constitutes Europeanization, logic dictates that the starting point of processes that might be called Europeanization has to be located around the time when Europe as an idea started to figure in the consciousness of those who had a surplus in their lives to think about such matters. To establish when such an 'idea of Europe' emerged and how it developed is an endeavour that has been admirably accomplished amongst others by Denys Hay (1957), Gerard Delanty (1995) and John Hobson (2004). The task here is therefore merely to plead for bringing existing historical knowledge into the Europeanization debate.

By utilizing the historical and sociological factors already identified as the content of Europeanization the following matrix can be constructed, where an initial reflexive historical approach shows the sometimes subtle and sometimes dramatic changes that have taken place in processes of Europeanization across time and space. A more thorough historical analysis will undoubtedly reveal more detail, but for now the matrix is indicative that Europeanization/EU-ization processes can be studied across time and space without compromising the concept's analytical value. What follows below is an initial venture into history by utilizing the five stages of Europeanization introduced earlier combined with the sociological framework. Together the two illustrate the

fruitfulness of combining the two theoretical approaches for studying both Europeanization and EU-ization. What follows is an illustrative description of each of the five historical epochs.

*The Period of European Self-Realization (<1450)*

Most historians agree that a European self-conception and ideational structure was forged some time between the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fifth century and the fall of Constantinople in 1453. From about the seventh century a European self-consciousness gradually replaced the lingering Roman identity in a process that is inextricably linked to the simultaneous spread of Christianity in Europe and to the threat to Christendom from outside Europe. The gradual conversion of 'barbarians' in northern Europe to Christianity made the antithesis between barbarism and Roman/civilization less meaningful (Hay, 1957, p. 23), whilst the collapse of Christian communities outside Europe made the spread of Christianity almost coincide with geographic Europe. As a result the unified Christian Church became the geographical contours of Europe (Delanty, 1995, p. 24), and the ideational structure of the time.

The idea of Christian unity was strengthened through conflict with invaders from the east and south, which forged a new conception of Europe's 'Other' as the Saracens and the 'Significant We' as the Christian Church united under the Pope. It may well be that the failure of the Crusades in restoring the fortunes of Christendom was the reason why European identity became so focused in its hostility towards Islam, whilst the 'Mongol' or the 'Tartar' became a secondary 'Other'. Both 'Others' strengthened the perception of 'Self' whilst they also provided increased interaction outside the geographical and cultural borders of Europe. The latter appears to have provided a transmission belt to Oriental and Islamic cultures for diffusion of eastern 'resource portfolios' (ideas, institutions and technologies) into Europe (Hobson, 2004, p. 46) through agents such as Crusaders, traders and the invading Moslems and Tartars themselves. Diffusion of ideas was therefore primarily going into Europe.

By the middle of the 15th century, the forging of Europe as a distinct entity clearly associated with Christianity and a recognition of Europe as different from other known civilizations in Africa and the Orient seems to have been completed through processes of ideational diffusion and adaptation. It is really only by then that the instability and fragmentation caused by the collapse of the Roman Empire, major internal population migrations and continual invasions from the east and south can be said to have ended and to have produced a pervading 'idea of Europe'. However, although Europe by

1450 had itself been Europeanized, there was as yet only little in this European emerging identity that could be linked to the idea set contained in today's ideas about Europe.

*The Period of Proto-Europeanization (1450–1700)*

The traditional representation of history suggests that the 'rise of the west' (McNeil, 1963) is intimately connected with the 'discoveries' of the 'New World', the sea route to India, and the cultural, technological and organizational innovations of the Italian Renaissance. Especially the assumption that the ideas of the Renaissance were endogenous ideas seems an unlikely representation of history. What seems much more likely is that Renaissance Italy became the 'hotbed' of new ideas precisely because Venice was the port of arrival in the newly established trade with the Orient, and because Jewish and Islamic scholars fleeing the Spanish Inquisition settled in Renaissance Italy. The ideational agents were therefore traders, scholars and translators, who diffused oriental resource portfolios and long forgotten ideas through the translation of lost Greek texts that had been stored in Islamic libraries. In this first stage of Europe's increased contact with the New World, the diffusion of ideas was therefore probably more in an inward direction than an outward direction. Outward ideational diffusion may well have been limited to the attempt at converting 'noble savages' to Christianity, which unfortunately also led to the diffusion of European diseases with disastrous consequences for several indigenous cultures.

In fact, revisionist historians suggest that the European representation of the age of discovery as the spread of western ideas to the rest of the world probably is exaggerated. It seems unlikely that Vasco da Gama's 'discovery' of the sea route to India in 1498 was the first sea connection between Europe and India. The establishment of trade with the Orient is undoubtedly an important historical juncture, but the route had probably been known by non-Europeans for centuries, but not used as Europe had little to offer Oriental trade (Hobson, 2004, p. 138). The rather flattering Eurocentric historical representation of European ingenuity and adventurism may therefore be a representation of a mythical past, as it seems unlikely that the extensive trade with the Orient could have been sustained simply on the basis of what Europe had to offer in manufactured goods. Without the silver obtained in Latin America, African slaves and opium trade, Europe simply did not have anything of interest to the Orient, resulting in a massive trade deficit between Europe and Asia (Hobson, 2004, p. 171; Frank, 1998). The European great leap forward, which in the present representation of history is seen as a glorious achievement originating in Renaissance Italy and based on values

and ideas that fit neatly with present-day ideas of Europeaness, are more likely to derive from not so glorious actions, such as the plundering of Latin American bullion, human trafficking and drugs pushing!

The period is nevertheless of major importance as a previous form of Europeanization. It is characterized by great change, including the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the discovery of the Americas, the Reformation and religious wars of the 17th century, all of which gave rise to important changes in the construction of 'Self' and 'Other'. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire created a new 'Other' in European discourse, which came to be associated with the 'Turk' rather than the earlier wider 'Other' in the form of Islam. With the Reformation and the religious wars of the 17th century it was also no longer possible to maintain the unified Christian Church as the 'Significant We', which meant that the juxtaposition of Christianity versus Islam lost its significance. At the same time the acquisition of the 'New World' greatly strengthened a sense of European superiority and provided a secondary 'Other' in the form of 'savages', which allowed the construction of a European identity as superior and civilized. As suggested by Delanty (1995), the European identity discourse changed from the Middle Ages where it was Christianity against Islam to the early modern period where it became 'civilization' over 'nature'. In so doing a 'Significant We' was constructed, which was the superior and limitless west, which now incorporated the 'New World' and which became associated with a set of European values that came to be inextricably associated with the idea of progress (Delanty, 1995, p. 65). This is an idea of Europe which has persisted and which certainly is seen as part of the current European idea set.

### *The Period of Incipit Europeanization (1700–1919)*

If Europeanization is seen as a process where ideational diffusion is in an outward direction, then the period of Incipit Europeanization is undoubtedly the *belle époque* of Europeanization. Despite lasting little more than two centuries, Europeanization during this stage had a remarkable and global impact through successfully diffusing a number of key European practices and principles. These included the expansion of the state system, administrative and organizational practices, industrialization and not least a Eurocentric interpretation of history and a construction of Europe (and the west) as superior. Even so, the content of Europeanization was a far cry from the ideas that we today associate with European key values.

In the current representation of history, the period is associated with the ideas of the Enlightenment, which are then linked to the present as the basis of contemporary European identity and the very foundations upon which the

EU is built. Yet such a representation of the ideational structure fails to distinguish between two different interpretations of the Enlightenment. The contemporary understanding of the Enlightenment can best be described as 'Liberal Enlightenment'. 'Liberal Enlightenment' sees a major cause of social evil as originating in prejudice, intolerance and superstition and advocates tolerance, freedom of thought and open-mindedness. Such an understanding of the Enlightenment is clearly in line with current ideas of what constitutes a European idea set. Yet, one of the main components of the Enlightenment at the time of the Incipit Europeanization period was the emphasis on reason and rationality as the guiding principle and as the defining property of the human condition (Scruton, 1996). However, reason did not lead to tolerance and open-mindedness as suggested in the current representation of history, but to a racist ideology, which enabled the construction of Europeans as a superior race (Hall and Hobson, 2010) and provided the ideological justification for colonialism and later fascism and Nazism (Delanty, 1995, p. 95): in other words ideas which stand in complete contradiction to the ideas that are now assumed to be the content of the Enlightenment and the basis for present-day Europeanization. These differences are however only visible through the use of the 'present-as-reality' definition.

The emphasis on reason and rationality was also a key component in the construction of European identity through identification of the 'Other' and 'Significant We'. Enlightenment thinking facilitated a classification of humankind along a mental continuum, in which western man was constructed as fully rational in a mature and developed sense whereas the east was constructed as irrational, immature and underdeveloped and incapable of self-government. 'The white man's burden' therefore became a duty for the more developed European civilizations to 'improve' non-European races through conquest and colonialism. In other words the diffusion patterns of the period are outward *from* Europe, and the ideational structure has now changed to an emphasis on European administrative systems and organizational principles, Christian ideas and the idea of racial superiority, supported by 'scientific proof' in scientific racism and social Darwinism. Unlike the earlier processes of diffusion where diffusion agents were individual traders, travellers and scholars, the diffusion process during the period of Incipit Europeanization was now institutionalized through colonialism and the Church, and agents were now colonial officials and missionaries. The European 'Significant We' was once again the civilized world consisting of white Europeans and European culture, whereas the 'Other' became once again the 'barbarians' or uncivilized primitive peoples. The content of Europeanization was once again a far cry from the ideas that we today associate with European values.



*The Period of Contemporary (Inward) Europeanization (1919>)*

World War I was a critical juncture, which spelt the beginning of the end of the ideational structure based on reason and rationality. The disbelief of what had happened in Europe was expressed in the arts through the surrealist movement's rejection of the reason and rationality of the so-called enlightened Europeans who had engaged in the slaughter of World War I. In ideational terms World War I signified the end of Europe as the source of outward ideational diffusion and the beginning of a period where ideas once again flowed *into* Europe.

The ideas which were now diffused into Europe came from the United States and were based on the American creed<sup>13</sup> and on an American notion of world order based on anti-imperialism and pro-nationalism, most famously expressed in the Wilsonian agenda of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Since the end of World War I, Wilsonian ideas have formed the ideational structure of Europeanization, although the precise content of Wilsonianism has been refined and further specified throughout the 20th century. Nevertheless, its essence has remained the three core notions of democracy, open economic markets and international institutions. Ironically however, Wilsonian ideas are also seen as originating in the Enlightenment, but they are based on a liberal and tolerant American interpretation rather than the European rationalist interpretation. In other words the current ideational structure actually does originate in the Enlightenment, but the current narrative smoothes over important ideational changes and ruptures in the ideational structure in order to make sense of the present.

Although the Wilsonian peace of 1919 initially failed to facilitate internalization and institutionalization of the idea set throughout Europe, the diffusion of the Wilsonian ideas has been pursued throughout the 20th century. Arguably a new wave of ideational diffusion has taken place following each of the three critical junctures of the 20th century – World War I, World War II and the end of the cold war. Each of these critical junctures gave rise to a new cycle of ideational diffusion, which gradually enlarged the community of states having internalized and institutionalized the Wilsonian idea set (Flockhart, 2001). On each occasion the process has defined the European 'Other' and 'Significant We', the 'Other' being constituted for internal reasons as Europe's own warmongering past, and during the cold war as the communist threat. The 'Significant We' has on all occasions

<sup>13</sup> The text of the American Creed is: 'I believe in the United States of America as a Government of the People, by the People, for the People; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic, a sovereign Nation of many Sovereign States; a perfect Union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of Freedom, Equality, Justice, and Humanity for which American Patriots sacrificed their Lives and Fortunes' (Page, 1917).

remained 'the free world' and the core members of the Euro-Atlantic community. The agents of ideational diffusion have been American policy-makers formulating the overall idea set and their representatives within the growing western institutional framework, through processes of social learning, adaptation and institution building. In each cycle of 20th-century ideational diffusion the United States has been the driving force behind initiatives that have led to the gradual enlargement of the value-based community. This is a process that is still ongoing, although much of the ideational diffusion is now conducted by the Europeans themselves as agents of diffusion.

*The Period of Contemporary (Outward) Europeanization and EU-ization (1945>)*

Having adapted to and internalized and institutionalized the promoted Wilsonian idea set through the three cycles of ideational diffusion into Europe in the 20th century, the Europeans have once again become diffusers of European ideas out of Europe. The agents of diffusion are increasingly institutionalized, where especially the EU is playing a growing role. The ideational structure is based on the Wilsonian ideas diffused into Europe throughout the 20th century, but certain specific European characteristics such as opposition to the death penalty, different views on the role of the state, social welfare and the use of force and foreign intervention have gradually been added to the European ideational structure in a process that seems likely to increasingly differentiate the European idea set from the American idea set. Diffusion of the European/Wilsonian idea set is conducted towards prospective members of the Euro-Atlantic community and in varying degrees on a global scale through development aid and trade agreements. Apart from this active outward Europeanization process, which has led to the enlargement of EU, Nato and Europe's other institutions, and to an elaborate network of partnerships and other diffusion-based relationships, a parallel process of EU-ization is also taking place.

The ideational structure in EU-ization is broadly the same as both the inward and outward forms of contemporary Europeanization, but the ideational structure of EU-ization is much more refined and detailed and consists of an ever increasing variety of specific policy areas. EU-ization is also slightly different from the two other contemporary Europeanization processes in as much that diffusion takes place through internal self-reflective processes, where the agents of diffusion are mostly European/EU policy-makers or civil servants. It is this latter process that has received most attention in the contemporary Europeanization debate. However, the specific difference between inward and outward Europeanization and EU-ization and






earlier forms of Europeanization has not been clearly acknowledged, which is precisely what has added to the persistent confusion about the concept and concerns about conceptual overstretch if a broader historical and conceptual scope is accepted.

## Conclusions

The article started out with the aim of addressing three questions relating to scope and content of Europeanization, which causal relationships should be analysed and which theory should be used. The view presented here is that history and identity cannot be separated because our representation of history is likely to be a reflection of our current identity, which leads us to defining the meaning of past events in such a way that they have meaning and utility for the political project and identity of the present (Maines *et al.*, 1983, p. 163). As a result, what we understand Europeanization to be is in a permanent state of reconstruction and reconstitution, implying that 'reality is always that of the present' (Mead, 1929, p. 235), where agents in the present select and construct a past which provides continuity and facilitates understanding of new situations.

By accepting Mead's pragmatic view of history, conceptualized here as the 'present-as-reality' definition, it becomes apparent that the concept of Europeanization cannot simply be accepted as static, but that its underlying ideational structure has changed on several occasions. As shown in Figure 1, it simply does not make sense to limit Europeanization to processes that have only taken place in the last 50 years or so, and which have been focused only on the EU. Europeanization in a historical sense is therefore as much a project which has established Europe and Europeanness as it has to do with the impact of the EU. Before present day EU-ization could take place, Europe had first to exist in the consciousness of people. One could say that the first project of Europeanization was the Europeanization of Europe, in which Europe both as an idea and an associated geographical area started to take shape. This is what is referred to in Figure 1 as the ideational structure, which is the set of ideas and practices that are associated with the term Europe. Each historical epoch has been associated with ideational structures that have changed gradually from one stage to the next, but significantly across time. Each historical epoch is also characterized by different ideational agents, ideational processes and directions of norm diffusion. In each historical epoch agents, processes and direction differ, as different individuals or collectivities, and later on institutions, have diffused ideas either into Europe in processes that have imported and consolidated Europe's own ideational structure, or in

Figure 1: The Historical and Sociological Content of Europeanization

Stages of Europeanization / Sociological and Ideational	> 1450 European Self-Realization	1450 – 1700 Proto Europeanization	1700 – 1914 Incipient Europeanization	1914 > Contemporary Inward Europeanization	1945 > Contemporary Outward Europeanization/EU-ization
<b>Ideational Structure Narrative</b>	Christian Unity	Civilization Christianity	European reason and rationality expressed in admin. and org principles "White man's burden"	Wilsonian ideas Anti-imperialism Pro-nationalism	'Normative Europe's' continually expanding norm set
<b>Ideational Agents</b>	Crusaders Traders Invading Moslems and Tartars	Traders Warriors/'Discoverers' Jewish and Islamic scholars and translators	Agents of colonial states Missionaries Discoverers	American policy-makers and their agents in various institutions – later European policy-makers	European policy-makers and their agents in European institutions and development agencies
<b>Ideational Processes</b>	Ideational diffusion/Resource portfolios Adaptation & Assimilation	Ideational diffusion/Resource portfolios Adaptation & Assimilation	Colonialism	State socialization Institution-building	State socialization Institution expansion and integration Social learning
<b>Norm-Diffusion Direction</b>					
<b>Other</b>	Barbarians, Saracens Tartars	Turks Savages	Barbarians Primitive people	Fascism & Europe's past The Soviet threat	Europe's past. Violent nationalism Soviet Threat Militant Islamism
<b>Significant we</b>	Rome The Christian Church	The superior and limitless west	Civilized world & reason and rationality	The 'free world'	EU core members Liberal Democracies

Source: Author's own data.

processes that have spread European ideas outside Europe's own geographical area. Finally each historical epoch is characterized by different conceptions of what constitutes the 'Other' and the 'Significant We'. Although the differences from one historical epoch to the next may only be slight, the changes add up over time, and they clearly show the link between identity and the ideational structure of the time.

By utilizing a Historical Sociological perspective and Social Identity Theory in the conceptual debate on Europeanization, a new picture has emerged which clearly reveals the complexity of the concept and processes involved in Europeanization/EU-ization, but which also reveals a comforting degree of similarity between all processes of Europeanization/EU-ization. Paradoxically, it seems that one of the main factors contributing to the conceptual and theoretical confusion within the field has been the attempts at limiting the conceptual scope of Europeanization to questions related directly to the EU. In so doing the question of origin of the present process and which causal relationships to include have become marred in an empirically determined delimitation, which has created several illogical exclusions from the field of Europeanization, and which seems to have been a main contributing

factor to the inability to generate cumulative research. Concerns about conceptual overstretch are the result of the lack of models and theories which could bring order into a very disorderly empirical field rather than concerns about including both cultural and political encounters.

The Historical Sociological framework and Social Constructivist theory put forward in this article both represent major theoretical literatures. Their incorporation into the field of Europeanization/EU-ization is therefore unlikely to contribute to simplifying the field of Europeanization/EU-ization. However, as focus has shifted from empirical and policy-related instances of the impact on and of the EU, to a focus on ideational transfer where the causal relationships to be explained concern how ideas are transferred and why they are accepted or rejected, cumulative research is much more likely to result in a framework that focuses on structures, agents and processes, rather than the specifics of a myriad of specific EU-related policies. After all without having uncovered the many different, but related processes of Europeanization, it is not possible to reach a disciplinary-wide consensus on what the concept entails and which causal relationships to investigate. No amount of empirical and policy specific case studies are going to bring the discipline any closer to an understanding of the concept and how it fits within an overall historical process unless research is based on models and theories – for that the combined Historical Sociological and Social Constructivist perspective presented here seems to hold some promise.

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